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Runoff Elections Vs. Single Ballot Rule: How does the public expenditure change? Evidence from Italian Municipalities
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2016 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

In this thesis, I investigate the effect of the runoff voting system on the size of the government and the composition of public expenditures. I use the change in the voting rule in Italian towns at 15,000 residents to run a Regression Discontinuity Design. Results show that municipalities under the dual ballot rule spend more than the ones under the plurality. The effect is due to a large increase in the bureaucratic structure, that confirms theoretical predictions about lower accountability under the runoff rule.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016.
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-296820OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-296820DiVA: diva2:939930
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Available from: 2016-06-20 Created: 2016-06-20 Last updated: 2016-06-20Bibliographically approved

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  • apa
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