Runoff Elections Vs. Single Ballot Rule: How does the public expenditure change? Evidence from Italian Municipalities
Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
In this thesis, I investigate the effect of the runoff voting system on the size of the government and the composition of public expenditures. I use the change in the voting rule in Italian towns at 15,000 residents to run a Regression Discontinuity Design. Results show that municipalities under the dual ballot rule spend more than the ones under the plurality. The effect is due to a large increase in the bureaucratic structure, that confirms theoretical predictions about lower accountability under the runoff rule.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-296820OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-296820DiVA: diva2:939930
Mörk, Eva, Professor
Bengtsson, Niklas, Biträdande universitetslektor