A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict
2003 (English)In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, Vol. 15, no 2, 194-205 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists’ aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We end by suggesting that our proposed position appears quite appealing since it preserves attractive elements from particularism as well as consequentialism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2003. Vol. 15, no 2, 194-205 p.
consequentialism, intrinsic value, particularism, supervenience, universalizability
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-70366OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-70366DiVA: diva2:98277