uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
Refine search result
1 - 17 of 17
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1.
    Enkvist, Tommy
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Newell, Ben
    University of New South Wales.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    On the role of causal intervention in multiple-cue judgment: Positive and negative effects on learning2006In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 32, no 1, p. 163-179Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous studies have suggested better learning when people actively intervene rather than when they passively observe the stimuli in a judgment task. In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the hypothesis that this improvement is associated with a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction. In a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues, the data replicated the improvement with intervention and participants who experimented more actively produced more accurate judgments. In a multiple-cue judgment task with binary cues, intervention produced poorer accuracy and participants who experimented more actively produced poorer judgments. These results provide no support for a representational shift but suggest that the improvement with active intervention may be limited to certain tasks and environments.

  • 2.
    Hansson, Patrik
    et al.
    Umeå Univ, Dept Psychol.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty2008In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 34, no 5, p. 1027-1042Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations.

  • 3.
    Henriksson, Maria P.
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Elwin, Ebba
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    What Is Coded Into Memory in the Absence of Outcome Feedback?2010In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 36, no 1, p. 1-16Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Although people often have to learn from environments with scarce and highly selective outcome feedback, the question of how nonfeedback trials are represented in memory and affect later performance has received little attention in models of learning and decision making. In this article, the authors use the generalized context model (Nosofsky, 1986) as a vehicle to test contrasting hypotheses about the coding of nonfeedback trials. Data across 3 experiments with selective decision-contingent and selective outcome-contingent feedback provide support for the hypothesis of constructivist coding (Elwin, Juslin, Olsson, & Enkvist, 2007), according to which the outcomes on nonfeedback trials are coded with the most likely outcome, as inferred by the individual. The relation to sampling-based approaches to judgment, and the adaptive significance of constructivist coding, are discussed.

  • 4.
    Henriksson, Maria P.
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Elwin, Ebba
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    What is Coded into Memory in the Absence of Outcome Feedback?2010In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 36, no 1, p. 1-16Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Although people often have to learn from environments with scarce and highly selective outcome feedback, the question of how non-feedback trials are represented in memory and affect later performance has received little attention in models of learning and decision making. In this article, the Generalized Context Model (R. M. Nosofsky, 1986) is used as a vehicle to test contrasting hypotheses about the coding of non-feedback trials. Data across 3 experiments with selective decision-contingent and selective outcome-contingent feedback provide support for the hypothesis of constructivist coding (E. Elwin, P. Juslin, H. Olsson, & T. Enkvist, 2007), according to which the outcomes on non-feedback trials are coded with the most likely outcome, as inferred by the individual. The relation to sampling-based approaches to judgment, and the adaptive significance of constructivist coding, are discussed.

  • 5. Jenny, Mirjam A.
    et al.
    Rieskamp, Joerg
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Inferring Conjunctive Probabilities From Noisy Samples: Evidence for the Configural Weighted Average Model2014In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 40, no 1, p. 203-217Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Judging whether multiple events will co-occur is an important aspect of everyday decision making. The underlying probabilities of occurrence are usually unknown and have to be inferred from experience. Using a rigorous, quantitative model comparison, we investigate how people judge the conjunctive probabilities of multiple events to co-occur. In 2 experiments, participants had to repeatedly choose between pairs of 2 conjunctive events (represented as 2 gambles). To estimate the probability that both events occur, they had access to a small sample of information. The 1st experiment consisted of a balanced set of gambles, whereas in the 2nd experiment, the gambles were constructed such that the models maximally differed in their predictions. A hierarchical Bayesian approach used for estimating the models' parameters and for testing the models against each other showed that the majority of participants were best described by the configural weighted average model. This model performed best in predicting people's choices, and it assumes that constituent probabilities are ranked by importance, weighted accordingly, and added up. The cognitive modeling approach provides an understanding of the cognitive processes underlying people's conjunctive probability judgments.

  • 6.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Calibration and diagnosticity of confidence in eyewitness identification: Comments on what can be inferred from the low confidence-accuracy correlation1996In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 22, p. 1304-1316Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Cue abstraction and exemplar memory in categorization2003In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 29, p. 924-941Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Format dependence in subjective probability calibration1999In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 25, p. 1038-1052Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Go With the Flow: How to Master a Nonlinear Multiple-Cue Judgment Task2006In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 32, p. 1371-1384Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 10.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The confidence-hindsight mirror effect in judgment: An accuracy-assessment model for the Knew-It-All-Along effect1998In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 24, p. 415-431Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The role of short term memory and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty2008In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, no 34, p. 1027-1042Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 12. Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Wennerholm, Pia
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    High-level reasoning and base-rate use: Do we need cue-competition to explain the inverse base-rate effect?2001In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 849-871Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous accounts of the inverse base-rate effect (D. L. Medin & S. M. Edelson, 1988) have revolved around the concept of cue-competition. In this article, the authors propose that high-level reasoning in the form of an eliminative inference mechanism may contribute to the effect. A quantitative implementation of this idea demonstrates that it has the power by itself to produce the pattern of base-rate effects in the Medin and Edelson (1988) design. Four predictions are derived that contradict the predictions by attention to distinctive input (ADIT; J. K. Kruschke, 1996), up to date the most successful account of the inverse base-rate effect. Results from 3 experiments disconfirm the predictions by ADIT and demonstrate the importance of high-level reasoning in designs of the Medin and Edelson kind. Implications for the interpretation of the inverse base-rate effect and the attention-shifting mechanisms presumed by ADIT are discussed.

  • 13.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Naïve Point Estimation2013In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 782-800Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The capacity of short-term memory is a key constraint when people make online judgments requiringthem to rely on samples retrieved from memory (e.g., Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). In this article, theauthors compare 2 accounts of how people use knowledge of statistical distributions to make pointestimates: either by retrieving precomputed large-sample representations or by retrieving small samplesof similar observations post hoc at the time of judgment, as constrained by short-term memory capacity(the naı¨ve sampling model: Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007). Results from four experiments supportthe predictions by the naı¨ve sampling model, including that participants sometimes guess values thatthey, when probed, demonstrably know have the lowest probability of occurring. Experiment 1 alsodemonstrated the operations of an unpredicted recognition-based inference. Computational modeling alsoincorporating this process demonstrated that the data from all 4 experiments were better predicted byassuming a post hoc sampling process constrained by short-term memory capacity than by assumingabstraction of large-sample representations of the distribution.

  • 14. Olsson, Anna-Carin
    et al.
    Enkvist, Tommy
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Go with the flow: How to master a nonlinear multiple-cue judgment task2006In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 32, no 6, p. 1371-1384Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The authors examined the cognitive processes that participants use in linear and nonlinear multiple-cue judgment tasks, hypothesizing that people are unable to use explicit cue abstraction in a nonlinear task, instead turning to exemplar memory. Experiment 1 confirmed that people are unable to use cue abstraction in nonlinear tasks but failed to confirm the hypothesized, spontaneous shift to exemplar memory. Instead, the participants appeared to be trapped in persistent and futile attempts to abstract the cue-criterion relations. Only after being instructed to rely on exemplar memory in Experiment 2 did they master the nonlinear task. The results suggest that adaptive shifts of representation need not occur spontaneously and that analytical thought may sometimes harm performance in nonlinear tasks.

  • 15.
    Olsson, Anna-Carin
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Enkvist, Tommy
    Juslin, Peter
    Go with the flow: How to master a nonlinear multiple-cue judgment task2006In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 32, no 6, p. 1371-1384Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Winman, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Björkman, Mats
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The confidence-hindsight mirror effect in judgment: An accuracy-assessment model for the knew-it-all-along phenomenon1998In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 24, no 2, p. 415-431Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents a model for the "knew-it-all-along effect": the accuracy-assessment model. The model is based on the assumption that participants in hindsight studies use the strategy of trying to reproduce the distribution of correct and wrong res

  • 17.
    Winman, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Wennerholm, Pia
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Can attentional theory explain the inverse base-rate effect?: Comments on Kruschke (2001)2003In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 29, no 6, p. 1390-1395Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In J. K. Kruschke's (2001; see record 2001-18940-005) study, it is argued that attentional theory is the sole satisfactory explanation of the inverse base rate effect and that eliminative inference (P. Juslin, P. Wennerholm, & A. Winman, 2001; see record 2001-07828-016) plays no role in the phenomenon. In this comment, the authors demonstrate that, in contrast to the central tenets of attentional theory, (a) rapid attention shifts as implemented in ADIT decelerate learning in the inverse base-rate task and (b) the claim that the inverse base-rate effect is directly caused by an attentional asymmetry is refuted by data. It is proposed that a complete account of the inverse base-rate effect needs to integrate attention effects with inference rules that are flexibly used for both induction and elimination.

1 - 17 of 17
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf