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  • 1.
    DeRouen Jr, Karl
    et al.
    University of Alabama.
    Lea, Jenna
    University of Alabama.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements2009In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 26, no 4, p. 367-387Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The focus of this article is civil war peace agreement duration from 1989 to 2005. Recent work by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007) has argued that power-sharing provisions have a cumulative impact. In other words, the more power-sharing provisions there are built into an agreement, the greater the prospects for peace. Our basic theoretical premise is that power-sharing provisions that are costlier to government and more difficult to implement will decrease the life span of the peace agreement because of government motivations to renegotiate and rebel incentive to strike preemptively before the government does or out of frustration because of delays in implementing costly provisions. In other words, governments will abandon the agreement because it concedes too much or rebels will abandon the agreement because of delays in implementation and/or to move preemptively. We look at three forms of power-sharing provisions: military (integration of rebels into army), territorial (autonomy), and political (shared government). Civil war peace agreements can expire after being replaced by a new agreement or if at least one party abandons the agreement. Hazard models are specified controlling for democracy score at time of signing, intensity of war, GDP per capita, and type of agreement.The results indicate that the less costly concessions by government of military integration and autonomy increase the duration of peace agreements, while political power-sharing provisions have a negative though insignificant impact on duration.

  • 2.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict, 1973-20042010In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 195-218Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent years have seen a surge of literature examining how political institutions influence the risk of civil conflict. A comparatively neglected aspect of this debate has been the heterogeneous impact of different forms of authoritarianism. In this article, I theoretically and empirically unpack the authoritarian regime category. I argue that authoritarian regimes differ both in their capacity to forcefully control opposition and in their ability to co-opt their rivals through offers of power positions and rents. Authoritarian regimes thus exhibit predictable differences in their ability to avoid organized violent challenges to their authority. I examine the association between four types of authoritarian regimes-military, monarchy, single-party, and multi-party electoral autocracies-and the onset of civil conflict from 1973 to 2004. I find that military regimes and multi-party electoral autocracies run a higher risk of armed conflict than single-party authoritarian regimes, which on the other hand seem to have an institutional set-up that makes them particularly resilient to armed challenges to their authority. These findings suggest that the emerging view, that political institutions are not a significant determinant of civil conflict, results from treating a heterogeneous set of authoritarian regimes as homogenous.

  • 3.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    de Soysa, Indra
    NTNU, Norway.
    Coercion, Co-optation , or Co-operation?: State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961 - 20042009In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 05-25Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent research identifies state capacity as a crucial determinant of civil peace. Scholars often interpret the association between wealth and peace as state capacity effects, but they have not clearly distinguished the impact of administrative reach and capacity for coercion from those effects that may capture good governance related to the provision of political goods and quality of institutions.We revisit the relationship between state capacity and civil peace by suggesting three different pathways through which the state avoids violent challenges to its authority: coercion, co-optation, and cooperation.We evaluate these three different notions of governing capacity both analytically and empirically, and we find that high levels of government spending on political goods and trustworthy institutions are more significant predictors of civil peace than are states' coercive capacities.The results suggest that civil peace is co-produced by social and state forces, where quasi-voluntary cooperation from society increases state capacity for maintaining peace.This is good news for policies aimed at building state capacity, since there seems to be room for agency beyond simply waiting for societies to become wealthy.

  • 4.
    Hatz, Sophia
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Selective or Collective?: Palestinian Perceptions of Targeting in House Demolition2018In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, p. 1-21Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There is a growing consensus that repression and counter-insurgency can be effective when selective. Yet the empirical evidence is mixed and theories specify that (unmeasured) perceptions of target selection matter. This article addresses this gap by directly measuring individuals’ interpretations of a coercive policy which varies in target selection. It employs original surveys with Palestinians on their exposure to house demolition, views on the policy and attitudes towards the Israel–Palestine conflict. The study finds that when interpreted as indiscriminate, house demolition increases opposition to compromise. The results are consistent when perceived target selection is manipulated in an embedded survey experiment.

  • 5.
    Hultman, Lisa
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Kathman, Jacob D.
    SUNY Buffalo, Dept Polit Sci, 520 Pk Hall, Buffalo, NY USA..
    Shannon, Megan
    Univ Colorado, Dept Polit Sci, Boulder, CO 80309 USA..
    United Nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace2016In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 231-249Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How do the qualities of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) influence the duration of peace after civil wars? Recent work shows that UN peacekeeping extends the duration of peace. However, this work has only been able to assess whether the presence or absence of UN missions affects post-conflict peace processes. Such analyses offer little in the way of policy prescriptions for planning and structuring PKOs to effectively pursue their goals. By employing fine-grained data on the personnel composition of PKOs, and generating expectations from rationalist bargaining models of civil war, we argue that the number and type of personnel deployed to a PKO influence the UN's ability guarantee peace by addressing the information and commitment problems that so often lead to the collapse of post-conflict peace. We analyze how the composition of missions influences the duration of peace, finding that, as the number of UN military troops deployed increases, the chance of civil war recurring decreases. However, other personnel types do not have the same effect. We conclude that the effectiveness of post-conflict peacekeeping lies in the ability of PKOs to alleviate commitment problems through the deployment of military troops that are able to defend the peace.

  • 6.
    Jarstad, Anna K.
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Nilsson, Desirée
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    From words to deeds: the implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace accords2008In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 206-223Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Is the implementation of power-sharing provisions the key to durable peace? This study analyzes whether the implementation of political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions contributes to peace. We introduce a new dataset (IMPACT), which contains unique information on the implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace accords in the post–Cold War period. Based on the logic of costly signaling, we demonstrate that when the parties engage in costly concessions by implementing military and territorial provisions, peace is more likely to prevail. In contrast, the implementation of political pacts is less costly, and hence does not increase the prospects of peace.

  • 7.
    Johansson, Karin
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Sarwari, Mehwish
    Department of Political Science, SUNY Buffalo State, C324 Classroom Building, Buffalo, NY 14222, USA.
    Sexual violence and biased military interventions in civil conflict2019In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 36, no 5, p. 469-493Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What is the impact of foreign troop support on combatant-perpetrated sexual violence against civilians? We hypothesize that biased troop support increases the risk of sexual violence by the subordinate party both as a consequence of strategic considerations and as a product of a situation increasingly conducive to opportunistic behavior. Time-series cross-section analyses of all civil wars during 1989–2012 are largely supportive of our expectation. Rebel groups are more likely to perpetrate sexual violence the more troop support the state receives. Likewise, state forces are more prone to commit sexual violence the more they are challenged by troops supporting the rebel group(s).

  • 8.
    Melander, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Selected To Go Where Murderers Lurk?: The Preventive Effect of Peacekeeping on Mass Killings of Civilians2009In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 26, no 4, p. 389-406Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study examines the preventive effect of peacekeeping on mass killings of civilians in intrastate conflicts. Peacekeepers may be sent to the most difficult conflicts. Control variables might capture the difficultness, for example, measures of the intensity of fighting. This is insufficient if there are factors that are difficult to pinpoint and measure that affect both the likelihood that peacekeepers are sent in and the risk of mass killings. Such unmeasured explanatory factors may bias our results. This paper applies a statistical technique, seemingly unrelated probit, that corrects for this problem and reveals a previously undetectable benign effect of peace keeping.

  • 9.
    Nilsson, Desirée
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Turning Weakness into Strength: Military Capabilities, Multiple Rebel Groups and Negotiated Settlements2010In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 253-271Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The fact that many civil wars involve several warring parties is often highlighted as an obstacle to conflict resolution. However, this issue has so far attracted little attention in previous research. This article aims to contribute to filling this gap. It is argued that whereas only very strong rebel groups should be able to force concessions, a multiparty context can turn the tables and increase the chances for weak rebel groups to reach a deal. The empirical analysis is based on dyadic data covering the government and each rebel group in all internal armed conflicts, 1989-2003. In accordance with the theory, it is found that the likelihood that the government and a weak rebel group will reach a negotiated settlement increases with the number of warring parties in the conflict.

  • 10.
    Öberg, Magnus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Möller, Frida
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Early conflict prevention in ethnic conflicts, 1990-1998: a New Data Set2009In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, ISSN 0738-8942, E-ISSN 1549-9219, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 69-93Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    n this article we present a new dataset: the Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises dataset (ECPEC). It contains data on operational conflict prevention in 67 ethnic crises in the period 1990—98 that vary in terms of both preventive action and crisis outcomes. The new dataset thus allows for the evaluation of the effects of different types of preventive measures and also gives an overview of who takes what measures and in what conflicts. The global overview shows some interesting patterns. Preventive activity in the escalatory phase of ethnic conflict is dominated by verbal attention and facilitation. Coercive measures are rarely employed prior to the outbreak of war. Preventive action is most common in Europe and the Middle East, while crises in Asia tend to receive comparatively little attention. Most of the preventive action is focused on a relatively small number of high profile cases like those in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Major Powers (with the exception of China), neighboring states, the UN, and regional organizations are the most active interveners. To illustrate the usefulness of a large-N dataset on preventive measures, we also present a first analysis of the effects of different types of measures. The findings suggest that diplomatic measures and relief efforts both have conflict dampening effects, while carrots (inducements) increase the likelihood of escalation to war. Other measures show no significant effects in this sample. The findings also show that third parties are more likely to intervene in conflicts that are more prone to escalate to war. This implies that unless we account for the propensity of third parties to intervene in the more difficult cases, we risk underestimating the effects of preventive measures.

1 - 10 of 10
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