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  • 1.
    Abyaneh, Morteza Y
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Electrocrystallization: Modelling and Its Applications2014Inngår i: Development in Electrochemistry: Science Inspired by Martin Fleischmann / [ed] Derek Pletcher, Zhong-Qun Tian and David E. Williams, John Wiley & Sons, 2014, 1, s. 49-64Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Mathematical modeling of the electrocrystallization processes and its applications has long been a subject dear to Martin Fleischmann. The study of nucleation is fundamental to the understanding of crystallization. In the context of electrocrystallization, the terms can be applied to phase formation at preferred sites on the electrode surface and phase formation at surfaces without such sites. Two models of nucleation are presented: a heterogeneous model (nucleation on an indent); and a spherical-cap model representing homogeneous nucleation. The transients are recorded by applying a two-step potential profile to the working electrode. This procedure ensures the reduction of the initial falling background/charging current, so that the magnitude of this initial current cannot mask the very early stages of electrocrystallization. Martin sought to establish an approach to nucleation based on quantum electrodynamics.

  • 2.
    Alanen, Lilli
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Descartes on Virtue2007Inngår i: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University , 2007, s. 1-10Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth and Queen Christina, as well as in parts of the Passions of the Soul, Descartes provides the beginnings of a theory of ethics. Descartes argues that the supreme good, or the end that one ought to pursue in all of one’s actions, is virtue. The latter is understood by Descartes as a matter of using one’s absolutely free will as well as one can. In the paper we try to shed some light on what this Cartesian notion of virtue more specifically entails.

  • 3.
    Andén, Lovisa
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi. Södertörn University.
    Language and Tradition in Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl and Saussure2018Inngår i: Studia Phænomenologica, ISSN 1582-5647, E-ISSN 2069-0061, Vol. XVIII, s. 183-205Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I examine how Merleau-Ponty develops Husserl’s genetic phenomenology through an elaboration of language, largely influenced by Saussure’s linguistics. Specifically, my focus will be on the unpublished notes to the course Sur le problème de la parole (On the Problem of Speech). I show how Merleau-Ponty recasts Husserl’s notion of the historicity of truth by means of an inquiry into the relation between truth and its linguistic expression. The account that Merleau-Ponty offers differs from Husserl’s in two important respects. Firstly, whereas Husserl describes a regressive inquiry of truth, Merleau-Ponty describes a regressive movement of truth, where every acquired truth seizes the tradition that precedes it. Secondly, this new notion of truth, and its dependency on its proper expression, opens up for a new understanding of literature.

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  • 4.
    Bengtsson, Gisela
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    On the Austere Conception of Nonsense2002Inngår i: Persons. An interdisciplinary dialogue: Papers of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium / [ed] Christian Kanzian, Josef Quitterer and Edmund Runggaldier, Kirchberg am Wechsel: ALWS , 2002, Vol. 10, nr 37, s. 25-27Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I criticize James Conant’s account of the ”austere conception of nonsense”. 1) Conant tells us that no distinctions are made within nonsense, according to the “austere conception of nonsense”. I argue that this is not the case. 2) Conant claims that there can be no fixed answers to whether a remark is nonsensical or not. He also provides a list of remarks that must be understood as meaningful. 3) I argue that it follows from Conant’s account that the success of the philosophical project of the Tractatus depends on the reader undergoing a certain psychological process. It is however crucial for Wittgenstein, according to Conant, to follow Frege in the separation between philosophy and psychology.

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  • 5.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Frege on Dichtung and Elucidation2018Inngår i: NEW ESSAYS ON FREGE: BETWEEN SCIENCE AND LITERATURE / [ed] Bengtsson, G; Saatela, S; Pichler, A, Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag New York, 2018, s. 101-117Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, I identify an assumption at play in anti-semantic interpretative approaches to Frege: the notion that translatability to Frege’s concept script functions as a criterion for deciding whether a thought is expressed in a sentence or utterance. I question the viability of this assumption by pointing to Frege’s accounts of the aim and character of his logical language and scientific discourse more generally, and by looking at his remarks on poetic forms of language, literature and fiction (Dichtung). Since it seems clear that the sentences used in poetic and literary forms of language that Frege discusses, have Sinn and are possible to understand, in his view, I argue that the translatability criterion for thoughts is flawed. A discussion of Frege’s appeal to an approach of willingness to understand in a reader, and the relation between Frege’s use of elucidatory discourse and his conception of Dichtung is central to my exposition in this paper.

  • 6.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Frontmatter2016Inngår i: The Nordic Wittgenstein Review, ISSN 2194-6825, Vol. 6, nr 1Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 7.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Introduction: Zwischen Dichtung und Wissenschaft2018Inngår i: NEW ESSAYS ON FREGE: BETWEEN SCIENCE AND LITERATURE / [ed] Bengtsson, G; Saatela, S; Pichler, A, Dordrecht: Springer Publishing Company, 2018, s. 1-7Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    “Simple, forceful, strict” are the words Georg Henrik von Wright uses to describe Gottlob Frege’s style of writing (von Wright 1993, 60). He adds that it often contains an element of ice-cold irony, and this description seems to capture well the style that had such a great impact on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s sentences (cf. Wittgenstein 1981, § 712). In a later essay, von Wright (1994) borrows a distinction between two different human intellectual approaches from Friedrich Waismann (1940), and gives it a central role in an outline of the origin and development of analytic philosophy. The distinction is between a scientific approach that has the search for knowledge and true propositions as a primary guideline, and a philosophical approach that views clarity as the ultimate goal. Those guided by a philosophical approach seek to make clear what propositions mean. Characteristic of this approach is the conception that philosophy is distinct from science, as it neither is directed at the construction of theories, nor guided by a search for knowledge in the form of true proposition. The scientific approach, on the other hand, is characterized by a unified view of science according to which philosophy forms a part of it. Interaction and conflict between these two approaches characterize the development of analytic philosophy, according to the picture von Wright presents. Without hesitation, von Wright lets Bertrand Russell represent the first approach and G. E. Moore the second. Frege is spoken of much more cautiously. It is as if von Wright does not quite know what to say or where to place Frege with regard to the distinction between the two different intellectual approaches.

  • 8.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    On Saying Nothing: Wittgenstein's conception of the right method in philosophy2014Inngår i: Analytical and Continental Philosophy:: Methods and Perspectives, Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society , 2014, Vol. 22, s. 18-20Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 9.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    På jakt efter det triviala2008Inngår i: Tankar: Tillägnade Sören Stenlund / [ed] Niklas Forsberg; Sharon Rider; Per Segerdahl, Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet , 2008, 54, s. 109-125-Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 10.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    På jakt efter det triviala.2008Inngår i: Tankar: Tillägnade Sören Stenlund / [ed] Niklas Forsberg; Sharon Rider; Pär Segerdahl, Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet , 2008, 109-125Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 11.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    The River: Frege and Wittgenstein on Stepping into Language2013Inngår i: UEA Wittgenstein Workshop / [ed] Kuusela, Oskari, Norwich, 2013Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 12.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Säätelä, SimoUniversity of Bergen.Pichler, AloisUniversity of Bergen.
    New Essays on Frege: Between Literature and Science2018Collection/Antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 13.
    Bergman, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Communities of Judgment: Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse2019Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis offers a teleosemantic account of moral discourse and judgment. It develops a number of views about the function and content of moral judgments and the nature of moral discourse based on Ruth Millikan’s theory of intentional content and the functions of intentional attitudes.

    Non-cognitivists in meta-ethics have argued that moral judgments are more akin to desires and other motivational attitudes than to descriptive beliefs. I argue that teleosemantics allows us to assign descriptive content to motivational attitudes and hence that even if the non-cognitivist is correct, moral judgments can be said to describe the world. Moreover, given further teleosemantic assumptions, this conclusion has consequences that are both surprising and interesting. First of all, while moral judgments have descriptive content, moral statements do not. The purpose of moral discourse is not to convey beliefs that are true simpliciter, but to convey attitudes that are descriptively correct when tokened by the addressee. Consequently, moral discourse requires speakers to adapt to hearers in order to secure their assent and bring them into "community of judgment" with themselves.

    Secondly, the descriptive content of a motivational attitude is partly a matter of the subject’s own preferences and circumstances. In particular, the descriptive correctness of a moral judgment is partly a function of the degree to which it is shared with others. Since a moral judgment also motivates the subject to spread it, it has the ability to, in a certain sense, make itself true. If regular descriptive beliefs are supposed to adapt the subject to the world, a moral judgment also has the capacity to adapt the world to the subject.

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  • 14.
    Björk, Ulrika
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Closer: Performance, Technologies, Phenomenology2010Inngår i: Hypatia, ISSN 0887-5367, E-ISSN 1527-2001, Vol. 25, nr 3, s. 704-707Artikkel, omtale (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 15.
    Boberg, Johan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Displacing the Subject of Knowledge2014Inngår i: Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives / [ed] Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl & Harald A. Wiltsche, Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society , 2014, s. 33-35Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper examines Foucault’s attempt to displace the constitutive role of the subject of knowledge and to replace it with the concrete practices that constitute subjects. The prevalent tendency to transform discourse analysis into a new form of epistemology, here exemplified through the works of Paul Veyne, is criticized. It is suggested that Veyne’s reading of Foucault is subject to an illusion similar to what Kant once called “transcendental illusion,” and gives rise to a new form of metaphysics which repeats the problematic that Foucault originally aimed to overcome.

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  • 16.
    Boberg, Johan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Scientifically Minded: Science, the Subject and Kant’s Critical Philosophy2020Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Modern philosophy is often seen as characterized by a shift of focus from the things themselves to our knowledge of them, i.e., by a turn to the subject and subjectivity. The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is seen as the site of the emergence of the idea of a subject that constitutes the object of knowledge, and thus plays a central role in this narrative. This study examines Kant’s theory of knowledge at the intersection between the history of science and the history of the modern subject, on the one hand, and in the tension between modern experimental and mathematical science and more traditional Aristotelian conceptions of epistemic perfection, on the other.

    The dissertation consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, I examine Kant’s concept of experience, and its relation both to Early Modern experimentalism and to the Wolffian tradition. In the second chapter, I argue that Kant adheres to a broadly Aristotelian conception of epistemic perfection – the ideal of understanding – but transforms this ideal into the self-understanding of reason, where reason can only have insight into the products of its own activity. In the third chapter, I use Kant’s conception of space and time to exemplify such products of reason, and argue that, for Kant, space and time are constructively generated representations that function as principles for ordering empirical knowledge. In the fourth and final chapter, I examine Kant’s conception of the subject, and situate it in relation to both the long history of the modern subject and German Enlightenment philosophy. Whereas the modern philosophical conception of the subject is usually taken to combine an ‘I’ functioning as the subject to which mental acts are attributed and an ‘I’ that has the ability to immediately perceive itself as the subject of these acts, I argue that Kant reconceives this relation between the ‘I’ and its acts as a purely intellectual self-relation. The unity of the ‘I’ is not a perceived unity, but a unity brought about by the intellect.

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  • 17.
    Boberg, Johan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Rider, SharonUppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Utbildning och demokrati i kunskapssamhället2016Konferanseproceedings (Annet vitenskapelig)
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  • 18.
    Bornemark, Jonna
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi. Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten.
    Kunskapens gräns, gränsens vetande: En fenomenologisk undersökning av transcendens och kroppslighet2009Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The limit between the proper and the foreign – how this limit is established, but also crossed and dissolved – has remained a crucial issue in phenomenology. Setting these questions in the context of the phenomenology of religion, this thesis develops an analysis of the relation between transcendence and body understood in terms of a certain limit.

    The introductory part is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s discussions of the concept of transcendence, which is shown to have an essential connection to the analysis of inner time-consciousness. Here we encounter a decisive limit to objectifying knowledge, which also comes across in his investigations of the body and its spatiality.

    The second part discusses Max Scheler’s critique of Husserl’s excessively objectifying view of knowledge, with a particular focus on Scheler’s understanding of love as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. Scheler is shown to have developed a new concept of transcendence that avoids the pitfalls of objectivism, although in his philosophy of religion he tends to downplay the importance of the body.

    The third part undertakes a reading of Edith Stein, who develops ideas similar to Scheler’s, though in a phenomenologically more nuanced fashion. Although her philosophy of religion also bypasses the body, Stein provides a more genuine access to the writings of the mystics, the analysis of which forms the core of the fourth and concluding part. Drawing on the work of the 13th century Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, this concluding chapter develops a phenomenological understanding of religion with an emphasis on transcendence and limit, while also retaining the centrality of our experience of the body. This means: a phenomenology of the limit is investigated, rather than a limit of phenomenology.

  • 19.
    Bråting, Kajsa
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Matematiska institutionen.
    Öberg, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Om matematiska begrepp: en filosofisk undersökning med tillämpningar2005Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 26, nr 4, s. 11-17Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 20.
    Bråting, Kajsa
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Fakulteten för utbildningsvetenskaper, Institutionen för pedagogik, didaktik och utbildningsstudier.
    Österman, Tove
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    John Dewey and mathematics education in Sweden2017Inngår i: "Dig where you stand" 4. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the History of Mathematics Education, Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura , 2017, s. 61-72Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
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  • 21.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Self-Knowledge, Scepticism and the Quest for a New Method: Juan Luis Vives on Cognition and the Impossibility of Perfect Knowledge2009Inngår i: Renaissance Scepticisms, Dordrecht: Springer , 2009, s. 33-60Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 22.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    The Immortality of the Soul2018Inngår i: Philosophy of Mind in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance / [ed] Stephan Schmid, London: Routledge, 2018, Vol. 67, nr 1, s. 229-249Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 23.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Augustine on Second-Order Desires and Persons2016Inngår i: Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy / [ed] Jari Kaukua and Tomas Ekenberg, Springer, 2016, s. 9-24Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Examines Augustine's view of the will and the self and explores parallels between Augustine's and Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical accounts of personhood. Throws new light on Augustine's views on moral responsibility by showing that even if Augustine may have abandoned certain libertarian assumptions as to the nature of human free will in his mature works, he retains the underlying view of personhood as dependent on a capacity for a certain form of second-order desiring.

  • 24.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Auktoritet och den fria viljan hos Anselm, Kant och R. P. Wolff.2012Inngår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, nr 2Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 25.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    La volonté abélardienne et la tradition augustinienne2009Inngår i: Regards sur la France du Moyen Âge: Mélanges offerts à Gunnel Engwall à l'occasion de son départ à la retraite / [ed] Olle Ferm & Per Förnegård, Stockholm: Sällskapet Runica et Mediævalia, Centre d'études médiévales de Stockholm , 2009, s. 263-276Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 26.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Power and Activity in Early Medieval Philosophy2009Inngår i: The World as Active Power: Studies in the History of European Reason / [ed] J. Pietarinen & V. Viljanen, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers , 2009Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 27.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Practical Rationality and the Wills of Confessions 82014Inngår i: Augustine's Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography / [ed] William E. Mann, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, s. 28-45Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 28.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Review of Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism by Katherin A. Rogers2016Inngår i: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 29.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    The Medieval Notion of the Superiority of the Will2014Inngår i: Swedish Students at the University of Leipzig in the Middle Ages / [ed] O. Ferm & S. Risberg, Stockholm: Centre for Medieval Studies, Stockholm University , 2014Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 30.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury2016Inngår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, ISSN 0960-8788, E-ISSN 1469-3526, Vol. 24, nr 2, s. 215-230Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.

  • 31.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Alien Structure and Themes from Analytic Philosophy2019Inngår i: Giornale di Metafisica, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 41, nr 1, s. 195-208Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We think of the world as consisting of objects, with properties and standing in relations. There are, to be sure, different views on what objects etc. there are, and on what their natures are. And some theorists want to subtract some elements from this picture. For example, the ontological nihilist says that there are no objects. But still, the view described is very much orthodoxy—so much orthodoxy that one may need to be reminded that the view that the world consists of objects, with properties and standing in relations is, precisely, a view. I here investigate the possibility that this view is false: that there is what may be called alien structure. And I investigate the relationship between alien structure and some important themes from the history of analytic philosophy.

  • 32.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Incoherentism and the Sorites Paradox2019Inngår i: The Sorites Paradox / [ed] Sergi Oms and Elia Zardini, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, s. 78-94Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Incoherentism about vagueness is the view that vague expressions/concepts are incoherent due to their vagueness. This chapter elaborates on what incoherentism is, and defends a particular incoherentist view. It presents an overview of important arguments for and against incoherentism. Among arguments for the view are claims that it provides an attractive account of the nature of vagueness, and of the way in which vagueness is associated with indeterminacy. Among arguments against the view are claims that it presupposes a mistaken view on semantic/conceptual competence, and that the view sits ill with how ubiquitous vagueness is. The specific view defended is compared to the views of Michael Dummett, Terence Horgan and Peter Unger.

  • 33.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Inconsistency and replacement2019Inngår i: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 62, nr 4, s. 387-402Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The article is an extended critical discussion of Kevin Scharp's Replacing Truth (2013a). Scharp's case for the claim that the concept of truth is inconsistent is criticized, and so is his case for the claim that the concept of truth must be replaced because of its inconsistency.

  • 34.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Making sense of logical pluralism2020Inngår i: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 63, nr 3-4, s. 433-454Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they render the debate trivial or otherwise philosophically uninteresting. One way to make philosophical good sense of the debate is to find a canonical purpose for logic such that the monist is someone who holds that some unique logic best serves this purpose and the pluralist holds that many logics do. However, in the article, general obstacles to finding such a purpose are discussed.

  • 35.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Modesty, Esotericism and Ineffability: Remarks on Hofweber2018Inngår i: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 78, nr 2, s. 291-303Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 36.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Rayo's Metametaphysics2014Inngår i: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 57, nr 4, s. 483-497Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In his important book The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Agustin Rayo lays out a distinctive metametaphysical view and applies it fruitfully to disputes concerning ontology and concerning modality. In this article, I present a number of criticisms of the view developed, mostly focusing on the underlying metametaphysics and Rayo's claims on its behalf.

  • 37.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions2019Inngår i: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 196, nr 4, s. 1225-1247Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley's regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present my favored solutions to these problems.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 38.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Reply to Bykvist and Olson2019Inngår i: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 31, nr 3, s. 347-349Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 39.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    The Existence of PersonitesInngår i: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 40.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Variance Theses in Ontology and Metaethics2020Inngår i: Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics / [ed] Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett, Oxford University Press, 2020, 1, s. 187-203Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The chapter illustrates conceptual engineering by bringing up a number of issues in metaontology and metaethics. A prominent debate in metaontology relates to whether some existence concept is metaphysically privileged. On the one hand, ontological realists say yes, and, on the other hand, friends of quantifier variance say no. The chapter brings up the corresponding question in metaethics by asking, is some rightness concept normatively privileged? It investigates this question, and compares the metaethics case and the metaontology case. One aim is to arrive at conclusions regarding possible limits to the project of conceptual engineering.

  • 41.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    What is Deflationism About Truth?2019Inngår i: Truth: A Contemporary Reader / [ed] Douglas Edwards, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019, s. 208-221Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 42.
    Fogal, Daniel
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language2016Inngår i: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 127, nr 1, s. 281-288Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 43.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    A New Conception of Original Sin?2015Inngår i: Heythrop Journal, ISSN 0018-1196, E-ISSN 1468-2265, Vol. 56, nr 2, s. 272-284Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 44.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    A Philosophy Less Ordinary2009Inngår i: Acknowledging Stanley Cavell, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2009, s. 123-146Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 45.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Den ensamma tankens tyngd: Ensamhet och språklig gemenskap2006Inngår i: Den moderna ensamheten, Stockholm/Stehag: Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposion , 2006, s. 187-208Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 46.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Different Forms of Forms of Life: A Philosophical Introduction2012Inngår i: Language, Ethics and Animal Life: Wittgenstein and Beyond / [ed] Niklas Forsberg, Mikel Burley and Nora Hämäläinen, New York: Bloomsbury Academic , 2012, s. 1-15Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 47.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Dogma: Vi är alla stygga barn2009Inngår i: Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, ISSN 0029-1943, E-ISSN 1504-2901, Vol. 44, nr 3-4, s. 176-190Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Niklas Forsberg: Dogma: We are All Wicked Children

    This paper discusses the question of dogmatism in relation to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is both a break from, yet dependent upon, the analytical philosophical tradition. If this fact is not acknowledged one runs the risk of appropriating Wittgenstein’s philosophy dogmatically.

    Glock’s reading of Wittgenstein is employed to show the mistake in reading Wittgenstein as if he worked entirely within the analytic philosophical tradition. Such readings generally attribute theses to Wittgenstein – in direct contrast to his own intentions – and they tend to disregard or misrepresent Wittgenstein’s deeply critical attitude towards the «scientific spirit» of the age.

    It is also argued that a reading that focuses solely on Wittgenstein’s more methodologically oriented remarks runs the risk of misrepresenting them, if they are disconnected from the particular philosophical problems that they are internally connected to.

    Finally, it is argued that the struggle against dogmatism is a constant struggle. Dogmatism is, in Wittgenstein’s conception of it, not something that can be fully avoided since dogmatism is inherent in the philosophical desire itself. Dogmatism in philosophy is not merely dogmatism in academic philosophy but comes together with a very natural desire to establish one fixed meaning for our words.

  • 48.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Filosofins ordblindhet eller Dyslexin som filosofins början2008Inngår i: Tankar:  tillägnade Sören Stenlund, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2008, s. 261-285Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 49.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Filosofins tillstånd i Sverige idag2006Inngår i: Ikaros, ISSN 1796-1998, nr 1, s. 14-15Artikkel, forskningsoversikt (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 50.
    Forsberg, Niklas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Interview. From Positivist Rabbi to Resolute Reader. James Conant in Conversation with Niklas Forsberg, Part 12013Inngår i: Nordic Witttgenstein Review, ISSN 2242-248X, Vol. 2, nr 2, s. 131-160Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
123456 1 - 50 of 256
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