uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
Refine search result
12 1 - 50 of 55
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1.
    Björkman, M
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, P
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, A
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    A reply to William R Farell's paper "A model of realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination"1994In: Perception and Psychophysics, Vol. 57, p. 255-259Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Björkman, Mats
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Realism of confidence in sensory discrimination: The underconfidence phenomenon.1993In: Perception & Psychophysics, ISSN 0031-5117, Vol. 54, no 1, p. 75-81Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Rational Assessments of Covariation and Causality2000In: Proceedings of the Twenty-second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2000Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Hagström, Josefin
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Virtually overcoming grammar learning with 3D application of Loci mnemonics?2018In: Applied Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 0888-4080, E-ISSN 1099-0720, Vol. 32, no 4, p. 450-462Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 5. Hansson, Patrik
    et al.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Naïve Sampling and Format Dependence in Subjective Probability Calibration2003In: Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society., 2003Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Hansson, Patrik
    et al.
    Umeå Univ, Dept Psychol.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty2008In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 34, no 5, p. 1027-1042Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations.

  • 7. Hansson, Patrik
    et al.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The naive intuitive statistician:Organism-Environment Relations from yet another Angle.2008In: The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. / [ed] Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 237-260Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 8. Jones, Sari
    et al.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Algorithm, heuristic or exemplar: Processes and representation in multiple-cue judgment2000In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2000, p. 244-249Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 9.
    JUSLIN, P
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    WINMAN, A
    Reply to William R. Ferrell's paper "Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both.1995In: SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, ISSN 0036-5564, Vol. 36, no 2, p. 153-163Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    William R. Ferrell's paper is a reply to our article ''Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: Two different accounts'', 1993, 34, 135-148 in this journal. Ferrell's critique centres around three issues: (1) The model of sensory discrimination pr

  • 10.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Jones, Sari
    Olsson, Henrik
    Winman, Anders
    Cue abstraction and exemplar memory: Evidence for multiple representation levels2003In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Vol. 29, no 5, p. 924-941Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, the authors compare 3 generic models of the cognitive processes in a categorization task. The cue abstraction model implies abstraction in training of explicit cue-criterion relations that are mentally integrated to form a judgment, the l

  • 11.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Probability theory: Not the very guide of life2009In: Psychological review, ISSN 0033-295X, E-ISSN 1939-1471, Vol. 116, no 4, p. 856-874Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Probability theory has long been taken as the self-evident norm against   which to evaluate inductive reasoning, and classical demonstrations of   violations of this norm include the conjunction error and base-rate   neglect. Many of these phenomena require multiplicative probability   integration, whereas people seem more inclined to linear additive   integration, in part, at least, because of well-known capacity   constraints on controlled thought. In this article, the authors show   with computer simulations that when based on approximate knowledge of   probabilities, as is routinely the case in natural environments, linear   additive integration can yield as accurate estimates, and as good   average decision returns, as estimates based on probability theory. It   is proposed that in natural environments people have little opportunity   or incentive to induce the normative rules of probability theory and,   given their cognitive constraints, linear additive integration may   often offer superior bounded rationality.

  • 12.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats2011In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 120, no 2, p. 248-267Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research on probability judgment has traditionally emphasized that people are susceptible to biases because they rely on "variable substitution": the assessment of normative variables is replaced by assessment of heuristic, subjective variables. A recent proposal is that many of these biases may rather derive from constraints on cognitive integration, where the capacity-limited and sequential nature of controlled judgment promotes linear additive integration, in contrast to many integration rules of probability theory (juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). A key implication by this theory is that it should be possible to improve peoples' probabilistic reasoning by changing probability problems into logarithm formats that require additive rather than multiplicative integration. Three experiments demonstrate that recasting tasks in a way that allows people to arrive at the answers by additive integration decreases cognitive biases, and while people can rapidly learn to produce the correct answers in an additive formats, they have great difficulty doing so with a multiplicative format.

  • 13.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Winman, Anders
    The calibration issue: Theoretical comments on Suantak, Bolger, and Ferrell (1996)1998In: ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, ISSN 0749-5978, Vol. 73, no 1, p. 3-26Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this comment on a recent article in this journal on calibration of subjective probabilities by Suantak, Bolger, and Ferrell (1996) we point to methodological problems with the data presented in the article, with computer simulations we demonstrate tha

  • 14.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Olsson, Nils
    Winman, Anders
    Calibration and diagnosticity of confidence in eyewitness identification: Comments on what can be inferred from the low confidence-accuracy correlation1996In: JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION, ISSN 0278-7393, Vol. 22, no 5, p. 1304-1316Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy as measured by the psi point-biserial correlation has been described as poor or even nonexistent in the literature on lineup identifications. In this article, 3 arguments are made. First, a low

  • 15. Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Wennerholm, Pia
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    High-level reasoning and base-rate use: Do we need cue-competition to explain the inverse base-rate effect?2001In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 849-871Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous accounts of the inverse base-rate effect (D. L. Medin & S. M. Edelson, 1988) have revolved around the concept of cue-competition. In this article, the authors propose that high-level reasoning in the form of an eliminative inference mechanism may contribute to the effect. A quantitative implementation of this idea demonstrates that it has the power by itself to produce the pattern of base-rate effects in the Medin and Edelson (1988) design. Four predictions are derived that contradict the predictions by attention to distinctive input (ADIT; J. K. Kruschke, 1996), up to date the most successful account of the inverse base-rate effect. Results from 3 experiments disconfirm the predictions by ADIT and demonstrate the importance of high-level reasoning in designs of the Medin and Edelson kind. Implications for the interpretation of the inverse base-rate effect and the attention-shifting mechanisms presumed by ADIT are discussed.

  • 16.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Hansson, Patrik
    The naive intuitive statistician: A naive sampling model of intuitive confidence intervals.2009In: Judgement and Decision making, London: Sage Publications, 2009, p. 678-703Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Hansson, Patrik
    Department of Psychology, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden .
    The naive intuitive statistician: A naive sampling model of intuitive confidence intervals2007In: Psychological review, ISSN 0033-295X, E-ISSN 1939-1471, Vol. 114, no 3, p. 678-703Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The perspective of the naïve intuitive statistician is outlined and applied to explain overconfidence when people produce intuitive confidence intervals and why this format leads to more overconfidence than other formally equivalent formats. The naïve sampling model implies that people accurately describe the sample information they have but are naïve in the sense that they uncritically take sample properties as estimates of population properties. A review demonstrates that the naïve sampling model accounts for the robust and important findings in previous research as well as provides novel predictions that are confirmed, including a way to minimize the overconfidence with interval production. The authors discuss the naïve sampling model as a representative of models inspired by the naïve intuitive statistician.

  • 18.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Olsson, Henrik
    Calibration, additivity, and source independence of probability judgments in general knowledge and sensory discrimination tasks2003In: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, ISSN 0749-5978, Vol. 92, no 1-2, p. 34-51Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Predictions for probability judgments in a general knowledge task were derived from the combined error model (Juslin, Olsson, & Bjorkman, 1997) and predictions for probability judgments in a sensory discrimination task were derived from the sensory sampli

  • 19.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Olsson, Henrik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Naive empiricism and dogmatism in confidence research: A critical examination of the hard-easy effect2000In: PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, ISSN 0033-295X, Vol. 107, no 2, p. 384-396Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two robust phenomena in research on confidence in one's general knowledge are the overconfidence phenomenon and the hard-easy effect. In this article, the authors propose that the hard-easy effect has been interpreted with insufficient attention to the sc

  • 20.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    WInman, Anders
    PERSSON, T
    Can overconfidence be used as an indicator of reconstructive rather than retrieval processes?1995In: COGNITION, ISSN 0010-0277, Vol. 54, no 1, p. 99-130Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent paper Wagenaar (1988) suggested that overconfidence can be used as an indicator of reconstructive processes which allow responses based on inference to be distinguished from responses based on retrieval. The ecological models (Bjorkman, in pr

  • 21. Klayman, J
    et al.
    Soll, J
    Juslin, P
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, A
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Information sampling and overconfidence in interval estimation2006In: Information sampling and adaptive cognition, Cambridge university Press, New York , 2006Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract
  • 22. Klayman, J
    et al.
    Soll, J
    Juslin, P
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, A
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Subjective Confidence and the Sampling of Knowledge2006In: Information Sampling and Adaptive Cognition, Cambridge Unviversity Press, New York , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Kerimi, Neda
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    A Swedish validation of the Berlin Numeracy test2015In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 56, no 2, p. 132-139Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent research has highlighted the importance of considering an individual’s level of numeracy, that is their numerical abilities, in a vast variety of judgment and decision making tasks. To accurately evaluate the influence of numeracy requires good and valid measures of the construct. In the present study we validate a Swedish version of the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). The validation was car- ried out on both a student sample and a sample representative of the Swedish population. The Swedish BNT showed sound psychometrical properties in both samples. Further, in both samples the BNT had satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity when correlating with other measures of numeracy, while not being significantly related to measures of personality. With respect to predictive validity the results indicated divergent patterns in the two samples. In the student sample, participants scoring highest on the BNT outperformed those in the other three levels, which did not differ in performance. In contrast, in the population sample participants scoring lowest on the BNT performed worse than those in the other three levels, which did not differ in performance. Taken together, however, the results suggest that the Swedish version of the BNT should be considered a valid measure of numeracy in both Swedish student and population representative samples.

  • 24.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Are all Data Created Equal?: Exploring Some Boundary Conditions for a Lazy Intuitive Statistician2014In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 9, no 5, p. e97686-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The study investigated potential effects of the presentation order of numeric information on retrospective subjective judgments of descriptive statistics of this information. The studies were theoretically motivated by the assumption in the naive sampling model of independence between temporal encoding order of data in long-term memory and retrieval probability (i.e. as implied by a "random sampling'' from memory metaphor). In Experiment 1, participants experienced Arabic numbers that varied in distribution shape/variability between the first and the second half of the information sequence. Results showed no effects of order on judgments of mean, variability or distribution shape. To strengthen the interpretation of these results, Experiment 2 used a repeated judgment procedure, with an initial judgment occurring prior to the change in distribution shape of the information half-way through data presentation. The results of Experiment 2 were in line with those from Experiment 1, and in addition showed that the act of making explicit judgments did not impair accuracy of later judgments, as would be suggested by an anchoring and insufficient adjustment strategy. Overall, the results indicated that participants were very responsive to the properties of the data while at the same time being more or less immune to order effects. The results were interpreted as being in line with the naive sampling models in which values are stored as exemplars and sampled randomly from long-term memory.

  • 25.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    No evidence of learning in non-symbolic numerical tasks: A comment on Park & Brannon (2014)2016In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 150, p. 243-247Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two recent studies - one of which was published in this journal - claimed to have found that learning on a non-symbolic arithmetic task improved performance on a symbolic arithmetic task (Park & Brannon, 2013, 2014). This finding has potentially far-reaching implications, because it would constitute evidence for a causal link between the Approximate Number System (ANS) and symbolic-math ability. Here, we argue that, due to the methodology used in both studies, the interpretation of data in terms of an improvement in ANS performance is problematic. We provide arguments and simulations showing that the trends in the data are similar to what one would expect for a non-learning observer. We discuss the implications for the original interpretation in terms of causality between non-symbolic and symbolic arithmetic performance.

  • 26.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Are there rapid feedback effects on Approximate Number System acuity?2013In: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, ISSN 1662-5161, E-ISSN 1662-5161, Vol. 7, p. 270-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Humans are believed to be equipped with an Approximate Number System (ANS) that supports non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitude. Correlations between individual measures of the precision of the ANS and mathematical ability have raised the question of whether the precision can be improved by feedback training. A study (DeWind and Brannon, 2012) reported improvement in discrimination precision occurring within 600700 trials of feedback, suggesting ANS malleability with rapidly improving acuity in response to feedback. We tried to replicate the rapid improvement in a control group design, while controlling for the use of perceptual cues. The results indicate no learning effects, but a minor constant advantage for the feedback group. The measures of motivation suggest that feedback has a positive effect on motivation and that the difference in discrimination is due to the greater motivation of participants with feedback. These results suggest that at least for adults the number sense may not respond to feedback in the short-term.

  • 27.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Calculate or wait: Is man an eager or a lazy intuitive statistician?2013In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 25, no 8, p. 994-1014Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research on people’s ability to act as intuitive statisticians has mainly focused on the accuracy of estimates of central tendency and variability. In this paper, we investigate two hypothesised cognitive processes by which people make judgements of distribution shape. The first claims that people spontaneously induce abstract representations of distribution properties from experience, including about distribution shape. The second process claims that people construct beliefs about distribution properties post hoc by retrieval from long-term memory of small samples from the distribution, implying format dependence with accuracy that differs depending on judgement format. Results from two experiments confirm the predicted format dependence, suggesting that people are often constrained by the post hoc assessment of distribution properties by sampling from long-term memory. The results, however, also suggest that, although post hoc sampling from memory seems to be the default process, under certain predictable circumstances people do induce abstract representations of distribution shape.

  • 28.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Effects of Response and Presentation Format on Measures of Approximate Number System Acuity2013In: Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society / [ed] M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, I. Wachsmuth, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., 2013, p. 2908-2913Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Human adults, infants, and non-human animals are believed to be equipped with an Approximate Number System (ANS) supporting non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitudes. Recent research has questioned both the validity and reliability of tasks intended to measure acuity in the ANS. Issues with validity and reliability might be due to differences in methodology. In the present study, we compare four tasks designed to measure ANS acuity, using a within-subjects design. The tasks are compared with respect to response and presentation format effects previously studied in the psychophysics literature, but largely ignored in the ANS literature. We find a presentation format effect and show that when non-symbolic numerical stimuli are presented sequentially the magnitude of the second stimulus is overestimated. Further, the results indicate that people’s sensitivity to differentiate between non-symbolic numerosities is dependent on response format. The implications of the results to measures of ANS acuity are discussed.

  • 29.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Is it Time Bayes went Fishing?: Bayesian Probabilistic Reasoning in a Category Learning Task2013In: Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society / [ed] M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, I. Wachsmuth, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., 2013, p. 906-911Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    People have generally been considered poor at probabilistic reasoning, producing subjective probability estimates that far from accord to normative rules. Features of the typical probabilistic reasoning task, however, make strong conclusions difficult. The present study, therefore, combines research on probabilistic reasoning with research on category learning where participants learn base rates and likelihoods in a category-learning task. Later they produce estimates of posterior probability based on the learnt probabilities. The results show that our participants can produce subjective probability estimates that are well calibrated against the normative Bayesian probability and are sensitive to base rates. Further, they have accurate knowledge of both base rate and means of the categories encountered during learning. This indicates that under some conditions people might be better at probabilistic reaso

  • 30.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Naïve Point Estimation2013In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 782-800Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The capacity of short-term memory is a key constraint when people make online judgments requiringthem to rely on samples retrieved from memory (e.g., Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). In this article, theauthors compare 2 accounts of how people use knowledge of statistical distributions to make pointestimates: either by retrieving precomputed large-sample representations or by retrieving small samplesof similar observations post hoc at the time of judgment, as constrained by short-term memory capacity(the naı¨ve sampling model: Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007). Results from four experiments supportthe predictions by the naı¨ve sampling model, including that participants sometimes guess values thatthey, when probed, demonstrably know have the lowest probability of occurring. Experiment 1 alsodemonstrated the operations of an unpredicted recognition-based inference. Computational modeling alsoincorporating this process demonstrated that the data from all 4 experiments were better predicted byassuming a post hoc sampling process constrained by short-term memory capacity than by assumingabstraction of large-sample representations of the distribution.

  • 31.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The association between higher education and approximate number system acuity2014In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 5, p. 462-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Humans are equipped with an approximate number system (ANS) supporting non-symbolic numerosity representation. Studies indicate a relationship between ANS-precision (acuity) and math achievement. Whether the ANS is a prerequisite for learning mathematics or if mathematics education enhances the ANS remains an open question. We investigated the association between higher education and ANS acuity with university students majoring in subjects with varying amounts of mathematics (mathematics, business, and humanities), measured either early (First year) or late (Third year) in their studies. The results suggested a non-significant trend where students taking more mathematics had better ANS acuity and a significant improvement in ANS acuity as a function of study length that was mainly confined to the business students. The results provide partial support for the hypothesis that education in mathematics can enhance the ANS acuity.

  • 32.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Measuring acuity of the approximate number system reliably and validly: the evaluation of an adaptive test procedure2013In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 4, p. 510-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two studies investigated the reliability and predictive validity of commonly used measures and models of Approximate Number System acuity (ANS). Study 1 investigated reliability by both an empirical approach and a simulation of maximum obtainable reliability under ideal conditions. Results showed that common measures of the Weber fraction (w) are reliable only when using a substantial number of trials, even under ideal conditions. Study 2 compared different purported measures of ANS acuity as for convergent and predictive validity in a within-subjects design and evaluated an adaptive test using the ZEST algorithm. Results showed that the adaptive measure can reduce the number of trials needed to reach acceptable reliability. Only direct tests with non-symbolic numerosity discriminations of stimuli presented simultaneously were related to arithmetic fluency. This correlation remained when controlling for general cognitive ability and perceptual speed. Further, the purported indirect measure of ANS acuity in terms of the Numeric Distance Effect (NDE) was not reliable and showed no sign of predictive validity. The non-symbolic NDE for reaction time was significantly related to direct w estimates in a direction contrary to the expected. Easier stimuli were found to be more reliable, but only harder (7:8 ratio) stimuli contributed to predictive validity.

  • 33.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Arithmetic Training Does Not Improve Approximate Number System Acuity2016In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 7, article id 1634Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The approximate number system (ANS) is thought to support non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitudes in humans. Recently much debate has focused on the causal direction for an observed relation between ANS acuity and arithmetic fluency. Here we investigate if arithmetic training can improve ANS acuity. We show with an experimental training study consisting of six 45-min training sessions that although feedback during arithmetic training improves arithmetic performance substantially, it does not influence ANS acuity. Hence, we find no support for a causal link where symbolic arithmetic training influences ANS acuity. Further, although short-term number memory is likely involved in arithmetic tasks we did not find that short-term memory capacity for numbers, measured by a digit-span test, was effected by arithmetic training. This suggests that the improvement in arithmetic fluency may have occurred independent of short-term memory efficiency, but rather due to long-term memory processes and/or mental calculation strategy development. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

  • 34.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Can approximate number system acuity improve with arithmetic training?2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 35.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Individual differences in nonverbal number skills predict math anxiety2017In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 159, p. 156-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Abstract Math anxiety (MA) involves negative affect and tension when solving mathematical problems, with potentially life-long consequences. MA has been hypothesized to be a consequence of negative learning experiences and cognitive predispositions. Recent research indicates genetic and neurophysiological links, suggesting that MA stems from a basic level deficiency in symbolic numerical processing. However, the contribution of evolutionary ancient purely nonverbal processes is not fully understood. Here we show that the roots of MA may go beyond symbolic numbers. We demonstrate that MA is correlated with precision of the Approximate Number System (ANS). Individuals high in MA have poorer ANS functioning than those low in MA. This correlation remains significant when controlling for other forms of anxiety and for cognitive variables. We show that MA mediates the documented correlation between ANS precision and math performance, both with ANS and with math performance as independent variable in the mediation model. In light of our results, we discuss the possibility that MA has deep roots, stemming from a non-verbal number processing deficiency. The findings provide new evidence advancing the theoretical understanding of the developmental etiology of MA.

  • 36.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    While waiting for the dots: The influence of short-term memory in tasks indexing the Approximate Number System?2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 37.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Heuristics Can Produce Surprisingly Rational Probability Estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014)2016In: Psychological review, ISSN 0033-295X, E-ISSN 1939-1471, Vol. 123, no 1, p. 103-111Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Costello and Watts (2014) present a model assuming that people’s knowledge of probabilities adheres toprobability theory, but that their probability judgments are perturbed by a random noise in the retrievalfrom memory. Predictions for the relationships between probability judgments for constituent events andtheir disjunctions and conjunctions, as well as for sums of such judgments were derived from probabilitytheory. Costello and Watts (2014) report behavioral data showing that subjective probability judgmentsaccord with these predictions. Based on the finding that subjective probability judgments followprobability theory, Costello and Watts (2014) conclude that the results imply that people’s probabilityjudgments embody the rules of probability theory and thereby refute theories of heuristic processing.Here, we demonstrate the invalidity of this conclusion by showing that all of the tested predictions followstraightforwardly from an account assuming heuristic probability integration (Nilsson, Winman, Juslin,& Hansson, 2009). We end with a discussion of a number of previous findings that harmonize very poorlywith the predictions by the model suggested by Costello and Watts (2014).

  • 38.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Hansson, Göran
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Linda is not a bearded lady: Configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors2009In: Journal of experimental psychology. General, ISSN 0096-3445, E-ISSN 1939-2222, Vol. 138, no 4, p. 517-534Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article explores the configural weighted average (CWA) hypothesis suggesting that extension biases, like conjunction and disjunction errors, occur because people estimate compound probabilities by taking a CWA of the constituent probabilities. The hypothesis suggests a process consistent with well-known cognitive constraints, which nonetheless achieves high robustness and bounded rationality in noisy real-life environments. Predictions by the CWA hypothesis are that in error-free data, conjunction and disjunction errors should be the rule rather than the exception when pairs of statements are randomly sampled from an environment, the rate of extension errors should increase when noise in data is decreased, and that adding a likely component should increase the probability of a conjunction. Four experiments generally verify the predictions by the hypothesis, demonstrating that extension errors are frequent also when tasks are selected according to a representative design.

  • 39.
    Olsson, Henrik
    et al.
    Max Planch Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The role of random error in confidence judgment: Reply to Merkle, Sieck, and Van Zandt (2008)2008In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257, E-ISSN 1099-0771, Vol. 21, no 4, p. 449-452Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract
  • 40.
    Olsson, Henrik
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Underconfidence in sensory discrimination: The interaction between experimental setting and response strategies1996In: PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS, ISSN 0031-5117, Vol. 58, no 3, p. 374-382Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent issue of this journal, Baranski and Petrusic (1994) presented empirical data revealing overconfidence in sensory discrimination. In this paper, we propose an explanation of Baranski and Petrusic's results, based on an idiosyncrasy in the expe

  • 41.
    Olsson, Nils
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Winman, Anders
    Realism of confidence in earwitness versus eyewitness identification1998In: JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-APPLIED, ISSN 1076-898X, Vol. 4, no 2, p. 101-118Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The confidence-accuracy relation in earwitness identification is studied with calibration and diagnosticity analysis. In comparison to eyewitness identification in similar circumstances (P. Juslin, N. Olsson, & A. Winman, 1996), earwitness accuracy is po

  • 42.
    Van den Berg, Ronald
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Recent Is More: A Negative Time-Order Effect in Nonsymbolic Numerical Judgment.2017In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, ISSN 0096-1523Print, Vol. 43, no 6, p. 1084-1097Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Humans as well as some nonhuman animals can estimate object numerosities—such as the number of sheep in a flock—without explicit counting. Here, we report on a negative time-order effect (TOE) in this type of judgment: When nonsymbolic numerical stimuli are presented sequentially, the second stimulus is overestimated compared to the first. We examined this “recent is more” effect in two comparative judgment tasks: larger–smaller discrimination and same–different discrimination. Ideal-observer modeling revealed evidence for a TOE in 88.2% of the individual data sets. Despite large individual differences in effect size, there was strong consistency in effect direction: 87.3% of the identified TOEs were negative. The average effect size was largely independent of task but did strongly depend on both stimulus magnitude and interstimulus interval. Finally, we used an estimation task to obtain insight into the origin of the effect. We found that subjects tend to overestimate both stimuli but the second one more strongly than the first one. Overall, our findings are highly consistent with findings from studies on TOEs in nonnumerical judgments, which suggests a common underlying mechanism.

  • 43. von Schéele, Ingrid
    et al.
    von Schéele, Bo
    Hansson, Göran
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Theorell, Töres
    Psychosocial factors and respiratory and cardiovascular parameters during psychophysiological stress profiling in working men and women2005In: Appl Psychophysiol Biofeedback, ISSN 1090-0586, Vol. 30, no 2, p. 125-36Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 44.
    Wennerholm, P.
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, A.
    Shanks, D. R.
    Reasoning or associations?: Cognitive representations in the inverse base-rate taskIn: Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract
  • 45.
    Winman, A
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, P
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    “I’m m/n Confident that I’m Correct.: ”: Confidence in Foresight and Hindsight as a Sampling Probability.2006In: Information Sampling and Adaptive Cognition, New York, Cambridge University Press , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 46.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Cognitive processes operating in hindsight1999In: SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, ISSN 0036-5564, Vol. 40, no 2, p. 135-145Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this investigation was to study the cognitive processes involved in the "knew-it-all-along'' effect, especially in regard to use of inferential processes. The results of three experiments showed that the magnitude of the phenomenon did not inc

  • 47.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Do perfume additives termed human pheromones warrant being termed pheromones?2004In: Physiology and Behavior, ISSN 0031-9384, E-ISSN 1873-507X, Vol. 82, no 4, p. 697-701Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two studies of the effects of perfume additives, termed human pheromones by the authors, have conveyed the message that these substances can promote an increase in human sociosexual behaviour [Physiol. Behav. 75 (2003) RI; Arch. Sex. Behav. 27 (1998) P,2]. The present paper presents an extended analysis of this data. It is shown that in neither study is there a statistically significant increase in any of the sociosexual behaviours for the experimental groups. In the control groups of both studies, there are, however, moderate but statistically significant decreases in the corresponding behaviour. Most notably, there is no support in data for the claim that the substances increase the attractiveness of the wearers of the substances to the other sex. It is concluded that more research using matched homogenous groups of participants is needed.

  • 48.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The importance of item selection in ''knew-it-all-along'' studies of general knowledge1997In: SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, ISSN 0036-5564, Vol. 38, no 1, p. 63-72Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study was designed to investigate the effects of item sampling on hindsight bias in experiments using general knowledge material. The results show that the use of random versus traditional experimenter-selected item samples can have different effect

  • 49.
    Winman, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Inferring causality assessments from predictive responses: Cue interaction without cue competition2006In: Q J Exp Psychol (Colchester), ISSN 1747-0218, Vol. 59, no 1, p. 28-45Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 50.
    Winman, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Hansson, Patrik
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Subjective probability intervals: How to reduce overconfidence by interval evaluation.2004In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cogntion, Vol. 30, no 6, p. 1167-75Article in journal (Refereed)
12 1 - 50 of 55
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf