How do local power-sharing arrangements affect levels of ethnopolitical hostility? The introduction of decentralisation in contexts previously marked by communal conflict underscores the need to assess local power-sharing mechanisms. However, existing literature on power-sharing has mainly examined national-level arrangements. In this article we contribute to the literature on decentralisation and ethnopolitical conflict by analysing two conflict-affected cases in Kenya. We find that local power sharing in Nakuru made intercommunal relations less hostile than in Uasin Gishu, where no such arrangement was present. The introduction and effects of local power sharing, however, is highly conditioned by national politics.
In Uganda, contested relations between the central government and sub-national regions have, since independence, shaped state formation and national identity in fundamental ways. Today, the country is characterised by regionally uneven state presence, and distinct sub-national identities and ongoing contestation over territorial demarcations, loci of authority and political identities. This article explores the politics of territory, identity and authority in three Ugandan regions in this context, in order to analyse the implications for exclusion and conflict at the sub-national level. This involves struggles over the territorial and administrative demarcations of and within regions; the loci and scope of authority with regards to these units; struggles over access to land; and the (non-)recognition of various cultural–political identities in these regions.
Anders Sjögren is a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala and in the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University. He has researched and published extensively on Ugandan and Kenyan politics over the last decade. This book is a revised version of his doctoral thesis. State-civil society relations in Africa have during recent decades been transformed in the context of economic liberalisation and state reform. This study explores state-civil society relations in contemporary Uganda, from 1986 to the present, in order to illustrate and explain the scope for and capacity of different social forces to create access to and democratise the state. The study interrogates state-civil society relations under the incumbent National Resistance Movement government as these are expressed through forms of interest representation and conflict regulation in different political arenas. It analyses this problem through an empirical study of the health sector at both national and local levels. Changes in the health regime – the rules and practices that regulate health politics – are analysed by a historical reconstruction of how different health regimes evolved from demands from social forces on the colonial and postcolonial state, in relation to broader patterns of political change. The ruling political coalition from 1986 has promoted a model for capitalist development based on donor-driven economic growth, institutional reform and political monopoly – what is referred to in the study as technocratic governance. Throughout, however, the technocratic tendency has been shaped in relation to the political economy of militarism as a more openly repressive form of authoritarian rule. The study argues that limits to democratisation of state society relations within the health sector and of Ugandan politics at large are best explained by relations of domination in society, within the state and among external political forces. The main conclusion is that democratisation of the state has been resisted by ruling groups, and therefore restricted.
State-civil society relations in Africa have during recent decades been transformed in the context of economic liberalisation and state reform. This study explores state-civil society relations in contemporary Uganda, from 1986 to the present, in order to illustrate and explain the scope for and capacity of different social forces to create access to and democratise the state. The study interrogates state-civil society relations under the present National Resistance Movement government as these are expressed through forms of interest representation and conflict regulation in different political arenas. It analyses the theoretical problem through an empirical study of the health sector at both national and local levels.
Changes in the health regime - the rules and practices that regulate health politics - are analysed by a historical reconstruction of how different health regimes evolved from demands from social forces on the colonial and post- colonial state, in relation to broader patterns of political change. The ruling political coalition from 1986 has promoted a model for capitalist development based on donor-driven economic growth, institutional reform and political monopoly – what is referred to in the study as technocratic governance.
Throughout, however, the technocratic tendency has been shaped in relation to the political economy of militarism as a more openly repressive form of authoritarian rule. The study argues that limits to democratisation of state- society relations within the health sector and of Ugandan politics at large are best explained by relations of domination in society, within the state and among external political forces. The main finding is that democratisation of the state has been resisted by ruling groups, and therefore restricted.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) respond differently to challengesfrom autocratic governments and opposition parties around theregulation and content of elections. Building on research onautocratic state regulation of CSOs, this article contributes asharper focus on their horizontal relations to increaseunderstanding of their diverse strategies of engagement. Thearticle argues that even in contexts dominated by a heavyhanded state, relations between CSOs are especially importantduring elections, when they are most mobilized and motivated tobuild coalitions. The results of a study into how nongovernmental associations (NGOs) and faith-based organizations(FBOs) engaged with electoral reforms around the Uganda 2016general elections show how relations of cooperation,competition, or conflict between civil society organizationsmodify the effects of state regulation by adding to theirincentives and capacities. The findings help explain the manyways CSOs engage with each other, the population, the state,and the opposition, including their submission to and protestsagainst the autocratic order. Horizontal relations of conflict andcompetition among the FBOs prevented effective coalitions andfacilitated submissive politics during Uganda’s 2016 elections.Relations among governance NGOs, however, were morecooperative and generated protest alliances, even though thosealliances proved difficult to sustain.
How do ethno-regional movements in electoral autocracies engage with electoral politics? This article argues that such engagement follows the general logic of social movement mobilization but differs from it in degree because of difficult political conditions. As movements in such contexts often face restricted political opportunity structures and command limited tangible resources, they need to compensate by drawing on intellectual and communicative resources to promote their demands in ways that overcome the challenges of sensitivity and particularism associated with their interests and identities. This study examines how Buganda Kingdom in Uganda has promoted its demands for federalism around three general elections and analyses how the Kingdom has addressed the challenges of sensitivity and particularism. The article concludes that the Kingdom’s efforts to overcome the sensitivity of their claims were not supported by an ability to transcend the particularism of their demands, and thus could not be sustained.
How does the strength of political-party opposition affect government-critical civil society organisations (CSOs)’ engagement with autocratic elections? The question is particularly pertinent in the current context of deepening autocratization and repression of civic dissent. In this article, I explore the argument that strong opposition parties or coalitions facilitate CSOs’ acts of dissent by offering robust dual electoral contestation: they credibly compete for power and forcefully politicise electoral regulation. Strong opposition parties thereby change the incentives for dissent and make civic activism more possible and meaningful. The article investigates this through a qualitative comparison of two cases of autocratisation: Kenya with a strong opposition, and Uganda with a weak one. The analysis largely supports the argument. However, the comparison also demonstrates that even with a strong opposition, autocratisation makes CSO dissent a dangerous activity that requires a careful balancing between rewards and risks.
Violent political revolt has been common in independent Uganda. For a long time such revolts were exclusively expressed as rural-based rebel groups fighting the government. Since the mid-2000s, however, this seems to have come to an end. Instead, urban riots, very rare in the past, have become much more common. This article analyses the changing patterns of types and location of violent political revolt in Uganda under the National Resistance Movement. It argues that the earlier prevalence of rural rebellions can be explained by the combination of a coercive and militarised state, and weak and ethnically factionalised political forces who took their violent resistance to rural regional bases. Over time, however, government counter-insurgency became more effective and the conditions for insurgency were undermined by withdrawal of external support. Furthermore, the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 2005 opened up new avenues for political expression. The changes to the political system were however more nominal than real in many respects. While the rebel option had become less attractive and feasible, a series of social, economic and political grievances remained which were only partly channelled through party politics. They also found expression through sporadic urban violent revolt.
Kenyas politiska system reformerades år 2010 med en ny författning och institutionella reformer. Dessa förändringar syftade uttryckligen till att bryta med den centraliserade och auktoritära presidentialism som präglat landet sedan självständigheten 1963, och som ansågs ha bidragit till de allvarliga politiska våldsamheter som ägde rum 2008 efter ett omtvistat presidentval. På papperet har landets styrelseskick därför förskjutits i riktning mot maktdelning och maktbalans med avsikt att kontrollera presidentmakten: horisontellt genom ökad självständighet för rättsväsendet och andra institutioner samt en grundlagsförankrad rättighetskatalog; vertikalt genom omfördelning av befogenheter och resurser till institutioner på länsnivå. I praktiken dröjer sig dock de centralistiska och auktoritära tendenserna kvar. Presidenten överskrider regelbundet ämbetets befogenheter, statliga organ bryter frekvent mot mänskliga rättigheter, lokalstyrets utrymme kringskärs, och de politiska valen kan möjligen sägas vara fria men knappast rättvisa – Kenya utgör alltså ett exempel på den regimtyp som kallas elektoral autokrati. De betydande skillnaderna mellan formellt och reellt styrelseskick kan härledas till att den nya politiska ordningen sjösattes i ett polariserat och ojämlikt samhälle. Mäktiga grupper motsätter sig reformer och försöker undergräva den nya ordningens maktbegränsande och ansvarsutkrävande ambitioner. Dragkampen om det politiska systemets inriktning samspelar därtill med etno-regionala spänningar och omfattande korruption, något som ytterligare försvårar förutsättningarna för ett mer demokratiskt och effektivt styrelseskick.
Kenyas politiska system reformerades år 2010 med en ny författning och institutionella reformer. Dessa förändringar syftade uttryckligen till att bryta med den centraliserade och auktoritära presidentialism som präglat landet sedan självständigheten 1963, och som ansågs ha bidragit till de allvarliga politiska våldsamheter som ägde rum 2008 efter ett omtvistat presidentval. På papperet har landets styrelseskick därför förskjutits i riktning mot maktdelning och maktbalans med avsikt att kontrollera presidentmakten: horisontellt genom ökad självständighet för rättsväsendet och andra institutioner samt en grundlagsförankrad rättighetskatalog; vertikalt genom omfördelning av befogenheter och resurser till institutioner på länsnivå. I praktiken dröjer sig dock de centralistiska och auktoritära tendenserna kvar. Presidenten överskrider emellanåt ämbetets befogenheter, statliga organ bryter frekvent mot mänskliga rättigheter, lokalstyrets utrymme är kringskuret, och de politiska valen kan möjligen sägas vara fria men knappast rättvisa – Kenya utgör alltså ett exempel på den regimtyp som kallas elektoral autokrati. De betydande skillnaderna mellan formellt och reellt styrelseskick kan härledas till att den nya politiska ordningen sjösattes i ett polariserat och ojämlikt samhälle. Mäktiga grupper motsätter sig reformer och försöker undergräva den nya ordningens maktbegränsande och ansvarsutkrävande ambitioner. Dragkampen om det politiska systemets inriktning samspelar därtill med etno-regionala spänningar och omfattande korruption, något som ytterligare försvårar förutsättningarna för ett mer demokratiskt och effektivt styrelseskick.
In the wake of return to relative peace in Acholi region, northern Uganda, from 2006, land matters have taken centre stage. After having been displaced into camps for many years, people have started to go back home. Their return is complicated by many factors, including above all, land disputes. While the Ugandan constitution and land legislation protects customary tenure, the social and economic institutions that uphold this tenure regime have been severely weakened as a result of war and displacement. The combination of demographic changes following large-scale displacement and gradual return; social and economic conflicts emanating from biting poverty for most and accumulation by a few; uncertain territorial demarcations by way of changing and contested statutory and communal boundaries in the context of weak and subverted regulatory institutions, together deepen conflicts over resources. This article analyses these issues by examining a case of land acquisition in Amuru: a bid by the Madhvani business group to access huge tracts of land in western Acholi for purposes of growing sugar cane, and the heated debates and protests this case has generated, as played out by political representation in different arenas such as the media, courts and representative assemblies.
In much of Africa, the simultaneous contestation over sub-national demarcations, political identities and the locus of authority has activated a territorial politics. In such contexts of uncertainty, state rulers and other social forces advance competing notions of the relevant and legitimate boundaries of territories and identities. This collection of articles examines how, across the continent, struggles over territory are linked to divergent understandings of identity and authority, with significance for territorial integrity, national identity and conflict.
Political parties in much of sub-Saharan Africa are often state-wide, but the societies are characterized by salient ethno-regional cleavages. State-wide parties, therefore, frequently encounter strategic challenges around ethno-regional mobilization and demands for special rights or self-rule. What shapes these parties' strategic choices? We analyze whether party strategies are characterized by accommodation, opposition, or dismissal, and argue that their strategies are shaped by the degree to which contestation around territorial politics are centralized. We examine this argument by comparing how regionally dominant state-wide parties have responded to ethno-regional mobilization in the Niger Delta in federal Nigeria and the Coast region in more centralized Kenya over the last decade, and find that centralized contestation over ethno-regional issues forces parties to engage with ethno-regional demands while decentralized contestation allows parties to dismiss them.