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  • 1.
    Andersson, Patric
    et al.
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Den paradoxalaspelkonsumenten? Om påverkan vid satsningar på sportsspel med odds.2014Ingår i: Marknadsföring och påverkanpå konsumenten / [ed] M. Söderlund, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2014, 1, s. 213-232Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 2.
    Andersson, Patric
    et al.
    Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Mkt & Strategy, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden..
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Do Bettors Correctly Perceive Odds?: Three Studies of How Bettors Interpret Betting Odds as Probabilistic Information2015Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257, E-ISSN 1099-0771, Vol. 28, nr 4, s. 331-346Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper reports on three studies investigating how accurately bettors (=people who regularly bet on sports events) interpret the probabilistic information implied by betting odds. All studies were based on data collected by web surveys prompting a total of 186 experienced bettors to convert sets of representative odds into frequency judgments. Bayesian statistical methods were used to analyze the data. From the results, the following conclusions were made: (i) On the whole, the bettors produced well-calibrated judgments, indicating that they have realistic perceptions of odds. (ii) Bettors were unable to consciously adjust judgments for different margins. (iii) Although their interval judgments often covered the estimates implied by the odds, the bettors tended to overestimate the variation of expected profitable bets between months. The results are consistent with prior research showing that people tend to make accurate probability judgments when faced with tasks characterized by constant and clear feedback.

  • 3. Jenny, Mirjam A.
    et al.
    Rieskamp, Joerg
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Inferring Conjunctive Probabilities From Noisy Samples: Evidence for the Configural Weighted Average Model2014Ingår i: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 40, nr 1, s. 203-217Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Judging whether multiple events will co-occur is an important aspect of everyday decision making. The underlying probabilities of occurrence are usually unknown and have to be inferred from experience. Using a rigorous, quantitative model comparison, we investigate how people judge the conjunctive probabilities of multiple events to co-occur. In 2 experiments, participants had to repeatedly choose between pairs of 2 conjunctive events (represented as 2 gambles). To estimate the probability that both events occur, they had access to a small sample of information. The 1st experiment consisted of a balanced set of gambles, whereas in the 2nd experiment, the gambles were constructed such that the models maximally differed in their predictions. A hierarchical Bayesian approach used for estimating the models' parameters and for testing the models against each other showed that the majority of participants were best described by the configural weighted average model. This model performed best in predicting people's choices, and it assumes that constituent probabilities are ranked by importance, weighted accordingly, and added up. The cognitive modeling approach provides an understanding of the cognitive processes underlying people's conjunctive probability judgments.

  • 4.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Elwin, Ebba
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Guath, Mona
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Millroth, Philip
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi. Uppsala Univ, Dept Psychol, Uppsala, Sweden..
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Sequential and myopic: On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task2016Ingår i: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 28, nr 1, s. 106-128Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    While there is extensive research on feedback, little research is aimed at the use of feedback to optimise conflicting goals. A task modelled after In Home Displays for providing feedback about electricity cost was designed to investigate the effects of feedback frequency, detail, and stability, when participants try to balance cost and utility. Frequent feedback proved to be advantageous in a deterministic system, but feedback aggregated over time was advantageous in a system with noisy feedback. Surprisingly, performance was better with noisy feedback, where the probabilism, in effect, acted as a filter, highlighting the applications that are most important for the cost and the utility. Computational modelling suggested that the best-fitting model assumes that the participants are sequential, considering one goal at a time, first satisfying the cost budget, only thereafter trying to maximise the utility, and reflexive, myopically responding primarily to the feedback explicitly available on a given trial.

  • 5.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi. Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi. Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi. Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Where do probability judgments come from? Evidence for similarity–graded probability2001Ingår i: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2001, s. 471-476Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 6.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Probability theory: Not the very guide of life2009Ingår i: Psychological review, ISSN 0033-295X, E-ISSN 1939-1471, Vol. 116, nr 4, s. 856-874Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Probability theory has long been taken as the self-evident norm against   which to evaluate inductive reasoning, and classical demonstrations of   violations of this norm include the conjunction error and base-rate   neglect. Many of these phenomena require multiplicative probability   integration, whereas people seem more inclined to linear additive   integration, in part, at least, because of well-known capacity   constraints on controlled thought. In this article, the authors show   with computer simulations that when based on approximate knowledge of   probabilities, as is routinely the case in natural environments, linear   additive integration can yield as accurate estimates, and as good   average decision returns, as estimates based on probability theory. It   is proposed that in natural environments people have little opportunity   or incentive to induce the normative rules of probability theory and,   given their cognitive constraints, linear additive integration may   often offer superior bounded rationality.

  • 7.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats2011Ingår i: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 120, nr 2, s. 248-267Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Research on probability judgment has traditionally emphasized that people are susceptible to biases because they rely on "variable substitution": the assessment of normative variables is replaced by assessment of heuristic, subjective variables. A recent proposal is that many of these biases may rather derive from constraints on cognitive integration, where the capacity-limited and sequential nature of controlled judgment promotes linear additive integration, in contrast to many integration rules of probability theory (juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). A key implication by this theory is that it should be possible to improve peoples' probabilistic reasoning by changing probability problems into logarithm formats that require additive rather than multiplicative integration. Three experiments demonstrate that recasting tasks in a way that allows people to arrive at the answers by additive integration decreases cognitive biases, and while people can rapidly learn to produce the correct answers in an additive formats, they have great difficulty doing so with a multiplicative format.

  • 8.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Preference or Ability: Exploring the Relations between Risk Preference, Personality, and Cognitive Abilities.2020Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257|, Vol. 33, nr 1, s. 1-15Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 9.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    The decision paradoxes motivating Prospect Theory: The prevalence of the paradoxes increases with numerical ability2019Ingår i: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 14, nr 4, s. 513-533Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Prospect Theory (PT: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of risky decision making is based on psychological phenomena (paradoxes) that motivate assumptions about how people react to gains and losses, and how they weight outcomes with probabilities. Recent studies suggest that people's numeracy affect their decision making. We therefore conducted a large-scale conceptual replication of the seminal study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where we targeted participants with larger variability in numeracy. Because people low in numeracy may be more dependent on anchors in the form of other judgments we also manipulated design type (within-subject design, vs. single-stimuli design, where participants assess only one problem). The results from about 1,800 participants showed that design type had no effect on the modal choices. The rate of replication of the paradoxes in Kahneman and Tversky was poor and positively related to the participants' numeracy. The Probabilistic Insurance Effect was observed at all levels of numeracy. The Reflection Effects were not fully replicated at any numeracy level. The Certainty and Isolation Effects explained by nonlinear probability weighting were replicated only at high numeracy. No participant exhibited all 9 paradoxes and more than 50% of the participants exhibited at most three of the 9 paradoxes. The choices by the participants with low numeracy were consistent with a shift towards a cautionary non-compensatory strategy of minimizing the risk of receiving the worst possible outcome. We discuss the implications for the psychological assumptions of PT.

  • 10.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Exploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework2008Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257, E-ISSN 1099-0771, Vol. 21, nr 4, s. 471-490Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The literature presents two major theories on the cause of the conjunction fallacy. The first attributes the conjunction fallacy to the representativeness heuristic. The second suggests that the conjunction fallacy is caused by people combining p(A) and p(B) into p(A&B) in an inappropriate manner. These two theories were contrasted in two category-learning experiments. As predicted by the latter theory, data showed that participants that could assess p(A&B) directly made fewer conjunction fallacies than participants who had to compute p(A) and p(B) separately and then combine them into p(A&B). Least conjunction fallacies were observed in the cases where the representativeness heuristic was applicable. Overall, data showed that an inability to appropriately combine probabilities is one of the key cognitive mechanisms behind the conjunction fallacy.

  • 11.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Andersson, Patric
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Are bets with the odds of 3.1 more likely than bets with the odds of 21/10? How odds in sports betting are perceived as probabilistic information. 2011Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Aim: Chance, risk and uncertainty are expressed in various formats for decision-makers in everyday-life. In the sports-betting market the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., Barcelona FC will beat Arsenal FC, Lee Westwood will win the 2011 Open Championship) are reflected by odds, which also determine the amount of money that consumers of betting products (henceforth punters) will receive if their bets turn out to be successful. Typically, odds are fixed and set in advance by betting firms that have proven to be extremely accurate in this task (Forrest et al., 2005; Deschamps, 2008). In Europe odds are generally expressed in either decimals (e.g., 1.61) or fractional numbers (e.g., 8/13), where the latter format is restricted to be used in the UK and Ireland. As odds can be easily converted into implicit probabilities, they may be seen as rare examples of highly predictive probabilistic forecasts. Punters are an ideal group to study when it comes to learn about how people understand and consider quantitative measures of chance, because they are not only exposed to probabilistic information but also they put their own money at stake when making decisions and, accordingly, they should be motivated to avoid judgmental biases. Surprisingly, there is limited research on the ability of punters. Thus, the aim of this paper is to empirically address the questions: Do punters realistically perceive odds? Does the presentation format affect how realistically odds are perceived?  

     

    Method: 68 punters responded to a web-based questionnaire where they evaluated two randomly presented sets of 10 bets involving different odds. The sets were identical except for the format (= within-subjects design): set A had bets with decimal-odds, while set B had bets with fraction-odds. The odds reflected 10 different levels and were sampled from a season of English Premier League Football matches. For each of the 20 bets, the participants were asked to imagine 100 such bets and estimate how many that would come true. In connection, they also reported their confidence on a 7-points scale and provided an interval for the given estimate.

     

    Results: Across the ten different bets, the estimates of the mean participant were somewhat realistic, although there were systematic deviations from the true implicit probabilities. The deviations were linked to the presentation format in that the participants, on average, tended to underestimate bets with odds expressed as decimals and overestimate bets with odds as fractional numbers (M=-3.69 vs. 4.49). Greater confidence was also associated with the former format.

     

    Conclusions: Consistent with prior research on the perception of probabilistic information (e.g., Gigerenzer 2002), the perception of the odds was affected by the presentation format. Though the difference between the formats could be due to psychometrical aspects, we attribute it to the fact that the Swedish punters are more familiar with the decimal-format. The most surprising finding was that the punters underestimated the probabilities when odds were presented as decimals. We see three tentative explanations for this finding: (1) punters truly underestimate probabilities, (2) our participants deliberately adjusted their probability estimates so that they included the take-out-rate of the betting firms (betting firms adjust their odds so that they will make a profit of x%), (3) our participants assessed probabilities that were well calibrated to their prior experiences but failed to understand that the prior experience is biased by the take-out-rate of the betting firms.  The questions of (i) whether or not the format-difference is caused by familiarity and (ii) why probabilities are underestimated with the decimal format are explored in two follow up studies with similar designs.

  • 12.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Andersson, Patric
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Can bettors convert odds into probabilities?2011Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 13.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Andersson, Patric
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Can bettors convert odds into probabilities? Three studies of how oddsin sports betting is perceived as probabilistic information.2012Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 14.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Andersson, Patric
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Combo bets are more attractive than single bets.2013Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 15.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Andersson, Patric
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Effects of conjunction fallacies in evaluating football bets.2009Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 16.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Andersson, Patric
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Making the Seemingly Impossible Appear Possible: Effects of Conjunction Fallacies in Evaluations of Bets on Football Games2010Ingår i: Journal of Economic Psychology, ISSN 0167-4870, E-ISSN 1872-7719, Vol. 31, nr 2, s. 172-180Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates whether people obey the conjunction rule when evaluating predictions concerning the outcomes of football games. The conjunction rule states that if event A and event B are two independent events, the probability that both events A and B will occur cannot be greater than the probability that A will occur. Hence, the prediction that AC Milan will beat Fiorentina at the same times as Juventus will beat Lecce cannot be more likely than the prediction that AC Milan will beat Fiorentina. In an empirical study, it was shown that people frequently violated the conjunction rule. When a prediction with a low or intermediate likelihood of success (e.g., Stoke City will beat Manchester United) was combined with one or two predictions that had high likelihood of success (e.g., Liverpool FC will beat Wigan), it was perceived to be more likely to happen than when it was presented alone. This was not true when it was combined with a prediction with a low likelihood of success. Thus, the perceived likelihood of a particular prediction is dependent on the context in which it is presented.

  • 17.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Exemplars in the Mist: The cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic2008Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 49, nr 3, s. 201-212Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the exemplar hypothesis (Juslin & Persson, 2002), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis.

  • 18.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Olsson, Henrik
    From prototypes to exemplars: Representational shifts in a probability judgment task2003Ingår i: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Cognitive Science Society, Boston, Massachusetts, USA , 2003, s. 868-873Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    What information is used to make subjective probability judgments? In this study we test a hypothesis, grounded both in research on categorization and developmental psychology, proposing that when first confronted with an environment people create prototy

  • 19.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Heuristics Can Produce Surprisingly Rational Probability Estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014)2016Ingår i: Psychological review, ISSN 0033-295X, E-ISSN 1939-1471, Vol. 123, nr 1, s. 103-111Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Costello and Watts (2014) present a model assuming that people’s knowledge of probabilities adheres toprobability theory, but that their probability judgments are perturbed by a random noise in the retrievalfrom memory. Predictions for the relationships between probability judgments for constituent events andtheir disjunctions and conjunctions, as well as for sums of such judgments were derived from probabilitytheory. Costello and Watts (2014) report behavioral data showing that subjective probability judgmentsaccord with these predictions. Based on the finding that subjective probability judgments followprobability theory, Costello and Watts (2014) conclude that the results imply that people’s probabilityjudgments embody the rules of probability theory and thereby refute theories of heuristic processing.Here, we demonstrate the invalidity of this conclusion by showing that all of the tested predictions followstraightforwardly from an account assuming heuristic probability integration (Nilsson, Winman, Juslin,& Hansson, 2009). We end with a discussion of a number of previous findings that harmonize very poorlywith the predictions by the model suggested by Costello and Watts (2014).

  • 20.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    The rationality of weighting and adding probabilities.2009Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 21.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Categorization vs. inference: Shift in attention or representation?2005Ingår i: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2005Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently it has been found that people that learn through in-ference create qualitatively different cognitive representations than those who learn through categorization. The present study addresses the question of whether the findings support-ing this claim generalize to a design where both learning tasks have a probabilistic relation between each stimulus cue and the category label. It was shown that participants in the cate-gorization condition learned faster than participants in the in-ference condition. Further, participants in the inference condi-tion did not rely on prototypical values when making one-cue categorizations. The results suggest that shifts in attention must be considered as a viable explanation of some of the re-sults in studies that investigate differences between inference and categorization.

  • 22.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Juslin, Peter
    The Cognitive Substrate of Subjective Probability2005Ingår i: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, Vol. 31, nr 4, s. 600-620Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 23.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Olsson, Henrik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    The cognitive substrate of subjective probability.2005Ingår i: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, Vol. 31, nr 4, s. 600-20Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as prototype similarity, relative likelihood, or evidential support accumulation (ESAM; D. J. Koehler, C. M. White, & R. Grondin, 2003); cue-based relative frequency; and exemplar memory, implemented by probabilities from exemplars (PROBEX; P. Juslin & M. Persson, 2002). Three experiments with different task structures consistently demonstrate that exemplar memory is the best account of the data whereas the results are inconsistent with extant formulations of the representativeness heuristic and cue-based relative frequency.

  • 24.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Rieskamp, Jörg
    University of Basel.
    Conjunctive probabilities and monetary incentives.2009Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 25.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Rieskamp, Jörg
    University of Basel.
    The effects of monetary incentives on how conjunctive probabilities areassessed.2009Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 26.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Rieskamp, Jörg
    Department of Psychology, University of Basel.
    Jenny, Mirjam
    Department of Psychology, University of Basel.
    Exploring theoverestimation of conjunctive probabilities2013Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 4, s. 101-Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    People often overestimate probabilities of conjunctive events. The authors explored whether the accuracy of conjunctive probability estimates can be improved by increased experience with relevant constituent events and by using memory aids. The first experiment showed that increased experience with constituent events increased the correlation between the estimated and the objective conjunctive probabilities, but it did not reduce overestimation of conjunctive probabilities. The second experiment showed that reducing cognitive load with memory aids for the constituent probabilities led to improved estimates of the conjunctive probabilities and to decreased overestimation of conjunctive probabilities. To explain the cognitive process underlying people’s probability estimates, the configural weighted average model was tested against the normative multiplicative model. The configural weighted average model generates conjunctive probabilities that systematically overestimate objective probabilities although the generated probabilities still correlate strongly with the objective probabilities. For the majority of participants the model was better than the multiplicative model in predicting the probability estimates. However, when memory aids were provided, the predictive accuracy of the multiplicative model increased. In sum, memory tools can improve people's conjunctive probability estimates.

  • 27.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Rieskamp, Jörg
    Department of Psychology, University of Basel.
    Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan
    Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam.
    Hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation for cumulative prospect theory2011Ingår i: Journal of mathematical psychology (Print), ISSN 0022-2496, E-ISSN 1096-0880, Vol. 55, nr 1, s. 84-93Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Cumulative prospect theory (CPT Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) has provided one of the most influential accounts of how people make decisions under risk. CPT is a formal model with parameters that quantify psychological processes such as loss aversion, subjective values of gains and losses, and subjective probabilities. In practical applications of CPT, the model's parameters are usually estimated using a single-participant maximum likelihood approach. The present study shows the advantages of an alternative, hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation procedure. Performance of the procedure is illustrated with a parameter recovery study and application to a real data set. The work reveals that without particular constraints on the parameter space, CPT can produce loss aversion without the parameter that has traditionally been associated with loss aversion. In general, the results illustrate that inferences about people's decision processes can crucially depend on the method used to estimate model parameters.

  • 28.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Rieskamp, Jörg
    University of Basel.
    Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan
    University of Basel.
    Hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation for models of decision under uncertainty.2011Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

     

    Cognitive modeling has long been the key tool in research on decision under uncertainty. Cognitive modeling has the benefits of generating exact model-predictions and providing the opportunity of rigorous model comparison tests. Cognitive modeling is not, however, without problems. This paper focuses on one of these, namely the problem of how to generate reliable estimates of a model´s free parameters.

    Traditionally, models are fitted to data at the individual level and parameter estimates are retrieved using maximum likelihood (ML) methods. A downside of this procedure is that it, due to the fact that it is susceptible to noise, tends to exaggerate individual differences. An alternative approach is to use hierarchical Bayesian (HB) parameter estimation. The approach is hierarchical because it uses models with several levels. In the simplest case (the case studied in this paper), the value of parameter x for individual i (individual level) is assumed to be sampled from a normally distributed hyper distribution with parameters m and s (the hyper level). The individual x-values and parameters m and s are estimated from individual data simultaneously. Importantly, the HB approach is less susceptible to noise because individual x-values are constrained by the hyper distribution.

    The present paper: The aim was to explore the benefits of the HB approach. The strategy was to estimate the parameters of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) with both the ML and the HB approach and compare the results. For clarity, CPT has five free parameters. The three that are most important here are α (quantifies the curvature of the value function for gains), β (quantifies the curvature of the value function for losses) and λ (quantifies the amount of loss aversion).

    Study 1: Study 1 was a parameter recovery study. Synthetic data was created as follows. A deterministic version of CPT, equipped with the parameter estimates from Tversky and Kahneman (1992; Journal of Risk and Uncertainty), generated choice-predictions for the 180 gamble-pairs used in Rieskamp (2008; JEP:LMC). Data sets with choices from 30 synthetic participants were created by adding noise to these predictions. The goal of Study 1 was to explore if the two approaches would be equally good at recovering the underlying parameters. Study 1 provided three key findings. (1) Overall, the medians for the ML-estimates corresponded well with the medians of the HB-estimates. (2) The HB approach was superior at filtering out noise. (3) Regardless of fitting approach, loss aversion was mainly captured by separating α and β so that α < β. As a result, λ was systematically underestimated. When CPT was constrained so that α = β, the underestimation was strongly reduced for ML-estimates and neutralized for HB-estimates.

    Study 2. CPT was fitted to the behavioral data from Rieskamp (2008). Study 2 replicated the main findings from Study 1. In addition, study 2 provided two finding regarding λ. (1) Neither the median ML-estimate nor the median HB-estimate indicated systematic loss aversion. (2) Extreme ML-estimates for λ can be caused by two very different factors, systematic loss aversion and noise. This was shown by the fact the 6 participants that received the most extreme ML-estimates all received HB-estimates very close to the mean of the hyper distribution for λ.

    Summary. Parameter λ is the weak-spot of CPT. In particular, it is systematically underestimated if α and β are allowed to vary freely and noisy data tend to attract extreme ML-estimates. On the general level, as it generates both more information and more stable parameter estimates, we conclude that HB parameter estimation has the potential of vitalizing the literature on decisions under uncertainty.

  • 29.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Rieskamp, Jörg
    University of Basel.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Jenny, Mirjam
    University of Basel.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    People systematically overestimate conjunctive probabilities.2013Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 30.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Hansson, Göran
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Linda is not a bearded lady: Configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors2009Ingår i: Journal of experimental psychology. General, ISSN 0096-3445, E-ISSN 1939-2222, Vol. 138, nr 4, s. 517-534Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article explores the configural weighted average (CWA) hypothesis suggesting that extension biases, like conjunction and disjunction errors, occur because people estimate compound probabilities by taking a CWA of the constituent probabilities. The hypothesis suggests a process consistent with well-known cognitive constraints, which nonetheless achieves high robustness and bounded rationality in noisy real-life environments. Predictions by the CWA hypothesis are that in error-free data, conjunction and disjunction errors should be the rule rather than the exception when pairs of statements are randomly sampled from an environment, the rate of extension errors should increase when noise in data is decreased, and that adding a likely component should increase the probability of a conjunction. Four experiments generally verify the predictions by the hypothesis, demonstrating that extension errors are frequent also when tasks are selected according to a representative design.

  • 31.
    Winman, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Kerimi, Neda
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    The role of ANS acuity and numeracy for the calibration and the coherence of subjective probability judgments2014Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 5, s. 851-Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of the study was to investigate how numeracy and acuity of the approximate number system (ANS) relate to the calibration and coherence of probability judgments. Based on the literature on number cognition, a first hypothesis was that those with lower numeracy would maintain a less linear use of the probability scale, contributing to overconfidence and nonlinear calibration curves. A second hypothesis was that also poorer acuity of the ANS would be associated with overconfidence and non-linearity. A third hypothesis, in line with dual-systems theory (e.g., Kahnernan and Frederick, 2002) was that people higher in numeracy should have better access to the normative probability rules, allowing them to decrease the rate of conjunction fallacies. Data from 213 participants sampled from the Swedish population showed that: (i) in line with the first hypothesis, overconfidence and the linearity of the calibration curves were related to numeracy, where people higher in numeracy were well calibrated with zero overconfidence. (ii) ANS was not associated with overconfidence and non-linearity, disconfirming the second hypothesis. (iii) The rate of conjunction fallacies was slightly, but to a statistically significant degree decreased by numeracy, but still high at all numeracy levels. An unexpected finding was that participants with better ANS acuity gave more realistic estimates of their performance relative to others.

  • 32.
    Winman, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Kerimi, Neda
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    The role of ANS-acuity and numeracy for the accuracy of subjective probability judgments.2013Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
1 - 32 av 32
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