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  • 1.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Augustine on Second-Order Desires and Persons2016In: Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy / [ed] Jari Kaukua and Tomas Ekenberg, Springer, 2016, p. 9-24Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Examines Augustine's view of the will and the self and explores parallels between Augustine's and Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical accounts of personhood. Throws new light on Augustine's views on moral responsibility by showing that even if Augustine may have abandoned certain libertarian assumptions as to the nature of human free will in his mature works, he retains the underlying view of personhood as dependent on a capacity for a certain form of second-order desiring.

  • 2.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Auktoritet och den fria viljan hos Anselm, Kant och R. P. Wolff.2012In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, no 2Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Free Will and Free Action in Anselm of Canterbury2005In: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 22, no 4Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    La volonté abélardienne et la tradition augustinienne2009In: Regards sur la France du Moyen Âge: Mélanges offerts à Gunnel Engwall à l'occasion de son départ à la retraite / [ed] Olle Ferm & Per Förnegård, Stockholm: Sällskapet Runica et Mediævalia, Centre d'études médiévales de Stockholm , 2009, p. 263-276Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Power and Activity in Early Medieval Philosophy2009In: The World as Active Power: Studies in the History of European Reason / [ed] J. Pietarinen & V. Viljanen, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers , 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Practical Rationality and the Wills of Confessions 82014In: Augustine's Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography / [ed] William E. Mann, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 28-45Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Review of Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism by Katherin A. Rogers2016In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    The Medieval Notion of the Superiority of the Will2014In: Swedish Students at the University of Leipzig in the Middle Ages / [ed] O. Ferm & S. Risberg, Stockholm: Centre for Medieval Studies, Stockholm University , 2014Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury2016In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, ISSN 0960-8788, E-ISSN 1469-3526, Vol. 24, no 2, p. 215-230Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.

  • 10.
    Kaukua, Jari
    et al.
    Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä.
    Ekenberg, TomasUppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy2016Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This book is a collection of studies on topics related to subjectivity and selfhood in medieval and early modern philosophy. The individual contributions approach the theme from a number of angles varying from cognitive and moral psychology to metaphysics and epistemology. Instead of a complete overview on the historical period, the book provides detailed glimpses into some of the most important figures of the period, such as Augustine, Avicenna, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume. The questions addressed include the ethical problems of the location of one's true self and the proper distribution of labour between desire, passion and reason, and the psychological tasks of accounting for subjective experience and self-knowledge and determining different types of self-awareness.

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