Why is it that certain threat images appear on the political agenda and others do not? The issue of how a political agenda is set has been studied in a series of different contexts and with the aid of any number of different theoretical approaches. Man
The study, which is based on my doctoral dissertation, analyses changes in beliefs of the Norwegian and Swedish foreign Ministers 1945-1948. The purpose is to explain why the decision-makers of the two Scandinavian countries chose various security po
The study sets out to analyse trends in the verbal politics concerning threat framing from the second year of independence up to the year 2000, focusing on policy makers in the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is concluded that the Russian thr
The book sets out to describe and explain trends in the verbal
This article shows that the threat framing by the Estonian elite has changed significantly over time. In order to explain these changes, the identity formations salient in the Estonian political discourse are analyzed using discourse analysis, and contrasted to two other explanatory approaches; one based on the ideas of realism, the other on cognitive theory. This demonstrates that the variation of threat images, as well as Estonia’s wish to join international organizations is not solely guided by any fear of Russia, but also by a desire to re-establish bonds with an identity formation Estonia once was part of. Thus, the change of threat images can be explained by the dynamics of identity formations, which in turn are linked to processes of socialization, as Estonia adapts to the discourse of the West. It is further argued that previous research on the linkages between identity formations and threat images has tended to oversimplify this relationship. In contrast to earlier research, this article claims that after independence the Estonian Self has not developed in polarized terms vis-à-vis the Russian state and the domestic Russian Other. Rather, it is concluded that what is at issue is a process of socialization. This implies not only learning and using language as a means towards the recognition of a multicultural Estonia, and the inclusion of the Russian minority in the Estonian Self, but also the institutionalization of such a language in terms of official policies.
The security behavior of small states has traditionally been explained by different takes of realism, liberalism, or constructivism – focusing on the behavior that aims toward safeguarding sovereignty or engaging in peace policies. The issue of why states with limited military capacities and little or no military alignments or engagements decide to participate in an international mission has received limited attention by previous research. In contrast, this article argues that a three-layered discursive model can make the choices of small states more precisely explained and thereby contribute to an increased understanding of small states’ security behavior beyond threat balancing and interdependence. Analyzing a deviant case of a non-aligned small state, this article explains why Sweden became increasingly involved in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. By focusing on the domestic political discourses regarding the Swedish involvement in this mission, it is suggested that a narrative shapes public perception of a particular policy and establishes interpretative dominance of how a particular event should be understood. This dominant domestic discourse makes a certain international behavior possible and even impossible to alter once established. In the Swedish case, it is demonstrated that this discourse assumed a ‘catch-all’ ambition, satisfying both domestic and international demands. In general terms, it should thus be emphasized that certain discourses and narratives are required in order to make it possible for a country to participate in a mission such as ISAF and prolong the mission for several years.
What happens to dominant narratives and settled self-images of so-called peace nations when experiencing actual combat in out-of-area military missions? This question arises when studying the contemporary international engagement of small states that previously have mostly been engaged in peacekeeping with limited mandates and non-use of force restrictions. As today's international missions have altered radically, it is important to analyse narrative friction and transformation in small states with little prior experience of international war-fighting. This article addresses this lacuna by examining two small states and self-proclaimed peace nations - Sweden and Norway - in relation to their engagement in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led security mission to Afghanistan 2002-14. By examining the interplay and discursive struggle of two narratives - peace nation and military culture - this article finds that these narratives constantly constitute and reconstitute a small state's self-image and the boundaries for acceptable or even required behaviour. With altered principles regarding use of force there is an increased friction between the narratives. By addressing these frictions, the article contributes to the literature on small state international military engagement and develops and refines assumptions regarding the drivers and consequences of small state participation in out-of-area missions.