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  • 1.
    Bengtsson, Niklas
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Engström, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Control and Efficiency in the Nonprofit Sector: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment2011Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Results in behavioral economics suggest that material incentives can crowd out motivation, if agents are mission-oriented rather than self-interested. We test this prediction on a sample of nonprot organizations in Sweden. Swedish nonprot organizations receive tax funds annually to promote human development issues through information campaigns. Traditionally, the contract with the main principal (the Swedish foreign aid agency) has been based on trust and self-regulation. We designed an experimental policy intervention, eectively replacing the trust-based contract with an increased level of monitoring from the principal, along with a threat to cut future funds if irregularities were detected. Our findings are inconsistent with (strong) motivational crowd-out. Overall, using both self-reported and observed measures of outreach, we find that the intervention improved eciency. Graphical analysis shows that non-monitored organizations exhibit a distinct tendency to maximize expenditure; in contrast, organizations in the treatment group are more likely to return unused grants to Sida. Additionally, we find no crowding out of private contributions and no evidence of a "discouraged NGO"-syndrome.

  • 2.
    Bengtsson, Niklas
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Engström, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Replacing trust with control: a field test of motivation crowd out theory2014In: Economic Journal, ISSN 0013-0133, E-ISSN 1468-0297, Vol. 124, no 577, p. 833-858Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Results in behavioural economics suggest that material incentives can crowd out motivation if agents are mission-oriented rather than self-interested. We test this prediction on a sample of non-profit organisations in Sweden. Traditionally, contracts with the main principal (the Swedish foreign aid agency) have been based on trust and self-regulation. We designed a randomised policy experiment, effectively replacing the trust-based contract with an increased level of monitoring from the principal. Overall, using both self-reported and observed measures of outreach, we find that the intervention increased outreach, reduced expenditures and reduced the number of financial irregularities.

  • 3.
    Engström, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Bling Bling Taxation and the Fiscal Virtues of Hip Hop2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper extends Ng’s (1987) model of optimal taxation of diamond goods — goods that are valued solely for their costliness. We extend his findings by analyzing how other goods should be taxed in the presence of pure diamond goods; modified Ramsey rules are derived in a basic single-type model as well as in a two-type model with redistribution. One key finding, that may be surprising and rather provoking, is that close complements (hip hop music) to diamond goods (bling bling) should be heavily subsidized.

  • 4.
    Engström, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Wage Formation and Redistribution2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper extends the basic Stiglitz (1982) model of optimal non- linear income taxation into a model featuring endogenous unemploy- ment and wages. This means that the government needs to consider the effects on wages and unemployment when designing the optimal tax function. The tax systems’ effects on the wage formation and the unemployment rates result in new intricate redistribution channels. A key result of the paper is that the government may, in order to redis- tribute, use the marginal tax rates to raise the unemployment rate for the high-skilled and lower it for the low-skilled workers.

  • 5.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Forsell, Eskil
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Demand effects of consumers' stated and revealed preferences2013Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Knowledge of how consumers react to different quality signals is fundamental for understanding how markets work. We study the online marketplace for Android apps where we compare the causal effects on demand from two quality related signals; other consumers' stated and revealed preferences toward an app. Our main result is that consumers are much more responsive to other consumers' revealed preferences, compared to others' stated preferences. A 10 percentile increase in displayed average rating only increases downloads by about 3 percent, while a 10 percentile increase in displayed number of downloads increases downloads by about 20 percent.

  • 6.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies.
    Hagen, Johannes
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies.
    Income underreporting among the self-employed: a permanent income approach2017In: European Economic Review, ISSN 0014-2921, E-ISSN 1873-572X, Vol. 92, p. 24p. 92-109Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The consumption based method to estimate underreporting among self-employed, introduced by Pissarides andWeber (1989), is one of the workhorses in the empirical literature on tax evasion/avoidance. We show that failure to account for transitory income fluctuations in current income may overestimate the degree of underreporting by around 40 percent. Previous studies typically use instrumental variable methods to address the issue. In contrast, our access to registry based longitudinal income measures allows a direct approach based on more permanent income measures. This also allows us to evaluate the performance of a list of instruments widely used in the previous literature. Our analysis shows that capital income is the most suitable instrument in our application, while education and housing related measures do not seem to satisfy the exclusion restrictions.

  • 7.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Hesselius, Patrik
    Uppsala University, Units outside the University, Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation.
    Holmlund, Bertil
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Vacancy Referrals, Job Search, and the Duration of Unemployment: A Randomized Experiment2012In: Labour, ISSN 1121-7081, E-ISSN 1467-9914, Vol. 26, no 4, p. 419-435Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One goal of the Public Employment Service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job-seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job-seekers to vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report results from a randomized Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is examined. To what extent do unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they are referred to? Does information to job-seekers about increased monitoring affect the probability of applying and the probability of leaving unemployment? The experiment indicates that a relatively large fraction (one-third) of the referrals do not result in job applications. Information about intensified monitoring causes an increase in the probability of job application, especially among young people. However, we find no significant impact on the duration of unemployment.

  • 8.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Holmlund, Bertil
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax Country: Evidence from Sweden2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Self-employed individuals have arguably greater opportunities than wage earners to underreport their incomes. The incentives for underreporting should be especially strong in an economy with generally high taxes. This paper uses recent income and expenditure data to examine the extent of underreporting of income among self-employed individuals in Sweden. A key hypothesis is that underreporting of incomes among the self-employed would be visible in the data as “excess food consumption”, for a given level of observed income. Our results confirm the underreporting hypothesis. In particular, we estimate that households with at least one self-employed member underreport their total incomes by around 30 percent. Under- reporting appears to be twice as prevalent among self-employed people with unincorporated businesses as among those with incorporated businesses.

  • 9.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Holmlund, Bertil
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilbrium2005Report (Other (popular scientific, debate etc.))
  • 10.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Holmlund, Bertil
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper presents a tractable general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms offer wages, and possibly sick pay, so as to maximize expected profits, recognizing that the compensation package affects the queue of job applicants and possibly the absence rate as well. Shocks to the value of leisure among nonemployed individuals interact with their search decisions and trigger movements into and out of the labor force. The analysis provides a number of results concerning the impact of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers’ and firms’ behavior. For example, higher nonemployment benefits are shown to increase absenteeism among employed workers. The normative anlysis identifies externalities associated with firm-provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies. Conditions are given under which welfare equivalence holds between publicly provided and firm-provided sick pay. Benefit differentiation across states of non-work are found to be associated with non-trival welfare gains.

  • 11.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Holmlund, Bertil
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Kolm, Ann-Sofie
    Tax differentiation, search unemployment, and home production2005In: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 57, p. 610-633Article in journal (Other (popular scientific, debate etc.))
  • 12.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Units outside the University, Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies. Uppsala Center for Labor Studies (UCLS).
    Hägglund, Pathric
    Johansson, Per
    Uppsala University, Units outside the University, Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation. Institute of Labor Economics (IZA); Inspektionen för socialförsäkringen (ISF); Uppsala Center for Labor Studies (UCLS).
    Early Interventions and Disability Insurance: Experience from a Field Experiment2017In: Economic Journal, ISSN 0013-0133, E-ISSN 1468-0297, Vol. 127, no 600, p. 363-392Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We estimate the effects of early assessments of an individual's need for vocational rehabilitation in the Swedish sickness insurance system using a field experiment. One of the interventions increases the flow to disability benefits by 20%. The effect is larger for unemployed individuals, who also are covered by the sickness insurance scheme. This result is in line with a theoretical model with moral hazard and asymmetric information in which individuals with low work incentives communicate worse health in response to the assessment for rehabilitation which then increases the hazard to disability benefits.

  • 13.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Units outside the University, Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson, Per
    Uppsala University, Units outside the University, Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    The medical doctors as gatekeepers in the sickness insurance?2012In: Applied Economics, ISSN 0003-6846, E-ISSN 1466-4283, Vol. 44, no 28, p. 3615-3625Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Based on a randomized experiment, we estimate effects from notification to medical doctors of tighter monitoring of their Medical Certificates (MCs). Both the time prescribed by the doctor certificates for sick leave (prescribed sick leave) and the impact on the length of the actual sickness absence (actual sick leave) is studied. We find no effect on the total number of prescribed sick leave days. However, we do find an increase in both prescribed and actual sick leave with a 25% work inability. We also find that the notification letter causes an increase in actual sick leave (i.e. the number of reimbursed sick days). We discuss a number of potential explanations for this rather surprising result.

  • 14.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Kolm, Ann-Sofie
    Liang, Che-Yuan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Maternal Addiction to Parental Leave2006Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    The increased demand for a more equal parental sharing of the responsibilities for children has led many countries to reconstruct their parental leave systems so to provide stronger incentives for fathers to participate in childcare. Father’s quotas are becoming widely spread across Europe. This paper provides arguments for why it may be welfare improving for both parents to increase the father’s share of the family’s parental leave time. However, regulations in terms of father’s quotas may not be optimal since it fails to recognise potentially heterogenous preferences. Instead, self-commitment devices should be provided in order to prevent mothers from taking too large share of the family’s leave time.

  • 15.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Nordblom, Katarina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies.
    Ohlsson, Henry
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies.
    Persson, Annika
    The Swedish Tax Agency.
    Loss evasion and tax aversion2015In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 7, p. 42p. 132-164Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The objective of this paper is to study if taxpayers behave in a loss aversemanner when filing their tax returns. This is important for tax design but alsofor understanding human behavior in general. The predictions of prospecttheory can be contrasted to those of expected utility theory. We use datafor 3.6 million Swedish taxpayers for the income year 2006. Our researchmethod is quasi-experimental using a regression kink and discontinuity approach.We also use an alternative instrumental-variables approach. There isstrong evidence of loss aversion. We estimate the coefficient of loss aversionusing actual behavior and the instrument-variables approach. Our estimate isvery close to the estimates reported in the experimental literature.

  • 16.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Nordblom, Katarina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics. Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
    Ohlsson, Henry
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Persson, Annika
    The Swedish Tax Agency.
    Tax Compliance and Loss Aversion2015In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, ISSN 1945-7731, E-ISSN 1945-774X, Vol. 7, no 4, p. 132-164Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study if taxpayers are loss averse when filing returns. Preliminary deficits might be viewed as losses assuming zero preliminary balances as reference points. Swedish taxpayers can to try to escape such losses by claiming deductions after receiving information about the preliminary balance. Using a regression kink and discontinuity approach, we study data for 3.6 million Swedish taxpayers for 2006. There are strong causal effects of preliminary tax deficits on the probability of claiming deductions. Compliance will increase and auditing costs will be reduced if preliminary taxes are calibrated so that most taxpayers receive refunds.

  • 17.
    Engström, Per
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Units outside the University, Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies.
    Nordblom, Katarina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies.
    Stefánsson, Arnaldur
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Multiple Misbehaving: Loss Averse and Inattentive to Monetary Incentives2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We study what determines taxpayers’ deduction behavior when filing tax returns. Preliminary deficits might be viewed as losses assuming zero preliminary balance as reference point. Swedish taxpayers may escape these losses by claiming deductions after receiving information about the preliminary balance. Furthermore, the Swedish income tax system has a substantial kink (20 percentage points) where the central government tax applies. Taxpayers slightly above the governmental tax kink have substantially higher (standard economic) incentives to claim deductions than taxpayers slightly below the kink. Using a regression kink and discontinuity approach with individual fixed effects, we study a panel of 4.1 million Swedish taxpayers in 1999 to 2006. We find strong causal effects of preliminary deficits on the probability of claiming deductions. The initial empirical evidence for a kink in deduction probability at the central government threshold, anticipated by standard economic theory, is weaker but significant. However, a more detailed analysis reveals that the kink at the tax threshold is not likely due to the tax incentives per se. When controlling for the preliminary tax deficit, the kink at the tax threshold disappears. Taxpayers just above the tax kink are namely more likely to run a preliminary tax deficit than those just below it. Hence, the most plausible explanation also for the kink at the tax threshold is therefore loss aversion and not standard economic incentives. The Swedish taxpayers are thus “misbehaving”, in a Thaler (2015) sense, on two separate margins: they are highly loss averse but surprisingly inattentive to standard monetary incentives.

1 - 17 of 17
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