Why do some events take precedence over others in terms of being viewed as security issues? This article argues that in order to answer this question it is necessary to move beyond the assumption that threat images are self-evident. Rather, a distinction should be made between the contextual conditions that may lay the foundation for a threat image and the subjective problem formulation by actors. In addition, in order to analyze how, why, and when an actor constructs a threat image and initiates a so-called securitization process, a broad conceptual and analytical framework should be employed. This article suggests a framework that incorporates ideas and identity at the international and domestic levels, and the internalization processes of the central decision-making unit performing the securitization. The article argues that while the diffusion of ideas by entrepreneurs forms an important basis for the threat constructions of national decision-makers, it is necessary to take the role of national and domestic identities into account in order to explain why some idea diffusion processes succeed while other do not. Identity serves as a catalyst or gate-keeper of idea diffusion. The internalization of the decision-making unit, finally, is a central mechanism that highlights the process between the explanatory factors and the outcome (securitization). By including these three concepts into the analysis, this article takes a holistic approach that can be employed to analyze different kinds of actor-based and non-actor-based threat images.
How are threat images framed and constructed by the so-called warlord democrats (WDs)? Societies that have suffered from large-scale civil wars are commonly permeated by inter-group fear and hate. In these contexts, former military or political leaders of armed groups sometimes become involved in post-war politics. These WDs can act as reconciliation spoilers by making securitising moves, i.e. they construct threat images that are potentially very costly for fragile post-conflict democratisation processes. It is therefore crucial to explore WDs’ speech acts. Yet, the literature on post-war politics has largely overlooked these individual aspects. This article argues that the central components of securitisation theory can be useful in understanding this phenomenon if adjusted to the contextual circumstances of post-war societies. By analysing speech acts by seven WDs in post-war Liberia and Sierra Leone, two forms of framing strategies stand out as particularly relevant. First, WDs’ securitising moves are often framed as veiled threats of violence, as it is often deemed too risky for these individuals outside formal power positions to overtly express threats in a generally de-securitised setting. Second, when WDs construct threats, they often chose to frame themselves or their constituencies or followers as the referent object of security.