Actor-systems dynamics is an innovative, multidisciplinary methodology for investigating and analyzing social struggles over economic resources and the related interplay between economic and socio-political institutions and processes. The authors, sociologists and economists, offer a systemic perspective on contemporary socio-economic issues such as economic crisis, unemployment, inflation, economic democracy and development; in their analyses, they identify several of the key factors that drive people to interact, to initiate change and transformation as well as to resist such change. Major underlying themes in the book are: Conflict over the distribution of economic resources and economic policies and institutions; the structural bases of economic inequality and conflict; the shaping and reshaping of socio-economic institutions, and the contradictions, conflicts and instabilities evoked by such developments; the failure of orthodox economic theories, including Keynesianism, in the face of recurrent economic crises and instabilities; the development and application of an open, dynamic actor-oriented systems theory - grounded in the social sciences - addressing complex socio-economic phenomena in ways diverging substantially from conventional economics. All in all, the papers collected here deal, on the one hand, with social power, conflict, and struggle concerning economic resources and institutions and, on the other hand, the structural and other factors which drive powering initiatives, conflict, and social innovation and transformation. The book is addressed to a broad spectrum of social and managerial scientists concerned with socio-economic issues, institutions, and development.
This paper concerns itself with the general problem of achieving cooperation in human groups and higher levels of social systems. Several social situations are considered where cooperation is problematic because self-interest contradicts group or collective interest: the prisoners' dilemma game; the commons' problem (Hardin, 1972); the collective action problem, i.e., the failure of memberships of many large interest groups, e.g., consumers and the general public, to cooperate to achieve common goals (Olson, 1968); and the problem of competitive panics, e.g., a crowd in a burning theater. We introduce a structural framework and methodology, using social system level concepts, to characterize and analyze such problems. It is shown that the various cases have a common underlying structure. In the analysis, we focus on the social context of the problematic situations and, in particular, on social processes that structure human interaction and collective behavior. A basic idea guiding the analysis is that actors purposively structure and transform interaction situations or games into situations of greater or less cooperation or conflict, depending upon the social context. We examine specific social control processes that may be found operating in social systems to resolve problems of achieving cooperative action, that is, to deal with contradictions between individual interests and autonomy on the one hand and group interest and need for cooperative action on the other. In particular, we focus on the social structuring and restructuring in groups of perceptions and evaluations, action possibilities, and decision procedures and, therefore, likely interaction patterns of those involved.
The aim of this conceptualization article is to formulate propositions about: (1) systemic faults in established money and financial systems, in particular the mechanisms that make for boom-and-bust cycles; and (2) the cognitive and action factors which limit the central banks capabilities to consistently and effectively to regulate or to limit these cycles. Drawing on earlier research (our own as well as that of others), this conceptualization is presented in Section 1. Section 2 identifies a new design and institutional arrangement, which would minimize the boom-and-bust predispositions in money and financial systems. This work builds on earlier research invested in “the Chicago Plan” (from the 1930s) in addition to our own research. Section 3 considers the expected political and ideological constraints on reforming financial systems. Previously operating constraints—including Neo-liberal erosion of New Deal banking arguments and reforms—make for formidable barriers. The paper concludes that reform is necessary—if boom-and-bust cycles on the scale of those since 1929 are to be effectively regulated; but it is suggested that such reform is politically and ideologically difficult if not impossible in the short-run.
The use of the term resilience has virtually exploded in the past decade, yet its usage points to wildly differing meanings and applications. Among the most widely used definitions, it is defined as the capacity of a system to respond to a perturbation or disturbance by resisting damage and recovering quickly (this is among several definitions critically discussed in the paper). Interdisciplinary theoretical discourses on resilience now include consideration of the interactions of humans and ecosystems by means of models of socio-ecological systems, and entails a shift from the maximum sustainable yield paradigm to environmental resource management that aims to build ecological resilience through adaptive resource management and adaptive governance".
The paper criticizes the mainstream conceptualization of resilience for its flat portrayal (and all-too-often neglect) of socio-cultural dimensions, the role of human agency, and innovative and creative activities. Drawing on a wide range of relevant sociological research, the paper offers an alternative conceptualization. It emphasizes: (1) the socio-cultural and institutional context of resilience processes; (2) the socio-political capacity of entrepreneurs to mobilize human agents and resources (including economic and technical resources) in response to systemic disturbances; and (3) the capacity to initiate innovation processes and produce creative responses and adaptations to systemic disturbances. Cases of municipalities and local communities are presented and analyzed in this new perspective. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the reconceptualization for CCA, DRR, and Sustainability Development.
This article presents a social systems theoretical approach to the field of socio-economics. Drawing on actor-system dynamics, a social systems theory, developed in the 1970s, we report on how it has been applied to socio-economic questions and analyses in a series of reports and publications for the past 40+ years. Among the problems discussed are: (1) The discontents and conflicts of capitalism. (2) Economic inequality, uneven socio-economic development, conflict and instability. (3) The limits of orthodox economic theories and policies in the face of recurrent economic crises and instabilities. Introduction of the paper briefly outlines the social systems theory, actor-system dynamics (ASD). Part I discusses the continued relevance of the systems approach, possibly even more so as systemic failures have occurred in the post-Keynesian world. In Part II, we consider what next for social systems analysis and its application to socioeconomic problems.
This article considers the concepts of sustainability and sustainable development in relation to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. We conceptualize sustainability from a social systemic perspective, that is, from a perspective that encompasses the multiple functionalities of a social system and their interrelationships in particular environmental contexts. The systems perspective is applied in our consideration and analysis of disaster risk reduction (DRR), climate change adaptation (CCA), and sustainable development (SD). Section “Sustainability and Sustainable Development” introduces briefly sustainability and sustainable development, followed by a brief presentation of the theory of complex social systems (Section “Social System Model”). The theory conceptualizes interdependent subsystems, their multiple functionalities, and the agential and systemic responses to internal and external stressors on a social system. Section “Case Studies of Response to Stressors” considers disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA), emerging in response to one or more systemic stressors. It illustrates these with disaster risk reduction in the cases of food and chemical security regulation in the EU. CCA is illustrated by initiatives and developments on the island of Gotland, Sweden and in the Gothenburg Metropolitan area, which go beyond a limited CCA perspective, taking into account long-term sustainability issues. Section “Sustainable Development as a Societal Development System” discusses the limitations of DRR and CCA, not only their technical limitations but economic, socio-cultural, and political limitations, as informed from a sustainability perspective. It is argued that DRRs are only partial subsystems and must be considered and assessed in the context of a more encompassing systemic perspective. Part of the discussion is focused on the distinction between sustainable and non-sustainable DRRs and CCAs. Section “Concluding Remarks” presents a few concluding remarks about the importance of a systemic perspective in analyzing DRR and CCA as well as other similar subsystems in terms of sustainable development.
This paper focuses on group normative procedures and distributional norms that are utilized in functioning groups in the production/generation of normative equilibria, that is, the major basis of social order in groups and communities. The group is an organizational arrangement with some degree of division of labor and characterized by group purposes and goals, a normative order and patterns of interaction and output. We identified three patterns of particular interest: (1) legitimation procedures in groups to resolve conflicts and make collective choices; (2) patterns of just outcomes satisfying the normatively prescribed group outcomes/outputs of a principle of distributive justice's; (3) normative equilibria, which are group patterns of interaction or collective decision that tend to stability because they satisfy or realize one or more key group norms.