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  • 1.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Are we lovers of the good?2004In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 138, no 2, p. 247-260Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Donald Davidson has stressed that we interpret a person correctly only if we represent him as satisfying certain norms of rationality. Some of these norms are "norms of coherence". A competent interpreter will find that the speaker has beliefs that are, by and large, consistent, and preferences that satisfy certain ordering conditions. However, other norms are "norms of correspondence". Thus, we must also, according to Davidson, assume that the speaker has beliefs that are, by and large, correct (by our lights), and desires that we, by and large, share. In this paper, I focus on the latter of these claims. I argue that, although Davidson may have made a case for the idea that we must assume that a speaker shares many of our beliefs, there is no justification for thinking that the same holds for our desires. Indeed, nothing Davidson says gives us reason to doubt that we are able to interpret a speaker without making any prior assumptions whatsoever about his particular desires. This conclusion points to a crucial asymmetry between beliefs and desires.

  • 2.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Book Review of On What Matters, Volume III, by DerekParfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xiv + 468 pp. ISBN 9780198778608.2018In: European Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0966-8373, E-ISSN 1468-0378, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 668-672Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists1999In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 65, p. 70-85Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Coherence and disagreement1992In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 65, no 3, p. 305-317Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Contrasts and Demons: On Sinnott-Armstrong’s moderate Pyrrhonian scepticism2010In: Rearticulations of Reason: Recent Currents / [ed] Leila Haaparanta, Helsinki: Hakapaino Oy , 2010, p. 243-260Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 6.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Crispin Wright on moral disagreement1998In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 48, no 192, p. 359-365Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, the appropriate conclusion is that the disagreement is not genuine, since we must otherwise attribute an inexplicable error.

  • 7.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Davidson and Quine's Empiricism2001In: Interpreting Davidson, San Fransisco: CSLI Publishers , 2001, p. 269-283Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Debunking and Disagreement2017In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 51, no 4, p. 754-774Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics or religion, is to provide a “debunking” argument against them. Another, even more familiar, way is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area. These types of challenge are often treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to. Yet, as they pursue similar conclusions one might well wonder how they are related. Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? The purpose of this paper is to argue that the latter is indeed the case and that appeals to disagreement have a crucial role to play in the debunking strategy.

  • 9.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations2005Conference proceedings (editor) (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Detaljernas paradox2012In: 10tal, ISSN 2000-5350, no 8/9, p. 91-93Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 11.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere2014In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 79, no S1, p. 55-72Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to a traditional argument against moral realism, the existence of objective moral facts is hard to reconcile with the existence of radical disagreement over moral issues. An increasingly popular response to this argument is to insist that it generalizes too easily. Thus, it has been argued that if one rejects moral realism on the basis of disagreement then one is committed to similar views about epistemology and meta-ethics itself, since the disagreements that arise in those areas are just as deep as the moral ones. This in turn is taken to show that a moral anti-realist should seek another basis for her position. For, if she extends her anti-realism also to epistemology and meta-ethics, then she is no longer in a position to say that her meta-ethical position is true or that it is a fact that we have reason to accept it. She therefore seems left with a position that hardly even seems to be a position. The purpose of the paper is to challenge this response and in particular the claim that the argument from disagreement applies equally well to epistemology and meta-ethics as it does to ethics. It is argued that, despite contrary appearances, there are crucial differences between the disagreements that occur in ethics compared to those that arise in the other areas. Moreover, even granted that the disagreements are just as deep, there are other differences between the areas that nevertheless justify drawing different conclusions about their status from the existence of those disagreements.

  • 12.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Disagreement, Moral2013In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the philosophical literature one often meets the locution “the argument from moral disagreement”, as if there is only one such argument. But there are in fact several arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, arguments that take quite different routes to their anti-realist conclusions. In what follows, some of these arguments are reconstructed and discussed.

  • 13.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Ethics2008In: The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, London: Routledge , 2008, p. 111-120Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 14.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Ethics, Theoretical Rationality and Eliminativism About Belief2009In: Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2009, p. 345-355Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 15.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Explaining the Reliability of Moral Beliefs2016In: Ethics and Explanation / [ed] Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 37-57Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Fem filosofiska frågor2001 (ed. 1)Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 17. Tersman, Folke
    Fresh Air?2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz / [ed] Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen m.fl., Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Hur bör du leva?2004 (ed. 1)Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 19.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Intuitional Disagreement2012In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 50, no 4, p. 639-659Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the best version of the ‘experimentalist’ challenge to the use of intuitions in philosophy and in particular in ethics and to discuss possible responses to the challenge. I focus especially on responses that invoke substantive assumptions of the very type intuitions are supposed to support. It is argued that even if this apparently circular strategy is thought legitimate, the prospects of providing a compelling response to the challenge are still bleak.

    Abstract: Some think that recent empirical research has shown that peoples' moral intuitions vary in a way that is hard to reconcile with the supposition that they are even modestly reliable. This is in turn supposed to generate skeptical conclusions regarding the claims and theories advanced by ethicists because of the crucial role intuitions have in the arguments offered in support of those claims. I begin by trying to articulate the most compelling version of this challenge. On that version, the main problem is the absence of a believable positive account of the reliability of the intuitions (rather than the bits of negative evidence that have so far been gathered). I then consider the response to this challenge that, in my view, holds most promise. It differs from others by invoking substantive moral assumptions. Such a strategy may appear problematically circular, in that the justification of those assumptions seems to presuppose the very thesis that is challenged (the thesis that our intuitions deserve being treated as evidence). However, although I think that objection can be met, I argue that there are other problems with the strategy. On the basis of a set of conditions that a successful defense of the pertinent kind plausibly must satisfy, I argue that the prospects of developing such an account are bleak.

  • 20.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Meaning, Morals, and Mistakes2011In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlsson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski and Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011, p. 345-350Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Disagreement2006 (ed. 1)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this book, Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking from moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.

  • 22.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge2017In: Moral Skepticism: New Essays / [ed] Diego Machuca, New York: Routledge, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Benacerraf challenge is a well-known objection to Platonism in mathematics. Its proponent argues that, if mathematical entities are, as Platonists claim, mind-independent, causally inert, and existent beyond space and time, then we are led to a skeptical stance according to which it is not possible to explain how it is that we have cognitive access to the mathematical realm or how it is that our mathematical beliefs are reliable. It has been argued that a similar objection could be leveled against those forms of moral realism that fall under what in Section 2 was called “robust moral realism.” In “Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge,” Folke Tersman considers whether, unlike the argument from the best explanation, the argument from disagreement, and the argument from evolution, the moral version of the Benacerraf challenge can undermine moral knowledge without appealing to empirical claims that moral realists deem controversial. His verdict is negative: to successfully counter certain responses to the moral version of the challenge, its proponent needs to have recourse to empirical considerations taken from some of the above arguments

  • 23.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Noncognitivism and inconsistency1995In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 361-371Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A popular objection to ethical noncognitivism is that it fails to account for the realist appearance of moral discourse. This paper focuses on one feature of this appearance: Our tendency to seek consistency among our moral views. Contrary to what has been argued, I hold that noncognitivists can rationalize this practice. In support of this position, I mention some considerations indicating why, on a noncognitivist view, it is reasonable to seek moral consistency. However, I also discuss how well the main competitor to noncognitivism (that is, moral realism) fares in rendering this practice reasonable.

  • 24.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Quine on ethics1998In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 64, no 1, p. 84-98Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In support of his noncognitivist view on ethics, Quine appeals to the claim that there are no ethical observation sentences. I argue that, given one of Quine's definition of 'observation sentence', this claim is false, while, given another, it is true. However, if taken strictly, no sentence satisfies the condition imposed by that definition. And even if it might be argued that the condition is satisfied to a higher degree by some nonethical sentences than by any ethical sentence, the relevance of this consideration is unclear. I conclude that the argument fails to vindicate noncognitivism.

  • 25.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recent Work on Reflective Equilibrium and Method in Ethics2018In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 13, no 6, article id e12493Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms? Or is it rather due to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent criticisms are related to certain general arguments regarding the possibility of knowledge in ethics that are currently intensely debated, such as the evolutionary debunking arguments. I argue that nothing that has come to light in that debate, or in the recent discussion about IRE more generally, decisively strengthens the case against it. If anything, the recent developments show that IRE deserves its present status.

  • 26.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Reivew of Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Liberty2001In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 67, no 2, p. 176-183Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy. Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Donald Davidson's Problems of Rationality 2006In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 72, no 3, p. 233-239Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy. Institutet för framtidsstudier.
    Review of Joyce, R., and Kirchin, S., (eds.), A World Without Values. Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010)2015In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, ISSN 2210-5697, Vol. 5, no 4, p. 333-337Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 29.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism2001In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 67, no 2, p. 177-183Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 30.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Stimulus Meaning Debunked1998In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 48, no 3, p. 371-385Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    W. V. Quine appears to have introduced his notion 'stimulus meaning' for two main purposes: To define the concept of an observation sentence, and to provide criteria for translation manuals. I argue that it is not useful for any of these purposes, in part by questioning Quine's views on semantics and epistemology. I also survey some alternative purposes that the notion is supposed to serve, and argue that its utility relative to these purposes is also limited. I therefore suggest that we let the notion drop out of our philosophical toolbox.

  • 31.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology2010In: Philosophical Topics, ISSN 0276-2080, E-ISSN 2154-154X, Vol. 38, no 2, p. 181-204Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    An increasingly popular strategy among critics of ethical antirealism is to stress that the traditional arguments for those theories work just as well in the case of other areas. For example, on the basis of that idea, it has recently been claimed that ethical expressivists are committed to being expressivists also about epistemic  judgments (including the judgment that it is rational to believe in ethical expressivism). This in turn is supposed to seriously undermine their position. The purpose of my paper is to examine this challenge. I argue that, in spite of the many similarities between the discourses, there are also crucial differences and that those differences justify a mixed verdict about them. According to the thesis I pursue, one can accept ethical expressivism on the basis of the traditional arguments and still, plausibly and coherently, deny a non-expressivist view about epistemic judgments.

  • 32.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience2008In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 86, no 3, p. 389-405Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (e.g., by Peter Singer) that these results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and therefore provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight (such as the idea of reflective equilibrium). I distinguish between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a sceptical attitude towards intuitions. I argue that, given the first version of the challenge, the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings. As for the second version of the challenge, I argue that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general.

  • 33.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Viability and Desirability of Global Democracy2006Conference proceedings (editor) (Other academic)
  • 34.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Tillsammans: en filosofisk debattbok om hur vi kan rädda vårt klimat2009Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 35.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Utilitarianism and the Idea of Reflective Equilibrium1991In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 395-406Article in journal (Refereed)
1 - 35 of 35
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