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  • 1.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    A Romantic Reading of the French ‘Burqa Ban’: Liberty as Self-Expression and the Symbolism of Uncovered Faces in the French Debate on Full Veils2015In: Confluence: online journal of world philosophies, ISSN 2199-0360, Vol. 2, p. 88-106Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper suggests that in order to understand the recent ban in France against covering one’s face in public, we need to move beyondthe theoretical frameworks typically applied to the more researched 'headscarf ban' of 2004. Previous research tends to interpret the 'burqa ban' as yet another attempt to impose republican unity and order over what was taken to be the excessive and divisive self-expression manifested by the Muslim veil. It has recently been suggested, however,that it might be more fruitful to approach the debate through a rather different theoretical lens: the Romantic ideal of liberty as self-expression, the original target of Isaiah Berlin’s warnings that positive liberty invites tyranny under the very banner of liberation. The paper follows up on this suggestion by revisiting the report that recommended the 2010 ban on full veils to the National Assembly. More specifically, it analyzes the section of the report in which it is argued that there is something special about faces, which requires usto keep them uncovered. This reasoning, it is argued, does indeed seem to be rooted in a Romantic understanding of liberty and human dignity, and in the fear that full veils suppress rather than express each individual’s unique self. The ban on full veils must thus also be understood as an attempt, whether misguided or not, to promote the self-expression of veiled women – not curb it, as previous research has nevertheless often assumed.

  • 2.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Att vara fri på svenska: ett frihetsälskande folk2010In: Avstamp: Svenska folkets värden och syn på brännande samhällsfrågor / [ed] Magnus Hagevi, Göteborg: Linnaeus University Press , 2010, p. 47-64Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Autonomy - the Metaphysical Blanket of Modern Man?: An examination of Berlin's two notions of liberty2007Conference paper (Other scientific)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper should be seen against the background of my dissertation project, in which I aim to sort out some of the empirical confusions concerning Ronald Inglehart’s so-called self-expression values by developing more theoretically refined research hypotheses. I argue that much of the empirical disagreement on whether self-expression values promote democracy or not depends on the fact that their active ingredient, called liberty aspirations, actually consists of several very different and often conflicting conceptions of liberty that have been collapsed into one. Thus, contrary to what Inglehart and his colleagues assume, there can be no unambiguous relationship between liberty aspirations and democracy. The relationship very much depends on which conception of liberty we are discussing. We will not know where self-expression values come from, why they arise, and which kind of democracy they do (or do not) promote, unless we know which sort of liberty aspirations they actually capture. In order to do this, we cannot as Inglehart start with factor scores. Beginning in the proper end necessarily brings us back to political theory.

  • 4.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Banning the Muslim Veil in the Name of Liberty – But Liberty of What Kind?2014In: ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, September 2014, 2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Contemporary European liberalism: Exclusionary, enlightened or romantic?2014In: Routledge handbook of European politics / [ed] José M. Magone, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014, p. 75-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Dangerous Liberties. Isaiah Berlin's Critique of Positive Liberty Revisited2010In: Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2010, 2010Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Den förrädiska friheten2011In: Neo Magasin, ISSN 1652-378X, no 5, p. 66-71Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 8.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Därför bör vi avstå från att provocera2011In: Dagens Nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447, no 2011-08-02Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 9.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Farliga ryggmärgsrelexer: Därför ska vi akta oss för att argumentera med känslorna2012In: Dagens Nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447, no 2012-02-20Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 10.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Freedom in Mass Values: Egocentric, Humanistic, or Both?: Using Isaiah Berlin to Understand a Contemporary Debate2012In: European Political Science Review, ISSN 1755-7739, E-ISSN 1755-7747, Vol. 4, no 2, p. 241-262Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Does an increasing emphasis on individual freedom in mass values erode or revitalize democratic societies? This paper offers a new approach to this debate by examining it through the lens of Isaiah Berlin, and his distinction between positive and negative freedom. I show that, contrary to the common assumption among scholars who study mass values regarding freedom, these do not consist of one dimension but two: negative and positive freedom. I also show that, while valuing negative liberty clearly leads a person to become more morally permissive and more condoning of non-compliance with legal norms, valuing positive liberty does not seem to have the same effects at all; in fact, it shows the very opposite relationship with respect to some of these attitudes. Thus, it matters what kind of freedom people value. The results rely on confirmatory factor and regression analyses on World Values Survey data from ten affluent Western countries in 2005–2006.

  • 11.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    ‘Hard Liberals’ and their Opposition to the Muslim Veil: Romantic, rather than Enlightened, Liberalism?2013In: ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, September 2013, Colchester: European Consortium for Political Research , 2013, p. -22Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper challenges the concept of ‘enlightenment liberalism’, which is held to prioritize the fostering of autonomy over tolerance and diversity. Enlightenment liberalism, it has example been argued, lies at the roots of recent attempts in many European countries to ban the Muslim veil in the name of liberalism. This paper questions the central role that previous research has attributed to ‘enlightenment liberalism’. I provide one of the first thorough explorations of the arguments of self-professed ‘enlightenment liberals’ such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Paul Berman, Nick Cohen, Pascal Bruckner, and the recently deceased Christopher Hitchens. Specifically, I look at their opposition to the Muslim veil and their view of the right role for religion in what they describe as secular modern democracies. This analysis shows that, contrary to the predominant view, their ‘hard liberalism’ does not revolve around fostering autonomy among supposedly irrational and emotional Muslims. Rather, they castigate liberal Westerners for lacking in emotional fervor and sincerity. Their position in fact builds on the value of authentically expressing one’s emotions; their goal is courageous dedication on the verge of martyrdom. To describe them as ‘enlightenment liberals’ or ‘enlightenment fundamentalists’ thus distorts their true ideological roots, which I argue are romantic. In fact, their stance is best described as ‘romantic liberalism’, an ideology that I have previously argued was also found in the defence of the infamous Muhammad cartoons in 2005 (Gustavsson, forthcoming in Political Studies 2013). This paper thus suggests that romantic ideals need not always side with multicultural toleration and diversity, as is often assumed. On the contrary, certain romantic ideals are more likely to end up taking the very opposite side, siding with ‘illiberal liberalism’ and its antagonism against the Muslim veil.Self-professed ‘enlightenment liberals’ among contemporary public intellectuals today, I argue, are better described as ‘romantic liberals’.

  • 12.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Harmful Speech and Self-Disclosure in the Case of the Danish Muhammad Cartoons: The Diverging Implications of Enlightenment Liberalism and Romantic Liberalism2014In: Free Speech, Public Deliberation, and Global Affairs Conference, The Arctic University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway, June 2014, 2014Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 13.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Individualism in Theory: Or the Virtues of Harry Potter, Luke Skywalker, Lisa Simpson and Pippi Longstocking2008Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is often suggested that the distinguishing characteristic of public opinion in contemporary Western societies is a lack of shared moral guidelines in life: everything goes. The only ideal left is what is often called individualism, namely that of not accepting any given roles, values or ideals in life but instead striving towards being as free as possible to behave as one pleases. In the thesis that this chapter forms a part of, I offer a different understanding of the much discussed culture of individualism. In later chapters, I shall present data that allow us to question existing assumptions regarding the empirical nature of individualistic values. In this chapter, however, I begin by addressing what I believe is still an un-settled issue of just as much, if not even more, importance: the concept of individualism and how to define it. This chapter aims to equip us with the theoretical Wellingtons we need before venturing into the empirical swamp of individualism. We still know too little about individualism as a set of moral ideals concerning how human beings and society ought to behave. The root of the problem, I suggest, is that we lack a theoretically sound definition of what this kind of normative individualism is and what it is not; which in turn means we have no existing framework for making systematic comparisons between different versions of individualistic ideals. Here, I develop a definition of normative individualism and such a framework.  In doing so, I do not only contribute to a more thorough understanding of individualism, but also to two closely related debates in political theory. Normative individualism, it is shown, amounts to valuing individual liberty of different kinds. Thus, the concept of individualism provides a new and rewarding entry to two classic conceptual questions which I also discuss: how to define freedom and how to define moral autonomy.

  • 14.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Introduktion2011In: Essäer om frihet / [ed] Isaiah Berlin ; redaktör: Henry Hardy ; förord av Håkan Tribell ; introduktion av Gina Gustavsson, Stockholm: Timbro , 2011, p. 9-24Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 15.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    ‘Isaiah Berlin’s Four Freedoms; Or the Virtues of Harry Potter, Luke Skywalker, Lisa Simpson, and Pippi Longstocking2009In: Nordic Network for Political Theory, Copenhagen, October 2009, 2009Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Liberal national identity: thinner than conservative, thicker than civic – but in terms of what?2015In: ECPR Joint Sessions, Warsaw, April 2015. Workshop: The Civic Turn in European Immigrant Integration Policies, Colchester: European Consortium for Political Research , 2015, p. -16Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Contemporary European policies and discourses regarding immigration and citizenship seem to be increasingly oriented towards strengthening the national identity. The typologies and analytical frameworks typically used to make sense of these trends, however, are in dire need of further elaboration. The goal of this paper is to help in this endeavour. The pre-dominant analytical approach for a long time has been to separate between ‘civic’ and ’ethnic’ national identities, and to assume that the more liberal and universalistic their content, the less nationalistic they are per definition, and vice versa. A great deal of recent research has suggested we need to go beyond these dichotomies, however – both because they are theoretically too crude, and because they hamper rather than help us in understanding the trend of purportedly universal liberal values being invoked as the very basis for exclusive, particularistic national identities after all (cf. Mouritsen & Olsen 2013). The most recent solution suggested by previous research is to leave the content of national identities aside altogether, and instead focus entirely on whether the boundaries of a given national identity are constructed in a voluntaristic or a deterministic way (Kriegbaum Jensen, 2014; Laegaard, 2007; Zimmer, 2003). In contrast, while this paper agrees with the need to go beyond the civic-ethnic and liberal-nationalist dichotomies, it offers an alternative solution to the problem. Instead of discarding ideal types like civic or ethnic nationalism as analytical categories altogether, I propose they can be further nuanced, by bringing in the literature in political theory that differentiates between ‘conservative nationalism’, ‘liberal nationalism’ and ‘civic patriotism’. These ideal types, I argue, can be spelled out along five different dimensions – and a number of additional policy dimensions – that the theoretical literature has failed to specify. Doing so allows us to create an analytical tool that is likely to help future research analyze and assess contemporary national identity trends in a way that connects the discussion to normative theory, especially regarding the recent empirical cases where liberal values are presented in a nationalistic way.

  • 17.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Reply to Crowder2015In: Review of Politics, ISSN 0034-6705, E-ISSN 1748-6858, Vol. 77, no 2, p. 279-284Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Romantic Liberalism. A book proposal2012In: Nordic Network for Political Theory, Roskilde, October 2012, 2012Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 19.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Romantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Disrespect in the Muhammad Cartoons Controversy2014In: Political Studies, ISSN 0032-3217, E-ISSN 1467-9248, Vol. 62, no 1, p. 53-69Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There is increasing scholarly concern that liberalism comes into conflict with religious diversity. William Galston blames this tendency on ‘enlightenment liberalism’, which places autonomous self-reflection at the heart of the liberal project. This paper, however, proposes a culprit that is more prone to both disrespect and fundamentalism: romantic liberalism, which idealises authentic self-expression. I develop this concept by re-visiting the Danish cartoon controversy, allegedly a case of enlightenment liberalism. This reveals that Flemming Rose, the editor who commissioned the cartoons, invokes romantic rather than enlightened values in defense of the publication. In contrast to previous research, I show that Rose does not portray the disrespectfulness of the cartoons as a side effect of trying to promote autonomy among Muslims. Rather, he argues in favor of artistic provocation as such, and invokes a distinctly romantic understanding of freedom of speech, which in many ways runs counter to the ideal of autonomy.

  • 20.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Romantic Liberalism. An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Values in the Muhammad Cartoons Controversy2012In: International Society for Political Psychology, Chicago, July 2012, 2012Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Romantic Liberalism. The role of individuality and autonomy in the opposition to Muslim veils among self- professed “enlightenment liberals”2013In: Political Studies Association, Cardiff, March 2013, 2013Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    The Freedom-Loving Egoist and Other Imaginary Creatures2009In: ECPR Joint Sessions, Lisbon, April 2009, 2009Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    The Inversion of Liberty: Isaiah Berlin and Coercion in the Name of LibertyManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This article reconstructs Isaiah Berlin’s ’inversion thesis': the notion that positive liberty leads to coercion in the name of liberty. Previous research has understood Berlin as analysing the logical implications of positive liberty; or, alternatively, as observing a mere historical fact with no apparent explanation. This paper suggests that there is a third, psychological, layer to Berlin’s argument. The inversion of liberty, I argue, is best understood as a psychological process intimately linked to Berlin’s insistence on the treacherous, at times dangerous, power of ideas over our actions – even when these actions are not logically justified but only appear so to us. My reading implies that the numerous examples of positive liberty which Berlin provides are united by a pattern that he believes makes these ideals more liable than others to lead their advocates to the fallacious conclusion that coercion is an act of liberation. I show that Berlin traced this risk to two elements in positive liberty: their focus on freedom from internal rather than external constraints to the self, and their interest in preference formation rather than preference enaction. Finally, I show that Berlin’s warnings are not exhausted by the Enlightenment notion of liberation by reason, the popular target among contemporary theorists concerned with repression in the name of liberty. My reading shows that Berlin saw romantic ideals of liberty, such as authenticity and self-realization, as equally vulnerable to this inversion – the very ideals of liberty, one might add, that are currently on the rise in public opinion.

  • 24.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    The Positive and Negative Dimensions of Freedom: Libertarianism and Self-Expression Values Revisited2009In: Building Bridges: North American and European Political Psychology Today, Lund, December, 2009, 2009Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 25.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    The Positive and Negative Dimensions of Freedom: Libertarianism and Self-Expression Values Revisited2009In: American Political Science Association, Toronto, September 2009, 2009Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 26.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    The Problem of Individualism: Examining the relations between self-reliance, autonomy and civic virtues2007Conference paper (Other scientific)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper is an outline of my dissertation project, which will deal with political psychology, civic values and participation. More specifically, I ask how the ideal of individualism affects a citizen's civicness. How does the fact that someone believes in the principle of individual independence in turn influence their tolerance, solidarity, participation and general engagement in politics? And what elements does the ideal of individualism consist of? Does it perhaps consist of different dimensions; and if so, do these different individualisms have varying effects on civic virtues? I here briefly comment on previous research on individualism and democracy and propose what I intend to do differently, followed by a dive into the empirical puzzle of individualism in the United States and in Sweden. I then develop a preliminary typology for what I call external and internal individualism. I also discuss why and how we should expect these different ideals to affect civic virtues. I further suggest that the issue of individualism and civicness relates to the larger question of how to balance the positive or ‘republican’ right to self-development through participation on the one hand, with the negative or ‘liberal’ right to privacy on the other. In this, my project actualizes a possible conflict at the heart of liberal democracy; a conflict between what Benjamin Constant calls the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns.

  • 27.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    The Psychological Dangers of Positive Liberty: Reconstructing a Neglected Undercurrent in Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty"2014In: Review of Politics, ISSN 0034-6705, E-ISSN 1748-6858, Vol. 76, no 2, p. 267-291Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Berlin is often taken to have exaggerated his case against positive liberty, since contrary to what he seems to argue, several versions of it do not logically justify coercion. A more historical interpretation of his warnings may save him from this accusation, yet on the other hand suggests his message is of little relevance for contemporary liberalism. In contrast to both these approaches, this essay considers a third and largely neglected aspect of “Two Concepts of Liberty,” that speaks more directly to the challenges facing liberalism today: Berlin's warning that positive liberty invites the specific kind of coercion that parades as liberation, and that it does so according to a psychologically predictable pattern. After reconstructing this undercurrent in Berlin's critique of positive liberty, this essay also considers the relevance of Berlin's warnings to contemporary European debates on banning the Muslim veil in the name of liberation.

  • 28.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    The Romantic Strain in Enlightenment Liberalism. Distinguishing a liberalism based on Kantian autonomy from one based on Millian individuality2013In: Immigration, Toleration, and Nationalism Conference, Helsinki, May 2013, 2013Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 29.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Treacherous Liberties: Isaiah Berlin's Theory of Positive and Negative Freedom in Contemporary Political Culture2011Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Contemporary attitudes in affluent Western societies are characterised by a growing emphasis on individual freedom. What, then, does this commitment to liberty entail for our openness to diversity; and ultimately for liberal democracy? Previous research on popular attitudes, for example by Ronald Inglehart, tends to assume that valuing freedom entails an encouragement of a plurality of life-styles. This thesis, by contrast, argues that there are several ideals of freedom in public opinion; ideals that may have opposing consequences for our permissiveness towards ways of life that differ from our own.

    The introductory essay in this book suggests that Isaiah Berlin’s theory of positive and negative freedom provides a fruitful analytical framework, which helps theorise and empirically nuance our picture of popular ideals of freedom. Essay I goes on to present a novel, psychological, interpretation of Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty. This essay also suggests that Berlin was critical not only of enlightened ideals of positive liberty, but also of romantic ones, which might be even more widespread today. Essay II then applies Berlin’s framework to contemporary survey data. Through confirmatory factor and regression analyses, this essay demonstrates that Berlin’s negative-positive distinction does in fact hold also in popular opinion; and that the two dimensions have rather different effects on moral and legal permissiveness. Essay III, finally, revisits a recent example of disrespect in the name of liberty: the Danish cartoon controversy. This essay develops the concept of ‘romantic liberalism’, thereby deepening our knowledge of romantic ideals of positive liberty, and their particularly disrespectful tendencies.

    Drawing on Isaiah Berlin, and his critique of positive liberty, the essays in this thesis together suggest that it is crucial for liberal democracy to recognise the existence of treacherous liberties: ideals that lead their supporters to ridicule, condemn, or even prohibit ways of life that differ from their own – all in the name of liberty.

    List of papers
    1. The Inversion of Liberty: Isaiah Berlin and Coercion in the Name of Liberty
    Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Inversion of Liberty: Isaiah Berlin and Coercion in the Name of Liberty
    (English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This article reconstructs Isaiah Berlin’s ’inversion thesis': the notion that positive liberty leads to coercion in the name of liberty. Previous research has understood Berlin as analysing the logical implications of positive liberty; or, alternatively, as observing a mere historical fact with no apparent explanation. This paper suggests that there is a third, psychological, layer to Berlin’s argument. The inversion of liberty, I argue, is best understood as a psychological process intimately linked to Berlin’s insistence on the treacherous, at times dangerous, power of ideas over our actions – even when these actions are not logically justified but only appear so to us. My reading implies that the numerous examples of positive liberty which Berlin provides are united by a pattern that he believes makes these ideals more liable than others to lead their advocates to the fallacious conclusion that coercion is an act of liberation. I show that Berlin traced this risk to two elements in positive liberty: their focus on freedom from internal rather than external constraints to the self, and their interest in preference formation rather than preference enaction. Finally, I show that Berlin’s warnings are not exhausted by the Enlightenment notion of liberation by reason, the popular target among contemporary theorists concerned with repression in the name of liberty. My reading shows that Berlin saw romantic ideals of liberty, such as authenticity and self-realization, as equally vulnerable to this inversion – the very ideals of liberty, one might add, that are currently on the rise in public opinion.

    Keywords
    romanticism, enlightenment, autonomy, authenticity, psychology, values, repression, tolerance
    National Category
    Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalisation Studies)
    Research subject
    Political Science
    Identifiers
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-159136 (URN)
    Projects
    The Impact of Religion
    Available from: 2011-09-22 Created: 2011-09-21 Last updated: 2018-01-12
    2. Freedom in Mass Values: Egocentric, Humanistic, or Both?: Using Isaiah Berlin to Understand a Contemporary Debate
    Open this publication in new window or tab >>Freedom in Mass Values: Egocentric, Humanistic, or Both?: Using Isaiah Berlin to Understand a Contemporary Debate
    2012 (English)In: European Political Science Review, ISSN 1755-7739, E-ISSN 1755-7747, Vol. 4, no 2, p. 241-262Article in journal (Refereed) Published
    Abstract [en]

    Does an increasing emphasis on individual freedom in mass values erode or revitalize democratic societies? This paper offers a new approach to this debate by examining it through the lens of Isaiah Berlin, and his distinction between positive and negative freedom. I show that, contrary to the common assumption among scholars who study mass values regarding freedom, these do not consist of one dimension but two: negative and positive freedom. I also show that, while valuing negative liberty clearly leads a person to become more morally permissive and more condoning of non-compliance with legal norms, valuing positive liberty does not seem to have the same effects at all; in fact, it shows the very opposite relationship with respect to some of these attitudes. Thus, it matters what kind of freedom people value. The results rely on confirmatory factor and regression analyses on World Values Survey data from ten affluent Western countries in 2005–2006.

    Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
    Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012
    Keywords
    liberty, self-expression, Inglehart, civicness, permissiveness, confirmatory factor analysis
    National Category
    Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalisation Studies)
    Research subject
    Political Science
    Identifiers
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-158849 (URN)10.1017/S1755773911000191 (DOI)000314174900005 ()
    Projects
    The Impact of Religion
    Available from: 2011-09-21 Created: 2011-09-18 Last updated: 2018-01-12Bibliographically approved
    3. Romantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Disrespect in the Muhammad Cartoons Controversy
    Open this publication in new window or tab >>Romantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Disrespect in the Muhammad Cartoons Controversy
    2014 (English)In: Political Studies, ISSN 0032-3217, E-ISSN 1467-9248, Vol. 62, no 1, p. 53-69Article in journal (Refereed) Published
    Abstract [en]

    There is increasing scholarly concern that liberalism comes into conflict with religious diversity. William Galston blames this tendency on ‘enlightenment liberalism’, which places autonomous self-reflection at the heart of the liberal project. This paper, however, proposes a culprit that is more prone to both disrespect and fundamentalism: romantic liberalism, which idealises authentic self-expression. I develop this concept by re-visiting the Danish cartoon controversy, allegedly a case of enlightenment liberalism. This reveals that Flemming Rose, the editor who commissioned the cartoons, invokes romantic rather than enlightened values in defense of the publication. In contrast to previous research, I show that Rose does not portray the disrespectfulness of the cartoons as a side effect of trying to promote autonomy among Muslims. Rather, he argues in favor of artistic provocation as such, and invokes a distinctly romantic understanding of freedom of speech, which in many ways runs counter to the ideal of autonomy.

    Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
    Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014
    Keywords
    Romanticism, authenticity, autonomy, Galston, freedom of speech, enlightenment liberalism, diversity, tolerance, positive liberty, self-expression
    National Category
    Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalisation Studies)
    Research subject
    Political Science
    Identifiers
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-159137 (URN)10.1111/1467-9248.12022 (DOI)000331387300004 ()
    Projects
    The Impact of Religion
    Available from: 2011-09-22 Created: 2011-09-21 Last updated: 2018-01-12Bibliographically approved
  • 30.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Veils, Nudity and Authenticity: Self-professed “enlightenment liberals” and their romantic crusade against the Muslim veil2013In: Conference of The Impact of Religion Programme, Uppsala, May 2013, 2013Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 31.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    What Individualism Is and Is Not: Or the ideals of Pippi Longstocking and Lisa Simpson2008Conference paper (Other scientific)
    Abstract [en]

    It is often suggested that the distinguishing characteristic of public opinion in contemporary Western societies is a lack of shared moral guidelines in life: everything goes. The only ideal left is what is often called individualism, namely that of not accepting any given roles, values or ideals in life but instead striving towards being as free as possible to behave as one pleases. In this paper, I shall question this understanding of individualism. I shall argue that, both conceptually and empirically, individualism is also a set of specific ideals, as opposed to the lack thereof. In this paper, I back up my argument both by theorizing and presenting two new empirical studies, one on Dutch and the other on Swedish survey data. These indicate there are no reasons to assume that just because one is an individualist in the sense that one values individual freedom, one would also condone egoism, freeriding and hedonism. Neither do individualists need to be alienated and lacking a larger goal in life than the pursuit of self-interest. Finally, one of the studies also suggests there are two types of individualistic ideals: one external and oriented towards freedom of action (exemplified by Pippi Longstocking) and another more internal and focused on freedom of thought (exemplified by Lisa Simpson).

  • 32.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Sundberg, Ralph
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal Predictors of Opposition to the Muslim Veil Among Swedish Students2013In: International Society for Political Psychology, Herzliya, Israel, July 2013, 2013Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 33.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Van der Noll, Jolanda
    Institut für Psychology, FernUniversität in Hagen.
    Sundberg, Ralph
    Independent.
    Intolerance in the Name of Liberalism: Opposition to Muslim Headscarves in Sweden and the Netherlands2014In: American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, August 30, 2014 Washington DC, USA., Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network , 2014Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Opposition to Muslim headscarves remains high in otherwise typically tolerant countries, like Sweden and the Netherlands. One suggested explanation is a mounting concern among liberal Europeans that Muslims threaten liberal values. Yet, the nature of these threatened values remains obscure. Empirical research on anti-Muslim attitudes in general, and their relation to liberal values in particular is limited.What understanding of liberalism characterizes those who oppose Muslim veiling? By studying attitudes towards the veil in a Swedish and a Dutch sample, we test a number of hypotheses informed by political theory, and the burgeoning field of immigration studies, which have rarely been used in political psychology. We include measures of different conceptions of liberalism and value orientations and resistance to Muslim veils.Our analyses suggest that post-materialism values are too crude measures for parsing out intolerance against the Muslim veil in a liberal sample. Positive attitudes to veiling are best predicted by a Reformation Liberalism, a commitment to a diversity-oriented understanding of liberalism. Both Enlightenment Liberalism (emphasizing autonomy) and Romantic Liberalism (stressing authenticity and individuality), on the other hand, seem to induce more negative attitudes towards the headscarf, yet providing mixed results in the two studies. Possible explanations for these mixed results are discussed.

  • 34.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Van der Noll, Jolanda
    Department of Community Psychology, University of Hagen, Hagen, Germany;.
    Sundberg, Ralph
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Opposing the Veil in the Name of Liberalism: Popular Attitudes to Liberalism and Muslim Veiling in the Netherlands2016In: Ethnic and Racial Studies, ISSN 0141-9870, E-ISSN 1466-4356, Vol. 39, no 10, p. 1719-1737Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Is popular antagonism towards Muslim veils in Europe rooted in an exclusionary ‘enlightenment liberalism’? By examining different conceptions of liberalism and readings of veiling in a Dutch survey from 2014, we present the first study that investigates this question empirically. We thus bring together two hitherto largely unconnected literatures. The first is the work on immigration and ethnicity, which has shown the centrality of enlightenment liberalism in anti-Muslim media and policy discourses. The second is the literature on anti-Muslim attitudes in public opinion, which explains support for veil bans as the result of perceiving veils as threatening the respondent's own, supposedly liberal, values – but has failed to distinguish between different conceptions of liberalism and thus reached inconclusive results. This, we show, can be remedied by distinguishing between ‘enlightenment liberals’, who hold negative attitudes, and ‘reformation liberals’, who hold positive attitudes towards Muslim veils.

  • 35.
    Van der Noll, Jolanda
    et al.
    University of Hagen.
    Gustavsson, Gina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Anti-religiosity and Islamophobia in the name of enlightenment values2015In: The International Society for Political Psychology Annual Meeting, San Diego, July 3-6, 2015, San Diego, 2015Conference paper (Other academic)
1 - 35 of 35
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