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  • 1.
    Gottwald, Janna M.
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Achermann, Sheila
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Marciszko, Carin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    An Embodied Account of Early Executive-Function Development: Prospective Motor Control in Infancy Is Related to Inhibition and Working Memory2016In: Psychological Science, ISSN 0956-7976, E-ISSN 1467-9280, Vol. 27, no 12, p. 1600-1610Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The importance of executive functioning for later life outcomes, along with its potential to be positively affected by intervention programs, motivates the need to find early markers of executive functioning. In this study, 18-month-olds performed three executive-function tasksinvolving simple inhibition, working memory, and more complex inhibitionand a motion-capture task assessing prospective motor control during reaching. We demonstrated that prospective motor control, as measured by the peak velocity of the first movement unit, is related to infants' performance on simple-inhibition and working memory tasks. The current study provides evidence that motor control and executive functioning are intertwined early in life, which suggests an embodied perspective on executive-functioning development. We argue that executive functions and prospective motor control develop from a common source and a single motive: to control action. This is the first demonstration that low-level movement planning is related to higher-order executive control early in life.

  • 2.
    Gottwald, Janna M.
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    de Bortoli Vizioli, Aurora
    Univ Padua, Dept Dev Psychol & Socializat, Padua, Italy.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Nyström, Pär
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Ekberg, Therese L.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    von Hofsten, Claes
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Infants prospectively control reaching based on the difficulty of future actions: To what extent can infants' multiple step actions be explained by Fitts' law?2017In: Developmental Psychology, ISSN 0012-1649, E-ISSN 1939-0599, Vol. 53, no 1, p. 4-12Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Prospective motor control, a key element of action planning, is the ability to adjust one's actions with respect to task demands and action goals in an anticipatory manner. The current study investigates whether 14-month-olds can prospectively control their reaching actions based on the difficulty of the subsequent action. We used a reach-to-place task, with difficulty of the placing action varied by goal size and goal distance. To target prospective motor control, we determined the kinematics of the prior reaching movements using a motion-tracking system. Peak velocity of the first movement unit of the reach served as indicator for prospective motor control. Both difficulty aspects (goal size and goal distance) affected prior reaching, suggesting that both these aspects of the subsequent action have an impact on the prior action. The smaller the goal size and the longer the distance to the goal, the slower infants were in the beginning of their reach toward the object. Additionally, we modeled movement times of both reaching and placing actions using a formulation of Fitts' law (as in heading). The model was significant for placement and reaching movement times. These findings suggest that 14-month-olds can plan their future actions and prospectively control their related movements with respect to future task difficulties.

  • 3.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juvrud, Joshua C.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Green, Dorota
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Marciszko, Carin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Action Prediction Allows Hypothesis Testing via Internal Forward Models at 6 Months of Age2018In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 9, article id 290Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We propose that action prediction provides a cornerstone in a learning process known as internal forward models. According to this suggestion infants' predictions (looking to the mouth of someone moving a spoon upward) will moments later be validated or proven false (spoon was in fact directed toward a bowl), information that is directly perceived as the distance between the predicted and actual goal. Using an individual difference approach we demonstrate that action prediction correlates with the tendency to react with surprise when social interactions are not acted out as expected (action evaluation). This association is demonstrated across tasks and in a large sample (n = 118) at 6 months of age. These results provide the first indication that infants might rely on internal forward models to structure their social world. Additional analysis, consistent with prior work and assumptions from embodied cognition, demonstrates that the latency of infants' action predictions correlate with the infant's own manual proficiency.

  • 4.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Mayerhofer, Bastian
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Is there something special with probabilities?: - Insight vs. computational ability in multiple risk combination2015In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 136, p. 282-303Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    While a wealth of evidence suggests that humans tend to rely on additive cue combination to make controlled judgments, many of the normative rules for probability combination require multiplicative combination. In this article, the authors combine the experimental paradigms on probability reasoning and multiple-cue judgment to allow a comparison between formally identical tasks that involve probability vs. other task contents. The purpose was to investigate if people have cognitive algorithms for the combination, specifically, of probability, affording multiplicative combination in the context of probability. Three experiments suggest that, although people show some signs of a qualitative understanding of the combination rules that are specific to probability, in all but the simplest cases they lack the cognitive algorithms needed for multiplication, but instead use a variety of additive heuristics to approximate the normative combination. Although these heuristics are surprisingly accurate, normative combination is not consistently achieved until the problems are framed in an additive way. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  • 5.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats2011In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 120, no 2, p. 248-267Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research on probability judgment has traditionally emphasized that people are susceptible to biases because they rely on "variable substitution": the assessment of normative variables is replaced by assessment of heuristic, subjective variables. A recent proposal is that many of these biases may rather derive from constraints on cognitive integration, where the capacity-limited and sequential nature of controlled judgment promotes linear additive integration, in contrast to many integration rules of probability theory (juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). A key implication by this theory is that it should be possible to improve peoples' probabilistic reasoning by changing probability problems into logarithm formats that require additive rather than multiplicative integration. Three experiments demonstrate that recasting tasks in a way that allows people to arrive at the answers by additive integration decreases cognitive biases, and while people can rapidly learn to produce the correct answers in an additive formats, they have great difficulty doing so with a multiplicative format.

  • 6.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Is the Intuitive Statistician Eager or Lazy?: Exploring the Cognitive Processes of Intuitive Statistical Judgments2013Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Numerical information is ubiquitous and people are continuously engaged in evaluating it by means of intuitive statistical judgments. Much research has evaluated if people’s judgments live up to the norms of statistical theory but directed far less attention to the cognitive processes that underlie the judgments.

    The present thesis outlines, compares, and tests two cognitive models for intuitive statistical judgments, summarized in the metaphors of the lazy and eager intuitive statistician. In short, the lazy statistician postpones judgments to the time of a query when the properties of a small sample of values retrieved from memory serve as proxies for population properties. In contrast, the eager statistician abstracts summary representations of population properties online from incoming data.

    Four empirical studies were conducted. Study I outlined the two models and investigated whether an eager or a lazy statistician best describes how people make intuitive statistical judgments. In general the results supported the notion that people spontaneously engage in a lazy process. Under certain specific conditions, however, participants were able to induce abstract representations of the experienced data. Study II and Study III extended the models to describe naive point estimates (Study II) and inference about a generating distribution (Study III). The results indicated that both the former and the latter type of judgment was better described by a lazy than an eager model. Finally, Study IV, building on the support in Studies I-III, investigated boundary conditions for a lazy model by exploring if statistical judgments are influenced by common memory effects (primacy and recency). The results indicated no such effects, suggesting that the sampling from long-term memory in a lazy process is not conditional on when the data is encountered.

    The present thesis makes two major contributions. First, the lazy and eager models are first attempts at outlining a process model that could possibly be applied for a large variety of statistical judgments. Second, because a lazy process imposes boundary conditions on the accuracy of statistical judgments, the results suggest that the limitations of a lazy intuitive statistician would need to be taken into consideration in a variety of situations.

    List of papers
    1. Calculate or wait: Is man an eager or a lazy intuitive statistician?
    Open this publication in new window or tab >>Calculate or wait: Is man an eager or a lazy intuitive statistician?
    2013 (English)In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 25, no 8, p. 994-1014Article in journal (Refereed) Published
    Abstract [en]

    Research on people’s ability to act as intuitive statisticians has mainly focused on the accuracy of estimates of central tendency and variability. In this paper, we investigate two hypothesised cognitive processes by which people make judgements of distribution shape. The first claims that people spontaneously induce abstract representations of distribution properties from experience, including about distribution shape. The second process claims that people construct beliefs about distribution properties post hoc by retrieval from long-term memory of small samples from the distribution, implying format dependence with accuracy that differs depending on judgement format. Results from two experiments confirm the predicted format dependence, suggesting that people are often constrained by the post hoc assessment of distribution properties by sampling from long-term memory. The results, however, also suggest that, although post hoc sampling from memory seems to be the default process, under certain predictable circumstances people do induce abstract representations of distribution shape.

    Keywords
    Intuitive statistics, Numerical cognition, Sampling model
    National Category
    Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
    Research subject
    Psychology
    Identifiers
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-209392 (URN)10.1080/20445911.2013.841170 (DOI)000326868000009 ()
    Funder
    Swedish Research Council
    Available from: 2013-10-18 Created: 2013-10-18 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
    2. Naïve Point Estimation
    Open this publication in new window or tab >>Naïve Point Estimation
    2013 (English)In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 782-800Article in journal (Refereed) Published
    Abstract [en]

    The capacity of short-term memory is a key constraint when people make online judgments requiringthem to rely on samples retrieved from memory (e.g., Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). In this article, theauthors compare 2 accounts of how people use knowledge of statistical distributions to make pointestimates: either by retrieving precomputed large-sample representations or by retrieving small samplesof similar observations post hoc at the time of judgment, as constrained by short-term memory capacity(the naı¨ve sampling model: Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007). Results from four experiments supportthe predictions by the naı¨ve sampling model, including that participants sometimes guess values thatthey, when probed, demonstrably know have the lowest probability of occurring. Experiment 1 alsodemonstrated the operations of an unpredicted recognition-based inference. Computational modeling alsoincorporating this process demonstrated that the data from all 4 experiments were better predicted byassuming a post hoc sampling process constrained by short-term memory capacity than by assumingabstraction of large-sample representations of the distribution.

    Keywords
    point estimation, sampling model, intuitive statistics
    National Category
    Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
    Research subject
    Psychology
    Identifiers
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-183145 (URN)10.1037/a0029670 (DOI)000318455900010 ()
    Funder
    Swedish Research CouncilRiksbankens Jubileumsfond
    Available from: 2012-10-23 Created: 2012-10-23 Last updated: 2017-12-07Bibliographically approved
    3. Where did that come from?: Identifying the source of a sample
    Open this publication in new window or tab >>Where did that come from?: Identifying the source of a sample
    2015 (English)In: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, ISSN 1747-0218, E-ISSN 1747-0226, Vol. 68, no 3, p. 499-522Article in journal (Refereed) Published
    Keywords
    Intuitive statistics, sample, inference, naïve intuitive statistician, naïve sampling model
    National Category
    Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
    Research subject
    Psychology
    Identifiers
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-211503 (URN)10.1080/17470218.2014.959534 (DOI)000349472400007 ()
    Funder
    Swedish Research Council
    Available from: 2013-11-25 Created: 2013-11-25 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
    4. Are all Data Created Equal?: Exploring Some Boundary Conditions for a Lazy Intuitive Statistician
    Open this publication in new window or tab >>Are all Data Created Equal?: Exploring Some Boundary Conditions for a Lazy Intuitive Statistician
    2014 (English)In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 9, no 5, p. e97686-Article in journal (Refereed) Published
    Abstract [en]

    The study investigated potential effects of the presentation order of numeric information on retrospective subjective judgments of descriptive statistics of this information. The studies were theoretically motivated by the assumption in the naive sampling model of independence between temporal encoding order of data in long-term memory and retrieval probability (i.e. as implied by a "random sampling'' from memory metaphor). In Experiment 1, participants experienced Arabic numbers that varied in distribution shape/variability between the first and the second half of the information sequence. Results showed no effects of order on judgments of mean, variability or distribution shape. To strengthen the interpretation of these results, Experiment 2 used a repeated judgment procedure, with an initial judgment occurring prior to the change in distribution shape of the information half-way through data presentation. The results of Experiment 2 were in line with those from Experiment 1, and in addition showed that the act of making explicit judgments did not impair accuracy of later judgments, as would be suggested by an anchoring and insufficient adjustment strategy. Overall, the results indicated that participants were very responsive to the properties of the data while at the same time being more or less immune to order effects. The results were interpreted as being in line with the naive sampling models in which values are stored as exemplars and sampled randomly from long-term memory.

    National Category
    Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
    Research subject
    Psychology
    Identifiers
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-211504 (URN)10.1371/journal.pone.0097686 (DOI)000339614800063 ()24834913 (PubMedID)
    Funder
    Swedish Research Council
    Available from: 2013-11-25 Created: 2013-11-25 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
  • 7.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The Lazy Intuitive Statistician: Influence of Data Representation and Retrieval Processes on Intuitive Statistical Judgment2012Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Intuitive statistical judgments are an integral part of people’s everyday life and a long line of research has investigated the extent to which man lives up to the norms of statistical theory when performing such judgments. A recent account of intuitive statistical judgments, summarized in the metaphor of the naïve intuitive statistician (K. Fiedler & P. Juslin, 2006), has suggested that people base judgments on small samples, which they have an ability to veridically record but an inability to evaluate the representativeness of.

    The present thesis builds on research concerning the naïve intuitive statistician and investigates how representation and memory retrieval of numerical information influences intuitive statistical judgments. Two studies were conducted. Study I introduced two possible accounts of how numerical information is represented and retrieved. The first possibility suggests that information is stored as exemplars and that estimates of statistical properties are calculated on small samples drawn from memory at the time of a query. The second possibility suggests that numerical information is stored as abstract summary statistics calculated at the time of exposure. The distinction was summarized in the metaphor of a lazy vs. an eager intuitive statistician. Study II extended the findings of Study I by investigating how point estimates of unknown quantities are formed from knowledge of statistical properties of a numerical variable. More specifically, a model of naïve point estimation based on the naïve sampling model (P., Juslin, A., Winman, & P., Hansson, 2007) was introduced to predict participants’ distribution of point estimates.

    In general, the results from both studies support the idea that people spontaneously act as lazy intuitive statisticians that record numerical information in a raw format during exposure and postpone evaluation of statistical properties until they are requested to do so. Under certain fairly predictable and limited circumstances, however, participants were able to form abstract representations of statistical properties. The results of Study II support the predictions by the model of naïve point estimation, including a novel phenomenon where participants give point estimates which they know, when probed otherwise, have a low probability of occurring.

    The findings of the two studies extend previous research concerning people’s ability to be intuitive statisticians by not only measuring how accurate the knowledge of properties of numerical variable is but by also describing how such knowledge is represented. The model of naïve point estimation contributes to the existing body of research by describing how people perform one type of intuitive statistical inference, point estimation, and shows how statistical properties of the underlying distribution influences the pattern of responses. The model also suggests novel explanations to results showing that people seem to have implicit expectations that distributions are normal.

  • 8.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Where did that come from?: Identifying the source of a sample2015In: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, ISSN 1747-0218, E-ISSN 1747-0226, Vol. 68, no 3, p. 499-522Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Marciszko, Carin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Kenward, Benjamin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Fransson, Mari
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    A Measure of Individual Differences in Numerosity Discriminaton in Infants Using Eye-tracking2015Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Marciszko, Carin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Kenward, Benjamin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Fransson, Mari
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Development of Geometric Acuity in Infants2015Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gredebäck, Gustaf
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Marciszko, Carin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Kenward, Benjamin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Fransson, Mari
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Within-Subjects Measurement of Numerosity Discrimination in Infants2015Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Intuitive information integration with Bayes' Theorem.2009Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Kerimi, Neda
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    A Swedish validation of the Berlin Numeracy test2015In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 56, no 2, p. 132-139Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent research has highlighted the importance of considering an individual’s level of numeracy, that is their numerical abilities, in a vast variety of judgment and decision making tasks. To accurately evaluate the influence of numeracy requires good and valid measures of the construct. In the present study we validate a Swedish version of the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). The validation was car- ried out on both a student sample and a sample representative of the Swedish population. The Swedish BNT showed sound psychometrical properties in both samples. Further, in both samples the BNT had satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity when correlating with other measures of numeracy, while not being significantly related to measures of personality. With respect to predictive validity the results indicated divergent patterns in the two samples. In the student sample, participants scoring highest on the BNT outperformed those in the other three levels, which did not differ in performance. In contrast, in the population sample participants scoring lowest on the BNT performed worse than those in the other three levels, which did not differ in performance. Taken together, however, the results suggest that the Swedish version of the BNT should be considered a valid measure of numeracy in both Swedish student and population representative samples.

  • 14.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Marciszko, Carin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Big Data from Small Children - Collecting and Analyzing large within-subjects data sets from infants2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Schultzberg, M. A.
    Engberg, A
    Optimal predictions without knowledge of empirical priors2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Are all Data Created Equal?: Exploring Some Boundary Conditions for a Lazy Intuitive Statistician2014In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 9, no 5, p. e97686-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The study investigated potential effects of the presentation order of numeric information on retrospective subjective judgments of descriptive statistics of this information. The studies were theoretically motivated by the assumption in the naive sampling model of independence between temporal encoding order of data in long-term memory and retrieval probability (i.e. as implied by a "random sampling'' from memory metaphor). In Experiment 1, participants experienced Arabic numbers that varied in distribution shape/variability between the first and the second half of the information sequence. Results showed no effects of order on judgments of mean, variability or distribution shape. To strengthen the interpretation of these results, Experiment 2 used a repeated judgment procedure, with an initial judgment occurring prior to the change in distribution shape of the information half-way through data presentation. The results of Experiment 2 were in line with those from Experiment 1, and in addition showed that the act of making explicit judgments did not impair accuracy of later judgments, as would be suggested by an anchoring and insufficient adjustment strategy. Overall, the results indicated that participants were very responsive to the properties of the data while at the same time being more or less immune to order effects. The results were interpreted as being in line with the naive sampling models in which values are stored as exemplars and sampled randomly from long-term memory.

  • 17.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    No evidence of learning in non-symbolic numerical tasks: A comment on Park & Brannon (2014)2016In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 150, p. 243-247Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two recent studies - one of which was published in this journal - claimed to have found that learning on a non-symbolic arithmetic task improved performance on a symbolic arithmetic task (Park & Brannon, 2013, 2014). This finding has potentially far-reaching implications, because it would constitute evidence for a causal link between the Approximate Number System (ANS) and symbolic-math ability. Here, we argue that, due to the methodology used in both studies, the interpretation of data in terms of an improvement in ANS performance is problematic. We provide arguments and simulations showing that the trends in the data are similar to what one would expect for a non-learning observer. We discuss the implications for the original interpretation in terms of causality between non-symbolic and symbolic arithmetic performance.

  • 18.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Are there rapid feedback effects on Approximate Number System acuity?2013In: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, ISSN 1662-5161, E-ISSN 1662-5161, Vol. 7, p. 270-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Humans are believed to be equipped with an Approximate Number System (ANS) that supports non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitude. Correlations between individual measures of the precision of the ANS and mathematical ability have raised the question of whether the precision can be improved by feedback training. A study (DeWind and Brannon, 2012) reported improvement in discrimination precision occurring within 600700 trials of feedback, suggesting ANS malleability with rapidly improving acuity in response to feedback. We tried to replicate the rapid improvement in a control group design, while controlling for the use of perceptual cues. The results indicate no learning effects, but a minor constant advantage for the feedback group. The measures of motivation suggest that feedback has a positive effect on motivation and that the difference in discrimination is due to the greater motivation of participants with feedback. These results suggest that at least for adults the number sense may not respond to feedback in the short-term.

  • 19.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Calculate or wait: Is man an eager or a lazy intuitive statistician?2013In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 25, no 8, p. 994-1014Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research on people’s ability to act as intuitive statisticians has mainly focused on the accuracy of estimates of central tendency and variability. In this paper, we investigate two hypothesised cognitive processes by which people make judgements of distribution shape. The first claims that people spontaneously induce abstract representations of distribution properties from experience, including about distribution shape. The second process claims that people construct beliefs about distribution properties post hoc by retrieval from long-term memory of small samples from the distribution, implying format dependence with accuracy that differs depending on judgement format. Results from two experiments confirm the predicted format dependence, suggesting that people are often constrained by the post hoc assessment of distribution properties by sampling from long-term memory. The results, however, also suggest that, although post hoc sampling from memory seems to be the default process, under certain predictable circumstances people do induce abstract representations of distribution shape.

  • 20.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Covariation estimates of continuous variables.2012Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Covariation estimates of continuous variables2012Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Covariation estimates of continuous variables.2011Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Dissociative Knowledge of Distributions.2010Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 24.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Effects of Response and Presentation Format on Measures of Approximate Number System Acuity2013In: Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society / [ed] M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, I. Wachsmuth, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., 2013, p. 2908-2913Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Human adults, infants, and non-human animals are believed to be equipped with an Approximate Number System (ANS) supporting non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitudes. Recent research has questioned both the validity and reliability of tasks intended to measure acuity in the ANS. Issues with validity and reliability might be due to differences in methodology. In the present study, we compare four tasks designed to measure ANS acuity, using a within-subjects design. The tasks are compared with respect to response and presentation format effects previously studied in the psychophysics literature, but largely ignored in the ANS literature. We find a presentation format effect and show that when non-symbolic numerical stimuli are presented sequentially the magnitude of the second stimulus is overestimated. Further, the results indicate that people’s sensitivity to differentiate between non-symbolic numerosities is dependent on response format. The implications of the results to measures of ANS acuity are discussed.

  • 25.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Is it possible to train the approximate number system?2012In: Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of theCognitive Science Society / [ed] Naomi Miyake, David Peebles, Richard P. Cooper, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., 2012, p. 2760-Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 26.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Is it Time Bayes went Fishing?: Bayesian Probabilistic Reasoning in a Category Learning Task2013In: Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society / [ed] M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, I. Wachsmuth, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., 2013, p. 906-911Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    People have generally been considered poor at probabilistic reasoning, producing subjective probability estimates that far from accord to normative rules. Features of the typical probabilistic reasoning task, however, make strong conclusions difficult. The present study, therefore, combines research on probabilistic reasoning with research on category learning where participants learn base rates and likelihoods in a category-learning task. Later they produce estimates of posterior probability based on the learnt probabilities. The results show that our participants can produce subjective probability estimates that are well calibrated against the normative Bayesian probability and are sensitive to base rates. Further, they have accurate knowledge of both base rate and means of the categories encountered during learning. This indicates that under some conditions people might be better at probabilistic reaso

  • 27.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Knowledge of statistical properties of numerical variables.2011Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 28.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Measuring the Approximate Number System2012Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 29.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Naïve Point Estimation2013In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 782-800Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The capacity of short-term memory is a key constraint when people make online judgments requiringthem to rely on samples retrieved from memory (e.g., Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). In this article, theauthors compare 2 accounts of how people use knowledge of statistical distributions to make pointestimates: either by retrieving precomputed large-sample representations or by retrieving small samplesof similar observations post hoc at the time of judgment, as constrained by short-term memory capacity(the naı¨ve sampling model: Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007). Results from four experiments supportthe predictions by the naı¨ve sampling model, including that participants sometimes guess values thatthey, when probed, demonstrably know have the lowest probability of occurring. Experiment 1 alsodemonstrated the operations of an unpredicted recognition-based inference. Computational modeling alsoincorporating this process demonstrated that the data from all 4 experiments were better predicted byassuming a post hoc sampling process constrained by short-term memory capacity than by assumingabstraction of large-sample representations of the distribution.

  • 30.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The association between higher education and approximate number system acuity2014In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 5, p. 462-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Humans are equipped with an approximate number system (ANS) supporting non-symbolic numerosity representation. Studies indicate a relationship between ANS-precision (acuity) and math achievement. Whether the ANS is a prerequisite for learning mathematics or if mathematics education enhances the ANS remains an open question. We investigated the association between higher education and ANS acuity with university students majoring in subjects with varying amounts of mathematics (mathematics, business, and humanities), measured either early (First year) or late (Third year) in their studies. The results suggested a non-significant trend where students taking more mathematics had better ANS acuity and a significant improvement in ANS acuity as a function of study length that was mainly confined to the business students. The results provide partial support for the hypothesis that education in mathematics can enhance the ANS acuity.

  • 31.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Measuring acuity of the approximate number system reliably and validly: the evaluation of an adaptive test procedure2013In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 4, p. 510-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two studies investigated the reliability and predictive validity of commonly used measures and models of Approximate Number System acuity (ANS). Study 1 investigated reliability by both an empirical approach and a simulation of maximum obtainable reliability under ideal conditions. Results showed that common measures of the Weber fraction (w) are reliable only when using a substantial number of trials, even under ideal conditions. Study 2 compared different purported measures of ANS acuity as for convergent and predictive validity in a within-subjects design and evaluated an adaptive test using the ZEST algorithm. Results showed that the adaptive measure can reduce the number of trials needed to reach acceptable reliability. Only direct tests with non-symbolic numerosity discriminations of stimuli presented simultaneously were related to arithmetic fluency. This correlation remained when controlling for general cognitive ability and perceptual speed. Further, the purported indirect measure of ANS acuity in terms of the Numeric Distance Effect (NDE) was not reliable and showed no sign of predictive validity. The non-symbolic NDE for reaction time was significantly related to direct w estimates in a direction contrary to the expected. Easier stimuli were found to be more reliable, but only harder (7:8 ratio) stimuli contributed to predictive validity.

  • 32.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Arithmetic Training Does Not Improve Approximate Number System Acuity2016In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 7, article id 1634Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The approximate number system (ANS) is thought to support non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitudes in humans. Recently much debate has focused on the causal direction for an observed relation between ANS acuity and arithmetic fluency. Here we investigate if arithmetic training can improve ANS acuity. We show with an experimental training study consisting of six 45-min training sessions that although feedback during arithmetic training improves arithmetic performance substantially, it does not influence ANS acuity. Hence, we find no support for a causal link where symbolic arithmetic training influences ANS acuity. Further, although short-term number memory is likely involved in arithmetic tasks we did not find that short-term memory capacity for numbers, measured by a digit-span test, was effected by arithmetic training. This suggests that the improvement in arithmetic fluency may have occurred independent of short-term memory efficiency, but rather due to long-term memory processes and/or mental calculation strategy development. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

  • 33.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Can approximate number system acuity improve with arithmetic training?2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 34.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Individual differences in nonverbal number skills predict math anxiety2017In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 159, p. 156-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Abstract Math anxiety (MA) involves negative affect and tension when solving mathematical problems, with potentially life-long consequences. MA has been hypothesized to be a consequence of negative learning experiences and cognitive predispositions. Recent research indicates genetic and neurophysiological links, suggesting that MA stems from a basic level deficiency in symbolic numerical processing. However, the contribution of evolutionary ancient purely nonverbal processes is not fully understood. Here we show that the roots of MA may go beyond symbolic numbers. We demonstrate that MA is correlated with precision of the Approximate Number System (ANS). Individuals high in MA have poorer ANS functioning than those low in MA. This correlation remains significant when controlling for other forms of anxiety and for cognitive variables. We show that MA mediates the documented correlation between ANS precision and math performance, both with ANS and with math performance as independent variable in the mediation model. In light of our results, we discuss the possibility that MA has deep roots, stemming from a non-verbal number processing deficiency. The findings provide new evidence advancing the theoretical understanding of the developmental etiology of MA.

  • 35.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    While waiting for the dots: The influence of short-term memory in tasks indexing the Approximate Number System?2014Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 36.
    Van den Berg, Ronald
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Poom, Leo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Recent Is More: A Negative Time-Order Effect in Nonsymbolic Numerical Judgment.2017In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, ISSN 0096-1523Print, Vol. 43, no 6, p. 1084-1097Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Humans as well as some nonhuman animals can estimate object numerosities—such as the number of sheep in a flock—without explicit counting. Here, we report on a negative time-order effect (TOE) in this type of judgment: When nonsymbolic numerical stimuli are presented sequentially, the second stimulus is overestimated compared to the first. We examined this “recent is more” effect in two comparative judgment tasks: larger–smaller discrimination and same–different discrimination. Ideal-observer modeling revealed evidence for a TOE in 88.2% of the individual data sets. Despite large individual differences in effect size, there was strong consistency in effect direction: 87.3% of the identified TOEs were negative. The average effect size was largely independent of task but did strongly depend on both stimulus magnitude and interstimulus interval. Finally, we used an estimation task to obtain insight into the origin of the effect. We found that subjects tend to overestimate both stimuli but the second one more strongly than the first one. Overall, our findings are highly consistent with findings from studies on TOEs in nonnumerical judgments, which suggests a common underlying mechanism.

  • 37.
    Winman, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Kerimi, Neda
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The role of ANS acuity and numeracy for the calibration and the coherence of subjective probability judgments2014In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 5, p. 851-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of the study was to investigate how numeracy and acuity of the approximate number system (ANS) relate to the calibration and coherence of probability judgments. Based on the literature on number cognition, a first hypothesis was that those with lower numeracy would maintain a less linear use of the probability scale, contributing to overconfidence and nonlinear calibration curves. A second hypothesis was that also poorer acuity of the ANS would be associated with overconfidence and non-linearity. A third hypothesis, in line with dual-systems theory (e.g., Kahnernan and Frederick, 2002) was that people higher in numeracy should have better access to the normative probability rules, allowing them to decrease the rate of conjunction fallacies. Data from 213 participants sampled from the Swedish population showed that: (i) in line with the first hypothesis, overconfidence and the linearity of the calibration curves were related to numeracy, where people higher in numeracy were well calibrated with zero overconfidence. (ii) ANS was not associated with overconfidence and non-linearity, disconfirming the second hypothesis. (iii) The rate of conjunction fallacies was slightly, but to a statistically significant degree decreased by numeracy, but still high at all numeracy levels. An unexpected finding was that participants with better ANS acuity gave more realistic estimates of their performance relative to others.

1 - 37 of 37
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