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  • 1.
    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas
    et al.
    Hochschule Fulda.
    Honig, Jan WillemSwedish National Defence College, Stockholm.Moran, DanielNaval Postgraduate School.
    Clausewitz: The State and War2011Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Clausewitz's understanding of war was shaped by his understanding of the state, which he regarded as the central institution of modern life. His achievements as a theorist of war in turn clarify one of the state's essential activities: the use of force to defend and advance its interests and values, and those of the society it governs. These diverse essays take Clausewitz's ideas about the state as the starting point for analyzing the central issue posed by his work: the relationship between war in all its manifestations, and politics in all its forms. The modern state was the starting point for Clausewitz's understanding of politics, but did not unduly confine his outlook, nor cause him to suppose that only states make war. Similarly, while it is the wars of states that provided most of the historical evidence on which his theoretical work rests, the implications of that work can be seen to encompass political violence in all its forms. It is for this reason that it continues to inspire reflection and admiration to this day.

  • 2.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    King's College London.
    Clausewitz and the Politics of Early Modern Warfare2011In: Clausewitz: The State and War / [ed] Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Jan Willem Honig, Daniel Moran, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011, p. 29-48Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 3. Honig, Jan Willem
    Introduction2012In: The Art of War, New York: Barnes & Noble , 2012, p. xv-xxiiiChapter in book (Other academic)
  • 4.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Peacekeeping and the Utility of Force: General Sir Michael Rose2012In: Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans / [ed] Mona Fixdal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 163-186Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    King’s College London, UK and Swedish National Defence College, Sweden.
    Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy: The Example of the 1415 Agincourt Campaign2012In: War in history, ISSN 0968-3445, E-ISSN 1477-0385, Vol. 19, no 2, p. 123-151Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Modern military historians struggle to explain medieval strategic behaviour. One key reason, the article argues, is their strong belief in the existence of timeless strategic standards. By analysing the example of the 1415 Agincourt campaign, the article proposes a new approach to understanding late medieval strategy. By reconstructing the normative framework that underpinned strategic practice, the critical importance emerges of an unusual set of conventions which regulated strategy and which allowed for a degree of risk-taking that the traditional and current historiography cannot otherwise explain.

  • 6.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    Försvarshögskolan.
    The Future of Military Strategy at Försvarshögskolan: An Attempt to Identify Some Useful Fundamentals2011In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 1, p. 148-161Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 7. Honig, Jan Willem
    The Idea of Total War: From Clausewitz to Ludendorff2012In: The Pacific War as total war: 2011 International Forum on War History: proceedings : September 14, 2011 Toshi Center Hotel., Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies , 2012, p. 29-41Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College.
    Käihkö, Ilmari
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Swedish National Defence College.
    Challenges of Command: The Rise of the "Strategic Colonel"2012In: Leadership in Challenging Situations / [ed] Harald Haas, Franz Kernic, Andrea Plaschke, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2012, p. 89-108Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Ångström, Jan
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    Department of War Studies, King’s College London, UK.
    Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan2012In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 35, no 5, p. 663-687Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.

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