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  • 1.
    Guath, Mona
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Millroth, Philip
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Does Sequential or Simultaneous Presentation of Value and Probability Affect the Information Integration in Risky Prospects?2015Konferensbidrag (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 2.
    Guath, Mona
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Millroth, Philip
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Elwin, Ebba
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Optimizing Electricity Consumption: A Case of Function Learning2015Ingår i: Journal of experimental psychology. Applied, ISSN 1076-898X, E-ISSN 1939-2192, Vol. 21, nr 4, s. 326-341Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A popular way to improve consumers' control over their electricity consumption is by providing outcome feedback on the cost with in-home displays. Research on function learning, however, suggests that outcome feedback may not always be ideal for learning, especially if the feedback signal is noisy. In this study, we relate research on function learning to in-home displays and use a laboratory task simulating a household to investigate the role of outcome feedback and function learning on electricity optimization. Three function training schemes (FTSs) are presented that convey specific properties of the functions that relate the electricity consumption to the utility and cost. In Experiment 1, we compared learning from outcome feedback with 3 FTSs, 1 of which allowed maximization of the utility while keeping the budget, despite no feedback about the total monthly cost. In Experiment 2, we explored the combination of this FTS and outcome feedback. The results suggested that electricity optimization may be facilitated if feedback learning is preceded by a brief period of function training.

  • 3.
    Juslin, Peter
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Elwin, Ebba
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Guath, Mona
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Millroth, Philip
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi. Uppsala Univ, Dept Psychol, Uppsala, Sweden..
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Sequential and myopic: On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task2016Ingår i: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 28, nr 1, s. 106-128Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    While there is extensive research on feedback, little research is aimed at the use of feedback to optimise conflicting goals. A task modelled after In Home Displays for providing feedback about electricity cost was designed to investigate the effects of feedback frequency, detail, and stability, when participants try to balance cost and utility. Frequent feedback proved to be advantageous in a deterministic system, but feedback aggregated over time was advantageous in a system with noisy feedback. Surprisingly, performance was better with noisy feedback, where the probabilism, in effect, acted as a filter, highlighting the applications that are most important for the cost and the utility. Computational modelling suggested that the best-fitting model assumes that the participants are sequential, considering one goal at a time, first satisfying the cost budget, only thereafter trying to maximise the utility, and reflexive, myopically responding primarily to the feedback explicitly available on a given trial.

  • 4.
    Millroth, Philip
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Integrating Probability- and Value Information in Judgment and Decision-Making under Risk: Cognitive Processes, Competence, and Performance2020Doktorsavhandling, sammanläggning (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    Many instances in human affairs involve considering the value of different outcomes and the probability (or risk) of these outcomes occuring (e.g., gambling, financial decision-making, medical decision-making, criminal behavior). The point of departure for present thesis is that descriptive theories of judgment- and decision making under risk have yet to fully utilize explanations grounded in accounts of how people integrate outcomes with their adherent probabilities. The most widely embraced accounts are positioned on opposite ends of a spectrum, holding either (i) that people consistently and effortlessly engage in the normative principle of multiplicatively integrating the value or utility of possible outcomes with their adherent probabilities (i.e., weighting), or (ii) that people only have the ability to engage in simple heuristics or context-dependent sampling strategies. The present thesis proposes that the field should consider positions between these extreme positions. To this end, three empirical studies were conducted in which people evaluated risky prospects in the form of numerically described monetary lotteries.

    The studies show that use of weighting was robust to increases of cognitive demands, as when (i) other evaluations are not available as reference points (Study I), (ii) outcomes and probabilities are presented sequentially before the evaluation (Study II), and (iii) the prospect structure involves two independent outcomes (Study III). The results suggest that - even if people can turn to heuristics when they are more efficient, for specific stages in the decision process, or for very complex problems - people indeed have both the inclination and ability to weight the outcomes by their probabilities in the evaluation of individual prospects, or for a subset of decision alternatives.

    In contrast to popular weighting models, however, the cognitive-modeling efforts throughout the studies speak against the notion that the weighting process can be assumed to be consistent and effortless. Instead, the cognitive process of weighting outcomes and probabilities is better characterized as an anchoring-and-adjustment strategy: people anchor on the value of the outcome and make linear adjustments downwards to account for probability. The studies show that these adjustments are often insufficient or noise-prone when the cognitive demands increase due to (i) properties of the task environment (Study I and Study II), or (ii) lack of domain-specific knowledge (i.e., numeracy and financial literacy, Study III). In conclusion, the thesis has highlighted the important, but previously neglected, nuances of human cognition in judgment and decision-making under risk - nuances found between previously conflicting standpoints. Future research exploring these nuances should make a necessary distinction between people’s underlying competence and the performance they exhibit at a given moment.

    Delarbeten
    1. Additive Weighting of Outcomes in Duplex Gambles: Spontaneous Prevalence, Cognitive Processing, and Effect of Financial Literacy
    Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Additive Weighting of Outcomes in Duplex Gambles: Spontaneous Prevalence, Cognitive Processing, and Effect of Financial Literacy
    (Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    Many descriptive theories of judgment and decision making under risk assume that people align with normative theory in that they add up the possible outcomes weighted by their adherent probabilities (or decision weights). Yet, few studies test this assumption by a systematic comparison between all of the plausible integration models that may connect the outcomes and probabilities in the prospects. In two experiments, we explore if people spontaneously weight outcomes by their adherent probabilities in evaluations of duplex prospects that involve two independent events, taking the plausible integration models into account. Based on a Brunswikian conception of analysis and intuition and the observed response distributions, we also examine if people perform this additive weighting by analytic thought-processes, explicitly “number-crunching” the value, or by intuitive processes. The results show that people often spontaneously weight the outcome values by the probabilities also in duplex gambles – and mainly by intuitive integration in the form of an anchoring-and-adjustment strategy – but with individual differences in the extent to which they spontaneously engage in this integration, which seem most strongly predicted by culturally acquired beliefs related to economy (e.g., financial literacy).  The results carry important implications for modeling and interpreting behavior in judgment and decision making under risk in that risk preferences elicited from monetary lotteries are strongly contaminated by information-processing demands of the task. The results also question the notion that people switch from additive weighting to heuristics because they are unable to engage in weighting strategies.

    Nyckelord
    judgment, decision making, risk, cognition
    Nationell ämneskategori
    Psykologi
    Identifikatorer
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-407864 (URN)
    Tillgänglig från: 2020-03-30 Skapad: 2020-03-30 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-03-30
    2. Memory and decision making: Effects of sequential presentation of probabilities and outcomes in risky prospects
    Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Memory and decision making: Effects of sequential presentation of probabilities and outcomes in risky prospects
    2019 (Engelska)Ingår i: Journal of experimental psychology. General, ISSN 0096-3445, E-ISSN 1939-2222, Vol. 148, nr 2, s. 304-324Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
    Abstract [en]

    The rationality of decision making under risk is of central concern in psychology and other behavioral sciences. In real-life, the information relevant to a decision often arrives sequentially or changes over time, implying nontrivial demands on memory. Yet, little is known about how this affects the ability to make rational decisions and a default assumption is rather that information about outcomes and probabilities are simultaneously available at the time of the decision. In 4 experiments, we show that participants receiving probability- and outcome information sequentially report substantially (29 to 83%) higher certainty equivalents than participants with simultaneous presentation. This holds also for monetary-incentivized participants with perfect recall of the information. Participants in the sequential conditions often violate stochastic dominance in the sense that they pay more for a lottery with low probability of an outcome than participants in the simultaneous condition pay for a high probability of the same outcome. Computational modeling demonstrates that Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) fails to account for the effects of sequential presentation, but a model assuming anchoring-and adjustment constrained by memory can account for the data. By implication, established assumptions of rationality may need to be reconsidered to account for the effects of memory in many real-life tasks.

    Nyckelord
    judgment and decision making under risk, memory, sequential presentation, anchoring and adjustment
    Nationell ämneskategori
    Psykologi
    Identifikatorer
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-361937 (URN)10.1037/xge0000438 (DOI)000456244600007 ()29878808 (PubMedID)
    Forskningsfinansiär
    VetenskapsrådetStiftelsen Marcus och Amalia Wallenbergs minnesfond
    Tillgänglig från: 2018-09-28 Skapad: 2018-09-28 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-03-30Bibliografiskt granskad
    3. Examining the Integrity of Evaluations of Risky Prospects Using a Single-Stimuli Design.
    Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Examining the Integrity of Evaluations of Risky Prospects Using a Single-Stimuli Design.
    2017 (Engelska)Ingår i: Decision, ISSN 2325-9973Electronic,2325-9965Print, s. No Pagination Specified-No Pagination SpecifiedArtikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
    Abstract [en]

    Expected utility theory, the normative benchmark for evaluation of risky prospect, implies that the evaluation is linear in probability, that it is concave in the outcome, and that probabilities and outcomes are multiplied. The present study examines how the evaluations of risky prospects are affected by the availability of comparative anchors. We report an experiment comparing a within-subjects design (WSD), in which 20 participants evaluated 36 prospects, with a single-subject design (SSD), in which each of 720 participants evaluated a single prospect. The results of fitting cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) to data showed that in the WSD, there was a roughly linear probability weighting function and a concave value function, as suggested by expected utility theory. In the SSD, on the other hand, there was a linear value function and a severely nonlinear weighting function for probability. The participants thus found it difficult to maintain the linear use of single-event probability disclosed in the WSD when they made evaluations in an SSD without access to comparative anchors. We argue that people may have much of the normative competence captured by expected utility theory, but this competence can only be manifested as normative performance given the availability of relevant comparative anchors. We discuss the possibility that this could explain why some economic markets are deemed rational, whereas others are not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

    Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
    Educational Publishing Foundation, 2017
    Nationell ämneskategori
    Psykologi
    Identifikatorer
    urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-333478 (URN)10.1037/dec0000085 (DOI)
    Konferens
    US
    Tillgänglig från: 2017-11-14 Skapad: 2017-11-14 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-03-30
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  • 5.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Guath, Mona
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Memory and decision making: Effects of sequential presentation of probabilities and outcomes in risky prospects2019Ingår i: Journal of experimental psychology. General, ISSN 0096-3445, E-ISSN 1939-2222, Vol. 148, nr 2, s. 304-324Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The rationality of decision making under risk is of central concern in psychology and other behavioral sciences. In real-life, the information relevant to a decision often arrives sequentially or changes over time, implying nontrivial demands on memory. Yet, little is known about how this affects the ability to make rational decisions and a default assumption is rather that information about outcomes and probabilities are simultaneously available at the time of the decision. In 4 experiments, we show that participants receiving probability- and outcome information sequentially report substantially (29 to 83%) higher certainty equivalents than participants with simultaneous presentation. This holds also for monetary-incentivized participants with perfect recall of the information. Participants in the sequential conditions often violate stochastic dominance in the sense that they pay more for a lottery with low probability of an outcome than participants in the simultaneous condition pay for a high probability of the same outcome. Computational modeling demonstrates that Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) fails to account for the effects of sequential presentation, but a model assuming anchoring-and adjustment constrained by memory can account for the data. By implication, established assumptions of rationality may need to be reconsidered to account for the effects of memory in many real-life tasks.

  • 6.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Prospect Evaluation as a Function of Denominator Neglect2014Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 7.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Prospect evaluation as a function of numeracy and probability denominator2015Ingår i: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 138, s. 1-9Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 8.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Prospect evaluation as a function of numeracy and probability denominator2015Ingår i: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 138, s. 1-9Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This study examines how numeracy and probability denominator (a direct-ratio probability, a relative frequency with denominator 100, a relative frequency with denominator 10,000) affect the evaluation of prospects in an expected-value based pricing task. We expected that numeracy would affect the results due to differences in the linearity of number perception and the susceptibility to denominator neglect with different probability formats. An analysis with functional measurement verified that participants integrated value and probability into an expected value. However, a significant interaction between numeracy and probability format and subsequent analyses of the parameters of cumulative prospect theory showed that the manipulation of probability denominator changed participants’ psychophysical response to probability and value. Standard methods in decision research may thus confound people’s genuine risk attitude with their numerical capacities and the probability format used.

  • 9.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Eriksson, Elias
    Ågren, Thomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Disentangling the effects of serotonin on risk perception: S-carriers of 5-HTTLPR are primarily concerned with the magnitude of the outcomes, not the uncertainty.2017Ingår i: Behavioral Neuroscience, ISSN 0735-7044, E-ISSN 1939-0084, Vol. 131, nr 5, s. 421-427Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Serotonin signaling is vital for reward processing, and hence, also for decision-making. The serotonin transporter gene linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) has been connected to decision making, suggesting that short-allele carriers (s) are more risk averse than long-allele homozygotes (ll). However, previous research has not identified if this occurs because s-carriers (i) are more sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcomes or (ii) are more sensitive to the magnitude of the outcomes. This issue was disentangled using a willingness-to-pay task, where the participants evaluated prospects involving certain gains, uncertain gains, and ambiguous gains. The results clearly favored the hypothesis that s-carriers react more to the magnitude of the outcomes. Self-reported measures of everyday risk-taking behavior also favored this hypothesis. We discuss how these results are in line with recent research on the serotonergic impact on reward processing.

  • 10.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Winman, Anders
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Lindskog, Marcus
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Preference or Ability: Exploring the Relations between Risk Preference, Personality, and Cognitive Abilities.2020Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257|, Vol. 33, nr 1, s. 1-15Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 11.
    Millroth, Philip
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Nilsson, Håkan
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Juslin, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    The decision paradoxes motivating Prospect Theory: The prevalence of the paradoxes increases with numerical ability2019Ingår i: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 14, nr 4, s. 513-533Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Prospect Theory (PT: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of risky decision making is based on psychological phenomena (paradoxes) that motivate assumptions about how people react to gains and losses, and how they weight outcomes with probabilities. Recent studies suggest that people's numeracy affect their decision making. We therefore conducted a large-scale conceptual replication of the seminal study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where we targeted participants with larger variability in numeracy. Because people low in numeracy may be more dependent on anchors in the form of other judgments we also manipulated design type (within-subject design, vs. single-stimuli design, where participants assess only one problem). The results from about 1,800 participants showed that design type had no effect on the modal choices. The rate of replication of the paradoxes in Kahneman and Tversky was poor and positively related to the participants' numeracy. The Probabilistic Insurance Effect was observed at all levels of numeracy. The Reflection Effects were not fully replicated at any numeracy level. The Certainty and Isolation Effects explained by nonlinear probability weighting were replicated only at high numeracy. No participant exhibited all 9 paradoxes and more than 50% of the participants exhibited at most three of the 9 paradoxes. The choices by the participants with low numeracy were consistent with a shift towards a cautionary non-compensatory strategy of minimizing the risk of receiving the worst possible outcome. We discuss the implications for the psychological assumptions of PT.

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  • 12.
    Ågren, Thomas
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Millroth, Philip
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Andersson, Peter
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Ridzén, Måns
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi.
    Björkstrand, Johannes
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för psykologi. Rigshosp, Neurobiol Res Unit, Copenhagen, Denmark; Lund Univ, Dept Psychol, Lund, Sweden.
    Detailed analysis of skin conductance responses during a gambling task: Decision, anticipation, and outcomes2019Ingår i: Psychophysiology, ISSN 0048-5772, E-ISSN 1469-8986, Vol. 56, nr 6, artikel-id e13338Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Physiological arousal is considered a key factor of gambling behavior. Hence, to understand gambling behavior it is important to study the arousal responses during gambling. Moreover, crucial mechanisms of action could be uncovered by detailing the situations that produce an arousal response. A gamble, or bet, can be partitioned into three distinct phases: (a) decision phase, during which the information concerning the gamble is presented, outcomes are appraised, and a decision is made on how to gamble; (b) anticipation phase, during which the result of the gamble is awaited; (c) outcome phase, during which the outcome of the gamble is presented. Previous research on arousal responses to gambling have mostly measured tonic changes in arousal, and when phasic responses have been measured, analyses have generally concentrated on one of the gamble phases. The aim of the present study was to map the arousal responses during gambling in more detail by measuring skin conductance responses (SCRs) during all three gamble phases of a simple card game. The anticipation phase was found to produce the largest arousal response, suggesting anticipation to be a major contributor to arousal during gambling behavior. Risk behavior during the gambling task was mirrored in self-reported risk taking in everyday life, and risk-takers displayed smaller SCRs compared to nonrisk-takers during decision making, suggesting this as a possible biomarker for risk-taking individuals.

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