This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection.
This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.
We study how partisan alignment across levels of government affects coalition formation and government stability using a regression discontinuity design and a large dataset of Spanish municipal elections. We document a positive effect of alignment on both government formation and stability. Alignment increases the probability that the most-voted party appoints the mayor and decreases the probability that the government is unseated during the term. Aligned parties also obtain sizeable electoral gains in the next elections. We show that these findings are not the consequence of favoritism in the allocation of transfers towards aligned governments.
We study the allocation of investment projects by municipal governments across groups of voters using data from a fiscal stimulus program carried out in Spain between 2009 and 2011. This program provided municipalities with a large endowment to spend in public investments and required the geocoding of each individual project. Combining these data with disaggregated election information at the census area level, we study whether politicians use expenditures to target their supporters or to raise turnout. Estimates from regression, matching and RDD methods show no evidence of local governments targeting areas of core support. Instead, investment goes disproportionately to low turnout areas, suggesting that politiciansuse funds to increase participation. We confirm this hypothesis by showing that, in the following elections, turnout is increased in areas that received more investment. Our results suggest that mobilization can be a strong force in shaping the allocation of resources acrossvoter groups within cities.
We study distributive politics inside cities by analysing how local governments allocate investment projects to voters across neighbourhoods. In particular, we ask whether politicians use investment to target their own supporters. To this aim, we use detailed geo-located investment data from Plan E, a large fiscal stimulus program carried out in Spain in 2009-2011. Our main empirical strategy is based on a close-elections regression discontinuity design. In contrast to previous studies which use aggregate data at the district or municipal level we exploit spatial variation in both investment and voter support within municipalities and find no evidence of supporter targeting. Complementary results indicate that voters may be responding to investment by increasing turnout.
We ask whether the birthplaces of Italian members of Parliament are favoured in the allocation of central government transfers. Using a panel of municipalities for the years between 1994 and 2006, we find that municipal governments of legislators' birth towns receive larger transfers per capita. Exploiting variation in birthplaces induced by parliamentary turnover for estimation, we find that this effect is driven by legislators who were born in a town outside their district of election. As a result, we argue that our findings cannot be a consequence of re-election incentives, the usual motivation for pork-barrel policies in the literature. Rather, politicians may be pursuing other personal motives. In line with this hypothesis, we find that the birth town bias essentially disappears when legislative elections are near. We explore several possible mechanisms behind our results by matching parliamentarians to a detailed dataset on local level administrators.
I exploit a reform that required Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheets before elections to study whether having more informed voters affects the political budget cycle. Municipal investment in the year before elections is 28.5% higher than in electoral years, and the reform reduced this pre-electoral spending increase by one third. I then study the role of local newspapers in disseminating municipal financial information to voters and find that the effect of the reform is twice as large in areas with relatively many newspaper readers, suggesting that mayors react to more informed voters by reducing spending manipulation.
I exploit a reform that required Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheetsbefore elections to study whether having more informed voters aects the political budgetcycle. To start, investment spending in the year before elections is 28.5% higher thanin the election year and this increase is mainly nanced with new debt and sales of publicassets. Taking advantage of the staggered timing of municipal elections, I estimate thatthe reform reduced this pre-electoral spending increase by around one-third. I also studythe role of local newspapers in disseminating municipal nancial information to votersand I nd that the reduction in spending after the reform is twice as strong in provinceswith above-median local newspapers sales per capita. I interpret these results as evidencethat mayors react to more informed voters by reducing spending manipulation.
In this paper we use data on US states and a regression-discontinuity design to study how divided government affects the polarization of the legislature, inter-branch conflict, and policy implementation. We document that Republican legislators serving under a divided government have more conservative ideologies than those serving under a fully unified government. Correspondingly, Democrats have more liberal ideologies. In terms of policy implementation, however, we find evidence of moderation: compared to unified Republican governments, divided ones with a democratic governorship or senate implement more liberal policies. When Democrats lose unified control, instead, policies become more conservative.
Do behavioral biases affect prices in a high-stake market? We study the role of left-digitbias in the purchase of an apartment, one of the most important assets in a household’sportfolio. Left-digit bias is the inability to fully process digits after the first, perceivingprices just below a round number (such as $3.99) as cheaper than their roundcounterpart ($4). We start by documenting that apartments listed at just-below asking prices are sold at a 3-5% higher final price after an auction. This effect appears not to bedriven by i) differences in observable characteristics; ii) differences in real estate agents’behavior; or iii) institutional characteristics of the market. We show that apartments using just-below prices attract more bidders and bids, leading to higher competition and to a higher final price. Our results suggest that inattentive buyers might be losing roughlyhalf a year of disposable income.
Do behavioral biases affect prices in a high-stakes market? We study the role of left-digit bias in the purchase of an apartment. Left-digit bias is the failure to fully process digits after the first, perceiving prices just below a round number (such as $3.99) as cheaper than their round counterpart ($4). Apartments with asking prices just below round millions are sold at a 3%–5% higher final price after an auction. This effect appears not to be driven by differences in observables or in real estate agents’ behavior. Auctions for apartments listed just below round numbers are more competitive and attract more bidders and bids.
This paper studies how divided government – arising when control of the government branches is split between parties – affects the polarization of the legislature and policy implementation. Using data on electoral and legislative outcomes for US states and a regression-discontinuity design, we show that Republican state senators are substantially more polarized when they serve in a divided government than they are in a fully unified government. We find similar but smaller effects for Democrats. In addition, governors facing an opposing, united legislature veto more bills, and have more of these overridden. However, in terms of policy implementation, we find evidence of moderation: when a unified Republican government loses a chamber or the governor to the Democratic party, the implemented legislation becomes much more liberal. Correspondingly, when Democrats lose unified control, policies become more conservative. These results suggest that divided government creates incentives for legislators to polarize knowing they will need to compromise in order to obtain their preferred policy.