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  • 1.
    Reisner, Andrew
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes2015Inngår i: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 260, s. 1-22Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.

  • 2.
    Reisner, Andrew
    Department of Philosophy, McGill University.
    Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity2015Inngår i: Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome / [ed] I. Hirose and A Reisner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1, s. 189-206Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper considers the relation between the sources of normativity, reasons, and normative conflicts. It argues that common views about how normative reasons relate to their sources have important consequences for how we can understand putative normative conflicts.

  • 3.
    Reisner, Andrew
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against2016Inngår i: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals / [ed] Martin Grajner and Pedro Schmechtig, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2016, s. 95-114Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system of requirements among an agent's mental states. It is argued that peer disagreement has either no, or a very limited, affect on what rationality requires of an agent in a given circumstance. This is in part because of difficulties generated by a novel example of evidence of evidence of p being evidence against p. This example calls into question the mechanisms whereby peer disagreement might affect what is rationally required of an agent. The chapter also reevaluates the importance of actual peer disagreement against the backdrop of prior expectations about whether disagreement is believed to be likely, arguing that peer disagreement is most likely to change what is rationally required of an agent when it is believed to be unlikely.

  • 4.
    Reisner, Andrew
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Pragmatic Reasons for Belief2018Inngår i: The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 1, s. 705-728Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a chapter describing of the state of the philosophical debate on pragmatic reasons for belief. 

  • 5.
    Reisner, Andrew
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity2018Inngår i: Normativity: Epistemic and Practical / [ed] C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 1, s. 221-240Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.

  • 6.
    Reisner, Andrew
    et al.
    Department of Philosophy, McGill University.
    Hirose, IwaoDepartment of Philosophy, McGill University.
    Weiging and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome2015Collection/Antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    John Broome has made major contributions to, and radical innovations in, contemporary moral philosophy. His research combines the formal method of economics with the philosophical analysis. Broome's works stretch over formal axiology, decision theory, philosophy of economics, population axiology, the value of life, the ethics of climate change, the nature of rationality, and practical and theoretical reasoning. Weighing and Reasoning brings together fifteen original essays from leading philosophers who have been influenced by the work and thought of John Broome.They explore Broome's works on the theory of value, and his works on practical and theoretical reasoning. This volume also includes Broome's note on his intellectual history to date.

  • 7.
    Reisner, Andrew
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Michaelson, Eliot
    Kings College London.
    Ethics for Fish2018Inngår i: The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics / [ed] Anne Barnhill; Mark Budolfson; Tyler Doggett, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 1, s. 189-208Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this chapter we discuss some of the central ethical issues specific to eating and harvesting fish. We survey recent research on fish intelligence and cognition and discuss possible considerations that are distinctive to questions about the ethics of eating fish as opposed to terrestrial and avian mammals. We conclude that those features that are distinctive to the harvesting and consumption of fish, including means of capture and the central role that fishing plays in many communities, do not suggest that eating fish is less morally problematic than eating terrestrial of avian animals.

  • 8.
    Reisner, Andrew
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    van Weelden, Joseph
    Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism2015Inngår i: Logos & Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology, ISSN 2069-0533, E-ISSN 2069-3052, Vol. 4, s. 429-448Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on careful reflection, lacks the intuitive advantage that it is sometimes supposed to have. Our second aim is to highlight the difference in the nature of the pragmatic reasons for belief that support moral testimony optimism and moral testimony pessimism, setting out more clearly the nature and magnitude of the challenge for the pessimist.

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