This data study provides the first comprehensive empirical overview of organised violence across the Shia and Sunni Muslim divide, 1989-2017. We present a conceptual framework of sectarian dimensions of armed conflicts: sectarian identities; sectarian ideologies; and sectarian alliances. Our analysis demonstrates the extent to which organised violence has been fought across the Shia-Sunni divide. We also explore the sectarian identity dimension in non-state armed conflicts and one-sided violence. Overall, our study shows that most of the organised violence across the Shia-Sunni divide is driven by states, rebel groups, and militias, rather than communities.
Why has there been no jihadist civil war in Southeast Asia? Although there has been a global surge in armed conflicts where at least one side fights for self-proclaimed Islamist aspirations, the region of Southeast Asia stands out by not having experienced a single jihadist civil war after 1975. Yet, so far, there have been no systematic comparisons of the frequency and nature of the Islamist violence in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. This study therefore contributes by exploring the empirical trajectories in the region and situating Southeast Asia to global developments, utilizing new and unique data on religiously defined armed conflicts 1975-2015. We find that whereas the number of people killed in Islamist violence has increased in the rest of the world, it has decreased in Southeast Asia. We argue that Southeast Asia has prevented outbreaks of jihadist civil wars, and contained and partially resolved ongoing Islamist conflicts before they have escalated, due to three interrelated factors: the lack of internationalization of Islamist conflicts in the region, the openness of political channels for voicing Islamist aspirations, and government repression. This article suggests insights from the region that can be valuable from a global perspective.
Research has shown the potential of nonviolent civil resistance in challenging autocratic state regimes (e.g. Sharp, 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Yet, little is known about its applicability in jihadist proto-states, that is, territories governed by militant jihadist groups. We argue that civil resistance is more likely to occur when jihadists impose a rule that local populations perceive as alien and when organizational structures capable of collective nonviolent mobilization are activated. We develop this argument through a comparative analysis of three jihadist proto-states: one in which manifest and organized civil resistance occurred (Islamic Emirate of Azawad in Mali in 2012), and two in which it did not: the Islamic State of Iraq (2006-2008) and the Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla in Yemen (2015-2016). Whereas the former was met with mainly armed resistance (the Sunni Awakening campaign), the latter saw neither armed nor unarmed organized and collective resistance by locals under its rule. We demonstrate how variation in the jihadists' governing strategies (especially the degree of adaptation to local conditions) as well as in the social structures for mobilization (i.e. whether opposition was channeled through civil society networks or tribal networks) created different conditions for civil resistance. This study adds to a growing research discussion on civil resistance against rebel governance (e.g. Arjona, 2015; Kaplan, 2017). More broadly, our study is an innovative first attempt to bridge research on terrorism, rebel governance, and civil resistance, three fields that have been siloed in previous research.