The civil-military interface in peace support operations is changing due to increasingly overlapping tasks, increased military involvement in humanitarian activities, and increased integration of all involved actors, not least through various current strategic concepts. This article not only describes these trends, but also, more importantly, analyses certain consequences in terms of mission effectiveness. The focus of the analysis is the ideas of 'militarisation of humanitarian aid' and the reverse 'humanitarianisation of the military'. The main arguments of this contribution are that the assumptions of increased effectiveness stemming from civil-military integration cannot be taken for granted and that there are harmful consequences stemming from blurring the lines between civilian, humanitarian and military actors. There is, in other words, a need to better specify and explain the causal mechanisms that lead to effectiveness in complex peace support operations.
A nation's structure and culture of civil-military relations are important and largely overlooked factors in explaining the performance of armed forces involved in complex expeditionary operations. The US model of 'Huntingtonian', divided civil-military structures and poor interagency cooperation, makes the US military less suited for complex expeditionary operations. British civil-military relations involve a Defence Ministry that conscientiously integrates military and civilian personnel, as well as extensive interagency cooperation and coordination. This 'Janowitzean', integrated form of civil-military relations makes the British military more likely to provide for the planning and implementation of comprehensive campaigns that employ and coordinate all instruments of power available to the state, as well as troops in the field displaying the flexibility and cultural and political understanding that are necessary in complex expeditionary operations.
A number of lessons stand out from the analysis of British operations in Helmand between 2006 and 2010: First, contrary to the legacy, British competence in the field of counterinsurgency is neither natural nor innate through regimental tradition or historical experience. The slow adaptation in Helmand is an indication that the expertise British forces developed in past operations is but a distant folktale within the British Armed Forces. Substantially changed training, painful relearning of counterinsurgency principles, and changed mindsets are therefore necessary to avoid repeated early failures in the future. Moreover, despite eventually adapting tactically to the situation and task in Helmand, the British Armed Forces proved inadequate in dealing with the task assigned to them for two key reasons. First, the resources of the British military are simply too small for large scale complex engagements such as those in Helmand or southern Iraq. Second, the over-arching comprehensive approach, especially the civilian aspects of operations that underpinned Britain’s historical successes with counterinsurgency, is today missing. In the end, the article calls for greater realism about what British contributions to international intervention can achieve – a strategy in tune with actual resources.
This paper uses the concept of 'organised hypocrisy' as a means of making sense of the inconsistencies and contradictions in contemporary theory and practice of international state-building. While organised hypocrisy in international politics allows states and organisations to maintain systemic stability and legitimacy by managing irreconcilable pressures that might otherwise render them unable to operate effectively, this paper argues that organised hypocrisy also has negative impacts on the operational effectiveness of state-building. It allows organisations to engage in operations without sufficient resources, thereby seriously undermining operational effectiveness and the credibility of international state-building as a legitimate political tool. Organised hypocrisy also creates false expectations among the local and global populations and thereby decreases the credibility of the strategic narrative that is supposed to explain and make sense of the transformation processes to the general public. The paper also explores a number of options for dealing with organised hypocrisy in a way that could improve the effectiveness of international state-building.
This article conducts a critical analysis of the historical lessons, theassumptions and the conduct of ‘hearts and minds’ approaches to counterinsurgency.This results in challenges. Theoretically the ‘hearts and minds’approach is rooted in modernisation theory and a normative Western approachto legitimacy that fails to live up to the expectations of the local population.The approach is also based on lessons from past successes such as the British1950s campaign in Malaya. However, a great contextual shift has taken placesince then and the relevance of past experiences is therefore questionable ina context of complex state-building in the wake of intervention. This also haspractical consequences as we seek to rectify the often misapplied approachesof today.
Security sector reform (SSR) is a concept that is highly visible within policy and practice circles and that increasingly shapes international programmes for development assistance, security co-operation and democracy promotion. This paper examines the concept and practice of SSR using theories of the state and state formation within a historical-philosophical perspective. The paper recognises that the processes of SSR are highly laudable and present great steps forward towards more holistic conceptions of security and international development. However, the main argument of the paper is that we should be careful of having too high expectations of the possibility of SSR fulfilling its ambitious goals of creating states that are both stable and democratic and accountable. Instead, we should carefully determine what level of ambition is realistic for each specific project depending on local circumstances. A further argument of this paper is that legitimate order and functioning state structures are prerequisites and preconditions for successful democratisation and accountability reforms within the security sector.
Since UNSCR 1325 was passed, the Swedish Armed Forces have gone through an impressive process of change from limited early projects to an institutionalised gender organisation that has worked to mainstream a gender perspective, to conduct training, and to establish specific gender-related functions, such as Gender Field Advisors and Gender Focal Points. The Gender Field Advisors have during this process been deployed with Swedish and international units in conflicts around the world and have thereby gained important experience as well as continued to refine the Swedish approach to gender implementation in military operations. The latest development has been the establishment of the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations, which will seek to function as a platform for continued implementation of a gender perspective in both Sweden and abroad.
The purpose of this report is to increase the understanding of these organisational processes, the driving factors and roadblocks within the armed forces, the activities conducted in the field and their impact at home and in the area of operations is essential to the continuing implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of a gender perspective more broadly. This understanding has the potential to provide support and lessons for similar processes in the armed forces of other countries and even other contexts.