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  • 1.
    Alanen, Lilli
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Descartes on Virtue2007Inngår i: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University , 2007, 1-10 s.Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth and Queen Christina, as well as in parts of the Passions of the Soul, Descartes provides the beginnings of a theory of ethics. Descartes argues that the supreme good, or the end that one ought to pursue in all of one’s actions, is virtue. The latter is understood by Descartes as a matter of using one’s absolutely free will as well as one can. In the paper we try to shed some light on what this Cartesian notion of virtue more specifically entails.

  • 2.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics2012Inngår i: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 18, nr 2, 145-157 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    A common intuition is that there is a moral difference between ‘making people happy’ and ‘making happy people.’ This intuition, often referred to as ‘the Asymmetry,’ has, however, been criticized on the grounds that it is incoherent. Why is there, for instance, not a corresponding difference between ‘making people unhappy’ and ‘making unhappy people’? I argue that the intuition faces several difficulties but that these can be met by introducing a certain kind of reason that is favouring but non-requiring. It is argued that there are structural similarities between the asymmetry and moral options and that the asymmetry can be defended as an instance of a moral option.

  • 3.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity2013Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis in an invistigation into the concept of "harm" and its moral relevance. A common view is that an analysis of harm should include a counterfactual condition: an act harms a person iff it makes that person worse off. A common objection to the moral relevance of harm, thus understood, is the non-identity problem.

    This thesis criticises the counterfactual condition, argues for an alternative analysis and that harm plays two important normative roles.

    The main ground for rejecting the counterfactual condition is that it has unacceptable consequences in cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. Several modifications to the condition are considered but all fail to solve this problem.

    According to the alternative analysis to do harm is to perform an act which (1) is responsible for the obtaining of a state of affairs which (2) makes a person’s life go worse. It is argued that (1) should be understood in terms of counterfactual dependence. This claim is defended against counterexamples based on redundant causation. An analysis of (2) is also provided using the notion of a well-being function. It is argued that by introducing this notion it is possible to analyse contributive value without making use of counterfactual comparisons and to solve the non-identity problem.

    Regarding the normative importance of harm, a popular intuition is that there is an asymmetry in our obligations to future people: that a person would have a life worth living were she to exist is not a reason in favour of creating that person while that a person would have a life not worth living is a reason against creating that person. It is argued that the asymmetry can be classified as a moral option grounded in autonomy. Central to this defence is the suggestion that harm is relevant to understanding autonomy. Autonomy involves partly the freedom to pursue one’s own aims as long as one does no harm.

  • 4.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Variabilism is not the solution to the asymmetry2015Inngår i: Thought: a journal of philosophy, ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 4, nr 1, 1-9 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    According to “the asymmetry”, the fact that a future person would have a life not worth living counts against bringing that person into existence but the fact that a future person would have a life worth living does not count in favour of bringing that person into existence. While this asymmetry seems intuitive, it is also puzzling: if we think that it is of moral importance to prevent people from living lives not worth living, shouldn’t we also that it is of moral importance to create people with lives worth living? Melinda Roberts has suggested a view, “Variabilism”, which she argues solves this problem. I argue that Variabilism fails as a solution to the asymmetry. First, Variabilism relies on a particular distinction between gains and losses which is at least as puzzling as the asymmetry itself. Second, in some cases Variabilism is incompatible with the asymmetry. In these cases, the fact that a person would have a life worth living does count in favour of creating her.

  • 5.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Värdet av att existera2017Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 38, nr 2, 3-14 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 6.
    Anderberg, Thomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    "Problem of Evil"2009Inngår i:  Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions / [ed] Nina Azari, Springer Verlag , 2009Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 7.
    Andersson, Emil
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Political Liberalism and the Interests of Children: A Reply to Timothy Michael Fowler2011Inngår i: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 17, nr 3, 291-296 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 8.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Aggregate and Average Utilitarianism2012Inngår i: The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism / [ed] J. E. Crimmins and D. G. Long, New York & London: Continuum Press , 2012Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 9.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Cirkulär tid - ett varv till2007Inngår i: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 28, nr 1, 29-30 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatible with the existence of “higher values”, any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non-standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures including negative as well as positive values.

  • 10.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Defining Goodness and Badness in Terms of Betterness without Negation2011Inngår i: Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior / [ed] Ehtibar Dzhafarov, Lacey Perry, New Jersey: World Scientific , 2011, 51-66 s.Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 11.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Extensive measurement with incomparability2008Inngår i: Journal of mathematical psychology (Print), ISSN 0022-2496, E-ISSN 1096-0880, Vol. 52, nr 4, 250-259 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard theories of extensive measurement assume that the objects to be measured form a complete order with respect to the relevant property. In this paper, representation and uniqueness theorems are presented for a theory that departs radically from this completeness assumption. It is first shown that any quasi-order on a countable set can be represented by vectors of real numbers. If such an order is supplemented by a concatenation operator, yielding a relational structure that satisfies a set of axioms similar to the standard axioms for an extensive structure, we obtain a scale possessing the crucial properties of a ratio scale. Incomparability is thus compatible with extensive measurement. The paper ends with a brief discussion on some possible applications and developments of this result.

  • 12.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    'Good' in Terms of 'Better'2016Inngår i: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 50, nr 1, 213-223 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    There have been many attempts to define the monadic value properties of intrinsic or final goodness and badness in terms of the dyadic betterness relation. By reducing the number of primitive concepts, such definitions would, if possible, be desirable for reasons of theoretical simplicity. Johan Gustafsson has recently argued, however, that no such definitions can succeed.1 I shall suggest definitions that avoid Gustafsson's objections, and have the further advantage of being more generally applicable than earlier proposals.

  • 13.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity2007Inngår i: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 73, nr 1, 3-25 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatible with the existence of “higher values”, any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non-standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures including negative as well as positive values.

  • 14.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Intransitivity2012Inngår i: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFollette, Wiley-Blackwell , 2012Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 15.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Non-Archimedean Extensive Measurement with Incomparability2011Inngår i: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, E-ISSN 1879-3118, Vol. 62, nr 1, 71-76 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard theories of extensive measurement require that all objects to be measured are comparable, and that no object is infinitely or infinitesimally greater than another. The present paper develops a theory that leaves room for infinite and infinitesimal differences, as well as incomparable objects. Our result is analogous to the standard representation and uniqueness theorem of extensive measurement, and only simple and familiar mathematical concepts are assumed.

  • 16.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle2013Inngår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 16, nr 3, 449-463 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the 'collapsing principle'. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome's view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu's defence of Broome's position fails.

  • 17. Dawson, Angus
    et al.
    Grill, Kalle
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Health Promotion: Conceptual and Ethical Issues2012Inngår i: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 5, nr 2, 101-103 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 18.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Death and Other Untimely Events2017Inngår i: Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR), ISSN 1053-8364, E-ISSN 2153-7984, Vol. 42, 253-257 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that his attempt to address the challenge does not succeed.

  • 19.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Död i tid och otid2012Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, nr 3, 3-15 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 20.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Döden igen2013Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, nr 4, 46-49 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 21.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Personal Value - By Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen2012Inngår i: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 78, 268-272 s.Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 22.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Recension av Mats Selander (red.), Gud och hans kritiker: en antologi om nyateismen2012Inngår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 16, nr 3, 62-66 s.Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 23.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Recension av Torbjörn Tännsjö, Filosofisk tröst: en bok om döden2016Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 37, nr 2, 53-56 s.Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 24.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins2014Inngår i: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 26, nr 02, 218-220 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 25.
    Enflo, Karin
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Measures of Freedom of Choice2012Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis studies the problem of measuring freedom of choice. It analyzes the concept of freedom of choice, discusses conditions that a measure should satisfy, and introduces a new class of measures that uniquely satisfy ten proposed conditions. The study uses a decision-theoretical model to represent situations of choice and a metric space model to represent differences between options.

    The first part of the thesis analyzes the concept of freedom of choice. Different conceptions of freedom of choice are categorized into evaluative and non-evaluative, as well as preference-dependent and preference-independent kinds. The main focus is on the three conceptions of freedom of choice as cardinality of choice sets, representativeness of the universal set, and diversity of options, as well as the three conceptions of freedom of rational choice, freedom of eligible choice, and freedom of evaluated choice.

    The second part discusses the conceptions, together with conditions for a measure and a variety of measures proposed in the literature. The discussion mostly focuses on preference-independent conceptions of freedom of choice, in particular the diversity conception. Different conceptions of diversity are discussed, as well as properties that could affect diversity, such as the cardinality of options, the differences between the options, and the distribution of differences between the options. As a result, the diversity conception is accepted as the proper explication of the concept of freedom of choice. In addition, eight conditions for a measure are accepted. The conditions concern domain-insensitivity, strict monotonicity, no-choice situations, dominance of differences, evenness, symmetry, spread of options, and limited function growth. None of the previously proposed measures satisfy all of these conditions.

    The third part concerns the construction of a ratio-scale measure that satisfies the accepted conditions. Two conditions are added regarding scale-independence and function growth proportional to cardinality. Lastly, it is shown that only one class of measures satisfy all ten conditions, given an additional assumption that the measures should be analytic functions with non-zero partial derivatives with respect to some function of the differences. These measures are introduced as the Ratio root measures.

  • 26.
    Enflo, Karin
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Measuring Opportunity2011Inngår i: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski och Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011, 53-68 s.Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 27.
    Enflo, Karin
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Vi vill inte alltid ha valfrihet2013Inngår i: Upsala Nya Tidning, ISSN 1104-0173, Vol. 123, nr 248, 5- s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 28.
    Grill, Kalle
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Neutrality as a constraint on political reasoning2012Inngår i: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, E-ISSN 1783-1431, Vol. 19, nr 3, 547-557 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 29.
    Hurtig, Kent
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Why Internalists about Reasons Should be Humeans about Motivation2009Inngår i: Hume on Motivation and Virtue: new essays / [ed] Charles R. Pigden, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan , 2009Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 30.
    Jedenheim Edling, Magnus
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Over-Determination and Act-Consequentialism2017Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This dissertation is a discussion of the challenge that cases of over-determination pose to Act-Consequentialism. Although there are many realistic examples of such cases – for example, pollution, overfishing, or the election of an inappropriate politician – I consider structurally purer examples, one of which I call “Case One.” Suppose that you and I independently shoot and kill a third person called “Victim.” Our bullets arrive at the same time and each shot would have killed Victim by itself. Finally, Victim would not have been killed, if neither of us had pulled the trigger. According to the Standard Version of Act-Consequentialism, an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better. Case One challenges the Standard Version because there does not seem to be such an alternative to my action: Victim would have died by your shot if I had not shot him, and similar remarks apply to your action.

    The dissertation is structured as follows. After Chapter One, which briefly introduces the main issues of the dissertation, I turn to Chapter Two – “Preliminaries” – where I outline the Standard Version and highlight the main characteristics of over-determination cases. These cases are divided into cases of redundant difference making and cases of redundant causation. Cases of redundant causation are subdivided further into cases of causal over-determination and pre-emption. I make an important stipulation in this chapter. I say that our actions in Case One and similar cases are “redundant negative difference makers.”

    In Chapter Three – “Replies” – I consider whether the proponent of Act-Consequentialism might question the intuition that you and I, respectively, act wrongly in Case One. The proponent might accept that we have this intuition but explain it away, or she might deny that we have the intuition and instead point to something else that is wrong in this kind of case. For example, she could suggest that although neither you nor I act wrongly individually, we act wrongly together. I argue that these replies are problematic.  For instance, explaining away this intuition might also force us to explain away intuitions that support the Standard Version.

    In Chapter Four – “Causal Consequences” – I discuss an alternative version of Act-Consequentialism that might seem to fare better. The Standard Version interprets the term “outcome of an action” as referring to the entire possible world that would obtain, if the action were performed. The version I have in mind, the “Causal Consequences Version of Act-Consequentialism,” understands “outcome of an action” as instead referring to the causal consequences of the action. It seems clear that you and I, respectively, cause the state of affairs that Victim dies in Case One. However, I show that the Causal Consequences Version has a number of unattractive implications.

    In Chapter Five – “the Non-Standard Version” – I suggest another alternative version of Act-Consequentialism. This version – the Non-Standard Version – implies that you and I act wrongly in Case One. Roughly, the Non-Standard Version says that an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better, or is a redundant negative difference maker. The Non-Standard Version is similar to a principle suggested by Derek Parfit. However, I shall argue that the Non-Standard Version is preferable to Parfit’s principle.

    In Chapter Six – “Further Cases” – I discuss a number of cases that challenge the Non-Standard Version. For example, what would the Non-Standard Version imply in a case very similar to Case One but where I would have killed another person, if I had not shot Victim? I argue that the Non-Standard Version handles this and other problematic cases, and that it is therefore a plausible alternative to the Standard Version. 

  • 31.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    20th Century Theories of Personal Identity2015Inngår i: Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries / [ed] Amy Kind, Routledge, 2015Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 32.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer2014Inngår i: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 18, 11-18 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against my critique.

  • 33.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Am I a Series2009Inngår i: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 34.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Animal Ethics2016Inngår i: Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity / [ed] Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon, Oxford University Press, 2016Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 35.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr2016Inngår i: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 36.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Being and Betterness2010Inngår i: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, 285-302 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 37.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Constituted Simples?2009Inngår i: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 37, nr 1, 87-89 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 38.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Death: Badness and Prudential Reasons2016Inngår i: Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy / [ed] K. Brownlee, D. Coady, K. Lippert-Rasmussen, Blackwell Publishing, 2016Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 39.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time2009Inngår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, 247-256 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 40.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Francescotti on Fission2009Inngår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 41.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Kaufman's Response to Lucretius2008Inngår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 89, nr 4, 470-485 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 42.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    More on the Mirror: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner2014Inngår i: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 18, nr 4, 341-351 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, I have objected that it is irrelevant what it is in fact rational for the person to care about. Fischer and Brueckner have replied to my critique. In this paper I respond to their latest pair of replies.

  • 43.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Nagels argument för asymmetri2002Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 44.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Non-Reductionism and Special Concern2007Inngår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 85, nr 4, 641-657 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 45.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    On Settling, by Robert E. Goodin: Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012, pp. viii + 1142014Inngår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 92, nr 1, 192-194 s.Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 46.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Parfit on Fission2010Inngår i: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 150, nr 1, 21-35 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 47.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Past and Future Non-Existence2012Inngår i: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 17, 51-64 s.Artikkel, omtale (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This paper criticizes these responses.

  • 48.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Recension av 8 filosofiska texter (red. Dan Munter & Kristian Löfgren)2008Inngår i: Filosofisk tidskriftArtikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 49.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Recension av Lennart Lundmark, Kort om döden2014Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, nr 1Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 50.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Recension av Åsa Nordén, Har nutida fysik religiös betydelse?2001Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
123 1 - 50 of 148
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