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  • 101.
    Moberger, Victor
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Tolvstegsideologin som pseudovetenskap2012In: Folkvett, ISSN 0283-0795, no 4, 7-38 p.Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 102.
    Pettersson, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Interpreting the Intuition of Neutrality2011In: Neither/Nor: philosophical papers dedicated to Erik Carlson on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski and Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011, 209-218 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 103.
    Pettersson, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The intuition of neutrality and consequentialist thinking: potential antinatalist implications2013In: SpringerPlus, E-ISSN 2193-1801, Vol. 2, 99Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many people seem to share some version of what has been called the “intuition of neutrality” aboutcreating new people, which, roughly, says that there exists a certain range of levels of well-beingsuch that creating people within this range is, in itself, morally neutral, but creating people with alevel of well-being outside this range is not morally neutral. In this paper, I will discuss differentinterpretations of this intuition, and specifically distinguish between what I will call counterfactualinterpretations and Do-interpretations of the intuition. I will argue that it is hard to interpret theintuition in a way that does not give rise to antinatalist moral reasons, i.e. reasons favoring an emptyfuture population, when it comes to choices of social policy. In particular, this holds if we assume aconception of relevant outcomes of actions reflecting consequentialist moral intuitions. In the end, I will formulate a normative principle of welfare promotion which I argue respects the most plausiblecounterfactual version of the neutrality intuition.

  • 104.
    Pettersson, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Logical Structure of the Moral Concepts: An Essay in Propositional Deontic Logic2010Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this thesis, the main focus is on deontic logic as a tool for formal representation of moral reasoning in natural language. The simple standard system of deontic logic (SDL), i.e. the minimal Kripkean modal logic extended with the deontic axiom, stating that necessity (interpreted as obligation) implies possibility (interpreted as permission), has often been considered inadequate for this aim, due to different problems, e.g. the so-called deontic paradoxes. A general survey of deontic logic and the problems with SDL is made in chapter 1. In chapter 2, a system denoted Classical Deontic-Modal logic (CDM1) is defined. In this system, there is a primary obligation operator indexed to sets of possible worlds, and a secondary requirement operator, defined in terms of strictly necessary conditions for fulfilling an obligation. This secondary operator has most of the properties of the necessity operator in SDL. In chapters 3 and 4, it is argued that CDM1 is able to handle the SDL problems presented in chapter 1 in an adequate way, and the treatment of these problems in CDM1 is also compared with their treatment in some other well-known deontic systems. In chapter 5, it is argued that even though the problems related to quantification in modal contexts are relevant to deontic logic, these issues are not specific to deontic logic. In chapter 6, the relations between some controversial features of moral reasoning, such as moral dilemmas and “non-standard” deontic categories like supererogation, and deontic logic are discussed. It is shown how CDM1 can be modified in order to accommodate these features.

  • 105.
    Prats, Elena
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Försäljning av medborgarskap i Europa2017Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 106.
    Reisner, Andrew
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    van Weelden, Joseph
    Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism2015In: Logos & Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology, ISSN 2069-0533, E-ISSN 2069-3052, Vol. 4, 429-448 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on careful reflection, lacks the intuitive advantage that it is sometimes supposed to have. Our second aim is to highlight the difference in the nature of the pragmatic reasons for belief that support moral testimony optimism and moral testimony pessimism, setting out more clearly the nature and magnitude of the challenge for the pessimist.

  • 107.
    Reyes Molina, Sebastián
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Michael Giudice, Understanding The Nature of Law: A Case for Constructive Conceptual Explanation2016In: Edinburgh Law Review, ISSN 1364-9809, E-ISSN 1755-1692, Vol. 20, no 3, 415-416 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 108.
    Reyes Molina, Sebastián
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Sobre derecho y averiguación de la verdad2017In: DOXA: Cuadernos filosofía del derecho, ISSN 0214-8676, Vol. 40, 317-336 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the field of Evidence Law the relation between truth and law has been a somewhat non-debated topic in the past years. It is a given that such connection exists and, it is understood as the notion of the ascertainment of truth of disputed questions of fact through legal evidence. The thesis that I have reconstructed in this paper has been presented by the Prof. Jordi Ferrer who grounds the connection between truth and law in the role of the legal system as a tool for guiding the behaviour of the governed. I call this thesis the theory of the structural clause of truth. In this paper I shall present a possible reconstruction of this theory, I shall raise two objections against it and I shall present five possible interpretations of the relation between truth and law.

  • 109.
    Risberg, Olle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Naturalism, non-naturalism eller misstagsteori?: Bergström och Olson om normativa skäl2017In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 4, 1-11 p.Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 110.
    Risberg, Olle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Om Tännsjös försvar av den motbjudande slutsatsen2014In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 18, no 1, 1-11 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Torbjörn Tännsjö har argumenterat för att den motbjudande slutsatsen bör accepteras. Den motbjudande slutsatsen är att en värld Z (i vilken det finns ofantligt många människor, som alla lever liv som med bara mycket liten marginal är värda att leva) skulle vara bättre än en värld A (i vilken det finns många människor som lever väldigt bra liv). För många är detta mycket kontraintuitivt, men Tännsjö försöker avväpna denna intuition på flera sätt.

    I artikeln diskuteras ett av dessa sätt, som bygger på den s.k. Nära-Noll-Hypotesen. Enligt denna hypotes är liven som levs av människor i västvärlden idag ungefär lika bra som de i Z-världen, d.v.s. bara med mycket liten marginal värda att leva. Jag argumenterar för att Nära-Noll-Hypotesen ställer till problem för Tännsjö – om hypotesen accepteras så verkar den redan kontraintuitiva omvända motbjudande slutsatsen bli ännu mer kontraintuitiv. Slutsatsen är således att Nära-Noll-Hypotesen inte är ett bra sätt för Tännsjö att försvara den motbjudande slutsatsen, eftersom denna hypotes gör ett annat argument mot hans position ännu allvarligare.

  • 111.
    Risberg, Olle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral PhilosophyIn: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to many popular views in normative ethics, meta-ethics, and axiology, facts about what we ought to do or what is good for us depend on facts about the attitudes that some agent would have in some relevant idealized circumstances. This paper presents an unrecognized structural problem for such views which threatens to be devastating.

  • 112.
    Risberg, Olle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems For Schroeder2016In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 28, no 1, 101-107 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I argue against Schroeder's account of the weight of normative reasons. It is shown that in certain cases an agent may have reasons she cannot know about without them ceasing to be reasons, and also reasons she cannot know about at all. Both possibilities are troubling for Schroeder's view.

  • 113.
    Rosenqvist, Simon
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Joshua D. Greene's "Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them"2017In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 14, no 2, 225-228 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 114.
    Rosenqvist, Simon
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Varför Torbjörn Tännsjö bör bli vegetarian2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 2, 33-35 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 115.
    Svedberg, Maria
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy. Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Recension av Kort om fri vilja av Thomas Pink2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, no 3, 48-56 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 116.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Are we lovers of the good?2004In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 138, no 2, 247-260 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Donald Davidson has stressed that we interpret a person correctly only if we represent him as satisfying certain norms of rationality. Some of these norms are "norms of coherence". A competent interpreter will find that the speaker has beliefs that are, by and large, consistent, and preferences that satisfy certain ordering conditions. However, other norms are "norms of correspondence". Thus, we must also, according to Davidson, assume that the speaker has beliefs that are, by and large, correct (by our lights), and desires that we, by and large, share. In this paper, I focus on the latter of these claims. I argue that, although Davidson may have made a case for the idea that we must assume that a speaker shares many of our beliefs, there is no justification for thinking that the same holds for our desires. Indeed, nothing Davidson says gives us reason to doubt that we are able to interpret a speaker without making any prior assumptions whatsoever about his particular desires. This conclusion points to a crucial asymmetry between beliefs and desires.

  • 117.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists1999In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 65, 70-85 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 118.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Coherence and disagreement1992In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 65, no 3, 305-317 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 119.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Contrasts and Demons: On Sinnott-Armstrong’s moderate Pyrrhonian scepticism2010In: Rearticulations of Reason: Recent Currents / [ed] Leila Haaparanta, Helsinki: Hakapaino Oy , 2010, 243-260 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 120.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Crispin Wright on moral disagreement1998In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 48, no 192, 359-365 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, the appropriate conclusion is that the disagreement is not genuine, since we must otherwise attribute an inexplicable error.

  • 121.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Davidson and Quine's Empiricism2001In: Interpreting Davidson, San Fransisco: CSLI Publishers , 2001, 269-283 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 122.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations2005Conference proceedings (editor) (Other academic)
  • 123.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere2014In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 79, no S1, 55-72 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to a traditional argument against moral realism, the existence of objective moral facts is hard to reconcile with the existence of radical disagreement over moral issues. An increasingly popular response to this argument is to insist that it generalizes too easily. Thus, it has been argued that if one rejects moral realism on the basis of disagreement then one is committed to similar views about epistemology and meta-ethics itself, since the disagreements that arise in those areas are just as deep as the moral ones. This in turn is taken to show that a moral anti-realist should seek another basis for her position. For, if she extends her anti-realism also to epistemology and meta-ethics, then she is no longer in a position to say that her meta-ethical position is true or that it is a fact that we have reason to accept it. She therefore seems left with a position that hardly even seems to be a position. The purpose of the paper is to challenge this response and in particular the claim that the argument from disagreement applies equally well to epistemology and meta-ethics as it does to ethics. It is argued that, despite contrary appearances, there are crucial differences between the disagreements that occur in ethics compared to those that arise in the other areas. Moreover, even granted that the disagreements are just as deep, there are other differences between the areas that nevertheless justify drawing different conclusions about their status from the existence of those disagreements.

  • 124.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Disagreement, Moral2013In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the philosophical literature one often meets the locution “the argument from moral disagreement”, as if there is only one such argument. But there are in fact several arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, arguments that take quite different routes to their anti-realist conclusions. In what follows, some of these arguments are reconstructed and discussed.

  • 125.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Ethics2008In: The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, London: Routledge , 2008, 111-120 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 126.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Ethics, Theoretical Rationality and Eliminativism About Belief2009In: Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2009, 345-355 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 127.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Explaining the Reliability of Moral Beliefs2016In: Ethics and Explanation / [ed] Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz, Oxford University Press, 2016, 37-57 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 128.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Fem filosofiska frågor2001 (ed. 1)Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 129.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Global Warming and Collective Dilemmas2014In: Access to Resources: An Urban Agenda / [ed] Henrietta Palmer, Baunach: Spurbuchverlag , 2014, 320-335 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 130.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Hur bör du leva?2004 (ed. 1)Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 131.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Intuitional Disagreement2012In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 50, no 4, 639-659 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the best version of the ‘experimentalist’ challenge to the use of intuitions in philosophy and in particular in ethics and to discuss possible responses to the challenge. I focus especially on responses that invoke substantive assumptions of the very type intuitions are supposed to support. It is argued that even if this apparently circular strategy is thought legitimate, the prospects of providing a compelling response to the challenge are still bleak.

    Abstract: Some think that recent empirical research has shown that peoples' moral intuitions vary in a way that is hard to reconcile with the supposition that they are even modestly reliable. This is in turn supposed to generate skeptical conclusions regarding the claims and theories advanced by ethicists because of the crucial role intuitions have in the arguments offered in support of those claims. I begin by trying to articulate the most compelling version of this challenge. On that version, the main problem is the absence of a believable positive account of the reliability of the intuitions (rather than the bits of negative evidence that have so far been gathered). I then consider the response to this challenge that, in my view, holds most promise. It differs from others by invoking substantive moral assumptions. Such a strategy may appear problematically circular, in that the justification of those assumptions seems to presuppose the very thesis that is challenged (the thesis that our intuitions deserve being treated as evidence). However, although I think that objection can be met, I argue that there are other problems with the strategy. On the basis of a set of conditions that a successful defense of the pertinent kind plausibly must satisfy, I argue that the prospects of developing such an account are bleak.

  • 132.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Meaning, Morals, and Mistakes2011In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlsson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski and Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011, 345-350 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 133.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Methodology in Metaethics2013In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What is ultimately at stake in the metaethical controversies? What evidence are the various theories responsive to, and why? What is their scope, and what are they, more specifically, about? These questions are, in a wide sense, methodological, as they pertain to the issue of how to assess metaethical positions and theories.

  • 134.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Disagreement2006 (ed. 1)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this book, Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking from moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.

  • 135.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Disagreement: Actual vs Possible2012In: Disagreement and Skepticism / [ed] Diego Machucha, London: Routledge, 2012, 90-108 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Suppose that the disagreement that exists regarding moral issues supports a skeptical or anti-realist conclusion of some sort (i.e., a conclusion to the effect that our moral convictions are not justified or cannot be (objectively) true). If so, could we plausibly generate the same conclusion by appealing to the mere possibility of such disagreement? This question has recently caused some controversy. In my paper, I explain why the answer is no and why the actual existence of certain types of disagreement have more weight, in the context of the realism/anti-realism debate, than the mere possibility of disagreements of the pertinent types. The view that ethical anti-realism can be defended with reference to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement is sometimes held to lead to global anti-realism (on the ground that disagreement is, in any area, always possible). The second aim of the paper is to show that this contention is false. On can appeal to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement in ethics in support of an anti-realist view and still, plausibly and coherently, deny global anti-realism.

  • 136.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge2017In: Moral Skepticism: New Essays / [ed] Diego Machuca, New York: Routledge, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Benacerraf challenge is a well-known objection to Platonism in mathematics. Its proponent argues that, if mathematical entities are, as Platonists claim, mind-independent, causally inert, and existent beyond space and time, then we are led to a skeptical stance according to which it is not possible to explain how it is that we have cognitive access to the mathematical realm or how it is that our mathematical beliefs are reliable. It has been argued that a similar objection could be leveled against those forms of moral realism that fall under what in Section 2 was called “robust moral realism.” In “Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge,” Folke Tersman considers whether, unlike the argument from the best explanation, the argument from disagreement, and the argument from evolution, the moral version of the Benacerraf challenge can undermine moral knowledge without appealing to empirical claims that moral realists deem controversial. His verdict is negative: to successfully counter certain responses to the moral version of the challenge, its proponent needs to have recourse to empirical considerations taken from some of the above arguments

  • 137.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Noncognitivism and inconsistency1995In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 33, no 3, 361-371 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A popular objection to ethical noncognitivism is that it fails to account for the realist appearance of moral discourse. This paper focuses on one feature of this appearance: Our tendency to seek consistency among our moral views. Contrary to what has been argued, I hold that noncognitivists can rationalize this practice. In support of this position, I mention some considerations indicating why, on a noncognitivist view, it is reasonable to seek moral consistency. However, I also discuss how well the main competitor to noncognitivism (that is, moral realism) fares in rendering this practice reasonable.

  • 138.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Nya empiriska ansatser inom etiken2010In: Årsbok / Kungl. Humanistiska vetenskaps-samfundet i Uppsala = Annales Societatis litterarum humaniorum regiae Upsaliensis / [ed] Merja Kytö, Uppsala: Swedish Science Press, 2010, 89-102 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 139.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Quine on ethics1998In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 64, no 1, 84-98 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In support of his noncognitivist view on ethics, Quine appeals to the claim that there are no ethical observation sentences. I argue that, given one of Quine's definition of 'observation sentence', this claim is false, while, given another, it is true. However, if taken strictly, no sentence satisfies the condition imposed by that definition. And even if it might be argued that the condition is satisfied to a higher degree by some nonethical sentences than by any ethical sentence, the relevance of this consideration is unclear. I conclude that the argument fails to vindicate noncognitivism.

  • 140.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Reivew of Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Liberty2001In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 67, no 2, 176-183 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 141.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy. Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Donald Davidson's Problems of Rationality 2006In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 72, no 3, 233-239 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 142.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism2001In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 67, no 2, 177-183 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 143.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Stimulus Meaning Debunked1998In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 48, no 3, 371-385 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    W. V. Quine appears to have introduced his notion 'stimulus meaning' for two main purposes: To define the concept of an observation sentence, and to provide criteria for translation manuals. I argue that it is not useful for any of these purposes, in part by questioning Quine's views on semantics and epistemology. I also survey some alternative purposes that the notion is supposed to serve, and argue that its utility relative to these purposes is also limited. I therefore suggest that we let the notion drop out of our philosophical toolbox.

  • 144.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Synliggörandet som motkraft2012In: Vårt förakt för svaghet: nazismens normer och värderingar - och våra egna / [ed] Harald Ofstad (författare av boken), Karneval förlag , 2012, 1-7 p.Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 145.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology2010In: Philosophical Topics, ISSN 0276-2080, E-ISSN 2154-154X, Vol. 38, no 2, 181-204 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    An increasingly popular strategy among critics of ethical antirealism is to stress that the traditional arguments for those theories work just as well in the case of other areas. For example, on the basis of that idea, it has recently been claimed that ethical expressivists are committed to being expressivists also about epistemic  judgments (including the judgment that it is rational to believe in ethical expressivism). This in turn is supposed to seriously undermine their position. The purpose of my paper is to examine this challenge. I argue that, in spite of the many similarities between the discourses, there are also crucial differences and that those differences justify a mixed verdict about them. According to the thesis I pursue, one can accept ethical expressivism on the basis of the traditional arguments and still, plausibly and coherently, deny a non-expressivist view about epistemic judgments.

  • 146.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience2008In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 86, no 3, 389-405 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (e.g., by Peter Singer) that these results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and therefore provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight (such as the idea of reflective equilibrium). I distinguish between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a sceptical attitude towards intuitions. I argue that, given the first version of the challenge, the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings. As for the second version of the challenge, I argue that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general.

  • 147.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Viability and Desirability of Global Democracy2006Conference proceedings (editor) (Other academic)
  • 148.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Tillsammans: en filosofisk debattbok om hur vi kan rädda vårt klimat2009Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 149.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Utilitarianism and the Idea of Reflective Equilibrium1991In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 12, no 3, 395-406 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
123 101 - 149 of 149
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