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  • 1151.
    Stoutland, Frederick
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Wittgenstein on Certainty and Truth1998In: Philosophical Investigations, p. 203-221Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 1152.
    Stoutland, Frederick
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Zur Verteidigung einer Nichtpsychologishchen Theorie der Handlunsgrunde2005In: e-journal Philosophie der Psychologie, Vol. MarchArticle in journal (Other scientific)
  • 1153.
    Stöpfgeshoff, Alexander
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    The Structure of the Virtues: A Study of Thomas Aquinas’s and Godfrey of Fontaines's Accounts of Moral Goodness2018Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This dissertation is a study of Thomas Aquinas’s (1225–1274) and Godfrey of Fontaines’s (d. 1306) moral philosophies. In this study, I conduct a detailed analysis of two Aristotelian commitments concerning the character virtues, namely, The Plurality of the Character Virtues and The Connection of the Character Virtues. Both Aquinas and Godfrey think that there are many distinct character virtues (such as moderation and justice), however, one cannot (perfectly) possess these character virtues in separation from each other.

    In Chapter I, it is established that Aquinas believes in the plurality of the character virtues not because of a specific account of the human soul, but because he is committed to a plurality in what he calls “the notion of goodness.” In Chapter II, it is argued that Aquinas’s account of virtuous action requires that there be a likeness between a person and their actions in terms of the notion of goodness explored in Chapter I. Chapters III through V lay out my account of how to reconstruct both Aquinas’s and Godfrey’s arguments for The Connection of the Character Virtues. The focus here lies on finding an interpretation that provides a valid argument for the connection of the character virtues. I argue that we ought to focus on a dependence between prudence and the character virtues. A central problem for this analysis is how to account for prudence as a unified virtue. On this issue, Godfrey provides an explicit argument that conceives of prudence as unified because prudence strikes a balance between the character virtues. Chapter VI investigates whether different groups, such as men and women, possess different types of character virtues. Godfrey offers a novel argument for the impossibility of male- and female-specific virtues. Finally, Chapter VII explores the question of how we should understand Godfrey’s account of prudence itself. I show that his discussion emphasizes the variable nature of ethics and that he endorses a view that has certain affinities with ethical particularism (in the contemporary sense).

  • 1154.
    Sukla, Ananta Ch.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Aesthetics. Sambalpur Univ, Dept English, Sambalpur, India..
    Fiction and Art Explorations in contemporary theory: Concluding Note2015In: Fiction And Art: Explorations In Contemporary Theory, BLOOMSBURY PUBL INC , 2015, p. 389-389Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 1155.
    Sukla, Ananta Ch.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Aesthetics. Sambalpur Univ, Dept English, Sambalpur, India..
    Fiction and Art Explorations in contemporary theory: Introduction2015In: Fiction And Art: Explorations In Contemporary Theory, BLOOMSBURY PUBL INC , 2015, p. 1-+Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 1156.
    Svanberg, Hakim
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine and Wittgenstein: Similarities and Common Misconceptions2019Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Quine and late Wittgenstein have often found themselves being compared for similarities and dissimilarities, we can attribute the allure of this subject to both philosophers being similar advocates of holism and epistemological relativity despite taking on different subject matters. Pieranna Garavaso attempted an inquiry of this type, where she compares Quine’s view on holism, relying mainly on “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, with Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Garavaso shows in her essay that there is a high level of correspondence between On Certainty and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” but ultimately concludes that despite any actual agreement between Quine and Wittgenstein, their views end up ultimately incompatible. I will argue that this is wrong; Quine’s conception of holism, and Wittgenstein’s conception of holism found in On Certainty are compatible, and even complementary. I will begin my text by giving a short presentation of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. I will then raise the similarities, and dissimilarities between the two texts before giving my final argument against the supposed conflict between them.

  • 1157.
    Svedberg, Maria
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy. Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Recension av Kort om fri vilja av Thomas Pink2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 48-56Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 1158.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Happiness, Well-being, and Their Relation to Virtue in Descartes' Ethics2011In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 77, no 3, p. 238-260Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    My main thesis in this article is that Descartes' ethics should be understood as involving a distinction between happiness and well-being. The distinction I have in mind is never clearly stated or articulated by Descartes himself, but I argue that we nevertheless have good reason to embrace it as an important component in a charitable reconstruction of his ethical thought. In section I, I present Descartes' account of happiness and of how he thinks happiness can (and cannot) be acquired. Then, in section II, I introduce and develop the distinction between happiness and well-being. I do this via a discussion of a difficult passage in one of Descartes' letters to Elisabeth, where he may seem first to grant and then immediately to reject the view that people's happiness can vary in degree depending on the possession of goods or perfections that are outside their power to control. I believe my proposed distinction can help us make good sense of this passage. In the last two sections (III and IV), I then offer some further grounds or reasons for why the proposed distinction should be ascribed to Descartes.

  • 1159.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Some Basic Issues in Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics2006Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    During the last three or four decades, a number of moral philosophers have moved in the direction of virtue ethics (VE). In this essay we begin by providing an outline of the main features of VE. It is argued that the basic normative requirement of VE is to aspire towards developing a morally virtuous character. Moral virtues, furthermore, are conceived of in a basically Aristotelian way: as well entrenched dispositions of character to deliberate and make decisions in accordance with correct reason, as well as to habitually act and feel in morally appropriate ways.

    We then proceed to discussing three basic issues in VE more thoroughly. In chapter 3 it is argued that while VE primarily focuses on what we should aim to be like, it also has something to say about what we ought to do. Ultimately a developmental account of right action, according to which what counts as right action depends on our specific levels of virtuous development, is defended. In chapter 4 it is argued that VE does not constitute a kind of moral elitism. Even if the practice of full virtue is limited to a very few people, the rest of us are still in a position to aspire towards becoming more virtuous than we presently are. And that is what VE require of us. Finally, in chapter 5, we discuss the plausibility of neo-Aristotelian naturalism. This is a form of naturalism that is usually put forward as an alternative to non-cognitivist views in meta-ethics and it is commonly taken to be closely associated with VE. It is argued that neo-Aristotelian naturalism is flawed. However, since VE is first and foremost a normative ethical theory, it is not committed to any particular position in meta-ethics. Hence, even if neo-Aristotelian naturalism fails, VE may still survive intact.

  • 1160.
    Svensson, Lennart
    et al.
    Pedagogiska institutionen, Lunds universitet.
    Anderberg, Elsie
    Pedagogiska institutionen, Lunds universitet.
    Alvegård, Christer
    Pedagogiska institutionen, Lunds universitet.
    Johansson, Thorsten
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    The use of language in understanding subject matter2009In: Instructional science, ISSN 0020-4277, E-ISSN 1573-1952, Vol. 37, no 3, p. 205-225Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Empirical results show that frequently the meaning of expressions used by students in expressing their understanding of subject matter does not correspond to the meaning of those expressions in the subject matter theory that the students are expected to learn. There is also often a lack of identity of meaning between the same students' use of the same expression from one use of the expression to another, in very similar contexts. The context gives a specific meaning to any expression. This variation in context and meaning is very central to the phenomena of teaching and learning. In educational research there is a need to differentiate between specific meanings expressed in conceptualizing subject matter, on the one hand, and concepts and meanings seen as parts of cognitive systems and social languages, on the other. The contextual character of the use of language is crucial to the understanding of teaching and learning and needs to be more carefully considered. The article is a discussion of the problem of varying meanings of language expressions in relation to major traditions of research, focusing on meanings and concepts within the field of learning and teaching.

  • 1161.
    Swartling, Elisabeth
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    In Defence of Hume's On the Standard of Taste 2018Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 30 credits / 45 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 1162.
    Säätelä, Simo
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy. Estetik.
    Aesthetic Experience and "Non-conceptual Content"2005In: Perspectives on Aesthetics, Art and Culture: Essays in honour of Lars-Olof Åhlberg, Thales, Stockholm , 2005, p. 351-Chapter in book (Other scientific)
  • 1163.
    Säätelä, Simo
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy. estetik.
    Det sanne, det gode og det det skjønne: En innføring i filosofi2004Book (Other (popular scientific, debate etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Det sanne, det gode og det skjønne gir en systematisk innføring i filosofi.

    Bokas første del tar for seg ulike syn på viten, vitenskap, forståelse og språk. Under tittelen "Det gode" tar forfatterne for seg ulike normative, etiske teorier, spørsmålet om hvorvidt mennesket har en fri vilje, samt hva som kjennetegner det menneskelige selvet. I bokens siste del "Det skjønne", presenteres sentrale estetiske teorier, samt forholdet mellom kunst, moral og erkjennelse. Forfatterne knytter stoffet opp mot særdeles lesbare og gjenkjennelige eksempler både fra historiske sammenhenger og samtidig dagligliv.

  • 1164.
    Säätelä, Simo
    et al.
    University of Bergen.
    Bengtsson, Gisela SusannaUppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.Österman, ToveUppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Nordic Wittgenstein Review. Vol 7 No 1 (2018): Volume 7 / Number 1 (June 2018)2018Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 1165.
    Säätelä, Simo
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Aesthetics.
    Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Österman, Tove
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Note from the editors2018In: Nordic Wittgenstein Review, ISSN 2194-6825, E-ISSN 2242-248X, Vol. 7, no 1, p. 5-8Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The debate surrounding Open Access publishing moved into a new and heated stage after the launching of the so called ”plan S” earlier this autumn.The plan is an initiative of cOAlition S, a consortium consisting of major national research agencies and funders from twelve European countries, coordinated bytheEuropean Research Council,and it requires that all scholarly publications resulting from research funded by members of the coalition must be openly available immediately upon publication without any embargo period, and be permanently accessible under an open license allowing for re-use for any purpose, subject to proper attribution of authorship. This means that the CC BY Attribution 4.0 license will be demanded for scholarly articles.

  • 1166.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Are we lovers of the good?2004In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 138, no 2, p. 247-260Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Donald Davidson has stressed that we interpret a person correctly only if we represent him as satisfying certain norms of rationality. Some of these norms are "norms of coherence". A competent interpreter will find that the speaker has beliefs that are, by and large, consistent, and preferences that satisfy certain ordering conditions. However, other norms are "norms of correspondence". Thus, we must also, according to Davidson, assume that the speaker has beliefs that are, by and large, correct (by our lights), and desires that we, by and large, share. In this paper, I focus on the latter of these claims. I argue that, although Davidson may have made a case for the idea that we must assume that a speaker shares many of our beliefs, there is no justification for thinking that the same holds for our desires. Indeed, nothing Davidson says gives us reason to doubt that we are able to interpret a speaker without making any prior assumptions whatsoever about his particular desires. This conclusion points to a crucial asymmetry between beliefs and desires.

  • 1167.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Kihlbom, Ulrik
    Ullholm, Anders
    Argumentationsanalys1994Book (Other academic)
  • 1168.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Benacerrafs utmaning2016In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 1169.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Book Review of On What Matters, Volume III, by DerekParfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xiv + 468 pp. ISBN 9780198778608.2018In: European Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0966-8373, E-ISSN 1468-0378, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 668-672Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 1170.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists1999In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 65, p. 70-85Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 1171.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Coherence and disagreement1992In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 65, no 3, p. 305-317Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 1172.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Contrasts and Demons: On Sinnott-Armstrong’s moderate Pyrrhonian scepticism2010In: Rearticulations of Reason: Recent Currents / [ed] Leila Haaparanta, Helsinki: Hakapaino Oy , 2010, p. 243-260Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 1173.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Crispin Wright on moral disagreement1998In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 48, no 192, p. 359-365Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, the appropriate conclusion is that the disagreement is not genuine, since we must otherwise attribute an inexplicable error.

  • 1174.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Davidson and Quine's Empiricism2001In: Interpreting Davidson, San Fransisco: CSLI Publishers , 2001, p. 269-283Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 1175.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Davidson om självkännedom2017In: Från Skaradjäkne till Uppsalapprofessor: Festskrift till Lars-Göran Johansson / [ed] George Masterton, Keizo Matsubara, Kim Solin, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen , 2017Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    I artikeln diskuteras huruvida Davidsons syn på mening kan användas för att förklara varför vi har privilegierad kunskap om innehållen i våra tankar.

  • 1176.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Debunking and Disagreement2017In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 51, no 4, p. 754-774Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics or religion, is to provide a “debunking” argument against them. Another, even more familiar, way is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area. These types of challenge are often treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to. Yet, as they pursue similar conclusions one might well wonder how they are related. Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? The purpose of this paper is to argue that the latter is indeed the case and that appeals to disagreement have a crucial role to play in the debunking strategy.

  • 1177.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations I2005Conference proceedings (editor) (Other academic)
  • 1178.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Detaljernas paradox2012In: 10tal, ISSN 2000-5350, no 8/9, p. 91-93Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 1179.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere2014In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 79, no S1, p. 55-72Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to a traditional argument against moral realism, the existence of objective moral facts is hard to reconcile with the existence of radical disagreement over moral issues. An increasingly popular response to this argument is to insist that it generalizes too easily. Thus, it has been argued that if one rejects moral realism on the basis of disagreement then one is committed to similar views about epistemology and meta-ethics itself, since the disagreements that arise in those areas are just as deep as the moral ones. This in turn is taken to show that a moral anti-realist should seek another basis for her position. For, if she extends her anti-realism also to epistemology and meta-ethics, then she is no longer in a position to say that her meta-ethical position is true or that it is a fact that we have reason to accept it. She therefore seems left with a position that hardly even seems to be a position. The purpose of the paper is to challenge this response and in particular the claim that the argument from disagreement applies equally well to epistemology and meta-ethics as it does to ethics. It is argued that, despite contrary appearances, there are crucial differences between the disagreements that occur in ethics compared to those that arise in the other areas. Moreover, even granted that the disagreements are just as deep, there are other differences between the areas that nevertheless justify drawing different conclusions about their status from the existence of those disagreements.

  • 1180.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Disagreement, Moral2013In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the philosophical literature one often meets the locution “the argument from moral disagreement”, as if there is only one such argument. But there are in fact several arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, arguments that take quite different routes to their anti-realist conclusions. In what follows, some of these arguments are reconstructed and discussed.

  • 1181.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Ethics2008In: The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film / [ed] Livingston, P; Plantinga, C, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 111-120Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 1182.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Ethics, Theoretical Rationality and Eliminativism About Belief2009In: Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2009, p. 345-355Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 1183.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Explaining the Reliability of Moral Beliefs2016In: Ethics and Explanation / [ed] Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 37-57Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 1184.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Fem filosofiska frågor2001 (ed. 1)Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 1185.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Global Warming and Collective Dilemmas2014In: Access to Resources: An Urban Agenda / [ed] Henrietta Palmer, Baunach: Spurbuchverlag , 2014, p. 320-335Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 1186.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Hur bör du leva?2004 (ed. 1)Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 1187.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Intuitional Disagreement2012In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 50, no 4, p. 639-659Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the best version of the ‘experimentalist’ challenge to the use of intuitions in philosophy and in particular in ethics and to discuss possible responses to the challenge. I focus especially on responses that invoke substantive assumptions of the very type intuitions are supposed to support. It is argued that even if this apparently circular strategy is thought legitimate, the prospects of providing a compelling response to the challenge are still bleak.

    Abstract: Some think that recent empirical research has shown that peoples' moral intuitions vary in a way that is hard to reconcile with the supposition that they are even modestly reliable. This is in turn supposed to generate skeptical conclusions regarding the claims and theories advanced by ethicists because of the crucial role intuitions have in the arguments offered in support of those claims. I begin by trying to articulate the most compelling version of this challenge. On that version, the main problem is the absence of a believable positive account of the reliability of the intuitions (rather than the bits of negative evidence that have so far been gathered). I then consider the response to this challenge that, in my view, holds most promise. It differs from others by invoking substantive moral assumptions. Such a strategy may appear problematically circular, in that the justification of those assumptions seems to presuppose the very thesis that is challenged (the thesis that our intuitions deserve being treated as evidence). However, although I think that objection can be met, I argue that there are other problems with the strategy. On the basis of a set of conditions that a successful defense of the pertinent kind plausibly must satisfy, I argue that the prospects of developing such an account are bleak.

  • 1188.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Meaning, Morals, and Mistakes2011In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlsson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski and Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011, p. 345-350Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 1189.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Methodological Reflections on Hägerström’s Meta-ethics2014In: Axel Hägerström and Modern Social Thought / [ed] Sven Eliaeson, Patricia Mindus, Stephen P. Turner, Bardwell Press , 2014Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 1190.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Methodology in Metaethics2013In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What is ultimately at stake in the metaethical controversies? What evidence are the various theories responsive to, and why? What is their scope, and what are they, more specifically, about? These questions are, in a wide sense, methodological, as they pertain to the issue of how to assess metaethical positions and theories.

  • 1191.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Disagreement2006 (ed. 1)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this book, Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking from moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.

  • 1192.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Disagreement: Actual vs Possible2012In: Disagreement and Skepticism / [ed] Diego Machucha, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 90-108Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Suppose that the disagreement that exists regarding moral issues supports a skeptical or anti-realist conclusion of some sort (i.e., a conclusion to the effect that our moral convictions are not justified or cannot be (objectively) true). If so, could we plausibly generate the same conclusion by appealing to the mere possibility of such disagreement? This question has recently caused some controversy. In my paper, I explain why the answer is no and why the actual existence of certain types of disagreement have more weight, in the context of the realism/anti-realism debate, than the mere possibility of disagreements of the pertinent types. The view that ethical anti-realism can be defended with reference to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement is sometimes held to lead to global anti-realism (on the ground that disagreement is, in any area, always possible). The second aim of the paper is to show that this contention is false. On can appeal to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement in ethics in support of an anti-realist view and still, plausibly and coherently, deny global anti-realism.

  • 1193.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge2017In: Moral Skepticism: New Essays / [ed] Diego Machuca, New York: Routledge, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Benacerraf challenge is a well-known objection to Platonism in mathematics. Its proponent argues that, if mathematical entities are, as Platonists claim, mind-independent, causally inert, and existent beyond space and time, then we are led to a skeptical stance according to which it is not possible to explain how it is that we have cognitive access to the mathematical realm or how it is that our mathematical beliefs are reliable. It has been argued that a similar objection could be leveled against those forms of moral realism that fall under what in Section 2 was called “robust moral realism.” In “Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge,” Folke Tersman considers whether, unlike the argument from the best explanation, the argument from disagreement, and the argument from evolution, the moral version of the Benacerraf challenge can undermine moral knowledge without appealing to empirical claims that moral realists deem controversial. His verdict is negative: to successfully counter certain responses to the moral version of the challenge, its proponent needs to have recourse to empirical considerations taken from some of the above arguments

  • 1194.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Noncognitivism and inconsistency1995In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 361-371Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A popular objection to ethical noncognitivism is that it fails to account for the realist appearance of moral discourse. This paper focuses on one feature of this appearance: Our tendency to seek consistency among our moral views. Contrary to what has been argued, I hold that noncognitivists can rationalize this practice. In support of this position, I mention some considerations indicating why, on a noncognitivist view, it is reasonable to seek moral consistency. However, I also discuss how well the main competitor to noncognitivism (that is, moral realism) fares in rendering this practice reasonable.

  • 1195.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Nya empiriska ansatser inom etiken2010In: Årsbok / Kungl. Humanistiska vetenskaps-samfundet i Uppsala = Annales Societatis litterarum humaniorum regiae Upsaliensis / [ed] Merja Kytö, Uppsala: Swedish Science Press, 2010, p. 89-102Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 1196.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Politiker kan lära av forskares dialog2014In: Sans, ISSN 2000-9690, no 3Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 1197.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Quine on ethics1998In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 64, no 1, p. 84-98Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In support of his noncognitivist view on ethics, Quine appeals to the claim that there are no ethical observation sentences. I argue that, given one of Quine's definition of 'observation sentence', this claim is false, while, given another, it is true. However, if taken strictly, no sentence satisfies the condition imposed by that definition. And even if it might be argued that the condition is satisfied to a higher degree by some nonethical sentences than by any ethical sentence, the relevance of this consideration is unclear. I conclude that the argument fails to vindicate noncognitivism.

  • 1198.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recent Work on Reflective Equilibrium and Method in Ethics2018In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 13, no 6, article id e12493Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms? Or is it rather due to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent criticisms are related to certain general arguments regarding the possibility of knowledge in ethics that are currently intensely debated, such as the evolutionary debunking arguments. I argue that nothing that has come to light in that debate, or in the recent discussion about IRE more generally, decisively strengthens the case against it. If anything, the recent developments show that IRE deserves its present status.

  • 1199.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Reivew of Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Liberty2001In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 67, no 2, p. 176-183Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 1200.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy. Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Donald Davidson's Problems of Rationality 2006In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 72, no 3, p. 233-239Article, book review (Other academic)
212223242526 1151 - 1200 of 1293
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