uu.seUppsala universitets publikationer
Ändra sökning
Avgränsa sökresultatet
3456789 251 - 300 av 1368
RefereraExporteraLänk till träfflistan
Permanent länk
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Annat format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annat språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Träffar per sida
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sortering
  • Standard (Relevans)
  • Författare A-Ö
  • Författare Ö-A
  • Titel A-Ö
  • Titel Ö-A
  • Publikationstyp A-Ö
  • Publikationstyp Ö-A
  • Äldst först
  • Nyast först
  • Skapad (Äldst först)
  • Skapad (Nyast först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Äldst först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Nyast först)
  • Disputationsdatum (tidigaste först)
  • Disputationsdatum (senaste först)
  • Standard (Relevans)
  • Författare A-Ö
  • Författare Ö-A
  • Titel A-Ö
  • Titel Ö-A
  • Publikationstyp A-Ö
  • Publikationstyp Ö-A
  • Äldst först
  • Nyast först
  • Skapad (Äldst först)
  • Skapad (Nyast först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Äldst först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Nyast först)
  • Disputationsdatum (tidigaste först)
  • Disputationsdatum (senaste först)
Markera
Maxantalet träffar du kan exportera från sökgränssnittet är 250. Vid större uttag använd dig av utsökningar.
  • 251.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    En renässansaristoteliker om den mänskliga frihetens gränser: Simone Porzios An homo bonus vel malus volens fiat2009Ingår i: Lychnos, ISSN 0076-1648, s. 49-67Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 252.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Frihet och nödvändighet i Lorenzo Vallas De libero arbitrio2013Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 3, s. 63-69Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 253.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Imagination and the Arousal of Emotions2005Ingår i: Philosophical Aspects on Emotions, Thales: Stockholm , 2005, s. 313-326Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 254.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Juan Luis Vives and Early Modern Psychology: A Critical Reappraisal2012Ingår i: Psychology and the Other Disciplines: A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250-1750) / [ed] P.J. J. M. Bakker, S. W. de Boer & C. Leijonhorst, Brill Academic Publishers, 2012, s. 81-105Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 255.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Juan Luis Vives' conception of freedom of the will and its scholastic background2006Ingår i: Vivarium, ISSN 0042-7543, E-ISSN 1568-5349, Vol. 44, nr 2-3, s. 396-417Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the present paper is to approach Juan Luis Vives' conception of freedom of the will in light of scholastic discussions on will and free choice, and point to some interesting similarities with the analysis of free choice contained in jean Buridan's Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum.

  • 256.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Ortega y Gasset om jakt, filosofisk metod och västerlandets kris2008Ingår i: Tankar tillägnade Sören Stenlund, 2008, s. 287-298Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 257.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Platon och dialogformens filosofiska innebörd2006Ingår i: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 27, nr 3, s. 14-20Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 258.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    'Quid sit anima': Juan Luis Vives on the soul and its relation to the body2010Ingår i: Renaissance Studies, ISSN 0269-1213, E-ISSN 1477-4658, Vol. 24, nr 4, s. 496-517Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    On account of his insights into human nature and conduct, the Renaissance humanist Juan Luis Vives (1493–1540) has occasionally been called ‘the father of modern psychology’. Even if the praise regarding his originality is not completely undeserved, it is something of an exaggeration to consider him the initiator of modern psychology without further qualifications. The aim of the present article is to analyse Vives's discussion of the general notion of the soul in his treatise De anima et vita (1538), and to show how deeply rooted it is in the tradition of philosophical psychology that goes back to Plato and Aristotle. Special attention is also paid to the influence of traditional medical theories, such as Galen's conception of the bodily instruments of the soul. Moreover, following the Neoplatonic tradition, Vives uses the analogy of light to explain how an immaterial soul can be united with, but not affected by, a physical body. It is argued that this approach is based on Nemesius of Emesa's treatise De natura hominis, a source that has not been duly appreciated in previous studies.

  • 259.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Renaissance Theories of Internal Senses2013Ingår i: Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant / [ed] S. Knuuttila & J. Sihvola, Springer Publishing Company, 2013, s. 147-156Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 260.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Self-Knowledge, Scepticism and the Quest for a New Method: Juan Luis Vives on Cognition and the Impossibility of Perfect Knowledge2009Ingår i: Renaissance Scepticisms, Dordrecht: Springer , 2009, s. 33-60Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 261.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Skam och frispråkighet: En dramatisk belysning av argumenten i Platons Gorgias2002Ingår i: Filosofisk tidskrift, nr 1, s. 3-13Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 262.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    The Immortality of the Soul2018Ingår i: Philosophy of Mind in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance / [ed] Stephan Schmid, London: Routledge, 2018, Vol. 67, nr 1, s. 229-249Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 263.
    Casini, Lorenzo
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    The Renaissance Debate on the Immortality of the Soul: Pietro Pomponazzi and the Plurality of Substantial Forms2007Ingår i: Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. , 2007Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 264.
    Cederberg, Astrid
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Familjen, nationen och extra hänsyn: En undersökning av Thomas Hurkas position2018Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
  • 265. Chellas, Brian F.
    et al.
    Segerberg, Krister
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    “Modal logics in the vicinity of S1.”1996Ingår i: Notre Dame journal of formal logic, Vol. 37, s. 1-24Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 266.
    Cop, Simon
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för estetik.
    Musikobjektets estetiska relevans2018Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (masterexamen), 30 poäng / 45 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [en]

    When listening to recorded music, we tend to hear properties which cannot be attributed to the musical work. For example, if I listen to Glenn Gould’s 1981 recording of Bach’s Goldberg Variations, I can hear Gould quietly humming along with the notes played on the keyboard. Further, if I listen to a recording of Bach’s Cello Suite no. 1 performed in Uppsala Cathedral, I am likely to hear the great reverberation in the church. Drawing on Bence Nanay’s concept of aesthetically relevant properties, I point to the fact that these features cannot be ignored, since attending to them seems to make an aesthetic difference in our experience of the music. This raises a fundamental question: if clearly audible properties such as Gould’s humming and the reverberation in Uppsala Cathedral cannot be attributed to the musical work, then to which musical phenomenon do we attribute these properties?

    Bach did not specify the condition that the musician must vocalize spontaneously in order to perform the Goldberg Variations correctly. Neither did he specify the condition that a performance of his Cello Suite no. 1 must take place in a cathedral in order to be correct. According to the standard view, then, none of these properties can be attributed to the musical work. Therefore, audible properties such as spontaneous vocalizations and reverberations are commonly thought of as belonging to the performance of musical works.

    In this thesis, I argue against the intuitive claim that these properties can be attributed to the performance. Instead, I propose that audible properties such as Gould’s humming and the reverberation in Uppsala Cathedral can be attributed to what I term the musical object, i.e. the perceptual object we encounter when listening to recorded music. The musical object is defined as the musical end-product created through performance, improvisation, or digital music-making, and is as such both transient and reproduceable. Thus, musical objects are distinct from (but may include) musical works.

    If my proposal is correct, then we can explain how musical works, performances and recordings of music tend to be evaluated independently of each other.

  • 267.
    Cuono, Massimo
    et al.
    Univ Turin, Dipartimento Culture Polit & Soc, Campus Luigi Einaudi,Lungo Dora Siena 100, I-10153 Turin, Italy.
    Mindus, Patricia
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Verso una teoria del diritto per l’età delle migrazioni di massa: Una tipologia del potere arbitrario2018Ingår i: Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto - Journal of Legal Philosophy, ISSN 2280-482X, Vol. 1, s. 11-32Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, a typology of forms of arbitrariness, as related to political power, is sketched out and applied specifically to the analysis of citizenship policies and border-control techniques. The paper offers a basic typology of forms of arbitrariness making possible a hopefully clarifying differentiation among forms of abuse: (a) illegal practices, (b) irrational policies, and (c) discriminatory statuses.

  • 268.
    Dahllöv, Mats
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för estetik.
    Jordens sång: Naturfilosofi och musik hos Gilles Deleuze2015Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (masterexamen), 30 poäng / 45 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay provides a thorough reading of Gilles Deleuze’s (1925–95) philosophy of nature and the way music relates to this philosophy. It does so with regards to changes in the view of nature in 20th century science, especially in the theories of self-organisation as developed by, among others, Ilya Prigogine. Deleuze’s metaphysics is viewed in relation to these theories, and is also compared to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which is related to classical science. The essay then investigates certain key issues in Deleuze’s philosophy concerning difference and univocity (or immanence), developed in his doctoral thesis Différence et répétition (1968). Also, certain aspects of the further evolution of this philosophy of immanence in Mille plateaux (1980), co-written with Félix Guattari, are examined. The essay then studies the role of aesthetics in Deleuze’s philosophy, and the way he transforms the aesthetics of Kant. The following chapter deals with Deleuze & Guattari’s primary text concerning music, ”De la ritournelle” in Mille plateaux. In this text, they develop a highly abstract concept of music, which, in their philosophy, is: 1) granted a cosmological reach regarding rhythms and motives; 2) made an essential aspect of the emergence of art, which they find in animals creating a territory (especially in the songbird); 3) used to discuss Baroque/Classicist, Romantic and 20th century musical styles. Apart from analysing these aspects, this chapter focuses on 20th century music, with a thorough examination of Gustav Mahler and of spectral music, demonstrating that Deleuze’s philosophy can deepen the understanding of this music. The chapter also discusses problematic tendencies in Deleuzian research on contemporary music, which does not take the entirety of Deleuze’s philosophy of nature into account. This essay argues that such knowledge is necessary to correctly examine the implications of Deleuze & Guattari’s philosophy of music. The lack of awareness of Deleuze’s philosophy of nature is also significant in the critique that Deleuze’s aesthetics has received by Jacques Rancière, which is analysed in the final chapter. This chapter also discusses Michael Gallope’s reading of Deleuze & Guattari, in which he makes a distinction between a metaphysical and an ethical-aesthetic philosophy of music. Although the relation between metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, is key to understanding their philosophy of music, this essay argues that Gallope’s idea of what sort of music they advocate is incorrect.

  • 269.
    Dammann, Guy
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Institutionen för musikvetenskap.
    Schellekens Dammann, Elisabeth
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    On The Moral Psychology and Normative Force Of Aesthetic Reasons2017Ingår i: Estetika, ISSN 0014-1291, Vol. 54, nr 1, s. 20-39Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates the way in which we adduce reasons in support of our aesthetic judgements. We examine the seemingly question-begging nature of that process, such that any aesthetic quality we adduce as a reason can be found compelling qua reason for a particular judgement if and only if that judgement is already assented to. We then analyse this phenomenon in the parallel contexts of gustatory taste and friendship, where the differences are understood to lie primarily with differences in the normative force of reasons held in support of gustatory judgements, aesthetic judgements, and personal friendships. While some question-begging obtains in all cases, in the latter we can begin to see that friendship can be justified with reference to its contribution to the good of ourselves. This is explored further in connection with the way in which examining our reasons for being friends with people is actually productive and generative of that friendship. Our conclusion is that while the giving of reasons for aesthetic judgements is still subject to a certain question-begging, those judgements acquire a powerful normative force in cultural contexts where it can be seen that assenting to them constitutes the realization of our good as individuals.

  • 270.
    Danielsson, Sven
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    The Supervenience of Intrinsic Value2001Ingår i: Omnium-gatherum: Philosophical essays dedicated to Jan Österberg on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, Dept of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2001, s. 93-103Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 271.
    Danielsson, Sven
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    What shall we do with deontic logic?2000Ingår i: Theoria, Vol. LXVI, nr 1, s. 97-114Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 272.
    Danielsson, Sven
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brentano and the buck-passers2007Ingår i: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 116, nr 463, s. 511-522Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take UP positive attitudes vis-i-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): it seems quite possible that there is sometimes reason to favour an object although that object is not good and possibly very evil. The problem is to delineate exactly what distinguishes reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind. In this paper we offer a Brentano-style solution. We also note that one version of the WKR problem was put forward by G. E. Moore in his review of the English translation of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Before getting to how our Brentano-style approach might offer a way out for Brentano and the buck-passers, we briefly consider and reject an interesting attempt to solve the WKR problem recently proposed by John Skorupski.

  • 273. Dawson, Angus
    et al.
    Grill, Kalle
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Health Promotion: Conceptual and Ethical Issues2012Ingår i: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 5, nr 2, s. 101-103Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 274.
    Ehlert, Adam
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Om Abort, så Spädbarnsmord?: En diskussion av Giubilini & Minervas skadebegrepp och skillnaden mellan foster och spädbarn2019Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (magisterexamen), 20 poäng / 30 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
  • 275.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Augustine on Second-Order Desires and Persons2016Ingår i: Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy / [ed] Jari Kaukua and Tomas Ekenberg, Springer, 2016, s. 9-24Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Examines Augustine's view of the will and the self and explores parallels between Augustine's and Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical accounts of personhood. Throws new light on Augustine's views on moral responsibility by showing that even if Augustine may have abandoned certain libertarian assumptions as to the nature of human free will in his mature works, he retains the underlying view of personhood as dependent on a capacity for a certain form of second-order desiring.

  • 276.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Auktoritet och den fria viljan hos Anselm, Kant och R. P. Wolff.2012Ingår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, nr 2Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 277.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Falling Freely: Anselm of Canterbury on the Will2005Doktorsavhandling, monografi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis clarifies the concept of will in Anselm of Canterbury in the context of his overall theologico-philosophical project. The will is central to Anselm's understanding of freedom of choice (libertas arbitrii), which he defines as “the power to keep rightness of will”. In Anselm, like in Kant, the will is also a crucial notion in spelling out the idea that it is the intention rather than an action per se, or its consequences, which matters from a moral standpoint. His approach to the problem of evil is therefore shaped by the presupposition that evil or injustice essentially consists in some fault in or of the will. In addition, Anselm subscribes to the Platonic notion that evil is a privation of good and ultimately identical to non-being, and therefore injustice is identified with a sort of lack of will.

    Anselm combines a naturalist conception of will with a rationalist conception of freedom. He construes voluntary action, i.e. action in which there is will involved, widely. Angels, human beings, and brute animals all act voluntarily, and by will. Freedom is, according to Anselm, precisely a power to act in accordance with right reason, and so a person’s freedom and rationality never conflict.

    Part 1 consists in a study of the central texts De veritate, De libertate arbitrii and De casu diaboli. Part 2 consists in a critical reconstruction of Anselm’s conception of the human will and its freedom against the background of his ethics, metaphysics, and views on modal semantics. In Part 3, Anselm’s position is assessed from the point of view of the contemporary debate of free will and determinism. In recent Anselm scholarship, it has been argued that Anselm is an incompatibilist and an indeterminist. These suggestions are here critically discussed.

  • 278.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Free Will and Free Action in Anselm of Canterbury2005Ingår i: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 22, nr 4Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 279.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    La volonté abélardienne et la tradition augustinienne2009Ingår i: Regards sur la France du Moyen Âge: Mélanges offerts à Gunnel Engwall à l'occasion de son départ à la retraite / [ed] Olle Ferm & Per Förnegård, Stockholm: Sällskapet Runica et Mediævalia, Centre d'études médiévales de Stockholm , 2009, s. 263-276Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 280.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Order in Obligational Disputations2002Ingår i: Medieval Forms of Argument: Disputation and Debate, ISSN 1-57910-916-0, s. 23-39Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 281.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Power and Activity in Early Medieval Philosophy2009Ingår i: The World as Active Power: Studies in the History of European Reason / [ed] J. Pietarinen & V. Viljanen, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers , 2009Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 282.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Practical Rationality and the Wills of Confessions 82014Ingår i: Augustine's Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography / [ed] William E. Mann, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, s. 28-45Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 283.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Review of Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism by Katherin A. Rogers2016Ingår i: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 284.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    St. Anselm and the Will as a Power2003Ingår i: A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on action, truth and other things in honour of Frederick StoutlandArtikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 285.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    The Medieval Notion of the Superiority of the Will2014Ingår i: Swedish Students at the University of Leipzig in the Middle Ages / [ed] O. Ferm & S. Risberg, Stockholm: Centre for Medieval Studies, Stockholm University , 2014Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 286.
    Ekenberg, Tomas
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.
    Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury2016Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, ISSN 0960-8788, E-ISSN 1469-3526, Vol. 24, nr 2, s. 215-230Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.

  • 287.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Death and Other Untimely Events2017Ingår i: Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR), ISSN 1053-8364, E-ISSN 2153-7984, Vol. 42, s. 253-257Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that his attempt to address the challenge does not succeed.

  • 288.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Död i tid och otid2012Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, nr 3, s. 3-15Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 289.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Döden igen2013Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, nr 4, s. 46-49Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 290.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Personal Value - By Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen2012Ingår i: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 78, s. 268-272Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 291.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Recension av Mats Selander (red.), Gud och hans kritiker: en antologi om nyateismen2012Ingår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 16, nr 3, s. 62-66Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 292.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Recension av Torbjörn Tännsjö, Filosofisk tröst: en bok om döden2016Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 37, nr 2, s. 53-56Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 293.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    The Good, the Bad, and the Dead: An Essay on Well-Being and Death2019Doktorsavhandling, monografi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    This book examines some central arguments in the debate about the value of death. The first main chapter, Chapter 2, begins with an introduction to the debate and a clarification of Epicureanism, i.e. the view that it is not bad to die. I then go on to evaluate several versions of a popular Epicurean line of argument, according to which death’s failure or inability to cause its victim any unpleasant experiences gives us reason to deny that death can be bad for the person who dies. I argue that none of these arguments succeeds. In Chapter 3, I turn to a more promising argument against the badness of death: the Timing Argument. Because there is no time at which death can be bad for its victim, the argument goes, it cannot be bad for her at all. To clarify the nature of this rather obscure argument, I offer two different interpretations, only one of which, I argue, should be considered a challenge to the anti-Epicurean. In Chapter 4, I review different attempts at refuting the Timing Argument, many of which fail to address the argument in its most challenging form. I also argue that there is no time at which death is bad for its victim, but that the conclusion to draw from this is that death can be bad for its victim without being bad for her at any time. The final chapter, Chapter 5, starts with the widespread worry that Epicureanism is hard to combine with certain normative commonsense ideas, e.g. the idea that we often prudentially ought to avoid death. As it turns out, however, the anti-Epicurean faces similar problems: in certain cases where, intuitively, a person has prudential reasons to avoid her death, the most prominent anti-Epicurean accounts fail to yield that her death is bad for her. This is a serious problem for anti-Epicureanism, and I end with a few remarks on its potential implications.

  • 294.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi.
    Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins2014Ingår i: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 26, nr 02, s. 218-220Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 295.
    Ekholm, Rikard
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för estetik.
    Identical, But Still Different: On Artistic Appropriation in Visual Art2012Doktorsavhandling, monografi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    In this dissertation about artistic appropriation I acknowledge that something indeed has happened in art. Visual art does not have to look in any special way anymore, or have historically validated content that can be visually grasped. Within this precondition artistic appropriation is situated. An artistic appropriation artwork is visually identical to a pre-existing artwork, but is still an independent artwork that is about something other than what the pre-existing artwork is about.The dissertation ties into, and separates itself from, two discussions: On the one hand, a discussion about the difference between a mere thing and an artwork that looks exactly like it. Duchamp’s Fountain is an example; it looks exactly like an ordinary urinal. On the other, the various ways artists have used pre-existing art throughout history to make new art. One historical example is the paraphrase. Previously, there has been no sufficient discussion about artists who make artworks that look exactly like pre-existing artworks and what this artistic practice says about the identity of art. I argue that artistic appropriation unveils the constitution of the artwork. In chapter one, a definition of artistic appropriation is introduced. Then there follows a discussion regarding previous research about appropriation and closely related concepts like adaptation and intertextuality. In chapter two, artistic appropriation is situated in relation to the historical avant-garde and later changes that made conceptual art possible. Present is also a discussion about how artistic appropriation both challenges and affirms traditional notions in art, such as originality, authorship and creativity. In chapter three there is a discussion about three artistic appropriators and their work: The artists are Elaine Sturtevant, Sherrie Levine and Michael Mandiberg. They must be understood in relation to a different set of backgrounds, which means that their artworks emerge differently.

  • 296.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    A Vindication of Tarski's Claims about the Liar Paradox2001Ingår i: The Logica Yearbook 2001 / [ed] Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer, Prague: Filosofia, 2001, s. 49-55Konferensbidrag (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 297.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Alternative Normative Concepts2012Ingår i: Analytic Philosophy, ISSN 2153-9596, E-ISSN 2153-960XArtikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 298.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy2009Ingår i: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 170, s. 393-414Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 299.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and Williams on Metaphysical Vagueness2011Ingår i: Oxford Studies in MetaphysicsArtikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 300.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Carnap and Ontological Pluralism2009Ingår i: Metametaphysics / [ed] David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman, Oxford University Press, 2009Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
3456789 251 - 300 av 1368
RefereraExporteraLänk till träfflistan
Permanent länk
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Annat format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annat språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf