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  • 1.
    Alanen, Lilli
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Descartes on Virtue2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University , 2007, 1-10 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth and Queen Christina, as well as in parts of the Passions of the Soul, Descartes provides the beginnings of a theory of ethics. Descartes argues that the supreme good, or the end that one ought to pursue in all of one’s actions, is virtue. The latter is understood by Descartes as a matter of using one’s absolutely free will as well as one can. In the paper we try to shed some light on what this Cartesian notion of virtue more specifically entails.

  • 2.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics2012In: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 18, no 2, 145-157 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A common intuition is that there is a moral difference between ‘making people happy’ and ‘making happy people.’ This intuition, often referred to as ‘the Asymmetry,’ has, however, been criticized on the grounds that it is incoherent. Why is there, for instance, not a corresponding difference between ‘making people unhappy’ and ‘making unhappy people’? I argue that the intuition faces several difficulties but that these can be met by introducing a certain kind of reason that is favouring but non-requiring. It is argued that there are structural similarities between the asymmetry and moral options and that the asymmetry can be defended as an instance of a moral option.

  • 3.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity2013Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis in an invistigation into the concept of "harm" and its moral relevance. A common view is that an analysis of harm should include a counterfactual condition: an act harms a person iff it makes that person worse off. A common objection to the moral relevance of harm, thus understood, is the non-identity problem.

    This thesis criticises the counterfactual condition, argues for an alternative analysis and that harm plays two important normative roles.

    The main ground for rejecting the counterfactual condition is that it has unacceptable consequences in cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. Several modifications to the condition are considered but all fail to solve this problem.

    According to the alternative analysis to do harm is to perform an act which (1) is responsible for the obtaining of a state of affairs which (2) makes a person’s life go worse. It is argued that (1) should be understood in terms of counterfactual dependence. This claim is defended against counterexamples based on redundant causation. An analysis of (2) is also provided using the notion of a well-being function. It is argued that by introducing this notion it is possible to analyse contributive value without making use of counterfactual comparisons and to solve the non-identity problem.

    Regarding the normative importance of harm, a popular intuition is that there is an asymmetry in our obligations to future people: that a person would have a life worth living were she to exist is not a reason in favour of creating that person while that a person would have a life not worth living is a reason against creating that person. It is argued that the asymmetry can be classified as a moral option grounded in autonomy. Central to this defence is the suggestion that harm is relevant to understanding autonomy. Autonomy involves partly the freedom to pursue one’s own aims as long as one does no harm.

  • 4.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Variabilism is not the solution to the asymmetry2015In: Thought: a journal of philosophy, ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 4, no 1, 1-9 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to “the asymmetry”, the fact that a future person would have a life not worth living counts against bringing that person into existence but the fact that a future person would have a life worth living does not count in favour of bringing that person into existence. While this asymmetry seems intuitive, it is also puzzling: if we think that it is of moral importance to prevent people from living lives not worth living, shouldn’t we also that it is of moral importance to create people with lives worth living? Melinda Roberts has suggested a view, “Variabilism”, which she argues solves this problem. I argue that Variabilism fails as a solution to the asymmetry. First, Variabilism relies on a particular distinction between gains and losses which is at least as puzzling as the asymmetry itself. Second, in some cases Variabilism is incompatible with the asymmetry. In these cases, the fact that a person would have a life worth living does count in favour of creating her.

  • 5.
    Algander, Per
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Värdet av att existera2017In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 38, no 2, 3-14 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 6.
    Anderberg, Thomas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    "Problem of Evil"2009In:  Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions / [ed] Nina Azari, Springer Verlag , 2009Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 7.
    Andersson, Emil
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Political Liberalism and the Interests of Children: A Reply to Timothy Michael Fowler2011In: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 17, no 3, 291-296 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Intransitivity2012In: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFollette, Wiley-Blackwell , 2012Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Extensive measurement with incomparability2008In: Journal of mathematical psychology (Print), ISSN 0022-2496, E-ISSN 1096-0880, Vol. 52, no 4, 250-259 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard theories of extensive measurement assume that the objects to be measured form a complete order with respect to the relevant property. In this paper, representation and uniqueness theorems are presented for a theory that departs radically from this completeness assumption. It is first shown that any quasi-order on a countable set can be represented by vectors of real numbers. If such an order is supplemented by a concatenation operator, yielding a relational structure that satisfies a set of axioms similar to the standard axioms for an extensive structure, we obtain a scale possessing the crucial properties of a ratio scale. Incomparability is thus compatible with extensive measurement. The paper ends with a brief discussion on some possible applications and developments of this result.

  • 10.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle2013In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 16, no 3, 449-463 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the 'collapsing principle'. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome's view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu's defence of Broome's position fails.

  • 11.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Cirkulär tid - ett varv till2007In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 28, no 1, 29-30 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatible with the existence of “higher values”, any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non-standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures including negative as well as positive values.

  • 12.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity2007In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 73, no 1, 3-25 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatible with the existence of “higher values”, any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non-standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures including negative as well as positive values.

  • 13.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Non-Archimedean Extensive Measurement with Incomparability2011In: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, Vol. 62, no 1, 71-76 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard theories of extensive measurement require that all objects to be measured are comparable, and that no object is infinitely or infinitesimally greater than another. The present paper develops a theory that leaves room for infinite and infinitesimal differences, as well as incomparable objects. Our result is analogous to the standard representation and uniqueness theorem of extensive measurement, and only simple and familiar mathematical concepts are assumed.

  • 14.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    'Good' in Terms of 'Better'2016In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 50, no 1, 213-223 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There have been many attempts to define the monadic value properties of intrinsic or final goodness and badness in terms of the dyadic betterness relation. By reducing the number of primitive concepts, such definitions would, if possible, be desirable for reasons of theoretical simplicity. Johan Gustafsson has recently argued, however, that no such definitions can succeed.1 I shall suggest definitions that avoid Gustafsson's objections, and have the further advantage of being more generally applicable than earlier proposals.

  • 15.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Defining Goodness and Badness in Terms of Betterness without Negation2011In: Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior / [ed] Ehtibar Dzhafarov, Lacey Perry, New Jersey: World Scientific , 2011, 51-66 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Carlson, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Aggregate and Average Utilitarianism2012In: The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism / [ed] J. E. Crimmins and D. G. Long, New York & London: Continuum Press , 2012Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 17. Dawson, Angus
    et al.
    Grill, Kalle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Health Promotion: Conceptual and Ethical Issues2012In: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 5, no 2, 101-103 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Personal Value - By Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen2012In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 78, 268-272 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 19.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Död i tid och otid2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, no 3, 3-15 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Döden igen2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 4, 46-49 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recension av Mats Selander (red.), Gud och hans kritiker: en antologi om nyateismen2012In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 16, no 3, 62-66 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 22.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recension av Torbjörn Tännsjö, Filosofisk tröst: en bok om döden2016In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 37, no 2, 53-56 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Death and Other Untimely Events2017In: Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR), ISSN 1053-8364, E-ISSN 2153-7984Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much - debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply I show that his attempt to address the challenge does not succeed.

  • 24.
    Ekendahl, Karl
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins2014In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 26, no 02, 218-220 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 25.
    Enflo, Karin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Vi vill inte alltid ha valfrihet2013In: Upsala Nya Tidning, ISSN 1104-0173, Vol. 123, no 248, 5- p.Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 26.
    Enflo, Karin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Measuring Opportunity2011In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski och Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011, 53-68 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Enflo, Karin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Measures of Freedom of Choice2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis studies the problem of measuring freedom of choice. It analyzes the concept of freedom of choice, discusses conditions that a measure should satisfy, and introduces a new class of measures that uniquely satisfy ten proposed conditions. The study uses a decision-theoretical model to represent situations of choice and a metric space model to represent differences between options.

    The first part of the thesis analyzes the concept of freedom of choice. Different conceptions of freedom of choice are categorized into evaluative and non-evaluative, as well as preference-dependent and preference-independent kinds. The main focus is on the three conceptions of freedom of choice as cardinality of choice sets, representativeness of the universal set, and diversity of options, as well as the three conceptions of freedom of rational choice, freedom of eligible choice, and freedom of evaluated choice.

    The second part discusses the conceptions, together with conditions for a measure and a variety of measures proposed in the literature. The discussion mostly focuses on preference-independent conceptions of freedom of choice, in particular the diversity conception. Different conceptions of diversity are discussed, as well as properties that could affect diversity, such as the cardinality of options, the differences between the options, and the distribution of differences between the options. As a result, the diversity conception is accepted as the proper explication of the concept of freedom of choice. In addition, eight conditions for a measure are accepted. The conditions concern domain-insensitivity, strict monotonicity, no-choice situations, dominance of differences, evenness, symmetry, spread of options, and limited function growth. None of the previously proposed measures satisfy all of these conditions.

    The third part concerns the construction of a ratio-scale measure that satisfies the accepted conditions. Two conditions are added regarding scale-independence and function growth proportional to cardinality. Lastly, it is shown that only one class of measures satisfy all ten conditions, given an additional assumption that the measures should be analytic functions with non-zero partial derivatives with respect to some function of the differences. These measures are introduced as the Ratio root measures.

  • 28.
    Grill, Kalle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Neutrality as a constraint on political reasoning2012In: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, Vol. 19, no 3, 547-557 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Hurtig, Kent
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Why Internalists about Reasons Should be Humeans about Motivation2009In: Hume on Motivation and Virtue: new essays / [ed] Charles R. Pigden, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan , 2009Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 30.
    Jedenheim Edling, Magnus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Over-Determination and Act-Consequentialism2017Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This dissertation is a discussion of the challenge that cases of over-determination pose to Act-Consequentialism. Although there are many realistic examples of such cases – for example, pollution, overfishing, or the election of an inappropriate politician – I consider structurally purer examples, one of which I call “Case One.” Suppose that you and I independently shoot and kill a third person called “Victim.” Our bullets arrive at the same time and each shot would have killed Victim by itself. Finally, Victim would not have been killed, if neither of us had pulled the trigger. According to the Standard Version of Act-Consequentialism, an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better. Case One challenges the Standard Version because there does not seem to be such an alternative to my action: Victim would have died by your shot if I had not shot him, and similar remarks apply to your action.

    The dissertation is structured as follows. After Chapter One, which briefly introduces the main issues of the dissertation, I turn to Chapter Two – “Preliminaries” – where I outline the Standard Version and highlight the main characteristics of over-determination cases. These cases are divided into cases of redundant difference making and cases of redundant causation. Cases of redundant causation are subdivided further into cases of causal over-determination and pre-emption. I make an important stipulation in this chapter. I say that our actions in Case One and similar cases are “redundant negative difference makers.”

    In Chapter Three – “Replies” – I consider whether the proponent of Act-Consequentialism might question the intuition that you and I, respectively, act wrongly in Case One. The proponent might accept that we have this intuition but explain it away, or she might deny that we have the intuition and instead point to something else that is wrong in this kind of case. For example, she could suggest that although neither you nor I act wrongly individually, we act wrongly together. I argue that these replies are problematic.  For instance, explaining away this intuition might also force us to explain away intuitions that support the Standard Version.

    In Chapter Four – “Causal Consequences” – I discuss an alternative version of Act-Consequentialism that might seem to fare better. The Standard Version interprets the term “outcome of an action” as referring to the entire possible world that would obtain, if the action were performed. The version I have in mind, the “Causal Consequences Version of Act-Consequentialism,” understands “outcome of an action” as instead referring to the causal consequences of the action. It seems clear that you and I, respectively, cause the state of affairs that Victim dies in Case One. However, I show that the Causal Consequences Version has a number of unattractive implications.

    In Chapter Five – “the Non-Standard Version” – I suggest another alternative version of Act-Consequentialism. This version – the Non-Standard Version – implies that you and I act wrongly in Case One. Roughly, the Non-Standard Version says that an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better, or is a redundant negative difference maker. The Non-Standard Version is similar to a principle suggested by Derek Parfit. However, I shall argue that the Non-Standard Version is preferable to Parfit’s principle.

    In Chapter Six – “Further Cases” – I discuss a number of cases that challenge the Non-Standard Version. For example, what would the Non-Standard Version imply in a case very similar to Case One but where I would have killed another person, if I had not shot Victim? I argue that the Non-Standard Version handles this and other problematic cases, and that it is therefore a plausible alternative to the Standard Version. 

  • 31.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Robert E. Goodin, On Settling (Princeton UP, 2012)2013In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 32.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Roaches's Argument against the Cohabitation View2010In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 33.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Christopher Belshaw, Annihilation and Steven Luper, The Philosophy of Death2012In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 121, no 481, 161-164 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 34.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recension av Rainer Carls, Om tro och vetande, Johan Lundborg, När ateismen erövrade Sverige, Sebastian Rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara2003In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 35.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recension av Thomas Hylland Eriksen & Dag O. Hessen, Egoism2002In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 36.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recension av Åsa Nordén, Har nutida fysik religiös betydelse?2001In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 37.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recension av Torbjörn Tännsjö, Konservatism2002In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 38.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Nagels argument för asymmetri2002In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Past and Future Non-Existence2012In: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 17, 51-64 p.Article, book review (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This paper criticizes these responses.

  • 40.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-Existence: Guest Editor's Introduction2012In: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 17, 1-4 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 41.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Review of Nils Holtug, Persons, Interests, and Justice2011In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, TheoriArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 42.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recension av Ulf Jonsson, Med tanke på Gud2005In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 43.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time2009In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, 247-256 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 44.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    What is Animalism?2007In: Ratio (Oxford. Print), ISSN 0034-0006, E-ISSN 1467-9329, Vol. 20, no 2, 194-205 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 45.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Kaufman's Response to Lucretius2008In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 89, no 4, 470-485 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 46.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Non-Reductionism and Special Concern2007In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 85, no 4, 641-657 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 47.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Constituted Simples?2009In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 37, no 1, 87-89 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 48.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Francescotti on Fission2009In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 49.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Am I a Series2009In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 50.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Time of Death's Badness2012In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, ISSN 0360-5310, E-ISSN 1744-5019, Vol. 37, no 5, 464-479 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceaseda view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issuesneed to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are before death (priorism) and after death (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, at notime (atemporalism), makes death unsatisfyingly different from other evils. I argue that this objection is mistaken, and that priorism and subsequentism face problems that atemporalism avoids. Moreover, I argue that if it is nonetheless insisted that we must find a time at which mydeath is bad for me, we can appeal to periods that begin before my death and end after my death. I end with some implications for posthumous harm.

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