

# **Towards a Security Community in the Baltic Region**

Patterns of Peace and Conflict

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# PREFACE

This booklet deals with security questions in the Baltic region. The issues are discussed with the concept of "security community" as the starting point. This concept is used here as an approach to the discussion whether well-known security threats pertinent to the region are changing and – if so – in what direction. The goal is to view the region as a whole, and not to argue from the perspective of any particular nation. However, it is for the reader to judge whether this attempt is successful.

The presentation is the result of intensive and close discussions within a group of researchers at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University: Björn Hagelin, Erik Melander, Kjell-Åke Nordquist, Erik Noreen and Peter Wallensteen. For instance, Table 8 in chapter 7 was an outcome of these deliberations, but views have been shared on all contributions.

Nevertheless, there has been a clear division of labour. Kjell-Åke Nordquist has been the main editor of the booklet and author of chapter 4, Erik Melander has authored chapter 3, Björn Hagelin chapter 5, and Peter Wallensteen and Kjell-Åke Nordquist co-authored chapters 1 and 2. Finally Peter Wallensteen authored chapters 6 and 7. Special contributions have been made by Katarina Engberg, (to chapters 2 and 6), Lena Jonsson and Erik Noreen (both for chapter 2).

Uppsala, March 1994

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Professor

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# THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY COMMUNITY

## 1.1 Wars and armed conflicts

One of the most significant issues in international relations is the one of armed conflict and war. During the Cold War, the continuous danger of nuclear war and a general insecurity for small countries plagued the world. In 1992, there were nine armed conflicts in Europe, and another 45 in the world as a whole. The number of peace treaties in 1993 was low. The question of local wars constitutes a new challenge to the international community. At the end of 1993 there was, however, no active armed conflict going on in the Baltic region. Occupations had been terminated, foreign troops were returning to their land of origin, patterns of co-operation were developing. These were positive signs. They were even more so set against the background of the recent, violent history. In 1991, there were serious confrontations in Vilnius and Riga. The question is what the future entails for the countries of the region in terms of peace and security. To respond to this question, the authors have chosen to begin with the notion of "security community". Thus, we ask: are conditions created for a future security community in the Baltic region? In a long-term perspective, a second question is important: towards which type of relations are we heading as a region?

## 1.2 Security community

What then does the notion of a "security community" entail? Today there is no fear of a renewed war between Sweden and Norway. The fear of war between

Germany and France is also receding among the general population and among leading decision-makers. This means that disputes between these countries are expected to be handled in peaceful ways: through direct negotiations or within multilateral organisations (such as Nordic co-operation, the European Union). These are examples of significant and lasting changes in relationships which, in this century, have given rise to serious conflicts or wars. The peoples of these countries now feel more secure vis-à-vis each other. As this feeling is shared on both sides, it can be said that a security community has been created in these cases, i. e. Sweden - Norway and France - Germany.

The notion of security community was introduced by a leading social scientist, Karl W. Deutsch, active in the United States but originally from Praha. His definitions can be seen below. The processes by which such security communities are created, while the countries still retain their independence, is an important one. In a discussion on the dangers of

wars and chances for peace in the Baltic area, the concept is useful. We thus ask whether such a security community can be developed in the Baltic region in the foreseeable future. This would mean a significant change in present relations between countries and peoples in the region. The Baltic region has been a battle-field and battle-sea of many wars in recent centuries, as can be seen in "The Battle for the Baltic" on page 6.

## 1.3 Characteristics of a Security Community

Deutsch specified 14 factors for the emergence of security communities. These seem to be relevant in a discussion of the use of this concept for the Baltic region, but can be merged into the following five aspects:

1. *Relations to outside actors* are important for the emergence of a security community. This might be the existence of a com-

## A Definition of Security Community

A security community is a group of people which has become "integrated". By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief... that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change". By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures without resort to large-scale physical force. A "pluralistic" security community is where the legal independence of separate governments are maintained.

(Karl W. Deutsch, et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957, p 5, 6)



Fig. 1. A security community is built on a co-operation where the parties have trust in each others good will to maintain peaceful relations. (Photo: Rolf Hamilton / Pressens Bild).

non military threat to the region or joint security co-operation extending beyond the region. Deutsch finds that outside military threats sometimes promote co-operation within a region, but that such effects are short-lived. It suggests, however, that the general relationships surrounding the region are important, and thus, we need to discuss the relations between the smaller states of the region and the major centers of power in Europe (chapter 2).

2. There would have to be a *communality in major values* among the countries concerned. This refers to a shared view of, for instance, democracy and market economy. *The spreading and stabilisation of democracy in Eu-*

*rope as a whole*, as agreed in the Paris Treaty of 1990, and in the Baltic region would be a most important factor for the future. In particular democracy increases the legitimacy of governments and gives access to power for more groups. The links between domestic democracy and absence of war are dealt with specifically (chapter 3).

3. There would have to be *muzzai responsiveness* among the states and peoples of the region. This refers to an ability to predict the behaviour of other states. It requires extensive contacts and communication, as well as psychological and political adjustment, for instance, to the loss of a dominant status that is a result of

changing conditions. *Experience in solving conflicts peacefully*, as well as active participation in international conferences, would indicate responsiveness. This aspect is dealt with in chapter 4.

4. *New forms of behaviour* among the states and peoples, which make the present distinctly different from the past, is another feature of a security community. This involves, for instance, improving economic conditions for the whole or important parts of the region (compared to other regions, as well as compared to the past). This we could interpret to mean a *shift away from reliance on armaments for security to disarmament*, giving room for other types of contacts, chapter 5.

## The Battle for the Baltic

The Baltic region is closely related – geographically and politically – to those parts in Central Europe where the modern state, as a concept and reality, emerged. The region has experienced a large number of major wars, where the major actors sought to establish control. The table is made in order not to be complete but to serve as a reminder of the violent history that the Baltic region shares.

Periods of War 1600-1679	Wars	Periods Without War 1611-1617 (6 years)
	First Polish-Swedish War (1607-1611)	
	Russo-Polish War (1617-1629)	
	Second Polish-Swedish War (1617-1629)	
	Thirty Years War (1618-48)	
	Russo-Polish War (1654-1656)	
	Russo-Swedish War (1656-1658)	
	Russo-Polish War (1658-1666)	
	First Northern War (1655-1660)	
	The Dutch War (1672-1679)	1680-1700 (20 years)
1700-1763	Second Northern War (1700-1721)	1791-1793 (12 years)
	War of Polish Succession (1733-1738)	1743-1756 (13 years)
	Russo-Sweden War (1741-1743)	1763-1788 (25 years)
	Seven Years War (1756-1763)	
1788-1815	Russo-Swedish War (1788-1790)	
	Russo-Swedish War (1808-1809)	
	Napoleonic Wars (1809-1815)	"The Concert of Europe" 1815-1849 (34 years)
1849-1864	First Schleswig-Holstein (1849)	
	Crimean War (1853-1856)	1864-1914 (50 years)
	Second Schleswig-Holstein (1864)	
1914-1921	World War I (1914-1918)	
	Russo-Polish War (1919-1920)	
	USSR vs Anti-Boisheviks (1917-1920)	1921-1989 (18 years)
1939-1945	World War II (1939-1945)	"The Long Peace" 1945-? (49 years in 1994)
	Russo-Finnish War (1939-1940)	

## Three Perspectives on International Relations

Perspective	Realism	Integration	Dominance-Liberation
<i>Basis for stable relations</i>	International balance of power; elite rule	International co-operation; internal democracy	Transformation into symmetric relations; economic justice
<i>Central unit of analysis</i>	The state; government	World society; inter- and intrastate relations	Structures; trade relations
<i>Focused level of conflict</i>	"Acute," open conflict; crisis orientation	Open but not militarised, manageable	Latent and/or open conflict; inevitable in society
<i>Key actors for change</i>	Decision-makers	International organisations; Non-Governmental Organisations	Liberation movements
<i>Causes of war</i>	Failing balance of power	Ignorance, prejudices, power interests	Centre-periphery conflict
<i>View of the human being as</i>	Self-oriented	Co-operative	Structurally conditioned

## 1.4 Security CONCEPTS

5. To this we need to add the significance of *common institutions* which at the same time respect and uphold the independence of the member states, and contribute to concerted actions in security matters. Such institutions may incorporate many of the four factors but are still important in their own respect. Such institutions, which might be the *United Nations, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), NATO, EU* (the European Union) or others, can be evaluated with respect to their significance for security in the Baltic region (chapter 6).

The five characteristic factors of security community dealt with separately in these five chapters are discussed in the final chapter. There an answer is suggested to the question of whether the conditions for a security community are present or not, or emerging. This is done by comparing three different points in time with respect to twelve significant relations involving all littoral Baltic states.

## 1.5 The Study of INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

During the period after the Second World War, three perspectives on conflicts in the international system have been guiding research and policy analysis: *realism* (or 'power politics'; 'statism'), *integration* (or 'transnationalism'; 'liberalism'; 'idealism') and *dominance-liberation* (or 'radicalism'). Although the basic characteristics are the same, the perspectives are labelled differently (as in parentheses) by different authors.

*Realism* is a perspective which stresses the role of (mainly) military and economic resources that governments have at their disposal for pursuing their interests. The international system is according to this perspective characterised by clashing national interests, and a certain balance of forces is required to maintain international stability. Peace, according to this view, is at best

# PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Not a single day passes without mass media tells us about violence, death and destruction following political struggle. In 1993, major armed conflicts took place in 28 countries on all the continents. Some countries had more than one major armed conflict and in all 88 such conflicts took place all over the world in 1993. A "major armed conflict" here means a conflict that has caused at least 1,000 deaths since its beginning and concerns the control of a government or of a territory (or both). In some conflicts, such as the Iraq - Kuwait War of 1991, many lives were taken during a short period of time. In others, such as in Northern Ireland, the conflict takes comparatively few lives but it exists during a long period of time. These two examples are different in many ways. Here we will point to three different categories of conflict.

1. *Inter-state conflicts* are international, i.e. between sovereign states.

2. *State-formation conflicts* are non-international and concerned with the basic constitutional structure of a state (e.g. Northern Ireland/Great Britain). A typical example of such a conflict is when a region wants

to secede or to have autonomy within an existing state. Such conflicts may also have international connections, to governments and movements in other countries.

3. *Internal conflicts* are concerned with the control of a government, for instance when a liberation movement wants to replace an incumbent government.

Dominating conflicts in 1993 according to categories.	
Category	Number
Inter-state	0
Internal	15
State-formation	13




Fig. 3. Major armed conflicts 1993.




Fig. 2. Dominating conflicts in the period after 1945 according to category. The upper curve shows the sum of internal and state-formation conflicts and the lower curve inter-state conflicts.

In 1993, no conflict was inter-state and the distribution between the two other categories was almost even. This situation has been dominating since World War II: very few inter-state conflicts and an increasing number of internal and state formation conflicts.

People on all continents have experienced armed conflicts in 1993. In Europe, all conflicts but one - Northern Ireland - have emerged after the end of the Cold War.

After the Second World War a more or less stable pattern of conflicts emerged. The following five conflictual regions have experienced long war periods between and within states. A conflictual region is defined as a region where at least three geographically bordering states are involved in major armed conflicts.

*The Middle East* (Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iran/Iraq), *Southern Africa* (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), *Central America* (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua), *South Asia* (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), *Indo-China* (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia).

# PATTERNS OF SECURITY

There are some regions in the world that have been free from armed conflicts after the Second World War and have developed in a direction towards "security communities". A pattern of security have emerged.

Such security regions are:  
*North America* (Canada, Mexico, USA);

*The Nordic countries* (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden);

*The European Community* (France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and Italy);

*The Australia/Pacific region* (Australia, New Zealand, Pacific states).

These regions all have a history of violence. For some of them this goes far back in time. The Nordic countries have not experienced an interstate war since 1809. The last Mexican-American war ended in the beginning of this century. France and Germany, now considering to form a security community were major belligerents on the European continent up to 1945.

The security regions all have established democratic systems

since the early part of the century, with the sole exception of Germany with its periods of Nazism and weaker democratic institutions in Mexico. Trade patterns have been an important feature in the creation of patterns of security. The European Community was created expressly with European security as a major objective. More recently formal trade agreements between the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA and between Canada, USA and Mexico in NAFTA, have emerged.

The end of the Cold War led to two different global processes: new peace agreements were made in a number of conflict situations (such as Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Cambodia), while in other areas new conflicts emerged (such as in former Yugoslavia, and the Caucasus region). In addition, a number of nations in the Baltic region regained independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus the outcome of the end of the Cold War was of a positive as well as negative character when it comes to peace and security aspects.

There is a possibility that southern Africa, which is a conflict region today, may develop into a security region. The conflicts following the end of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique seem to have come to an end. The apartheid system in the Republic of South Africa is being abandoned. Democratic institutions are slowly developing with new multiparty elections. Yet the war in Angola is the worst in the world today in terms of casualties. Positive developments are also seen in Central America where important steps towards internal demilitarization are taken.

There is also a third category of regions or states, where neither war nor peace has reigned in the post-World War II period. We will not count these as security regions but as *suppressive regions*. States that did not allow pluralist views about their own society are included in this category. Examples are a majority of African states from independence up to 1990, the Soviet Union, China/Burma/Mongolia, and military dictatorships in Latin America from 1950s up to 1992.

Thus, we can see three types of regions in the post-World War II period: "security regions", "conflictual regions", and "suppressive regions".

The Baltic region has experiences from two of the three types of regions. This heritage shapes the conceptions of security in different countries of the region, as well as opinions about how security can be achieved in the future.




Fig. 4. Security regions (Maps drawn by Karin Hallgren).

stability through a balance-of-power.

The integration perspective focuses on the many forms of international co-operation in political and economic matters that characterise the global system of today. Increased co-operation is a way to increase peaceful relations according to this perspective. Thus, non-state actors such as corporations and non-governmental organisations should be

studied as well as governments. The dominance - liberation perspective, finally, focuses the economically unbalanced relations - asymmetries - that characterise for instance global trade relations. This asymmetric system - which in practise exploits its weaker parts - is an important factor behind conflicts both within and between states, according to this perspective. The perspective, then, is often a rationale for liberation movements of different kinds. All of them, however, stress the need for structural changes in society.

The three perspectives focus different aspects of international relations. They are not incompatible, but complementary. Each one has its merits and weaknesses. In this summary the perspectives are presented in a way that stresses their differences rather than similarities.

# SECURITY DILEMMAS, POLICIES AND MAJOR ACTORS

## 2.1 The dilemmas

The purpose of a security community in the Baltic region is to solve security dilemmas. Thus, we need to consider the basic security problems in the region. Going from a narrow definition of security, i.e. freedom from the threat of military attack, to a more comprehensive concept, we can make an inventory of possible security problems today. This includes the following four comprehensive dilemmas:

1. Maintaining independence of the smaller countries in the region versus strategic and military objectives of major actors in Europe. This means the issues of foreign forces, the building on new forms of defence capacity, transparency in military activities and the creation of security arrangements.
2. Consolidating democratic forms of government versus the fear of minorities of being left out from the political process. This means creating societies with durable democracy, and where armed groups can be held back by civilian society.
3. Building states of many peoples versus building states dominated by one people. This entails questions of citizenship, voting rights, right to be elected and to hold office, as well as respect for differences in cultural heritage and political views.
4. Achieving economic growth with Western integration versus fear of groups or states being "left behind" in economic development. This points to the dangers of uneven economic development nationally as well as regionally.

The security community is particularly focused on the first type of dilemma. The solution of other dilemmas are seen to contribute to the creation of the security com-

munity. Thus we need to consider the recent military developments of the leading actors in the region.

## 2.2 Security strategies after WW II

The peace accord agreed upon by the allied powers - the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France - after WW II was not one of stability. Soviet expansion in the three Baltic states and Central Europe developed soon into a new confrontation, the Cold War, between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

The central piece in the Western strategy against an offensive threat from the Soviet Union was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, in 1949. NATO was the US-led military alliance of Canada, USA and West European states, which today counts 16 members. It was formed in the aftermath of the coup in Praha in February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade later the same year.

The official strategy was containment. Its goal was to keep the Soviet threat against Western Europe and North America within limits. The threat was seen on several levels: Firstly the Communist Parties in Western Europe were perceived as a domestic arm of Soviet power. Another threat was the increasing offensive Soviet conventional capacity in Eastern Europe. Finally, Soviet behaviour against democratic or nationalist forces in Eastern Europe was an additional element in the Western threat image, as well as Stalinist terror in the enlarged Soviet Union itself. Thus, Soviet armed forces were seen as a sign of strength in a time when Western military capacity was reduced, economic crisis was

serious and difficult reconstruction work had begun. In the West, Soviet behaviour was not often seen as a reaction to uncertainty or fear of American superiority in technology, nuclear and industrial capacity. The victories of the Communists in China and the Korean war were further indications of the expansionism and global reach of Soviet ambitions.

Throughout the entire subsequent Cold War period there were alternating periods of détente and confrontation. Basic societal changes remained, and investments in nuclear and conventional military technological development stayed on a high level. Strategies of second strike nuclear capability were developed in the West. Only if the West kept sufficient nuclear capacity to retaliate against a Soviet first strike with nuclear weapons could deterrence be achieved and Soviet aggressiveness contained, NATO and Western leaders argued.

Thus, a nuclear arms race ensued first in quantitative terms (each side acquiring as many and as varied nuclear forces as possible) and later in qualitative terms (increased precision, multiple warheads, missile defences). This was accompanied with high level of force readiness, continuous military manoeuvres involving both conventional and nuclear forces, a system of military bases around the globe, and support for different sides in wars in the third world. Historically unprecedented amounts of resources were devoted to military research and development, as well as to large standing armies.

All this had implications for the Baltic Region. The region was divided between the two sides, with neutral Sweden and Finland in-between, and the less threatening NATO link to Norway. During the Cold War the Baltic Sea




Fig. 5. In spring 1989 Soviets Michail Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl signed a series of mutual agreements. These paved the way for the events in the summer of 1989 when thousands of DDR citizens left the country through German embassies in e.g. Poland, and the fall of the Berlin wall in November 9, 1989. The east west conflict and the cold war was over (Photo: Pressens Bild).

became a sea where military nerves were tested. Fleets from the two sides were permanently observing each other in the Baltic waters. There was continuous surveillance by air.

The neutral countries in the region, Sweden and Finland, were under pressure from both sides. In the 1950s there were repeated crises between Sweden and the Soviet Union. The most serious incident was when Soviet air force shot down a Swedish aircraft. Finland was exposed to direct political intervention from the Soviet authorities at several occasions, the most notable being the so-called Note Crisis of 1961. Repeated crises over Berlin, e.g. in 1953, 1958 and 1961 kept tension high. Militarily suppressed revolts in Poland showed the fragility of the Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact (1956, 1970, 1980-1981). Alternating forms of government emerged but were quickly repressed (Praha 1968).

## 2.3 The Cold War ends

Only by the second half of the 1980s did the prospective combatants begin to move out of this chilling grip. Confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons were initiated, especially at the Stockholm conference 1986. A political dialogue was begun following the summit meeting in Geneva in 1985, and a joint position was developed on particular conflicts, e.g. the war between Iran and Iraq, 1987. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was agreed upon in 1988. The first disarmament agreement, the INF treaty in 1987, was concluded on intermediate-range nuclear forces stating that the missiles should be abolished within three years. (This agreement is now concluded).

The disarmament agreement on nuclear issues, the end of Communist monopoly of power in East European countries in 1989, and the unification of Germany paved

the way for a more durable and hopeful structure for peace and security in Europe as a whole and, thus, for the Baltic Region. The development was not without setbacks, however. The movements for independence in Lithuania and Latvia were met by military power in January 1991. The unsuccessful coup in Moscow in August 1991 was followed by the independence of the Baltic countries in September 1991 and, three months later, to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact disappeared and NATO remained the only militarily effective international organisation in Europe.

## 2.4 NATO and Partnership for Peace

The question has now emerged on the roles of NATO, created as an alliance in the case of a major war in Europe. Only in 1994 did it find a new task. In the Bosnian crisis the organisation was employed in military action for the first time since its inception. The future role of NATO might be in peace-keeping, in situations where the European countries in general would agree on the objectives and means of the possible missions.

In November 1998 President Clinton proposed the creation of Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an extension or complement to NATO. The offer was directed to all former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union members in Europe. Also other countries showed interest. The US objective was clear: PfP would enhance transparency among the military establishments in Europe and include, for instance, joint training for peace-keeping missions. It would also make possible the harmonization of weapons purchases. In effect, PfP would be a way for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to get acquainted with Western military and political thinking. Among other things this would involve safeguarding civil-

ian control over the military forces, thus, enhancing the possibilities of a future democratic development. Whether joining PfP would also lead to membership in NATO or a reformulation of NATO objectives in the future is unclear.

Some countries see PfP as a way of coming closer to NATO, others see it as a confidence-building measure between former enemies, thus creating conditions for equal co-operation between Russia and the West. PfP does not include any security guarantees and does not specify any external threats. In fact, it is operating as a set of bilateral agreements, rather than as a unified model. By March 1994 all Baltic countries, including Poland, had said they would join PfP. Also Russia, Sweden and Finland were preparing to join the program.

## 2.5 Security Thinking in Russia:

### The New Doctrine

by Lena Jonsson

Soviet security policy during the Cold War period was shaped by the experiences from the Second World War. Never again was war to be fought on Russian soil. Soviet defence was going to be on the same level as the Western powers and to have the capacity to attack quickly over the borders. A war should be fought on enemy territory. Tanks and armed vehicles made up the core of the armaments. Research and military industry was aiming at keeping at an equal level with Western development of military technology. As a consequence, Soviet defence developed into a burden on the civilian population and was perceived as threatening by the outside world.

The end of the Cold War has changed the situation fundamentally. After a period of transition with large cuts in military forces, a new Russian military doctrine was signed by President Yeltsin on 2 November 1993. So far, only

## What is Security Policy?

"Defence policy", "foreign policy", "security policy" - anyone interested in international relations frequently encounters different concepts regarding a state's relations with its neighbours. There is no final definition of these concepts - their meaning is constantly changing.

Different states use different means to maximize security. All states try to prevent an armed attack against its territory. For small states, it is especially important to establish good neighbourly relations with bordering states. However, this is not always possible. Alliances membership is considered an alternative by many small states. For some, this is an important way to compensate for local insecurity, for others an alliance adds to an already stable regional situation.

Major powers also use military presence abroad as an important part of their security policy. During the Cold War, the super powers, USA and USSR, had well defined spheres of influence on all continents. This was often perceived as a security problem by minor states. Today, with the super power rivalry dissolved, foreign military presence is less problematic for regional and national security.

During the first part of the Cold War, "security policy" was often synonymous with defence and strategic matters. During the 1980s, however, a wider understanding of "security" developed. This development began among Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and spilled over into policy-making circles and governments. In 1984, for instance, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (also called the Palme Commission) coined the concept of "Common Security". The Commission thereby stressed the mutual character of security.

Another development was the 1987 UN conference on the convention between disarmament and development. The conference stressed that these factors are also of significance to the security of states. A general feature of this development has been that "security" tends to include more and more issues of an internal or transnational character, such as development, environment and human rights. Thus, the role of the state has diminished at the expense of a more comprehensive understanding of what is "security".

The wider meaning of security and security policy, including dimensions of trade and economy, environmental protection, and disarmament, reflects better a common understanding of security. However, it also makes the security debate more difficult. A major reason is that the relationship between various elements of a complex security concept is not clear. One example is the relationship between disarmament and development: Although a lot of resources are spent on armaments due to political conflicts, the dissolution of these conflicts does not necessarily mean that governments reduce their arms spending. And even if this were the case, they would not necessarily use the money available, the so called peace dividend, on development.

a so called "detailed account" of traditional Russian security policy. The doctrine has been published.

This account gives the impression that the doctrine was written in a hurry and with a certain lack of consensus. Most foreign commentators, however, have seen it as an indication of a return to a more about the principle of non-offen-

sive defence has been changed in favour of offensive acts, transferring a war to enemy territory.

The threat of direct aggression against Russia has "considerably declined" according to the doctrine, even if the threat of war still remains. The threat caused by local conflicts within the former Soviet Union takes priority over a threat from the West. However, according to the new doctrine, local wars may escalate into global wars involving the use of nuclear weapons.

The main reasons for local wars are described as social, political, territorial, religious, national/ethnic problems, and "the desire of a number of states and political forces to resolve them by means of armed struggle". No direct enemy is pointed out. However, judging from an analysis of the mentioned sources and factors sustaining conflicts and wars, the authors of the doctrine have two groups in mind: neighbouring states and great powers including Western countries.

Several conceivable sources of war are mentioned: the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of Russia, the introduction of foreign troops on the territories of neighbouring states, and military build-up undermining the "strategic stability".

Among the factors leading to large-scale war, special attention is paid to "internal armed conflicts (inside Russia), which threaten the vitally important interests of the Russian Federation and which may be used as an excuse for other states to 'intervene in its internal affairs'".

In order to prevent the escalation of local conflict and war into large-scale war, the doctrine emphasises the importance of "upholding stability in regions bordering Russia and its allies, as in the world in general". The Russian government was very active during 1993 trying to make the international community agree to Russian peacekeeping forces in the former Soviet Union under the auspices of the UN or the CSCE.

## STATE BUILDING AND BOUNDARY MAKING

Today there is no land on earth that is not regulated by an international boundary. This situation is a recent development in the political history. Only one hundred years ago, vast territories on many continents were not defined or demarcated as belonging to particular states. This was not necessarily a problem for the inhabitants who handled their relations by other means than establishing boundaries in the modern sense of the word.

In Europe, the drawing of boundaries has been an intra-continental process, while boundary-making in other parts of the world has been external.

There are three concepts that are used in connection with this subject. *Boundary* indicates the line separating two states, while *border* refers to the area where the boundary line is located. *Frontier* means a (legally) unregulated territory between two political centres, or just the outer reaches of a political centre. These concepts are often used without any distinction.

By the end of the 11th century there were no large unknown territories between political centres, i.e. frontiers, in Europe. Throughout the ages, the many small areas – parishes, cantons, bishoprics etc. – that existed from time to time, have functioned as “building pieces” in the many changes of borders that Europe has experienced particularly after wars.

In the late 18th century the drawing of boundaries was presented as a form of peace-making, by the geographers in Europe and elsewhere. During the colonial period, when many European states expanded beyond their political centres, claims for mining, cultivation, the use of rivers, or control of mountain passes were often causes of armed conflict and wars. When state interests clashed over a certain territory, a precise delimitation and demarcation on the ground was considered as a way to remove “every occasion for quarrel” (Vattel 1758, cited in Prescott, 1987, p. 58). This idea is present also today. When states conclude boundary agreements, the peace-making effect is often mentioned in the preamble of the agreement.

Today the drawing of boundaries can be a way both for small states and major powers to strengthen their position. For instance, when a small state has internationally recognised boundaries with its neighbours it also has the legal protection for these boundaries as it is formulated in international treaties. The Helsinki Final Act from 1975, stipulates that boundaries are inviolable. This treaty is now accepted by 53 states, among them all the states in Europe. The Final Act states that

*“The participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.” (From Helsinki Final Act, 1975).*

States whose boundary relations are unclear may be tempted to establish “physical facts” on land that serves as borderlands. These facts can then be used as a point of reference for boundary negotiations. The typical example is the building of settlements, for instance for agricultural purposes, in areas which are not under forceful national jurisdiction.

Borders are often thought of as areas of separation, taxation and control, if not of overt conflict. But borders can also function as meeting-points and areas of co-operation and development. It is not easy to think of a well functioning international community without borders and boundaries. They mark where one legal system ends and another begins, thus making clear the conditions for economic co-operation and development. A well defined, internationally recognised boundary is a good point of reference for the development of resources, also those that surround the boundary.

Finally, boundaries have a psychological function in being a physical mark of “what is ours”, and what is not. This works in two directions: it creates togetherness for those that accept the boundary – which can be something good in itself – but it creates opposite feelings for those who feel they are “on the wrong side”. When a boundary excludes people from one another, extreme ideologies, misperceptions and chauvinist sentiments are likely to develop. The best way of treating the emotions that may arise around boundaries is to make them penetrable. If a boundary is open for people and goods, it is not likely to cause problems.

## PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

### 3.1 Peace and democracy

Democracies are about as prone to wars as authoritarian states. But stable democracies are very unlikely to wage war against other stable democracies. The explanation for peace among stable democracies lies primarily in normative restraints on conflict behaviour inherent in the democratic political culture. When two democracies are facing each other in a dispute, mutual trust is maintained as each side perceives the aversion to violent solutions in the other. This is a brief summary of the results from recent research on how democracy influences the willingness of states to enter into war.

In 1993, Bruce Russett published a book reflecting the state of the art of the research on the democracy-peace nexus. The finding that democracies shun war against each other is very solid, and has been characterized as the closest to an empirical law research in international relations has come. In fact, apart from a few special cases, one of which will be dealt with below, two democracies have not once fought a full-scale war against each other. Democratic peace is thus important and needs to be fully understood. It is also a crucial element in developing a security community.

Learning about this relationship for the first time, one might become beset by doubts, especially if one is used to viewing the world through the mistrustful, perhaps even cynical, lenses of *Realpolitik*. A person used to thinking in terms of power politics might argue that the democratic states never fought each other simply because they perceived a threat from a common enemy, and therefore felt a need

to keep peace among themselves. Or one might explain the absence of war among the democracies by claiming that most democracies are rich countries, and therefore lack issues of disagreement serious enough to cause war. These, and similar arguments, propose that the democratic peace is spurious, that is, only illusory. An example of a truly spurious relation can be found in the folklore larger, and the birth-rate among




Fig. 6. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant published at the end of the 18th century his book *On Eternal Peace*, which contained a first outline of the concepts of security communities and a discussion on the prerequisite for lasting peace. Kant was a professor of Philosophy at the old East Prussian University of Königsberg, today's Kaliningrad, a site that both under German and Russian rule has been turned into a military fortress (Painting: Uppsala University Library).




Fig. 7. In 1982 a conflict emerged between Sweden and Denmark if the island of Hesselø was to be considered Danish territory or within international water. The question became acute when oil was found in the region. However, the conflict was settled by peaceful means as expected between two democratic states. International mediation found that the lighthouse keeper, although not always on the island, was to be considered a permanent Danish resident, and thus the island was Danish. (Photo: Ingvar Andersson; Pressens Bild).

must bear the burden of military service, bombings, shortages and so on, can be expected to dislike costly foreign adventures. If the executives are directly or indirectly accountable to the people, they must take the preferences of the population into consideration if they want to remain in power after the next election.

Due to the high degree of institutional constraint in most democracies, a state in a dispute with another democratic state can count on ample time for conflict resolution processes, such as mediation, and virtually no risk of incurring surprise attack. However, not all democratic states have highly constrained executives. The presidents of France and Russia, for example, have extensive presidential powers, and could be considered as relatively unconstrained in this regard. Furthermore, a state may have a constrained executive without being truly democratic. There have been wars between states where both belligerents have been of the latter category.

of the explanation for the democratic peace. In democracies, violence is seen as an illegitimate way of furthering one's political ambitions. Actors in the democratic political game abstain from violent means, and trust others to do the same. A competitive political system cannot survive in the absence of this mutual trust in peaceful intentions. Thus the peaceful resolution of conflicts is a powerful norm that allows a smooth process of achieving a consensus among wills within the democratic state. Other important norms that constitute the democratic political culture are tolerance, and a willingness to compromise. The norms of the democratic political culture carry with them normative restraints on the use of violence in settling a conflict.

The very same norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts can be applied to relations between states, provided that mutual trust is present. In the same way as actors within a democracy view each other as trustworthy, in terms of peaceful intentions, a stable democratic political system works as an identification tag, allowing foreign policy decision makers to distinguish between states. Decision makers in democratic states view other democracies as peaceful, just, and deserving of accommodation. Authoritarian states, on the other hand, rely on the suppression of their own people. If these states are in a state of aggression with their own citizens, how can they be trusted not to have aggressive intentions toward other states? Authoritarian states are seen by decision makers in democracies as inherently distrustful, aggressive and unjust.

Another important aspect of democracy is the institutional constraints on the executive's power to decide in matters of war. It is often a complicated procedure to persuade the people, the legislature, and other independent institutions that war is necessary. Especially ordinary men and women, who, in the event of war,

humans tends to be higher in the countryside than in towns and cities. Thus the relationship between storks and babies is spurious.

There are, however, ways of controlling for shared influences, such as the degree of urbanization in the folklore example. The relationship between a high degree of democracy in two states and the absence of war between them has been thoroughly controlled for many such influences through the use of advanced statistical methods. It is true that other influences, among them wealth, economic growth and common alliance membership, reduce the likelihood of war between a pair of states. But the democratic peace holds for such controls. Recently a consensus has emerged in the research community that mutual stable democracy is very close to a sufficient condition for peace in the relationship between a pair of states. The democratic peace reigns even when other favourable conditions, such as wealth, are absent. The democratic peace is not limited to, for example, rich industrialized countries or to NATO-members. Furthermore, no other favourable influence can aspire for the status of a sufficient condition for stable peace, since one can find cases of war that clearly refutes such assertions. For example, wars between members of the same military alliance system are in fact quite common, as is indicated by wars such as the Hungarian uprising in 1956, when Hungary and the Soviet Union, two members of the Warsaw Pact fought each other. Another example is the war in 1982 between Great Britain and Argentina, both of which were allied to the United States.

### 3.2 Democracy as Conflict Resolution

Democracy is rule by the people on the basis of peaceful resolution of conflicts. This basis of peaceful conflict resolution is at the heart

parties, were more democratic, in a true sense of the word. Today, however, the notion of people's democracy has been referred to the dustbin of history. Instead there are some rather noncontroversial criteria of democracy within the field of political science that might be utilized. In modern states, democracy is usually identified with the right of all the citizens to vote, freely contested multi-party elections, and an executive either popularly elected, or responsible to an elected legislature. Often requirements for civil liberties, such as free speech, are also added. One way of gauging the political culture of a state is to measure the amount of internal political violence, such as terrorism and political executions.

When it comes to democratizing countries, special problems arise. As was already outlined above, perceptions are central. It is very important to the process how decision makers in one country see the regime in another country, and whether or not a democratizing counterpart is judged sin-

### 3.4 The Historical Evidence

In applying the criteria outlined above to the history of warfare, one reaches the conclusion that two democracies never, or extremely rarely, fight full-scale wars against each other. One case that seems to contradict this assertion at a first glance might be the case of Finland during the Second World War. Following the defeat in the Winter War of 1939-1940, in which Finland suffered large territorial losses in the aftermath of a Soviet war of aggression, Finland joined Nazi-Germany in 1941 in its attack on the Soviet Union. After great pressures from Stalin, the Western Democracies, now allied to the Soviet Union, declared war on Finland. Democratic Finland, thus, ended up on the "wrong" side, formally in a state of war with several democratic countries.

It is important to note, however, that Finland only fought the Soviet Union, and that no battles

took place between Finnish forces, and forces from a democratic country.

Nothing in the arguments above suggests that democracies will not experience conflicts among themselves. The point is that democracies can handle even serious disagreement when dealing with other democracies without resorting to arms. One example might be the territorial dispute between Sweden and Denmark in 1982, concerning the status of a small island (Hesselø) located between the two countries. The interest in the question was heightened by the belief that the seabed in the disputed area might contain valuable mineral resources. This conflict was resolved without any references to military power, or use of coercive measures. In contrast, the dispute between democratic Great Britain and the military dictatorship of Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in the South Atlantic resulted in war the same year.

*Zum Ewigen Frieden – Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (known in English as *On Perpetual Peace – A Philosophical Essay*). In this work, Kant spoke of "liberal republics" that would create a "pacific union" by accepting the principles of a metaphorical "treaty." In addition to the normative constraints and the institutional constraints, Kant pointed to the pacifying effect of mutually beneficial trade, an argument that later was to become central to the liberal tradition.

In Kant's days, not very many countries were democracies even by the lower standards of that time. As long as Switzerland, USA and possibly France, were the only reasonably democratic countries, Kant's vision might indeed seem utopian. Today, judging by the global spread of democracy, the prospects for Kant's pacific union to become reality is greater than ever before in history. Particularly important is the dramatic change toward democracy in the Baltic region – one important element in building a security community.

### 3.5 The theory of Kant

The theory on the democratic peace actually originates from the Baltic region. In 1795, the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant in Königsberg, present-day Kaliningrad, finished

# MUTUAL RESPONSIVENESS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

## 4.1 Conflict resolution

"Conflict resolution" takes place on all levels of society, every day. It can be described as "a process of harmonizing goals that initially were incompatible". More practically formulated it is "an adjustment to realities". A "conflict" emerges when individuals or groups try to satisfy their demands in a way that is not compatible with those of others. This takes the form of a social process, which may be violent or not violent. In politics, this includes the expression of a variety of attitudes and many different forms of behaviour: from war to peaceful talks.

In recent years, it has become common among international governmental, as well as non-governmental organisations, to talk about "peaceful conflict resolution". Also, in the social sciences this concept has aroused increasingly more interest. Some point to this concept as the main principle of treating political controversy within and between states in the post-Cold War era. Others look upon it as a theoretical challenge in the development of knowledge of the human society. These two different ways of approaching the same idea is not a problem but rather an asset in the development of knowledge in this field. In the following "peaceful conflict resolution" will mean conflict settlements that take place

- without the use of military operations or threats
- with the voluntary acceptance from all parties
- with a solution that the parties find acceptable over a period long enough to allow review of the matter.

The concept of "security community" is closely related to "peace-

ful conflict resolution". In particular the characteristic of "mutual responsiveness" is an important condition for conflict resolution. "Mutual responsiveness" indicates a requirement for the establishment of a peaceful conflict resolution process. It points to the "ability to predict the behaviour of other states." Avoiding escalation is the first step in a conflict resolution process. If two parties are not able to predict the behaviour in a conflict situation, the conflict more easily becomes escalated, since no one wants to be taken by surprise by the other party's preparations. Therefore, predicting a counter-party's behaviour is crucial.

## 4.2 Conflict resolution and Territorial Changes

Throughout history, the Baltic region has experienced both peaceful and violent forms of conflict resolution. One important type of conflict, where both types of conflict resolution have been used in the region, is conflict over territory. The Baltic region has seen a large number of territorial changes between states. A territorial change includes a change of political status of the whole of a territory (for instance from independent status to occupation) as well as portions of it. Also, many Baltic territories have had – and some still has – a special political status as a result of an agreement between governments. In most cases these territorial changes were the result of wars or post-war negotiations.

In the CSCE Treaty from 1975 – also called the Helsinki Final Act – it is agreed that the present boundaries in Europe are inviolable.

ble and can only be changed through negotiations. During the Cold War era, this provision signified a stabilizing status quo. In the post-Cold War era, two of the CSCE Treaty signatory states (the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union) have been dissolved and boundaries are seen in a different light. Governments bring up the question of boundaries as matters of negotiation, and, according to nationalist groups in some countries, these matters are devices in support-raising rhetoric. Thus, proposals for the establishment of new boundary lines have been put forward. The historic reasons for these demands are innumerable. The Baltic region has seen territorial changes in the 20th century that are ranging from achieving statehood or becoming occupied by other states (Norway, Denmark, Finland, Baltic republics), autonomy solutions (Åland, Schleswig), boundary revisions (Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Russia) to practical boundary line adjustments (Sweden/Norway). More examples on each type could be given, in fact all Baltic countries have undergone territorial changes during this century.

With this background, it is interesting to reflect on major experiences of peaceful settlement of territorial conflicts in the Baltic region. There are at least three such situations implemented during this century, with very different characters from a structural point of view:

- an ethnically mixed and balanced region, divided between two states (Schleswig divided between Denmark and Germany)
- a territorial minority community, with a homogeneous local ethnic majority within one state (Åland Islands in Finland)

## Documents on Peaceful Resolution of Conflict

The principle of peaceful resolution of disputes between states is well established in international law. In fact, states are today obliged to find a peaceful settlement of any conflict that threatens international peace and security. In a series of agreements between states this principle has been developed. Some of the most important are listed below.

- 1899/1907 Hague Conventions on peaceful settlement of disputes.
- 1920 Charter of the League of Nations, articles 13 - 15
- 1920 Charter of the Permanent Court of International Justice
- 1945 Charter of the United Nations, articles 2(3) and 33
- 1945 Charter of the International Court of Justice
- 1948 Charter of the Organisation of American States, article 20
- 1957 European Convention on peaceful resolution of conflicts
- 1959 European Court for Human Rights
- 1963 Charter of the Organisation of African Unity
- 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
- 1990 The Paris Treaty

It is easy to see the principle of peaceful conflict resolution as a weak tool for states attempting to maintain security and territorial integrity. However, the principle of peaceful conflict resolution can not be seen in isolation. First, it is a basic norm in the development of international relations in general without which the international community would risk more anarchic behaviour, for instance in trade relations. Secondly, it is part of a normative system of opinions, interests, and sentiments among leaders, peoples and international organisations. Combined, these norms can exert strong influence on anyone that violates the principle.

The principle of peaceful conflict resolution applies to major as well as minor states, and is in the interest of both. All are treated equally in a formal sense. Major states gain prestige and good will if they abide by international law, minor states achieve a treatment on equal terms, thus avoiding that "might is right".

• two balanced ethnic groups in one state (Norwegians and Swedes in the Union of the two countries).

These three situations have their historically given particularities. At the same time, they share traits with conflicts of today with ethnic dimensions. It is probably not an exaggeration to say, that these three types of situations, describe a significant portion of all conflict situations within which ethnic conflicts take place today.

### 4.3 The case of Schleswig - Divided Region in Denmark and Germany

The present boundary between Denmark and Germany was created in 1920, after the First World War. It divided a territory that since medieval times had been

held together, although under various formal arrangements. The territory in question includes the regions of Schleswig, Holstein, and the Frisian Islands. On these islands, a German-Frisian dialect is spoken. In Schleswig, German and Danish are mixed. Following the First World War, Denmark - although neutral in the war - proposed a readjustment of its boundary with Germany to the Versailles Conference. According to the principle of people's self-determination, a popular referendum was employed to create a foundation for the political decision to come. Such referenda were held in many German border areas after the First World War, for instance in Elsass-Lothringen, Danzig and Memelland.

The 1920 boundary divides an area where language is not the dividing factor. Even if German generally is spoken more in the south, and Danish in the north of the region, this does not divide

### 4.4 The case of Norway - Separation From a Union

In 1905, relations between Sweden and Norway had developed

The new relations between the countries could develop peacefully immediately. No armed conflict, with memories of violence and injustices across the border, had occurred. Historians ascribe this peaceful way out of a significant crisis a main role in the coming stability of the relations between the two countries. This stability developed in spite of the challenges posed by two world wars, including the German occupation of Norway in the latter.

### 4.5 Åland Islands - From Periphery to Autonomy

The archipelago of islands stretches out from Finland into the Baltic, ending with a few major islands where open seas begin, have been a major link between East and West throughout history. During Sweden's and Russia's century-long struggle for influence in Northern Europe, the Åland Islands have been exposed to invasions from all sides. Although Åland acquired its status of autonomy through a decision in the League of Nations 1921, the islands were demilitarized already in 1856. In the Peace Treaty between Britain, France and Rus-




Fig 8. In 1905 Norway claimed independence from the Swedish-Norwegian Union, established in 1814. After a crisis, negotiations took place in Karlstad, close to the border, with the group pictured. A full separation between the countries was then agreed. (Photo: Uppsala University Library).

sia, ending the Crimean War, it was decided that no fortresses were allowed on the islands. Attempts from Russia in the early 1900s to change this status were strongly opposed by Britain and Sweden. In 1908 the Baltic Declaration was signed by Russia, Sweden and Britain where the parties agreed to maintain the demilitarization of Åland.

Following World War I, Finland sought independence from Russia. However, before that, the population on Åland expressed a clear preference for joining Sweden. Sweden was reluctant to act on this matter in a situation where Finland were to become independent. Finally, the matter was by Great Britain brought before the League of Nations, which decided both on the demilitarization aspect and the political status in 1921. The demilitarization was extended into a total demilitarization of the islands, and Åland should remain part of Finland (which had declared its independence in 1917) but have significant rights for the preservation of its Swedish identity.

Although the decision was against the will of the Åland population, it was accepted and implemented. Gradually Åland developed its own identity and prosperity as a trading island in the midst of two industrializing countries - Finland and Sweden. Instead of becoming a periphery of Sweden, Åland became a centre between two countries.

In 1993, Åland got a revised Autonomy Act, which increases the scope and form for the local government.

### 4.6 Why Did These Solutions Last?

Why were these solutions durable? One important factor is that in all three cases, the basic aspirations of the peoples of the respective regions were taken into consideration. There was a popular dimension to the decision making in all three cases. This is an

important aspect of durable conflict resolution generally in territorial matters.

Secondly, the relations after the agreement were co-operative but not exploitative. There were no economic ties linked to the settlements as such. Such links had to develop on their own merits. Thus, the agreements were not endangered by non-territorial developments, such as trade.

Thirdly, the agreements brought in all important aspects in the Norway-Sweden case, independence for Norway was the overriding issue but border fortifications was also an important

were established in these cases,

the implementation has not been a simple matter for the parties. However, the emerging democratic traditions that developed in the countries involved created a mutual responsiveness between those involved, for instance during the Second World War. On the whole, these cases illustrate, that what once was a political issue threatening the stability and integrity of more than one country, can be transformed into a peaceful and developing political order, where ethnic and other aspirations are given their proper role in the conflict resolution process.

# ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT

## 5.1 Armaments, Arms Control and Disarmament

Several attempts have been made to explain why and how nations arm, and the approaches are manifold. The main factor distinguishing different explanations is often the level of explanation, such as actor-characteristics (the actor is often defined as a nation or government); groups within an actor; characteristics of relations between actors; and the social system or the physical context.

Within the different explanations there are two 'schools' which have achieved special importance. The first tries to explain armaments mainly as a result of relational factors. Lewis F. Richardson's mathematical study in 1960 may be considered the starting-point for one of the most influential approaches within this group, namely action-reaction. They generally focus on pairs of antagonistic major powers. Governments are treated as unified and rational actors with complete information. US-Soviet military relations were often presented in terms of this explanation.

During the 1970s, the simple assumptions in the action-reaction approach lead to explanations building on the variety of groups and interests within nations. These types of studies do not confine themselves to antagonistic powers or bilateral 'arms races'. Instead they include more varied explanations, such as bureaucratic processes, conflicting interests among groups and individuals, pressure groups, as well as economic and technological constraints and demands. The so-called 'military-industrial complex' (MIC) theory is the core theoretical approach in this group.

From the 1970s, different theoretical approaches have been combined and further developed, involving more factors (see box below). It is very likely that detailed armament studies of the US-USSR relations during the 1980s, which surely are to be written, will find some support from all or most types of explanations. For instance, the general international antagonism as a prerequisite for their bilateral arms race behaviour with regard to nuclear weapons in particular, both quantitatively and qualitatively, may find support in the action-reaction theory. The qualitative aspects could probably be applied, if at least in part, to MIC factors. If one would dare make a prediction, it could be that domestic factors, political and not least economic, were the most important for the new arms control and disarmament agreements between the superpowers from the late 1980s.

The factors explaining 'arms races' may, therefore, be useful in attempting to explain arms control and disarmament. But it cannot be assumed that the old theoretical explanations can just be 'turned around'.

## 5.2 The End of the Cold War and Arms Control

As can be seen on page 26, defence expenditures in the region increased in only three countries between 1991 and 1992, namely Norway, Finland and Poland. Norway thereby narrowed the gap between itself and Sweden, the Nordic country with the highest defence expenditure. These increases can be explained to some extent by the dollar exchange rates. Moreover, upward fluctuations are likely to be of short dura-

## Example of Factors Influencing Armaments

The different types of factors listed below are in most cases assumed to support armaments. Some however, may also have a restraining effect.

- *Internal:* economic, bureaucratic, research, military, political interest and pressure groups or combined sectional interests.
- *Actor characteristics,* such as military mission, 'national pride', expansionist ideology, alliance position, conflict patterns or type of political rule.
- *Relations between governments,* such as specific political, economic or other relations to the opponent(s), as well as political, military, economic and other relations to allies and 'friendly governments' (see also alliance position as an actor characteristic).
- *Systemic characteristics,* for instance changes in long-term economic cycles, international 'power distribution', technological requirements, etc.

Adapted from Gleditsch & Njølstad 1990.




Fig. 9. The delegation from Åland to the Swedish King and government in front of Stockholm Castle on May 31, 1920, to ask for Åland becoming a part of Sweden as Finland gained independence. The two foremost and eloquent spokesmen were chief editor Julius Sundblom (with a raincoat on the arm) and Carl Björkman (pinnace and gloves). The claim of the Ålanders provoked a conflict between Sweden and Finland that finally was settled by the League of Nations. (Photo: Pressens Bild).

# ARMAMENTS AND THE ARMS RACE

Large military establishments exist today in most countries in the world also in peacetime and in absence of immediate military threats. Defence budgets are typically around 3-4 % of the GNP and considerable arsenals of arms and standing forces are thus normal. In Europe the Cold War was the most important factor for armaments that took place within the NATO and WTO alliances. East and West armed competitively, an arms race developed. Europe became the most heavily armed continent in the world.

The NATO military expenditures in Europe has slowly increased during the entire Cold War period and amounted to some 180 billion US dollars in 1991 prices during the 1960s. For the WTO military expenditures were of even larger size, although no precise figures have been available to the international community. It is assumed that Soviet military expenditure rose to about 35 % of the BNP and accounted for some 65 % of the industrial output, figures typical for war economies. Of course this had a large negative impact on Soviet society.

Germany, at the center of the East-West confrontation, had a standing military force of about 1.4 million soldiers up to 1990, while European NATO as a whole had about 3,6 million military personnel. By far the largest sums were used for conventional (non-nuclear) forces.

The arms race was also a race to develop the best and most advanced arms technologies and considerable sums were used for development of new weapons systems. Military industry and research establishments were major employers of young engineers and natural scientists. During the 1980s some 80 projects aiming at deploying new weapons and weapons systems were on-going in European NATO countries, and an unknown number of similar projects on the WTO side.

Both countries aspired after nuclear superiority. In general it was the USSR and its allies that followed American and NATO weapons development. The military industrial complex, now fighting to survive, was a forceful factor in the arms race in both countries. Who was first in the development of major technological breakthroughs during the cold war varied, as illustrated below.

## The race for superiority. Development of major weapon systems

Nuclear Weapons	USA	USSR	Conventional Weapons	USA	USSR
Atom bomb	1945	1949	Main battle tank	1952	1949
Intercontinental bomber	1948	1955	Nuclear powered submarine	1955	1958
Intercontinental ballistic missile	1958	1957	Computer guided missile	1960	1968
Submarine launched ball. missile	1960	1968	Surface-to-air missile	1963	1961
Multiple warhead for missiles	1966	1968	Long-range fighter bomber	1962	1973
Anti-ballistic missile, ABM	1972	1968	High-speed attack submarine	1976	1970
Sea-launched cruise missiles	1982	1971	Television-guided missile	1972	1987

## Conventional arsenals 1990 and the CFE treaty limits

	Battle tanks	Artillery	Armoured combat vehicles	Combat aircraft	Attack helicopters
<b>Soviet (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus)</b>	20,694	13,828	29,348	6,455	1,380
CFE ceiling	13,150	13,175	20,000	5,150	1,500
cuts	7,544	653	9,348	1,295	170+
<b>Poland</b>	2,850	2,300	2,377	654	128
CFE ceiling	1,730	1,610	2,150	460	130
cuts	1,120	690	227	194	2+
<b>Germany</b>	7,133	4,644	9,598	1,064	357
CFE ceiling	4,166	2,705	3,446	900	306
cuts	2,967	1,939	6,152	164	
<b>Total WTO</b>	33,191	26,953	42,949	8,372	1,701
CFE ceiling	20,000	20,000	30,000	6,800	2,000
cuts	13,191	6,953	12,949	1,572	299+
<b>Total NATO</b>	25,091	20,620	34,453	5,939	1,736
CFE ceiling	19,142	18,286	29,822	6,662	2,000
cuts	5,949	2,334	4,631	723+	264+
<b>Total cuts</b>	19,140	9,287	17,580	1,572	0

# DISARMAMENT

Growing military expenditures in Europe peaked in 1985-86. The decrease which then started accelerated dramatically after 1990 and the end of the Cold War. While the downward trend has been rather gentle in NATO countries, the decrease is expected to be some 15 % by 1995. The former socialist bloc countries have seen a virtual collapse of their military budgets.

The disarmament of Europe that now takes place has several causes. The militaries do not compete successfully for public funding when military threats are less clear and resources are badly needed elsewhere. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the WTO has caused withdrawal of Russian forces from all countries outside Russia. Likewise American, French and British forces have withdrawn from Germany. The implementation of disarmament agreements, in particular the CFE treaty, has resulted in a virtual demilitarization of central Europe.

## European NATO military expenditures

Costs in billion US\$, 1991 prices; and military personnel in thousands.

	1983	1985	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Expenditures	178.3	182.3	190.2	188.7	189.0	189.7	187.4	181.9
Personnel	3,639	3,602	3,693	3,625	3,534	3,509	3,391	3,348

Efforts to curtail the arms race were going on during the entire Cold War period. It is obvious that armaments lead to an increasing risk of war, not the least by mistake, and deplete countries of resources important for social and economic development. A standing UN multilateral committee for disarmament negotiations existed in Geneva, and later in Vienna for the reduction of conventional forces between NATO and WTO. The talks were, however, for decades impeded by lack of trust between the superpowers. Few agreements were reached during the 1960s and 70s. After 1986 a different climate finally made progress possible.

Any disarmament agreement must specify provisions for an efficient control of compliance with the treaty, by means of suitable verification measures. However the best verification, on site inspection, was not accepted by the superpowers, in particular SU, on their own territories. They allowed verification only by so called 'national means'. These were not clearly defined, but included 'spy' satellites. This situation provoked counter-measures in order to hide certain installations and activities. During the INF negotiations a breakthrough was made to accept on-site inspections on the territories where the INF missiles were deployed in order to verify the destruction of the weapons and assembly facilities. This was a break-through into a much needed additional confidence building measure.

The enormous military arsenals that have been built up will, however, be costly to disarm, destroy or convert. We will live with large military expenditures for a long time to come.

## Some Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements

*Geneva Protocol, 1925*, prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. The *1993 Chemical Weapons Convention*, in addition to usage, also bans production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Convention is under ratification and is not yet in force.

*Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963*, bans testing of nuclear weapons on the ground, under water or in outer space. During 1992 USA made 6 tests and China 2. During 1993 only one nuclear test (under ground) was made (by China) and in July USA declared a moratorium to September 1994. This moratorium is accepted by Russia, France, Great Britain and China. Negotiations based on a Swedish proposal for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are presently going on. If accepted, this would completely prohibit all nuclear tests. The prospects for such an agreement are presently better than ever since 1963.

*Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968*, prohibits the transfer of technology for nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. Requires safeguards on nuclear facilities. Non-nuclear states undertake to have their nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection.

*Biological Weapons Convention, 1972*, prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.

*Intimate Weapons Convention, 1981*, is an umbrella convention covering protocols that a) prohibit weapons intended to injure by fragments that cannot be X-rayed, b) restricts or prohibits the use of mines, booby-traps etc., and c) restricts the use of incendiary weapons.

*The CFE Treaty, 1990*, sets a ceiling for five categories of military equipment (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) from the Atlantic Ocean to Ural Mountains.

## Military expenditures in the Baltic Region.

	Defence expenditures, \$m (1985)		\$ per capita		% of GDP/GNP	
	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992
Belarus	-	1,647	-	158	-	4.5
Czechoslovakia	906	789	58	50	2.7	2.2
Denmark	1,299	1,256	255	247	2.1	2.2
Estonia	-	37	-	24	-	0.6
Finland	1,103	1,140	220	226	1.8	1.9
Germany	20,122	19,252	263	251	2.5	2.4
Latvia	-	40	-	15	-	0.5
Lithuania	-	55	-	15	-	0.7
Norway	1,797	2,023	427	480	3.1	3.3
Poland	2,170	2,279	57	60	2	2.3
Russia	52,510	39,680	443	268	1.1	0.9
Sweden	3,126	2,861	363	330	2.7	2.5
Ukraine	4,530	4,320	108	82	3.3	3.8

Source: *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, IISS (London) 1993, pp. 224-225

tion under the present circumstances. The general trend is clearly downward. Among the 13 countries listed in the table, despite drastic reductions, Russia has by far the highest defence expenditure in absolute terms and as share of GDP/GNP. In absolute terms, Germany is no. 2, followed by the Ukraine and Sweden. The three Baltic states were the only countries with defence expenditures below one percent of the Gross Domestic or Gross National Product.

New factors and circumstances may have to be included in order to explain the downward armament process. For instance, the role of *individuals*, as distinct from *groups*, as well as *timing* may have been underestimated among the arms race factors. For instance, could the present reductions have occurred with other presidents than George Bush in the USA and Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union? And would the downward process have begun, had not president Gorbachev been brave enough to express the politically risky conclusion that the arms race was futile and to act on that conviction at that particular moment in time?

In December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved. The 'Cold War' as we were used to see it - military, political and to an important

degree technological competition and rivalry between the world's two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective military alliances - came to an end. The division in 'East' and 'West', as manifested by the Berlin Wall, was history. These developments opened the way for new arms control and disarmament initiatives.

The agreements in 1991 and 1993 to reduce and limit offensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads on American and Soviet/Russian missiles (the START I Treaty, to which Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also accede, and the START II Treaty), as well as decisions by France and Great Britain to either eliminate, reduce or no longer deploy certain



Fig. 10. Soviet Union's Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan signed in December 1987 the INF Treaty. In this bilateral treaty the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy within three years all intermediary and shorter range nuclear missiles. The arsenal under the treaty included the SS 20 and the Pershing missiles which caused the major east west political crisis in the 1980s (Photo: Pressens Bild).




Fig. 11. With the Agreement in Paris in 1990 on the Limitations of Conventional (non-nuclear) Forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty, a large arsenal of weapons were in for destruction. Many of the factories previously producing weapons changed to demilitarize the same weapons. (Photo: Pressens Bild).

weapons and/or nuclear delivery systems, are clearly important. However, other agreements are likely to have more direct consequences for Europe and the Baltic region, in particular the 1987 INF (i.e. intermediate range nuclear forces) Treaty and follow-on agreements to the 1990 CFE reductions (i.e. conventional armed forces in Europe), as well as confidence and security building measures discussed in the *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*.

## 5.3 The Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe

The Treaty, formally known as the *Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*, was signed in December 1987. It went into force in June, 1988, and was the first nuclear disarmament treaty. As such, it is important not only for the peoples of the Baltic, but for all of Europe. It may be assumed that those missiles were all aimed at mili-

weapons at the time - but in the acceptance by both sides of on-site inspection on their respective territories to verify the destruction of these weapons and assembly facilities. This was a breakthrough in confidence building.

While the Treaty's inspection rules are limited to 13 years, the Treaty is of indefinite duration. It has established cooperative measures to enhance the use of reconnaissance systems and a Special Verification Commission as a forum for American and Russian representatives to discuss compliance issues and measures to improve the effectiveness of the Treaty.

## 5.4 The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The CFE Treaty was signed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) governments and the Warsaw Pact (WP) governments in November, 1990. The rapid progress has been accrued largely to Soviet acceptance of deep reductions in WP's ground forces. The purpose of this treaty was not disarmament, but increased stability in Europe by reducing the military potential and by reducing the possibilities for a surprise attack. Although some types of equipment could remain, most equipment within the CFE region to be destroyed or converted to avoid a quick re-creation of the previous force structures.

CFE includes conventional forces deployed in the member states from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU): tanks (weighing at least 16.5 metric tons with a gun of at least 7.5 cm), artillery (guns, howitzers, mortars and multiple rocket launchers of 10 cm calibre and above), armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. For all of these categories of weapons there is a maximum quantitative ceiling (see information page 24). As a conse-

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


Fig. 12. The treaty on Limitations of Conventional (non-nuclear) Forces in Europe, the CFE treaty, aims at reducing armaments in Central Europe, although the treaty covers the region from the Atlantic to Ural. The treaty defines four zones. In the central zone (blue) a major reduction of weapon systems has been achieved. These weapons can be destroyed or redeployed in the outer zones up to certain agreed ceilings. The flanking zones have the largest allowed ceilings. Increase of military forces have therefore occurred e.g. east of Finland. The agreement was signed by NATO and WTO (SIPRI Yearbook, 1993)

quence of the formulation of the Treaty, the USA had only to reduce its tank inventory with a few percent, while the Soviet Union had to cut it almost by half.

The complications and uncertainties with implementing the CFE Treaty caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union were largely settled in 1992 and the Treaty came into power in November 1992. The new independent states were not parties to the initial Treaty and were therefore not bound by it. The three Baltic states were in what was in 1990 defined as the 'expanded central zone', together with the rest of the then four Soviet military districts including the Leningrad region. However, at a meeting on 10th January 1992 at the NATO Head-

quarters the so called High Level Working Group agreed that:

*Treaty obligations assumed by the former Soviet Union should be wholly accounted for by all the newly independent States in the area of application and approved among them in a manner acceptable to all Parties to the Treaty.*

The Treaty contains a commitment to follow-on talks - the 1990 CFE treaty is therefore referred to as CFE-1. Already in 1991 it was agreed upon to reduce the armed forces of a unified Germany to 370,000 personnel within 3-4 years of the entry into force of the Treaty. Further, in 1992, troop

level ceilings were agreed upon in the so called CFE-1A talks.

Due to the fact that Europe of 1993 was very different from Europe of 1990, some analysts question the future relevance of CFE. The acceptance of the CFE provisions by the new independent states, plus the future complete withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from these countries, mean that much of the original basis for CFE-1 is, in fact, already outdated. On the other hand, security and confidence is not once and for all given. There are still categories of military equipment excluded from the CFE-1 Treaty limitations, most importantly naval equipment. Also, qualitative military improvements (research and development) are not yet in-

cluded. There are, therefore, important benefits to be gained by continuing the CFE negotiations.

### 5.5 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The CSCE has come a long way from the initial steps in 1975, when the important issues were confined to three 'baskets' (security; economic, scientific and technological, including environmental, cooperation; and human rights), to today's wider diplomatic involvement in European security. The central thread of confidence-building measures in the Final Act from Helsinki in 1975 has been the basis for all discussions. During the 1980s they were called CSBM (Confidence- and Security Building Measures).

It is clear that CSCE has an important role to play. The new independent states are part of the new European architecture, agreeing on the common values defined in the CSCE negotiations. The document from Paris in 1990 - *the Paris Charter for a New Europe* - defined the new Europe and extended the future roles of the CSCE in crisis management,

conflict resolution including the possibility of military peace-keeping operations (see box below).

### 5.6 Demilitarisation and Security Community

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and its military forces has increased the dangers of, and certain incentives for, the proliferation of arms and related technologies. Both the former Soviet Union and the USA transferred weapons to other nations as a result of the CFE reductions. Daniel Rothenfeld, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), claims that in the post-cold war period, one of the key issues to be resolved is that of arms transfers' (*World Armaments and Disarmament, 1993, p. 7*). The Baltic states have been caught in the transit of much militarily relevant material, thereby adding a disturbing international security dimension to the border control problems.

Military exports have become a most important complement to a reduced domestic military market. Attempts to reduce incentives for continued military production

### Baltic Region signatories to major multilateral arms control agreements, as of 31 December 1992

	1925 Geneva Protocol	Partial Test Ban Treaty	Non-Proliferation Treaty	Biological Weapons Convention	Inhumane Weapons Convention	CFE Treaty
Belarus	1970	1963	-	1975	1982	1992
Czechoslovakia	1938	1963	1969	1973	1982	1991
Denmark	1930	1964	1969	1973	1982	1991
Estonia	1931	-	1992	-	-	-
Finland	1929	1964	1969	1974	1982	1991
Germany	1929	1964	1975	1983	1992	-
Latvia	1931	-	1992	-	-	-
Lithuania	1932	-	1991	-	-	-
Norway	1932	1963	1969	1973	1983	1991
Poland	1929	1963	1969	1973	1983	1991
Russian Fed.	1928	1963	1970	1976	1982	1992
Sweden	1930	1963	1970	1976	1982	1992
Ukraine	-	1963	-	1975	1982	1992

### Confidence Building Measures

The term dates back to the CSCE Final Act from Helsinki in 1975. CBM originally focused on military measures. The means have primarily been openness in military matters, such as open and prior reporting of larger military exercises and voluntary observations of exercises. The aim was to remove causes of political tension, to strengthen mutual confidence and, by so doing, support increasing stability and security in Europe and thus reduce the risk of war by mistake. Limitations of military activities and disarmament have been secondary means. During the 1980s, CBMs were broadened into CSBM (Confidence- and Security Building Measures) thus including a wider scope of measures.

have not been successful. The economic and social situations for soldiers returning to Russia have not been completely solved, as is true also for Russians wanting to remain in new independent states. The outcome of the Russian election in December 1993 increased

the uncertainties of Russia's political stability and foreign policy.

There are several issues affecting the military situation in and around the Baltic Sea. In particular, there is both old and new behaviour in terms of parallel armament and disarmament developments. Both may, in fact, be necessary in order for the region to achieve a state of security in the short run. Armament and disarmament policies in Russia, in Central European states, as well as in the USA will depend upon the success of president Yeltsin's policies and, most importantly, upon who succeeds him. In this, support by governments outside the Baltic region is important. Continued good relations between the USA and Russia, as well as a successful political balance between history and the future by the governments in the new independent states, is of central importance for European security in general and Baltic security in particular.

The new independent states are 'remilitarizing' - although on a low level - by formulating national defence policies and creating



Fig. 13. The Soviet forces in Europe changed to Russian control and will withdraw to Russia up to August 1994. The Russian soldier, waiting for returning home to an insecure future, demonstrates his weapons to interested youngsters (Photo: Pressens Bild).

bilateral relations. At the time of writing, however, it looks as if the present American government does not want to risk its relations with the present Russian leadership by offering full NATO membership to these nations or, for that matter, by complicating president Yeltsin's political balancing act in any other respect.

In order to create a security community in the long run, however, further successful 'arms build-down' and restructuring are needed, not only in Europe, but globally as well. Policy is 'the art of the possible', and it may be wise to remember that today is tomorrow's yesterday. What we do not achieve today may be impossible tomorrow. In a security community, national military forces, defence and security policies must not increase uncertainty and mistrust regarding national military ambitions. In the Baltic Sea region, issues affecting national and regional (in)security - in whatever way - should be discussed and settled in democratic agreement among the nations concerned. Generally, open and good statesmanship is always a better recipe for security-building than secrecy and hostile statements.

### Common Abbreviations

- ABM Anti-ballistic missile (Missile defence against intercontinental ballistic missiles)
- BW Biological weapons
- CBM Confidence-building measures
- CW Chemical weapons
- CBW Chemical and biological weapons
- CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
- CSEB Confidence and Security Building Measures
- CTBT (T) Comprehensive Test Ban (Treaty); (nuclear weapons)
- ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
- INF Intermediate range Nuclear Forces
- MAD Mutual assured destruction (Deterrence based capacity of each super-power to destroy the other)
- M(B)FR Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reductions
- NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty (nuclear weapons)
- NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
- R&D Research and Development
- SALT Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (SALT I and II)
- SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
- SDI Strategic Defence Initiative ('Star Wars' programme, USA, launched 1983)
- START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (US-USSR negotiations beginning in 1982; START I agreement signed 1991, START II between USA and Russia in 1993)

# COMMON INSTITUTIONS FOR BALTIC SECURITY

## 6.1 The need for alliances

The countries in the Baltic Region are for the most part left to fend for themselves. Three of them are today members of a military alliance (Norway, Denmark and Germany). The other countries are, in a strict sense, militarily non-aligned. Many of them are in search of partners. For many, there is a fear that recently attained independence, restoration of statehood and/or democratisation will be threatened from inside or outside. Levels of economic development vary in the region. Economic performance, no matter on what level of development, is not according to expectations in most countries. All this contributes to a sense of uneasiness, if not insecurity.

The future is unusually difficult to predict, in particular due to the questions about Russia's political developments. This means, that important elements of a security community have not yet emerged. Nevertheless, there is a growth in the communality of values (new democratic and market institutions) and an increasing responsiveness among many countries. New and constructive forms of behaviour are occurring. Thus, some of the factors we specified for a security community are increasingly present.

## 6.2 Institutions in the Baltic Region

There is no particular international institution that covers the Baltic Region (as defined here) alone. The atomistic nature of the security arrangements in the area has led to a debate as well as practical efforts to establish new

institutional frameworks, covering at least some of the states. The Council of Baltic States was set up in March 1992 with all 10 Baltic littoral states as members. Annual meetings are planned.

Some of the environmental issues dealt with in this Council also pose security questions (e.g. the status of some evacuated military bases and the dumping of chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea). Another example is the North Atlantic Council which has invited observers from the rest of the region. There are attempts to develop old frameworks as well as searching for new ones.

The only existing institutions that explicitly deal with foreign and defence policies, and who have members in the region, are those associated with the European Union (e.g. EU itself and WEU, the Western European Union),

NATO (NATO itself, NACC, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and PFP, Partnership for Peace), the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the United Nations. Let us look more closely at these organisations.

Two states in the region are presently members of the EU (Denmark and Germany) and three are negotiating for full membership (Finland, Sweden, Norway). The Maastricht Treaty, in effect since November 1993, explicitly mentions security and defence policies as one of its areas of concern. WEU is closely associated with the EU. Presently, only Germany is a member of WEU, while Denmark has observer status.

NATO has three members in the Baltic region, Norway, Denmark and Germany. It is the

## Organisations and Conferences

- OSCE Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe (Founding document: Helsinki Final Act, 1975)
- IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency (a UN agency established 1957, i.a. monitors safeguard agreements under the NPT)
- NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council (created in 1991, a council for consultation and co-operation between NATO and Central and Eastern European states on security matters)
- NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization (US-led military alliance established in 1949, 16 member states in 1991.)
- EU European Union (former EC, European Community, 1958. The then six members increased to 12 by 1986; presently three Baltic region states apply for membership: Finland, Norway and Sweden. Denmark is a member since 1973, Germany (FRG) was a founding state of EC)
- WEU Western European Union (defence and collaboration organization established in 1948 by seven West-European states, strengthened in 1991 into a military organisation of the EU, with a complementary role vis-a-vis NATO)
- WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization (Soviet-led alliance, established in 1955, following West Germany's acceptance as NATO member 1954, dissolved in 1991)

strongest militarily of the four organisations. The commitment of the United States is of particular significance. NACC, which is a non-military extension of NATO, includes all former Warsaw Treaty Organisation members (including Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) among the Baltic littoral states. Finland is an observer. Thus, Sweden is the only country in the region that stands entirely outside this framework. The same countries were affected by the FPP initiative by President Clinton in 1993 and endorsed by the NATO summit meeting in January 1994, suggesting different forms of security arrangements of "partners" with NATO and the USA, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland have now joined this initiative.

CSCE counts all states of the region as members. Within the CSCE framework, there is no particular subgroup consisting of the Baltic region. The EU members have a tradition of close co-ordination in this body. CSCE has 52 members and decisions in CSCE requires consensus (minus one state). Several specified secretariats are being set up as the Treaty of Paris in November 1990 has given CSCE new functions. One is the High Commissioner for Minority Affairs, created in 1992.

The United Nations has 184 members. All states of the Baltic Region are engaged in the organisation. It has several informal subgroups, such as the Nordic, the Western and the Eastern European groups, but no particular division for the Baltic Region. The central decision-making body of the UN is the Security Council, with 15 members. Five permanent members have the right to veto decisions. Russia, as a permanent member, has more impact than any other state in the Baltic region. The proposal to make Germany a new permanent member would, if accepted, have implications for the Baltic region. Whether this would lead to constructive involvement of the UN in the region or block any such involvement and instead stimu-

## The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

In 1975, thirty-five states - including all NATO and WTO member states - concluded the Helsinki Final Act, which aimed at creating peace and stability in Europe. This is the founding document for the CSCE process. It includes among other things a declaration about the inviolability of existing European borders which meant that all European states and the USA accepted the post-World War II order in Europe. The agreement is divided into sections ("baskets") dealing with specific areas:

1. security and confidence-building measures
2. economic, scientific and technological cooperation and environmental issues
3. human rights, culture, education and free flow of people and of information.

A fourth section states that regular review conferences be held in order to continue and strengthen the multilateral process that was started by the Helsinki Conference. The CSCE member states come together regularly to meetings and conferences, represented by their Heads of State, to review conferences, and various council and committee meetings.

The CSCE is not an institution or international organization similar to the United Nations. Although the CSCE process has resulted in the development of a CSCE Secretariat and a Secretary-General, these are not comparable in terms of resources or political position to their counter-parts in the UN.

Following the end of the Cold War, the CSCE has increased its activities. In particular preventive diplomacy, minority questions and the strengthening of democratic institutions have been on the CSCE agenda. As a result of this, an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR), has been set up in Poland. In 1992 a High Commissioner on National Minorities was appointed. The task for the Commissioner is to provide early warning and early action with respect to tensions where national minority issues are involved.

During 1992 and 1993 the CSCE has sent a number of Missions to areas of tension and conflict, for instance to Yugoslavia, Skopje, Georgia, Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, and Tajikistan. The CSCE is also actively involved in efforts to settle the conflict about Nagorno-Karabach in the Caucasian region.

All states in Europe and the Baltic Region are members of the CSCE.

late direct action by either of the two, can of course be debated.

Also the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) should be mentioned. This body was created following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The strongest party of this organisation is Russia. Also, Belarus and Ukraine are members, as well as countries in Caucasus and Central Asia.

## 6.3 FOUR FRAMEWORKS CONSIDERED

Let us consider the four frameworks and their implications for security in the Baltic region. For an operational pluralistic security community there are four important functions to fulfil: first, the institution should *preserve the independence* of the members, by respecting the sovereignty of the member states, but also by being

able to act in case of threats. A successful organisation, thus, is one which contributes to reducing the fear of member states of losing the national independence.

Secondly, it should manage to keep *the Baltic region peaceful*, i.e. contribute to an open sea and to arms control in the region. Thirdly, it is important that it *incorporates the European powers* who have an impact on regional security. This refers in particular to Russia, being the foremost military power of the area, and Germany. Fourth, there has to be a *link to other centers and parts of the world*, notably, Western Europe, North America and the rest of the world. It is unlikely that the Baltic region will be isolated from all events in other regions. During the Cold War, tension was transported via alliances. After the Cold War, economic ties, as well as refugee flows, arms trade, and international crime may provide such links.

What would be the contribution of the four institutions with respect to the four functions?

Nations. The present international debate on reforming and strengthening the UN does, in other words, have an important implication for the Baltic Region. For instance, many countries favour Germany, another Baltic Sea country, becoming a permanent member of the Security Council.

The CSCE has many of the same advantages as the UN. It does incorporate many of the interested parties, although it is restricted to "European" members. Japan is an observer. The broad definition of "Europe", extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok, makes it an organisation of the North of the world. It has a record of dealing with Baltic region affairs, in particular with Estonia and Latvia. Diplomatically, the CSCE moved ahead during 1993 and had significant impact not the least in the Baltic region. It is an organisation under development. Reforms and strengthening of its capacity may yield important benefits to the Baltic region. The paradox of the organisation is that its success

The table below is a point of departure for discussion. It shows that none of the available frameworks receives a full score. There are many question-marks and doubts. The most inclusive is the United Nations. It would have many advantages, particularly as it incorporates all major states and security interests in the region. Its record in preserving the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not better or worse than any other organisation. It may, however, have been able to maintain impartiality more than many others. Would the UN act swiftly and early to counter a threat to the independence of countries in the Baltic region? It should then be remembered that one member of the region has the right to veto decisions in the Security Council. The answer will depend on the decisions of the Security Council and on the options available to the organisation. This might necessitate a change in the composition of the Security Council as well as an extension of security options available to the United

options available to the United

## Four Possible Frameworks for a Baltic Security Community

Framework/ Organisation	Does it Preserve Independence?		Does it Contribute to Arms Control? Russia? Germany?		Does it link to USA? Third World?	
	Uncertain. Depends on development of future foreign and defence policy	No	No	Yes	No	No
EU/WEU	Strongest military institution, but uncertain future mission	No	Through CFE talks	Yes	No	No
NATO	Diplomatic strength. No military functions. Decisions require consensus	Yes	Only through overlapping membership in CFE talks	Yes	Yes	No
CSCE	Committed to sovereignty, but would it act in the Baltic?	Yes. For instance chemical weapons. NPT.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UN						




Fig. 14. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, formed at a meeting in Helsinki in 1975 again assembling in Helsinki on July 10-12, 1992. In the intervening years CSCE had grown into an important institution for promoting peace and security in Europe by implementing confidence building measures, attempting various conflict resolution procedures and safeguarding of human rights. Among the participants at this meeting are The Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the American President George Bush, the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, the host, Finland's President Mauno Koivisto, Russia's former President Mikhail Gorbachev, and the British Prime Minister John Major. The total number of member states in CSCE are 53, including all European States (Photo: Pressens Bild).

rests on its lack of intrusion: it has not been perceived as a threat. Thus, it has been able to take up internal issues, e.g. the status of the Russian population. CSCE was not seen to represent the interest of any particular member state, as decisions had to rely on a near-consensus. If it were to become more intrusive ("strong"), for instance, through a European Security Council arrangement, this might reduce its diplomatic effectiveness.

NATO is the only truly military organisation. Together with Russia it is the foremost military power in Europe. It commits the United States to European affairs. It is, however, a product of the Cold War. Its military strategies and doctrines are presently re-evaluated. An important question is how NATO is viewed in Russia:

## 6.4 The role of EU/WEU

Finally, the EU/WEU remains being of lesser military significance. However, it might become more important in regard to building a security community in the Baltic Region, as it rests on economic co-operation rather than direct military security interests. Its strength lies in its ability to tie countries together into networks and thus prevent conflicts from emerging or escalating into serious interstate disputes. Its military abilities are likely to remain low for the foreseeable future. It is not likely to engage in military action to preserve independence of small states, or play a role in arms control questions. Furthermore, it shows a record of uneasy

relationships with the United States. The EU/WEU is, however, an arrangement presently undergoing significant change. Different scenarios are possible. In case the three regional states (Finland, Norway and Sweden) now approaching EU for full membership were to enter, EU would increase its concern with the affairs of the Baltic Region. It would make five out of 15 or 16 EU-members littoral states to the Baltic Sea, and inevitably lead to an interest in promoting regional investment and ties to other states. Possibly such an enlargement could at the same time serve to slow down the development of common defence policies within the EU.

The score-board for the four institutions relevant for building a security community, thus, gives a mixed result. There is no institution that by itself would be the only candidate for constructing such a framework. The states of the region already have links to the organisations, but in most or organisations Baltic regional affairs take a low priority. Is this, then, an argument for creating entirely new organisations or frameworks? Should such frameworks be subsections of existing larger units or be entirely independent? This

might be the most useful discussion to pursue at this time.

There are subregional collective efforts that could be discussed. For instance, would a closer security co-operation between Sweden, Finland and Norway today be an alternative that benefits the entire region? Would such co-operation require a formal link to NATO? Would similar co-ordination between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania be of military significance? There are also possible bilateral relationships, such as direct links between the USA and individual countries in the region, in the form of security guarantees. Would such assurances be credible? Would they be provocative?

Finally there are the individual routes to security: maintaining a military defence to at least dissuade from the cheapest and simplest ways an aggressor could invent. This would amount to being a well-armed but neutral and/or non-aligned state. The military investments would be very costly and reinforce the atomistic state concept in the region. A cheaper and equally peace-promoting alternative might be to contribute to the conditions for a security community.

Perhaps, the issues of institutions for a security community should not be forced at this time. Instead contacts on all levels should be encouraged to ensure the development of common values, to practise mutual responsiveness, improve chances of economic growth and continuously transcend the borders to outside actors. The institutions mentioned should be encouraged to promote, rather than prevent, such conditions. Differently put: First, a community of security would have to emerge, and then an institution of a security community would come later. In due course appropriate institutional forms may become logical and grow organically.

## 6.5 Baltic Region and the Rest of Europe

by Katarina Engberg

While none of the major issues on the Baltic region, notably the Russian-Baltic agenda, can be solved by international entities if there is no bilateral understanding at hand, it is also true that Baltic security cannot be of con-




Fig. 15. Kaliningrad is the capital of the Kaliningrad oblast. This region was an exclave of Germany up to 1945. It was then annexed to the Soviet Union and became again an exclave now of Russia from 1991. The German population of the region was virtually eliminated at the end of the Second World War, and large scale immigration of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians have since occurred. The region is heavily militarized and faces a difficult task of major restructuring and conversion (Map: Karth Hallgren).

cern solely to the Baltic states and Russia. There are a number of reasons for why the rest of Europe ought to pay more attention to Baltic security.

1) Europe cannot isolate itself from Baltic insecurity or, for that matter, from unrest in any of the territories of the former Soviet Union. Traditional concepts, such as 'buffer' and 'strategic depth' have a limited application in today's Europe. A reassertion of Russian hegemony over the Baltic states would have a destabilizing effect on European security.

2) The Baltic area constitutes one of the few points where Russia meets the West. The relationship between the Nordic countries and the Soviet Union was, during the Cold War, a matter of primary regional concern. Since Sweden, Finland and Norway are likely future members of the European Union, their borders with Russia could become the Union's Russian border and their policies towards the Baltic states and Russia will condition the Union's policies.

3) The Baltic area contains one of Russia's main urban areas - Greater St. Petersburg with 7 million inhabitants. It is perfectly possible to elaborate a policy that could benefit the whole region - the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic countries and Russia.

4) The Kaliningrad exclave with its large concentration of ex-Soviet forces outside Russia. The West is not likely to extend security guarantees to the Baltic states and traditional Western security instruments are not particularly useful in an area of gradual political and economic transition.

Europe has so far few policies and even less instruments at its disposition in dealing with these intricate challenges to its security. But standing back also entails a cost to be reckoned with, as has been shown by the Balkan experience. Refugee flows is just the most evident and visible consequence of ethnic strife. The need to stigmatise and sanction the quest for 'ethnic superiority' from predominant ethnic groups seems to be one lesson to be drawn from the Balkan war. Another is the

urgency of codifying and enforcing the right of minorities in order both to protect them and to minimise the danger of manipulation of the minority issue by either the majority or the minority side of the conflict. An enhanced CSCE, possibly Partnership for Peace, seems to offer the best forum for dealing with the densely interwoven Baltic security problems such as the demilitarisation of the area, including Kaliningrad, the solution of border disputes, and the protection of minority rights.

The Baltic region has its best historic chance ever to equip itself with a co-operative security regime. It could again become a crossroads for Russian, German, Polish and Nordic influence. Unlike the past however, when the Baltic area formed the bedrock of European great power politics, the region in the future is likely to constitute a European subregion of transition from the countries of the European Union to Russia - the only of its kind in Europe. The uniqueness of the Baltic region will require unique solutions.

However, as Karl W. Deutsch suggests, a security community will not develop through threats but through shared values, responsiveness, new behaviour and joint frameworks. Clearly, the Baltic Region has been exposed to violence, often brought to the region rather than emerging from within. Particularly relationships between the major actors in the region (Germany, Poland, Russia) and their counterparts (e.g. Britain and France) have been important. None the less, in a long-term perspective the Baltic Region has been heading towards what Deutsch would label "a security community".

What have we learnt about the present state of affairs in the region? Does a security community exist today in the region as a whole or in particular relationships? What are the prospects of such a community developing? If there is no uniform development, which relations are problematic? The different chapters give us insights that need to be brought together in a systematic fashion. First, we may note that, as of today, the fear of war in the region is generally low. This does not mean, however, that threats have disappeared or that all peoples feel safe.

We illustrated four security dilemmas associated with strate-

## 7.1 Four main points to be considered

We have described four conditions that are important for the emergence of a security community in the Baltic Region. Initially, we asked the question of which type of relations in a long-term perspective we are heading towards as a region. We have illustrated possible military threats in the region.

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## 7.2 What did we learn

The table on page 38 summarises what we have learnt, focusing on relations among the littoral countries of the Baltic Sea. Rather than analysing all possible bilateral relations, some countries are grouped together. This is done for practical purposes and by necessity overlooks important nuances. For instance, Finland is treated together with the Baltic countries proper, in a group termed 'Fennobaltic countries', a group that may in fact not see itself as an actor. In all, these are 12 relationships. Furthermore, the table attempts to portray the developments of the region towards a security community. Thus, an assessment has been made with respect to each of the 12 relationships at three points in time: 1934, 1964 and 1994. These years indicate the situation in the period between the World Wars, at the midst of the Cold War and a time in the post-Cold War era. 1934 marks the time when expectations were still high for the League of Nations as a vehicle for peace in Europe. 1964 was the time when major power détente and tensions set the framework for what was regarded as "realistic". 1994 shows the present "window of opportunity".

The table on page 38 requires some explanations. Relations between states, or groups of states, are found in the column to the far left. The next column indicates the most recent experience of war or politically significant armed clash in this relationship. Most recent important political crises are also indicated. Such experiences constitute important memories and might create fears for the future. The third column shows the year when all countries in the

fic considerations, consolidation of democracy, multiethnic state-building and economic development. There are potentials for serious conflict. The concept of security community is a positive definition of peace. It suggests that there is something more than deterrence or isolationism that guides security thinking. It sets the goals higher than deterring the threat of war. It points to the need for preventive and comprehensive policies to reduce the dangers of war for the future.

We have also illustrated ways in which war can be avoided by peaceful means. We have seen considerable progress towards democratic forms of government. After the parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum in Russia in December 1993, all countries of the region now have elected national assemblies. Constitutions which contain division of roles among executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government are in operation. The press is free. The roles of the military, police and intelligence services are curtailed.

In terms of responsiveness and conflict resolution, less has happened. Negotiations take place, nevertheless, on serious matters among the states of the region. In this regard there is a positive tendency. The same is partly true for the development of non-military forms of behaviour. Defence doctrines are generally becoming more defensive and new relationships are formed. At the same time, relocation of troops is raising new possibilities, not all of which are benign. In terms of institutional development, less has yet occurred. The region is still trying to find its position in the European security arrangement.

We illustrated four security dilemmas associated with strate-

## Assessing the Emergence of a Security Community in the Baltic Region, 1934, 1964, 1994

Relations between states or groups of states	End of most recent war	All states democratic since*		Security Community	
		1922/1991	1934	1964	1994
Fenno-Baltic relations and Fennoscandinavian states	not relevant	1922/1991	no	no	emerging
Scandinavian states and Fennoscandinavian states	1721	1922/1991	no	no	yes
Scandinavian states and Poland	1721	1917/1990	no	no	emerging
Scandinavian states and Russia	1809 (Cold War crises)	1993	no	no	no
Intra-Scandinavian relations	1814 (1905)	1914	yes	yes	yes
Fenno-Baltic states and Poland	1922	1922/1991	no	no	no
Scandinavian states and Germany	1945	1918/1949	no	yes	yes
Fenno-Baltic states and Germany	1945	1922/1991	no	no	emerging
Russia and Poland	1945 (1956, 1970, 1981)	1993	no	no	no
Poland and Germany	1945	1918/1990	no	no	emerging
Germany and Russia	1945 (Berlin: 1953, 1958, 1961)	1993	no	no	no
Fenno-Baltic states and Russia	1945 (1952, 1991)	1993	no	no	no
Number of relations with "No Security Community"			11	10	5

Note: Finland and Baltic states constitute the group of "Fenno-Baltic" states. Sources: Doyle 1986, yearbooks.

\* Two years in the column indicates that democracy has vanished and returned in these years.

group achieved democratic conditions. This, as we have indicated, is an important factor for communitality of values in a security community. There are two periods of democracy building: after the First World War and after the Cold War. Thus, for some countries, where democratic conditions were overturned, two different dates are indicated. In the three

columns to the right, assessments are made of the state of the relationships in terms of attaining a security community at three points in time during the last 60 years. The last line in the table shows a considerable move towards a security community in the region. In 1934 only, one relationship met the criteria set for a security community, namely the intra-Scandinavian relations. In all other relationships, democratic conditions were weakened by 1934 (e.g. in Germany, Latvia, Estonia; Poland soon to follow) or never given a chance to develop (Russia). Responsiveness between the states was low, military action was on the rise, and no common institutions were in existence,

within the existing frameworks of cooperation. This means that the communitality of values (democracy) as well as responsiveness and new forms of behaviour are clearly visible. Institutions, such as the OECD, might be useful for handling economic relations. Responsiveness contributes to predictability and confidence.

Of the twelve relationships described, in 1994, three are in security communities, and are likely to remain so in the future. Another four show positive developments. These relations are described as "emerging" in Table 8. This label is chosen from the expectation that democratic conditions are durable, and that a gradual learning process in responsiveness and new behaviour is taking place. Organisational frameworks may be developing as well.

### 7.3 The five difficult pairs

For five pairs the future is uncertain, due to the existence of ethnic, border or other disputes, as well as internal developments (notably the stability of democratic institutions). These five relationships involve the three largest countries of the Baltic Region, i.e. Russia, Germany and Poland. A disturbing factor is that Russia and Germany have the highest defence expenditures in the re-

gion. For Russia there is uncertainty in four relations. The basic reason is the prospects for the stability of democratic institutions. Russia is the country most recent-democratised. The elections in December 1993 can be seen as a landmark in this development. Stabilisation of democratic institutions, increased responsiveness and participation in international institution-building might be important for the emergence of a security community in Russia's relations.

We also note uncertainty in Germany's relation with Russia. Considerable efforts are being made to stabilise these relations. As Germany shows positive developments in most other relations, the possibilities of a spillover might be considerable. The potential, at least, is there. For Poland, we note uncertainty in relations with Russia, as well as with one Baltic country, Lithuania. In both these relations, the short history of democracy is one factor. Also war experiences make responsiveness particularly important for the future.

In none of the relationships is there an expectation of war in the near future. The conclusive picture of the region shows that it finds itself in a dynamic phase where many possibilities exist. It is for the public debate, civil society and political leaders within and outside the region to realize the possibilities and grasp the opportunities at hand.

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