Discursive Identity Construction in Populism

A Case Study on Fidesz and PiS

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1. Introduction

During the last two decades, different forms of populist parties have gained ground in nearly all European countries (Kaltwasser et al., 2017). Two of these countries are Hungary and Poland, which will constitute the study objects of this thesis. The Polish Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the Hungarian Hungarian Civic Alliance (Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz) are unique cases of European right-wing populist parties due to their strong governmental position. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz has governed since they won the election of 2010 with 52% of the votes, giving them a supermajority of more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats (Csigó and Merkovity, 2016, p. 299). In Poland, PiS won an absolute majority of the parliamentary seats in the 2015 election by winning only 37.5% of the votes (Adekoya, 2017; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018, p. 277). Both PiS and Fidesz, as the only right-wing populist parties in Europe, thus have their own majority in the parliament.

Poland and Hungary are often seen to be developing in a similar direction, and are frequently paired and described as similar (ex. Bugaric and Kuhelj, 2018; Grzymala-Busse, 2017; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018; Rohac, 2018). Both Fidesz and PiS began their journey as a mainstream party, but began to radicalise in the early 2000s. Eventually, both parties outflanked the parties previously situated to the right of them, and ultimately largely absorbed them (Stanley, 2017, pp. 147–148). Moreover, both PiS and Fidesz have implemented reforms accused of challenging the independence of the judiciary and the status of civil society organisations, and hence eroding liberal democracy (Rohac, 2018). Poland and Hungary have consequently gone from role models of democratization to forerunners of authoritarianism in the region (Hanley and Vachudova, 2018, p. 276).

Despite its recent upswing, populism is not a new phenomenon, but has been referred to since the 19th century. It stems from the idea of the sovereign people, which legitimizes and stands above the government (Kaltwasser et al., 2017, pp. 2–4). Today, many scholars agree that right-wing populism poses a significant threat to liberal democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1670; Rummens, 2017, p. 555). It is hence important to enhance our understanding of the phenomenon, as well as the processes in which it affects liberal democracy. In today’s definitions of populism, the antagonistic relationship between the People and the Other is central. The People is described as a single, homogenous group with a shared common interest, which the populist actor attempts to obey. This group is put in contrast to a dangerous Other,
which can take multiple forms. Despite the significant role of social identities in populism, there
has been limited research on how these identities are formed, and even less empirical
application of identity theories on populist actors and discourses (Enyedi, 2016; Lugosi, 2018;
Panizza, 2017; Wodak, 2015). An enhanced understanding of how social identities are
constructed can therefore inform our understanding of populism, how it functions and why it
gains ground.

In this thesis, I will analyse the discourses of Polish PiS and Hungarian Fidesz. The aim is to
reconstruct the identities of the Self and the Other found in the two discourses, as well as to
analyse the discursive processes in which these identities are created. The Self is conceptualized
as the Hungarian and Polish nation, respectively, and the Other is conceptualized as the West.
This thesis aims to answer the question:

What does the identities of the Self and the Other look like in the discourses used by PiS and
Fidesz, and how are they discursively created?

The purpose of the thesis is hence to contribute to our empirical knowledge of Hungarian and
Polish right-wing populism in government, and thereby contribute to the larger field of
populism. In order to do this, I will conduct a discourse analysis using political speeches,
statements and other official material generated by PiS and Fidesz as material. The analytical
framework will build primarily on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), but will draw on
Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis (PDA) as well. Furthermore, the analytical framework is
inspired both by traditional populism research and by identity theories found in adjacent fields,
mainly Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Discourse Analysis (DA) and security studies.

2. Theory
In this section, I will provide a theoretical background of the field of populism and other identity
theories focusing on the construction of the Self and the Other. I aim to illustrate the significant
role identity creation have in the conceptualization of populism, as well as the potential to draw
on theories on identity construction from adjacent research fields. Firstly, I will describe the
existing conceptualizations and theories of populism. Secondly, I will review earlier research
on populism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), focusing on Hungary and Poland. Thirdly,
I will outline how the more general populist field have theorised the role of identity. Lastly, I
will describe how theories on identity construction from adjacent fields can contribute to a deeper conceptualization of identity creation in populist discourse.

2.1. Populism Defined
As the populist phenomenon has spread empirically, it has received growing attention academically. However, this growing body of research is fragmented (Kaltwasser et al., 2017, p. 1). Populism as a concept has been defined in various ways, sometimes not defined at all, and sometimes deemed unusable due to the difficulties to define it. It has been defined as an ideology, a strategy, a political discourse, a movement and a communication style. Multiple academic fields have engaged with the phenomenon, including history, political science and sociology (Mudde, 2017a, p. 27). Furthermore, populism usually has a distinct negative label in the European context, while it in the South American context is considered a much more positive phenomenon and understood as a democratizing and equalizing movement (Ostiguy, 2017, pp. 73-74). The fragmented research is partly due to the fact that many scholars entering the field start from scratch, finding the existing research unwieldy. However, there have been calls from prominent scholars to build on the existing research and to connect the different areas of the field (Kaltwasser et al., 2017, p. 1; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018). In this section, I will outline the main conceptualizations and theories of populism in order to provide a background and illustrate the importance of the dichotomy of the Self and the Other in populism theories.

2.1.1. Theoretical Approaches to Populism
Wodak (2015, pp. 25–26) describes three central concepts in the scholarly debate. The first is the notion of the People, as a central community in the Homeland, which is the second concept. Thirdly, this Homeland with the pure People is juxtaposed against an antagonistic Other, consisting of for example the elites, minority groups or immigrants. Lastly, there is a distancing dynamic between the People, the Elites and the Other, and these elements gain substance through their antagonistic relationships. Wodak herself defines populism as a “political ideology that rejects existing political consensus and usually combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism”. It separates the pure People from the corrupt Elite in a Manichean world view, where their politics are seen as the expression of the general will (Wodak, 2015, pp. 7–8).

In her definition, Wodak draws on Mudde’s (2017a) Ideational Approach, one of the most prominent in the field. Here, populism is seen as a “thin” ideology, which compared to the
traditional “thick” ideologies lack full-range political socio-economic frameworks. Instead, they have a more limited scope of ideas (Mudde, 2017a, p. 30). However, populist parties usually combine populism with other, more “thick” ideologies such as conservatism, socialism or nationalism (Mudde, 2017b, pp. 36-37). In its core, populism according to the ideational approach is defined as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 534). The division between the elite and the people is here based on moral, compared to for example socialism where the division is based on class (Mudde, 2017a, pp. 29–30). The People are “pure” and “authentic” while the Elite is “corrupt” and “unauthentic” (Mudde, 2017a, pp. 29–30). Exactly how the People is defined differs, but is based on self-perception and self-idealization. If populism is combined with an additional ideology, that theory can contribute to the definition. Hence, a socialist populist may put extra emphasis on class while a nationalist populist may stress elements of the nation (Mudde, 2017a, p. 32). In this way, the People is portrayed as a homogenous group with shared interests, from which the common good and the general will can be derived. Hence, populist politicians can claim to honour the general will despite ignoring the preferences of large groups in the society, and to be the true voice of the people in comparison to the “lying” elite. The proposals put forth are often portrayed as common sense and as standing above party politics. The oppositions politics is on the other hand described as special interest politics, lacking consideration and relevance for the people (Mudde, 2017b, pp. 33-34).

Two other prominent approaches to populism are the Socio-Cultural Approach (Ostiguy, 2017) and the Political-Strategic Approach (Weyland, 2017). The Socio-Cultural Approach puts forth an additional axis to the traditional left-right axis, consisting of a divide between the “high” and the “low”, where populism is defined as the “flaunting of the low”. Low appeals means a “cruder, personalistic, culturally “nativist” and overall “less sublimated” way of being and doing politics.” (Ostiguy, 2017, p. 73). Political leaders articulate low appeals in a two-way political relationship with the social basis, which due to social-cultural and political-cultural historical reasons resonate with certain groups. Here, identity creation plays an important role (Ostiguy, 2017, pp. 73). Socio-cultural groups are given identities, which interact with political identities (Ostiguy, 2017, pp. 80–81). Furthermore, populist actors usually refer to a dangerous Other. The opposition is accused of “sweeping this Other under the rug” and hence betraying the People. Meanwhile, the populists, claiming to represent the truest of the People, bring this
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truth into the light, often in a quite aggressive and loud way (Ostiguy, 2017, pp. 76). The author claim this approach better fits populism in a global context than the ideational approach, since the focus on “purity” and “corruptness” is very Euro-centric (Ostiguy, 2017, pp. 91).

The Political-Strategic Approach (Weyland, 2017) instead puts focus on “personalistic leadership that rests on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large masses of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland, 2017, p. 48). The connection and communication between the populist politician and the masses is seen as a political strategy for gaining, concentrating and exercising power, both regarding public support and controlling the government. Like in the other approaches, populist actors are said to emphasise that they are simply following “the will of the People”. The populists usually create a direct identification with the People, and direct communication with them through media is important (Weyland, 2017, pp. 54–55, 58). Hence, this approach puts more weight on the communicative aspects of populism than the other approaches.

We can conclude from above that populism can be conceptualized and defined in various ways. The moral dichotomy and antagonistic relationship between the People and the Other is however a central element in all definitions. The populist actor identifies with the People and thus gain moral legitimization to govern.

2.1.2. Populism and Democracy – Corrective or Threat?

The relationship between populism and democracy is contested. Even though most scholars find populism and populist politicians to be a threat to democratic institutions, it could also be argued that populism in fact acts as a corrective to democracy. When discussing the relationship between populism and democracy, it is important to understand the difference between how populism and liberal democracy view the demos (the people). According to populism, the people is a homogenous group with a shared identity and a collective will. Liberal democracy, on the other hand, views the people as a group of equal individuals with “irreducible plurality”. The two different understandings of the people leads to two different understandings of the democratic process (Rummens, 2017, p. 554).

To some, populism is the purest form of democracy since it acts as a counterweight to elitist political groupings, strengthens political representation and promotes the inclusion of excluded groups (Kaltwasser, 2012, pp. 184–185, 189). Since populism views the demos as the true and
honest people, and they are the true representatives of the people, they have an exclusive moral right to express that general will. Liberal principles such as the rule of law, minority rights and the separation of powers are by populists often seen as hinders to the popular will, and is hence considered undemocratic (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1670; Müller, 2017, pp. 597–598; Rummens, 2017, p. 555). However, many argue that populism is a threat to democracy for this very reason; the majoritarian part of democracy cannot be separated from the liberal part which includes minority rights and checks and balances mechanisms. Furthermore, populism fails to recognize the democratic legitimacy of the democratic opposition, since it does not represent the “will of the true people” (Rummens, 2017, pp. 555–556, 561).

2.2. Earlier Research – Populism in CEE

Here, I will review the existing research conducted on populism in CEE, focusing on research conducted on Hungary and Poland. The literature is diverse and cover many issues. There are several articles and books with a descriptive focus, outlining populist actors today and historically. Other scholars focus on defining populism and developing ways to categorise populist actors. Furthermore, extensive research has been conducted on how populism relate to democratic decline and how illiberalism and nationalism shows in the ideology of populist parties. Finally, the role of media, communication and neoliberalism has also been examined, as well as the impact of the transition from communism on the rise of populism.

The larger part of the literature on populism in CEE is descriptive, concerning both the political arena and populist parties. Focus is put on the current situation as well as on the historical development of the parties (Havlík and Pinková, 2012; Jasiewicz, 2008; Murer, 2015). Furthermore, several scholars have attempted to categorise or define different types of populism found in CEE. One of the earlier categorisations, presented by Mudde (2000) distinguishes between agrarian, economic and political populism. Later, there have been studies showing that CEE populism can also be categorised according to if the populist appeals are inward or outward looking, i.e. if populist appeals are directed towards other parties or towards the own party and voters (Deegan-Krause and Haughton, 2009), or according to radical and centrist populism, i.e. if populism as an ideology is “thick” or “hollowed out” (Stanley, 2017).

Another theme in the literature is the connection between populism and communication. Aalberg et al. (2017) have conducted comparative case studies on the political communication
of European populist parties and the role of the media, assuming that their success largely stems from how they communicate and interact with the media. Here, populism is seen as a communicative style which central characteristics include a communicative construction of the people and references to anti-elitism and the exclusion of out-groups. Similarly, Szabó et al. (2018) have examined the position of radical-right media in Hungary and Romania, since its activities and stance can affect the discursive opportunities and reach of right-wing populist parties.

Furthermore, multiple scholars have examined CEE populism in relation to democratic decline. Scholars agree that populism pose a serious threat to liberal democracy and undermine democratic institutions, checks and balances and the rule of law, especially in Hungary and Poland (Bugaric, 2008; Bugaric and Kuhelj, 2018; Fomina and Kucharczyk, 2016; Grzymala-Busse, 2017; Murer, 2015). Bustikova and Guasti (2017) examines democratic decline in the Visegrád Four countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia). They conclude that Hungary is the only country out of the four which is on the brink of a full illiberal turn instead of simply a swerve, meaning that the key conditions, which include issues such as eroding independence of the judiciary, media and civil society as well as constitutional change, have occurred over at least two electoral cycles.

There have been attempts to explain the rise of populism in CEE. It has been argued to be a backlash against the liberal transition after the fall of communism, as well as against the political elite who led the transition (Stanley, 2017). When the region emerged from the Soviet sphere of influence and joined the EU (European Union), the public had high social and economic expectations which failed to materialize, resulting in a rise of the populist opposition (Laczó, 2018; Shields, 2015). It has also been suggested that salient ethnic minority parties have contributed to the success of populist parties, since it increases ethno-nationalistic divides within the state (Koev, 2015). Populisms connection with neoliberalism has also been examined. It is argued that neoliberalism is, despite earlier assumptions, very compatible with nationalism and populism (Shields, 2015; Weyland, 1999). Neoliberalism in Poland has further been found to contribute to an increase in vertical allegiance, i.e. to trade, ethnicity of religion, which complements the previous horizontal allegiances of class (Shields, 2015).

Discursive practises of identity creation in Hungary and Poland have received less attention. There have however been scholars studying parts of the area. Enyedi (2016) have analysed the
ideology and discourse of Jobbik and Fidesz to see how elitism is used and integrated into the populist appeal. He found that anti-elitism was only partially present in the discourse of the two parties, which both supported hierarchical state structures and the reduction of popular participation. This contradicts traditional definitions of populism, and is labelled by Enyadi as “paternalist populism”. Furthermore, Enyadi shows that the ideology of Jobbik and especially Fidesz show clear nationalistic elements, and the political community is based on ethno-cultural factors rather than citizenship. Lugosi (2018) have studied how Jobbik and Fidesz frame social welfare issues, categorising them after populism and nationalism. She concludes that both parties frame the issues mainly according to nationalist views, where social benefits are limited to those belonging to their view of the nation. Murer (2015) have traced the development of Jobbik to see how the party’s illiberal and nationalist rhetoric have changed and threaten the Hungarian democracy.

The perhaps greatest contribution to the field of populist identity creation comes from Wodak (2015). She has described how right-wing populist actors through communicative and discursive strategies can influence public debate and media to their own gain. Using examples from different European countries, she illustrates how nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric can legitimise an exclusionary agenda in populist politics. Furthermore, Wodak et al. (2009) have conducted an in-depth analysis of national identity creation in Austria. Here, the authors examine how national identity can be discursively created through creating national sameness and differentiating it from others.

Hence, we can see that populism studies of CEE have focused on a broad spectrum of issues. There have been contributions to the areas of identity creation and discursive practices, where Hungary have received more attention than Poland. The greatest contribution to this area is probably by Wodak and Wodak et al., though their primary focus has not always been CEE. Their theories will be developed further below. However, we can conclude from the literature review that identity creation in the discourses used by PiS and Fidesz is yet to be examined in depth, as well as the identity creation of the Other. Meanwhile, identity creation of the Self has been more carefully examined.
2.3. Populism and Identity Creation

In this section, I will outline theories on identity found in the more general populism literature. The section will cover the conceptualization of and relationship between the Self and the Other, as well as the common link between populism and nationalism.

2.3.1. The Self and the Other

As described above, a central notion to populism is the relationship between the People and an antagonistic Other. For right-wing populists, the People and the nation are deeply connected and together constitute what we can call the Self. Here, I will outline existing theories on the Self and the Other in populism.

Populist actors attempt to construct the People as a single, homogenous group, which is situated against an Other in an us vs. them logic (Panizza, 2017, pp. 409–410). The Other is often describes as the Elite in populist theories. In practice, however, the definition of both the Self and the Other is dependent on which ideologies populism is combined with. For example, right-wing populists which combine populism with nativism often excludes groups on the bases of ethnicity, which thus becomes part of the Other (Mudde, 2017a, p. 32). The Other is both a group against which the people can be defined against, and a threat to the identity of the People. The threat of the Other usually refers to the identity of the people; the People can never become its full self as long as it is threatened by the Other (Panizza, 2017, pp. 409–410). The Others are further used to construct fear and scapegoats on which various threats are blamed. The fear created is then used by populist political actors to simplify complex situations to a Manichean dichotomy and legitimize an exclusionary agenda in everyday politics (Wodak, 2015, pp. 1–5).

According to Panizza (2017, pp. 411–414), the identification is created through a process in which the populist leader and the people respond to each other and together create a shared identity. The populist leaders identify with the people, and adapt their rhetoric to fit the social context. The populist leaders “flaunt the low” and positions themselves outside of the establishment and closer to the people. Furthermore, the people are elevated to be the true sovereigns, and are promised a community where the Other is overthrown and the People rule as the only demos. Raising the people to be the true demos also leads to a moral justification of governing in their interest only, while excluding large parts of the population (Müller, 2017, pp. 596–597).
The fact that the Other is often equalised with the Elite has led to the idea that populist parties are incapable of governing, since they cannot protest against themselves and cannot be in government without suddenly belonging to the Elite which they oppose. However, populists can easily find scape-goats and enemies belonging to the Elite in other places than in their own government or even their own nation. The victimization of themselves could therefore continue while in government (Müller, 2017, pp. 596–597).

### 2.3.2. Populism and Nationalism

Populism and nationalism have long been closely related, both conceptually and empirically speaking. The two ideologies share the people and the nation-state as central components. However, it is important to remember that nationalism and populism are two separate concepts, which can be linked in various ways and to various degrees (Cleen, 2017, p. 342; Wodak, 2015, p. 47).

In the notion of nationalism, there is a sense of belonging to a community which differentiates itself from others through a shared culture, language and history. The nation is constructed largely through a clear opposition between the nation and other groups, an opposition which also informs the decision on membership to the nation. Like in populism, the People is a constructed object, here through nationalist discourses where the nation is the organising principle. It is hence an exclusionary practise which divides people into groups, where those belonging to the nation is the most important group and the other groups make up the non-nation group. Moreover, an important element of nationalism is the belief that the nation has a right to be sovereign and independent (Cleen, 2017, pp. 344–245; Wodak, 2015, pp. 76–77).

When populism and nationalism is combined, there can simultaneously be a down/up (populist) and in/out (nationalist) element to the definition of the People. Along these lines, it is common for populists to define the Other not only as the elite, but also as a non-national elite, for example the EU. The EU moreover fits the nationalist profile of the Other since it threatens the sovereignty and independence of the nation (Cleen, 2017, pp. 347–348). It should however be noted that the relationship to EU is often ambivalent among populist actors. Euroscepticism is often very strong, but the identity of being a European is simultaneously used when needed, for example to depict non-Europeans as the Other (Wodak, 2015, p. 54).
2.4. Theories of Identity Construction – The Self and the Other

In the above sections, we can see that the dichotomy of the Self and the Other is a defining element of populism, and that the role of these identities have been examined by several scholars. However, adjacent fields such as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (Campbell, 1992; Hopf, 1999; Weldes, 2011), security studies (Hansen, 2006) and Discourse Analysis (DA) (Wodak et al., 2009) have developed further theories on the discursive identity formation of the Self and the Other. These theories are difficult to entirely separate from the theories on the Self and the Other found in traditional populism literature, as they have inspired each other. However, theories from these adjacent fields have the potential to add to my analysis in several ways. In this section, I will outline relevant literature on identity formation from fields adjacent to populism research, focusing on the discursive construction and use of the Self and the Other. Wodak et al. (2009) are included since they do not necessary belong to traditional populist discourse but also to the field of DA. Furthermore, since the fields are often closely related I did not want to exclude authors belonging to a different field than that reviewed at the moment providing they describe similar theories.

2.4.1. Ontological Security

Political science has long focused on physical and material security as a primary goal of states. In the recent years, a new conceptualization of the security nations seek has grown, called ontological security (Dingott Alkopher, 2018; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2005). Ontological security refers to actors wanting to stabilise and feel secure in their identity, and experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in order to realize a sense of agency. Actors wish to create cognitive and behavioural certainty through the establishment of routines, primarily concerning relationships with other actors (Mitzen, 2006, pp. 341–343).

States seek both physical and ontological security, and these two ambitions can come into conflict with each other (Mitzen, 2006, pp. 341–343). Ontological security is relevant when studying conflicts between states, but also to understand domestic issues. If the stability of the collective identity is threatened, for example through immigration disturbing routines and bringing with it new identities, the situation can be framed as a security issue despite a lack of physical threats. The state can then respond either by adjusting its identity or by attempts to re-stabilise the old identity through discourses referring to a common history and culture (Dingott Alkopher, 2018, pp. 317–319).
To illustrate this phenomenon, there have been studies made on conflicts not driven by physical survival, but rather other motivations and desires that can be explained by ontological insecurity (Steele, 2005). Furthermore, Dingott Alkopher (2018) has studied how immigration has challenged the collective identities of the Visegrad Four countries, resulting in the securitization of their identities. The loss of control of boundaries was seen as a loss of control of basic state functions, and there was a feeling that the cultural identity and the national sovereignty of the countries were threatened. There was hence a destabilization of their ontological security. The situation was handled by the countries through a discursive renationalization of immigration policies, where nationalist discourse provided a sense of stability and security.

2.4.2. State Identity as a Social Construction

State identity is an important factor when it comes to how state interests and actions are shaped. Traditionally, most scholars have treated state identity as an objective, static factor. However, others have argued that state identity is constantly evolving and that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between actions, interest and identity (Vucetic, 2017, pp. 4–6). Today it is commonly believed that national identities are never static or naturally given. Rather, they are fluid, dynamic and constantly changing. Through discursive practises they are transformed and dismantled, produced and reproduced (Wodak, 2015, p. 70; Wodak et al., 2009, pp. 2–3). Hence, when speaking of a state, we contribute to creating its identity. Material facts are certainly real, but they are discursively articulated in certain ways that attribute meaning to them (Hansen, 2006, pp. 25, 32). State identity is thus constructed through social practises such as discourse and state-society dynamics, which eventually become implicit and taken for granted (Hopf, 1998).

The discursive process in which state identity is formed is constituted by processes of differentiation and linking between different groups, i.e. through relational difference (Hansen, 2006, p. 24). Government discourse creates various social objects and ascribes each object an identity and posits relationships between them. As a result, some objects are perceived as friendly, sophisticated allies and some are evil, barbarian enemies which constitutes fear and danger and should be considered as threats. Others may be much more vague and ambiguous. When a situation or problem is described and objects have been given identities and relationships, national identities and interests are created with them. The creation of national
identity and interests therefore does not follow the situation description, but are created simultaneously and embedded in the situation description (Weldes, 2011, pp. 320–323).

2.4.3. State Identity and Foreign Policy

State identity hence affects policies such as foreign policy, but foreign policy also affects state identity. The relationship is mutually constitutive rather than causal; identities are produced and reproduced by political actors using foreign policy discourses, while foreign policy decisions is simultaneously informed, enabled and constrained by identity (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006, pp. 25–26; Vucetic, 2017). With this understanding of the concept of foreign policy follows increasing difficulties with treating identity as a fixed variable. Instead, the process through which identity and foreign policy affect each other is given increasing weight, often with a discursive focus (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006; Wodak et al., 2009).

Rather than being pre-existing objects just waiting to be discovered by states, national identities and national interests are constructed by a common understanding of the world (Weldes, 2011, pp. 320–323). Similarly, states foreign policy is not an objective outcome of preferences and identities of a state given prior to the policy creation. Rather, it is a political performance in which identities and boundaries are produced and reproduced. Concepts such as *domestic* and *foreign* are not pre-existing, independent spheres, but created through foreign policy practices which both separates and join them (Campbell, 2011, pp. 90–93, 1992, p. 85).

Since policy and identity are constantly adjusted to fit each other in an ongoing discursive process, the presented world view and the national interests that follows will be seen as common sense, as if they objectively reflected reality. The legitimization of policies is therefore an interlinked process with the construction of national interests, since legitimacy follows logically from the process (Hansen, 2006, pp. 25–30; Weldes, 2011, pp. 342–343). Furthermore, the discursive process in which identities and foreign policies are produced and reproduced takes place within a social and political space that contains an already existing identity. This both limits and enables policy decisions since this pre-existing identity both need to be taken into consideration in the process and can be used to build on (Hansen, 2006, pp. 29–30).
2.4.4. The Role of the Other

Foreign policy can hence be seen as a performative practice which creates and differentiates a *domestic* and a *foreign*, or a Self and an Other. This difference is a prerequisite for identity. Foreign policy is a devise for states to interpret and articulate danger, and differentiates the Self from the Other through producing discourses of fear and danger. The concept of danger used in this process is not an objective one. Rather, it is interpreted, sometimes not even needing an event to provide the grounds for it (Campbell, 2011, pp. 90–92, 1992, pp. 2–3, 11–12). For problems to become security-issues, they need to be constructed as such within the political discourse (Hansen, 2006, pp. 33–34).

There is a constant fear of this “otherness”, and the sovereign power of the state is all that can protect the people from it and from becoming like them (Campbell, 2011, pp. 90–92). Besides legitimizing the state, the articulation of danger also contributes to identity construction. In order to situate a threat, a closed entity to which the threat is directed is needed; to know what “we” fear, we must know who “we” are (Campbell, 1992, p. 85; Hansen, 2006, pp. 33–34). When describing a Self and an Other in terms which are positively and negatively loaded, one not only separates the two, but also creates a moral space of inferior and superior entities (Campbell, 1992, p. 85).

There is not a consensus over how this Other looks. Campbell (2011, 1992) promotes an Other that are radically different from and constitutes a severe threat to the Self. Hansen (2006, p. 37) differs from Campbell in that she argues that the Other does not need to be a single, radical Other. Instead, she argues that there are degrees of Otherness. The radical other is an important part of foreign policy discourse, but that is only part of it. The identities of Others are situated in a more complex scheme of identities, where some are extreme but most have degrees of Otherness. We hence need to be able to examine the construction of the Self and the Other by assuming flexibility and allowing for degrees of Otherness. Moreover, though sounding contradictory, the Other can be seen as a threat based on its similarity with the Self. An example is the relationship of Russia and China, who both identified as models of socialism but in slightly different ways. Since there could only be one forerunner of socialism, the two countries began to drift apart and see each other as threats instead of allies (Hopf, 2012, p. 259).

Furthermore, not all threats need to be external. Threats can also be internal, and come from for example feminism, homosexuality or ethnic minorities (Campbell, 2011, pp. 93–94; Wodak,
In a similar manner can the Other be a temporal Other, for example an older version of the Self the state is afraid to return to (Hansen, 2006, p. 40). Here, an example is the theory put forth by Wæver (1996) that Europe’s main Other is Europe’s own past. The great transformations taking place after the Second World War was not motivated primarily in search of greatness or to protect Europe from an external enemy; it was to ensure that the future of Europe would not entail a repetition of its past.

2.5. Theorizing Populism and Identity Creation

Concluding the theory section, we can see that the definition of populism is fragmented and diverse. Multiple definitions and conceptualizations on populism can be found, and it is difficult to find consensus. However, one can identify common denominators in the conceptualizations of populism, the most prominent being an antagonistic relationship between the People and a dangerous Other (Mudde, 2017a; Ostiguy, 2017; Weyland, 2017; Wodak, 2015). These social objects are not merely representations of their physical characteristics, but are socially constructed.

Multiple scholars have examined the role of the Self and the Other in populism (Cleen, 2017; Mudde, 2017a; Müller, 2017; Panizza, 2017; Wodak, 2015). The construction of a homogenous People which are situated against a dangerous Other is discussed, as well as populisms relation to nationalism. Here, Wodak (2015) and Wodak et al. (Wodak et al., 2009) have contributed greatly. However, Wodak’s (2015) main focus is discursive and rhetoric strategies and the use of fear in exclusionary practices, rather than cohesive identities of a Self and an Other. Wodak et al. (2009) focus on the construction of a cohesive national identity, but places less emphasis on the construction of an Other. In CEE-literature, the ideology of Jobbik and Fidesz has been studied focusing on their use of elitism and nationalist or illiberal framing and rhetoric (Enyedi, 2016; Lugosi, 2018; Murer, 2015). Here, identity plays an important role since nationalism and elitism both rely greatly on social identity constructions as ideologies. However, these studies do not investigate the construction of the Self and the Other identities, but rather include identity since it is part of the concepts elitism and nationalism. Furthermore, these three studies all focus on Hungary and not Poland. Hence, there is still a need to study the construction of a cohesive Self and Other, as well as to study the construction of these identities in the Hungarian and Polish context.
In the analytical framework and analysis, I will draw greatly on earlier research on populism. However, fields adjacent to populism, mainly FPA, DA and security studies, have developed further theories on identity construction which can add to my analysis in several ways. Firstly, the concept of ontological security offers a way of thinking about why identity is important to uphold for states. Secondly, these theories elaborate on the social process in which state identity is discursively created. Thirdly, they offer models of how state identity is connected to state actions and foreign policy. Lastly, they further develop the concept of the Other, and offer flexibility in the forms this Other can take.

3. Methodology
In the theory section, I outlined relevant theories and reviewed earlier research on populism and identity creation. I argue that theories on identity creation from adjacent fields can add to the existing research on populism to constitute a good basis for studying identity creation in populism discourse. In this thesis, I will conduct case studies on the political discourses used by the Polish and Hungarian governing parties, PiS and Fidesz. I will reconstruct their political discourses, focusing on identity constructions, and identify similarities and differences between them. In this section, I will in further detail describe the research design and analytical framework used to conduct the study.

3.1. Discourse Analysis
In this thesis, I will use Discourse Analysis (DA) as the method to conduct the study. According to DA, the use of language is a performative practice. The discourse through which an object is comprehended forms a version of that object, thus contributing to its constitution. Discourses are hence not merely a way to understand the social world, it is also constitutive of it. Purely material facts exist, but are given meaning through the use of discourse (Bryman, 2012, pp. 528–529; Hansen, 2006, pp. 19–20). In the analysis, the method used is primarily Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). However, I will also draw on Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis (PDA).

3.1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis
CDA concerns the analysis of language text and discursive practises. It emphasises the relationship between language, power and ideology, drawing on Foucault's theories of
CDA centres on everyday communication, both written and spoken. The theory assumes a mutually constitutive relationship between social structures and discursive acts, where both shape and is shaped by the other (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 4; Wodak et al., 2009, p. 8). Through such discursive acts, social actors constitute objects, situations and identities as well as relationships between social groups (Wodak et al., 2009). In other words, discursive practices can be used to influence both the shape of different identities and the relationships between them, often with power relations playing a main role. Discourses are further used to produce and reproduce social conditions and power relations, as well as to reproduce, transform or legitimate the status quo. CDA can hence be a tool to study and reveal such ideological, cultural and social processes and reveal power relations hidden in discourse (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 25–26, 87; Machin and Mayr, 2012, pp. 4–5; Mullet, 2018, p. 119; Wodak et al., 2009, p. 8). Furthermore, CDA puts emphasis on the strategic use of ideas in discourse, and has put forth frameworks of rhetoric and discursive strategies which will be described in further detail below (Wodak, 2015; Wodak et al., 2009).

3.1.2. Poststructural Discourse Analysis

Related to CDA is PDA, in which the political construction of meaning and identities are given emphasis (Howarth and Griggs, 2012, p. 305). CDA and PDA share many similarities, such as the view of discourse and social reality as mutually constitutive (Howarth and Griggs, 2012, pp. 305–306). Language relies on our current understanding of problems and subjectivities, while these problems and subjectivities simultaneously are being formed by the use of language. Likewise, the discursive construction of state identity both affect and is affected by state action; the two are ontologically inseparable (Hansen, 2006, pp. 18–24). However, the two approaches differ in other aspects, such as in their view of what constitutes a discourse. PDA has a more extensive view of discourse in that it also includes social actions and political practices (Fairclough, 2013, p. 181).

The need to include PDA in this analysis is derived from the work of Hansen (2006), which places greater emphasis on the discursive linking and differentiation concerning social identities. According to Hansen (2006, pp. 18–24, 41–44), language constitute a social and political system of signs that through its combinations generate meaning and in this way construct identity and difference. In this way, identity is discursively created and meaning ascribed through discursive processes of linking and differentiation. The Self and the Other is
described using different terms, which are situated within a larger system. These identities are constantly changing. Descriptions can lose its meaning, terms can change meanings and discourses can become so established that they eventually are implicit.

By combining CDA and PDA, we can construct a methodological approach which emphasise the role of discursive practices in constituting the social reality. CDA provides a focus on power relations and the use of discursive and rhetoric strategies, while PDA contributes with theories of linking and differentiating which are vital in identity construction.

3.2. Identify the Self and the Other
As a first step in our analysis, we need to identify which shape the Self and the Other assumes in the two discourses, i.e. which Self and which Other I am analysing. As mentioned above, the main social object which constitutes the Self in populism discourses is the people, in which the identity of the nation is very important (Cleen, 2017; Mudde, 2017a; Ostiguy, 2017; Wodak, 2015). Hence, when analysing the Self, I will look for descriptions of the People and the nation, which together constitute the identities of Poland and Hungary.

The Other can take various forms and shapes, and there are usually more than one Other in one political discourse (Hansen, 2006; Hopf, 2012; Mudde, 2017a). Hence, it can be more difficult to determine the Other than the Self. When first commencing this analysis, I had four potential Others in mind: the EU, the West, Russia and immigrants. However, when analysing the material, I found that Russia was mentioned only briefly. Meanwhile, the EU, Europe and the West was spoken of much more often, and often used interchangeably. Immigrants were mentioned but usually not on their own. Rather, immigrants were used in the discourse of the EU and the West to describe the threat posed by EU. Hence, Russia and immigrants will not pose a specific Other in my analysis. Instead, the Other will be conceptualized through the EU, Europe and the West, which are used interchangeably and hence not distinguishable as specific Others. Furthermore, even though other “western” nations such as the USA are not mentioned by name, they could very well be included in concepts such as “the internationalists” (Orbán, 2018a). In the analysis, the Other will be therefore conceptualized as the West, although it should be kept in mind that this mainly refers to the institution of the EU but also includes other concepts such as Europe and the international west.
3.3. Analytical Framework

After identifying the Self and the Other, we need to outline an analytical framework, that is how we should study the text. CDA, which provides the basis for this analysis together with influences from PDA, is a flexible, diverse approach which does not contain one specific analytical framework (Mullet, 2018, pp. 117–118). Furthermore, discourse analysis can focus on numerous levels of the discourse. It can concern the use of semiotics and textual structure, the content of the text, textual consumption and production patterns and larger sociocultural practices (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 7, 9). In this thesis, focus will be on the content of text. It should however be noted that many scholars argue that discourses should be studied by combining different levels of analysis and different kind of material in order to grasp the bigger picture (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 4, 9; Hansen, 2006, pp. 49–51; Mullet, 2018). However, this was not possible within the scope of this thesis.

Below, I will develop the analytical framework used in the analysis. The analysis will, simply put, examine how identity is discursively constructed in the material. The aim is not to look only at how these identities are described, but also at the discursive process in which identities are produced and re-produced. In order to do this, the analytical framework described below will provide the basis for the analysis. The analytical framework draws on theories and frameworks introduced mainly by Hansen (2006), Wodak (2015; 2009) and Campbell (1992). The analytical framework outline discursive and rhetoric strategies which can be used in identity creation, mainly put forth by Wodak (2015). I will moreover draw on Hansen’s (2006) theories of discursive linking and differentiation of the Self and the Other, as well as the different discursive dimensions mentioned by Wodak (2009, p. 26) and described in more detail by Hansen (2006, pp. 41–44). Lastly, I will draw on the theories on identity creation described in the theory section, more specifically those on the shape of Otherness and the relationship between national identity and reforms. The analytical framework is meant to be adaptable to different geographical and political contexts, since it is not bound to a specific description of the identities but rather can adapt to different cultural and historical contexts.

3.3.1. Linking and Differentiation

When analysing how identity is discursively created, a basic component is to identify how the Self and the Other are described. This will be carried out through identifying terms describing these identities, as well as how these terms and the objects they describe relate to each other.
through sameness and difference (Hansen, 2006, pp. 41–42). When constructing this Self and Other, right-wing populists consequently construct similarities and differences between various groups, in order to present the nation as a culturally homogenous community and underline the clear distinction between the nation and other entities (Wodak, 2015, pp. 54–55; Wodak et al., 2009, p. 33). As Hansen (2006, pp. 41–42) describes it, “meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs” The Self is thus described using processes of linking, in which different terms describe the Self. These can then be differentiated against a different description of the Other. In my analysis, I will identify the terms used to describe the Self and the Other, reconstruct the identities and see how they relate to each other. Here, it is also important to notice opposites. For example, if the Self is described as civilised and respectful, the Other can be described as barbarian and disrespectful. To illustrate this, I will construct figures inspired by Hansen’s framework of linking and differentiation. The figure below exemplifies the construction of identities through linking and differentiating.

(Hansen, 2006, p. 18)

*Figure 1: Illustration of linking and differentiation.*

3.3.2. Discursive and Rhetoric Strategies

After Europe’s experience with totalitarianism in the 20th century, most populist right-wing politicians use a more subtle, coded version of earlier rhetoric. They refer to their ideologies as
common-sense and use different strategies to “justify the unjustifiable and speak the unspeakable” (Wodak, 2015, p. 46). We can hence not expect to find identities and ideology clearly articulated. Therefore, we need to look closer at the different strategies potentially used in identity creation.

The strategy of calculated ambivalence enables political actors to communicate different messages to different audiences at the same time (Wodak, 2015, pp. 62–63). For example, discriminatory statements tend to be coded into insinuations, inferences or presuppositions, which are understood only by a certain group. Further strategies include referring to a posed danger to the homogenous community in order to legitimise the exclusionary agenda, and describe the Self as unique and superior to distance itself from the Other (Wodak, 2015, pp. 50–55). Furthermore, it is common to attempt to shift blame and responsibility, including creating scape goats. Lastly, another strategy is to simplify issues though portraying them as black and white (Wodak et al., 2009, pp. 36–39).

An additional rhetorical device is body politics, which also connects to the gender coding of discourses and power relations. In body politics, political themes and groups such as the nation are described using the human body as a metaphor. Examples are to compare the head of state to a body’s head, or the national culture to the soul. Understanding social order as a healthy human body provides an opportunity to comprehend different groups as dangers to this body (Campbell, 1992, pp. 87–88). Right-wing populists often speak of the human body as a healthy, pure blooded, mother tongue-speaking, white male, who needs to be protected from outside deceases and parasites. The male body is a metaphor or source domain for the conservative family, with a protective father, nurturing mother and obeying children. The male body and the patriarchal family logic can in turn be transferred to the nation, where the “pure people” obey their father leader who protects them from outside threats and where women care for the children. Access to the nation is, like to the domain of the body and of the family, determined by blood, and those not fitting into the traditional family model (consisting of a married man and woman with children) are not welcomed into the community of the People either (Wodak, 2015, pp. 76–77, 151–153).

3.3.3. Dimensions

Identities are constructed across several dimensions, namely a spatial, temporal and ethical dimension (Hansen, 2006, pp. 46–51; Wodak et al., 2009, p. 26). Spatial identities involve the
construction of boundaries and the following division of space. This includes both countries and other geographical areas laden with political content, such as the Orient. Furthermore, the spatial division can also be between politically charged groups such as “terrorists” and “homosexuals”. Temporal identities, meanwhile, revolve around time and include descriptions of development, change and transformation. When used more subtly, temporal descriptions can take the form of words loaded with a temporal identity, such as primitive or tribal. Temporal construction of identity can refer to both the past, the present and the future. Finally, an ethical identity is created through a combination of ethics, morality and responsibility. This is normally framed as a responsibility of the state towards its citizens, which invests the state with the power to make authoritative and far-ranged decisions. However, this dimension can also involve a description of a (non)responsibility towards the Other, for example as an international responsibility to stop genocide. In discursive identity analysis, we hence need to trace the identity constructions of the Self and the Other in these three dimensions.

3.3.4. Shapes of Otherness
As described in the theory section, the Other can take various forms, shapes and degrees. The Other can be a radical threat accompanied by articulations of severe danger (Campbell, 1992), a more complex Other with various degrees of Otherness (Hansen, 2006), or even an identity very similar to the Self (Hopf, 2012). Moreover, the Other can take the form of different domestic groups (Campbell, 2011; Wodak, 2015) or even a temporal Other (Wæver, 1996). In our analysis, we hence need to be open to different kinds of Other. We should be wary of its shape and form as well of its relationship with the Self.

3.3.5. Identity and Policies
We have seen in the theory section that foreign policy and state identity have a mutually constitutive relationship (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006, pp. 25–26; Weldes, 2011). In the analysis, I search for a connection between identity construction and policies, including domestic ones. I hence wish to see if this mutually constitutive relationship can translate to the relationship between identity of the Self and the Other and reforms. Naturally, not all reforms will be able to connect to identity, but I will seek to identify if the more discussed reforms in Poland and Hungary have a connection with the identity of the Self and the Other. To do this, I will be attentive to if identity construction can be found in the same context as where a new reform is promoted, and if these reforms contain references to identity creation.
3.4. Selection of Cases

To answer my research question, I have chosen to conduct case studies. This is motivated by the fact that the issue being studied, identity creation in populist discourse, is difficult to separate from the context. It furthermore demands an analysis with a broad focus rather than an analysis focusing on a number of predetermined parameters (Yin, 2003, pp. 14–15).

I have chosen to analyse the discourses of Hungarian Fidesz and Polish PiS. The two parties are selected primarily due to their position as the only European populist parties governing alone. Their governmental position adds relevance to the findings for two reasons. Firstly, it indicates that the identity constructions found in their discourses are likely to be shared by a large share of the citizens. Secondly, the fact that the discourses of PiS and Fidesz are the discourses put forth by the official governments of Poland and Hungary means that they have large significance in the international community. The two parties need to relate to other international actors, and other international actors need to relate to them and their discourses. Furthermore, their governmental position indicates that there will be official material available to a larger extent than for smaller populist parties, as well as implemented reforms.

Though this study is not a comparative case study in the traditional sense, I have chosen to include two cases instead of one. This is also primarily due to them being the only cases of European populist parties governing alone. Furthermore, Poland and Hungary share a similar history and culture, and are often found in the same context regarding issues such as populism, eroding democracy and debate with the EU (Bustikova and Guasti, 2017; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018, p. 276; Rohac, 2018). The fact that Hungary and Poland are often described as similar provides a good basis for discussing potential similarities and differences in their respective identity creation. Moreover, including more than one case also has the potential to make the findings more robust if similarities are found (Yin, 2003, p. 19). Including two cases furthermore highlights the respective findings and provides a larger context to situate them in. Though not generalizable, the similarities and differences found between the two cases gives an indication of what might be generalizable and what might be specific for that particular case.

Originally, I planned to examine the identity creation of the own nation, the EU and Russia, since the two countries share many similarities but differ in their relationship with Russia.
However, I found that Russia is not mentioned much in the material. Though interesting in itself, the absence of Russia in the material made it more difficult to motivate my case selection.

It should be noted that not all scholars consider PiS and Fidesz to be populist parties. For example, Mudde (2017b, p. 28) does not include the parties as, here radical, populist right-wing parties due to their lack of nativism as a core ideological feature. Others have focused on the more unmitigated populist parties in their analysis, namely Hungarian Jobbik and Polish Self-Defence, and hence excluded Fidesz and PiS (Havlík and Pinková, 2012). However, it is common that scholars disagree on the categorisation of certain concepts. This may be especially true for the fragmented research area of populism, as already noticed by several scholars (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018).

3.5. Selection of Material
To conduct my analysis, I will examine political speeches, statements and other official documents by key political actors in PiS and Fidesz. I have chosen political speeches and statements as the basis for my analysis because they are accessible and open. Furthermore, speeches are delivered in order to achieve a political goal as well as to promote the political discourse of the actor preforming the speech. When selecting material, I have focused on texts dealing with general issues related to the Self and the Other. Furthermore, I have attempted to include texts concerning both domestic and international issues, to capture descriptions of both the Self and the Other. Hence, it should constitute suitable material for studying identity creation in political discourse. When selecting my material, I have aimed for the most updated material possible, preferable from the last year, in order to analyse current discourses. However, this has not always been possible.

When conducting a discourse analysis, texts of primary analytical relevance, in my case the political speeches and party programme, should preferably be situated within a larger context. This is because every text refers to other texts. They are entities locked within a large textual web, so called intertextuality (Hansen, 2006, pp. 49–51). Additionally, as mentioned above, more material can be of interest than simply text when analysing discourse (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 1–4). In accordance with this, it would have been interesting to include non-textual material in my analysis, such as focus groups, patterns of media use and sociocultural government activities such as inaugurations of monuments. Likewise, I would have wished to include
Hungarian and Polish background texts. However, due to the scope of this paper this was not possible.

An additional issue when selecting my material was my lack of pre-existing contextual knowledge and language skills. I do not speak Hungarian nor Polish, which hindered my material selection. Meanwhile, my limited contextual knowledge, such as cultural and historical background of the countries, most likely made me miss references and metaphors. This is of course problematic, but it is not reasonable to limit ourselves to study only our own context. Attempting to keep my observations objective and not interpret the material in ways I am uncertain of, I believe my findings still hold despite my lack of contextual knowledge.

3.5.1. Hungary

In Hungary, Viktor Orbán is the main political actor. He is both the prime minister and the party leader of Fidesz. Many of his speeches are translated and uploaded to the government website for public access. Hence, there is a wide selection of material to choose from. I find no reason to believe the translation is lacking or that certain opinions have been downplayed compared to the original speech. Orbán and Fidesz are very confident in their opinions and I have not seen any indications that they wish to hide parts of their discourse to the international audience.

When selecting my material for the analysis, I limited myself to the period of May to October. May was chosen because it was the month when the new government was formed and thus the start of a new term. October was the last month before the start of this analysis. Furthermore, I only chose speeches, and not press conferences and shorter statements. Neither did I select any speeches from non-political contexts, for example at inaugurations of sports arenas. Instead, I chose the speeches which were held in a political, general context, for example at the formation of the new government. This was mainly because I believed the political speeches held with a general focus would provide me with a broader picture and include different aspects of the identity construction. It should be noted that I also included the “State of the Nation” speech from February 2018, even though it does not fall in the chosen time period. This is because it is a very important and comprehensive speech which sets the tone for the Orbán presidency. The final material for the analysis consist of seven speeches consisting of approximately 24 pages of text combined.
3.5.2. Poland

In Poland, the situation is more complicated. The head of PiS, and according to many the de facto leader of Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński, is this electoral term Keeping in the background and is making very few public appearances. Speculations are spreading regarding his health (Davis, 2018). However, Kaczyński still holds a major decisive role in the party (Santora and Berendt, 2018). Instead, Andrzej Duda, who was previously quite unknown, was chosen to be the Polish president for this term. He is seen as a moderate conservative and has already vetoed an attempt by PiS to reform the judiciary (Santora and Berendt, 2018). It is however not clear how independent Duda is and how much he follows the orders of Kaczyński and the party. It could very well be a conscious decision by PiS to have a more moderate politician as president to play down the party’s radical side. If true, it is an interesting strategic choice by PiS and could be due to the fact that PiS faces a stronger opposition than for example Fidesz does. Moreover, this could very well affect the findings of my analysis since the discourse of Duda may be different than the general discourse of PiS.

Besides difficulties deciding which political actor should be the main focus of my analysis of PiS discourse, speeches held by both Duda and Kaczyński are hard to find translated. The government have uploaded speeches held by Duda on their official website, but only in the original language. This means that the only speeches available in full in English are those originally given in English, usually in international contexts such as the UN. This poses a problem since it could very well be the case that a different discourse is used towards the international audience than towards the Polish people. However, I have also found trustworthy translations of the PiS party program and speeches originally delivered in polish which I use.

In my analysis, I will use five speeches held by Duda from the period of May to October. Furthermore, I use three translated speeches held by Kaczyński in 2015 and 2016, as well as one TV interview with Kaczyński from 2015 and parts of the PiS party program from 2014. I have also used six relevant (i.e. contains some kind of general identity construction of at least one of the identities I look for) translated quotes from statements and speeches held by Duda from May to October found on the official President website. The translations are hence done by the Polish government and should therefore mirror the meaning in the original texts. This group of texts also contains the proposed questions for the planned constitutional referendum, in order to see which issues are important and how they are described. These translated quotes and the referendum are published from May to October. Furthermore, I have used three articles
containing translated quotes from Kaczyński, from July 2017 to September. I have hence chosen to include different kinds of texts from different actors. Both Duda and Kaczyński have been included since it is not clear who is the main actor in the party or the government, and I hence thought it better to include both. Furthermore, I have included different kinds of text since I thought it better to have a sufficient amount of material than a strict selection limit.

3.6. Validity and Reliability

Reliability refers to the replicability of the study, i.e. if a different researcher who replicated the study would reach the same results. In interpretivist studies, it is difficult for the researcher to remain entirely objective and hence reach a completely objective result (Bryman, 2012, p. 390). CDA scholars such as Mullet (2018, p. 120) have even argued that interpretivist research cannot be objective and we should acknowledge that instead of trying to be objective. However, we must be aware of our subjectivity and be transparent. I have been aware that my background affects my interpretation of and ability to understand textual references and metaphors. If a researcher with better knowledge of the context, for example a Hungarian or Polish researcher, had conducted the same study, it is very possible they would reach different results than I have been able to. Hopefully though, their results would simply be “more complete”, and the analysis deeper rather than different.

Regarding the external validity of this study, i.e. the generalization of the results, the result from the case studies is not generalizable to other contexts. The general findings on identity creation in Hungary and Poland may be valid for other countries as well, but that is not necessarily the case and hence need to be examined and potentially confirmed through further studies. However, the methodological framework proposed in this thesis is transferable to other cases.

4. Analysis

In the analysis, I will analyse the identity construction of the Self and the Other as put forth in the discourses used by PiS and Fidesz. The analysis will be based on the analytical framework outlined above. I will analyse the discourses one by one, and conclude with a discussion on potential similarities and differences.
4.1. The Fidesz Discourse

In this section, I will analyse the descriptions of the identity of Hungary and the West (where the West, as described in the methodology section, includes different actors such as the EU and Western Europe) found in the Fidesz material, as well as the discursive processes in which they were formed. Below, I will outline the main themes and aspects of the Self and Other identity from the Fidesz discourse, as well as analyse the discursive process according to the above outlined analytical framework.

4.1.1. The Hungarians – A Unique Species of Homo Sapiens

In the Fidesz discourse, the Hungarian people are described as a “unique species” of Homo Sapiens, with a unique language and culture (Orbán, 2018b). According to Orbán, the members of the government, including himself, believe that “the greatest thing in our lives is that we were born Hungarian” (Orbán, 2018c). Hungarians are described as courageous, strong, and values work, the family and the homeland above all else. The possibility that Hungarians would go extinct is a terrifying thought, and the government should take actions needed to prevent this. Hungarians, it is said, only have a future if they remain Hungarian and “cultivate the Hungarian language, defend our Christian and Hungarian culture, and preserve independence and Hungarian freedom.” (Orbán, 2018a). Here, we can see that the Hungarians are described as a unique people, with a unique way of life. This uniqueness contributes to legitimizing their existence. This is further demonstrated by the statement that “the Hungarians have given more to the world than they have taken from it.” (Orbán, 2018b), which indicates a moral legitimization of the Hungarians existence.

According to the Fidesz discourse, the Hungarian statehood has rested on Christian foundations for one thousand years and counting. Today, Fidesz is a national-Christian government and the Hungarians are Christian people with a Christian culture. Therefore, the ways of life which have sprung from Christianity, that is human dignity, the family, faith communities and the nation, must be protected against threats. As Orbán describes it, speaking of the role of the government in relation to immigration, “If all this is reduced to the interests of a minority, then it will simultaneously mean the end of Europe and the loss of one thousand years of Hungarian statehood.” (Orbán, 2018c). Here, one can identify how the discourse excludes minorities from the “true people”, and legitimizes their priority of the Christian culture over minority rights by referring to Hungary’s history of Christianity.
4.1.2. Threats Against Hungary – Low Birth Rates and Immigration

The discourse identifies a number of clear threats to the Hungarian people and their way of life, both physical and cultural. The physical extinction is a possibility due to low birth-rates, which has pushed the government to pursue family-centred policies. The described goal is to increase childbirth, and thus stop the demographic decline and guarantee the survival of the Hungarians. In accordance with this, marriage and traditional families are described to form the unifying backbone of the country. Here, we can see how identity creation and policies are interlinked; the identity of the Hungarians as unique demands that they reproduce in order to not go extinct, which need to be guaranteed through family policies. Furthermore, the great emphasis on the traditional families with many children is a strategic use of body politics. The traditional family can, as described in the methodology, be seen as a metaphor for the ordered, traditional society where there is only room for traditional roles. The threat of cultural extinction, on the other hand, is depicted as a possibility mainly due to immigration and European cultural unification. Both these aspects are blamed on the EU, since they are seen as the ones pushing this agenda.

In the Fidesz discourse, immigrants are often equated with Muslims and described in very negative and quantifiable terms. If immigration is allowed, it is said, the result will be a transformation of Europe and the demise of Christian values and culture. Muslims will be in a majority and “our culture, our identity and our nations as we know them will cease to exist.” (Orbán, 2018a). Europe will be occupied without knowing it, and Orbán asks if civilizations can commit suicide (Orbán, 2018a). Those who are pro-immigration also wish to make Europe into an empire. They seek to “replace the European Union of nation states with a multicultural empire of mixed populations, smoothed into a unity: a Europe without nation states; an elite separated from its national roots; an alliance with multinational power groups; a coalition with financial speculators.” (Orbán, 2018d). In order to achieve this, they have, according to the Fidesz discourse, deliberately failed to protect Europe against immigrants. The Islamic threat will consequently come knocking on the door from the West as well as from the South. This European elite moreover tries to convince Hungary and other nations that they will profit from immigration in terms of economic growth. Orbán, however, likened this with “saying that a flu epidemic is a good thing.” (Orbán, 2018a). Hence, immigrants are seen as a threat to the European people, culture and values. It is however through the EU that this threat becomes real, since it is the EU who force migrant quotas on Hungary. Consequently, the upcoming EU
election should be “about a great, important, common European issue: the issue of immigration, and the future related to it” (Orbán, 2018e).

Immigration is hence a great threat according to the Fidesz discourse. The description of it involves the use of both the temporal and ethical dimension. The temporal dimension is used through the common referral to a transformation or demise of the society, and a dystopic picture of the future. Furthermore, the reference to an immigrant occupation is easy to relate back to the, in the discourse often mentioned, occupations by Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The ethical dimension is illustrated through the use of values in the discourse, such as the importance of Christian values and culture. Moreover, the Hungarian government is described to have a responsibility towards the Hungarian people to defend them against the EU and the immigration that follows. Furthermore, the comparison of immigration to a flu epidemic is a clear use of body politics, where immigration threatens the healthy, pure society of today. It is also worth noticing the description of immigration as an important, common European issue. This indicates that immigration is seen as a threat to all European countries, and not only Hungary. The Fidesz discourse thus attempts to portray the issue as above party politics, or even above national politics, and to be seen as a common, European issue.

4.1.3. Defend our Borders – Finally Independence

Since the Hungarian nation is depicted to be deeply vulnerable to international threats, the government stresses the right to defend the Hungarian borders. No one but the Hungarians will decide who they will and will not live alongside. While “public security in Europe has deteriorated”, Hungary has taken action and “proved that it is able to defend its borders.” (Orbán, 2018f). The right to border control is in the discourse closely related to the notion of sovereignty, another concept which is deeply rooted in the Fidesz discourse. The audience is reminded that Hungary during the occupations by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as during the time under Soviet influence, lacked sovereignty and thus the right to defend its own borders. Therefore, a free and sovereign Hungary is described as being of utter importance, and the Hungarian people are seen to have sacrificed a lot to obtain it. The Hungarian sovereignty is perceived as a prerequisite for being able to decide over the country’s fate, so as to never being forced to “deliver the fate of the country into the hands of the internationalists.” (Orbán, 2018a). Ensuring this is however a struggle, since the EU “want the keys to the gates.”
According to the discourse, the struggle for sovereignty includes ensuring that there is a Hungarian owned banking system and a Hungarian owned media.

The importance of sovereignty is hence a defining element in the identity description of the Hungarian nation in the Fidesz discourse. It is used to demonstrate the threat posed by the EU and the irreconcilability of the EU with the Hungarian identity. Furthermore, a Hungarian owned banking system and media is portrayed as a prerequisite for this sovereignty. It is not explicit in the material if “Hungarian owned” refers to owned by Hungarian companies or owned by the Hungarian government. However, the government have previously implemented reforms giving them large control over the national media (“Hungary,” 2015), and this could be an attempt to justify that policy.

An additional occurring theme in the discourse, connected to the notion of sovereignty, is the historical victimization of Hungary. It is described that Hungary after the first World War lost two-thirds of their territory in the Treaty of Trianon, along with the millions of Hungarians who lived in these areas. During the second World War they were occupied twice, only to be, as Orbán phrase it, “sold off” (Orbán, 2018d) by the west into the Soviet Union sphere of influence at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Despite this, it is described, they remained European. The communist oppression lasted until 1989, threatening Hungary with “cultural annihilation” (Orbán, 2018d). In 1956, Hungarians felt the time was right to revolt against the communist regime. According to the Fidesz discourse, they were urged on by the west, and promised assistance which never came. Instead, the Hungarians were “abandoned to our fate.” (Orbán, 2018d). Even though the attempt failed, the revolution of 1956 is still used to illustrate the courage, heroism and greatness on Hungarians.

Here, we can see that temporal identities are used to link the present Self to the former Self, in order to show how its history have contributed to its identity. Furthermore, the existence of the Self and its anger against the Other gains legitimacy from the experiences of the former Self in relation to the former Other. Furthermore, the millions of Hungarians lost in the Treaty of Trianon are now being welcomed back. Many of them no longer have Hungarian citizenship, but the Hungarian government has made it easier for them to become Hungarian citizens and have hence extended their definition of what it is to be a Hungarian citizen. Orbán describes that “I can express what we’ve done as transforming the process of unifying the nation into a process of nation building.” (Orbán, 2018e). Here, there is both an illustration of the spatial
dimension through the grievance of the lost Hungarian territory, and an actual redefinition of who is defined as a Hungarian citizen. The reform can hence be seen as interconnected with the discursive identity construction.

4.1.4. The West – Liberal Elitists

When Hungary finally became free from the oppression in its past, they thought they could return home to Christian Europe. Now, however, they find that Europe is again endangered, but this time not by external military threats but through its own doing. Europe has undergone a shift:

"In Christian Europe there was honour in work, man had dignity, men and women were equal, the family was the basis of the nation, the nation was the basis of Europe, and states guaranteed security. In today's open-society Europe there are no borders; European people can be readily replaced with immigrants; the family has been transformed into an optional, fluid form of cohabitation; the nation, national identity and national pride are seen as negative and obsolete notions; and the state no longer guarantees security in Europe. In fact, in liberal Europe being European means nothing at all: it has no direction, and it is simply form devoid of content.” (Orbán, 2018e)

It is described how Europe in the past was a great, Christian community of sovereign nations which dared to think and act. Today, however, Europe has been transformed by a liberal elite which censors uncomfortable facts and opinions. Europe should be a homeland of nations, where Europeans “are born the sons and daughters of nations.” (Orbán, 2018d). This dynamic is according to the discourse what made Europe so strong and great. Now, however, Europe has turned into a melting pot, and imperialistic ideas are taking over. It is claimed that the larger nations tried to make the Hungarians into their subjects when Hungary joined the EU. They did not know, however, that Hungarians could “smell out imperial designs from afar,” (Orbán, 2018d). “Brussels today is ruled by those who want to replace an alliance of free nations with a European empire: a European empire led not by the elected leaders of nations, but by Brussels bureaucrats.” (Orbán, 2018d). This will destroy Europe, and Fidesz proclaim they will not let that happen.

The observed recent increase in the international standing of Hungary is seen to be a result of their ability for straight-talking. In Budapest, they say what they think and do what they say.
This is put in sharp contrast against the liberal west, where political correctness, “Eurobabble” and liberal grandstanding is the name of the game. The liberal Europe of today is one of forced coalitions where liberal media dictates. Hungary has however “sent the muzzle back to Brussels and the dog lead to the IMF” (Orbán, 2018a). The fact that the EU does not let Hungary decide for themselves on issues such as border control is seen as outrageous. The Sargentini report was called blackmail and an abuse of power, and the EU is seen as denying the Hungarian people the right to decide for themselves and make their own judgement. According to the Fidesz discourse, this is part of the international liberal elite’s “plan for European population replacement, in the hope that they can thereby weaken nation states and parties based on Christian foundations, and then take control of the European Union – and with it the nations of Europe.” (Orbán, 2018f).

As illustrated here, the notion of Europe is given various forms and assumes various temporal identities in the Fidesz discourse. The Self, Hungary, is part of the old, Christian Europe of nation states. The new, transformed Europe, however, is part of the Western Other and represent the demise of former Europe. This is a clear use of temporal identities, where the former Europe, in which Hungary belongs, is pitted against the new Europe, which Hungary no longer identifies with. The new Europe further threatens the remains of the former Europe and Hungary with extinction. Moreover, Europe was formerly seen as the future of Hungary. Now, however, Hungary has surpassed Europe and declared itself the future of Europe: “In 1990 Europe was still our future; but today we are Europe’s future.” (Orbán, 2018c). Furthermore, the lack of clear separation between the identity of Europe and the identity of the EU indicates that Europe means something else than simply the institution of EU, or the geographical location of the European states. It also has a historical, moral and cultural dimension. This further demonstrates the use of Europe as an ethical identity, especially the former Europe which entails additional culture and values. Moreover, the ethical dimension is shown through the accusations against the EU of their abuse of power.

4.1.5. George Soros – Leader of the Evil

The man embodying the demise of the liberal world is George Soros, a Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist. He is both referred to directly and indirectly. An example is the mentioning of a new, terrible “open society” of Europe, which is a reference to Soros’s Open Society Foundations, an organization dedicated to promoting democracy.
George Soros and his “network” are ascribed great plans. According to the Fidesz discourse, they seek to transform Europe and steer it towards a post-Christian and post-national era, the so-called Soros Plan. Soros’s network promote immigration since immigrants are easier for them to “work with” than the patriotic, brave Hungarians who will do anything for their country. Orbán describes how “one of the Soros network’s chief ideologues, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, recently let slip that some years ago they secretly launched a programme to breed a Soros-like human race, or, as they modestly put it – if I can pronounce the term – Homo sorosensus. This means “Soros man”.” (Orbán, 2018a). Furthermore, the Soros network wish to deteriorate Europe as they “see the business opportunities inherent in the weakening of the euro.” (Orbán, 2018a).

The Fidesz discourse hence use an actual person to illustrate the threat of democracy, immigration and globalisation. This is a clear use of body politics. Furthermore, the discourse describes how the “Soros network” wish to create a new species, “Homo sorosensus”, which can be put in contrast with the description of Hungarians as a unique species as mentioned above. Hence, the new “species” of George Soros threatens the “Hungarian species”, and therefore need to be stopped.

According to Orbán, the fact that Soros and his men are still allowed to live among them safely is proof of the Hungarians generosity and tolerance. However, they need to be stopped. One precaution in this fight is the “Stop Soros” legislative proposal, which includes financial screenings of funding to “pro-migrant NGOs, or pseudo-civil society organisations” (Orbán, 2018a), and diverting part of such funding to the border protection budget. In reality, however, this legislation essentially criminalize aid to illegal immigrants and means that NGOs can be fined (“Hungary passes anti-immigrant ‘Stop Soros’ laws,” 2018). The legislation is framed, as hinted by its name, to restore order and fight the threatening global elite of George Soros.

4.1.6. Illiberal Democracy – A New Era

Orbán claims that the liberal elite in Europe has failed, and therefore need to be replaced with a Christian democratic elite. The essence of democracy is said to have disappeared from liberal democracy, and left is liberal non-democracy. Meanwhile, Christian democracy is described as illiberal. It stands for illiberal concepts such as Christian culture rather than the liberal multiculturalism, anti-immigration rather than pro-immigration, and the Christian family model rather than adaptable family models. Now, Orbán claims, is the time for the liberal elite of ’68
to be removed and replaced. The new elite is comprised of the anti-communist generation of the ‘90s, which has Christian convictions and commitment to the nation. Here, it is interesting to note that the change is phrased as a replacement of the old elite with a new one, rather than removing it. This is not in accordance with the traditional understanding of populism as anti-elitist. Furthermore, the two elites are given identities by connecting them to two different historical events. The ‘68 movement and the anti-communist movement of the ‘90s already carry meaning, which is now transferred to the two elite groups.

As stated above, the era of liberal democracy is portrayed as having come to an end. In the Fidesz discourse, this is said to have been revealed largely during the financial crisis of 2008. A new era or world order was simultaneously launched, in which new lead players and values was formed and Christian democracy given the lead. The two-thirds parliamentary majority Fidesz won in the 2010 election is seen as a proof of mandate for them to build this new era, including “a new constitutional order based on national and Christian foundations.” (Orbán, 2018e). An era, however, is more than just a political system. It is “a spiritual order, a kind of prevailing mood, perhaps even taste – a form of attitude”, and “is determined by cultural trends, collective beliefs and social customs.” (Orbán, 2018e). The new era is hence as much cultural as it is political, and includes ethical descriptions.
4.1.7. Conclusion – Hungary and the West in the Fidesz Discourse

As illustrated by the figure, there are clear strategies of linking and differentiation used in the Fidesz discourse to form a coherent Hungary and differentiate itself from the West. Hungary is portrayed as a Christian nation, with a unique people, culture and language. Hungarians are a brave and honest people, who value the sovereignty and well-being of the homeland above all else. They are the “true” Europe as well as the future of Europe. The historical victimization of Hungary is an important element in the identity discourse, and helps demonstrate the strength of Hungary, as well as legitimize why Hungary has to fight for its sovereignty. Furthermore, they see themselves as illiberal and democratic, as opposed to the liberal West, since they have tradition values and act in the name of the Hungarian people and not in the name of obsolete minorities.

The West, on the other hand, is a censoring, liberal mess which is pushing Europe towards the brink of ruin. It is detached from the people, with no real democratic intentions. Minorities are valued above nation states and liberal values above traditional. The West are characterised by controlling tendencies, as well as a wish to turn Europe into one big melting pot of an empire which threatens Hungary’s sovereignty. Immigration, mainly from Muslim countries, is a tool
in this process. Yet, the West is not a clear, radical Other. There are oppositions between the West and Hungary, but the West is also an ally to Hungary with which Hungary share history and culture. They are both part of Europe, which gives it an ambivalent role in identity creation. Hungary clearly identifies with the former, powerful Europe and see itself as one of the rightful great nations of Europe. However, Europe is also used as a description of The Western Other. Here, it is the modern, liberal Europe, in which the EU dominates, that is described. The former glory days of Hungary and Europe, where Christian values dominated and the civilisation prospered, is put in contrast with the “new” Europe, where Christianity is abolished and Europe is on the brink to disaster.

4.2. The PiS Discourse

In this section, I will analyse the descriptions of the identity of Poland and the West (where the West, as described in the methodology section, includes different actors such as the EU and Western Europe) found in the PiS material, as well as the discursive processes in which they were formed. Below, I will outline the main themes and aspects of the Self and Other identity from the PiS discourse, as well as analyse the discursive process according to the above outlined analytical framework.

4.2.1. The Poles – Patriotism and Freedom

The notion of being Polish centres in the PiS discourse around concepts of pride, patriotism and tradition. The PiS party programme states that being Polish is not ethnically defined. Rather, the nation is defined in terms of a common “culture, language, historical experiences, political traditions, civilizational values, and lived fate” (Porter-Szűcs, 2016a). The Polish nation is described as rooted in Christianity as well as in values of liberty, freedom and equality. The political identity of the nation is formed through “the teachings of the Catholic Church, Polish tradition, and Polish patriotism” (Porter-Szűcs, 2016a). In the PiS discourse, the importance of pride in being Polish is stressed. It is said that such pride have deteriorated due to slanders both from the outside and from “the worst sort of Poles.” (Porter-Szűcs, 2016b). Poland thus need to regain the sense of unity, pride and identity it once had. Only with the pride restored can Poland be what they ought to be, “a great European nation” (Kaczyński, 2015) which is heard and listened to. To reinstate such pride, cultural policy areas such as education can be used as a tool. It is not clear exactly what reforms are referred to here, but is shows that policies are seen as a potential tool to transform national values and install national pride.
Today, there are 20 million Poles living abroad, compared to 40 million living in the “motherland”. The Poles living abroad will however “always feel yourselves to be Poles and therefore you are.” (“President says foreign-based Poles will help build a dream Poland,” 2018). They are instilled with Polish culture thanks to the work of Polish parents, teachers and priests living abroad. The PiS discourse hence call attention to the fact that not only those holding Polish citizenship are Poles, but also those identifying with Polish culture and values.

In the PiS discourse, the family is considered to be the foundation of all social life, including the nation. The Polish nation is thought to be a community of free Poles and Polish families, comprising a cultural model. The family is considered to be between a man and a woman, and the importance of having children is stressed. It is noted that the number of Poles are not increasing, which is referred to as a demographic crisis. Two factors are described as the reasons behind this crisis. The first is the migration which takes place due to a lack of pride over being Polish, and the second is a weakened position of the family due to factors such as the spread of “gender ideology”, i.e. feminism (Porter-Szűcs, 2016a). The importance of the strengthened position of the family is further showed by it being the subject of one proposed question for the constitutional referendum (“The proposed constitutional referendum questions,” 2018). Moreover, the role of the family in the PiS discourse is an illustration of body politics, where the traditional, multi-child family is seen as the foundation of the community and the motherland. Those not belonging to a “traditional” family can hence be seen as being outside of the community as well. Furthermore, the framing of “gender ideology” as destroying Polish families demonstrates feminisms irreconcilability with the Polish identity, in which families are vital.

4.2.2. Poland – The Eternal Victim

The victimization of Poland is constantly present in the PiS discourse. 2018 marks 100 years since Poland regained its independence after the 123 years long occupation during the Partitions of Poland. Only 21 years later, during the Second World War, Poland was occupied by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it is described how Poland after the war was held under Soviet influence until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. During the Second World War, Poland fought with the Allies but felt according to the discourse betrayed by the West after the war ended. The discourse describes how Poland were excluded from the victory celebrations and was instead “sold” at the Yalta conference in 1945. As Duda puts it, “the Cold
War divide was an attempt to cut Poland off from her natural European political environment” (Duda, 2018a). The event is described as being a loss for all of Europe, since it created an unnatural fracture between east and west which remains to this day. According to the PiS discourse, this crack can be identified through demeaning western talk of the Polish “cultural otherness” (Duda, 2018a), and references to an EU which core is comprised of the western countries while the periphery states of the east are seen as baggage. Consequently, Poland feel betrayed and mistreated by Western Europe. According to the PiS discourse, these past wrongdoings of the West have had consequences on the relationship between the EU and Poland to this day. For example, Duda has said when speaking of the EU that “of course we have the right to have expectations towards Europe — especially towards the Europe that left us to be the prey of the Russians in 1945 — but above all we have the right to rule ourselves here on our own and decide what form Poland should have.” (Shotter and Huber, 2018). In a similar vein, Kaczyński has stated that “the program of deep changes in our country will not slow down, on the contrary — there cannot be any talk about reaching an agreement with powers that for years treated Poland as their own private loot,” (“Kaczynski: Poland will stand its ground in EU spat,” 2018). Hence, the historical mistakes of the West are used to legitimize the present suspicion against them. The former identities of the Self and the Other are thus used as a legitimization for the relationship between the current Self and the Other.

Connected to the victimization discourse is the shifting of blame regarding the actions that took place during the Second World War. Kaczyński admits that horrible events took place and that Poland played a role in them. He however claims that Poland would never have been involved were it not for Germany and their aggression towards Poland. He states that we “need to remember these events in order to be able to appropriately address responsibility and blame” (Kaczyński, 2016), a situation description in which Poland is falsely accused of something that was not their doing. Historical events are hence also used to shame certain countries and to promote a moral hierarchy, where Poland stand above for example Germany. This illustrates a use of both the temporal and ethical dimension.

4.2.3. The Role of the Government – Strong and Effective
The victimization discourse is further used to stress the importance of a sovereign, independent Poland. The nation state is seen as a precondition for democracy as well as a defender of national interests, and any undermining of its sovereignty is unacceptable and dangerous. Fundamental rights of the nation, such as freedom, independence and an own culture, must
therefore be secured. According to the PiS discourse, Poland has throughout history defended themselves many times, and is ready to do so again. This includes defending their vision of the world.

In accordance with this, the discourse states, the Polish government need to be strong and effective. Consequently, institutional reforms and a change in various parts of the state apparatus is needed. This includes reforms of executive and judicial institutions, such as democratic control mechanism. The goal is said to be a strong, effective government and a judicial system which truly protects the people rather than the enemies. It cannot be susceptible to external pressure and must be able to mobilize forces and means to serve the common good. As a way to institutionalize a stronger government, one question of the proposed constitutional referendum is: "Are you for the strengthening of the authority of the democratically elected president in the sphere of foreign policy and command over the Polish Armed Forces?" ("The proposed constitutional referendum questions," 2018). Furthermore, the discourse explains, the government and its actions must be respected since they were elected by the people. The fact that they were democratically elected also means that the parliamentarians “could not be supporters of particularistic interest groups”, nor let themselves be influenced by outsiders ("President addresses National Assembly,” 2018).

Hence, a strong, effective government is according to the PiS discourse an important part of the Polish identity. In order to achieve this, there is an alleged need for reforms of executive and judicial institutions, which shows a link between identity construction and reforms. The statement that the judicial system needs to be reformed to protect the people rather than the enemies implies a biased judicial system, and the “enemies” are here excluded from the true People. This is also a potential use of the strategy of calculated ambivalence, since the judicial reforms is motivated in several ways which could resonate with different audiences. Some may wish to reform the judiciary in order to have a strong executive power, while other may think that argument is useless but instead believe reforms are needed in order to protect the “real” People. It is furthermore reminded that the government and the president is democratically elected by the people. This fact mandates the decisions of the government and implies that they must serve the common good, and not support “particularistic interest groups” or “outsiders”.
4.2.4. The EU – Longing and Anger

According to the PiS discourse, the divide of the Cold War between Western and Eastern Europe brought both political and social consequences, and asserted a notion that the former Soviet-countries were “less European”. After 1989, however, “Poland and other countries of the region came back on the natural path to integration with the European institutions.” (Duda, 2018a). Poland wishes to integrate with and decrease the distance towards the other EU member states, especially the western states which represents development and wealth. However, Poland feels mistreated and excluded by the EU, and experience a hierarchy in which Poland is at the bottom. This exclusionary agenda has according to the PiS discourse caused a loss of people’s trust, and needs to be changed. The EU need to be a community of equals based on the sovereign equality of all states, where there is a mutual understanding and common interest that is not there today. As Duda puts it, “Let us be the people of Europe’s future not the echoes of Europe’s past” (Duda, 2018a). This is a noticeable use of the temporal dimension, where the Self is described as having the potential to transform from its former identity to a new one. Furthermore, the EU is portrayed as lacking ethical and moral values, since it does not treat its member states equal.

Even though Poland wishes to integrate further with the EU, there are many aspects of the EU Poland disagrees with. It is described how Poland need to be careful not to be “infected by social diseases” spreading in the EU (“Defiant Kaczynski says Poland must avoid EU’s ‘social diseases,’” 2018). Here, the use of the phrase “infected by social diseases” is a strategy of body politics where the “disease”, which spreads through the EU, threatens the healthy body of Poland. PiS further rejects all infringements on national sovereignty, and states that Poland will erect legal barriers towards any practises eroding sovereignty, such as “judicial repression” (Porter-Szűcs, 2016a). This is illustrated by one proposed question for the constitutional referendum: ”Are you for the inclusion in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of guarantees of Poland's sovereignty within the European Union and the priority of the Constitution over international and European law?” (“The proposed constitutional referendum questions,” 2018). According to the PiS discourse, there is hence an impression that the EU is interfering beyond its mandate in Polish affairs and threatens their sovereignty. Those who are concerned about the EU are accused of thinking about their own interests and ”some imaginary community which has little bearing on us.” (“President’s speech about EU was correct and strong - top aide,” 2018). Instead, Polish affairs are portrayed as the priority, in which the EU should not interfere, and European affairs are considered secondary. In accordance with this,
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Kaczyński has declared that "there is of course no way that Poland will relinquish a decision on judicial reform to the European Court of Justice. That is a domestic matter guaranteed by EU law." ("Kaczynski: Poland will stand its ground in EU spat,” 2018).

The PiS discourse claims a common cultural heritage and shared history of Europe, which for example includes common Judeo-Christian ethics. It is said that this shared identity and these pre-political values need to be acknowledged, and the EU should not be limited to treaties and administration. Rather, Europe should be a community of ethics, with shared values such as loyalty, solidarity and forgiveness. However, PiS rejects every attempt towards a cultural unification of Europe. This position is defended with the idea that diversity is part of the European cultural heritage, and needed for the strength and development of Europe: “Unification or the radical impoverishment of that diversity, replacing the cultural heritage with primitive civilizational experiments, will mean the weakening of our continent.” (Porter-Szűcs, 2016a). Furthermore, regarding the EU’s mandatory migrant quota, Kaczyński stated that “We have not exploited the countries from which these refugees are coming to Europe these days, we have not used their labour force and finally we have not invited them to Europe. We have a full moral right to say ‘no’,” (“Kaczyński: Poland did not invite refugees, has right to say ‘no,’” 2017). Hence, according to the discourse, Poland has no ethical responsibility to accept migrants. Western Europe, on the other hand, has previously colonised large parts of the world and therefore have a different moral responsibility than Poland. The above use of the phrase Judeo-Christian ethics furthermore demonstrates a construction of an ethical identities as well as a wish to make friends with the past. Lastly, it should be noted that cultural unification is described as “primitive civilizational experiments”, where the use of the word primitive can be seen as an attempt to construct an identity of the EU as primitive and uncivilised.
4.2.5. Conclusion – Poland and the West in the PiS Discourse

![Figure 3: Identity of Poland and the West in the PiS discourse.](image)

In the PiS discourse, the identity of Poland is characterized by historical victimization. The country has long been oppressed and the Polish people have fought hard for their independence. Consequently, a sovereign, democratic Poland where the People have the deciding vote is of great value for the Polish identity. To guarantee the Polish sovereignty, a strong and effective government that have the means to act in the name of the People is vital for Poland’s future. In accordance with this, Poles are described as strong, patriotic and ready to build up the country. Catholic and Judeo-Christian ethics are important in this identity, and the family is the basis for all social life. Furthermore, Poles are not ethnically defined, but rather according to a shared culture, language and tradition.

The West is in the PiS discourse seen as oppressing, interfering and hierarchic. The West has betrayed Poland several times, and though there is a clear wish to form closer relationships with Western Europe, Poland views the EU with suspicion and anger. The greatest fear is the loss of Polish sovereignty and independence. The figure above shows only the differentiating between
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Poland and The West. However, there are claimed similarities as well, such as a shared cultural heritage and shared values. Furthermore, the West is seen as a successful region and something Poland wishes to get closer to and be part of. The view of the West in the PiS discourse is hence an example of how the degree and shape of Otherness can vary from case to case, and entail both negative and positive elements simultaneously. Poland wishes to grow within the EU, but fear the EU will interfere in Polish internal affairs and threaten their sovereignty. The EU will not be allowed to dictate over Poland and the decisions made by the democratically elected government. According to the PiS discourse, the EU should acknowledge the shared identity of European countries, and return to pre-political values. However, and somewhat contradictory, a potential cultural unification of Europe is simultaneously seen as disastrous.

4.3. Comparative Discussion

As indicated in the above sections, there are both similarities and differences regarding identity construction between the PiS discourse and the Fidesz discourse. Regarding the identity of the Self, both discourses centres around a common culture, language, religion and tradition, in which the family and Christian values have an important role. The constructed history of the two nations are used to motivate the importance of a sovereign, independent state which under no circumstances will let external actors control them. However, Fidesz focus more on the uniqueness of the Hungarian people and culture. Even so, the identity of the own nation is similarly constructed in the two discourses, while the larger difference concerns the construction of the West. In both discourses, the West is depicted as controlling, deceiving and as threatening the own nation with interference and cultural unification. However, the West simultaneously holds a positive identity in the PiS discourse, and a clear wish for integration and being treated as equals are expressed. In the Fidesz discourse, no such wish is expressed. Rather, Hungary is differentiated against West in a more radical way, and the threat posed by the West is described as more extreme, even though they are not solely enemies. The West is hence a more radical Other in the Fidesz discourse than in the PiS discourse.

These identities are created is a discursive process which also shares many similarities between the two discourses. Firstly, there are clear uses of temporal, spatial and ethical identities in both discourses. Regarding the temporal dimension, both the own nation and Europe takes on different temporal identities which are used in various ways. In the Fidesz discourse, there are comparisons between a former, present and future Europe, which represents different ideal and
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dystopian societies and the demise of the West. Concerning the historical victimization of the Self, the historical mistakes of the West are used to legitimize the present suspicion against them. Hence, the former identity of the Self and the Other is used as a legitimization for the relationship between the current Self and the Other. A direct similarity between the two discourses in this context is the reference to them being “sold” by the West at the Yalta conference. This historical victimization further holds an ethical dimension since it blames the West for the experiences of the own nation. The theme of historical victimization is important in both discourses, but have a more prominent role in the identity creation of the PiS discourse. In this regard, the PiS discourse dwells more on the past while the Fidesz discourse is more forward-looking with many references to future dystopias. The spatial dimension is seen through references to the divide between Eastern and Western Europe as unnatural, and that Hungary’s and Poland’s natural place is with the rest of Europe. Furthermore, Europe and the EU are used as interchangeable concepts, especially in the Fidesz discourse. Hence, the EU is considered more than its geographical or technical definition. It is seen as an extension of the cultural and historical heritage of the continent of Europe. Here, Europe is prescribed an ethical identity as well. The ethical dimension is further present in the common referral to values, moral and faith.

Secondly, both discourses use discursive strategies. The own nation is portrayed as unique, especially in the Fidesz discourse. Issues are simplified, for example concerning the consequences of immigration or the power of the EU over its member states. Furthermore, blame is shifted to the West regarding issues such as the Holocaust and the demise of traditional values. Both discourses moreover speak of posed threats. For PiS, this is mainly in the shape of lost sovereignty, while for Fidesz this threat is both in the shape of lost sovereignty and cultural and physical extinction. However, all threats are posed by the West, usually the EU more specifically. Lastly, there are clear uses of body politics in both discourses. Examples here include the metaphorical use of a disease, and, in the case of George Soros, the use of an actual person to embody a greater threat. However, I have not been able to identify the strategy of calculated ambivalence much in the material. This could however be due to my lack of contextual knowledge, or that my material was all directed to a similar audience.

Regarding the connections between identity construction and policies, the analysis has given us several examples which point to a relationship between identity construction and policies. Two more legislations than the one’s described in the material are however worth mentioning
due to their clear similarities with the identity construction identified in the analysis: the new Hungarian constitution and the Polish “Holocaust law”. Parts of the Fidesz discourse have been entrenched in the new Constitution of 2011 (“Hungary’s Constitution of 2011,” 2011). It contains several references to Hungary’s Christian heritage and unique cultural and language. There are moreover sections which weakens democratic checks and balances, such as restrains on the constitutional court, while strengthening the position of the government (Dempsey, 2011; “Q&A,” 2013). This is consistent the role a strong, independent government plays in the Fidesz view of Hungary. In Poland, a new law condemns blaming Poland for crimes committed during the Holocaust (John, 2018). Even though the government recently decided not to implement criminal penalties for those violating the law (Santora, 2018), it clearly fits in the discourse of historical victimization of Poland; Poland is only a victim, never a perpetrator. Poland has moreover implemented numerous reforms which have strengthened the government’s influence over the judiciary, threatening its independence (Jones and Wlodarczak-Semczuk, 2018). Such reforms are in accordance with the PiS discourse regarding the view of the government as strong and efficient.

5. Conclusion

This thesis has studied the discursive identity creation of the political parties PiS and Fidesz. Focus have been on the Self and the Other, conceptualized as the own nation and the West. The analysis has shown that both the PiS discourse and the Fidesz discourse portray the Self as unique, strong and brave, where the People share a common and distinctive culture, religion and set of values. Meanwhile, the West is depicted as controlling, interfering and untrustworthy. The historical victimization of the own nation in relation to the West is important in both discourses. The West has previously threatened and threaten once again one of the most fundamental elements of the own nation – its sovereignty. Hence, the discourses both assert that a strong, efficient state is crucial, as well as necessary reforms of judicial and executive institutions to ensure this. Moreover, both PiS and Fidesz use several rhetoric strategies to defend and uphold these identities.

Hence, there are many similarities between identity creation in the Fidesz discourse and the PiS discourse. However, it should be remembered that there are significant differences as well. Firstly, the PiS discourse is more moderate, while the Fidesz discourse is more extreme in its identity construction and situation description. In the Fidesz discourse, the world view and
identities put forth are very clear, and Orbán is constantly trying to convince the audience that they are true. In the PiS discourse, however, these identities are much more concealed and less radical. This could be due to various reasons. Firstly, the domestic political situation is different in the two countries. In Hungary, Fidesz control considerable parts of the media and the civil society has been largely weakened. The opposition is weak and fragmented, with parts of it competing from even further to the right (Kingsley, 2018; Müller, 2017, p. 597; Verseck, 2018). In Poland, on the other hand, the opposition is stronger, though still relatively weak, and is mainly based at the centre-left of the political scale. The media is not under government control and there is a much more vibrant civil society (Magyar and Mitrovits, 2017). Hence, there may be more room for Fidesz to express their views in a more extreme way than there is for PiS. Secondly, Fidesz has been in office longer than PiS. It is thus possible that they have had time to institutionalise their position and have gradually become more radical in their discourse as time goes by. It is hence possible that PiS will follow the same pattern in the future. Lastly, it is possible that I have simply not found the correct material in order to see the more radical side of the PiS discourse.

The second important difference between the two discourses, which is connected to the previous point, is that the Fidesz description of the West entails a more radical degree of Otherness than the PiS description. According to Fidesz, the West poses a direct threat to Hungary and their unique way of life. According to the PiS discourse, on the other hand, Poland wishes to integrate and be a part of the Western European community despite its flaws. This difference could be due to the countries different relationships to Russia. Hungary feels allegiance with Russia, and can hence turn to them for support. Poland, on the other hand, has no such positive relationship with Russia, but see them as enemies (Bayer, 2017). Consequently, Poland may feel the need to be closer to Europe in order to have an ally to turn to there. However, the reasons for these two differences between the discourses would benefit from further research.

The findings in the analysis are, generally speaking, consistent with the theories discussed in the theory section of this essay. The analysis identified a clear dichotomy between a Self and an Other, as well as an attempt to construct a homogenous, unique nation and People. Moreover, the parties claim to follow the “general will” of that People while not valuing minority rights. Regarding the role of the Other, the West demonstrates an Other which takes on different degrees of Otherness and can include both positive and negative elements. The Other is framed
as posing a threat to the Self, in this case mainly against its sovereignty, which is in turn used to legitimise the state and its actions. Furthermore, the concept of ontological security can be used to explain the importance for PiS and Fidesz to secure and uphold a certain identity against the threat of cultural unification which other parts of the world poses. The Polish and Hungarian identities have, according to the discourses, been threatened and partly destroyed by other great powers in the past. Hence, the EU’s wish to integrate the region and coordinate the member countries on multiple policy areas is perceived as an intimidating threat. Furthermore, the use of the term “Judeo-Christian” ethics in the PiS discourse, as well as the importance of shifting blame to Germany for events taking place during the Second World War, can from this point of view be seen as an indication that Poland struggles with the historical part of its identity more than Hungary does. Lastly, a mutually constitutive relationship between identity construction and policies has been identified in the analysis, where both are used to reinforce the other. In this discursive process, there is furthermore an in-built legitimization of state actions. This relationship indicates that the identity constructions in populism is not merely rhetorical to gain support, but has political substance. Some of the laws can be seen as symbolic, such as the Polish “Holocaust law”. Others, however, such as the deconstruction of an independent judiciary, have a large impact on the countries and appears to have a larger political agenda. Here, it should furthermore be noted that the stance towards EU in the discourses can be categorised as foreign policy. This is naturally linked to the identity description in the discourses, since the two are discursively inseparable. However, this analysis has not included concrete policies towards the EU.

Even though it is very difficult to generalize with only two cases as a basis, the analysis provides us with indications of potential general learnings on identity construction in populism discourse. Firstly, populist actors act and look differently in different countries. This is not necessarily due to economic or ideological differences, but because the social contexts are different. Populist parties, like other political parties, need to relate to a pre-existing context and pre-existing identity constructions, which we should be aware of when studying them. Secondly, this analysis shows that we should be open to the idea of different shapes of the Other. Not only can it take on different identities; it can also take on different degrees of Otherness and include both positive and negative elements. The analysis also provides two clear examples of how the Other can look for populist parties in government, i.e. take the shape of an international Other. Thirdly, identity creation in populism should not only be seen as a rhetoric device. This analysis has showed that identity construction is closely related to reforms and new legislations.
The findings of this thesis hence have relevance for understanding the concept of populism, which in turn is important to understand its impact on our political societies. Furthermore, understanding how Hungary and Poland view themselves and the West is important in the ongoing debate within the EU regarding the rules of democracy and rule of law. It provides an increased understanding of Hungary’s and Poland’s point of view, as well as which issues are important for them in the debate. However, further research is needed on the issue. Through studying populist identity construction in other countries, we can construct enhanced, general theories on the subject which assists our understanding of populism.
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