APRÈS NOUS, LE DÉLUGE:
Conservative media's xenophobic storytelling in
the United Kingdom, USA and France

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Abstract

This thesis analyses a series of texts from the United States, United Kingdom and France using Critical Discourse Analysis. It is an analysis of the framework of conservative political speech in conservative media and by conservative and non-conservative politicians. By using similar speech patterns, vocabulary and syntax, even in different languages and dialects, conservative media created a similar approach to discussing various events transpiring from 2011 to 2015.

I chose three noteworthy events from these four years: The Arab Spring and the fall of Gaddafi in Libya; the attack on the Benghazi, Libya consulate; and the attacks in Paris on the 13th of November 2015. Each article chosen represents the chosen values of conservatives in their various countries (Fairclough and Fairclough 2017), and because of the globalised structure of the media, those values seem to converge into one conservative ideal. Each article constructed a vision of their respective country's society and how it was being affected by the events chosen. These constructions were then echoed by politicians in various speeches and parliamentary meetings, therefore reinforcing the conservative philosophy put forward by the media.

Using critical discourse analysis, I analyse contemporaneous articles discussing the aforementioned events, in order to answer the question: how did right-wing media create a similar conservative set of policies and values that covered the United States, the United Kingdom and France? I use Isabela and Norman Fairclough's theory of political discourse analysis. Using their explanations about reasonable arguments, I show how conservative media uses inflammatory and oftentimes derogatory language to create a vision of the world from 2011 to 2015, and how this sort of media set the groundwork of current conservative values and policies.
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Dedication
To my mother, who raised me to be proud, loud and kind.

Gratitude
To all my teachers, past and present, who always saw what I could achieve.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

During the Arab Spring, I was living in London. On the morning after Muammar Gaddafi's death, it seemed that every tabloid newspaper had a photo of his bruised, battered and bloodied face, covered in headlines like 'The Monster Dragged Through the Streets!' What struck me was the small children who were surrounded by this imagery that even made me queasy. I wondered how their psyches would be affected by this; would they see all men that looked like Gaddafi as monsters, waiting to be slain? As the Arab Spring bloomed throughout the Middle East and North Africa, I noticed that certain newspapers concentrated on a certain segment of the Muslim population, crowing about the rise of Sharia Law. When I returned to America, on television especially, commentators would emphasize President Obama's middle name (Hussein) as if there was some issue with it; it seemed to say that he was a Muslim infiltrator, bent on bringing Islam into America. Burqa bans followed hijab bans in France, and women were assaulted for wearing them, having them ripped off their heads. Their modesty was seen as an affront to France's laïcité, the militant secularism that was supposed to protect their religious freedoms but was loathe to protect these women that looked so different.

Media, like economic trade, has become globalised. CNN International plays in airports around the world, and you can read the New York Times in Johannesburg, if you'd like. Media conglomerates such as Fox Corporation own huge swathes of international media consumption. Content that is meant to be mass-produced and consumed by vastly different audiences must be constructed in a certain way in order to appeal to those audiences. However, there is no real standard for that construction. Thus, mass media companies are able to set the tone and values for their various holdings, and disseminate those tones and values wherever their reach might extend.

Right-wing media has at its core three values: "libertarianism, anti-communism, and religio-cultural traditionalism" (Bauer and Nadler 2018). Along with these values, there is also an interest in maintaining the mores of the dominant social and political classes (Bauer et al 2018). Whilst a society at large may not hold these values, or have other media that espouses other values, modern conservative media has captured the trust of conservative
readers. This means that conservative readers are more likely to trust conservative media and mistrust any other type of media (Bauer et al 2018). Each country has a certain way of displaying these values; they do not look the same. Anti-communism is not necessarily as strong in France, for example, as in the United States, but they are quite nationalist. The United Kingdom is far more secular than the United States, but it still shares anti-Islamic views and uses similar language. The degree to which conservative ideals are held depends on the history of the country and its relationship to them.

In constructing a vision of the world that confirms the ideals of a White, male and Christian leadership, conservative media will use language that makes these ideals paramount. Conservative media takes for granted that their readers share their values and then normalises that language (Machin and Mayr 2015). They normalise the language by repeating it, connecting previous texts to each other, and recalling historical instances of what they are trying to prove. They also may use language that a reader is familiar with already to make the reader feel confident in what is being said.

From 2011 to 2015, conservative media in the United Kingdom, the United States and France coalesced around certain ideas that projected the values of Western-style representative democracy, support for ongoing wars and pro-Christian, anti-Islamic attitudes. They did so by using sometimes violent and lurid language, and by supporting the politicians that used similar language and stances whilst deriding those politicians that were viewed as weak. These four years were marked by pro-democratic uprisings across the Middle East; an uptick in asylum seekers and refugees in Europe; and a civil war in Syria that combined both of these events. By using such similar language, conservative media in these three countries were able to influence society as a whole, and push the political discourse rightward. Using similar linguistic styles, even in two different languages, means that a right-wing network of similarly-sounding political speech can be spread around the world.

1.1 Objectives
I lived in France, the United Kingdom and the United States from 2011 to 2015. Whilst I did not consume conservative media in any of these countries, I was often surrounded by it on public transportation in France and the UK; living in the Southern states of America meant
that many of my co-workers and students espoused right-wing views from media they were consuming on a daily basis.

Each country has marked societal and cultural differences, but their political backgrounds are quite similar. Enlightenment philosophies influenced all three countries; slavery, imperialism and class struggles marred and continue to mar every country's past and present. Immigration has changed the face of the population, and while these periods of immigration has generated positive outcomes for each country, there have been periods of xenophobia that followed each new immigrant arrival.

Two world wars devastated the economies of France and the United Kingdom, allowing the United States to become powerful in different ways. The relative youth of the colonised United States also means that there is not as strong of a national identity as there is in the United Kingdom and France. Patriotism in the United States is displayed by standing for the pledge, the national anthem being played before every sports game and the amount of flags one has is a measure of how patriotic one is. Covering one's house in flags in the United Kingdom is seen as jingoistic, especially if it just St George's flag, and flags are seen so rarely in France that after national tragedies, people often paint the tricolore (the French flag) on poster boards.

Racism is much more nuanced in each country as well; someone in the United Kingdom may have no issue with Black people, but hold serious animus towards Asians from India and Pakistan. In France, there is racial hatred towards Saharan Africans, but colorism plays a role into what sort of Black person is acceptable.

Reading these newspapers, it is not difficult to discern their racist and xenophobic tendencies. *The Daily Mail* and *Fox News* are especially egregious. My objective in this thesis is not just to point out where these media are being racist and xenophobic, but to show how these media have maintained and upheld the status quo (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). I also want to show how conservative media has become more extreme in their right-wing ideologies, getting closer to their so-called 'fringe' ideas.
1.2 Methodology

I am focussing on three distinct periods during this time frame: the first Arab Spring movements, especially in Libya, Tunisia and Syria; the terrorist attack on the American consulate in Benghazi, Libya; and the terrorist attacks in Paris France. These three periods of time garnered an enormous amount of press coverage and moved many people either towards more compassionate policies or to more authoritarian ones. The United Kingdom, USA and France certainly all moved rightward during this period; in the United Kingdom, there was a rise of the UKIP and BNP (UK Independence Party and British National Party); the United States seemed to celebrate the rise of Donald Trump, and France's Front National rose to power again, ending with Marine Le Pen getting 34 percent of the presidential vote in 2017.

I used Fairclough's ideas of political discourse analysis to dissect the use of language in these articles and speeches. Norman and Isabela Fairclough's book *Political Discourse Analysis* is part of the backbone of my research, along with other books that have been introduced to me during this Master's course in religion in peace and conflict, such as *How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis* by David Machin and Andrea Mayr and *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* by Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips. I want to dissect how the media uses language not only to disseminate facts and inform the public, but also how they manipulate coverage in order to elicit certain reactions out of not only the public, but government officials as well.

Fairclough's critical discourse analysis "explains that these discourses, such as of national unity or racial or cultural superiority, project certain social values and ideas and in turn contribute to the (re)production of social life" (Machin and Mayr 2015: 21). That is, by repeating certain phrases, words and even images, we reinforce the ideas of conservatism. Political discourse analysis is examining the arguments made in political speech and attempting to either deconstruct the argument or refute its conclusion (Fairclough and Fairclough 2017). Thus, the question becomes not 'Is this article racist?' but 'How does this article support and maintain the racist views already espoused in society?"
1.3 Data

Storytelling is repetition. Humans are quite adept at pattern recognition, even when that pattern is very short. My hypothesis is that the language and images used by conservative media in the United Kingdom, France and the United States of America set up, endorsed and maintained a xenophobic and anti-Islamic ideology. Therefore, I need quite a few articles in order to reproduce the pattern, and to show that far from receding, right-wing ideology surged from 2011 to 2015.

What is unusual is that from 2011 to 2015, all three countries seemingly made a sharp turn towards overt xenophobia, especially towards Muslims. Whilst this xenophobia was not unusual, the similarities in rhetoric and discourse were. The language sounded the same, the types of stories being released echoed each other and the ideologies espoused, whilst not exactly equal, defied cultural differences.

I chose articles from *The Daily Mail, Fox News* and *Le Figaro*, conservative media from the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France, respectively. I also chose political speeches and memoranda from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron, President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden from the USA and President François Hollande of France. By using media and political speech, I will be able to show how politicians, even non-conservative ones, legitimised the discourse of the media. By quoting from conservative media, using conservative media groups or only speaking with conservative groups, politicians in the UK, the USA and France solidified conservative media's influence on political discourse and made their arguments more conservative in general.
CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Politics is about argumentation; the discourse in politics is a series of choices in order to meet a goal (Fairclough et al 2017). Analysis of political speech is not only what that speech may represent, but also the choices embedded in it (Fairclough et al 2017). During a crisis such as the Arab Spring, Benghazi or the Paris terrorist attack, there are competing strategies for how to best deal with the crisis in order to return "balance and rationality" (Fairclough et al 2017: 2).

Crisis situations are inherently complex; however, right wing media's argumentation is toward immediate and simplified alternatives (Fairclough et al 2017). For example, in the case of Libya, the rebels were mostly good, unless they were too Muslim (Gordon 2011). As with any crisis, "...human action occurs against a background of incomplete information, uncertainty and risk, and deciding which action is appropriate always involves an element of gamble, however carefully well-judged" (Fairclough et al 2017: 5). Right wing media aims to cut through that uncertainty and doubt and establish one way to look at any given situation, in this case creating a narrative of racist populism.

The simplistic views espoused by right wing media are attractive because they follow the moral beliefs of evangelistic Christian traditions, especially in America (Bauer et al 2018). For people who share these same beliefs, without necessarily being evangelical, there is a sense of right and wrong in a world that rarely holds these answers. There is a sense of stability as well; many people looking into a historic past will see a strong country where the people in power shared their beliefs and values.

With the globalisation of media, similarities in conservative media discourse can easily be traced; whilst the UK, the USA and France don't always share the same sort of political ideology, late modern conservative arguments have begun to converge on colonialist, xenophobic ideas centred on populist traditionalism.
2.1 Arguments

Each of the articles, speeches and memoranda were released in a post-9/11 society; that is, with the assumptions that Islam supports terrorism and is inherently violent and less democratic than other religions (Polakow-Suransky 2017). Religious concepts such as *jihad* and *Sharia* are given one-sided definitions which strip them of any context other than those given by conservative or fundamentalist imams. Every attack attributed to Islamic terrorists joins the long string of other attacks since the eleventh of September, creating the social reality of Islam as a religion that promotes violence. Of course, attacks by radicalised people in the name of Islam have bolstered the argument within the conservative media, no matter how rare the attacks are.

Conservative media seeks to capitalise on the anger of people after each attack (Polakow-Suransky 2017). They will do so by pointing out errors in government surveillance, over-exaggerating crimes done by minorities or demonising normal cultural behaviours. Right wing media will say that "experts" fail to predict these crisis situations and so the subsequent advice might be worthless. However, just because deliberative practice may sometimes be myopic does not mean that deliberative argumentation must be completely abandoned (Fairclough et al 2017).

Within the conservative media argument in France, the UK and the United States is one basic belief: "[they] are convinced that mainstream journalism is deeply biased against conservatives" (Bauer et al 2018). Along with this belief is also the view that "liberals see conservatives as deeply morally flawed and seek to humiliate them and exclude them from any legitimate place in political discourse" (Bauer et al 2018). Because of this, conservative media tends to stay within the confines of other conservative media; hence why conservative media tends to sound the same, even across nations. In the United Kingdom and the United States, terrorism is nearly always coupled with "Islamic" or "radical" so that it separate from regular violence and focuses on Muslim people in particular. French media does not always use this sort of language, but there is a class separation; newspapers like *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* are written for rich people with a higher education, whilst *L'Express* uses more slang and less complicated or old-fashioned vocabulary. They are all conservative newspapers, however. In France and the United Kingdom, where immigrants tend to live in certain areas
of a large city, the names of the neighbourhood are used as a shortcut for "undesirable" locations.

2.2 Discourse
According to critical discourse analysis philosophy as espoused by Norman Fairclough, language is both relational and ideational; language is enclosed within a particular historical and social context but that same language can be used to transform that same context (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Critical discourse analysis within the context of political speech means that language is used to create some model of how the world functions (Fairclough et al 2017). Models in political speech are "characterized in terms of a set of features" but are not necessarily used to describe particular systems (Fairclough et al 2017:10).

The main goals of critical discourse analysis are to "reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world" (Jørgensen et al 2002: 63). According to Fairclough et al, political discourse is "primarily argumentative" (2017: 10) and therefore concerns itself mainly with creating a particular set of goals. However, in terms of discursive practices of conservative media, the goal may be more nebulous; their speech is primarily concerned with non-argumentative genres such as narrative-building (Fairclough et al 2017).

Conservative media uses discursive practices in conventional ways; that is, their language "works towards the stability of the dominant order of discourse and thereby the dominant social order" (Jørgensen et al 2002: 73). Since conservative media tends to be insular, they tend to use the same language. This use of homogeneous discursive practice is known as intertextuality. Social practice being the container for discursive practice and all texts means that all text bears the impact of history and vice versa (Jørgensen et al 2002).

Currently, conservative media holds sway across these three nations (Coppins 2017): Fox News consistently has the largest viewership in the United States; the Daily Mail is the second largest newspaper in terms of readership in the UK; Le Figaro is the second largest newspaper in France. Media consumers do have a myriad number of choices in order to receive their news; however, just because those choices are possible does not mean that the
discourses are equal (Jørgensen et al 2002). The internet, television, newspaper and radio compete for attention in the marketplace of ideas; the information that garners the most viewers, readers or listeners is the most important. Therefore, any ideal of integrity, morality or even truth is no longer necessary: everything is about "weaponization of information" (Coppins 2017). The weapons of the right-wing media is "narrowly tailored news for increasingly niche audiences" where one never has to see anything with which one disagrees (Coppins 2017).

2.3 Values and Ideology

Ideology, according to Fairclough, is how meaning is constructed to "contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination" (Jørgensen et al 2002: 75). Ideology is not stated outright; one must use text in order to construct that meaning. According to Fairclough et al:

In ideology critique, critical social science seeks causal explanations of the normalization, naturalization and institutionalization, as well as pervasiveness and endurance within populations, of particular beliefs and concerns. It seeks to explain them in terms of material and social relations in particular forms of social life [...] This is ideology in its critical sense, tied particularly to the question of how social orders which are significantly detrimental to human well-being can nevertheless endure. (2017: 80)

Conservative ideology has historically been centred on values associated with the literal conservation of some historical ideal. In the United States, United Kingdom and France, that historical ideal has been Christian, White and overwhelmingly male. In all three, changes in society brought on by immigration, women gaining the vote and colonial power decreasing have created a backlash from Christian and White leaders, both male and female. In each country, the rise of right-wing parties "is a direct result of members of the majority perceiving a threat to their culture, community, and way of life" (Polakow-Suransky 2017: 175).

And in each country, that threat is perceived to be Muslims. This especially targeted xenophobia surfaced in the United States after the attacks on the eleventh of September. It had been lurking in France since the 1960s and the arrival of Muslim immigrants from former
French colonies, but really crested after the November 2015 attacks. The United Kingdom has of course had a large population of Muslim people from its former colonies, and the attacks in 2005 showed the cracks in British society. Every time there is an attack by terrorists using Islam as a shield, there is a new wave of xenophobic resistance against all Muslims, no matter if they are new immigrants or settled citizens. In fact, settled citizens are still seen as the other, almost a sleeper-cell that has not been properly indoctrinated in the dominant culture (Polakow-Suransky 2017).

Right-wing ideology can be boiled down to three overarching concepts: flag, faith and family. There are other ideals and values held by right-wing people, and they are not equal in these three nations. These ideals are more commonly regarded as nationalist-patriotism, evangelical or conservative Christianity and White patriarchy. Under the flag, only certain people can be accepted as citizens, given narrow cultural definitions. In the United States, this means that Native Americans are often not on that list; in France, the grand-children of immigrants are seen as foreigners; in the United Kingdom, rigid class structures mean that immigrant families are kept on one rung of the capitalist ladder. One must prove that one is a citizen through a series of convoluted, often changing criteria; any deviance, and one may be accused of treason or supporting the enemy.

Faith for all these three countries is some form of Christianity. In the United States, it is usually Protestant and evangelical. France is a culturally Catholic country, and the United Kingdom has a state religion in the Anglican Church. And whilst all three of these countries have some form of secularism, in practice these protections usually only extend to those of Judeo-Christian faiths, and in regular application only to Christians who match the theological tenets of the majority government. In France, this means Easter services may be held outdoors but Muslims are banned from praying outdoors; in the United States, the construction of mosques and Islamic cultural centres may be protested, or vandalised; in the United Kingdom, calls to boycott restaurants that offer halal options come in waves.

One might think that the family part of the right-wing ideology would have a very wide definition, but for these countries, the family is heteronormative, with a male breadwinner and a woman who stays home with multiple children, upholding the patriarchy and the normative
values of the country. And with declining birth rates by White women (Bauer 2018), the fear of the 'great replacement' is rampant within the right-wing community (Polakow-Suransky 2017).

Right-wing media seeks to uphold these principles by using words that denigrate the outsider and uplift the majority. This is done to maintain a society wherein even those who have more in common with the minority will feel more connected to the powerful in society.
CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS

3.1 The Arab Spring and the Fall of Libya

"Now the rebels impose Sharia law as Islamic rules become 'basic source' of Libyan legislation"

The Daily Mail is both a physical newspaper and online presence. Online, just as in its physical form, it is interspersed with irrelevant advertisement. On the website there are social media buttons and celebrity news with photos of women in swimsuits. The social media buttons make it easier to share the article, giving it a wider audience than just those who might visit the website (see Fig 3.1). The page is cluttered and distracting. Comments are open on the website, and most are anonymous.

Figure 3.1 - Webpage for Daily Mail article 24 October 2011

The title immediately lets the reader know how the Daily Mail views the legislative changes proposed in Libya. The verb "impose" implies a top-down proclamation by authoritarian
forces; it is aggressive language (Machin et al 2015). Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, far from being the new prime minister or even the permanent leader, was an interim leader making statements that may not have ended in any legislation.

Shari'a is not "Islamic law" as stated in Greenhill's article (2011). It is a series of tenets and interpretations that are voluntary, based on both the Qur'an and the Hadith (An-Nai'm and Power 2015). As there are many different interpretations based on cultural standards and leftover laws from colonisation, there is no set 'Islamic law' (An-Nai'm et al 2015). Conflating Shari'a with whatever laws may be culturally appropriate in Libya, where the Council's interpretations of Islam may be conservative, is in keeping with how conservative media talks about Islamic interpretations.

Greenhill writes "The chairman of the National Transitional Council declared that a future parliament would have an 'Islamist tint' and any existing laws contradicting the teachings of Islam would be 'nullified'" (2011, emphasis mine). Making a declaration is an assertion, and shows that the writer wants his audience to think that the chairman's words are final, and that his interpretation is complete (Machin et al 2015). However, as Mustafa Abdul-Jalil was interim and that the council for which he was chairman was titled 'transitional', there would be no way of knowing if his interpretations would be final or accepted by the actual government. Nullifying non-Islamic laws would also mean revoking laws that may have been set by colonial powers that were antithetical to Islam, something that Western powers would not appreciate.

Directly beneath this statement is a photo of the first chairman, Mahmoud Jibril, where he is surrounded by microphones; his gaze is not towards the camera but off to the side, which can imply unease or uncertainty (Machin et al 2015). The photo is not of the man who Greenhill is writing about, but he is mentioned in the article. Calling the former chairman 'Prime Minister' also imbues him with a sense of power that would be understandable to British readers (Machin et al 2015).
Greenhill continues: "The sudden lurch by a country seen as very moderate towards Islamic extremism will alarm many in the West who supported the ousting of Colonel Gaddafi" (2011). Earlier in the article, he describes Gaddafi's rule as "decades of tyranny" (Greenhill 2011). A moderate leader cannot be described as tyrannical. However, Gaddafi was friendly with Western powers, who in turn were interested in Libya's oil resources. Therefore, a transitional council and subsequent government that may not be friendly towards Western powers would be alarming to the Daily Mail and its readers, including people in Parliament who used this article as part of their research into the Arab Spring.

Greenhill mentions the Qur'anic allowance of four wives twice in the article. In the first instance, he writes "men will even be permitted to take up to four wives" and later "The Muslim holy book, the Koran, allows men to take up to four wives" (2011). In the first line, it is just a suggestion, and in the second, an allowance. While the Qur'an does allow polygamy (4:3 Sahih International), it is only possible if the man is able to support multiple wives and if the woman chooses to join the other women in a polygamous relationship. Greenhill writes as if men would just take up four wives for no reason, or that somehow this is a massive change from normal Islamic society. This part of Muslim life is often cited as part of the barbarism of Islam, where it's assumed that women in polygamous relationships are abused or not given a choice (An-Nai'm et al 2015). By displaying these religious differences with no context, and calling them extreme, Greenhill is othering Muslims and also making them seem irrevocably different from Christians (Machin et al 2015).

In using the 'Sharia Law' bogeyman, Greenhill is implying that Libya's transitional government will pull Libya away from Western governments and be unwilling to work with them. In order to vilify the Council and their decisions, Greenhill uses language that is aggressive and seemingly final to make the choices of the council conclusive. Whilst celebrating the rebellion, Greenhill makes sure to let his readers know that he disapproves of their choices and that Britain and the West should as well.

1 There are multiple spellings of Gaddafi; I will preserve the spelling of each publication.
"British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring"

In 2012, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons released a comprehensive memorandum on the Arab Spring and the British response to it. Whilst it is not explicitly xenophobic, the information collected comes from testimony that is so, and the memorandum itself has a paternalistic and colonial tone throughout.

Starting in the introduction, the Foreign Affairs Committee starts by setting its reason for even becoming involved in the Arab Spring movement: "The region is vital to the UK's commercial, energy, and security interests, and the changes wrought by the Arab Spring revolutions have enormous implications for Britain and British foreign policy" (Parliament 2012: 13). According to Fairclough and Fairclough (2017), this sort of reasoning is based on goal-setting expectations: the Foreign Affairs Committee has recognised that their old relationships will shift and change, and so too may their ability to negotiate with the new leader. Also, because Britain is a colonial power, this memorandum shows that they are still using their historical political might in the area to control and constrain "the contributions of non-powerful participants" (Fairclough 2015: 76).

The Foreign Affairs Committee also mentions that the UK "must adjust to the loss of old strategic partners…; [...] and support what is hoped will be the emergence of new democratic states, will all the stabilisation, development, and support of democratisation…" (Parliament 2012: 13). The United Kingdom worked with leaders who were authoritarian and anti-democracy; they admit as much in this memorandum (Parliament 2012). However, they write about their issues with the transitional governments, mostly because they are not comfortable with them, mostly because they were Islamist and anti-Western in nature (Parliament 2012).

In the memorandum, Parliament writes about the Prime Minister David Cameron's remarks "about potential conflict between British 'interests' and 'values'" (Parliament 2012: 14). Cameron implies here that the goals of the Arab Spring movement are somehow contradictory to Britain's as a democracy. He is stating that the movement, whilst an important upswell of anti-authoritarian protest, is different from other pro-democracy
protests, possibly because many Muslims in Arab Spring countries do not find religion and democracy antithetical.

In explaining "the social and political causes of the Arab Spring", Parliament lists "resentment of authoritarian rules [...] and a repressive security state apparatus that was responsible for myriad human rights abuses, including torture and killings" (2012: 17). This is in direct contrast to the *Daily Mail*'s assertion that places like Libya were 'moderate' (Greenhill 2011), especially since Parliament writes that the human rights abuses were "particularly true in Libya, where public hangings [...] loomed large in recent memory" (2012: 17). One may ask why Western leaders worked with authoritarian states for so long, but in the post-colonial era, Western powers have only intervened in very public disasters or when it is hurting their own interests, even though both of those may have been inspired by colonial destruction. In the case of the Arab Spring, Western leaders were caught off-guard, but are now waiting for the leadership vacuum to set up a system wherein they may once more exploit the resources of these countries, especially in oil-rich nations like Libya.

Parliament lists one of the reasons for the Arab Spring as "globalisation, as well as a greater ease of travel [...] as frustrated young people became 'acutely aware' of their relative deprivation…" (2012: 18). Globalisation in discourse is being "used to used to support and legitimize actions and policies within particular arguments" (Fairclough 2007: 14). Two of the core claims of globalisation are that it "benefits everyone" and "furthers the spread of democracy in the world" (Steger 2005 as cited in Fairclough 2007: 34). Parliament is supporting the ideology of globalism as legitimate by expanding the philosophy of globalisation from freedom of economic movement to the freedom of ideas (Fairclough 2007). Globalisation has maintained the historical power structures and even extended them, especially for post-colonial powers such as the United Kingdom (Fairclough 2007). And as the memorandum brings in "international voices" to bolster the condemnation of Gaddafi, there is even more of a sense of globalism (Parliament 2012: 32).

Whilst there is no directly racist or xenophobic language in the memorandum, Parliament used written evidence from sources such as the Barnabas Fund, "an international charity which seeks to support Christians" (Parliament 2012: ev 176). The Barnabas Fund published
a booklet entitled *The Slippery Slope: The Islamisation of the UK*; the Parliament using their written evidence shows tacit support for the ideas espoused by this charity.

The question that Parliament puts forward: "What will be the future role of Islamist movements in the region and what should the British Government's stance towards them?" (Parliament 2012: 14). The Barnabas Fund answers at least the first part of the question. Their analysis is that any "Islamist" government would represent "a deep dichotomy between the real wish of the Arab masses for freedom and their devotion to Islam and shari'a" (Barnabas Fund 2012 as cited in Parliament 2012: ev 177). Islam is not opposed to democracy and the Qur'an calls for discussion and consultation (42:38 Sahih International) and the punishment of tyrants (42:42 Sahih International). The West's view that "real freedom and justice for all can never be achieved as long as the separation of religion from the state is opposed [...]" (Barnabas Fund 2012 as cited in Parliament 2012: ev 177) shows that the Wahhabist form of Islam exported by Saudi Arabia has been used to completely delegitimize the actual ideas of the Qur'an and non-cultural Islam.

The Barnabas Fund claims that "Islamist-led governments might begin as advocates of democracy, but will have the inherent tendency to gravitate to the repression of all views considered un-Islamic or contrary to shari'a" (Barnabas Fund 2012 as cited in Parliament 2012: ev 177). The Fund uses Greenhill's 2011 article to extrapolate that the United Kingdom must be especially sceptical of the Arab Spring's ability not to become repressive regimes.

For Parliament, this memorandum establishes the United Kingdom's view of the Arab Spring within a post-colonial, paternalistic view. They admit that they were "taken by surprise" and "did not have a sufficiently broad base of contacts from different social groups and geographical regions [...]" (Parliament 2012: 20), which shows that in the post-colonialist view, these countries and the people suffering in them, especially in Libya, were not important enough for the Foreign Affairs Committee until they affected trade and diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. This memorandum does not challenge the overarching social practices of Western-style diplomacy, and reinforces the 'us versus them' dichotomy. Using the Barnabas Fund, a charity accused of xenophobia the year before the memorandum was released, shows that the committee supports the ideas of the Fund, even though there is
no real proof for the Fund's evidence. The intertextuality of the memorandum, using texts that support long-established ideas, shows that the discourse of the House of Commons was to maintain the status-quo and absolve the country of any sort of blame (Jørgensen et al 2002).

"Arab Spring Optimism Gives Way to Fear of Islamic Rise"

Fox News is mostly a television broadcast but has an extensive online presence, just as the Daily Mail does. Many of the online articles are matched with similar news broadcasts. The Fox News website is similar to the Daily Mail one in that it has social media share buttons and links down the side to articles that are popular on the site. Unlike the Daily Mail, Fox News has a less-cluttered page with three colours (red, white and blue) instead of multiple ones (see Fig 3.2).

![Fox News webpage](https://example.com/fn_article.png)

*Figure 3.2 - Webpage for Fox News article 28 October 2011*

The title is a dichotomy: "optimism gives way to fear" (Rosen 2011). Just as in the Daily Mail article, readers are told that Islam should be feared -- the title does not say "extremist" or "fundamentalist". The countries where the Arab Spring happened are mostly Muslim to begin with; conflating Islam with terrorism confirms the anti-Islamic discursive practices of these conservative media (Machin et al 2015).
*Fox News* tends to use hyperbolic language to increase fear in its readers (Machin et al 2015). In the very first sentence, the Arab Spring has been "tempered by fear in Western capitals that radical Islamists might also rise up and try and hijack [it]" (Rosen 2011). The fear is in Western capitals because it is in those capitals where religion and government must be separate for there to be democracy.

As in the *Daily Mail* article by Greenhill, Rosen writes of the new government in Libya. However, instead of just focussing on the National Transitional Council, he also writes of "an ex-terrorist once jailed by the Central Intelligence Agency" who "now runs the country's foremost military organization [...]" (2011). Calling someone an 'ex-terrorist' is typing a person, also known as genericization (Machin et al 2015: 81). Any *Fox News* reader will see 'terrorist' and know exactly what Rosen means, or would be able to conjure up some image of a terrorist from a film or television show. Muslims have been terrorists in film and television for a long while (Oliver 2015a), and so using 'terrorist' to describe the head of a military organisation will help readers picture him.

Rosen changes tack to write about the Obama administration's failures during the Arab Spring. People who consumed *Fox News* and other conservative media outlets read near-constant hostility against the Obama administration. The hostility against Obama spread to his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Rosen (2011) asks two hypothetical questions; it is the second one that shows what Rosen and other conservatives feel: "Have events to date strengthened U.S. security -- or left American weakened abroad, with Islamic fundamentalism ascendant?" Usually, political writing is ambiguous, so that there could be some sense of "addressing" the issue "without actually making clear what this involves" (Machin et al 2015: 191). However, Rosen's language is clear whilst the question is hedging; even using an em-dash shows that the second part of the question is how Rosen actually feels about the situation in Libya (Machin et al 2015).

Rosen writes about Jamie Smith, "a former CIA officer who has made three fact finding trips to Libya this year" (2011). Using Smith as an expert gives the article some veneer of respectability, as words from government officials are used more often in news stories, and media consumers tend to trust government officials more than any other experts (Fairclough
2015). Rosen also does not quite Smith directly, but tells us what he "says" (2011); not directly quoting someone and re-wording whatever statements they might give allows the author to give some distance between the speaker and the consumer, which not only gives the speaker more expertise but also the sense of engagement (Machin et al 2015: 59). Rosen quotes Smith directly later in the article: "So now you've got a radical Islamist terrorist leader who is running the most powerful military group in Libya" (2011). Here is someone who was not only in the CIA but also a war veteran using language that Fox News readers would understand. Even though Rosen uses the neutral structuring word "said" or "says" whenever he is quoting Smith, the language he is using is still inflammatory. Neutral words tend to disengage the speaker from the consumer (Machin et al 2015), making the speaker have more expertise or even more power over the discourse (Fairclough 2015).

In the video, which talks mostly about Egypt, the journalist interviews "Islamic hardliners who don't hide their zeal to impose Sharia law" (embedded in Rosen 2011). Of course, speaking only to hardliners and showing videos of protests from the more extreme groups glosses over the fact that there are myriad forms of Islam and those who may want a more secular government or those that do not see shari'a as opposed to democracy. Within the video, one of the reporters make reference to the Salafi movement within Egypt (embedded in Rosen 2011). Salafism is another name for Wahhabism, an ultra-conservative movement within Sunni Islam. Substituting salafism with Islam, as they do in the video, "conceals and shapes understanding" (Machin et al 2015: 164). Knowing about the various sects and beliefs within the Islamic community is not expected of a normal media consumer, but only focussing on one makes it the dominant way of thinking about Islam, and makes it easier to create the understanding of Islam and terrorism being connected (Machin et al 2015).

Both the Greenhill and Rosen articles conflate Islam and terrorism through the lens of what is beneficial or not to the West. Both articles present one side of Islam and make the idea of Shari'a something antithetical to democracy. They both write of the rise of fundamentalism as a given, meaning there will be no room for argument (Machin et al 2015). Anyone seen using diplomacy instead of force is seen as weak and foolish, as both Cameron and Obama were described (Greenhill 2011 and Rosen 2011). In this way, the wall between Muslim-majority
countries and the West are strengthened, even though there may have been political alliances before the Arab Spring.

"Faces of the Arab Spring --The Good, the Bad and the Ugly"

This opinion piece on *Fox News* was written by JD Gordon. Gordon, according to the *Fox News* biography, "is a retired Navy Commander who served as a Pentagon spokesman in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2005-09" (2011). This immediately gives him a position of power and makes his opinion more legitimate (Fairclough 2015).

In his opinion piece, Gordon separates six "key players" in the Arab Spring uprising into three categories based on the film *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly* (2011). Because of his declared expertise in military and defense matters, his categorization is seen as more factual and believable, and readers less likely to question it (Machin et al 2015).

Gordon sets out to "distinguish [those] who share our values and love for freedom - versus those who despise them" (2011). "Sharing values" implies values that Gordon and his readers would have, and thus would not have be explicitly said (Fairclough et al 2017). A "love for freedom" is another implication: there are many types of freedom, but an American author writing to an American audience would not have to elucidate that he means the freedoms either outlined in the US Constitution or built into the American mythos. Using this kind of language creates an understanding between the publication and its audience, creating a sort of solidarity. Gordon, writing for *Fox News* "is speaking on behalf of itself" and "its readers"; "in doing so, [*Fox News*] is making an implicit authority claim [...] - that it has the authority to speak for others" (Fairclough 2015: 143).

Under the heading *The Ugly*, Gordon writes this about Abu Sufian Bin Qumu:

> A former Libyan Army tank driver in the 1980's, his arrest on drug and murder charges caused him to flee to Egypt, then Afghanistan and later Sudan where he developed strong ties to Al Qaeda. Captured by Pakistani security forces after fleeing Afghanistan in Dec. 2001, he was turned over to U.S. forces -- and shipped to Guantanamo. Transferred back to Col. Muammar Qaddafi's government in 2007, he
was later freed under an amnesty program. Bin Qumu is now leading and training Libyan opposition forces (2011).

Gordon and his audience would think that Bin Qumu is 'bad' and does not share their values for a number of reasons: his arrest for morally distasteful things, his work with a terrorist organisation, and his work with Qaddafi. Listing his drug charges could be a stylistic choice, or it could show that Gordon finds it worse than murder. Murder is seen as amoral and against many people's values; feelings about drugs vary across cultures. However, for Gordon and his readers, drug charges are usually seen as just as serious as any other amoral activity. The fact Bin Qumu worked with Al Qaeda is immediately disqualifying; al Qaeda is the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Finally, his work with Qaddafi would be seen as morally suspect, because Qaddafi is a polarising figure in Western media even though Western governments worked with him throughout his reign.

Gordon calls President Obama 'Mr Obama' (2011), showing a distinct lack of respect for Obama's position. Though that it his choice, it seems odd for a person who had such close ties to government and the presidency in general, especially someone who was once in the military. Disrespecting the Commander-in-chief generally results in a dishonorable discharge, something Gordon would have known. He does call Obama "our president" later, but his speech early in the article shows his readers how he really feels about Obama (2011). He use of "our president" also seems less respectful within its context: "Since our president now seems content to let the chips fall where they may in emerging governments -- we shouldn't be surprised when anti-U.S. hostile regimes become the norm throughout the Arab world" (Gordon 2011). In full context, Gordon is using 'our president' sarcastically, letting his readers know that he too finds Obama and his non-military approach to the Arab Spring distasteful.

This opinion piece follows a few important pieces of media storytelling: consonance, unambiguity and superlativeness (Bell 1991). Gordon writes of these men with the knowledge that his readers have "preconceptions about the social group or nation from which the news actors come" (Bell 1991: 157); this is consonance. Gordon knows his readers have ideas about Arab people, and the fact that most of his readers believe that Arab people are Muslim, and Muslim people cannot hold the same beliefs and morals as Western, white Christian
people. He describes each person unambiguously (Bell 1991): the people in the "good" column are "Western friendly, modern and secular" or "pro-business" (Gordon 2011). And using titles such as good, bad and ugly are superlatives (Bell 1991). Gordon's readers know what each column means, and to be in the Ugly column means to be against American values.

"Feu sur la Libye de Kadhafi!"

*Lé Figaro* is the oldest daily newspaper in France. It has an upper-class writing style, and has been a moderate right-wing newspaper since its inception in 1826. In 2006, it was banned in Tunisia after publishing an opinion piece that was anti-Islam and critical of the Prophet Muhammad (CPJ 2006). The newspaper is owned by the Dassault Group, who not only owns a military supply company but also has members in Le Parlement in the conservative Républcains, formerly the Union for a Popular Movement.

This article, entitled 'Fire on Kadhafi's Libya!' is written almost in a short-story style, with sweeping descriptions of the planes, the naval vessels and the soldiers themselves. Conservative media and consumers of conservative media broadly see the military as the highest form of authority: they are hierarchical, heavily male and defenders of the homeland. French people have a generally neutral view towards its military, but as *Lé Figaro* is owned by a military supplier, their coverage is going to be positive.

This is listed as a *reportage exclusif* [exclusive report]: *Lé Figaro* is the only newspaper allowed on board the aircraft carrier named *Charles de Gaulle*. It starts as a captain's log, with the time and date, along with the location of the vessel. It goes on to describe the aircraft on board, along with the missiles, and then the soldiers themselves: "Habillés de rouge, les armuriers s'affairent sous l'œil de leur chef, une femme" [Dressed in red, the arms specialists busy themselves under the watch of their commander, a woman] (Clarens 2011). There is special attention to the fact that the leader is a woman, which is unusual enough to be newsworthy (Bell 1991). Though a country devoted to the equality of the sexes, the reality in France is far from that; there are still not feminine versions of military terms or ranks. Also, the word *s'affairer* is a much more refined version of the usual term for 'to busy oneself' [s'occuper], which shows that *Lé Figaro* places itself in the culture as an upper-class gatekeeper (Fairclough 2015).
The article is an exhaustive list of the firepower available to the French military, but it is also a look at the military itself. Clarens writes of the pilots: "Ces hommes sont hyperentraînés. [...] Surtout, ils ont mémorisés les codes, mots et chiffres qui permettront de les identifier s'ils devaient s'éjecter, ou de savoir s'ils n'ont pas un pistolet sur la tempe, s'ils n'ont pas été pris [These men are hyper-trained … Above all, they have memorised the codes, words and numbers that will allow them to be identified in case they have to eject, or to know if they have a gun to their temple, or if they've been taken] (Clarens 2011).

This part of the article paints the men as more masculine and more powerful than an average man; they are trained to be ready in case of any situation, and have been inoculated against fear by the grace of their extensive training. Here Clarens, who is a documentarian and has worked for French television as an editor, is using words to build a visual representation of these men, framing them as a camera would.

Every plane mentioned in the article is built by the Dassault Group, which is never mentioned in the article. Instead, to anthropomorphize these planes and to hide what they are used for, i.e. to drop missiles on targets, they are called "nounous" or "nannies" (Clarens 2011). This act of personification obscures the actual agents and processes of war (Machin et al 2015). Clarens does mention missiles and other weapons, but they are always dropped by the planes themselves and never by the gunners or other controllers. Missiles are now guided by computer, but someone still has to launch it; taking away the agent absolves the soldiers of blame (Machin et al 2015).

The only person named in the entire article is rear-admiral Philippe Coindreau, to protect the safety of the soldiers' families, according to Clarens (2011). In describing France's role in NATO's mission in Libya, he states "Aujourd'hui, les forces libyennes sont partagés en deux. Il y a celles de Kadhafi et celles de l'opposition, et elles sont du même type. Il existe un risque de confusion de nous" [Currently, Libyan forces are split in two. It's the forces of the Kadhafi and those of the opposition, and they're the same type. There's a risque of confusion for us] (Clarens 2011). Here, the rear admiral admits that it is difficult for the French forces to tell the forces apart, especially from the air. Western forces do not take the time to learn about
their opposition, which brings the risk of killing allies or even innocent civilians. He continues to say that the operation is not well-coordinated and that there exists a great risk for condemnation [méprise] (Clarens 2011). Here, Clarens (2011) shows Coindreau as vulnerable and thoughtful, in order to keep him a sympathetic character (Machin et al 2015).

At the end of the article, Coindreau speaks again, this time in answer to a question. The reporter asks about the criticism that the operations have garnered ["Que pensez-vous des critiques formulées contre les opérations menées en Libye?"] (Clarens 2011). Coindreau replies "C'est essentiellement le fait politique qui est critiqué. Pas le fait militaire" [It's essentially the politics that's being critiqued, not the military action] (Clarens 2011). Where Coindreau is wrong is that whilst it was the National Assembly that chose to join the NATO coalition against Libya, it is the soldiers who are carrying out the mission. In America, there is a mantra of "Support the Troops!" even if one fundamentally disagrees with the idea of war itself; once again, war is so depersonalised that there is no connection between the soldier and the war (Machin et al 2015). France and America both have volunteer armies; there is no need to join the military currently. National pride, tradition and, in America's case, fear of poverty, make people choose to join the military, but military forces should be prepared for criticism, especially since their ranks uphold colonial powers and patriarchal ideals of hierarchy.

Clarens takes her readers on-board a vessel covered in planes owned by the same company that owns the newspaper for which she writes. The soldiers show off their strength, power and might on a ship named for a French national hero and the Dassault Group gets to parade their best military planes for the wealthy readers of Le Figaro. France has a long military history, but the language used in this article recalls propaganda of the First World War. Intertextuality connects readers to a proud past (Jørgensen et al 2002), though this coalition strike would probably not be considered just.

"Printemps arabe: les islamistes ne sont plus bannis"

In this Le Figaro article, Georges Malbrunot states that French ambassadors are retrying diplomacy with the so-called Islamist groups across the Maghreb now that the old powers have fallen in those countries. The Maghreb are the northern African countries, some former colonies, which were affected by the Arab Spring.
In the article, he quotes Alain Juppé, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, as telling the French ambassadors of those nation states to increase their visibility to those Islamic groups who had accepted democracy and renounced violence ["élargir le spectre de leurs interlocuteurs aux courants islamiques ayant accepté le jeu démocratique et renoncé à la violence"] (Malbrunot 2011). The Minister of course holds the power in this discourse (Fairclough 2015); he and his ambassadors are trained diplomats who understand the game of democracy, whereas the rebels of the Arab Spring have been fighting against dictators and have had to play a different game.

In Libya, however, the diplomats are more wary of the Transitional Councils, especially the leader of the Tripoli Military Council Abdel Hakim Belhaj, mentioned in Rosen's 2011 article as a former jihadi (Malbrunot 2011). Belhaj has military power, but the Western powers want him to soften his ideas towards the rights of women and the role of religion, which Malbrunot points out specifically ["droit des femmes, rôle de la religion notamment"] (2011). Once again, there is a confusion between separation of church and state as a Western ideal and how religion and government might work in any non-Western context.

An unnamed ambassador recognises that diplomats had ignored the Islamic contingent of the Arab Spring: "Bien sûr que nous avions tort de ne pas voir les islamistes [...] Les islamistes que je rencontre sont des gens raisonnables et rationnels, ils ont une stratégie, ce sont des politiques, c'est de notre devoir de les voir" [Of course we were wrong not to speak with the Islamists. … The Islamists that I meet are reasonable and rational people; they have a strategy. It's politics, and it's our duty to meet with them] (Malbrunot 2011). People who are not named in news articles tend to be open with reporters; here there is an admittance that Western powers are sometimes blind to working with people because of their own biases; this is similar to the admission by the UK's Foreign Affairs Committee that the Arab Spring took them by surprise (Parliament 2012).
With the advent of the Internet and the ability to make comments on news articles, audience reactions are easier to gauge how the article is affecting social practice (Jørgensen et al. 2002). The comment above echoes most all the articles cited in this section; this person holds a very Western view of democracy and secularism (see Fig 3.3):

La séparation de la religion [sic] et de l'état est un des piliers de la démocratie. Malheureusement les peuples arabes ne l'ont apparemment [sic] pas compris alors que la chance leur était donnée. Entre un dictateur qui prônait la laïcité [sic] et un gouvernement qui prône la charia et l'intolérance, le peuple arabe va encore souffrir et les femmes se voiler. Bon courage aux nouveaux "afghanistan" [sic] et talibans!

[The separation of religion and the state is one of the pillars of democracy. Unfortunately, the Arabic people apparently did not understand that chance that was given to them. Between a dictator who promised secularism and a government which extols Shari'a and intolerance, Arabic people will once again suffer and women will cover themselves. Good luck to the new "Afghanistsans" and Talibans!] (bbb hhh as commented on Malbrunot 2011)

This person conflates Shari'a with the forced veiling of women, and diminishes the human rights abuses of Kadhafi and the other Arab Spring dictators because they promised secularism. Malbrunot writes that French ambassadors are willing to work with Islamic groups as long as they conform to Western ideals. This xenophobia is even more subtle because on the surface, being willing to work with Islamic groups makes it seem that French ambassadors are willing to meet with them despite differences in religion and politics; however, the ambassadors are only willing to meet with them on certain grounds. This means that the discourse will be unbalanced, with the French side holding power and the Islamic groups having to work within an unfamiliar framework (Fairclough 2015).
3.2 Benghazi: Myth and Fact

The attacks of Benghazi happened on the eleventh anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Rumours and allegations circled the globe immediately following the attack, which culminated in a years-long investigation by the Republican majority US House of Representatives. Whilst no-one was held criminally liable, the House condemned President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Conservative media around the world repeated the stories as first reported, making murky the actual truth.

"Bloody handprints, stolen documents and shocking security failings: Harrowing pictures inside crumbling U.S. consulate in Benghazi after attacks that left ambassador and three others dead"

The Daily Mail's write-up of the events at Benghazi on 11 September 2012 were written two days later. Because of this, much of the article is speculative and based on early reports that had not been substantiated.

Daily Mail articles begin with bullet points of the more salient or more shocking points of the article. Whilst this may be helpful for people scanning the news during a time-crunch, it is easy to provide misleading or false information without context (Bell 1991). The bullet points are full of inflammatory language: "Dramatic, bloody, horror; sensitive documents; attack could not be prevented" (Stebner 2012). Using language like this, readers will connect this attack with other attacks that would have been described in this way (Bell 1991).

Since this article was written within two days of the attack, there was still no actual information on what had happened or what had transpired. The Daily Mail's articles are usually pushed out without much analysis. This may not be the fault of the original writer, but of the copy editor, who may treat the story "as reality, an adequate and accurate representation (which is of course an idealization)" (Bell 1991: 225).

Using the passive voice, such as "reports have also circulated…" (Stebner 2012) means that there is no agent and thus no blame to be placed (Machin et al 2015). These qualifiers also allow the Daily Mail to print unsubstantiated reports or rumours such as "the attack in
Benghazi was an inside job and...the US Department of State knew of the attack up to 48 hours ahead of time..." (Stebner 2012). Later, Stebner once again uses similar language when she writes "it is also believed..." (2012). By hedging, a writer or copy editor may protect themselves from any repercussions, but people tend to ignore that type of language, especially if it agrees with their beliefs in the first place (Fairclough et al 2017).

In the recounting of the timeline, Stebner uses the word swarm to describe the protestors outside of the consulate: "nearly 400 protestors were swarming around the complex" (2012). Using this sort of dehumanising language is common throughout conservative media, especially when talking about large crowds of non-white people. This language would be used later even by the Prime Minister of the UK David Cameron, when describing migrants trying to reach the United Kingdom through Calais, France: "You've got a swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life, wanting to come to Britain" (ITV 2015). This type of language raises fear in the readers of the Daily Mail.

Before the attack was fully understood, it was connected to protests against a severely anti-Islamic film. Other reasons were floated, such as retaliation for the killing of a Libyan Al-Qaeda leader or general 9/11 anniversary protests (Stebner 2012). All three of the reasons stem from the belief inherent in Western media about violence in Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim-majority societies. Even though most Western governments supported the actions of the Arab Spring protests, as goodwill faded, old stereotypes returned.

Even though the attacks were later established to be pre-planned, Stebner writes that the protests were a result of a film that had overtly racist and anti-Islamic themes (2012). She then writes a synopsis of the film, including a quote from the film-maker, where he states "Islam is a cancer" (Stebner 2012). Stebner describes the film as showing "the prophet Muhammad as a fraud, a womanizer and a madman in an overtly mocking way" (2012), implying that the film-maker had simply gone too far instead of lying. Muslims are often depicted in this way, and so this film is just a long line of negative depictions of people who follow Islam (Oliver 2015b).
The photos of the aftermath were the main point of the article. Photos of bloody handprints, ransacked and burned rooms will inflame either sympathy or anger, increasing fear amongst Westerners (Machin et al 2015). One of the photos that fits in with the feeling that this attack was specifically about the United States is a photo of a US flag trampled and dirty (see Fig 3.4). The photo caption states "Old Glory: A US flag is seen amid the rubble of the US consulate amid other debris" (Stebner 2012). For conservative American readers, seeing an American flag in a non-pristine state is an enormous insult; showing a dirty flag is like showing a flag being burned. This photo may "encourage the viewer to think about certain kinds of identities and values in a way that language could not have done" (Machin et al 2015: 31).

![Image of a US flag trampled and dirty](image.png)

**Figure 3.4 Photo from 13 September 2012 Daily Mail article by Beth Stebner**

Commenting on online articles makes it easier to see the opinions of readers. There is no way of knowing if these people are commenting honestly or trying to spark certain responses. However, commenting is a way to gauge the beliefs and values of a reader, or at least what they want other readers to think. The comment in figure 3.5 was a prevailing feeling amongst American readers, and even echoed by prominent politicians during the time: presidential candidate and US Senator Mitt Romney "said Obama's first reaction was to sympathize with
the attackers rather than to condemn the attacks" (Stebner 2012). In actuality, a statement from the American embassy released a statement on the anti-Islamic film: 'The Embassy of the United States in Cairo condemns the continuing efforts by misguided individuals to hurt the religious feelings of Muslims - as we condemn efforts to offend believers of all religions' (Stebner 2012). As Stebner mentions, the statement was released before the attacks (2012).

Figure 3.5 Comment on Daily Mail article by Stebner 13 September 2012

In a comment on the article, 'Bob' from 'Cooper Texas USA' states that "the blame lies squarely at Obama and Hillary Clinton's feet. [...] We cannot get hom [sic] out of office soon enough. He and clinton are funding the enemies of America both need to face treason charges" (as commented on Stebner 2012). The attacks at Benghazi were later found to be a series of mistakes and mishandling by many people, and whilst the leadership failed to provide adequate protection, it was the fault of poor budgeting and a lack of knowledge of growing resentment in Libya. Clinton and Obama were both guilty of questionable foreign policy decisions, but there was no proof after years of research of anything nefarious as both 'Bob' and Mitt Romney assumed.

Like the article about the Arab Spring movement moving towards "Islamic extremism" (Greenhill 2011), this article speaks of Islam and Muslims as quick to anger and mostly violent without acknowledgement that terrorists and ordinary Muslims do not agree on methodology or how to react to insults to Islam. Using inflammatory language and photos shows this article was written to elicit a negative response from readers, and solidify the narrative of Muslims -- or at least Arabs and North Africans -- as being an angry and reactionary people. Also, by writing so soon after the attacks, rumours, prevarications and outright falsehoods managed to become part of the discourse surrounding the Benghazi attacks.
In another article written a few days after the attack, *Le Figaro*’s article entitled "Benghazi: le récit de l'assaut anti-américain" [Benghazi: the account of an anti-American assault] is a bit more circumspect than the *Daily Mail* article but still contains rumours and unconfirmed accounts. It also uses inflammatory and racist language to describe the attackers.

According to the article, the attack started thus: "À proximité du consulat, les plus proches voisins confirment qu'une centaine d'hommes, des «extrémistes» islamistes, certains armés, sont arrivés vers 20 h 30, et que leurs tirs, notamment au RPG, ont contraint les forces de police à quitter les lieux" [Near the consulate, the closest neighbours confirm that around a hundred men, "extremist" islamists, some armed, arrived at around 2030 (830 pm) and that their shots, notably with RPGs, forced the police to leave the scene] (Portes 2012).

This statement directly contradicts the *Daily Mail* account, where there were 400 attackers and the attack started at 2200 [10 pm] (Stebner 2012). The timeline seems a little less clear in the *Figaro* account, but the lack of precision is taken up by story-telling. Each section is titled by intriguing words, and as *Le Figaro* tends to poetic, upper-class language, it is written more as a short-story based on facts. Portes even writes "Les épisodes suivants, sur lesquels les autorités américaines et libyennes ne se sont guère exprimées, sont dignes d'un roman d'espionnage" [The following events, about which the American and Libyan authorities have hardly spoken, are worthy of a spy novel] (2012). In this way, *Le Figaro* has "extracted bits of information and reassembled them in newsworthy order" (Bell 1991: 172). Instead of telling a chronological story, as most people tend to do, Portes sets up a story of an invading force against an ally, with all the historical undertones that may bring (Jørgensen et al 2002).

As in the *Daily Mail* article, there are rumours and suppositions that are not supported by any facts:

Rapide et meurtrière, l'opération est assurément l'œuvre d'hommes aguerris. Pour le commandant Shaqabi, les combattants issus de la rébellion libyenne ne sont pas capables d'une pareille action. À demi-mot, on comprend que ses frères d'armes soupçonnent plutôt d'anciens kadhafistes où des professionnels du djihad, venus peut-être de l'étranger. Mais le temps n'est pas aux suppositions.
Quick and deadly, the operation is assuredly the domain of experts. According to commander Shaqabi, Libyan rebel combatants are not capable of a comparable action. One might suppose that his comrades-in-arms suspect former Kadhafi fighters or jihadi mercenaries coming from abroad. But now is not the time for rumours. (Portes 2012)

By writing rumours and suppositions into his article, Portes allows them to become part of the text of Benghazi, and people usually remember things they have first read (Bell 1991). Also, writing of foreign jihadi fighters reinforces the cultural wars dynamics: jihad is an alien idea from a religion that many French people have antipathy towards (Polakow-Suransky 2017).

According to Portes, one of the witnesses describes "hundreds of men, extremists dressed in Afghani style with long beards" [une centaine d'hommes, des extrémistes habillés à l'afghane et portent de longues barbes] (2012). This image of extremists is completely familiar to Western readers; Afghani men wearing long tunics with vests and turbans with long beards is the quintessential "Muslim extremists" because of Osama Bin Laden and the Mujahadeen. By describing the attackers that way, readers would have an instant vision of those that attacked the Benghazi consulate and any attendant feelings of those visions.

Just as Portes and Stebner wrote of rumours and suppositions without making any corrections, thus putting the rumours and suppositions into the discourse surrounding Benghazi, so too did readers and commentators. There was so much false information in the days that followed the Benghazi attack that it took four years to put down any sort of timeline in an official capacity, and even then there were unanswered questions and continued rumours. One of the commentators on the Le Figaro article (Fig 3.6) adds a lie when she writes "Les videos [sic] que j'ai visionnées montrent les terroristes jouer à se lancer le corps de l'ambassadeur. Votre article ne raconte pas tout" [The videos I saw show the terrorists throwing around the body of the ambassador. Your article doesn't tell everything] (dejanire as commenting on Portes 2012). There are no videos showing this horrific event; there may be videos of terrorists defiling a human body, but that this commentator thinks she saw videos of it happening here means that she believes that terrorists are capable of it and that they are this same group.

Commander Imad Shaqabi is a commander of the Daraa Libyan (Libyan Shield) militia.
Both the Daily Mail and Le Figaro articles were written very quickly after the attack. There are discrepancies in both, but they have many things in common: horrified language about the complete destruction of the consulate and the killing of four Americans. There are even the same photos of the destruction and the rioters in both articles. Using similar language, even across different language groups, shows that there is some commonality in thought amongst conservative journalists. However, if a journalist is not able to go to a country in question, they may use a news agency such as Agence France Presse or the Associated Press (Bell 1991). Because of that agency use, "the multiple and apparently independent versions make the story seem unfaultable" (Bell 1991: 227). But if the agency does not have all the information, or has its own agenda, the article itself may have the same issues; i.e. misinformation, lies or bias.

"The ugly truth about Benghazi and Team Obama"

In Michael Goodwin's opinion piece on Fox News, "The ugly truth about Benghazi and Team Obama", he spends a lot of time accusing the president and his administration of lying and using overwrought, bombastic language with no factual support. The opinion piece ends with a course of action that is the only way to correct what Goodwin sees as a massive error (Fairclough et al 2017).

Goodwin writes that "there were two possible explanations for why the White House failed to immediately call the Benghazi attack an act of terrorism" (2012). Of course, President Obama did say "No act of terror will go unpunished" two days after the attack (Stebner 2012). However, Goodwin means that President Obama did not call it Islamic terrorism, which for Fox News and its readers, is the only type of terrorism that exists. For example, when a white
supremacist attacked a Sikh temple in Wisconsin on the 5th of August, 2012, the attacker was simply called a shooter and his time as a soldier was highlighted (Fox News 2012). This phenomenon is not restricted to Fox News, and to deny terrorism exists in any other context other than Islamic types is reinforce the status-quo (Jørgensen et al 2002).

Goodwin's argument is that President Obama should be punished by Congress for his and his administration's flagrant lies. To deconstruct his argument, Fairclough et al have systemized arguments with "circumstantial premises, goal premises, value premises and a claim for action" (2017: 88).

Claim (solution): In order to punish the president "the next move is up to Congress." / "Republicans say they are determined to get the full truth..." / "...[T]he full power of the constitution must be brought to bear." (Goodwin 2012)

Circumstantial premises (problems): "The repeated claim...was a monstrous lie." / "It was political self-preservation, meaning the president and his team put politics first." / "[Susan] Rice made a fool of herself..." (Goodwin 2012)

Goal premises: "...[H]uge economic and tax differences must be resolved..." / "[T]he country would be better served if the administration co-operates." (Goodwin 2012)

Value premises: "Professional integrity" / "Nobody is above the law..." (Goodwin 2012)

Though Goodwin lists his goals for the Obama administration, he also states that the truth would be "unlikely" (2012), even though later investigation did not find the administration completely culpable (House of Representatives, 114th Congress 2016). Also, Goodwin gives platitudes to "ex-CIA boss David Petraeus", even though he was being investigated for his conduct by the CIA (2012).

Goodwin disrespects President Obama and his administration, accusing him of lying and incompetence. He is especially withering towards a woman of colour, calling her "damaged
goods”; this is dehumanising language (Fairclough 2015). His language is problematic and racist, along with xenophobic by reinforcing the false link between terrorism and Islam.

"Final Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi"

In 997 pages, Republican Congresspeople try and put an official spin on the Benghazi attacks. They use official statements, testimony from Congressional hearings and also quotes from conservative news sources. The writing is not directly xenophobic or Islamophobic; however, it maintains the American mythos whilst the majority party browbeats the minority party.

Representatives Jim Jordan and Mike Pompeo's addendum to the report is the most partisan. They are both incredibly conservative; Pompeo once stated on the House floor in 2013 that Muslim leaders who did not immediately condemn terrorist attacks were "potentially complicit" in the attacks (Beinart 2018). Therefore, whilst they are careful not to blame Muslims directly, it is not difficult to see why they write so vehemently on the failures of President Obama and Secretary Clinton.

Instead of directly answering questions about the attack, Jordan and Pompeo just claim that Obama and Clinton lied for political gain. According to them: "And so on this highly charged political stage—just 56 days before the presidential election—events forced the administration to make a choice about what to tell the American people…” (House of Representatives 2016: 424). In fact, the differences between what is said publicly and privately is referenced throughout the addendum. It is doubtful that many people would read the whole report, but it is the most complete Republican view of the attack. There is a Democratic rebuttal from the Democratic Representatives, but it was not reported on in Fox News, thus it did not get as wide an audience as the conservative report.

As in Goodwin's article, Jordan and Pompeo list the problems of the administration; unlike Goodwin, they offer no solutions. So their list of problems is just that; in this setting, the goal premise would be that the administration did an awful job, thus Democrats should not be trusted with high-level administration (Fairclough et al 2017). In their addendum, Jordan and Pompeo list the following circumstantial premises, i.e. problems with the Benghazi incident:
The administration misled the public about the events in Benghazi
Security in Benghazi was woefully inadequate and Secretary Clinton failed to lead
America did not move heaven and earth to rescue our people
The administration broke its promise to bring the terrorists to justice
The administration did not cooperate with the investigation (House of Representatives, 114th Congress 2016: 424-425)

Expanding on them later in the addendum does not clarify their position. For the
circumstantial premise "the administration broke its promise to bring the terrorists to justice",
Jordan and Pompeo write that "that terrorist will not receive the full measure of justice after
the administration chose not to seek the death penalty" (House of Representatives, 144th Congress 2016: 424). For Jordan and Pompeo, the death penalty is the highest form of justice,
though this is not the view held by Western societies in Europe, though very far-right parties
in the UK and France would like a return to the death penalty. In their addendum, Jordan and
Pompeo do not "explicitly advocate for a course of action" (Fairclough et al 2017: 8);
however, due to their animus towards President Obama and Secretary Clinton, one can
assume that it would be a return to Republican leadership, which is what occurred.

In political discourse analysis, "getting people to accept a particular narrative of the crisis, to
see it in a certain way, is generally a political concern precisely because it gives people a
reason for favouring or accepting certain lines of action and policies rather than others"
(Fairclough et al 2017: 4). This report was meant to place the blame squarely on President
Obama and Secretary Clinton, but also to destroy their credibility as political actors. By only
finding fault with Obama and Clinton, without trying to contextualize any errors that may
have occurred, any past actions by previous administrations would be masked.

Even though the two year investigation could not directly fault the Obama administration,
people believe that Benghazi was a terrorist attack that could have been predicted and stopped
before the death of four Americans. The Benghazi incident is where the splintering of
viewing politics in America began. How one feels about what happened usually determines
one's political affiliation. As there was no satisfactory conclusion, whomever one believed
determines their action in future elections.
3.3 13 November 2015: Attacks in Paris

The attacks in Paris on the 13th of November 2015 were horrific. It shattered the general feeling of security in France and in the European Union overall. However, it was not long after the attacks that the narrative returned immediately to the so-called "Muslim threat" lurking within the country (Polakow-Suransky 2017).

"Paris attack sees 129 dead after Eagles of Death Metal"

The Daily Mail's article on the attacks was hastily written the day of the attacks. It is full of errors and blatant anti-Islamic and xenophobic writing. As in the Le Figaro article about Benghazi, it is not written in chronological order, but in what would be the most 'newsworthy' (Bell 1991), including listing the British and American victims, and posting bloody photos and videos along with victims wrapped in emergency blankets. In this way, the Daily Mail is "selecting and staging the events it reports and, simultaneously… promoting its own norms about how we should feel, think and act on the world…" (Chouliaraki 2006: 61).

As in all other Daily Mail articles, there is a bulleted summary at the beginning, filled with incendiary language: "up to 100 were massacred" ; "militant [sic] brandishing an AK-47 machine gun"; "two suicide bombers"; "disguising themselves as migrants entering Greece" (Akbar et al 2015). Knowing that Daily Mail readers share their views, using words like this will tell the readers that those writing also share their views. Sprinkled throughout the article are pieces of writing that let the reader know that the attackers were not only foreign, but Muslim: they are called "jihadi gunmen" and it is mentioned three times that the attackers called out "Allahu-Akbar" (Akbar et al 2015). Three of the attackers were migrants, which connected them to all the other migrants that had entered Europe around this time. Other articles had already written about the so-called migrant crisis, calling them "marauding migrants" and "armed refugees" who "swarm around vehicles waiting at the port" of Calais wanting to come to Britain (Barnett and Ingham 2015). Whilst the religion of the migrants are not always mentioned, in the article about the Paris attacks, the fact that the attackers were Muslim was highlighted.

The Daily Mail writes about the attacks in multiple ways: describing in detail the deaths of the Britons, listing those who had died by number and nationality, along with human interest
pieces like the man whose life was saved by his mobile phone, blood donations and even the fact that a football match against the English the following week would probably be postponed (Akbar et al 2015). This could be attributed to the fact that there were four writers on this massive article, with other writers contributing, but the jumbled, confusing layout of the article is two-fold. First, the Daily Mail is written for a very large British audience who would have already been following the news on social media, and so it is close to the layout of a jumbled Twitter or Facebook feed, both of which have no real sense of time (Bell 1991). And secondly, not really knowing who is reading means that the Daily Mail would have to know how to cater to any type of reader (Bell 1991).

The final part of the article lists all the other terrorist attacks in the Western world, or at least attacks that affected Westerners. According to Chouliaraki:

Any piece of news in cultural or geographical proximity to the West has priority over news from afar, often independently of the latter's magnitude. This hierarchy of viewing depends on the concentration of the economic and political powers of broadcasting in the West, which renders the sufferings of Western people relevant and urgent… (2006: 63)

Only one terror attack of the nine mentioned was from an organisation not connected to "Islamic extremism", and only three were outside of Europe or the United States: Bali, Indonesia; Mumbai, India and Sousse, Tunisia (Akbar et al 2015). However, Western victims were mentioned directly in the Bali and Sousse attacks and in the short section on the Mumbai attacks, they were framed as something that could happen in the UK (Akbar et al 2015).

Blatant xenophobia is not necessary in articles like this one. Using biased speech, conflating all terrorists attacks with Islam, making sure that one's readers knew that there were migrants in the Paris attack sets up the expectation that Islam is a violent religion that supports these attacks. The article is written to inflame readers with the spectacle of Western suffering at the hands of foreign invaders; for readers of the Daily Mail, this would not be unusual.
"Prime Minister’s Response to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015-16"

David Cameron's memo, released after the 13 November attacks, lists his ideas and arguments for the UK's continuing strategy in the Middle East. He argues for military action in Syria in order to protect the United Kingdom, and also to try and reduce radicalisation in the United Kingdom itself (Cameron 2015).

In arguing for military action in Syria, Cameron states that the need for this action "arises because of a government's first duty: the responsibility to protect its citizens" (2015: 1). His claim is that since ISIL\(^3\) has its headquarters in Syria, that they must attack ISIL where it is before it can attack the United Kingdom (Cameron 2015). This may be a sound argument, but it is not valid: many of the terrorists do not travel from Syria to the United Kingdom, but are groomed within the country or are residents who travel to Syria to get training. In one line, Cameron says that the United Kingdom will "continue our effort here at home to counter radicalisation" (2015: 2). However, there are no goal premises to support this promise, therefore there are no actual conclusions to draw or arguments to be made (Fairclough et al 2017).

Cameron's memo is separated into five sections: The Threat from ISIL; The UK's Strategy for Syria; Diplomatic Action; Humanitarian Action; and Military Action (2015). In each section, he outlines his arguments for how best to deal with the Syrian crisis. Whilst his arguments may be sound, he is arguing from a neoliberal and British Conservative premise, which means that he believes that military might will correct whatever issues there may be in Syria, and humanitarian action must somehow benefit the United Kingdom.

Under the section describing the threat from ISIL, Cameron claims that "ISIL targets our way of life, spreading fear and terror" (2015: 3). He then continues to say that "they [ISIL] exploit the internet both to radicalise and recruit the vulnerable…" (Cameron 2015: 3). To claim that

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\(^3\) ISIL is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the acronym used by Cameron and Obama. ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is used often in America, and in France and by most Arabic speakers, Daesh or Daech, the Arabic acronym (داعش).
using military action against these attempts might stem radicalisation is to assume that killing ISIL recruiters in Syria may stop any other radical from using the internet to recruit.

In the section about the strategy from Syria, one of Cameron's goals is to "continue our leading role in humanitarian support and forestall further migratory flows towards Europe" (2015: 4). Although he writes that ISIL is a major threat, and that they are dangerous for British people, he implies that Syrians are safe and they should not continue to try and come to Europe. In 2015, only 16915 people were granted asylum or some other form of protection in the UK (Blinder 2019) versus over fifty thousand in Germany during the same period (Grote 2018). Also, as Cameron planned to join the coalition airstrike (2015), he would have been creating more danger for the Syrian people, creating even more refugees and asylum seekers.

By joining the airstrike, Cameron argues that "this military effort helps put ISIL on the defensive, suppressing their ability to conduct external attacks against the UK and our friends and allies" (2015: 8). Here, the conservative ideal of using violence to solve violent problems is on display. Although Cameron writes about political solutions, he thinks that only brutality will combat brutality. These military strikes might work temporarily, but from the American perspective do not work: Iraq and Afghanistan are still in disarray and terrorists regularly kill soldiers and civilians in both these countries.

Cameron's argument cannot "withstand critical questioning" (Fairclough et al 2017: 94). His decisions may appease warhawks in his own party, but are decried by the opposite party and even his anti-war constituents. This memorandum was meant to justify military reasoning, but Cameron evades direct answers and misinterprets data in order to advance his own argument (Fairclough et al 2017). His decision to use military action cannot be seen as legitimate as there were no public exchanges or deliberation (Fairclough et al 2017).

"President Obama Offers a Statement on the Attacks in Paris"
President Obama's remarks on the attacks in Paris were given the same day. Whilst the sentiments are bland and perfunctory, there is an underlying understanding that the United States will support France in their future endeavours against terrorism.
President Obama, known as a skilful orator and as a lawyer, would be adept at debate and possible manipulation. Whilst this speech is not deliberative speech, nor is President Obama trying to advance an argument, parts of his speech contain persuasive definitions meant to push forth a rhetorical goal (Fairclough et al 2017). Twice Obama says that America will "stand together with them [France] in the fight against terrorism and extremism" and that "we have offered our full support to them" (2015). Here he has defined America as a staunch ally that will follow France into war. Since this is a speech to show condolence, we can assume that Obama is being truthful and sincere (Fairclough et al 2017), or at least knows that he must come across as truthful and sincere.

In Obama's speech, he states that "Paris itself represents the timeless values of human progress" and that "in this time of tragedy … the bonds of liberté and égalité and fraternité are not only values that the French people care so deeply about, but they are values that we share" (2015). This is an ideological flourish in that these beliefs are associated with a dominant group, i.e. France and Enlightenment thinking (Fairclough et al 2017). Whilst Obama may not be intentionally promoting these ideals, through education and immersion in Western thought, he as well as other Americans will have internalised this ideology (Fairclough et al 2017).

Unlike the conservative media articles, Obama does not call what happened in Paris 'radical Islamic terrorism'. However, he does not need to: when he says "we've gone through these kinds of episodes ourselves" (Obama 2015), an American audience will think of the eleventh of September, or the Boston bombing. When he calls France "an extraordinary counterterrorism partner" (Obama 2015), it is not likely he means against right-wing terror groups. Here, because it does not seem that President Obama is arguing for anything, there need not be any counter-argument; however, he is still pushing towards the rhetorical goal of retaliation against an enemy (Fairclough et al 2017).

Vice President Joe Biden's speech is a lot clearer and has an argument: "The United States stands ready to support the French government and the people of Paris" (2015). Biden's speech is much more emotive and persuasive; he is directing the American people towards one conclusion and no others (Fairclough et al 2017). Of course it is emotive and persuasive.
Loss of human life is an emotional event, and the need for retaliation may be strong in some people. However, it is during this time one should be most prepared against persuasive and emotive reasoning; one must "distinguish between those cases in which loaded terms are used legitimately to defend a particular standpoint... and those cases in which loaded terms and definitions are used deceptively, as if no other possible viewpoint is possible, as if they were neutral, fact-stating propositions beyond any conceivable doubt" (Fairclough et al 2017: 93).

Biden is not being deceptive; he believes that it is a proper course of action. However, with blunt language such as "we will never bow" and "we will never break" (Biden 2015), he is not allowing any other argument through.

Biden's language is closer to conservative language about terrorism when he states "such savagery can never threaten who we are" (2015). He calls the act itself savagery, though it is not far from calling people savage or savages, as conservative media would do. Biden has always been seen as a lot less measured and diplomatic than Obama, so his language is more blunt and less prevaricating. Whilst this may be seen as down-to-earth or relatable, Biden has chosen a very specific word that evokes a very specific image (Fairclough et al 2017).

Though neither President Obama nor Vice President Biden put forth a distinct argument, they are reinforcing the bonds of allyship between the United States and France. No matter how Americans themselves feel about France, they both know that they must show dedication to an ally, seeing as this relationship is durable and long-lasting, and must remain so in the current political atmosphere (Fairclough et al 2017).

"France's Hollande responds to Paris attacks that leave at least 129 dead"

In the Fox News article about the Paris attacks, all blame is placed squarely on Islamic extremism. Just as in the Daily Mail article, they use language that implies that all terrorism is connected to Islam. Also, they deny a face and a name to most of the victims and the attackers, making this whole incident seem far away from any possibility of humanity (Chouliaraki 2006).

In the opening paragraph, Herridge and Rosen write "Eight ISIS terrorists wielding AK-47s and wearing suicide belts carried out coordinated attacks at six sites around Paris Friday
night…” (2015). ISIS is the height of terrorism. Much of the news surrounding the organisation is about its horrific attacks, its executions of minority religious followers and other marginalised people. Starting the article with descriptions of terrorists that already have a fearsome reputation means that readers will already know how to react to the rest of the story (Bell 1991).

Herridge and Rosen mention that "France is already bombing ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq as part of the U.S.-led coalition, and has troops fighting extremists in Africa" (2015). Here, the implication is that ISIS is a foreign enemy that has brought the war to France, and France has become a battlefield against anti-Christian forces. George W Bush used this sort of language when he talked about the Crusade against al-Qaeda (Carroll 2004). To a Western audience, France is the center of much Christian ideology.

As this article was written the day after the attacks, there are still falsehoods in it that were never corrected. Herridge and Rosen write that a Syrian passport was found on one of the suicide bombers; this was later proven to be a false passport to hide the bomber's origins. This was a falsehood also repeated in the Daily Mail article, and by repetition, the pattern sticks; comments in the Daily Mail article implied that people were coming through the "refugee route" to cause violence (haradin commenting on Akbar et al 2015). The comments show that whatever news source the commentators are watching all have similar ideas and they are now part of the social practice of the group (Fairclough 2007).

Herridge and Rosen quote a statement from ISIS in their article:

"Let France and those who walk in its path know that they will remain on the top of the list of targets of the IS," the statement also read, in part, "and that the smell of death will never leave their noses as long as they lead the convoy of the Crusader campaign" (2015).

The statement from ISIS is violent and dangerous, but also repeats language about the Crusades and invaders. Hollande's speech the night of the includes the same sort of language when he describes France as fighting "a jihadist army" that is "against what we are: A free country that means something to the whole planet" (Herridge et al 2015). Once again, it is
West versus East, and Crusade versus jihad. So while Hollande's language is less confrontational, it is still setting up an argument (Fairclough et al 2017).

As in every article about an attack on Western targets, the terrorists shout "Allahu Akbar" and swear vengeance for Syria (Herridge et al 2015). With everything else in this article, it solidifies the anti-Islamic sentiment throughout conservative media. There is no counter-argument about the treatment of Muslims in France and how they are often marginalised in society and how poor integration leads to radicalisation (Polakow-Suransky 2017). This can also be seen in the radicalisation of White supremacists, but they are rarely grouped together as one threat, especially after an attack (Arendt 1958 and Polakow-Suransky 2017).

"Goldnadel: pour en finir avec l'islamo-gauchisme"

*Le Figaro* describes Goldnadel as the president of the Franco-Israeli Association. His opinion piece on the 13 November 2015 attacks, published on the same date as Hollande's speech to the French people, is full of invective and racist, but it is also a nationalist call-to-arms: his argument is that France has become weak in its multiculturalism, and that will be its downfall.

He opens with a visually powerful statement: "Bien sûr qu'il faut nommer le nom de la nouvelle bête immonde si on veut avoir la moindre chance de la terrasser" [Of course we need to name this new vile beast if we want to have the smallest chance of bringing it down] (Goldnadel 2015a). He uses hunting language, something done by the upper classes in France, to show his class bonafides. Comparing human beings to animals is dehumanising and insulting, and also something that antisemitic people say about Jewish people. Goldnadel is a secular Jew, but he does not think that Islamophobia is comparable with antisemitism, because Jewish people have suffered longer than Muslim people and are still not violent (2015b). Being Islamophobic in order to integrate better in French society would not matter to people in power, who have been Antisemitic for a long time in France and would continue to be so (Fairclough 2015). Being a model minority does not mean that one is safe from later discrimination.
Goldnadel claims that the problem is leftist or liberal Islam; Islam that has been made more palatable to French audiences by more exposure in political parties and in the media. In fact, he says that "Jamais l'islam radical ne se serait implanté aussi insidieusement, profondément, irrésistiblement sur le sol et dans les esprits français, sans l'assistance du prêt-à-penser gauchisant" [Never would radical Islam have been so insidiously, profoundly and irresistibly planted in the souls of the French, without the assistance from the perfectly-wrapped leftist notions] (2015). He claims that because the media has looked at how Muslims have been treated in France that they are apologising for the terrorists. However, when he claims that this leftist-Islam bond has gotten into politics, he is being deceptive (Fairclough et al 2017). French presidents on both sides of the aisle and all political persuasions have suppressed the ability of Muslims to freely practise their faiths (Polakow-Suransky 2017).

Goldnadel writes that Muslims should have given more than some small apology [léger regret] but says that "leftist stupidity...started screaming bloody murder about the state of emergency and mourning a multicultural France that you would think we wanted to kill" [la stupidité gauchisante... pousse ses premiers cris d'orfraie quant à l'état d'urgence et chante à nouveau les louanges d'une France multiculturelle que l'on aurait voulu assassiner] (2015). Here, he is blaming all Muslims in France for the actions of a disaffected, radicalised few. He is also continuing the idea that because integration has not been perfect, or that people are not acting like the true French, that they are all enemies and are only being protected by people who have been easily tricked (Polakow-Suransky 2017).

He approves of Hollande's state of emergency because he thinks that "Comme si l'on comprenait enfin que l'Europe psychotique, toujours en proie à son complexe de culpabilité, n'était pas moins suicidaire que ces hybrides paranoïaques d'Orient et d'Occident qui nous détestent tant" [Irrational Europe, still in the grip of its guilty conscience, finally understood that we needed to be less suicidal than these paranoid cross-breeds of East and West who hate us so much] (2015). His entire article has been dehumanising but here he compares the attackers and of course any immigrant who happens to be Arab to undesirable mixed breed animals. He also thinks that Europe is only kind to immigrants because of a guilt complex, which would possibly be the failure of the European state to save Jewish people.
Goldnadel has not written dog-whistles: his hatred is blatant, and polarising. The comments both decry and celebrate this essay. However, his belief in a France that submitting to Islamic will is not unusual, and he is only sharing the beliefs that are popular with the French power structure (Fairclough 2015). His argument is coupled with the hypocrisy of "defending the purity of French national identity" (Polakow-Suransky 2017: 3), as his parents are descended from Polish and Russian Jews.

"Hommage national: le texte intégral du discours de François Hollande"

President Hollande gave his speech to the victims of the 13 November 2015 attacks fourteen days later; he had written the speech himself (Manilèze 2015). It is a powerful speech meant to provoke powerful emotions. However, the various rhetorical flourishes that Hollande chooses to use show that this is not just a speech in remembrance of the victims, but an argument for how France should be viewed, especially against a particular enemy (Fairclough et al 2017).

Towards the beginning of the speech, Hollande states "Une horde d'assassins a tué 130 des nôtres et en a blessé des centaines, au nom d'une cause folle et d'un dieu trahi" [A horde of assassins killed 130 of our own and wounded hundreds of others, in the name of an insane cause and a misinterpreted god] (2015). He does not name each individual victim, but magnifies them as martyrs by calling those who killed them assassins; at the end of the speech, he even specifically calls them martyrs (Hollande 2015). As he continues, he says they were killed because they were "life, France and liberty" [la vie, la France, la liberté] (Hollande 2015).

In 2001, in the evening of the September 11th attacks, President George W Bush, in his speech to the American people, stated that "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world" (2001). In both speeches, the argument is that the terrorists hate France and America for their freedoms or their Western ideals; it is stated categorically, without any prevarication or vagueness. This ignores the harassment of Muslims in France, especially banning hijabs in public spaces and disallowing public Muslim prayer (Polakow-Suransky 2017), and the sudden removal of American support of the mujahadeen after the fall of the USSR, creating al-Qaeda. Targeting innocent
people would not be a reasonable response; however, to state that freedom and liberty were the only reasons for these two massive attacks would be misleading and deceptive (Fairclough et al 2017).

Hollande mentions the protests after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, where French people spoke out against racism and anti-Islamism more specifically. Speaking about that peace march, Hollande says "Ils savaient que la France n'est l'ennemie d'aucun peuple, que ses soldats se portent là où on les appelle, pour protéger les plus faibles et non pour assouvir une quelconque domination" [They knew that France is not the enemy of any people, that its soldiers go where they are called, to protect the weakest and not to satisfy some kind of domination] (2015). This of course ignores France's entire violent colonial history and the fact that many of the protesters in the crowd of the Charlie Hebdo attacks were protesting against the unnecessary wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria and the rise of anti-Islamic movements in France (Bantigny et al 2018). Aligning every French person with neoliberal and pro-war ideas precludes any other argument (Fairclough et al 2017).

When Hollande speaks of the terrorists, he mentions Islam specifically: "Nous connaissons l'ennemi, c'est la haine [...] c'est le fanatisme qui veut soumettre l'homme à un ordre inhumain, c'est l'obscurantisme, c'est-à-dire un islam dévoyé qui renie le message de son livre sacré" [We know the enemy, it is hatred … it is fanaticism which wants humans to submit to an inhumane order, it is anti-progress, that is, it is a perverted Islam that renounces the message of its sacred text] (2015). Even though he calls it a 'perverted' Islam, it is still Islam that is the cause of these attacks, and so it is Islam that must be stopped, according to Hollande's argument.

In order to stop the enemy, Hollande says "Cet ennemi nous le vaincrons ensemble, avec nos forces, celles de la République, avec nos armes, celles de la démocratie, avec nos institutions, avec le droit" [Together we will vanquish this enemy, with the forces of the Republic and with our weapons: those of democracy, our institutions, with the law] (2015). In this part of the speech, Hollande makes sure that Western philosophical arguments remain: democracy and the rule of law must be established as the sine qua non of anti-terrorism. However, using violent language such as 'vainquons' [vaincrons], 'forces' and 'weapons' [armes] shows that
violence is forefront on the agenda; violence being met with violence is a common reaction after terror attacks. In fact, Hollande continues directly after this statement with "Dans ce combat, nous pouvons compter sur nos militaires, engagés sur des opérations difficiles, en Syrie, en Irak, au Sahel" [In this fight, we can count on our soldiers, engaged in difficult operations in Syria, in Iraq and in the Sahel⁴] (2015). Here Hollande is reversing from the previous sentence: violence here is explicit. What is unusual is that only three of the eleven attackers were of foreign origin. A stronger case should be made to see where there were failures of integration across the European Union and helping those immigrants feel more welcome and more involved in their new societies. Bombing countries where people may be fleeing terrorism does nothing to invite understanding, nor is it the only clear way to combat terrorism. It certainly did not work after the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

Hollande's speech was a patriotic rallying cry after a damaging terrorist attack. However, using political rhetoric throughout means that he was trying to set an argument and advance his own goals (Fairclough 2017). He had no counter-arguments, which preclude any other discussion. In fact, speeches like these are meant to suppress voices of dissent by calling them anti-patriotic or worse, supportive of terrorism.

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⁴ The Sahel is a region of northern and western Africa stretching from Senegal to Sudan (Encyclopædia Britannica 2018).
CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION

4.1 Bias and Polarization

Bias is a blindness towards one's own social practices. If a person has never read anything except that which aligns with their own beliefs, then it is easy to believe certain ideas about the outside world.

Consensus, which is a general agreement about a certain topic, is something that is done to strengthen hierarchies and consolidate arguments (Fairclough et al 2017). Consensus building aligns a person's belief within the agreed upon social practice. Consensus is not negative as long as there has been a deliberative, fair process that allows for different viewpoints to be argued (Fairclough et al 2017). However, consensus cannot be done when there is only one power structure or one belief without any other viewpoints (Fairclough 2015).

Before the siloing effects of Twitter and Facebook, the internet was an open, anonymous forum that allowed for a mostly free exchange of ideas (Sparks in de Jong, Shaw and Stammer 2005). According to Sparks, "the whole point of the internet is that any computer, anywhere, can connect with any other computer, anywhere else" (in de Jong et al 2005: 43). Because of this openness and exchange, the internet was supposed to be a democratizing influence on speech and allow people from any background to voice their opinions and argue for their point of view. However, internet is not globally accessible; this is slowly changing with the relative inexpensive cost of smartphones. However, since Western countries did not have to start with lacking infrastructure, their ability for near full penetration of internet spaces and therefore control of online spaces is much more complete than most countries in the global South.

Since Western media has a much deeper penetration, Western concerns are going to be forefront. And therefore, Western philosophical ideas and political mores are going to be spread more quickly (Fairclough 2015). In this way, the prerogatives of the powerful are put forward as more newsworthy or more important as "media production is shaped by national cultures (de Jong in de Jong et al 2005: 111). The more you find articles from the Daily Mail..."
on your Facebook page, the more you will be exposed to their ideas, and the more you may agree with them.

On the internet, conservatives who use social media are more likely to become more conservative after being exposed to liberal ideas (Bail et al 2018). This is because conservative media is so insular that it usually only sources news from other conservative sources, and at least in the United States and the United Kingdom, political beliefs can determine where one lives and the media one consumes. However, because conservative media is a powerful force across Western media, it is not difficult for people to be exposed to it. According to Coppins, this sort of dissemination is because conservative media is organised and tends not to stray from central conservative ideas; it is harder for liberal or leftist media to be so organised as there are many different issues, ideas and morals (2017).

Conservative media is powerful because it does not try and fight capitalism. Media and news depends on powerful capitalist forces to be disseminated, including advertisement and even if certain cable or satellite companies will carry their stations (Sparks in de Jong et al 2005). Fox News is owned by Rupert Murdoch, a conservative Australian oligarch. Jonathan Harmsworth, 4th Viscount Rothermere, owns DMG Media, which runs the Daily Mail, and the Dassault Group, a military supplier, owns Le Figaro. Each of these media groups are owned by powerful men who can therefore control the media environment (Fairclough 2015).

Since the internet does allow anyone with even a small knowledge of internet protocol to post whatever they would like, there is a wealth of information posted that is not just incorrect, but completely false. However, if someone powerful endorses that information, it is difficult for that falsehood to be corrected (Bail et al 2018). Thus, if a powerful politician posts something from an unreliable site, more people will be exposed to that unreliable site, and would be more likely to believe it is true (Fairclough 2015). A reader may believe that it is "legitimate because it conforms to certain norms or values that [they] adhere to" (Fairclough et al 2017: 109).

It is often difficult to determine if a site has bias, especially if other sites use similar language or it happens to conform to the reader's bias. Even more difficult is when mass media with a
wide readership seems to hold the same consensus, especially on foreign news. The media does this by either lightly editing press releases but not offering any other context or using the same language when describing foreign news (Ostrow 2019). This may be because reporters need to maintain the power structure in order to continue to have access to that power structure (Fairclough 2015), or not to upset the advertisers that support much of the television news in the United States.

4.2 Translation Limitations
In order to successfully translate a text, one must have not only an understanding of the culture and a grasp of the grammatical structures of the original language but also an understanding of the culture and structures of the translated language. A translated text must be readable and understandable (Sun and Shreve 2014). However, word-for-word translation is not possible as "translation is neither the transference nor the transcoding of meaning, but the substitution of meaning" (Dutta 2009: 59).

I had to translate French into English, not only to make the French more understandable to a non-French-speaking audience, but also to show the similarities in language amongst conservative media, even in another language. I am a competent French speaker, and native in English; however, I am not French. Thus, my understanding of French is limited as an observer of the culture. Choosing Le Figaro, an upper-class conservative newspaper, also made translation difficult as I am neither upper-class nor conservative. Thus, my goal was to make sure that the intent of the speech was made clear.

In Eugene Nida's theory of translation, there are three priorities:

(a) contextual consistency has priority over verbal consistency, (b) dynamic equivalence has priority over formal correspondence, and (c) forms that are used by and acceptable to the audience for which a translation is intended have priority over forms that may be traditionally more prestigious (Nida 1964 as cited in Dutta 2009: 60)

Therefore, whilst translating, I wanted to make sure that my language kept the same register as the original French, which meant that I had to use a register that would be seen as formal but not stifling.
The following passages were ones that have especially tricky cultural differences or concepts that need to be put in a certain order in English to be understood. According to Dutta, "The difference observed in the vocabulary of two languages can be attributed to the difference found in ideas and opinions that are commonly expressed in the two languages" (2009: 62).

| Original: «élargir le spectre de leurs interlocuteurs aux courants islamiques ayant accepté le jeu démocratique et renoncé à la violence». (Juppé in Malbrunot 2011) |
| Direct translation: "to spread their representatives' shadow to those ordinary Islamists who had accepted the democratic game and renounced violence" |
| Personal translation: to increase their visibility to those Islamic groups who had accepted democracy and renounced violence |

Here, in the original, there is a sense of "to darken's one door", which makes Juppé's quote more ominous but probably not what he meant. Another way to translate would be to "extend one's hand" to these Islamic groups. Talking about the "democratic game" shows that Juppé sees politics as a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers, which is interesting in a linguistic capacity about his view of French diplomacy (Fairclough 2015), but not in an explanation of what he was saying.

| Original: Rapide et meurtrière, l'opération est assurément l'œuvre d'hommes aguerris. Pour le commandant Shaqabi, les combattants issus de la rébellion libyenne ne sont pas capables d'une pareille action. À demi-mot, on comprend que ses frères d'armes soupçonnent plutôt d'anciens kadhafistes où des professionnels du djihad, venus peut-être de l'étranger. Mais le temps n'est pas aux suppositions. (Portes 2011) |
| Direct translation: Quick and deadly, the operation is assuredly the work of warrior men. For commander Shaqabi, the combatants from the Libyan rebellion are not capable of a parallel action. Tacitly, one understands that these brothers-in-arms rather suspect former Kadhafists or professional jihadis, coming perhaps from abroad. But the time isn't for suppositions. |
| Personal translation: Quick and deadly, the operation is assuredly the domain of experts. According to commander Shaqabi, Libyan rebel combatants are not capable of a comparable action. One might suppose that his comrades-in-arms suspect former Kadhafi fighters or jihadi mercenaries coming from abroad. But now is not the time for rumours. |
Here, the point was not to rely too heavily on what are called "false friends": words that look the same in a language but have a different contextual meaning. English has many French root words, but the original French has more context behind it. The difference between "brothers-in-arms" and "comrades-in-arms" may be subtle, but possibly more understandable to an English speaking audience. The difference between the direct translation and my personal translation is using a literary register that sounds very old fashioned to a formal register that sounds more contemporary. "Suppositions" is an English word, but "rumours" is more understandable.

| Original | Nous connaissons l’ennemi, c’est la haine... L’ennemi, c’est le fanatisme qui veut soumettre l’homme à un ordre inhumain, c’est l’obscurantisme, c’est-à-dire un islam dévoyé qui renie le message de son livre sacré. Cet ennemi nous le vaincrons ensemble, avec nos forces, celles de la République, avec nos armes, celles de la démocratie, avec nos institutions, avec le droit. Dans ce combat, nous pouvons compter sur nos militaires, engagés sur des opérations difficiles, en Syrie, en Irak, au Sahel. (Hollande 2015) |
| Direct translation | We know the enemy, it's hate...The enemy is the fanaticism that wants to submit man to an inhuman order, it is obscurantism, that is to say an Islam led astray which renounces the message of its sacred book. This enemy, we will vanquish together with our forces, those of the Republic, with our weapons, those of democracy, with our institutions, with the law. In this combat, we are able to count on our soldiers, engaged in difficult operations, in Syria, in Iraq, in the Sahel. |
| Personal translation | We know the enemy, it is hatred … it is fanaticism which wants humans to submit to an inhumane order, it is anti-progress, that is, it is a perverted Islam that renounces the message of its sacred text. Together we will vanquish this enemy, with the forces of the Republic and with our weapons: those of democracy, our institutions, with the law. In this fight, we can count on our soldiers, engaged in difficult operations in Syria, in Iraq and in the Sahel. |

Hollande's speech was poetic and forceful, so I wanted to maintain both that poetry and that force in my translation. However, there was once again the problem of "false friends": in this case, the word "obscurantisme" is a concept in English, but it is such a formal, old-fashioned word that it does not have the same impact as "anti-progress". I also used less patriarchal language when I wrote "humans" instead of "man". "Humanité" (humanity) does exist as a concept, but colloquial French speech still uses "homme" as a placeholder for all people. I liked "perverted Islam" rather than "an Islam led astray" in the final translation because it shows the Islam followed by terrorists as one that is not acceptable to the majority of
Muslims. I did not translate "Sahel", but added a footnote for added context, as some readers may not understand where that is.

| Original: Comme si l'on comprenait enfin que l'Europe psychotique, toujours en proie à son complexe de culpabilité, n'était pas moins suicidaire que ces hybrides paranoïaques d'Orient et d'Occident qui nous détestent tant. (Goldnadel 2015) |
| Direct translation: As if one had finally understood that hysterical Europe, still prey to its guilt complex, wasn't less suicidal than these paranoid hybrids of the East and West that hate us so much. |
| Personal translation: Irrational Europe, still in the grip of its guilty conscience, finally understood that we needed to be less suicidal than these paranoid cross-breeds of East and West who hate us so much. |

Double negatives are allowed in French, and just make a sentence more negative. This construction is not grammatically correct in English, so I had to rearrange some of the words to make it more understandable and less confusing. The entire sentence was hyperbolic and negative, but I wanted to use the more powerful "cross-breeds" instead of "hybrids" to recall the animalistic speech Goldnadel had used earlier in his opinion piece. Both Goldnadel and I used "we" and "us" to include him in the Europeans, rather than the Middle-eastern and North African immigrants that he claims hate the French, even though, as mentioned, he is descended from immigrants himself.

With translation, it is necessary to understand grammar, vocabulary and sentence structure, but it is also necessary to understand multiple cultural cues and build consensus and understanding between the two cultures. Translation cannot be direct word-to-word; however, it is important not to distort the original meaning of the words used.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

As I was writing my thesis, two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand were attacked and fifty Muslims were killed. The attacker was a White supremacists who praised other terrorists like Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian man who killed 77 people in 2011 in Oslo and Utøya and Dylann Roof, the White supremacist who killed 9 people in 2015 in Charleston, South Carolina (Al Jazeera 2019). But his manifesto specifically celebrated President Donald Trump as 'a symbol of renewed white identity' (Al Jazeera 2019). Here then, the culmination of the xenophobic storytelling that was so insidious as to be almost unnoticeable.

Dog-whistles are of course imperceptible to those untrained to hear them. Since the attacks in America on the eleventh of September 2001, xenophobic language towards Muslims has only increased.

Fox News, the Daily Mail and Le Figaro are right-wing news sources. Fox News was created in order to be a conservative counterpoint to the supposedly liberal CNN (Mifflin 1996). Le Figaro has always been owned by upper class conservatives (Grubb 1996). The Daily Mail supported fascism and Nazism, since the owner was a friend of Hitler and Mussolini (Griffith 1980). The right-wing bonafides cannot be denied. However, showing open support for disagreeable or apparently politically-incorrect ideals is no longer a supported social practice. Those in power need to hide their biases or face consequences. However, what is acceptable and unacceptable depends on the power of the people speaking out (Fairclough 2015). As long as the person speaking out has the same power of those reporting, or even some similarity within the current social hierarchy, their story is more likely to be told (Chouliaraki 2006).

The "us versus them" dichotomy can be subtle, or it can be overt. Calling a camp full of migrants "filthy" but extolling the building of a church within that camp is subtle: the other, non-Christian migrants are filthy, but these Christian migrants are hard-working and industrious (Associated Press 2016). The difference between "radical extremist" and "lone wolf" is only obvious after constant exposure: the radical extremists are always non-Western,
almost exclusive Muslim; the White supremacist who ran down anti-fascist counter-protesters is a lone wolf, whose motives are still considered unknowable.

The repetition of this speech spreads from media into daily social practice (Fairclough 2015). They become euphemisms, and those euphemisms become acceptable. And once that becomes acceptable, one can start using more obvious language. Since news can travel so quickly and has no real boundaries except language and government censorship, the flow of information can move asynchronously (Bell 1991). Currently, the news that travels the furthest and is seen by the most people across the most networks is seen as the most relevant and, in some cases, the most true (Coppins 2017). Conservative media currently has the most visibility, and in the marketplace of ideas, that means it is the most valuable. It has that visibility and that value for two reasons: the people who read it are of two camps. In the first camp, it is the people who agree with the current social structure and want to maintain it (Fairclough 2007). In the second, it is people reacting angrily to it, making videos debunking it or reposting that content on social media, with angry notes. Anger is the current drive of media and social practice.

According to conservative media, the political argument is that Muslim people are trying to take over great Western nations. That argument is apparent in the United States, the United Kingdom and France; their conservative media is robust and consistent. Anyone arguing against it is seen as a plant or delusional, or even someone who wants to help Muslims do just that.

Immigration has been seen in various ways across these three countries: as a bolster for a waning population after war (the United Kingdom), as necessary for westward colonisation (the United States) and the disastrous effect of ending colonisation (France and the United Kingdom). However, most immigrant populations have been slowly accepted into the fabric of society. Since the eleventh of September 2001, this has changed. Muslim immigrants have been seen as an invading force, who refuse to integrate and bring with them dangerous, anti-Western ideas.
Coupled with the rise of populism in all three of these nations, this is a dangerous precedent (Polakow-Suransky 2017). Conservative media has fueled anti-Islamic resentment by refusing to give context to news about terrorist attacks, or by concentrating on only those attacks that followed their continuing timeline of Islamic extremism. By drawing a line from the 9/11 attacks, conservative media has made sure that there has been a clear connection to Muslims and the rise of terrorism.

By ignoring these dog-whistles, or being oblivious to them by not reading or watching these outlets, the sudden explosion of anti-Islamic sentiment must come to some surprise to some. Steve Bannon hailed the 1973 book *Le Camp des Saints* (The Camp of the Saints), a book wherein "the Third World had started to overflow its banks, and the West was its sewer" (Raspail as cited in Polakow-Suransky 2017: 4), as necessary to understanding the current crisis (Allen 2018). Each article that others a Muslim, or groups them together with an attacker, solidifies the social practice and makes hate and anger more acceptable.

By allowing right-wing media to continue to plant these subtle seeds of hatred, xenophobia will grow more powerful. Anger at an 'other' is something that is inherent in a capitalist society that thrives on scarcity: it allows people who have no power in society a reason why they have no power. Exposing manipulation is the best way to redirect anger towards action. Globalised media means the homogenisation of language and social practice, and allowing xenophobia to be a dominant social practice is deleterious to the future of a post-capitalist society.
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