The Persona of the Wolffian Philosopher in Early Eighteenth-Century Germany

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Abstract: This article contributes to the scholarly discussion of identity formation and persona by focusing on the expulsion of the German philosopher Christian Wolff from Prussia in 1723, and on the wave of printed propaganda that surrounded the event. In these writings the Wolffian philosopher was depicted as a diligent practitioner in the service of the Prussian state and as a sage in the Socratic tradition. In this interpretation the tension between socio-political reality and claims on sagehood is used to complicate the scholarly analysis of what it meant to be and live as a philosopher in the early modern period.

Keywords: identity, persona, early modern Germany, philosophy, Enlightenment, practice, exercise, cultura animi

I. The Persona of the Wolffian Philosopher in Early Eighteenth-Century Germany

In the last two decades an increasing number of scholars have employed the analytical concept of persona in historical study. Drawing on social constructivist approaches, most historians of philosophy have come to use persona to capture the manifestation of a socially recognisable type or office such as, for instance, that of the natural philosopher, the metaphysician and so on. Much effort has been devoted to reconstructing the production of personae from the lives and writings of specific philosophers such as Francis Bacon, René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. This article follows a different strand of analysis by focusing on the production of philosophical personae in the wake of a specific event that occurred in early eighteenth-century Germany. The event in question is the expulsion of the distinguished German philosopher Christian Wolff from Prussia in 1723, and the wave of printed propaganda that was produced before and after his departure. At the core of these writings was the Wolffian philosopher or the Weltweiser, a complex figure depicted simultaneously as a useful cog in the big wheel of the consolidating Prussian state and as a philosophical sage in the Socratic tradition.

The article uses the textbooks and propaganda connected to the so-called Wolff-affair to analyse the persona of the Wolffian philosopher, focusing particularly on the tension between socio-political reality and philosophical ideals. The Wolffian philosopher emerges as a disciplined and diligent practitioner perfectly aligned with the socio-political needs and demands of the rapidly developing Prussian state. At the same time this figure was also constructed in relation to the ancient ideal of the Socratic sage, a person for whom every claim on power and worldly gain constituted a potential source of inner corruption. In addition to contributing new knowledge regarding identity formation in eighteenth-century philosophy, the article uses the case of the Wolff affair to problematise some of the underlying assumptions guiding scholarly analysis of what it meant to be and live as a philosopher in the early modern period.
II. Rethinking the Wolff Affair

The main events of the Wolff affair are well known. Wolff moved to the Prussian town of Halle to teach at the newly founded university in 1706. After a slow start he managed to establish himself as a popular lecturer and writer, and in the 1710s his reputation grew as he began to publish a series of accessible textbooks written in the vernacular and referred to as the *German Philosophy*. His growing fame together with the particulars of his philosophy brought him onto a collision course with the leading faction of university theologians, and at the turn of the decade a number of coinciding factors brought things to a head. In 1720 Wolff published the *German Metaphysics*, followed by the *German Ethics* – both works in which he made bold and provocative claims regarding the primacy of reason – and was also elected pro-rector at the university. The following year seething tensions burst into open conflict as Wolff delivered a speech as pro-rector, using the example of Chinese ethics to show that a sound morality could be established quite independently of revelation. The speech triggered a chain of accusations and counter-accusations that eventually led to Wolff’s expulsion from Prussia in November 1723 by an edict of King Friedrich Wilhelm I. Rather than settling matters, the expulsion intensified the conflict, and in 1727 the theologians convinced the king to place a ban on the sale and teaching of Wolff’s metaphysics and ethics, backed up by the threat of a fine. In the following decade, however, the tide changed, first as the ban was lifted in 1734, and then as a royal commission cleared Wolff of all charges in 1736. Four years later the new king, Frederick the Great, who saw himself as a supporter of the emerging Enlightenment, reinstated Wolff as a professor of law at the University of Halle.

After Wolff’s expulsion from Prussia, it was not long before the two sides began to broadcast opposing versions of what had happened. While the theologians told the story of an immoral and blasphemous doctrine, the philosophers painted the picture of Wolff and the Wolfians as the defenders of reason against religious intolerance and irrationality. In the course of time Wolff’s expulsion and triumphal return to Halle in 1740 were inscribed in the larger story of the victory of reason and Enlightenment over religious superstition. This narrative thrived in the nineteenth century and continued to be reproduced in the twentieth. If the overall narrative of Enlightenment versus religion still finds some credence, modern research has revolved around the reconstruction of the events and their possible causes. With this focus in mind, some scholars have analysed the Wolff affair as a result of doctrinal opposition, whereas others have highlighted the level of personal enmity and competition over university positions, and yet others have situated the conflict within the larger context of university reform and the emerging Prussian state. In addition, a number of revisionist studies have shown that the emphasis on doctrinal opposition, framing Hallean Pietism as hostile to philosophy and science, is itself a product of successful Wolfian propaganda, with little basis in truth. Kelly Whitmer has thus argued that Francke’s Orphanage – quite apart from the Wolff affair – unfolded as an eclectic scientific community marked by collaborations across disciplinary boundaries.

While scholars have focused almost exclusively on mapping out and explaining the causes and events of the Wolff affair, or on revising some of the historical narratives that accompanied it, few attempts have so far been made to approach it as an instance of philosophical identity formation. This is despite the fact that the affair entailed the production of a vast number of texts, of which the bulk touches in more or less detail on the character of Wolff and the Wolfian philosopher. Regardless of their status as evidence of actual events, these texts were one of the principal sites for the development of the persona of...
the Wolffian philosopher; the analysis that follows takes advantage of and works with the ideals operating within the texts themselves.

The study of philosophical identity formation through the analytical concept of persona draws on two main research traditions. The first is typically associated with the French historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot, who in the course of the 1980s criticised the dominant reading of ancient philosophy as an embryonic attempt at an abstract theory of knowledge and instead argued that it was, first of all, a way of life in which spiritual exercises were used to form a certain kind of moral self.\textsuperscript{14} The second was fuelled by historians and sociologists of science who, also in the 1980s, criticised the focus within history of science on abstract theories, and in a similar way argued that scientific knowledge is first of all produced by people in concrete situations through scientific practices.\textsuperscript{15} While historians of philosophy and science struggled with similar problems and brought forth similar shifts in perspective quite independently, one recent tendency has been to merge these disciplinary approaches.\textsuperscript{16} Bringing together and cross-fertilising analytical concepts such as \textit{spiritual exercises}, \textit{scientific practices} and \textit{scientific personae}, a number of scholars have now shown that the production of knowledge through practices and exercises was intimately and inseparably linked to the formation of specific identities or selves in the early modern period.\textsuperscript{17} This article is a contribution to such research but also an attempt to problematise some of the assumptions on which it relies.

III. The Wolffian Philosopher as Diligent Practitioner

Permeating the Wolffian philosophy as a whole was the recurrent emphasis on philosophy as exercises performed in order to cultivate the mind cognitively and morally. It is thus no coincidence that Wolff opened the \textit{German Logic} (1712), perhaps his most influential textbook, by establishing a connection between virtue and knowledge:

\begin{quote}
The human being has not received anything more splendid from God than his understanding: As soon as he loses his understanding, he becomes either a child or as savage as a wild animal, whereby he also becomes unable to honour God and to serve humans. Thus, the more someone knows how to use his intellect, the more he can be called a human.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Rhetorical though they may be, these assertions nevertheless struck a major chord: to be a philosopher was a matter of using one’s mind, and to use one’s mind was a matter of exercise (\textit{Übung}). As Wolff observed, ‘all skill is obtained through exercise.’\textsuperscript{19} Philosophical knowledge did not come cheaply but required subordination to a rigorous regimen of the mind marked by regular exercises of one’s cognitive abilities. In the \textit{German Logic}, Wolff discussed how students should proceed in order to form clear and distinct concepts and definitions. In part these exercises took the form of internal operations of the mind whereby concepts were systematically investigated, and in part they also involved material practices such as note-taking:

\begin{quote}
These are useful rules for students, that they shall diligently repeat what they have learned, not all at once, but that they shall deal with it all in such an order as the knowledge of one depends on the knowledge of another, and that they shall diligently write down what good they hear or what they think best out of their own accord.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

While the first part of the \textit{German Logic} covered the formation of concepts, definitions and demonstrations, the second part addressed questions of how to read and evaluate books, how to convince and refute and finally how to carry out formal disputations. While the
plethora of exercises was broad. Wolff emphasised engagement with books written in accordance with the rules of logic: ‘If one wishes to carry out such exercises, through which one can obtain proficiency in the practice of logic, then one must read such writings that have been composed in accordance with the rules of logic, and examine them as was presented above in Chapters 9 and 11.’\(^{21}\) To engage with exemplary books was a good way of sharpening one’s philosophical skills. Another, less peaceful exercise was, of course, to scrutinise arguments and books to reveal flaws and inconsistencies.

If the German Logic focused on the exercise of basic skills in forming concepts and conclusions, making demonstrations and reading, arguing and writing convincingly, the German Metaphysics applied the same perspective at the level of metaphysics and ethics. In the preface Wolff thus stated that ‘whoever contemplates the present unfortunate times, sees how they come from lack of understanding and virtue. People who are children in intellect but men in malice plunge many into great misfortune and ruin.’\(^{22}\) This dangerous trend could only be broken by systematically exercising and disciplining the mind. The key was to practice specific ways of thinking and acting until they eventually became habits. ‘The exercise consists in repeating a certain way of thinking often and particularly in repeating certain actions often. And the skill that arises from it consists in an ease of having such thoughts, or particularly of performing such acts.’\(^{23}\) The connection between knowledge and virtue was further developed in the German Ethics.\(^{24}\) In the preface Wolff emphasised that virtuous action required the basic skills elaborated in the German Logic, applied in a way that enabled the exercise of the good and the omission of the bad. Following the contemporary tradition of natural law, Wolff distinguished between duties towards the self, towards God and towards others. As regards the former, the human being is obliged to ‘do what makes his state more perfect and avoid that which makes it less perfect’.\(^{25}\) ‘This, in turn, required knowledge of the self, and particularly of the soul and its faculties, operations and states. Far from being a mere abstract principle, the knowledge of the self boiled down to the establishment of a regimen of concrete daily self-examination:

1. When one wakes up early one shall consider what must necessarily be done during the day, and what might go wrong if one fails to do so. 2. Thereafter, one must strain oneself to examine in what way each of these actions contributes to the perfection of our inner and outer condition [...] 3. When one wishes to go to sleep, one must consider everything that one has done and not done during the day, and lastly, 4. examine how much we hereby have managed to contribute to the fulfilment of our final goal. When one does this work continuously, the desired habit will soon be established.\(^{26}\)

Wolff’s philosophy incorporated a system that extended from the level of the formation of concepts, definitions and demonstrations to the formation and government of habits of thought and action through disciplined exercise.

Emphasis on the practical, skill-oriented nature of the Wolffian philosophy permeated not only Wolff’s textbooks but also the wider polemic literature. In 1724 Wolff’s main antagonist, the theology professor Joachim Lange, painted the picture, in an extensive and highly critical writing, of Wolff as an obstinate wiseacre who boasted about his own intellectual superiority. Yet the real problem with Wolff was not so much his arrogance as the way in which he corrupted the young through his teachings. This had been going on for years and had resulted in a growing group of rebellious students.

We particularly noticed in them a disregard for the divine words and for those divine truths that constitute the basis and order of our prosperity, and in addition, such a presumption
regarding their intelligence, through which they thought they had been destined to this philosophy, that they wanted to know everything better than others; although the weakness of their intellect was evident to some, but not to themselves.27

Lange returned to the topic of the depraved Wolffian students in another polemical text:

One has for many years seen the deplorable effects on many theology students, who, when they have before given good testimonials and marks of their God and shown an obedient soul, have completely lost their balance and become disdainful of all good order and of God and his words after they have visited the Wolffian lectures.28

Later the same year Lange’s accusations were published together with a reply in which Wolff launched a counter-attack on the institutional heart of the Hallean theologians, August Hermann Francke’s Orphanage for the education of pious Christians:

I know examples of teachers at the Orphanage, who have been turned into atheists at the institutions there, and who have secretly been hardened in this harmful state through false piety, and who have thanked me with mouth and hand for relieving them through my lectures [...] In many places the teachers have complained that students, who have only studied in Halle [at the Orphanage], are neither capable of understanding theses nor proving them.29

The problem with the Orphanage, it seems, was that teachers succumbed to atheism and students to stupidity, owing to poor education and deficient methods. That the Wolffian method, in contrast, was able to raise the veil of ignorance was an idea that Wolff returned to in another written defence: ‘[Those in my] audience who have regularly visited my lectures have always affirmed that they proceed better in their theological study after they acquired from me a basis in philosophy.’30 Here again Wolff countered the depiction of his teachings as immoral and rebellious by asserting that they constituted a superior philosophy. He did this not just by saying that the theologians were vicious and the Wolffians virtuous in some general sense, but by claiming that the latter were cognitively superior as a result of diligent studies in the Wolffian method. In other words, the Wolffians excelled by possessing a number of skills and traits connected to the specific Wolffian brand of philosophy.

When Wolff stressed character traits such as diligence, discipline and temperance, as we have seen, he was thinking of them not just as virtues in themselves but as virtues necessary for philosophical knowledge. Wolff’s emphasis on these qualities can be understood against the background of what recent historians of science have referred to as epistemic virtues.31 Epistemic virtues are traits conducive to knowledge production or, as Daston and Galison have pointed out, ‘norms that are internalized and enforced by appeal to ethical values, as well as to pragmatic efficacy in securing knowledge’.32 In the early modern age traits such as diligence, discipline and temperance were often ascribed such epistemic functions. In this sense, Wolff’s discourse was far from original but reflected an early modern epistemic order.

The years following Wolff’s expulsion were marked by heavy attacks by the Pietist theologians, who managed to convince the king to ban the selling and teaching of Wolff’s metaphysics and ethics. In the mid-1730s the situation changed; a commission lifted the ban, and in 1740 the new king, Frederick the Great, called Wolff back to Halle and reinstalled him as a professor.

Now, with the turning of the tide, the Wolffians did not hesitate; they entered a period of prolific production that included writing the history of the Wolffian philosophy. In 1737 the Wolffian Georg Hartmann published the extensive Introduction to the History of the
Leibniz-Wolffian Philosophy. About the same time, in 1735-8, another Wolffian, Carl Günther Ludovici, published a three-volume work entitled Detailed Sketch of a Complete History of the Wolffian Philosophy. Both works put the Wolffian philosophy in a favourable light and defended it against the accusations of the theologians. An important part of the strategy was to counter the idea that the Wolffian philosophy corrupted the young. To this end Hartmann highlighted the way in which Wolff’s lectures, among other things, taught students: i) how to clarify their understanding by forming clear and distinct concepts and definitions; ii) how to use this method at home without the aid of books; iii) how to read books and particularly the Scripture; iv) how to prepare presentations; and v) how to free oneself from various prejudices. Later in the same text Hartmann discussed the benefits and usefulness of the Wolffian philosophy in several detailed points, emphasising that the Wolffian method provided the key to making correct judgements and distinguishing truth from falsehood:

Yes, the usefulness of the Wolffian philosophy is revealed in the way in which it makes people capable of judging things in a reasonable way without rushing. The one who wishes to do this must not only know how to make a judgement but also know the common foundation of how this should be done. The common foundation is not only to be found in the higher faculties but quite often, yes even most often, in philosophy.

In this key passage Hartmann situated the skill of the Wolffian philosopher in the context of university education, arguing that the Wolffian philosophy constituted the foundation of all the disciplines. While Wolff had stressed the practical utility of his method for every discipline, especially theology and jurisprudence, Hartmann also provided a long list of intellectuals who affirmed and advocated the use of the Wolffian method within theology.

In comparison with Hartmann’s book, Ludovici’s three-volume work was less polemic. It was organised instead as a systematic overview of the Wolffian school of philosophy that also addressed the topic of how to become a Wolffian philosopher. The student must start with mathematics and proceed to more advanced disciplines such as metaphysics and ethics. When following this order of studies, the student should fulfil a number of duties. First, the student must understand (verstehen) everything correctly, which was a matter of producing clear and distinct definitions. Second, the student must comprehend (begreifen) truths by making scientific demonstrations and by carefully considering and learning the rules pertaining to scientific demonstrations. Leading on from this, Ludovici continued,

The third duty is to make oneself familiar with that which has been understood and comprehended. In doing this one must frequently consider that which one has understood and comprehended, and one must consider with unrestrained diligence. These three duties lead us to the fourth, that it takes time to learn each part.

Here we again see the persona of the diligent practitioner whose success was the result of a strict regimen of the mind, whereby the cognitive abilities were disciplined through exercises in the Wolffian method.

Having returned to Halle in 1740, Wolff began writing his autobiography, or Lebenslauf. In it he again mobilised the narrative of the truth-seeking Wolffian student by describing theologians’ complaints that students turned away from theology and that ‘some students demanded better definitions and proofs from them [the theologians]’. A similar observation was made by Wolff’s biographer Johann Christoph Gottsched:

The philosophical hearers of our Mr Chancellor came with a well-prepared reason into the lectures of others, and could generally neither find the kind of light nor the kind of conviction.
that they were used to from Mr Wolf’s lectures. Often they posed questions and objections to their teachers, partly regarding the insufficiency of their definitions, partly regarding some conclusions that were not sufficiently binding. Some of these young people, who could see their teacher’s weakness in both, became braver than students in their position should be. All told, the persona of the Wolffian philosopher was further established in the second half of the 1730s. It was developed in accounts of how the student must discipline his own mind through strenuous exercise and, in turn, how this made him able and willing to scrutinise and reveal the flaws of others. Although they were now in a more favourable position, Wolff and the Wolffians were eager to uphold and strengthen this picture of the Wolffian philosopher by emphasising epistemic virtues such as discipline and diligence.

IV. The Diligent Practitioner in the Service of the Prussian State

When Wolff and the Wolffians portrayed the philosopher as a diligent practitioner of a new useful method, they were being far from original. In fact, they were falling back on an established tradition wherein distinguished philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes and Leibniz had all described the new philosophy and the philosopher in similar terms. Scholars have been careful to point out that portraits of the ideal philosopher must also be understood as claims on power and prestige made in specific socio-political contexts. Stephen Gaukroger has thus argued that, when Bacon introduced the natural philosopher as a new kind of sage, he did so as an attempt to challenge the authority of the schoolman. In a similar vein, Ian Hunter shows that Leibniz, by performing the persona of the metaphysical sage, was ‘attempting to transfer the philosophical mediation of the Christian faith – together with all of the power and prestige attaching to it – from the custodianship of confessional theologians to that of rationalist metaphysicians’. Hunter’s reading of Leibniz’s metaphysics as a self-purging metaphysical practice launched in the context of university politics is relevant here. In Wolff’s case, the larger socio-political context is the emerging Prussian state and the educational reform that followed in its wake, of which the new University of Halle is the best concrete example. With a curriculum tailor-made to deliver practical knowledge, the university of Halle was perfectly aligned with the plans and needs of the rapidly consolidating Prussian state. Against this background, the Wolff affair can be seen as a struggle between two projects and visions that both depended on the ability to please and secure support from the Prussian state.

On the one hand, Francke and his associates worked hard to win the approval of King Friedrich Wilhelm I. In the early 1710s progress was slow and marked by disagreement, but the Pietists gradually convinced the king that they were loyal servants who provided the Prussian state with obedient subjects and skilled officials. Towards the end of the decade close bonds of trust and confidence developed, and the king expressed great satisfaction and congratulated Francke on a tour of the Orphanage in 1720 – the very same year as Wolff published the German Metaphysics and the German Ethics. As Carl Hinrichs has pointed out, this engagement with the king was key to the transformation of German Pietism into something of a Prussian state religion. On the other hand, the image of the Wolffian philosophy as a universal and useful science, and the Wolffian philosopher as a highly competent and diligent practitioner, should also be seen in the light of the new reform university and the emerging Prussian
state. If tailored to suit the practical and administrative needs of the Prussian state, the Wolffian philosophy also adapted well politically. In the highly conservative German Politics, Wolff thus gave an account of child-rearing and discipline using the Wolffian pedagogy. From an early age children should be taught to use their intellect and reason to draw correct conclusions, to obey their parents dutifully and to do what is right rather than what they want. On a macro level obedience and loyalty towards parents were part of a hierarchy in which every person was obliged to obey authorities and ultimately the king. However, just as subjects were obliged to subordinate themselves to the king, so the king was obliged to rule wisely, with the common good in mind. Wolff’s systematic emphasis on discipline, duty and loyalty to authorities has led Eckhart Hellmuth to use the label ‘Prussian Natural Law’ (‘Preußische Naturrecht’). What made the Wolffian philosophy attractive for the Prussian state was precisely its way of combining a work ethic that framed happiness as the result of strict discipline and hard work with an unyielding belief in duty and loyalty towards authorities.

Similar points have been made by Johannes Bronisch, who has drawn attention to a highly interesting text that Wolff wrote on the king as philosopher and the philosopher as king. The text was published in Latin in 1730, and was then translated and published in German in 1740. In On the Connection of Government Power with Philosophy, Wolff argued that ‘in any case, a regent must understand what is required for general welfare and tranquillity as well as only striving for what he is convinced is beneficial to the preservation of the same.’ To do this it was necessary to acknowledge and overcome shortcomings by exercising the intellect and will. ‘Hence it is now to be shown more clearly why a ruler fails out of ignorance or out of delusion or because of the dominance of the desires, and at the same time to show how philosophy can improve both intellect and will.’ The wise ruler must systematically exercise philosophy, thereby disciplining his mind to act knowledgeably for the common good rather than out of ignorance and selfish desires. In other words, the ruler must undergo solid training and education in the Wolffian philosophy. As Bronisch has pointed out, this programme was put to the test through nothing less than the education and training of the philosopher-king Frederick the Great.

Despite Wolff’s arguments for the value of the Wolffian philosophy and philosopher to the Prussian state, the king sided with the Pietists to the point of expelling Wolff from Prussia. As Carl Hinrichs and others have shown, the Pietist victory was the result of successful relationship-building. When the conflict with Wolff broke out in the early 1720s, the king trusted and acted on Francke’s description of the Wolffian philosophy as harmful. What eventually tipped the balance was a challenge to Pietist authority in the mid-1730s, as some of the king’s advisers – most notably, Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel – persuaded the king that the Pietist critique was based on misunderstandings and deliberate misreading. The king not only listened to these advisers but also actually engaged with the Wolffian philosophy himself. He soon came to appreciate its qualities, and eventually to recommend the employment of Wolffian philosophers at German universities. This shift in the king’s position suggests that the effort to present the Wolffian philosophy in a favourable light eventually paid off.

V. Persona and Identity Formation in Early Modern Philosophy

That the early modern ideal of the philosophical sage was deployed in specific socio-political contexts does not mean that its emphasis on cognitive and moral cultivation was a mere rhetorical ornament or social mask. On the contrary, one of the principal advantages of understanding persona through the analytical framework of an office is
that it effectively avoids the distinction between mask and real self. Instead, identities are seen to take form on the individual and the social level simultaneously. Through mechanisms of subjectivation, beliefs and behaviours are internalised and formed in relation to social norms and ideals. As Conal Condren has put it, the understanding of persona as an office includes ‘a whole sphere of responsibilities, rights of action for their fulfilment, necessary attributes, skills and specific virtues, highlighted by concomitant vices and failures’.58 In a similar vein John Cottingham has argued that ‘we are moving to a richer and more positive sense of the term persona: one that takes us away from masks and acting towards something more “personal”, something connected not just with a “career”, but with the full moral and psychological dimensions of someone’s chosen form of life’.59

A third illustrative example is Hunter’s reading, according to which Leibniz’s metaphysics of perfection constituted a self-purifying spiritual exercise in which the philosopher, by contemplating and gradually abstracting from the empirical world and its objects, reaches a state of pure intellectual reflection.60 He further argues that this exercise, performed in order to configure a subject capable of understanding divine or rational truth, cannot be separated from the performance of a particular kind of personhood, that of the self-purifying metaphysical sage. While the exercise of philosophy was thus the very motor of a process of self-transformation, Hunter’s analysis nevertheless concludes with the argument that Leibniz, by performing the persona of the metaphysical sage, attempted to transfer power and authority ‘from the custodianship of confessional theologians to that of rationalist metaphysicians’.61

As mentioned above, the great benefit of the notion of persona as office is that it avoids any distinctions between real self and mask by adopting a social-constructivist approach wherein selves and identities are constantly shaped and reshaped in relation to social contexts. In other words, no real self is assumed to lie behind the socially constructed self. Thus early modern philosophy can be seen to have taken form as a sincere self-transformative exercise that also entailed claims on status, authority and power. In this light the Wolff affair becomes an even more striking case than that of Leibniz, since Wolff’s challenge to the theologians resulted in severe consequences – his own expulsion and the ban on his philosophy.

Approaching identity formation and personhood as a process of subjectivation can clearly shed light on the Wolffian philosopher, but it comes at a cost. Most concrete analyses tend to impose a reductive view of human motivation by assuming an underlying rational agent intent on achieving and maximising specific goals. In strong socio-political readings the goals tend to be status, authority and power. In more moderate socio-political and stronger Hadotian readings, they are framed in terms of the realisation of virtue, wisdom and sagehood.

The context of the early modern cultura animi tradition can serve to problematise the rational agent as an implicit model of human behaviour.62 The cultura animi provided a prescription for a mind perceived as diseased, distempered and perturbed by the passions, as well as an ideal of virtue and wisdom in the form of the philosophical sage or the Christian saint. The Christian version of cultura animi informed Francke’s autobiographical account of himself as a worldly sinner who, tormented by the contradiction between his outer manifestation of priesthood and his inner apostasy, eventually arrived at the conversion that filled him with living faith and knowledge and brought him closer to God.63 Francke’s rather typical experience was fuelled by powerful spiritual exercises organised around the confrontation with one’s corrupt, sinful and hypocritical nature. In a similar vein, Wolff repeatedly affirmed that the soul was corrupted by passions and desires stemming from ignorance, and that it could only be cured through a strict regimen of...
philosophical exercises including daily examination and evaluation of one’s state of mind. The ideal here was the philosophical sage, or as Wolff also put it, the philosopher-king.

It was this ideal that Wolff appealed to when he inscribed his own destiny in the larger narrative of philosophical martyrs, starting with Socrates and ending with his own expulsion from Prussia. The moral of the story was that he, like many previous philosophers, had endured injustice for the sake of truth. Every philosopher, he argued, should be prepared to make this sacrifice. “We must not abstain from doing the good that we must do only because others might use it as an opportunity to do evil. Hence, a philosopher must always tell the truth to others even though others might take the opportunity to attack him.” A similar ideal was expressed in the notion of the freedom to philosophise, which required the philosopher to follow the voice of reason rather than accepting others’ assertions, even if the consequences were severe punishment and death.

The assumption that every claim on virtue and wisdom is also a claim on power elides a central feature of the cultura animi: its configuration of a subject ready to interpret the desire for recognition and authority as potentially corrupt. That is, the more one channelled an attitude of doubt and self-examination towards the renunciation of worldly gains, the more one could expect actually to feel like a philosopher or theologian. Here identity formation, rather than comprising a streamlined series of rational choices, was an uncertain and contradictory process whereby fractured subjects were often forged at the intersection of opposing discourses. Such a process is best described through a structuralist framework, as opposed to a focus on rational agency. This is not to reject socio-political readings or to argue that Wolff lacked socio-political motives but to acknowledge that the cultura animi turned philosophical identity formation into a complex endeavour in which the affirmation of social status and power could elicit inner fears of corruption or fraudulence.

Acknowledging the cultura animi discourse clarifies a further, puzzling aspect of the Wolff affair. The assumption that philosophical identity formation depended on the ability to claim power and prestige in a social setting makes it difficult to understand why Wolff’s expulsion and the ban on his works actually increased the popularity of his philosophy. If, however, we recognise that it involved the implementation of an ideal of philosophical martyrdom as the ultimate sign of restraint and philosophical devotion, then the dynamics of the Wolff affair emerge more clearly. Its conflicts made philosophy matter, but even beyond this they created conditions for practitioners to actually feel like philosophers – martyrs dedicated to the cause of truth and wisdom.

NOTES

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2. Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and


10. Beutel, ‘Causa Wolffiana’. Despite the somewhat misleading title, Beutel’s article is today one of the most thorough studies available. Another earlier and more biased study is Ferdinand Josef Schneider’s article on the ‘final struggle between Pietism and rationalism’; see Ferdinand Josef Schneider, ‘Das geistige Leben von Halle im Zeichen des Endkampfes zwischen Pietismus und Rationalismus’, Sachsen und Anhalt 14 (1938), p.137-66.


18. ‘Der mensch hat nichts vortrefflicher von GÖtt empfangen, als seinen Verstand: denn so bald er nur in demselben verrückt wird, so halb wird er entweder ein Kind, oder ärger als ein wildes Thier, und ist also ungeschickt, GÖtt zu ehren und den Menschen zu dienen. Solchegestalt kan einer um so vielmehr ein Mensch genennet werden, je mehr er die Kräfte seines Verstandes zu gebrauchen weiß.’ Christian Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes, p.45.

20. 'Dieses sind nützliche Regeln für die Studirenden, daß sie fleißig wiederholen, was sie einmahl gelernt, nicht vielerley auf einmahl, auch alles in solcher Ordnung, wie die Erkänninß des einen von der Erkänninß des andern dependiret, vornehmen, und was sie gutes hören, oder was bey eigenem Nachsinnen ihnen einfället, fleißig aufschreiben.' Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes, p.136.


25. 'dasjenige thut, was ihn und seinen Zustand vollommener machet, und unterlässet, was ihn und denselben unvollkommener machet.' Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, p.144.

26. '1. Wenn man frühe erwachet, soll man bedencken was den Tag über nothwendig zu thun ist, und was durch dessen Veranlassung sonst etwas noch vorfallen kan. 2. Hierauf soll man sich bemühen zu untersuchen, was eine jede von diesen Handlungen zur Vollkommenheit unseres innerlichen und äußeren Zustandes beytragen.... 3. Wenn man schlaffen gehen will, soll man sich auf alles besinnen, was man den Tag über gethan und unterlassen hat, und endlich 4. untersuchen, wie viel wir durch zu Erhaltung unserer letzten Absicht beygetragen. Wenn man diese Arbeit unausgesetzt forttreiben, so wird sich die verlangte Gewohnheit bald geben.' Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, p.105-6.


Philosophie

preamble.

mic Virtues in the Sciences and the Humanities

noch die Ueberzeugung fanden, die sie in Hrn. Wolfs Vorlesungen gewohnet waren. Sie machten
der Phlosophie geleget.
dß sie in ihrem studio theologico besser fortkommen können nachdem sie den Grund bey mir in
worden
verhartet, mir es mit Mund und Hand gedancket, daß sie durch meine lectiones davon befreyet
Atheisten worden, und heimlich bey der äuserlichen Gleißnerei in diesem schädlichem Zustande
Doct. und Prof. Joachim Langens oder

Wolff Gesammelte Werke

Wolff von Heinrich Wuttke

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Dokumente

Anleitung zur Historie der Leibnitzisch-Wolf

Hartmann,

Carl Günther Ludovici,

33.

Hartmann, Anleitung zur Historie der Leibnitzisch-Wolffschen Philosophie.


38. ‘Die dritte Pflicht will, daß man sich des verstandene und begriffene geläufig mache. In welcher Absicht man das, was man verstanden und begriffen hat, öfters überlegen, auch in der Uberlegung mit unermüdetem Fleiße anhalten muß. Diese drei Pflichten führen uns auf die vierte, daß man sich zu Erlernung eines jeden Thelies Zeit nehmte.’ Ludovici, Ausführlicher Entwurf, p.309.


40. ’die philosophischen Zuhörer unsers Hrn. Kanzlers, mit einer wohl vorbereiteten Vernunft in die Vorlesungen anderer kamen; und gemeiniglich in ihrem Vortrage, weder dasjenige Licht, noch die Ueberzeugung fanden, die sie in Hrn. Wolfs Vorlesungen gewohnet waren. Sie machten


42. Stephen Gaukroger, ’The Persona of the Natural Philosopher’, in Condren, Gaukroger and Hunter (eds), The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe.

43. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, p.115.


45. The connection between the Prussian state and German Pietism has by now been confirmed by several thorough studies. See: Klaus Depperman, Der hallesche Pietismus und der preußische Staat unter Friedrich III (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961); Hinrichs, Preußentum und Pietismus; Richard L. Gawthrop, Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Christopher M. Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).


47. Hinrichs, Preußentum und Pietismus, p.100.


52. Bronisch, Der Mäzen der Aufklärung. As Bronisch has pointed out, the idea of the king as philosopher went back to Wolff’s notorious speech on Chinese ethics, in which he depicted China as a land ruled by wise philosopher kings.
53. Bronisch, Der Mäzen der Aufklärung, p.106.


57. Hinrichs, Preußentum und Pietismus, p.438-41.


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