

A European State of Mind

Rhetorical Formations of European Identity within the EU 1973–2014

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Abstract

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European identity has become a central issue in the EU's political imaginary. In recent years, European identity—and related notions of a European destiny, European culture, and a European narrative—has been deployed as a weapon against the rise of the political far-right across Europe. Epideictic rhetoric is thus at the heart of the EU's political debate.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the EU works rhetorically with collective identity formation and to examine the implications of such formations for both the EU and its citizens. Through rhetorical and topological close readings, the study explores these practices of identity formation from a thematic as well as a diachronic perspective (1973–2014). It does so with the theory of constitutive rhetoric as its framework even as it proposes to extend the theory's subject field in terms of constitutive means, temporal imaginaries, and projected practices.

Each analytical chapter addresses a different aspect of the EU's constitutive rhetoric: The transition from the formation of an institutional identity to the formation of collective identity and how the means of identity formation have both altered and accumulated; the EU's historiographical construction of a new narrative that reaches beyond the lifetime of the union in search of a more authentic past to use as a foundation in present and future mythology. This narrative hinges on the founding narrative of peace that enables the EU to act as a normative exemplum in Europe and beyond; and, finally, the visionary rhetoric of eternity and omnipresence that incorporates the whole world into its own imaginary, while simultaneously projecting a specific set of norms that constrains the agency of the model EU citizen: the Eurostar.

The study concludes that throughout its practices of collective identity formation, the EU is positioned as an ambivalent rhetorical agent. On the one hand, the EU wishes to become recognised and mythologised as the Subject—the heart of Europe, a state of mind, a symbol of transcendence, peace, and tolerance. On the other, to be viewed as the silent benefactor and facilitator of peace and deliberation, the arbiter of soft, nonideological power. The Eurostar fills the important function of confirming the self-interpellation of the EU's ambivalent position and embodying the culture of nonideological deliberation in the face of the ideology of others.

Keywords: constitutive rhetoric, collective identity formation, the European Union, European identity, rhetorical studies, close reading

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To Rasmus, Walter, and Ole

List of Papers

This thesis is the further development of my licentiate thesis:

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Abbreviations

Declaration on European Identity	1973-declaration
‘A People’s Europe. Reports from the ad hoc Committee’	‘A People’s Europe’
Treaty on European Union	Maastricht Treaty
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe	Constitutional Treaty
New Narrative for Europe	New Narrative
<i>The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative</i>	<i>Mind and Body</i>
“Declaration: The Mind and Body of Europe”	New Narrative declaration
The European Community/Communities	The Community
The European Union	The EU
Member of the European Parliament	MEP
European Parliament	EP

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1. Introduction

The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries.

—Declaration on European Identity, 1973

The European Council considers it essential that the Community should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world.

—‘A People’s Europe’, 1985

[The member states are] RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world;

—The Maastricht Treaty, 1992

[The member states are] CONVINCED that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny;

—The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004

Europe is a state of mind that goes beyond a grouping of Nation States, an internal market and the geographical contours of a continent. Europe is a moral and political responsibility, which must be carried, not only by institutions and politicians, but by each and every European. Europe is a source of inspiration from the past, emancipation in the present, and an aspiration towards a sustainable future. Europe is an identity, an idea, an ideal.

—*The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, 2014

Over the last decade, the political far-right has gained strength all across Europe. Not only have parties from the far-right increased their mandates in various national parliaments, but we see a similar pattern when it comes to the European Parliament (EP).¹

This politically changed landscape has compelled national and EU politicians to seek effective ways of countering the mythologies of the far-right, which often centres around origin, the nation as the fundamental and delimited unit of community, and thus values of continuity, tradition, and stability. One example of such counter-strategies is the EU initiative New Narrative for Europe, launched in 2013, which explicitly seeks to thwart growing nationalism and populism in a still-increasing number of EU member states, doing so by seeking to create a shared cultural narrative. “We won’t have real unity”, said then-president of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso at the project launch, “until we acknowledge a sense of belonging to a community which is bigger than the nation or the region, a sense of a shared European destiny”.² The strategy of the EU to counter nationalism and populism, in other words, in many ways draws upon nationalist and populist myths about collective identity and even a shared destiny.³ Epideictic rhetoric is at the centre of today’s political debate.

It is from this apparent paradox—countering nationalism with nationalist tools—that I begin this exploration. The efforts to create European identity are not novel practices designed only to counter forces of the far-right, though. Although identity is a contested and “much abused” concept,⁴ and often seems to prompt fragmentation rather than cohesion, it has nevertheless been a theme within the European Community since the early 1970s. The prospect of crafting European identity has been—and continues to be—conceived as a positive and desirable quest in various strands of the political rhetoric of the EU with an almost self-evident justification:⁵ it is viewed as a necessary, legitimising step to further integrate member states and, simultaneously, as a marker of the plurality as well as the unresolved and always-in-the-making nature of the EU. Thus, varying, if not even contradictory, demands and hopes are invested in the notion

¹ We witness this increase in Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, and Belgium, just to mention the top five. See BBC News, “Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism”.

² Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”, para. 32.

³ These efforts could arguably be viewed as a type of metapolitics. For example, rhetorical scholar Karl Ekeman explores the role of culture in the metapolitical strategies of the European alt-right. See Ekeman, “Solecism or Barbarism”; Ekeman, “On Gramscianism of the Right”.

⁴ Delanty, “Is There a European Identity?”, 76.

⁵ García, “New Narrative Project”, 345.

of European identity: it shall create unity even as it reflects diversity—a constitutive dichotomy that preserves its creative force through persistent, unrelenting articulation.⁶

With the signing of the Declaration on European Identity in 1973, European identity became an explicit endeavour within the Community; and in 1984, the first concrete steps towards creating such identity were undertaken in the form of a committee that was founded with a mandate to propose “measures to strengthen and promote its [the Community’s] identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world”.⁷ The result was the publication of two reports called ‘A People’s Europe. Reports from the ad hoc Committee’ (‘A People’s Europe’).

Efforts to propose a European identity have presented themselves in forensic and epideictic texts as well, among them the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 and the non-ratified Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in 2004. While the former implemented the Union citizenship and the economic union (EMU), and consolidated earlier treaties into the three-pillar structure, the latter proposed the federal idea of a common constitution for all member states, which was eventually rejected by the very polity it was supposed to constitute. To be sure, creating a common legal framework is not the same as crafting identity per se but these two treaties offer more than a legal framework; they exemplify epideictic practices of normative and moral orientation toward European values, history, heritage, and culture, as well as anticipations for the future.

Finally, as mentioned, most recently, the project New Narrative for Europe (New Narrative) has sought to create a sense of belonging among EU citizens. The explicit purpose of this project was to create a bond between older and younger generations of Europeans due to a perceived lack of interest in the EU from its citizens generally but especially from younger generations, a disinterest founded in a lack of embodied historical memory and growing nationalism and populism in an expanding number of EU member states. In the months before the EP election in May 2014, growing populism and nationalism were often brought into the election debate, as many feared that the political far-right would gain more seats in the parliament, a fear solidly confirmed by the election result.⁸ The New Narrative project, therefore, turns to culture. It is in the name of culture that the many contributors of the initiative compose stories of European origin, of cosmopolitanism, and of the central role of European cultural

⁶ For a presentation of the constitutive dichotomy, see Just, “Constitution of Meaning”, 153 ff.

⁷ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 5.

⁸ See, e.g., Simons, “EU Elections 2014”; Handelsblatt, “Europawahl 2014”.

production in collective identity formation. According to the initiative, culture—in its widest sense—is not just where the architects of the EU would have wanted to start, but also the hope for the future, that which will help create social cohesion.⁹

The scholarly literature on collective identity formation within the EU largely conceptualises this endeavour as identity politics,¹⁰ another political and rhetorical phenomenon that has gained a renewed impetus and a changed signification within the last decade. No longer strongly rooted in leftist social movements, identity politics, in general and public use, has come to designate any kind of political engagement with identity and thus can signify both nationalist, racist rhetoric as well as feminist, queer, and anti-racist rhetoric. In chapter 2, I dwell on this conceptual change and its implications for studies on the EU's efforts at identity formation, and further elucidate my claim that speaking about identity in a political context is not necessarily the same as engaging in identity politics, which is why I instead point to the theory of constitutive rhetoric as a more fitting framework.

Consequently, in this thesis, I explore five concrete attempts at collective identity formation within first the Community and then the EU from the perspective of constitutive rhetoric as developed by Maurice Charland.¹¹ I conduct this study, firstly, to illuminate this specific material and its means of crafting collective European identity; and, secondly, to enrich and further develop the theory of constitutive rhetoric by highlighting its challenges and potential through rhetorical criticism of rhetorical practices that span various times, places, and genres.

The purpose of this study is thus to explore a range of representations of European identity within the five EU initiatives: Declaration on European Identity (1973), 'A People's Europe' (1985), the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Constitutional Treaty (2004), and A New Narrative for Europe (2014). Three sets of questions guide this study: First, how is European identity described and contextualised, and what are the spatial, temporal, and symbolic means used for such purposes? Second, whom or what do such identity formations represent and encompass? Who are the historical and visionary narratives for? And which norms and values are invoked herein? And, thirdly, what are the implications of such formations for both

⁹ One of the architects, Jean Monnet, is often quoted for saying: "If I were to do it again from scratch, I would start with culture", although scholars question the authenticity of this statement. See, e.g., Shore, *Building Europe*, 44; García, "New Narrative Project", 345.

¹⁰ See, among others, Risse et al., "To Euro or Not"; Hansen, "Europeans Only?"; Risse, "Euro and Identity Politics"; Risse, *Community of Europeans?*; Cross, "Identity Politics".

¹¹ Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric".

the EU and its citizens? How are citizens positioned and constrained within these narratives, and which acts are encouraged?

While this study primarily aims to contribute to rhetorical scholarship, it also adds to the growing body of literature on the subject, although it offers a different perspective than what is often presented by disciplines more familiar to EU studies (i.e., the social sciences) by highlighting the rhetorical—discursive as well as nondiscursive—dimensions of collective identity formation and the interconnections between discourse and its sociocultural context. In addition, understanding collective identity formation in a diachronic perspective helps us understand such and similar practices within and around the EU today. Consequently, with the perspective of constitutive rhetoric as a general theoretical framework, this study contributes to the research on the relations between collective identity formation and politics by engaging with the specific attempts to rhetorically craft European identity in the five EU initiatives. I will focus, on the one hand, on how the discourse of European identity evolves over time while, on the other hand, exploring different thematic topologies. I do so by examining all five initiatives, but, due to its extent and more recent date, *New Narrative* and the publication produced from it, *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, take a more prominent position and function as my point of departure for exploring the four previous initiatives.¹²

In this introductory chapter, I discuss the complexity of the EU as a rhetorical agent, its specific language, as well as EU citizens. Furthermore, I introduce the field of EU studies and how rhetorical scholarship contributes to this field. I argue that one of its most important contributions is its explicit and close engagement with the discursive, symbolic means and practices of the EU. Rhetoric's contribution is thus also methodological, and I present my analytical approach and selection as well as delimitation at the end of this chapter.

Who is the EU? Agent and Agency

In the five initiatives studied here, we find a wide range of speakers representing the EU in different ways. “The EU” sometimes signifies its institutions (Council, Parliament, Commission), individual members of the EP, and officials; sometimes presents itself as an abstraction indicating an economic, political, and cultural idea and ideal; and, on yet another level,

¹² Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*.

refers to its citizens. In other words, to understand the EU as an agent is complex and thus demands attention.

The EU as a rhetorical agent is a position rarely problematised in EU studies. Scholars of rhetoric have, however, discussed both this position and the presumed agency of the EU and the speaking subject more generally. These scholars highlight the rhetorical process, language circulation, and the complexity of the fragmented rhetorical situation as important points of interest.¹³ Such questions of agential status and rhetorical agency are deeply intertwined, and will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Sine N. Just argues that the EU should be understood as a rhetorical process, which means to “highlight the Union’s situational constraints, its contingency, and its doubtfulness [Danish: *tvivlsomhed*] far more than other assertions of the EU’s communicative character”: the EU is constituted indirectly through the varying concrete, communicative practices that take place, which is where the scholarly field of rhetoric can make an important contribution to EU studies.¹⁴ Just directs our attention to public debates and other types of public opinion making as supplements to more traditional understandings of the EU as a specific institutional order of governance.

Such “struggle with and over language”¹⁵ is likewise central to Kristine M. Berg who takes Kenneth Burke’s words as her starting point: “When a bit of talking takes place, just what is doing the talking? Just where are the words coming from? . . . Do we simply use words, or do they not also use us?”¹⁶ Berg notes that “rhetors use language just as language uses rhetors”,¹⁷ thus turning the rhetor, in this case the EU, into both an agent and a product of a *language already in circulation*, a notion she appropriates from Judy Segal.¹⁸ For her part, Segal argues that the rhetor is not “simply a strategist with a purpose who speaks through crafted texts to an audience in order to change or make up their minds”, they are “also an agency—for a language that is already in circulation”.¹⁹ Consequently, we can

¹³ Just, “Indirekte kommunikativ konstituering”; Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”; Kjeldsen, “Speaking of Europe”.

¹⁴ Just, “Indirekte kommunikativ konstituering”, 18. From the Danish: “hvilket sætter fokus på Unionens situationsbundethed, dens kontingens, og dens tvivlsomhed i langt højere grad end andre formuleringer af EU’s kommunikative væsen”. “Tvivlsomhed” is ambiguous in this context and can mean either a hesitancy or uncertainty on the part of the EU as to its own nature or a more general doubt or uncertainty about the EU from the part of the general public. Both meanings would apply.

¹⁵ Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”, 23.

¹⁶ Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 6.

¹⁷ Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”, 23.

¹⁸ Segal, *Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine*, 2005; Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”, 23 ff.

¹⁹ Segal, *Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine*, 2005, 14.

understand the EU as both an intentional, strategic agent assisting in creating a specific language and an agency of this language.

In a similar vein, Jens E. Kjeldsen highlights the general complexity of the rhetorical situation in a mediatised and globalised world, which makes it difficult for the speaker to control the uptake of the message, as the audience is dispersed and the original message is rearranged and cut into “fragments and soundbites”.²⁰ Furthermore, he argues that “the speaker of today seems to be constituted by a number of consultants and speech writers. Both politically and rhetorically, the speech has become a polyphonic—and often complicated—compromise”.²¹ This polyphony is exemplified by a prime minister who, when speaking in the EP, not only has a dual role (prime minister in their home country and head of government in the EU) and a host of people who have all had their say in the final speech, but also a triple audience: the EP, the national parliament, and the population, which again is diverse and numerous (EU, national, regional, etc.).²² We can specify this complexity further by distinguishing between two different meanings of representation made visible by the German *vertreten* (politicians *represent* the political preferences and priorities of the citizens, they speak for them) and *darstellen* (the media *re-presents* parliamentary debate to the citizens), respectively.²³ In a similar double meaning, different spokespersons, MEPs, commissioners, EU officials, national politicians, and chairpersons of various committees, conventions, and intergovernmental conferences represent the EU as an institution in various external matters while simultaneously representing its citizens internally. Moreover, the EU is re-presented in the media. But the media, likewise, serves a double function as it re-presents the EU to the citizens and represents EU citizens in its capacity as the fourth estate. In both senses of the word, representation “means the making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact”.²⁴ The relationship between the representative and what or whom is represented, then, is characterised by a duality between presence and nonpresence and thus invokes questions of accountability, performativity, and rhetorical agency.

Whom, then, do we hold accountable for rhetoric emanating from a dispersed, fragmented, colossal but often unspecific and even invisible agent? “If power is no longer constrained by models of sovereignty”, Judith Butler asks, “if it emanates from any number of ‘centers,’ how are we

²⁰ Kjeldsen, “Speaking of Europe”, 20.

²¹ Kjeldsen, 21.

²² Kjeldsen, 40.

²³ Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, 70.

²⁴ Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, 8–9.

to find the origin and cause of that act of power by which injury is done?”²⁵ Butler argues that we should focus less on trying to locate this origin and more on the specific “practices in which power is actualized in its effects”,²⁶ because the subject is not the original source of, in her case, hate speech; hate speech circulates, it invokes convention, and is thus always a “*citation of itself*”; only because we already know its force from its prior instances do we know it to be so offensive now”.²⁷ Language (as well as other symbols) travels with heavy historical and linguistic luggage, which is why the subject does not own the language it utters; we might be aware of and are certainly responsible for our linguistic choices, but we are not their points of origin, as their historical threads are long and manifold. This performative dispersion explains why some words can be unbearable and hurtful even if we do not intend for them to hurt; we simply cannot decide what linguistic luggage is activated within others and thus how they interpret the meaning of our utterance.

These considerations are similar to Segal’s concept of language already in circulation and Burke’s idea that words use us when we speak. In many ways, Burke, writing in 1966, foresees the postmodern critique of the independent, coherent, and agentic subject capable of fulfilling their intentions in the world—a critique which has sparked both appreciation and frustration in the scholarly community of rhetoric.²⁸ Erin Rand’s conceptualisation of rhetorical agency is productive. She suggests that

In contrast to an understanding of rhetorical agency as the ability of rhetors or texts to act, I view rhetorical agency as the capacity for words and/or actions to come to make sense and therefore to create effects through their particular formal and stylistic conventions. These conventions are, I contend, specific materializations of institutional power.²⁹

²⁵ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 78.

²⁶ Butler, 79.

²⁷ Butler, 80. Emphasis in the original.

²⁸ Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*. Issues of rhetorical agency and the status of the rhetorical agent have been considered and debated in rhetorical scholarship over the past two decades. For an overview of the fundamental issues, see the debate between, on the one hand, Cheryl Geisler and, on the other, Christian Lundberg and Joshua Gunn in *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. In summation, the primary concern they raise pertains to the status of the rhetor and rhetorician as strategic, powerful agents: How do we teach rhetors to act in the world if their agency is compromised and contingent? And how do we account for the relevance of rhetoric as an academic discipline if rhetoric holds limited power? The primary appreciation, on the other hand, concerns the relation between agent and agency. What happens if we discard the metaphor of possession (the agent possessing agency)? The suggestion is that it will direct attention to the contingency of our actions, material conditions, and our social, political, cultural circumstances. See Geisler, “How Ought We”; Lundberg and Gunn, “‘Ouija Board’”; Geisler, “Teaching the Post-Modern Rhetor”.

²⁹ Rand, “Inflammatory Fag”, 299–300.

So, instead of viewing agency as something the agent or the text possesses, Rand defines rhetorical agency as a more general capacity enacted in particular situations and contingent upon specific conventions. This departure from the—in the rhetorical tradition—close relationship between agent and agency complicates the issue of rhetorical responsibility, however. As will be clear, the performative power of the EU's language is dispersed not only due to the EU's complex structure and different centres, but also because language itself is dispersed and circulated by scholars, journalists, and cultural ambassadors, making it all the more difficult to locate the centre. Therefore, this language and the EU's rhetorical practices are at the centre of this study.

The question is, then, what language is this EU language?³⁰ Although it may seem practical, as Vivien Schmidt suggests, to distinguish between *coordinative discourse*, processes of policy construction, and *communicative discourse*, the efforts at legitimation through the communication of this policy to stakeholders, politicians, and the broader public, it is questionable how useful this distinction is.³¹ As Schmidt notes, both of these discourses are complex, multi-levelled, and do not necessarily cohere,³² and, as the artefacts studied in this thesis bear witness to, coordinative and communicative discourses are not always easy to separate into analytical units. 'A People's Europe' would most likely fall under the coordinative category, but it also exemplifies efforts at legitimation. Similarly, New Narrative falls under the communicative category, but in many ways also seeks to coordinate political action in the future.

A more significant aspect of the EU language, then, is how it reflects the EU's ambivalent relationship with ideology. As Jonathan White notes,

the EU was from the beginning an *anti*-ideological project. Initiated in an era of heightened anxiety about political isms, notably fascism and

³⁰ Here, I am not speaking of the many different, national languages within the EU and how this diversity forms a peculiar EU language. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the different translations of the initiatives, although that would make for an interesting study as well. For example, in the German, French, and Danish translations of 'A People's Europe', focus is not on a *people*, but on *citizens*. This distinction is often invoked in order to signal different levels of formalities: *People(s)* is used in more epideictic, lofty statements about European values and principles, e.g., in a preamble, whereas *citizens* signify the political subjects and their rights and liberties. In other words, the difference in translation is not unimportant. The comparative studies I have come across focus on varieties within the national press coverages. See, e.g., Just, "Constitution of Meaning"; Jasson, "Developing Discourse?"; Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*; Barth and Bijsmans, "Maas-tricht Treaty and Public Debates".

³¹ See, for example, Schmidt, "Arguing about the Eurozone Crisis"; Schmidt, "Speaking to the Markets".

³² Schmidt, "Arguing about the Eurozone Crisis", 458 ff.

communism, European integration was defined in contradistinction. It was about creating a realm beyond ideological division, whether conceived spiritually as a space of Christian unity, or materially as a market detached from political pressures.³³

The rejections of the Constitution Treaty in 2005 marked a new era, however. On the back of the high-strung debates about the role of Christianity and the EU symbols, which I describe in more detail in chapter 3, followed accusations of neo-liberalism, globalism, and federalism,³⁴ and more recently, European colonialism has caught up with the EU as well.³⁵ As White argues, the EU

has always had a contradictory relation to ideologies. It is historically the expression of two opposing tendencies—the effort to *promote* certain ideologies transnationally, embedding them in new institutions, and the effort to *transcend* ideological conflicts and build a supranational sphere beyond their reach.³⁶

Especially, but not solely, in the initially reluctant EU member states, such as the UK and Denmark, the anti-ideological stance of the EU was part of the argument that membership was advantageous: EU membership was portrayed as purely providing practical benefits—in trade, security, movement of work forces, and similar tangible policy areas.³⁷ Cultural policy was not on the table in the 1970s, and even though it was legislatively made possible by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, it continues to be an area with an ambivalent status within the EU, first and foremost manifesting in cultural heritage and production funding.³⁸ In many ways, culture seems

³³ White, ‘Europeanising Ideologies’, para. 3.

³⁴ White, para. 6.

³⁵ Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.

³⁶ White, ‘Europeanising Ideologies’, para. 2.

³⁷ As Manners and Murray note, EU technocrats across all member states advanced this “narrative of benefits”, and more recently this narrative has unfolded in the national context of the UK during the Brexit referendum. Alan Finlayson notes that while the Remain campaign concentrated on the transactional costs and benefits of EU membership, emphasising its practical and rational benefits, the Leave campaign “concentrated on the failure of EU membership to satisfy the interests of particular groups explaining economic decline not with reference to the fiscal austerity imposed after the 2008 Global Financial Crash, nor to the industrial restructuring and globalisation of the nineteen-eighties but to membership of the EU since 1973”. Leaving the union thus was framed as a promise of freedom. See Finlayson, “Brexit, YouTube”, 15; Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 188.

³⁸ Gordon argues that the article on culture implemented in the Maastricht Treaty has had little effect, mainly due to “overcomplicated and overregulated (for fiscal accountability reasons) with onerous application and payment procedures” coupled with a relatively small culture budget. Gordon, “Great Expectations”, 109.

to constitute the invisible line between tangible, functional politics and value-based, normative metapolitics.³⁹ This status is part of the reason that the positioning of culture as the core around which the New Narrative for Europe, and its fight against nationalism should revolve, is important to scrutinise.

What has changed, though, is not so much European integration as an ideological project but the rhetorical practices in relation to ideology: as the EU's rhetoric on culture, identity, and European history approaches a European mythology, ideology becomes conspicuous. This development, however, does not imply that the EU as a whole has incorporated a new way of speaking. Many, if not most, areas of the EU's work are still characterised by an anti-ideological rhetoric completely void of any isms. It is telling that in the artefacts studied here, there is no socialism, no conservatism, no liberalism. In New Narrative, there is conceptual agreement among the EU representatives to talk about liberal democracies, but not liberalism; totalitarian regimes, but not fascism.⁴⁰ These contradictory rhetorical practices—on the one hand, approaching mythology, on the other hand, refraining from ideology—generate a peculiar language specific to the EU. It is this mythological but anti-ideological rhetoric that I explore in this thesis.

These different layers of complexity relating to the EU and the EU language generally function to decentre the rhetorical agent and, consequently, rhetorical agency. All of these issues—about the polyphonic and fragmented speech situation, about performativity, and about the EU language—complicate the issue of naming. On a pragmatic level, we must name what we study; and thus, by naming “the EU” as a singular rhetorical agent, even though I know a range of difficulties are involved in this move, I contribute to the interpellation of the EU as a singular, coherent, and agentic entity. I do, however, make an effort to name the many contributors in the five initiatives in order to show the dispersion of rhetorical agency. These complications also indicate the need for precision and the need to be able—when relevant—to talk about Europe as something *other* than the EU, except when making a point of the ambiguity. In the EU

³⁹ Cultural policy has received scholarly critique precisely on the grounds of this ambivalence. See Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’”; Shore, *Building Europe*; Shore, “In Uno Plures”. As mentioned, more recently, Ekeman explores the role of culture within the European alt-right and conceptualises efforts of this kind as strategies of metapolitics. See Ekeman, “Solecism or Barbarism”; Ekeman, “On Gramscianism of the Right”.

⁴⁰ García likewise notes how *New Narrative* “does not highlight the competition between political narratives of the EU (such as social democrat versus liberal narratives, or narratives of enlargement versus narratives of deepening) but seeks to rebuild a form of consensus on the grounds, of the rejection of populism and nationalism”. García, “New Narrative Project”, 348.

texts as well as in the scholarly literature, these two categories—Europe and the EU—are often used interchangeably, and the same is true when it comes to its inhabitants: Europeans and EU citizens. I scrutinise these rhetorical phenomena more closely in chapter 5 as central mechanisms in the historiography of the EU.

For Whom? Audience and the EU Citizen

Whom, then, are these five EU initiatives explicitly addressing? How is the audience projected in the artefacts?⁴¹ And in connection with the general objective to form European identity, whom is this identity for? Although I agree with Charland, who, in turn, leans on Burke when he argues that “a transcendent subject as audience member, who would exist prior to and apart from the speech to be judged” does not exist,¹ I do find it useful, again for pragmatic reasons, to briefly note some of the key characteristics of the potential audiences here in the introduction before returning to the question of the subject and performativity in chapter 2.

Although all of the five initiatives are publicly available, they address several audiences, and EU citizens are only rarely the explicit audience. The two treaties, for instance, can be regarded as written and signed on behalf of the EU citizens, as being *for* its citizens, but they are mostly communicated and read in abbreviated forms conveyed through national and EU politicians and the media. In this sense, the most recent initiative, New Narrative, is the only initiative explicitly seeking to communicate with EU citizens.

Furthermore, the explicitly proclaimed audience might be different than the intended or perceived audience, a situation made no less complex in today’s mediatised and globalised society. As Kjeldsen notes in his aforementioned study on Tony Blair’s address to the EP in 2005, the “orator not only addresses the specific audience in the EP, but also a wide range of different countries and groups in Europe”.⁴² The coverage of Blair’s speech was largely crafted as “a story about Blair in the EU-Parliament rather than an account of the present and urgent situation of Europe and the European Union”.⁴³ So, in the same way that a politician might explicitly address another politician but implicitly direct the message to the

⁴¹ In other words, who is the texts’ *second persona*? I refrain from using this concept and therefore will not go further into its conceptual implications here, but I briefly touch upon its relation to constitutive rhetoric in chapter 2, see note 185. See Black, “Second Persona”.

⁴² Kjeldsen, “Speaking of Europe”, 20.

⁴³ Kjeldsen, 41.

general public, an EU report might explicitly address the president of the European Council or EU citizens, but implicitly speak to a different audience; or, it might be directed at both at the same time. The amplification of this complexity due to the rise of new media might be a fairly recent challenge, but it is neither uncommon (it characterises all types of political communication), nor likely to disappear.

Even though four of the five EU initiatives studied in this thesis do not directly address EU citizens, European identity in a diachronic perspective gradually becomes a collective identity meant to encompass EU citizens, an identity *for* the EU's citizens, as I show in chapter 4. So before exploring the various interpellations of EU citizens in the artefacts, it is worth noting some characteristics about the EU citizens who actually inhabit the EU member states. The scholars presented in this section do not consistently distinguish between Europeans and EU citizens, but, in my view, it is important to do so, both for reasons of precision and to avoid making claims on behalf of people who are not part of the EU.

EU citizens are a culturally, politically, and linguistically very diverse group of people. As Luis B. García notes, "EU integration means reincarnation as a world power for France, redemption of the past for Germany, resurrection and independence for Central and European states, optimization for the United Kingdom".⁴⁴ Similarly, Ian Manners and Philomena Murray argue that founding and other Western member states have, until recently, ascribed to the "Nobel narrative [the narrative of European integration as a peace project], while newer members identify with economic Europe".⁴⁵ The identity as EU citizen is, in other words, strongly related to and contextualised by differing national identities. But demographic differences within and across member states are important to bear in mind. Neil Fligstein seeks to explain why some citizens are more "likely to adopt a European identity" than others and argues that the primary source of European identity is positive interaction "on a regular basis with people from other European countries", a privilege granted to only a small portion of EU citizens.⁴⁶ Studying England, France, and Germany, this "middle- and upper-middle-class" group of EU citizens has had a large impact on the centre-left and -right parties; but the far-left and -right are two very

⁴⁴ García, "New Narrative Project", 346.

⁴⁵ Manners and Murray, "End of a Noble Narrative?", 197. The authors argue that the "central legitimizing role [of the Nobel narrative] has effectively ended", due to younger generations with no experience of the war and a "somewhat tarnished" reputation. See Manners and Murray, 188. Although the premises are most likely true, I do not completely agree with the conclusion that the narrative has lost its legitimising role. Rather, the role as a peace project has moved outside the borders of the EU. I discuss this issue in chapter 6.

⁴⁶ Fligstein, "Who Are the Europeans", 132–33.

different stories, based on fear of globalisation and fear that the nation state will be undermined, respectively.⁴⁷ To this spectrum, Fligstein adds the category “situational Europeans”, meaning people, who determine their stance on a political issue based on their “own interest and that of the nation”,⁴⁸ the UK and Denmark being prime examples of this situationally contingent adherence. For instance, Catharina Sørensen identifies four types of Euroscepticism based on economy, sovereignty, democracy, and social welfare, and posits that citizens in different member states adhere to different types and combinations of scepticism. Where the perceived loss of sovereignty plays a strong role in the UK, Denmark, and Sweden, the much-debated democratic deficit is more often brought to the fore in Italy, Spain, and Portugal.⁴⁹ This distinction underscores the inconsistent, differentiated, and always potentially changing nature of the EU citizenry. This variation also manifests in Thomas Risse’s conceptualisation of European identity. He diligently avoids any statements about what European identity is on a supranational level; according to him, European identity is different in each member state, as it is contextualised by national identity, which, as a result, is “Europeanised”.⁵⁰

In light of this diversity, it is, as García notes, “undoubtedly difficult to articulate narratives of belonging beyond the thin notion of ‘unity in diversity’”;⁵¹ and all the more interesting that the EU makes such efforts. It is in trying to understand the relation between these rhetorical efforts at collective identity formation and the specific narrative and discursive tensions that rhetorical scholarship and, more specifically, this study contributes to EU studies.

EU Studies from a Rhetorical Perspective

Although the EU as an object of study has traditionally been undertaken in the social sciences, disciplines within the humanities, such as history, anthropology, and philosophy, have gained ground within the past two decades, and different variants of discourse analysis are increasingly employed in order to better understand the discourses and narratives of and

⁴⁷ Fligstein, 133.

⁴⁸ Fligstein, 134.

⁴⁹ “Euroscepticism”; Rasmussen and Sørensen, “Denmark: A Pragmatic Euroscepticism”.

⁵⁰ Risse, “A European Identity?”; Risse, *Community of Europeans?*

⁵¹ García, “New Narrative Project”, 346.

about the EU and its citizens, several of which will be actualised in this study.⁵²

Rhetorical scholarship has also made its, albeit still small, contribution to studies of the EU, and there is good reason for this interest: not only does rhetorical scholarship have much to offer in a field so grounded in the social sciences, but the EU is also an intriguing object of study for rhetorical scholars. The EU holds great financial, political, and social power, and thus pose dilemmas just like any nation state, albeit on a different and more complex level. The EU, then, complicates many of the concepts we take for granted: rhetor, audience, agency. These concepts are of course complicated in other arenas as well, but the EU is an uncharted field and thus offers ample opportunity to explore.

Rhetorical citizenship and performances of the “admirable citizen” are at the heart of Berg’s doctoral thesis about the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. Two of Berg’s findings are particularly relevant to this study, the first one centring around the aforementioned concept of “a language already in circulation”.⁵³ Berg traces the EU’s concept of *intercultural dialogue* in scholarship on intercultural communication and dialogue, which leads to the second point—namely her conclusion that “‘intercultural dialogue’, while presented as a genre based in practice, is a language ideology aimed at generating a particular kind of civic engagement” and, consequently, promotes certain normative ideals of how to perform the role of a good citizen.⁵⁴ Similar mechanisms are at play in the initiatives studied here and will be thematised in chapter 6.

Just has written extensively about the EU, probing questions of the EU’s legitimacy and legitimation strategies, the role and importance of public debate on EU issues, as well as the role of the media in such debates, and the processes of public opinion formation.⁵⁵ In her doctoral thesis, Just concludes that the continuous and widely branched process of public opinion formation is where the EU finds its legitimacy and

⁵² Some relevant examples are Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*; Case, “Being European: East and West”; Dewandre, “Political Agents”; Diez, “Europe as a Discursive Battleground”; Fornäs, *Europe Faces Europe*; Hansen, “Europeans Only?”; Holmes, “Experimental Identities (after Maastricht)”; Howarth and Torfing, *Discourse Theory*; Kaelble, “Identification with Europe”; Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”; Sandberg, “Grænsens nærvær og fravær”; Shore, *Building Europe*; Wodak and Weiss, “Analyzing European Union Discourses”; Wæhrens, “Erindringspolitik til forhandling”.

⁵³ Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”; Segal, *Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine*, 2005.

⁵⁴ Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”, 276.

⁵⁵ Just, “Constitution of Meaning”; “Deliberative Processes”; Just, “No Place like Home?”; Just, “European Public Debate”; Just, “Velkommen til Merkolland”; Just, “This Is Not a Pipe”.

European collective identity emerges.⁵⁶ She thus highlights both the constitutive connection between articulation and context and the multitude of positions and identities in public opinion making. This second point is also at the core of her study on the DebateEurope website, in which she concludes that

the analysis of the offered identities and performed agencies of DebateEurope shows how a single invitation opens up room for a multitude of enactments. Thus, the analysis indicates that the formation of unified European public opinions is unrealistic. However, this does not mean that European public opinion formation is impossible.⁵⁷

Throughout her scholarship on the EU, Just remains preoccupied with the relation between public opinion formation and citizens' involvement herein, the latter of which is discussed in chapter 6. For instance, European public opinion formation could arguably be understood as the purpose of New Narrative, although the platform from which it was launched did not offer the same possibilities as DebateEurope.

In addition to Just and Berg, Alessandra Beasley von Burg has contributed substantially to this field. Beasley von Burg explores the tensions between, on the one hand, the EU's policy of freedom of movement and cosmopolitan ideals and, on the other hand, limited conceptualisations of citizenship that restrict the mobility of non-EU citizens, such as the Roma people for whom movement is a condition of living. She therefore proposes to "renovate" the EU citizenship so that it includes both "the freedom of movement as an EU right and the concept of being free to move and freedom as human rights".⁵⁸ Movement in relation to cosmopolitanism is addressed in chapter 6.

Finally, media and communication scholar Johan Fornäs systematically explores the introduction and interpretation of the EU symbols in his book *Signifying Europe*⁵⁹ —Europe Day, the European motto, flag, and currency. These symbols have a salient function to the constitutive rhetoric of the EU and will be scrutinised further in chapter 4. Fornäs has also edited an anthology that centres Eastern European perspectives on European identity formation.⁶⁰ Relevant to this study is philosopher Carl

⁵⁶ Just, "Constitution of Meaning".

⁵⁷ Just, "European Public Debate", 92–93.

⁵⁸ Beasley Von Burg, "Free to Move", 83; see also Beasley Von Burg, "Caught between History and Imagination"; Beasley Von Burg, "Stochastic Citizenship"; Beasley Von Burg, "Muslims and Multiculturalism".

⁵⁹ Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*.

⁶⁰ Fornäs, *Europe Faces Europe*.

Cederberg's contribution,⁶¹ which explores the relation between identity and ideal in *New Narrative*. His analysis is discussed in chapter 6.

The study at hand is surely not the first to take an interest in how collective identity formation has developed in the policies and rhetoric of the EU, and I examine a large segment of this literature in the theoretical chapter (2). Worth mentioning here is that much of the more recent scholarship highlights multiplicity and hybridity. For example, sociologist Martin Kohli and political scientist Michael Bruter both explore multiple identity constructions within the EU empirically; Kohli argues that there is a potential for hybrid identities among migrants and border communities,⁶² and Bruter suggests that we begin to see multiplicity as a reinforcement rather than exclusion.⁶³ Furthermore, political scientist Thomas Risse has written extensively on the relationship between national and European identity, and, as briefly mentioned, concludes that these features are not just close, but interdependent.⁶⁴

We also see efforts to expand the field of EU studies towards other disciplines. The anthology *European Identity* explicitly seeks to expand the field traditionally dominated by political science and its reliance on "survey instruments" and "polls",⁶⁵ as well as its functionalist and rationalist past.⁶⁶ The belief in functional pressures, institutional ties, and actor interests—in short: the force of "constraints and incentives" that dominated the field in the 1960s and 1970s⁶⁷—is not capable of capturing "the dynamics of European identity construction", as it is formulated.⁶⁸ Instead, they argue for a multidisciplinary approach: "While the work of political scientists and the survey techniques upon which they rely are important, in this book we largely turn elsewhere—to anthropology, sociology, and history".⁶⁹ Of particular interest to this study is the contribution by sociologist Adrian Favell.⁷⁰ Favell studies movement and migration to and within the EU: so-called ethnic migration from outside the EU, intra-EU elite migration in the West, and a category that falls between these two, namely migration from Eastern Europe. Though the majority of these migrants are EU

⁶¹ Cederberg, "Europe as Identity and Ideal".

⁶² Kohli, "The Battlegrounds of European Identity", 113.

⁶³ Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?*, 20–22.

⁶⁴ Risse et al., "To Euro or Not?"; Risse, "A European Identity?"; *Community of Europeans?*; Risse, "No Demos?"

⁶⁵ Checkel and Katzenstein, *European Identity*, 10.

⁶⁶ Checkel and Katzenstein, 4 ff.

⁶⁷ Checkel and Katzenstein, 7.

⁶⁸ Checkel and Katzenstein, 19.

⁶⁹ Checkel and Katzenstein, 2.

⁷⁰ Favell, "Immigration, Migration".

citizens, “white, Christian, skilled and in high demand”,⁷¹ they often experience similar prejudices and exclusion to those coming from outside the EU. I discuss Favell’s contribution and his book, *Eurostars and Eurocities*,⁷² in which he studies the intra-EU elite migration more closely, in chapter 6.

Finally, political scientist Peo Hansen and intellectual historian Stefan Jonsson’s extensive study on the close relationship between European integration and colonialism informs this project as well. In *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*,⁷³ Hansen and Jonsson retrieve “a history of the European union (EU) long neglected or ignored in scholarship”.⁷⁴ This is a history of the role of particularly European colonialism in Africa in the founding years of the EU as well as its continuous role today and how the official founding narrative of the EU (a project of peace, freedom, and democracy) serves as a red herring to divert attention from its “geopolitical ambitions and economic interests”.⁷⁵ While these ambitions and interests may not be purposefully hidden in the way Hansen and Jonsson suggest—the EU is very open about its ambitions to be able to speak “with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper rôle in the world”⁷⁶—they are supposedly fulfilled on philanthropical grounds; and to help solve problems on a global scale and ensure that influence is not “in the hands of a very small number of great powers”.⁷⁷

In other words, “the little dots” on the map that compose what is formally known as the Overseas Countries and Territories within the EU are “fundamentally at odds with the EU’s dominant self-understanding”,⁷⁸ a self-understanding which is, according to the authors, upheld by the scholarly community in its failure to scrutinise the EU’s official story and the strategies it has employed: “Historiography being one of the most powerful of these strategies, it becomes particularly important to examine the complicity of historians and EU researchers in establishing a selective and one-sided interpretation of the EU’s past”.⁷⁹ Hansen and Jonsson set out to rectify this fundamental problem by examining the more or less forgotten programme called *Eurafrica*, formed in the 1920s as a geopolitical constellation with the promise of providing “Europe with raw materials for

⁷¹ Favell, 184.

⁷² Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*.

⁷³ Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.

⁷⁴ Hansen and Jonsson, xiv.

⁷⁵ Hansen and Jonsson, xv.

⁷⁶ Commission of the European Communities, “Declaration on European Identity”, 120.

⁷⁷ Commission of the European Communities, 120.

⁷⁸ Hansen and Jonsson, 1, 2.

⁷⁹ Hansen and Jonsson, 4.

its industry, nutrition for its population, land for its overpopulation, labour for its unemployed, and markets for its products”⁸⁰—without the unfortunate connotations of colonialism. Although studies have appeared within recent years that shed light on the relationship between European integration and colonialism, they are few.⁸¹ In the study at hand, my focus is on the geographical, physical, and symbolic resources and means used in the EU’s collective identity formation—on what is there; but I invoke Philip Wander’s concept of the *third persona* in chapter 5 to address what is *not there*.⁸²

In sum, the research on European identity in relation to the EU stresses important perspectives relating to the dynamic, interdependent, and ambiguous nature of identity formation, including its multiplicity in various contextualised forms and its multidirectional movements. Furthermore, much of the existing literature goes against the more traditional reliance on quantitative analysis based on survey instruments and polls. However, a common denominator of these studies, aside from their social science background, is their reluctance to discuss what the concept of European identity actually signifies and the symbolic forms it takes. To varying degrees, they discuss narratives, myths, and/or discourse as important parts of identity formation, but few examine how this discourse and other symbolic practices involved actually manifest.

⁸⁰ Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 28. They quote Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s “Afrika” in *Panurope* 5:2, 1929, 3. It may seem illogical that Europe should be overpopulated in the immediate years after World War I, but the acceleration of population growth in the nineteenth century, which “was a direct consequence of declining death rates and stable or even rising fertility rates”, did actually predict overpopulation. In fact, despite two devastating wars, we can observe a population growth from 1900 to 1950 (from 296.000 to 393.000). Haines, “Population of Europe”.

⁸¹ See, e.g., Aman, “EU and the Recycling of Colonialism”; Bhabra, “Whither Europe?”; Bhabra, “Current Crisis of Europe”. Hansen and Jonsson explain that *Eurafrica* is rendered insignificant in existing scholarship for several reasons: First of all, the history of the EU is Eurocentric in the sense that the history of Europe and Africa are seen as insular and distinct narratives, meaning that European history is viewed as what takes place on or beginning on the European continent. Secondly, colonial history is viewed not as a global world history, but as matters of the specific nation states. As a consequence, “Euafrica drops out of the picture”. See Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 14, see also 259 ff. Furthermore, two historiographical paradigms have dominated the view on European and African post-war relations: the Cold War and decolonisation. The Cold War has formed a dominant analytical framework in historiographical accounts of EU history, specifically neglecting the impact of Africa and colonialism on European integration, a neglect which is further underscored by the general view that the Cold War instituted a period of decolonisation. Hansen and Jonsson argue that such efforts of decolonisation are actually redefined relationships of interdependence. See Hansen and Jonsson, 269.

⁸² Wander, “Third Persona”.

In light of this dearth of scholarship, it is interesting that García notes a recent narrative turn “in the literature on European studies and in institutional and political practice”, identifying New Narrative as an example.⁸³ Indeed, we see many validations of such a turn in historical, sociological, and political scientific areas of EU scholarship, and many of these scholars rely on discourse analysis.⁸⁴ However, with notable exceptions, such as anthropologist Cris Shore’s work on the EU’s collective identity formation through cultural policies, and Peo Hansen’s work on the EU’s political efforts to form such identity,⁸⁵ many scholars engaging with narrative are not attentive to how the narrative in question is voiced and crafted: they paraphrase texts and/or reconstruct their arguments, but do not analyse and interpret the symbolic forms and practices.⁸⁶

⁸³ García, “New Narrative Project”, 350.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., Diez, “Europe as a Discursive Battleground”; Forchtner and Kolvraa, “Narrating a ‘New Europe’”; Hansen, “Europeans Only?”; Hoffmann, “Re-Conceptualizing Legitimacy”; Howarth and Torfing, *Discourse Theory*; Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”; Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”; Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”; Sala, “Europe’s Odyssey?”; Sala, “Narrating Europe”; Wodak and Angouri, “From Grexit to Grecovery”; Wodak and Weiss, “Analyzing European Union Discourses”.

⁸⁵ Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’”; Shore, “Imagining the New Europe”; Shore, *Building Europe*; Shore, “In Uno Plures”; Hansen, “Europeans Only?”. Although not as encompassing, it is still worth noting Forchtner and Kolvraa’s analysis of narratives of old and new Europe and how they are interrelated and Holmes’s ethnographic analysis of the experimental character and interconnectedness of post-Maastricht identity formation. Such identity formation stems from a range of very different voices and thus arise bottom-up as well as top-down, he argues. See Holmes, “Experimental Identities (after Maastricht)”; Forchtner and Kolvraa, “Narrating a ‘New Europe.’”

⁸⁶ A notable example of this lack of engagement with the text is Vivien Schmidt’s analyses of the European Central Bank’s and EU leaders’ rhetorical handling of the sovereign debt crisis. Her argument is compelling, but her analysis consists mainly of her own reconstructions of the differing discourses (coordinative and communicative). She neither shows the empirical examples that lay the foundations for interpretation, nor explains how she arrives at these interpretations. In fact, neither in the text nor in the bibliography does she list the artefacts she analyses. See Schmidt, “Arguing about the Eurozone Crisis”; Schmidt, “Speaking to the Markets”. Another example is Ian Manners and Philomena Murray’s analysis of six different EU narratives (among which, one is the New Narrative) and their interaction. After describing and paraphrasing the New Narrative declaration in one paragraph, their analysis consists of a slightly longer paragraph in which they apply a set of predefined analytic concepts, as in the following: “From the perspective of temporal ordering of events, the New Narrative did not provide any coherent *narrative structure*. Although it did have a beginning (“The Mind and Body of Europe”), a middle (“Europe’s Evolving Narrative”) and an end (“The Renaissance Meets Cosmopolitanism”), the narrative linking these parts of the story was unconvincing. Thus in terms of *narrative identity*, the New Narrative was not able to constitute a recognisable story of what Europe is for most Europeans; instead, it tended to identify a partial, culturalist sense of Europe”. See Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 191. Although their conclusion may be right, I am less convinced by the way they arrive at that conclusion.

Rhetorical scholar Robert Asen identifies a similar and more general “discursive turn to policy analysis”.⁸⁷ Policy is of course only a small part of the rhetorical artefacts produced within the EU, but his point merits extension to other areas of EU studies. Often, he claims, scholars from disciplines not traditionally preoccupied with discourse “treat concepts like metaphor and narrative as a critical smorgasbord assembled in the interests of taxonomy”.⁸⁸ This critique resonates with Just’s demarcation of a rhetorical approach from a discourse analytical approach. Discourse analysis, she argues, is most often interested in establishing general categories, compartmentalising artefacts, and in seeking “differences and order”;⁸⁹ contrastingly, rhetorical analysis, as exemplified by Just and the study at hand, aims at illuminating interdependence, nuances, and complex relationships between artefacts.⁹⁰

In other words, explorations of narrative and discursive aspects of the EU and its citizens are employed by disciplines well-established in EU studies, but rhetorical scholarship can make valuable contributions. It can do so by engaging closely and thoroughly with communications concrete manifestations and the symbolic—discursive as well as nondiscursive—practices of the EU in a back-and-forth movement between theoretical concept and artefact, and by keeping an open stance towards ambiguous, processual, and interrelated dynamics of the artefacts analysed.

Analytical Approaches: Rhetorical and Topological Readings

Rhetorical analysis, then, is important if we truly want to understand *how* political myths and narratives of collective identity are crafted and the different ways they work.

The readings presented in this thesis rely on a hermeneutical understanding of human beings’ position in the world and in history. From this perspective, “the prejudices and preconceptions that occupy the

⁸⁷ Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric”, 124.

⁸⁸ Asen, 124. Asen’s critique refers to Frank Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Deborah A. Stone, *Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making* (New York: Norton, 2002).

⁸⁹ Just, “Constitution of Meaning”, 19. Just takes Gilbert Weiss as the primary representative of this type of discourse analysis. Other notable examples of this approach is Manners and Murray’s article mentioned above and Ruth Wodak who has also done a lot work on the EU. See Wodak and Weiss, “Analyzing European Union Discourses”; Wodak and Angouri, “From Grexit to Grecovery”; Angouri and Wodak, “They Became Big”.

⁹⁰ Just, “Constitution of Meaning”, 19.

interpreter's consciousness"⁹¹ are not freely available for them to dispose of as they like, but are rather a universal human condition, and the critical task is to lay bare the conditions that constrain meaning formation and understanding. More concretely, this perspective forms the basis of a conviction that our understanding of an artefact (as a whole) is based on a constant process of comparison between artefact and our disciplinary assumptions about its meaning.⁹² From this, the two analytical approaches that inform this study are derived: conceptually driven rhetorical criticism and topological reading.

Conceptually Driven Rhetorical Criticism

Conceptually driven rhetorical criticism is presented as a critical practice by James Jasinski in his article "The Status of Theory and Method in Rhetorical Criticism",⁹³ in which he offers a metacritical history of how critical rhetorical practices and the ideas informing these practices have shifted during the second half of the twentieth century. Jasinski does not so much present a new way of doing rhetorical criticism as offer a concept for what he observes is being performed in the scholarly community of rhetorical scholars. He calls it "one of the most significant recent developments in rhetorical studies";⁹⁴ a change from method-driven to theory-driven rhetorical criticism, which is also characteristic of this thesis.⁹⁵

The central concern of this approach to rhetorical criticism is the relation between concept/theory and object/analysis. Theory is understood as serving criticism by offering a vocabulary (concepts) to help us

⁹¹ Gadamer, *Sanning Och Metod*, 142. From the Swedish: "De fördomar och förhandsmeningar, som ockuperar tolkarens medvetande, står honom inte fritt till förfogande".

⁹² Villadsen, "Dyre ord", 13.

⁹³ Jasinski, "Status of Theory and Method".

⁹⁴ Jasinski, 254.

⁹⁵ Jasinski argues that whereas *method* was seen as one of the most important components of rhetorical criticism in the 1940s–1960s, *theory* becomes the centre of attention in the 1970s onwards. The purpose of a strong methodological ground in rhetorical criticism was, he argues, to foster the ability to make thorough analytical contributions, evaluated on a systematic grounding instead of on the critic's individual preferences. Method was thus understood as a systematic process viewed as a "a means of redemption" from a historically tarnished reputation and thus as a way to achieve "academic respectability". See Fisher, "Method in Rhetorical Criticism", 102–3. This methodological focus led, however, to a counterreaction in the 1970s, informed by the question: Have we become too preoccupied with the *how* of the criticism instead of the analysis, the criticism, itself? Centring theory instead of method in the critical practice is thus an answer to this question.

understand our material,⁹⁶ and criticism serves theory by testing hypotheses, illustrating, modifying existing theory, and so forth. In this approach,

the concept(s) remain essentially works in progress; our understanding of the concept(s) evolves through the back and forth movement between concept and object. Similarly, the critic's understanding of the object grows or develops as conceptual thickening helps illuminate its diverse qualities.⁹⁷

Thus, the critical practice is imagined as a movement between concept and object, mutually illuminating each other. The often-cited metaphor *conceptual thickening* is especially valuable as it highlights the various ways a concept or a theory evolves: by exemplification, by (small or extensive) modification, by broadening its subject area, by narrowing its application, and so on.

Jasinski's conceptualisation is largely inspired by Michael Leff, whose scholarly work was concerned with practicing and conceptualising rhetorical close reading. Leff argues that each rhetorical criticism vibrates theoretical principles "against the particular case";⁹⁸ or, to use another one of his metaphors, in rhetorical criticism, "theory moves along the broken ground covered by the specific material of the discipline".⁹⁹ This dynamic indicates, firstly, that the critic must get a sense of the unevenness, the multifaceted character of a body of material in order to know what theoretical concepts prove relevant; secondly, it implies the locus of the critic's attention: the ground, wherefore it might not be possible to use the same concepts on the entire body of material. Close reading thus opens up the object not just to one theory or concept predetermined by the critic, but to several theories and concepts in their interaction with the object and each other.¹⁰⁰

I find this particular reading practice useful and relevant when working with my material: How is the idea of European identity, as it is articulated in this specific material, understandable using the vocabulary of, among others, the theory of constitutive rhetoric? How does it interact with the theory of semiology? And how are these concepts elaborated along the way?

⁹⁶ Jasinski, "Status of Theory and Method", 257. Jasinski references Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, NY: Basic Books, 1973, 26–27.

⁹⁷ Jasinski, 256.

⁹⁸ Leff, "Interpretation", 347.

⁹⁹ Leff, 347.

¹⁰⁰ Jasinski, "Status of Theory and Method", 261–62.

Specifically, rhetorical close reading, like the readings I perform in this study, entails that the critic, in different measures, “linger[s] over words, verbal images, elements of style, sentences, argument patterns, and entire paragraphs and larger discursive units within the text to explore their significance on multiple levels”.¹⁰¹ This approach is, in other words, largely attentive to the intrinsic values and functions of rhetorical material. The disadvantage of this focus is that it also potentially isolates the specific artefact from larger discursive phenomena, neglecting to explore the “external influences the text has had on its context”,¹⁰² or the cultural, political, historical influences *on* the text, for that matter. This valid critique is all the more relevant when analysing discourse with multiple audiences, as is the case with the EU’s discourse on European identity. As a remedy to this critique, Leah Ceccarelli suggests adding an intertextual element to the textual analysis through historical research on the reception of the rhetorical practices being studied.¹⁰³ I will not provide a full account of the historical reception as Ceccarelli suggests, but I have sought to find reviews of and studies on historical and contemporary press coverage of the EU initiatives and incorporated these external views of the five initiatives into the chapter on their rhetorical and historical context (chapter 3). In other words, I use the reception as a way of understanding how others have perceived the EU’s rhetoric on European identity and not as a systematic checklist to see if the arguments I make are true or not. Thus, I hope to show that it is possible to engage in a reading that captures cultural, political, and historical influences both *on* and *of* the text, although my primary commitment remains close readings of the EU’s rhetorical practices of collective identity formation.

Topological Reading: Patterns and Tensions

Although not referring to her analytical practice as close reading, this is arguably what Maria Johansen does in her study on *raison d’état* and the Swedish intelligence and security service in a series of White Papers [*SOU: Statens Offentliga Utredningar*] published in the 1960s onwards.¹⁰⁴ Her analysis is concerned with the text’s topology, a practice inspired by Roland Barthes’s reading of Balzac’s *Sarrasine*, in which he offers the metaphor of *starring* the text: “We shall therefore star the text [*on étoilera donc le texte*], separating, in the manner of a minor earthquake, the blocks of

¹⁰¹ Jasinski, *Sourcebook on Rhetoric*, 93.

¹⁰² Ceccarelli, *Shaping Science with Rhetoric*, 6–7; Leff, “Things Made by Words”, 228.

¹⁰³ Ceccarelli, *Shaping Science with Rhetoric*, 6.

¹⁰⁴ Johansen, *Offentlig skrift*.

signification of which reading grasps only the smooth surface”.¹⁰⁵ “*Etoile-éra*” has several translations, one of which is “to star”. Another translation invoked by Barthes’s imagery is “to crack into the shape of a star” [*fråler en forme d'étoile*]; for example, when a small stone hits a window-pane without breaking it. In conjunction with the metaphor of starrng—putting the text on stage, viewing it from all possible angles, but also considering the shape of an (iconic) star—“starring the text” signifies, on the one hand, the plurality of a text, that it does not have one single reading, or meaning, but several, and that they are ongoing and never-ending: we will never reach its true meaning. On the other hand, starring the text entails separation, separating different units of a text in order to map its different significations.

In Johansen’s adaptation, topological reading involves reading with an eye toward the topological characteristics of a *body of texts*.¹⁰⁶ She pays attention to different blocks of signification within the texts and how these blocks appear, sometimes side by side, intertwined or in tension with one another, how they break, and sometimes even form new blocks of meaning through these movements. Johansen studies “the kaleidoscopic displacements of form in the text’s topology. Topology means the study of objects with regard to form—to the mutual layers and relations between different points—and not distance”.¹⁰⁷ Such an approach aims to attend to recurring patterns in a text or a body of texts, even though they may be remote in space, time, and/or theme. Hence, reading with what we could call a topological sensitivity means being sensitive to the (formal) characteristics that *unite* a body of texts, rather than to read with a focus on *distance*. This sensitivity allows Johansen to read the SOU White Papers as a coherent body of texts, going back and forth between the texts, instead of reading five single texts temporally apart and thematically different; a stance that prompts questions such as: Which patterns appear in the texts? What tensions appear within or when juxtaposing these patterns? And what are the implications of such tensions?

What I take from Johansen is a step back from the obvious chronological order of the five EU initiatives in order to approach a more topological

¹⁰⁵ Barthes, *S/Z: An Essay*, 13.

¹⁰⁶ This move from a single to a collection of texts is a significant deviation from Barthes, who ascribes the structuring of texts into large volumes as “classical rhetoric and secondary-school explication”, something he warns against: “Whence the idea, and so to speak the necessity, of a gradual analysis of a single text”, in which case I interpret ‘text’ quite literally. Barthes, 12.

¹⁰⁷ Johansen, *Offentlig skrift*, 211. From the Swedish: “kalejdoskopiska formförskjutningar i textens topologi. Topologi utgör helt enkelt studiet av objekt där hänsyn tas just till form—till de inbördes lägena och relationerna mellan olika punkter—och inte avstånd”.

order. When I began this work, I almost intuitively imagined a chronological development; a process automatically indicating progress or change of some sort. Changes definitely occur but, at the same time, many arguments and thematic figurations appear over and over again. My initial hypothesis that the EU was creating an institutional identity in the 1970s and 1980s and a collective, cultural identity in the 1990s onwards is at once true and not true. It is true that there is such a development, a change in scope and focus from an institutional level to a citizen level, but at the same time, very similar stories of the EU's relationship with its citizens are narrated repeatedly. Thus, the central challenge for the EU as an institution, from the point of view of the institution itself, seems to be the same today as it was in the 1970s: How do we connect with our citizens?

To the work at hand, this tension between chronology and recurrence is interesting on an analytical and theoretical level, and challenging on a pragmatic level: how does one structure an analysis of material that extends over time without using a chronology of some kind? I have chosen to view the material as a body of texts and study the patterns they make up, across time and incoherent thematic perspectives. This process involves reading these texts both in and out of their chronological sequence. I do, however, within each thematic section seek to keep a chronological order as a pedagogical means of making my diachronic arguments clearer to the reader.

*

In sum, what I adopt from the two analytical approaches described above, is, firstly, attention to the reciprocal process between concept and object in rhetorical criticism, whereby the critical act is a theory of the case, illuminating the object and thickening the concept simultaneously; and, secondly, a view on the plurality of the artefacts while at the same time taking a step back from their chronological order and viewing the body of texts as a topology with both uniting features and tensions. These two approaches might seem contradictory, one pulling critical attention to the specific object of study, the other to uniting features and tensions in a body of artefacts. We may understand this approach as a combination of macro and micro level analysis:

At the macro level, the statements of individuals may be mixed and matched to reconstruct larger themes. Discourse appears as the rhetor, and situation refers to the larger political, economic, and social forces

informing policy debate. At the micro level, particular exchanges obtain significance for both their representativeness and their exceptionalism.¹⁰⁸

Consequently, I aim at doing justice to the singular artefact when representing it in the larger thematic structures. By closely engaging with the symbolic practices of the EU and focusing on their ambiguities and inter-relatedness, this approach is, as noted, markedly different from other EU studies that take an interest in narrative and discourse.

Finally, it is worth noting the methodological challenge of studying an institution and a topic in constant change. This flux is a general challenge to everyone studying contemporary phenomena and thus not exceptional to this study, but the effects warrant mention. Firstly, this fluidity complicates delimitation. I have drawn a rather strict temporal line from 1973 to 2014 in terms of delimitating my objects of study, but they need to be viewed within their broader historical and contemporary context. Secondly, not only the contemporary EU and European identity is in constant change, the past is also. The understanding of historical material changes in light of contemporary political and societal changes as well as changing historical insights. It is difficult—and not necessarily desirable—to detach my readings from contemporary phenomena such as Brexit and the European debate on migration and refugees and, more recently, the Covid-19 pandemic and its political consequences for the internal cohesion of the EU: the Polish government's passing of anti-abortion laws in the shadow of the pandemic and the following demonstrations, and Italy's difficult fight against the pandemic and the resulting anti-EU sentiments in Italy, as solidarity from other EU countries has lacked. All of these phenomena have provoked the reappearance of well-known internal divisions of power across the EU: North/South as well as East/West. This does not mean that I do continuous readings of such present phenomena as well, but rather that they inform my readings of the material at hand and continuously add to the context within which I view my objects of study. They appear throughout the study as examples and contextual perspectives.

Selection and Delimitation

My primary objects of study are: the Declaration on European Identity,¹⁰⁹ a short declaration signed in 1973 by the then nine member states of the

¹⁰⁸ Asen, "Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric", 134.

¹⁰⁹ Commission of the European Communities, "Declaration on European Identity".

Community; the two ‘A People’s Europe’ reports,¹¹⁰ written by a committee founded at a European Council in 1984 and presented in 1985; the Maastricht Treaty,¹¹¹ signed in 1992 and fully ratified in 1993; the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,¹¹² signed in 2004, but never ratified and thus never in effect; and the publication *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*,¹¹³ the result of the project New Narrative for Europe initiated in 2013 by the European Parliament and since then taken over by the European Commission. This publication includes different types of artefacts such as political speeches, art work, philosophical and other scholarly texts, as well as the “Declaration: The Mind and Body of Europe”.

Together, these primary artefacts represent a broad view of how the rhetoric on European identity has developed over time and in different genres within first the Community and since then the EU. With these primary artefacts as my starting point, I explore the communication surrounding them—among others, relevant press releases, speeches, and official statements—in order to create a broader picture of how the initiatives were communicated publicly and the conversations of which they were a part. Furthermore, I trace the wider distribution and circulation of the themes and ideas of the five initiatives in nondiscursive symbolic representations and in scholarship (the mechanism of circulation is explained further in chapter 3). For this reason, previous research on the five initiatives relevant to this study are presented and analysed in the historical background (chapter 3) and in the analytical chapters (4–6).

These five EU initiatives do not cohere as a self-evident body of artefacts; in fact, we might conceive of this material as rather eclectic. Artefacts of multiple authorship do not form readily identifiable thematic units, but this does not mean that they are chosen arbitrarily.¹¹⁴ With reference to Michael McGee’s dictum that “our first job as professional consumers of discourse is *inventing a text suitable for criticism*”,¹¹⁵ Asen argues that although the critical practice involves judgment and creativity, it does not necessarily follow that the critic has “unconstrained agency in creating a text from cultural materials”.¹¹⁶ The specific thematic assemblage arises from

¹¹⁰ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”.

¹¹¹ Council of the European Communities, “Treaty on European Union”.

¹¹² European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”.

¹¹³ Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*.

¹¹⁴ Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric”, 132.

¹¹⁵ McGee, “Text, Context”, 288. Emphasis in the original.

¹¹⁶ Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric”, 142.

the “copresence of these competing positions [in the artefacts], not the creative assembling of the sovereign rhetorical critic”.¹¹⁷

In this spirit, the five EU initiatives have been chosen due to their call for European identity, formalised with the Declaration on European Identity in 1973. Not all of them mention European identity as an explicit objective, but they articulate other related aims: to create a sense of belonging, a European destiny, as well as to foster common European values. Some of the initiatives studied presuppose the existence of a European identity; others articulate this identity as a concrete goal. While some of the initiatives are evidently relevant to this study, others might appear less obvious, however. Among the more evident texts is the Declaration on European Identity, which indicates “the first significant step towards defining a cultural basis for European unification” and is thus a unique initiative of its time.¹¹⁸ The same can be said about ‘A People’s Europe’, which “marks . . . an overall re-orientation within the EC towards a heightened concern with questions of identity, culture and citizenship”.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, it was not until ‘A People’s Europe’ that the issue of European identity was explicitly discussed within the Community.¹²⁰ ‘A People’s Europe’ may appear as rhetorically unremarkable, which is why it is worth emphasising that in policy debates, “mundane statements often are more influential than exceptional rhetorical performances”.¹²¹ Even though the specific language use in the two reports is rather mundane, the texts are eventful as rhetorical practices.

Contrastingly, the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty are not in the same way self-evident parts of my material and also take a less prominent position in the analysis, but nonetheless each has its specific traits that makes it particularly interesting to this study. Both treaties were in several member states heavily contested by politicians and citizens alike which, in connection to the Maastricht Treaty, resulted in opt-out solutions for the UK and Denmark. The Maastricht Treaty is often described as a turning point in European integration, not least because it marks the introduction of a single currency, “without doubt the most significant move toward European integration so far”.¹²² This is of course underscored by the timing, the kairotic moment of post-Cold War Europe, but also due to the restructuring of the Community into a Union with its three-

¹¹⁷ Asen, 133.

¹¹⁸ Shore, *Building Europe*, 44.

¹¹⁹ Hansen, *Europeans Only?*, 32.

¹²⁰ Hansen, 54.

¹²¹ Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric”, 133.

¹²² Risse et al., “To Euro or Not”, 148.

pillar structure and the implementation of the Union Citizenship.¹²³ The scholarly literature often describes the Maastricht Treaty as a defining moment in the history of the EU, marking a before and after.¹²⁴ As García notes, not until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty did the EU and scholars alike begin to reflect upon the potential need “to complement economic integration by fostering cultural and political bonds among Europeans”, thus justifying the existence of the EU to its citizens.¹²⁵

In the case of the Constitutional Treaty, contestation led to its complete abandonment after the rejections following the Dutch and French referenda. Thus, the federal idea of a common constitution for all member states was rejected by the same polity it was supposed to constitute. The question is, then: why study a text as an example of constitutive rhetoric, when it was never in effect? Although the text was never ratified, it actually did have effects, among which as a draft for the Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009. Furthermore, the preambles to both the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty are remarkable in that they introduce the ideas of European identity and a common European destiny, respectively, into the constitutional framework. These aspects, taken together, indicate that specifically these two treaties are valuable texts for this study.

Another interesting aspect of a treaty or constitution is the performativity of the genre. Although in the case of the EU most treaties are amended or replaced after some years, a treaty has an effective lifetime until it is officially replaced by a new one—it has a performative force quite different from the other initiatives (and can be forceful, as just noted, even when legally not in function). While a political report such as ‘A People’s Europe’ would become politically irrelevant once its proposals were implemented,¹²⁶ a treaty or constitution has a more continuous influence and significance returned to over and over again. For instance, the phrase “a more perfect union” from the preamble to the Constitution of the United States was a *topos* in Obama’s eponymous speech in 2008 as well as Joe Biden’s inaugural speech in 2021; it was the title of an episode of the popular TV show *The Good Wife*; and it served as the title of a book from 2015 by Ben Carson, who served in the Trump administration. It is thus

¹²³ Cris Shore asserts that this is an idea first advocated in the reports from ‘A People’s Europe’, but I do not find any mentions of citizenship in the reports. See Shore, “In Uno Plures”, 15–16.

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Shore, *Building Europe*, 53; Hansen, “Europeans Only?”, 53, 121; Holmes, “Experimental Identities (after Maastricht)”, 52.

¹²⁵ García, “Introduction”, 286.

¹²⁶ At least that is most often the case; in this particular instance, the phrase and vision of ‘A People’s Europe’ circulates for many years after. See Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 78–79.

returned to across the political spectrum and in different spheres of society. Similarly, the vision of “an ever closer union” from the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, 1957, is often referred to and quoted; the crucial difference is, though, that the circulation of this topos is restricted to the political and academic sphere and has not, to my knowledge, reached mainstream culture.

New Narrative, like the Declaration on European Identity and ‘A People’s Europe’, more naturally lends itself to a study on rhetorical perspectives of collective identity formation. The project explicitly calls for a common European narrative to connect citizens across generations and thereby create “a sense of belonging to Europe, to a community of values, culture and interests”,¹²⁷ and it did so only shortly after the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. Furthermore, New Narrative specifically targeted EU citizens, particularly the “younger generation” and thus more clearly formed part of a communicative discourse (rather than coordinative).¹²⁸ Finally, the bricolage nature of the publication *Mind and Body* enables the incorporation of a broad range of genres as well as types of contributors (artists, intellectuals, politicians), on the one hand, while, on the other hand, the bricolage diffuses responsibility of what is said, written, and depicted. While the contributors of publications such as *Mind and Body* may understand their task differently, their participation and significance are constrained by the multiple authorship because the authors “must negotiate his or her participation in light of the others with whom he or she directly interacts as well as others who may participate at different times and settings”.¹²⁹ In this way, the result is an artefact that both induces polysemy and coheres at the same time. These characteristics—the explicitness about its identity formation strategy, its target audience and its bricolage nature—makes it a highly interesting object for this study, which is also why it takes a prominent place in the thesis on a whole.

The selection of these five initiatives invokes the question of genre. If we understand genre as “the recurrence of similar forms”,¹³⁰ such forms constrain the range of possible symbolic forms and thus create expectations in the mind of its audience: “form is the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor and the adequate satisfying of that appetite”.¹³¹ It is, of course, not always possible to satisfy this appetite, and it also does not mean that it is impossible to say anything unexpected or new; the

¹²⁷ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 25.

¹²⁸ This difference is explained in the above section “Who is the EU?”. See also Schmidt, “Arguing about the Eurozone Crisis”; Schmidt, “Speaking to the Markets”.

¹²⁹ Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric”, 133.

¹³⁰ Campbell and Jamieson, “Form and Genre”, 20.

¹³¹ Burke, *Counter-Statement*, 31.

constellations of forms, the concrete tactics, and the situational context are some of “the unique elements in the rhetorical act, the particular means by which a genre is individuated in a given case”.¹³²

Even within a specific genre, several genres can co-exist and, as a result, different constraints and expectations. For example, a treaty is a legal text and therefore must live up to expectations of clarity and specificity. The preamble, on the other hand, has an epideictic character allowing for more lofty statements about the values and principles characteristic of the be-spoken community or institution. Similarly, the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty suggest more than a common legal framework; they express ideas about European values, heritage, history, and societal as well as political norms. As a result, treaties are of rhetorical interest not only as legal documents.

For these reasons, the preamble is often regarded as having less legal importance since it introduces the principal framework to the actual law, it is not *the* law. However, the preamble is not unimportant. In 1971, the preamble in the French constitution was given constitutional value and thus placed alongside the constitution text, and a similar change happened in Bosnia in 2000, where the preamble was given “normative force”.¹³³ Likewise, as I will return to, the draft for the Constitutional Treaty underwent much debate specifically due to the preamble. The preamble carries importance, in other words, and is often one of the most cited passages in a constitution.

The main result from New Narrative, the publication *Mind and Body*,¹³⁴ is a mix of not only different contributors (fifty in total), but also different textual and visual genres (political speech, philosophical essays, and conversation along with infographics, art installations, and photo collages) juxtaposed under one heading, a genre best described as a bricolage. Many of the contributions are speeches held at the New Narrative general assemblies and thus perform both deliberative and epideictic functions, celebrating the initiative and the people involved while pushing a specific political agenda. So, in terms of genre and the expectations they create, how are we to understand New Narrative as a whole? That the fifty contributors have agreed to participate in the publication and to various degrees participated in the initiative (at general assemblies and other forums) and thus are constrained by one another’s presence, does not mean that

¹³² Campbell and Jamieson, “Form and Genre”, 14.

¹³³ The Constitutional Council of France. “Decision No. 71–44 DC of 16 July 1971. Law Completing the Provisions of Articles 5 and 7 of the Law of 1 July 1901 on Association Agreements”, July 16, 1971. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Partial Decision U 5/98 III”, July 1, 2000, 9.

¹³⁴ Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*.

they have coordinated their contributions with each other, nor that they can be individually held accountable for the collected whole. Several of the so-called miscellaneous contributions were held or written for other occasions, but reprinted in *Mind and Body*. Thus, each contribution has its own purpose that cannot be assumed to be identical with the general purpose of the publication as a whole. Moving from one speaker to fifty indicates a distribution of agency and, consequently, a diffusion of responsibility that we can understand as a way of engaging (parts of) the European community, but such a shift complicates the analysis of audience and speaker and runs the risk of blurring the distinction between politicians and various civil society ambassadors: is the “we” articulated in these contributions the same or different? We see indications of both. The contributions can be understood as smaller, varying, and sometimes contradictory narratives in a larger narrative frame with an explicitly polyphonic design—but, initiated by the European Parliament and organised by the European Commission, the general frame and voice is that of the EU,¹³⁵ and I explore this voice even when exploring the others. All of these traits make *New Narrative* distinctive in comparison to the four other initiatives.

The question is, then, how are the expectations created through genre conventions suited to the purpose of collective identity formation? What expectations are raised by a visionary text in contrast to a political report? Constitutive rhetoric is characterised by a distinct temporality: it seeks to constitute a community in the present on the basis of an affinity with key values and norms of a past community, thus indicating a direction and guidance for the community and its actions in the future. If we relate this temporality to the five EU initiatives, we note that a treaty contains elements of stability (this is the law)¹³⁶ and more visionary elements (this is what we strive towards). A preamble is expected to briefly articulate the values and norms of the community, drawing a line from the past to the present and onto the future. It would, however, be unconventional to have a preamble that extended this articulation into a longer historical narrative of the nation or the institution. This is also the case with the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty—*narratio* takes up very little space. It

¹³⁵ *Mind and Body* was edited by Emiliano Battista, Nicola Setari, and Els Rossignol. Aside from Nicola Setari, the editors were not participants or otherwise involved with the content of the initiative. I go into details about the New Narrative process in chapter 3, but it is worth mentioning here that since the members of the New Narrative cultural committee failed to deliver the declaration they were supposed to write, the European Commission commissioned one of the editors of *Mind and Body*, Nicola Setari, to draft the declaration. See Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 371.

¹³⁶ For a discussion of Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the relation between law and stability, see Buhre “Speaking Other Times”, 167 ff.

is worth noting, then, that not all texts are natural sites to process the traumas of the past, be that warfare, crusades, colonisation, or the Holocaust. A treaty is expected to create a stable foundation for the members of its community, not to poke at issues that might create division. Such expectations of proportionality, however, indicate that the few historical narratives that *do* exist are all the more interesting: how is the past conceptualised in the two treaties?

The Declaration on European Identity and ‘A People’s Europe’ are both characterised by a visionary outlook: the declaration declares a vision and direction for the Community’s future work and contains no historiographical elements; ‘A People’s Europe’ seeks to promote the image of the Community by changing its perception and relating its future work to the enhancement of the everyday lives of its citizens instead of institutional structures and bureaucracy. As such, they contain almost no elements of historical narrative.

New Narrative’s publication *Mind and Body* more easily lends itself to explorations of both past and future endeavours. While Kaiser argues that historical experience plays a marginal role in the New Narrative declaration and the general assembly workshops, I find that, when exploring the entire publication, *Mind and Body* contains elaborate narratives of Europe’s and/or the EU’s past, all of which are coupled with visionary elements.¹³⁷ How are we to understand, then, efforts at collective identity formation in visionary texts? Visions for whom? This question is discussed more coherently in chapter 6.

These five initiatives compose a very small selection out of many potentially fruitful artefacts that in some way or another touch upon the subject of European identity. For instance, as Shore consistently shows, culture in general and cultural heritage in particular have increasingly become large focal areas within the EU since the 1990s, especially with the legal basis provided by the Maastricht Treaty to act in areas of culture and education.¹³⁸ The connection between the EU’s cultural policy initiatives and collective identity formation is an interesting and timely topic, the relevance of which will only increase. Culture has, indeed, become “an omnipresent topos” in the rhetoric of the EU, and is also central to New

¹³⁷ Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 368–69; Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”, 221.

¹³⁸ Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’”; Shore, “Imagining the New Europe”; Shore, *Building Europe*; Shore, “In Uno Plures”; see also Hansen, “Europeans Only?”. For example, *Creative Europe* is a major funding programme in the cultural and creative sector, and in terms of heritage, *European Heritage Days*, launched in 1985 by the Council of Europe, has been a co organised event with the EU since 1999 and the *European Union Prize for Cultural Heritage* has been organised since 2002. Further, 2018 was the *European Year of Cultural Heritage*.

Narrative, exemplifying what Berg and Just calls the fourth perspective on culture: the discursive perspective, meaning the explicit articulation of culture, not as a background to discourse, but as the centre of attention.¹³⁹ The New Narrative publication speaks of culture as an important factor in terms of connecting with citizens, but offers few specific suggestions for cultural initiatives. In this sense, culture will also be a topos in the study at hand, but I focus on initiatives that take a broader perspective on the institution at large in order to see how constitutive rhetoric works not just in one particular area of the EU's work, such as cultural policy, but in various genres in different political contexts.

Many more initiatives and campaigns focusing on European culture have emerged in the wake of New Narrative—from the EU and its partner organisations, but also as a more general political development, not least in the populist rhetoric the EU has set out to combat. I discuss this contemporary development briefly in chapter 7.

Outline and Content

Following this introduction (1), I present my theoretical framework (2). The concept of collective identity is introduced along with the notion of identity politics and how it relates to the theory of constitutive rhetoric, the latter of which guides this study. I also revisit this theory and highlight various ways in which we can—and should—widen its scope.

Chapter 3 provides a chronological presentation of the objects of study in their diverse historical contexts and rhetorical situations. I view them as constituting various rhetorical ecologies that circulate across time and within different spheres.

Aside from providing an analytical focal point for this study, the theory of constitutive rhetoric provides a structure for the main body of this study, namely the three analytical chapters, in which I investigate how the EU works rhetorically with collective identity formation, from a thematic as well as diachronic perspective (1973–2014). Chapter 4 centres on *the making of a collective subject* and traces the transition over time from the formation of an institutional identity to the formation of collective identity

¹³⁹ Berg and Just, “Når kultur sættes til debat”, 28, 35 ff. Berg and Just take Barbara Johnstone's three perspectives on culture as their starting point and adds to those this fourth perspective. See Barbara Johnstone. ‘Communication in Multicultural Settings: Resources and Strategies for Affiliation and Identity’. *Language, Culture and Identity* Language and Cultural Contact, no. 27 (1999): 25–40. As Gordon notes, although the article on culture in the Maastricht Treaty according to him has had little effect, the “EU is multiplying its usages of the word ‘culture’”. Gordon, “Great Expectations”, 115.

and, ultimately, to their fusion. It also explores the various functional, physical, and symbolic means and resources the EU employs and through which the EU seeks to connect (with) its citizens.

In chapter 5, I investigate how the *collective subject is positioned within a transhistorical frame* and thus explores the EU's historical narratives. A new narrative—an archive of glory—is crafted in relation to the founding narrative of peace. Central mechanisms in this historiography are the discursive ambiguity between Europe and the EU as a means to gain access to a broader, richer past and the politics of time through which different imaginaries of time are put to political use.

Chapter 6 focuses attention on how *the collective subject is positioned and constrained* by the EU's constitutive rhetoric. I explore its visionary rhetoric through topoi of omnipresence and eternity—European cosmopolitanism, a European destiny, universality as European essence, and a European state of mind—that, in conjunction, provide a frame for what it signifies and entails to be an EU citizen. This frame is characterised by a tension between abstract ideals of mobility, plurality, and deliberative democracy and the concrete practices of both the EU and its citizens through which these ideals are enacted.

Finally, I end with a conclusion and further discussion (7), in which I summarise and discuss the main results of the study and point to tensions and tendencies that warrant further discussion and research. I also discuss my analytical approaches and point to theoretical implications of my study valuable to future research on collective identity formation on an institutional level.

2. Theoretical Framework: Constitutive Rhetoric and Collective Identity Formation

If identification is locating oneself in space and time,¹⁴⁰ identity is “done” continuously—we are always ongoingly locating ourselves in different groups, places, times, contexts. How can we account for the process of locating not only ourselves but others as parts of a larger collectivity that extends back and forth in time? Or, in the words of Maurice Charland:

If it is easier to praise Athens before Athenians than before Laecedemonians, we should ask how those in Athens come to experience themselves as Athenians. Indeed, a rhetoric to Athenians in praise of Athens would be relatively insignificant compared to a rhetoric that constitutes Athenians as such.¹⁴¹

This is the central question in this chapter: how can we understand the rhetorical process through which those inhabiting the EU come to experience themselves as EU citizens, or, as is often preferred, as Europeans?

The five initiatives studied in this thesis are situated in different historical and rhetorical contexts, they are written in different genres, and their aims diverge. One feature uniting them, though, is their efforts at collective identity formation—of constitutive rhetoric. In this chapter, I problematise the general acceptance of conceptualising this practice as identity politics and seek to clarify how the concepts of identity politics and constitutive rhetoric interrelate but also diverge. In many ways, constitutive rhetoric and identity politics cover the same ground. They are concerned with how collective identities are enacted in and related to the political realm and political claims made on the basis of collective identity. The conceptual challenges with the concept of identity politics are, however, important to bear in mind. Consequently, I argue that as a critical lens,

¹⁴⁰ Dickinson and Maugh, “Placing Visual Rhetoric”, 261.

¹⁴¹ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 134. Jean-Jacques Rousseau made a similar claim in *The Social Contract*: “It would be better, before examining the act by which a people gives itself to a king, to examine that by which it has become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society”. Rousseau, *Social Contract and Discourses*, book 1, chap. 5, 173.

constitutive rhetoric is preferable even if identity politics is widely used and well-known not only in the scholarly community but also the general public.

In the present chapter, I begin by presenting the concept of identity, and then turn to identity politics and the research on the EU and identity politics. Following this, the theoretical frame of constitutive rhetoric is presented and discussed with the aim of challenging and elaborating this theory. This elaboration is informed by the work of Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, Roland Barthes, and Frida Buhre.

Identity and Politics

According to sociologist Martin Kohli, the concept of identity has “haunted the sociological imagination” since the 1950s. Because of its inherent vagueness on the one side and its ability to capture something significant on the other,¹⁴² Kohli observes that “each time the concept of identity has been proclaimed dead, it has been speedily reanimated”.¹⁴³ Berg and Just make a similar point about the concept of culture, and write that when a concept becomes “an omnipresent topos”¹⁴⁴ in politics, academia, and civil society, it takes, on the one hand, an almost all-encompassing meaning; on the other, very concrete meanings connected to different, specific contexts. Likewise, rhetorical scholars Jon Viklund and Patrik Mehrens draw our attention to such processes of conceptual ambivalence. In their analysis of the singular notion of “the people” and how it is used in different historical contexts, they argue that when the frequency of symbolic representations of a concept and the amount of new topoi guiding the meaning of a concept increase, meaning becomes ambiguous and destabilized.¹⁴⁵ So, too, with “collective identity”, which sometimes leans on primordial notions such as race and ethnicity, sometimes civic notions such as democratic polity and civilisation.¹⁴⁶ In other words, we might view identity and collective identity as empty signifiers:

¹⁴² Kohli, “Battlegrounds of European Identity”, 114–15.

¹⁴³ Kohli, 115.

¹⁴⁴ Berg and Just, “Når kultur sættes til debat”, 28. From the Danish: “et al-lestedsnærværende topos”.

¹⁴⁵ Viklund and Mehrens, “Retoriseringen av begreppet folk”, 62–63.

¹⁴⁶ Risse, *Community of Europeans?*, 27–28; Kohli, “Battlegrounds of European Identity”. This distinction corresponds to that between *ethnos*, signifying “the ‘people’ as an imagined community of membership and filiation”, and *dēmos*, “the ‘people’ as the collective subject of representation, decision making, and rights”. See Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 8; see also Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*.

omnipresent, emptied of specific content but also contingent upon different specific contexts.¹⁴⁷

This proposition, however, should not lead to the conclusion that the concept of collective identity should be discarded as an analytical tool. Similar to Laclau, Viklund and Mehrens posit that the uncertainty and ambiguity that follow from conceptual destabilisation creates a space for new meaning to emerge.¹⁴⁸ Thus, although difficult to manage, the aforementioned vagueness can be viewed as a space of invention, compelling scholars to take seriously the ambivalence and vagueness not as weaknesses of the concept, but as a realistic conceptualisation of the world in which we live. In this sense, we can view the conceptual destabilisation as a mirror image of empirical destabilisation. For instance, the empirical material I study invokes various ideas and notions of European identity and a range of topoi, themes, and arguments based on such ideas that, then, undergo different transformations. Sometimes they are articulated as issues of identity, sometimes as belonging, sometimes as the need for a common destiny. To better understand these varying and sometimes contradictory ideas, arguments, and transformations, I use the concept *collective identity* as an umbrella term—despite its messiness and vagueness. As Burke has famously said, theory should not eliminate ambiguity, but display it.¹⁴⁹

As Kohli advocates, taking “identity seriously”¹⁵⁰ requires a broader understanding of European identity that moves between the different levels of identity: personal, social, and collective.¹⁵¹ In this study, I focus solely

¹⁴⁷ I return to the concept of the empty signifier below. See Laclau, “Death and Resurrection”.

¹⁴⁸ Viklund and Mehrens, “Retoriseringen av begreppet folk”, 68.

¹⁴⁹ Burke, *Grammar of Motives*, xviii.

¹⁵⁰ Kohli, “Battlegrounds of European Identity”, 116. Kohli refers to Martin Schmidberger. “EU-Akzeptanz Und Europäische Identität Im Deutschfranzösischen Grenzgebiet”. *Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte* 25, no. 6 (1998): 18–25.

¹⁵¹ By operating between these levels, Kohli argues, it is possible to grasp the postmodern hybridisation of identities, the “ambivalences and dilemmas, based on fuzzy boundaries and hybrid recombinations of diverging logics of action” See Kohli, 116. This approach leads Kohli to interesting empirical evidence of hybrid identities and explorations of the conditions required for conflicts to contribute to hybridisation rather than fundamentalisation of identities. Kohli, 133–34. Another interesting example is border populations understood as carriers of hybrid identities, and a study on the acceptance of European integration in the border region between France and Germany shows that, compared with their respective national populations at large, citizens in border regions were more accepting of European integration and had a higher level of trust in the neighbouring population. See Kohli, 132. See also Balibar’s notion of the border as the melting pot for the formation of a people in Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 1. Much has changed since Kohli’s article was published—Eastern enlargement, in particular—which have caused new lines of disagreement within the EU, but his conclusions in many ways foresee the conflicts we are now living in.

on the official discursive and symbolic practices of European identity, and thus concentrate my analysis on the level of collective identity. But if we, as a point of reference, assume that personal identity refers to a person's sense of "coherence and continuity" across time and space,¹⁵² social identity can be understood on an "interperson-intergroup-continuum", with interpersonal relations such as those within a family at the one end and, at the other, identifications based on being "members of a social group or category, i.e. not as individuals but as types".¹⁵³ According to Kohli, collective identity, then, belongs to this latter end of the continuum and refers to "social identities that are based on large and potentially important group differences, e.g. those defined by gender, social class, age, or ethnicity".¹⁵⁴ And like identity politics, collective identities in this conceptualisation can be understood as strategies to distinguish one group from another or a search for "strong categories" that can lead to political mobilisation.¹⁵⁵

Kohli's definition of this third—and, to this study, most important—level of collective identity lacks precision, though. He uses the terms national, political, institutional, and collective identity somewhat interchangeably.¹⁵⁶ In this study, I limit my use to *collective identity* and *institutional identity*, but insist on their difference. They both indicate the subject of the identity: the collective subject and the institution, respectively. This distinction, however, does not mean that the empirical articulations of European identity do not, at times, overlap, but I find it useful to conceptually separate the two—not least because doing so enables me to see one particular change in a diachronic perspective, namely that from institutional to collective identity and, ultimately, their fusion, thematised in chapter 4. Therefore, institutional identity is used instead of political identity to

¹⁵² Kohli, "Battlegrounds of European Identity", 116.

¹⁵³ Kohli, 116–17.

¹⁵⁴ Kohli, 117.

¹⁵⁵ Kohli, 117.

¹⁵⁶ Although Kohli's study, indeed, is a serious attempt to achieve a more complex understanding of European identity, the attempt to foreground the complexity slightly obscures his analysis in the sense that it moves between the different levels without specifying these levels. As mentioned, particularly his definition of collective identity lacks precision. Kohli mentions national identity as an example of collective identity based on a territorial reference (Kohli, 117.), and his notion of political identity is particularly broad. If we think in the terms of the distinction between *ethnos* and *dēmos* (see Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 8; see also Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms.*), political identity sometimes is very similar to a collective identity in the sense of *ethnos* ("the massive mobilizing potential of political identities has become evident in the recent surges of ethno-nationalism". See Kohli, "Battlegrounds of European Identity", 119); sometimes to a collective identity in the sense of *dēmos*, referring to "a 'civic' conception of Europe" (Kohli, 129.); other times again, political identity refers to what I would suggest to call institutional identity: "the political identity of the Community itself" (Kohli, 120.)

signify “the political identity of the Community itself”.¹⁵⁷ Accordingly, the theoretical and analytical use of the concept of identity is also justified based on the empirical use of the concept in the artefacts I explore.

Identity Politics and the EU

The fact that identity is political has led many scholars to make the argument that when the EU is engaging with the question of European identity, that engagement can be described as identity politics. But is talking about identity in a political context necessarily the same as engaging in identity politics? In this section, I problematise the concept of identity politics generally and more specifically how the concept has slipped into EU studies and the implications of this slippage. I thus wish to separate the notion of *collective identity formation* from *identity politics* and argue that the theory of constitutive rhetoric is a more fitting framework for exploring collective identity formation.

Many of the EU’s political practices of the 1980s onwards have been concerned with, not solely but importantly, collective identity formation: the making of traditions (Europe Day, the European anthem), the production of symbols (flag, emblem), and ensuring mobility across the internal EU borders. And if we take a broader look, identity, indeed, seems to be the core around which politics revolve today—from the alt-right movement to the feminist movement and political parties on both ends of the left-right spectrum. To grasp how these very different practices relate to one another, the philosophers Silas Marker and Vincent Hendricks identify a narrow and a broad understanding of identity politics. In the broad understanding, identity politics is a *political field* on the same level as economic politics or health care politics. It thus incorporates the entire above-mentioned spectrum, feminism and nationalism, left wing as well as right wing politics. Identity politics in this sense is quite simply a claim that identity matters politically.¹⁵⁸

The narrow understanding of identity politics, on the other hand, aligns with a more traditional conceptualisation in which identity politics has been reserved for the description of practices of social movements such as the feminist movement and the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Identity politics in this sense is conceived as a strategy to decentre the working class as the primary political subject in order to increase the focus on marginalised groups in society, such as women, people of colour,

¹⁵⁷ Kohli, “Battlegrounds of European Identity”, 120.

¹⁵⁸ Hendricks and Marker, *Os og dem*, 16.

and ethnic minorities.¹⁵⁹ Sociologist Mary Bernstein similarly points out that identity politics—which to her signifies a “collective identity approach to social movements”¹⁶⁰—traditionally was understood as “a distinct political practice in contradistinction to class politics”.¹⁶¹ In this narrower sense, identity politics is thus viewed as a practice performed by a certain type of actor: marginalised societal groups who fight to be understood and accepted as valid rhetorical agents. Conceiving the EU, a global political actor with the competence to act forcefully on behalf of and with consequences for others, as engaging in identity politics is, in other words, very far from this conceptualisation.

Nevertheless, this conceptualisation has become the scholarly trend within EU studies. While a few EU scholars view identity politics as communitarianism,¹⁶² or dismiss it, rather condescendingly, as “a wide range of claims for recognition from women’s groups, gays and lesbians, aboriginal peoples, immigrants, ethnic groups, and other who feel deprived of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem”,¹⁶³ most EU scholars use the term to signify a top-down approach to collective identity formation. But who or what is defined as the top varies. Some understand identity politics as very similar to nationalist movements in current or prospecting EU member states,¹⁶⁴ but the majority understands it as practices performed by the EU.¹⁶⁵ Based on observations of a series of anthropological studies, Jonathan Hill and Thomas Wilson note the emergence of a distinction between studies of top-down and bottom-up approaches to identity politics, respectively, where particularly studies of the former seem to increase. They therefore propose distinguishing between *identity politics* and *politics of identity*:

“Identity politics” refers mainly to the “top down” processes whereby various political, economic, and other social entities attempt to mould collective identities, based on ethnicity, race, language, and place, into relatively fixed and “naturalized” frames for understanding political action and the body politic. . . . The “politics of identity” refers to a more “bottom up” process through which local people challenge, subvert, or negotiate culture

¹⁵⁹ Hendricks and Marker, 15.

¹⁶⁰ Bernstein, “Identity Politics”, 67.

¹⁶¹ Bernstein, 49.

¹⁶² Fornäs, *Europe Faces Europe*, 8.

¹⁶³ Fossum, “Identity-Politics in the European Union”, 375.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g., Pavlovaite, “Being European by Joining Europe”; Tamminen, “Cross-Border Cooperation”; Lähdesmäki, “Identity Politics”.

¹⁶⁵ See, e.g., Risse et al., “To Euro or Not”; Risse, “Euro and Identity Politics”; Risse, *Community of Europeans?*; Börzel and Risse, “From the Euro to the Schengen Crises”; Cross, “Identity Politics”; Hansen, “Europeans Only?”; Keridis, “Turkey and the Identity of Europe”; Shore, *Building Europe*; Shore, “In Uno Plures”.

and identity and contest structures of power and wealth that constrain their social lives.¹⁶⁶

Here, the terminology has been reversed: the bottom-up process traditionally thought of as identity politics is termed *politics of identity*, and *identity politics* has become attributed to top-down approaches to identity formation akin to what has been connected to the practices of the EU (which is also mentioned as an example of this category).¹⁶⁷

In light of this conceptual change—or even reversal—a striking feature of the scholarship on identity politics in an EU context is how little the concept is theorised, if at all; often identity politics is taken to be understood beforehand, without any further explanation. Mai’a Cross, for instance, reviews four scholarly contributions in her article “Identity Politics and European Integration”, but does not offer any clarification as to how she or any of the reviewed authors understand the concept; and identity politics is mentioned in the title only, not in the article itself. Out of the four books reviewed, only two actually mention identity politics. For example, *A Community of Europeans?*¹⁶⁸ is written by Thomas Risse who, on several occasions, has written about European identity and Europeaness “in the framework of identity politics”.¹⁶⁹ He argues “that one cannot even begin to understand EU enlargement without taking identity politics into account”,¹⁷⁰ but he, still, does not offer any satisfactory conceptualisation of identity politics. According to him, identity politics is enacted when political actors “frame their preferred courses of action in . . . identity terms” and when “collective nation-state identities . . . delineate the realm of appropriate and legitimate political choices”¹⁷¹—in other words, when discourse about identity guides the norms of political debate and judgment. Often, he changes unnoticeably between “identity politics”, “identity discourse”, “identity talk”, and “identity arguments”,¹⁷² which indicates that

¹⁶⁶ Hill and Wilson, “Identity Politics”, 2.

¹⁶⁷ Hill and Wilson, 2. Although “politics of identity” is less frequent in the literature, Hill and Wilson’s distinctions can become confusing; Keridis, for instance, names a section “Politics of Identity”, which then turns out to be about identity politics as a top-down approach, thus making no distinction between the two. See Keridis, “Turkey and the Identity of Europe”, 2. Hansen also does not distinguish between the two concepts, as is clear in the quote later on in this section. Hansen, “Europeans Only?”, 51.

¹⁶⁸ Risse, *Community of Europeans?*

¹⁶⁹ Risse, “Euro and Identity Politics”, 1, 13. See also Risse et al., “To Euro or Not”; Börzel and Risse, “From the Euro to the Schengen Crises”.

¹⁷⁰ Risse, *Community of Europeans?*, 204.

¹⁷¹ Risse et al., “To Euro or Not”, 158.

¹⁷² See, e.g., Risse, *Community of Europeans?*, 2, 32, 63, 79, 208; Börzel and Risse, “From the Euro to the Schengen Crises”, 97–99.

identity politics indeed has come to mean simply “identity talk”; any talk about identity.¹⁷³

Other scholars view identity politics in relation to how the EU handles marginalized groups in society. Political scientist Peo Hansen, for example, argues that identity politics (also referred to as politics of identity) generally has become an almost exclusively derogatory term, when used to describe the actions and debates involving marginalised groups—the head scarf debate, debates about nonbinary gender identifications, gender equality, and so forth:

There is thus a need to question how the concept of identity politics is being employed and, even more importantly, to question why it is that only certain groups and expressions have come to be associated with the politics of identity. One of the problems with this conception of identity politics is that it excludes other and perhaps more important cites [*sic*] from where this politics is also being waged.¹⁷⁴

According to Hansen, we therefore need to recognise that not only marginalised groups in society engage in identity politics: “such articulatory practices . . . are taking place at, for instance, the level of the state [which therefore] must be scrutinized as constituting a type of identity politics as well”.¹⁷⁵ In other words, while Hill and Wilson argue that we need different concepts for the top-down and bottom-up approaches, respectively, Hansen proposes that these practices are contingent upon one another and should therefore be seen as reciprocal and relational: when marginalised groups engage in identity politics, this may be seen as a response to institutional identity politics—as a tactical response to institutional strategies¹⁷⁶—which in many cases has assigned and thus externally imposed identities for these groups as “others”.¹⁷⁷ An example would be racial stereotypes such as Native American headwear appropriated by sports teams and children costumes.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ The other book reviewed by Mai’a Cross is the aforementioned anthology *European Identity*, in which the editors broadly define “European identity politics” as any effort of collective identity formation, regardless of its starting point—top or bottom, left or right—which is why it can signify both “cosmopolitan and populist forms of European identity politics”. No further definition is given. Checkel and Katzenstein, *European Identity*, 13.

¹⁷⁴ Hansen, *Europeans Only?*, 51.

¹⁷⁵ Hansen, 52.

¹⁷⁶ I here allude to Michel de Certeau’s distinction between strategies and tactics developed in de Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, xix.

¹⁷⁷ Hansen, *Europeans Only?*, 52.

¹⁷⁸ The visual identity of the ice hockey team Frölunda Indians in Gothenburg, Sweden, was until recently built up around the stereotypical Native American, like several sports teams in the US, such as Washington Football Team (until 2020 known as the Washington

Hansen therefore scrutinises the identity politics of the EU with a focus on how it constructs difference and otherness via categories such as *migrant* and *immigrant*.¹⁷⁹ Though valuable, this contribution does not get us far when we seek to understand not only exclusionary mechanisms in collective identity formation, but also inclusionary, visionary categories. I do not mean to argue that the EU does not contribute to exclusion and to furthering elitist visions of the EU citizen; my claim is simply that this is not the complete, complex picture.

In sum, then, the question is whether we can take these conceptualisations of identity politics and move them from one sphere to another, as EU scholars have. As I hope to have made clear, I claim that we cannot. I agree with Hansen that identity political practices should be studied regardless of where they arise;¹⁸⁰ and when we look at the diverse aims of identity politics described by Bernstein—“to change institutions; to transform mainstream culture, its categories, and values, and perhaps by extension its policies and structures; to transform participants; or simply to educate legislators or the public”¹⁸¹—surprisingly, they could be the aims of the EU as well. Yet, one crucial distinction is the difference between the two in terms of power and agency. As Robert Asen writes, “some debate participants . . . may be better positioned than others to draw attention to an issue and affect the pace of the debates”.¹⁸² In the same way, while the empowered institution has the agency (not least economically) to try to reach these objectives, social movements of any kind are in less resourceful positions and in a very different manner have to adjust to the institutional structures and communication channels laid out for them.

An important consequence, then, is that the EU and similar agents do not necessarily have to “transform mainstream culture, its categories, and values, and perhaps by extension its policies and structures”; they can approach it the other way around: change policies and structures and, by extension, change culture, categories, and values.¹⁸³ Consequently, moving

Redskins) and Cleveland Indians. This video makes a good example: <https://youtu.be/pFhTjY4opDs>. Accessed on April 9, 2021.

¹⁷⁹ This reciprocity also works the other way around, as Bernstein shows: “Identity politics has been coopted by the state through the commodification of diversity itself”, for instance by including books by African American authors in the curricula, “without African Americans having equal access to those college campuses as either faculty or students”. See Bernstein, “Identity Politics”, 64. Bernstein refers to Patricia H. Collins, *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

¹⁸⁰ Hansen, *Europeans Only?*, 51.

¹⁸¹ Bernstein, “Identity Politics”, 62.

¹⁸² Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric”, 136.

¹⁸³ An example of this, albeit from a very different context, is the law against corporeal punishment of children. When it was introduced in Sweden in 1979, it did not enjoy

identity politics from a marginalised to an empowered setting is not simply a move from a bottom-up to a top-down perspective; it entails a difference in terms of agential status and range of power as well as objectives and the concrete measures taken to reach these objectives.¹⁸⁴

I argue, therefore, that the casual manner in which the concept of identity politics has been transferred from a marginalised to an empowered setting is problematic because of these inherent complexities when using the concept in a scholarly context. Furthermore, this transference obscures the challenges that arise from such a movement by turning difference in agential status, power, available objectives, and the concrete measures available to reach these objectives into simply a change in perspective: from bottom-up to a top-down. Consequently, in its place, I propose the theory of constitutive rhetoric.

Constitutive Rhetoric: How Europeans Come to Life

The question is, then, how can we account for the rhetorical process through which an audience is projected in a set of artefacts?¹⁸⁵ How do collective identities come to life?

Drawing on literary and rhetorical scholar Kenneth Burke and philosopher Louis Althusser, Charland explains this process of collective identity formation as a process of *identification* and *interpellation*, respectively. To exemplify these functions, Charland takes as his starting point a political movement (Mouvement Souveraineté-Association) that arose in the Canadian province Quebec during the late 1960s with the purpose of

popular support, but according to the Swedish Children's rights organisation, Bris, the law has had "a normative effect" Rydberg, "Hänsed lag".

¹⁸⁴ Michel de Certeau's distinction between strategies and tactics can help clarify this point. In simplified terms, strategies are, according to him, developed by people in power with institutional backing. Tactics are used by those not in power, within the parameters of the strategies laid out and thus offers other kinds of agency. See de Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, and for further developments and critiques of de Certeau's distinction, see Buchanan, *Michel de Certeau*, Andres et al., "Negotiating Polyvocal Strategies".

¹⁸⁵ Or, in other words, who is the text's *second persona*? The concept of the second persona was presented by Edwin Black in 1970 and has since become part of the modern rhetorical canon. It signifies "the projected . . . image of a man [*sic*], and though that man may never find actual embodiment, it is still a man that the image is of". Black, "Second Persona", 113. In other words, the second persona is a textual category implying the audience fitting for the text; the audience to whom the text will be meaningful. Charland mentions Black's discussion of the second persona as a similar process of interpellation, but argues that Black does not fully account for the process through which this interpellation happens, most importantly he fails to account for the ontological status of the audience and persona, respectively. See Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric", 136.

claiming sovereignty for *le peuple Québécois*, a previously unestablished category. The question is how and why almost half of the voting electorate in Quebec went from identifying as *French-Canadian* to *Québécois*—how did *les Québécois* become *les Québécois*—and how did this change in signifier relate to the claim for sovereignty? To make such a claim, Charland argues, it was necessary to first call upon the subjects—the French-speaking citizens of Quebec—as *Québécois* and collectively as *le peuple Québécois*, to insert them into a transhistorical narrative, and thus to constitute them as the future citizenry of Quebec.

According to Althusser, interpellation is the act of hailing—calling upon—a subject which, in self-recognition (or guilt¹⁸⁶) turns around (literally or metaphorically) and, consequently, accepts the subject position and ideology this hailing brings with it:¹⁸⁷ Québécois! Europeans! Charland views the process through which people accept this hailing and come to understand themselves as Québécois, Basque, European, and so on, as a process of identification, and he is interested in the material implications of such processes of constitutive rhetoric: What ideology is inscribed in these interpellations? And what practices are rendered possible as a consequence thereof? Following Althusser, Charland argues that this process of calling upon and, in the specific cases of *le peuple Québécois* and Europeans, inviting a subject to be part of a collective identity, inscribes the subject into ideology.¹⁸⁸ This process is not an act of persuasion; rather, it is a process of identification understood as a rhetorical consequence of the collaboration happening *in and through* a given discourse: an audience must be created rhetorically before it can be persuaded rhetorically,¹⁸⁹ and this creation happens through identification. The subject does not exist as an entity prior to and separated from discourse; it is created again and again in several—and potentially divergent—narratives, fields, and communities through ongoing identification.¹⁹⁰

Consequently, constitutive rhetoric is founded on an inherent paradox, as it must presuppose the subject as a given, extra-rhetorical entity (Europeans) and at the same time create this subject through rhetoric (Europeans):

¹⁸⁶ Althusser mentions guilt and uses religious ideology as one possible example of interpellation out of many, but by doing that, Butler argues, “the divine power of naming structures the theory of interpellation”. She thus seeks to show “how interpellation is essentially figured through the religious example”, compelled by conscience and/or a desire to be. Butler, “Conscience Doth Make Subjects”, 10, 12.

¹⁸⁷ Althusser and Jameson, *Lenin and Philosophy*, 118.

¹⁸⁸ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 138.

¹⁸⁹ Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives*, 50; Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 133–34.

¹⁹⁰ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 138.

The ideological “trick” of such a rhetoric is that it presents that which is most rhetorical as the existence of a *peuple*, or of a subject, as extrarhetorical. . . . Thus this rhetoric paradoxically must constitute the identity of “Québécois” as it simultaneously presumes it to be existing outside of rhetoric and form the basis for a rhetorical address.¹⁹¹

In this way, continuous articulation of an identity *as if* it already exists can become a step towards *actually creating* this identity; or, if the members of the audience fail to recognize themselves in such interpellations, they might simply be perceived as continuous calls without any responses. This constitutive paradox highlights the strategic aspect of identity claims; they are not necessarily indicators of an ontological position, but rather seeks to attain specific goals of identification and, as a result thereof, political goals.

This point, then, not only matters on an ontological level, but also has empirical consequences. According to Charland, constitutive rhetoric can articulate and potentially provide an explanation and answer to contradicting subject positions. *Québécois* is framed as a reconciliation of the two subject positions in *French-Canadian*: the ethnic French subject, and the political Canadian subject. Constitutive rhetoric thus potentially provides a response to discourses that no longer match one’s understanding of self: “Tensions in the realm of the symbolic render possible the rhetorical repositioning or rearticulation of subjects”.¹⁹² In Québec, the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association framed this tension as the distortion of “the ‘natural’ principle that *peuples* attain control of their future”.¹⁹³ Why do some peoples preside over their own future but *les Québécois* do not? Why should the Canadian government have this right?

What constitutive rhetoric offers, then, is to reconceptualise and thus transcend contradicting subject positions. In other words, constitutive rhetoric is action-oriented and seeks to attain concrete political goals, but it also provides a response to perceived inconsistencies: being French-Canadian means, in Charland’s example, to be part of “an impotent minority without a homeland”.¹⁹⁴ Being Québécois, on the other hand, “serve[s] to

¹⁹¹ Charland, 137.

¹⁹² Charland, 147.

¹⁹³ Charland, 145. James B. White also writes about constitutive rhetoric in his reading of Edmund Burke’s speech about the British constitution. An important point in his conceptualisation concerns reciprocity and congruence between the textual universe and reality as experienced by the audience in order for them to be able to translate the textual logic into the material world without experiencing a rupture; a criterium closely related to what Walter R. Fisher calls narrative fidelity. See White, *When Words Lose Their Meaning*, 220; Fisher, “Narration”, 8.

¹⁹⁴ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 142. This “impotent minority” is, we must not forget, also former settlers who colonised this land. Reading Charland’s article today, it is

overcome or define away the recalcitrance the world presents by providing the subject with new perspectives and motives”.¹⁹⁵ In this way, constitutive rhetoric “captures alienated subjects” and provides them with meaning and motive.

Charland’s argument about the ontological status of the subject is fundamentally about “our symbolicity” and, more specifically, the “textual nature of social being”.¹⁹⁶ *Les Québécois*—as a subject in history and in the present—are made real through narrative representation: as individual subjects and a people, they “exist only as a series of narrative ideological effects”.¹⁹⁷ Or, as Charland writes straightforwardly: “In the telling of a story of a *peuple*, a *peuple* comes to be”.¹⁹⁸ Narrative functions as a stabilising structure by creating coherence and meaning out of “temporally and spatially separate events”,¹⁹⁹ thus rendering human beings and the events we experience meaningful and coherent. Since “the locus of yesterday’s act becomes that of today’s . . . narratives offer a world in which human agency is possible and acts can be meaningful”.²⁰⁰ They provide order and a place to dwell.²⁰¹

Narrative, then, is a very broad term that encompasses genres in the realm of fiction—a poem, a lullaby, a drama—and nonfictional genres such as documentaries or news stories as well as more general discourses in society.²⁰² This latter, more general discourse in society is the focus of this study: the EU’s historiography, contemporary discourse on European identity, and future-oriented visions of Europe/EU. The artefacts studied in these pages do not have the characteristic features of a drama or epos, but they contain traditional narrative elements such as mythological analogies, narratives of the past and the future, and narrative as a general discourse—in other words, a narrative, discursive topology.

difficult not to be struck by the incredible lack of self-insight in the historiography of the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association.

¹⁹⁵ Charland, 142.

¹⁹⁶ Charland, 137.

¹⁹⁷ Charland, 139. Even more so as a people. The correlation between individual subject in the material world and in the textual world might lead one to think that they are the same, but, as Charland argues, “it does not even have a unitary body corresponding to its imputed unitary agency and consciousness”. Charland, 139.

¹⁹⁸ “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 140.

¹⁹⁹ Charland, 139.

²⁰⁰ Charland, 139.

²⁰¹ Charland, 142.

²⁰² Fisher, “Narration”, 7.

Three Ideological Functions of Constitutive Rhetoric

According to Charland, the interpellated subject exists only as a *narrative ideological effect*: a rhetorical, ideological construction, not an extra-rhetorical entity existing independently of ideology. In this study, I speak of *narrative ideological functions* instead, rephrasing simply to highlight the unending, reciprocal, and uncomplete nature of constitutive rhetoric. Charland discerns three such functions, which consist of (1) transcending the individual subject in order to constitute a collective subject; (2) positioning this collective subject in a transhistorical narrative, and (3) positioning and constraining the subject to act in accordance with the narrative logic.²⁰³

The first narrative ideological function of constitutive rhetoric concerns how the subject becomes part of a collective subject. Charland explains this movement as a result of what Burke terms *ultimate identification*, as it transcends the interests of particular subjects or groups in order to create this collective identity.²⁰⁴ As Michael McGee points out, the paradox of abstract categories such as “people” or “Europeans” is that not even the rhetors addressing this subject—Europeans, for example—attribute the same codes of identity to this abstraction.²⁰⁵

In this sense, ultimate identification is similar to what political philosopher Ernesto Laclau calls the *empty signifier*. If we see an image of a placard that says “justice”, we understand what it means and the values it acknowledges—regardless of its mediation and how distanced we are in time and space from the actual situation in which the placard is used, we understand.²⁰⁶ This phenomenon explains why individuals can act in the name of a larger group and how we can interpret their actions as a collective act while remaining aware that only “within the formal structure of a narrative history . . . is [it] possible to conceive of a set of individuals as if they were but one”.²⁰⁷ So, in the same way that “justice” can be meaningful to people in different places and with different histories and experiences, “European” can be meaningful to people in Germany, France, Poland, Greece, and so forth, while meaning different things.

The second ideological function concerns the transhistorical community created between the collective subject today and in the past. The narrative of Québécois independence that was fought for in specific military

²⁰³ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 139–41.

²⁰⁴ Charland, 138.

²⁰⁵ McGee, “In Search of ‘the People,’” 239; Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 139.

²⁰⁶ Laclau, “Death and Resurrection”, 306–7. Laclau borrows this example from Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). For a more thorough explanation of how the empty signifier functions and how it relates to the *floating signifier*, see Laclau, 305–11.

²⁰⁷ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 140.

battles, referenda, political debates, and so on, indicates a clear continuation and development from a past collective agent to a present collective agent, and the former (Québécois of the past) thus becomes the ground for the existence of the latter (Québécois of the present) as well as the specific goals fought for on this basis. In other words, the collective subject gains rhetorical agency in the present moment from a sense that it extends through time. Charland comments that

this interpretive stance is perfectly reasonable. It is also perfectly tautological, for it is a making sense that depends upon the a priori acceptance of that which it attempts to prove the existence of, a collective agent, the *peuple Québécois*, that transcends the limitations of individuality at any historical moment.²⁰⁸

Charland does not define what he means by transhistoricity in more specific terms. It signifies the extension of the present into the past, a consubstantiality “between the dead and the living. . . . Time is collapsed as narrative identification occur”.²⁰⁹ Transhistoricity thus assumes that a certain or a set of characteristics transcend the boundaries between past, present, and future. In this sense, when I speak of transhistoricity, I do not mean to indicate that it is ahistorical or atemporal in the sense that it is beyond the influence of historical events or temporal movement; rather, transhistoricity assumes a sameness *despite* historical events and temporal movement. This is what makes it extraordinary. Within the context of the narrative form, events are meaningful, not only as causal relations but also on the basis of a consubstantial connection between a past and present collective agent.²¹⁰ An example of this function is the anachronistic use of pronouns (our land) and nouns (Québécois) to signify a territory and a people who existed centuries ago and who called themselves “Canadian”. In this way, the *peuple Québécois* is presented as existing prior to the Canadian state.²¹¹ We see similar strategies in the EU initiatives in which the distinction between the EU and Europe is blurred not only in name but also in time, a function I dwell upon in chapter 5.

²⁰⁸ Charland, 140.

²⁰⁹ Charland, 140.

²¹⁰ Charland, 139.

²¹¹ Charland, 145. This anachronism is very common. One clear example is the textbook for the British naturalisation test in which citizens of the time before the Acts of Union in 1707 are repeatedly referred to as British. See Home Office of the United Kingdom, *Life in the United Kingdom*. The Acts of Union makes the anachronism very obvious, but often it is rather a temporal sliding slope. Consider also how often we speak about Danes, Swedes, Germans, the French, and, indeed, Europeans, when signifying people living long before these categories were established. See Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, 17 ff.; Heilo and Nilsson, “Back to Byzantium”, 89 ff.

Finally, on this basis, inscribed into a narrative with a “history, motives, and a *telos*”, constitutive rhetoric positions and constrains the subject,²¹² calling on them to provide narrative closure: “While classical narratives have an ending, constitutive rhetoric leaves the task of narrative closure to the constituted subjects”.²¹³ But not just any closure; the people addressed are, through their interpellation, compelled to act in accordance with the continuation and vision projected by the narrative in order not to disparage their position within the narrative, and hence their ability to act.²¹⁴ Consequently, the narrative logic is compulsive in the sense that it is characterised by a teleological movement toward emancipation.²¹⁵ Relying on Althusser’s materialist conception of ideology, Charland asserts that this third function, the insertion of a narrative agent in the material world, reveals the ideological nature of constitutive rhetoric.²¹⁶

Not all efforts at constitutive rhetoric fit with the process as outlined by Charland, however. In the following, I go into more detail with the specific functions and operations of constitutive rhetoric in a discussion of various reconceptualisations and alterations with the help of, among others, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, Frida Buhre, and Roland Barthes. The main issue is how we should understand efforts at constitutive rhetoric that seem to divert from the seminal example of *les Québécois*. The EU, for example, provides alternative subjectivities not as a response to tensions perceived by the EU citizens, but rather to tensions perceived first and foremost within the EU itself. The symbolic means used to interpellate the collective subject exceeds the mere discursive, and plural temporal imaginaries intersect and create different foundations for transhistoricity. Finally, the narrative closure projected is less distinct than the fight for national independence and thus also more difficult to evaluate. I explore these and related complexities in the following section.

Widening the Scope of Constitutive Rhetoric

The readings and theorisations discussed in this section are not explicitly related to Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric, but they deepen and further this theory in different ways. I am interested first and foremost in how these theorisations can interact with the theory of constitutive

²¹² Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 140.

²¹³ Charland, 143.

²¹⁴ Charland, 141.

²¹⁵ Charland, 144.

²¹⁶ Charland, 143.

rhetoric and less in how they inform, for example, Althusser's general theory of ideology.

Interpellation: Reciprocity, Dispersion, and Agency

As Judith Butler has pointed out, Althusser's concept of interpellation needs revision.²¹⁷ Butler views interpellation as a reciprocal and, consequently, a decentred process that affects the subject even in its absence. If we begin with the issue of reciprocity, one of the examples of interpellation Althusser uses is that of a police officer hailing an individual in the street: "Hey, you there!" As a result, "the hailed individual will turn round".²¹⁸ The reciprocity of this operation is exemplified most tragically by Althusser himself who in his posthumously published autobiography describes how he,²¹⁹ after killing his wife, went out to hail a police officer in the street, turning himself in—"turning around (to face the law, to find a face for the law?)".²²⁰ The Brexit referendum provides a more recent example of this inversed hailing. We might consider whether the 48 percent that voted against Brexit was indirectly calling on the politicians in order to "turn themselves in" as not only UK citizens, but also EU citizens. Thus, it could be argued that it was not until after Brexit that the 48 percent was truly interpellated as EU citizens—not as a consequence of being hailed as such by the law or the state, but by themselves.²²¹

This reversal of the scene exemplifies how hailing is not exclusively restricted to the representative of the law and thus how both parties are constituted in the process of interpellation. Although Althusser is not as specific in his theorisation of the inversed hailing as Butler is, his discussion of the Subject (capital S) does contain elements of this reciprocity. This Subject is the something or someone who does the interpellation, who hails, who calls, and it is separate from "ordinary subjects, with a small s".²²² With Christianity as his general example, he continues:

God needs them, the Subject needs the subjects, just as men need God, the subjects need the Subject. Better: God needs men, the great Subject needs subjects, even in the terrible inversion of his image in them (when the subjects wallow in debauchery, i.e. sin).²²³

²¹⁷ Butler, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects"; Butler, *Excitable Speech*.

²¹⁸ Althusser and Jameson, *Lenin and Philosophy*, 118.

²¹⁹ Althusser, *L'avenir Dure Longtemps*.

²²⁰ Butler, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects", 6; Althusser, *L'avenir Dure Longtemps*.

²²¹ I owe this great example to David Payne.

²²² Althusser and Jameson, *Lenin and Philosophy*, 121.

²²³ Althusser and Jameson, 122.

Ideology, the Law, the Subject is thus co-constituted by the subjects in a reciprocal process in “a turning back and turning toward”.²²⁴ This dynamic is visible in the EU initiatives as well, probing the question: Who is hailing whom? To what tension is European identity a response? In this sense, the five EU initiatives studied in this thesis differ from *les Québécois* because the search for European identity does not start from citizen demands; rather, it is an EU endeavour. And these endeavours provide different answers to the question of where the perceived tension is to be found—between institution/citizen, East/West, old/young, nationalist/cosmopolitan, and, perhaps most importantly, within the EU itself.

Secondly, and as a result, this reciprocity questions the unitary status and power of the Subject. Butler dissociates the constitutive power from the voice, the hailing Subject:

The interpellative name may arrive without a speaker—on bureaucratic forms, the census, adoption papers, employment applications. Who utters such words? The bureaucratic and disciplinary diffusion of sovereign power produces a terrain of discursive power that operates without a subject, but that constitutes the subject in the course of its operation.²²⁵

Butler thus questions the power of the Subject in order to show that power and agency are often diffuse and difficult to identify. As Berg argues, constitutive rhetoric works through language already in circulation—by different rhetors in different spheres at different times.²²⁶ Indeed, paraphrasing Foucault, Butler writes: “The time of the discourse is not the time of the subject”.²²⁷ Words might be read temporally, spatially, culturally apart from the specific point or time of utterance which, as Erin Rand notes, means that the speaker or writer has no control over how the words uttered are received and understood; and interpellations operate under the same conditions. Like Butler, Rand wishes to “resist the assumption of a necessary and predictable relationship between an intending agent and an action’s effect”,²²⁸ due to “the irreducible distance between the polemic and its uptake” and thus the inability of the rhetor to control both *if* and *how* the audience understands the message.²²⁹ The point of highlighting this

²²⁴ Butler, “Conscience Doth Make Subjects”, 13.

²²⁵ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 34.

²²⁶ Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”, 23 ff.

²²⁷ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 31. Foucault writes: “Discourse is not life; its time is not yours”. See Michel Foucault, “Politics and the Study of Discourse”. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (Eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 71.

²²⁸ Rand, “Inflammatory Fag”, 297.

²²⁹ Rand, 298.

lack of control is not that we should disregard the power of the Subject with a capital S. As I will show in the chapters that follow, several aspects of the EU's constitutive rhetoric are circulated by other rhetorical agents in the public and scholarly sphere (and, in a few cases, the direction is reversed). Even if this circulation is not an explicit strategy of the EU, we can still trace it back to the EU—to the Subject.

My point is rather that the severance of the relationship between the intending agent and the effects of their actions suggests an openness or potentiality, as Butler phrases it: "We might reread 'being' as precisely that potentiality that remains unexhausted by any particular interpellation".²³⁰ In other words, any one interpellation will always be insufficient but productively so. This insufficiency highlights the ontological and agentic instability of the Subject which is crucial when trying to understand the EU's continuous but also widely dispersed calls for European identity.

The dispersed and decentred voice of interpellation also affects the question of means: through what means are subjects interpellated and constituted? Althusser and Butler understand ritual as an act of interpellation,²³¹ and Charland briefly mentions "aesthetic practices" such as drama, imagery, music, architecture, and design as other "ideological rhetorical practices", but his focus is largely on text.²³² He views the subject as a symbol-using, though primarily textual being. But, as Barthes shows, a wide range of materials—books, commercials, films, sports, iconography, toys, and so forth—interpellate subjects as part of a collective subject through our cultural habits.²³³ Historian Eric Hobsbawm describes how rapid societal transformations weaken recognizable social patterns, and when familiar traditions seem incapable of incorporating such change, new traditions are called for.²³⁴ So, in the same way that Charland conceives of constitutive rhetoric as a means to transcend contradicting subject positions, Hobsbawm views the invention of traditions as a way to cope with the instability brought about by rapid change. Indeed, he defines such invented traditions as

²³⁰ Butler, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects", 26. Butler borrows this point from Agamben whom she quotes as saying the following: "There is in effect something that humans are and have to be, but this is not an essence nor properly a thing: *It is the simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality*". See Giorgio Agamben (1993). *The Coming Community*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, section 11.

²³¹ Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, 117 ff.; Butler, 'Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All', 19 ff.

²³² Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric", 148.

²³³ Barthes, *Mythologies*.

²³⁴ Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions", 4–5.

a set of practices, normally covered by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.²³⁵

Such traditions are of course perceived in language use, but also in a wide range of other symbolic gestures, not least those of the EU: images (stamps, coins, bills), rituals (annual sports events), symbols (flags, emblems), music (anthems), architecture (the EU quarters in Brussels and Strasbourg), and many more. Language interpellates subjects in specific subject positions, but it works in a close and contingent relationship with other nontextual symbols and embodied practices. In this study, focus rests primarily on textual processes, but I include other types of symbolic and embodied practices in the analysis as well, and I hope it will become evident that they too are instances of constitutive rhetoric. I argue, therefore, that such nontextual rhetorical practices deserve to be brought to the foreground in a theorisation of constitutive rhetoric.²³⁶

Finally, Butler argues that interpellation constitutes the subject also in its absence, “without the subject’s knowing”,²³⁷ because “the subject need not always turn around in order to be constituted as a subject”.²³⁸ This is so even when the subject protests the interpellation offered: “Indifferent to your protests, the force of interpellation continues to work. One is still constituted by discourse, but at a distance from oneself”.²³⁹ Butler’s example is hate speech, which might be uttered in absence or in protest, and we can also think about unwanted gender identifications (e.g., he/she to signify a person identifying as nonbinary). To the material at hand, the question is slightly different: what is the consequence of a continued hailing if the subjects called upon are out of earshot or simply refuse the call—do not turn around, do not even protest? This important point is relevant to all five initiatives studied here; if we were to follow Althusser’s stricter conceptualisation—that in order for the interpellation to be completed, the hailed subject must acknowledge the hailing, must turn around—we would have to dismiss several of the practices in the initiatives as instances of interpellation, depending on whom we judge to be the audience.

There is agency, then, in the acts of declining to identify with the audience projected in a discourse, the closure projected by the narrative, or the

²³⁵ Hobsbawm, 1.

²³⁶ For instance, Per Liljenberg Halstrøm and Per Galle argue that design can be viewed as an example of constitutive rhetoric. See Halstrøm and Galle, “Design as Co-Evolution”.

²³⁷ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 33.

²³⁸ Butler, 31.

²³⁹ Butler, 33.

interpellation contained in the ritual—for example, rejecting to sing the national anthem during a football match, taking the knee, rejecting to take communion at a service, or sitting down where you are not supposed to sit. Rejecting an interpellation is of course not the same as annulling the interpellative force, but it is a counteraction with agency of its own. Returning to the idea of conceptual destabilization and the space it creates for new meaning to emerge mentioned at the opening of this chapter, we might observe the same potentiality here. As Rand argues, agency “emerges not as the ability to create intentionally a certain set of effects, but as a process made possible by the very undecidability or riskiness of those effects”,²⁴⁰ which resembles Butler’s notion of insurrectionary speech.²⁴¹ But where Rand’s focus is on (polemical) speakers’ inability to control their message, Butler’s focus is on the hailed subject’s ability to resist: “The name one is called both subordinates and enables, producing a scene of agency from ambivalence, a set of effects that exceed the animating intentions of the call”.²⁴²

In the context of this study, my point is to highlight the indeterminacy of constitutive rhetoric; the agentic instability of not only the hailing subject, the EU, but also of the hailed subject, whether we regard this collective subject to be EU citizens or the EU itself. This indeterminacy highlights an important prerequisite of collective identity formation within the EU (after all, enlargement, which inevitably destabilises, has been one of the driving forces of the EU in the post–Cold War era) that simultaneously constitutes an immense challenge. As will become clear, balancing myths of European greatness and more pragmatic, civic codes of identity is not at all easy—let alone figuring out how thick or thin these myths can be without becoming either too substantial, and thus static and unproductive, or too insubstantial and, as a result, meaningless.²⁴³

Ideology: A Dream of the Undistorted

These indeterminacies—of the Subject, of the subjects, of their agency and, consequently, constitutive effects—can be further illuminated by Laclau’s conception of ideology in response to, among others, Althusser. In very general terms, Althusser perceives ideology as various societal

²⁴⁰ Rand, “Inflammatory Fag”, 312.

²⁴¹ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 163.

²⁴² Butler, 163.

²⁴³ The metaphor of thick and thin myths is an adaptation from Michael Walzer’s conception of thick and thin morality in *Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), described in Laclau, “Death and Resurrection”.

structures (i.e., education, the public health system, religion) that fundamentally work to maintain the economic conditions and thus to continue cycles of repression.²⁴⁴ His attention therefore rests on ideology embodied in institutions, its rituals and its mundane practices (going to school, eating in the cafeteria with other children, participating in its social activities, contributing to the bake sale, etc.).²⁴⁵ These practices are understood as distortions of something original and primary—something undistorted. In this sense, even though this primary meaning—that which is undistorted—might be unattainable in Althusser's view (there is no extra-rhetorical place from which critique of ideology can be made), by concentrating on distortion, he still posits the existence of something undistorted.²⁴⁶

In contrast to this view, Laclau asserts that the primary product of ideology—and thus what the analysis of ideology should pay attention to—is not distortion but the idea that something undistorted exists in the first place. He states that “the original meaning is illusory and the distortive operation consists in precisely creating that illusion—that is, to project onto something which is essentially divided the illusion of a fullness . . . that it lacks”.²⁴⁷ As an example, a specific political proposal—say, free movement across the EU—is not in itself ideological; it becomes ideological when it “starts incarnating something more and different from itself . . . the possibility of constituting the community as a coherent whole”;²⁴⁸ a cosmopolitan spirit, cultural unity, and a specifically European inclination towards tolerance and curiosity. Only through the fiction of something undistorted, something complete, does the collective identity of the community acquire coherence.²⁴⁹ This operation—of attributing fullness to something divided—is, in other words, both necessary to ideology (to create the fiction of fullness) and impossible (it is an illusion),²⁵⁰ in much the same way as constitutive rhetoric paradoxically must presuppose the subject as a given, extra-rhetorical entity (Europeans) and at the same time create this subject through rhetoric (Europeans).²⁵¹

²⁴⁴ Directly through the Repressive State Apparatus, indirectly through the Ideological State Apparatus. Althusser and Jameson, *Lenin and Philosophy*, 95 ff.

²⁴⁵ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss Althusser's conception of ideology in-depth. For a critique and further development of Althusser's theory of ideology, See Butler, ‘Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All’; Laclau, ‘The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology’; Žižek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment*; Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*. For a discussion of how Žižek's and Althusser's conceptions differ, see Stagnell, ‘Ambassador's Letter’, 56–62.

²⁴⁶ Laclau, ‘Death and Resurrection’, 302.

²⁴⁷ Laclau, 301.

²⁴⁸ Laclau, 303.

²⁴⁹ Laclau, 302.

²⁵⁰ Laclau, 302.

²⁵¹ Charland, ‘Constitutive Rhetoric’, 137.

Although Charland's theory builds on a conception of ideology that focuses on material, ideological effects—it is the insertion of a narrative agent in the material world that reveals the ideological nature of constitutive rhetoric²⁵²—and thus on ideology as distortion, it does so also with the aim of analysing the efforts to create the undistorted, such as the creation of an original and transhistorical *peuple Québécois* governed by “the ‘natural’ principle that *peuples* attain control of their future”.²⁵³

In the context of this study, these considerations are relevant because they provide a different purpose to the analysis. While Charland may not have inherited Althusser's focus on ideology as mainly repressive, he does maintain his attention to determinate, ideological effects. Laclau, contrastingly, concentrates on the functions through which dreams and illusions of closure, of whole and full identities, are created. The interesting questions to be asked, then, are not how distortion or deception are created, but rather, how the idea of pure, coherent, and unifying meaning is created and the function such creation fills in the formation of collective identity.

Transhistoricity and Temporality

Another contribution to the rereading of Charland concerns the issue of time. As mentioned, the transhistorical subject creates a consubstantiality between the past subject and the present subject. But the transhistorical subject and narrative are more complex than simply extending through time. Particularly relevant to this study is the historiographical use of the past (how the past is depicted and the role it has in relation to the present), and how this historiography is used in political argumentation. Frida Buhre's theory of temporal imaginaries and how they enable different rhetorical practices is fruitful for clarifying this use—particularly her conceptualisation of the notions *remembrance* and *foundation*. These same concepts are also theorised by historian of ideas Victoria Fareld. Both Buhre and Fareld base their conceptualisations on the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt and view *remembrance* as a key concept in trying to understand present times' recourse to the past. Buhre argues that remembrance has a double function in Arendt's thinking.²⁵⁴ It can, on the one hand, challenge the past and the narrative of origin (Buhre terms this *agonistic* remembrance), or it can serve the function of repeating and managing the past (*authoritarian* remembrance).

²⁵² Charland, 143.

²⁵³ Charland, 145.

²⁵⁴ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 141.

Agonistic remembrance engages in a plural relationship with the past.²⁵⁵ As Fareld writes, this kind of remembrance allows us to go back to a beginning in the past not in order to repeat it, but in order to imagine our foundations and beginnings, to engage with them critically and thus enable new alternative beginnings in the future; it allows a “renewing [of] the world by starting over once again”—“to go backwards in order to move forward”.²⁵⁶ In Arendt’s thinking, agonistic remembrance is a collective, political responsibility that potentially enables social, political change. The latter kind, authoritarian remembrance, does not seek plurality but instead seeks to repeat the past. The “present political culture is imagined as a continuous heritage and testimony to a past event of foundation”.²⁵⁷ Remembrance, in this latter sense, potentially incorporates dominative features if remembrance of the past and anticipation of the future collapses into sameness. Buhre exemplifies such temporal collapse with a passage from the New Narrative declaration that states: “Europe is a source of inspiration from the past, emancipation in the present and an aspiration towards a sustainable future. Europe is an identity, an idea, an ideal”.²⁵⁸ Europe as past inspiration sets limits to actions in the present, and Europe as future aspiration sets limits to identity formation in the present. It thus forms an “a-temporal political imaginary”.²⁵⁹ The past, present, and future—inspiration, emancipation, aspiration—have collapsed and therefore impair political agency, as all that is left to do is a future repetition of what already was: “the future is nothing but what the past has already given”.²⁶⁰

According to Buhre, both the agonistic and the authoritarian turn to the past is based on the need to become real; the reality and continued existence of an institution or a government depends upon “the presence of others who have seen and heard and will remember”.²⁶¹ Both types of remembrance—in fact, any relation with both the past and the future—

²⁵⁵ Buhre, 140.

²⁵⁶ Fareld, “Temporalt ansvar”, 158, 150. From the Swedish: “förnya världen genom att börja om på nytt”. And: “att gå bakåt för att röra sig framåt”.

²⁵⁷ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 152. The distinction between agonistic and authoritarian remembrance is similar to Svetlana Boym’s conception of *reflective* and *restorative* nostalgia. Whereas the former “does not follow a single plot but explores ways of inhabiting many places at once and imagining different time zones”, the latter seeks an origin and “attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home”. See Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, XVIII.

²⁵⁸ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 141. Buhre quotes the New Narrative declaration. See Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

²⁵⁹ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 142.

²⁶⁰ Buhre, 141.

²⁶¹ Buhre, 150. Buhre quotes Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 95.

are inherently anachronistic, since both are “rhetorically produced as a trace in the present”.²⁶² Anachronisms, then, are not necessarily problematic, as Buhre argues throughout her study; an anachronistic relationship to the past can, in fact, be freedom-enabling, lest this relationship is plural. It is this latter characteristic that fails to appear in authoritarian politics of remembrance. In this type of remembrance, the foundation—or constitutive event, origin (e.g., the birth of Christ and Aeneas’s founding of Rome)—is a “beginning for eternity”.²⁶³ In such events, the original foundation both “acknowledges a radical change (foundation)” and “refuses to address the possibility of further change (no new foundation is possible; it is unrepeatable)”.²⁶⁴

The search for origin and a proper foundation is central to the EU’s historiography thematised in chapter 5, and the notions of remembrance and foundation are helpful in deepening the understanding of temporality in the EU’s constitutive rhetoric.

Myth and Historiography

Lastly, Roland Barthes’s theory of myth serves as an exploration in more specific terms of the dreams of fullness described by Laclau as well as the EU’s historiography of the European past.

In his *Mythologies*, Barthes defines myth as a type of speech (writing, spoken words, imagery, sports, and so forth) that places “Nature at the very bottom of History” and thus transforms social belief, culture, and history into natural conditions.²⁶⁵ It is therefore important, he argues, to show that nature is itself historical; a construct in much the same sense as Laclau views the primary meaning, the idea of fullness, as fiction. Mythical speech, then, is an extension of the semiotic model of the sign (e.g., a golden star) as composed of a signifier (the image of a golden star) and a signified (a fixed luminous point in the night sky). He adds to this first-order language system a second-order mythical system as a means to show how myths emerge and function (figure 1). In this second-order system, the *sign* of the first system (a golden star), becomes the *signifier* of a mythical *signified* (e.g., divinity, transcendence, eternity). So, while the language system refers to the denotative level of signification, the mythical system thus refers to the connotative level.

²⁶² Buhre, 24.

²⁶³ Buhre, 156. Buhre quotes Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political thought*, rev. edition, edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Penguin, 2006, 121 as well as *The Promise of Politics*, edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2005, 49.

²⁶⁴ Buhre, 157.

²⁶⁵ Barthes, *Mythologies*, 101.




Figure 1. Barthes's semiological system.²⁶⁶

What singles out myth from any other system of connotation is the fact that the signified in the mythical system “is determined, it is at once historical and intentional”.²⁶⁷ The fundamental operation of myth, then, is to naturalise the connection between the star (signifier) and divinity (signified). However, there is no natural connection between the star and divinity; the signification is historical and contextual, and, moreover, it is aided by other signs in the same cluster (in the EU’s flag, the golden pentagram forms a circle with eleven other golden pentagrams).²⁶⁸

The linguistic sign (meaning) and the mythical signifier (form) thus occupy the same slot in the system: the linguistic sign is also (potentially) a mythical signifier, and this double occupation enables a back-and-forth movement between the linguistic and the mythical level. As Barthes explains:

The meaning will be for the form like an instantaneous reserve of history, a tamed richness, which it is possible to call and dismiss in a sort of rapid alternation: the form must constantly be able to be rooted again in the meaning and to get there what nature it needs for its nutriment; above all, it must be able to hide there. It is this constant game of hide-and-seek between the meaning and the form that defines myth.²⁶⁹

This rapid alternation, this game of hide-and-seek between form and meaning, is what enables us to read the EU sometimes as a *linguistic sign* of the political institution, sometimes as a *mythical signifier* of Europe (the *mythical signified*); and vice-versa: sometimes Europe is simply a *linguistic sign* of the geographical landmass, sometimes a *mythical signifier* of a specific past, history, culture, values, and the mythological figure of Europa (the *mythical signified*). While I invoke Barthes’s theory of myth in all three analytical chapters (4–6), it is especially the articulations and functions of this game

²⁶⁶ Barthes, 115.

²⁶⁷ Barthes, 118.

²⁶⁸ Barthes, 129–31.

²⁶⁹ Barthes, 118.

of hide-and-seek, the ambiguity allowed by the play between the level of language and the level of myth, that I dwell on, most prominently in the analysis of the founding and the new narrative, respectively (chapter 5).

When is Constitutive Rhetoric Successful?

As I hope has become clear, constitutive rhetoric is not just symbolic gestures, but a potential means to make concrete political arguments and material achievements in the world. But, as indicated, its success is not easily evaluated. Charland only briefly comments on this aspect. He states, without elaborating, that not all constitutive rhetoric succeeds.²⁷⁰ However, based on the voting results of the referendum for Québec sovereignty, where 45 percent had voted *for* sovereignty, this particular instance of constitutive rhetoric had not been a rhetorical failure; rather, it had been quite powerful, as it meant that 45 percent had accepted the narrative about *les Québécois* and the claim for sovereignty based on this narrative.²⁷¹ In other words, consciousness as a collective subject arguably came into being, and, consequently, a political movement, but the concrete, material political result—sovereignty—failed to appear. Does this mean that it was a failure, as Charland predicts could be a possible interpretation, or was it largely a success, as he himself would have it? The answer depends on our idea of the successful interpellation: is the interpellation successful only insofar as the subjects called upon accept the invitation and thus are interpellated as, in this case, Europeans? Or do interpellations work even if the hailed subjects are not listening? Or refusing to listen? And does it suffice if some accept it and others do not?

These questions indicate that the success of constitutive rhetoric is perhaps best understood on a scale, and one with multiple dimensions. As legal scholar James B. White argues, two important success criteria in constitutive rhetoric concern reciprocity and congruence between the textual universe and reality as experienced by the audience. These criteria are crucial in order for the audience to be able to translate the textual logic into the material world without experiencing a rupture.²⁷²

The question of success is also inscribed with a certain temporality: how do we account for both short- and long-term changes in collective identity formation? Most interpellations rarely succeed the first time, but demand several attempts and from different voices and through different

²⁷⁰ Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric", 141.

²⁷¹ Charland, 135.

²⁷² White, *When Words Lose Their Meaning*, 220.

means. A child does not think of itself in terms of national identity from birth, but gradually, over time, through continuous callings (from the family, but also from the educational system, pedagogical philosophies, the health care system, and so on). This is also true in the case of European identification in which we furthermore note an aspect of multiplicity: as several EU scholars point out, European identity often comes in national colours, indicating, on the one hand, that citizens identify as both national and European at one and the same time, or, on the other, that they identify as primarily national in some regards, primarily as European in others.²⁷³ This behaviour suggests that the more dispersed and diverse individuals are, the more difficult it becomes to successfully interpellate them under one single name such as “Europeans”—at least with the same signification.

The point here is neither to discard potentially failed constitutive rhetoric as being irrelevant nor to build a complex model of the dimensions of rhetorical success and failure; rather, it is to problematise the concept in order to make it useful in situations other than that of *le peuple Québécois*. In the case of the EU, the situation may be said to be reversed; the citizenry is there, but the identity is still in the making. Or, perhaps, both are there, they simply take different shapes than what was expected by different politicians at different times. We will be better equipped to understand the implications of constitutive rhetoric by exploring interpellations that are apparently unsuccessful or only partly successful and thus illuminate the theory from a different perspective.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have argued that although most EU scholars use the notion of identity politics to explain the EU’s efforts at collective identity formation, the theory of constitutive rhetoric is a more fitting frame. Constitutive rhetoric and identity politics cover, on a general level, the same ground. Both are concerned with how collective identities are enacted in and related to the political realm and what political claims are made on the basis of collective identity. But the casual manner in which the concept of identity politics has been transferred from a marginalised to an empowered setting is problematic because it obscures the challenges that arise from such a move by turning difference in agential status, power, available

²⁷³ See, e.g., Risse, “A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities”; Risse, *A Community of Europeans?*; Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”; Checkel and Katzenstein, *European Identity*.

objectives, and the concrete measures available to reach these objectives into simply a change in perspective: from bottom-up to top-down. This change has hardly been described or theorised, and the concept lacks analytic precision as a result thereof.

In its place, I propose a turn to the theory of constitutive rhetoric, which breaks with a traditional rhetorical understanding of the ontology of the audience. In its place, it offers a frame for understanding the *rhetorical process of collective identity formation*. It is, in other words, a theory that enables us to understand *how* specific instances of interpellation and collective identity formation operate in their discursive contexts.

I have suggested a set of extensions and alterations to Charland's theory based on Butler's reconceptualisation of interpellation, Laclau's revisit of ideology, Buhre's explorations of temporality, and Barthes's theory of myth, respectively. On a general level, incorporating a more dynamic view on interpellation that centres reciprocity, dispersion, and agency allows us to question and better understand the indeterminate, decentred, and processual character of collective identity formation: who is hailing whom? To which tensions is collective identity a response, and who perceives these tensions? By highlighting the ontological and agentic instability of both Subject and subjects we will be better qualified to understand why calls for collective identity are continuous and changeable.

On a more specific level, these readings suggest elaborations on the three ideological functions. They suggest, firstly, that we widen our gaze to include not only text, but also other symbolic as well as physical means of interpellations. I explore this widened subject field in chapter 4 that centres on the *creation of a collective subject*. Secondly, they suggest that we include plural and intersecting temporal imaginaries in the analysis of the transhistorical subject since this can help us achieve a more complex understanding of the different foundations for this transhistoricity. This plurality is exemplified in chapter 5 which focuses on the *creation of a transhistorical collective subject*. And, finally, these readings give reason to believe that we should broaden our view of the practices projected in constitutive narratives to include not only concrete political practices but also epideictic practices of normative and moral orientation. Such practices are discussed in chapter 6 in which the *positioning and constraining of the collective subject* within the narrative frame is thematised.

This extended constitutive rhetoric, then, provides a theoretical framework but also a structure and analytical focal point for this study. But before turning to the analysis, I provide a historical and rhetorical background to the five EU initiatives.

3. Rhetorical Ecologies: Historical Context and Situation

Since the early 1970s, European identity has been a theme within, first, the Community and, since then, the EU. Different historical and political constraints have formed varying backdrops to articulations of European identity, and these are the focus of this chapter. It offers a chronological presentation of the five EU initiatives in their interconnected historical contexts and rhetorical situations in order to understand the conditions and constraints of the specific time, the exigences they are responding to, and whom they address.

From a historical perspective, the EU is surely not the first institution to approach the question of and actively provide shape and form to European identity. The expansive road system and the aqueducts of the Roman Empire, for example, were effective ways of demarcating the Empire and simultaneously interweaving the culturally very diverse peoples within the Empire. The same can be said about Emperor Augustus's use of coins to communicate his position: his image literally travelled across the Empire millions of times.

What is interesting about this analogy is the striking parallel between such ancient efforts to shape collective identity and many of the suggestions of, first and foremost, 'A People's Europe' to bring together the peoples of the Community: Community-wide sports contests with teams bearing the emblem of the Community; television shows broadcast in all member states; and the symbols of the Community figuring on number plates transported along the European road system, on coins and bills travelling through commerce, and on flag posts in every member state.

This parallel also highlights the circulation of rhetorical practices and discourses across time and space. From a Bitzerian perspective, the five EU initiatives studied in this thesis can be viewed as each responding to a rhetorical exigence, a problem that can and needs to be solved through a rhetorical response.²⁷⁴ Equally important to bear in mind, though, are factors of distribution and circulation; as Jenny Edbauer argues, the theory

²⁷⁴ Bitzer, "Rhetorical Situation".

of the rhetorical situation tends to conceptualise rhetoric within a scene of objectively existing, discrete exigences, constraints, rhetorical responses, rhetorical agents, and audiences that form a totality.²⁷⁵ Although this model is informative when it comes to the rhetorical elements of a particular situation, it often “mask[s] the fluidity of rhetoric”.²⁷⁶ In contrast to this view, Edbauer proposes that scholars pay attention to *rhetorical ecologies* in which we may take notice of how “situation bleeds into the concatenation of public interaction” and “public interactions bleed into wider social processes”.²⁷⁷ In other words, this perspective views rhetoric as a process of distribution and ongoing circulation, in which a specific counter-rhetoric can add to and/or co-opt the original rhetoric.²⁷⁸ Rhetorical networks in this extended conception—encompassing both the original rhetorical practices as well as the counter-rhetoric and other types of distribution that arise as a result—are “held together trans-situationally”.²⁷⁹ Rhetorical practices and strategies circulate, and they move.

We see such processes of distribution and circulation in the EU’s rhetoric as well. Language, concepts, and narratives circulate both diachronically and synchronically. As Berg shows, concepts such as intercultural dialogue circulate synchronically across institutions and fields,²⁸⁰ and García likewise notes both a production and circulation of narratives among scholars and civil society. As such, “it may not be surprising that the Commission has turned towards narratives after the subject has been articulated by academic authors”, as several of these same authors did so within their EU-funded research.²⁸¹ In other words: the EU calls for and funds research on the European public sphere which, in turn, cultivates research highlighting the importance of narrative that then encourages a turn towards narrative in the political agenda of the EU. This procedure is not suspicious, but it creates an amplification of, in this case, the role of narrative in the formation of a public sphere in and through circulation.

In much the same manner, many of the ideas articulated in the initiatives studied here circulate over time and in different spheres. They are articulated within different situational constraints, but are at the same time interconnected; the political transition from Community to Union and the deeper economic and political integration it brought about are concrete results of the fall of the iron curtain and the reunification of Germany—

²⁷⁵ Edbauer, “Unframing Models”, 7.

²⁷⁶ Edbauer, 20.

²⁷⁷ Edbauer, 9.

²⁷⁸ Edbauer, 13.

²⁷⁹ Edbauer, 20.

²⁸⁰ Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”.

²⁸¹ García, “New Narrative Project”, 344.

but the idea of a union and a united Europe was debated long before then. It was even a topic in ‘A People’s Europe’ (1985) and in the Declaration on European Identity (1973). In the same way, the Constitutional Treaty (2004) would not have been possible to draft without the Maastricht Treaty (1993), and these previous texts are significant to initiatives such as New Narrative (2014); as Claudia S. Sternberg argues, the vision and rhetoric of ‘A People’s Europe’ circulated long before and after the eponymous initiative in 1984–1985. This rhetoric contextualises and enables the idea of a “European state of mind”, a central metaphor in New Narrative.

I do not intend to make the argument that these artefacts are interwoven in any extraordinary manner; as I have pointed out, other artefacts could also have been part of this study. I also do not intend to impose a causality in what, through a chronology such as this, might easily seem a line of events. We often tend to interpret the past from the vantage point of a particular, contemporary event which tends to obscure the fact that other events or actions were possible as well—once the call for a sense of belonging and European identity is articulated, we no longer see other potential calls, as Kendall Phillips explains.²⁸² Such a viewpoint creates the false impression of coherence and causality. In line with this argument, although I grant the most recent initiative New Narrative a more prominent position as the point of departure from which I explore the four previous initiatives, they do not form a causal line of events—the direction taken in New Narrative is not the only possible result of the previous initiatives.

In the following, I describe and contextualise the five initiatives in chronological order and conclude the chapter with some general thoughts on the purpose of European identity formation from the viewpoint of the initiatives and scholarly accounts, respectively.

Declaration on European Identity (1973)

European identity became an official endeavour with the Declaration on European Identity (1973-declaration), a four page document that consists of twenty-two numbered sections structured in three chapters. While the first chapter focuses on the *why* and *how* of European identity, the second chapter looks outwards and dedicates two-thirds of the text (section nine to twenty-one) to the nine member states’ relations with every other part

²⁸² Phillips articulates this Foucauldian argument in a discussion of articulated acts of dissent and the spaces of dissension from which they arise. See Phillips, “The Event of Dissension”, 62–63.

of the world, parts which are mentioned and dealt with each in their own section in the following order: “the Member Countries of the Council of Europe, and with other European countries”; “the Mediterranean and African countries”; “the countries of the Middle East”; “the United States”; “industrialized countries, such as Japan and Canada”; “the USSR and the East European countries”; “China”; “other Asian countries”; “the Latin American countries”; and, finally, “the less favoured nations”—no one is left out (although some are more present than others). All of these sections express hope of either continuing existing or initiating future cooperation and indicate the overarching orientation in the 1973-declaration towards the world.

Nevertheless, as Sternberg notes, the declaration is “commonly referred to as the first step in the ongoing creation of belonging”²⁸³ and constitutes a reference point for many future efforts at identity formations because it provided a framework for the issue of European identity through formulations such as the following:

The diversity of cultures within the framework of common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a united Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism.²⁸⁴

Its gaze, in other words, is directed both inwards and outwards.

The declaration was published shortly after the first enlargement of the European Community turning “the Six” into “the Nine”, with the UK, Ireland, and Denmark as its three new member states. An issue heavily debated during this period was universal suffrage for the European Parliament.²⁸⁵ But in 1984, all member states agreed, and the first election was held in 1979 with a voter turnout of 61.99 percent, which, at least in hindsight, was quite impressive; in fact, it has never since been that high.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 92.

²⁸⁴ Commission of the European Communities, “Declaration on European Identity”, 119.

²⁸⁵ Universal suffrage had been discussed regularly since the 1950s but was contested chiefly by France. For example, French president Charles de Gaulle feared that although universal suffrage might seem to increase the legitimacy of the Parliament, potential low voter turnouts would, instead, decrease it. But in 1974, French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing agreed to change the French position on the matter. See Deschamps and Maufort, “The New European Parliament”.

²⁸⁶ Despite the fact that the Parliament’s powers and policy areas have only increased, the voter turnout has correspondingly decreased until the most recent election in 2019. In 2014, the turnout was 42.54%, and in 2019 it was 50.66%. The voter turnout increased in

In other words, the Community was in a process of democratisation; the Parliament came to be elected directly by the populations instead of by the national parliaments, the first ever international body with a democratic election.²⁸⁷ But the competences held by the Parliament—although gradually increasing—were still limited. Like the Common Assembly that was its predecessor, the Parliament had a primarily advisory function.

The European Council in Copenhagen, December 14–15, 1973, during which the 1973-declaration was agreed upon, was constrained by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the resulting energy crisis, highlighted by the presence of the Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, and the Emirates.²⁸⁸ Shortly before this Council, French president Georges Pompidou had expressed worry over the fact that the Community had not taken part in the negotiations between the Arabs and the Israeli and thus left this task to other powers. This was regrettable, he said, first of all because confrontations between the USA and the USSR often led to an escalation of conflict (rather than the hoped for de-escalation),²⁸⁹ but also due to obvious economic interests. Indeed, the oil crisis pushed the narrative of the Community as a peace project to the background and instead, national, economic interests prevailed.²⁹⁰

In his opening address at the Council, president of the European Council and Danish prime minister, Anker Jørgensen, emphasised the importance of “European co-operation and the sense of a common European bond” in order to tackle “the problems faced by the European nations as a consequence of the Middle East conflict”.²⁹¹ At the European Council in Hague four years earlier, in December 1969, West German chancellor Willy Brandt had stated it more bluntly:

If all were well with Europe, we would not be meeting today. If the Community were able to speak with one voice our main topic here would be foreign policy: the question of the peaceful organization of Europe,

21 out of the 28 member states in the 2019 election. European Parliament and Kantar, “2019 European Election Results”.

²⁸⁷ Deschamps and Maufort, “The New European Parliament”.

²⁸⁸ Today, the meetings of the Heads of State or Government are called European Councils, but sometimes also Council summits/meetings/conferences in order to differentiate the meeting from the institution itself. However, up until their formalisation at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1973, they were called European Summits and is often still referred to as a “summit”, “summit conference”, or “conference”. I have chosen to use European Council throughout this text, but quotes that use other terms do appear.

²⁸⁹ Commission of the European Communities, “Preparation for the Summit Conference”, 25 (point 1403).

²⁹⁰ Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 189.

²⁹¹ Quoted in Commission of the European Communities, “Copenhagen Summit Conference”, 8.

negotiations with the countries of Eastern Europe and our interests with regard to the conflict in the Middle East.²⁹²

Brandt further argued that the Community needed to grow in order to be able to take a solid position in matters of foreign policy.²⁹³ According to Brandt, a balance between large and small member states was paramount, and the Community would need to be large enough to constitute a real counterweight to “the superpowers and meet its worldwide responsibilities”:²⁹⁴ those who feared that Germany “could upset the balance within the Community ought to favour enlargement”.²⁹⁵

In this sense, the call to speak with one voice is a prerequisite to taking a common stance in foreign affairs and thus an important aspect of the Community’s role in the world. In addition, it is connected to visions of enlargement which may seem contradictory in light of internal disagreements, but it is articulated as a requirement in order to constitute a real counterweight in global politics: the Community needs to take solid political positions not only in European matters but also globally; and, as a consequence, it needs to grow.

These same issues—the necessity to speak with one voice and, consequently, form a common stance in foreign affairs—formed the background to the European Council in Copenhagen four years later in 1973 which, correspondingly, resulted in two concrete outputs: the introduction of a common energy policy (in light of the Arab-Israeli War and the resulting energy crisis) and the 1973-declaration. The reception in the media, however, focused primarily on the former:²⁹⁶ the common energy policy and the presence of the Arab ministers at the Council, an asymmetry also noted by the German newspaper *Stuttgarter Zeitung*: “The Arabs [who, it is worth noting, were invited] turned the Summit into a show. Nobody is interested in the Declaration on European Identity or in the great worries about the future of the European institutions”.²⁹⁷ This picture reverberates

²⁹² Brandt, “Statement by Willy Brandt”, 35.

²⁹³ This was an indirect comment to France who in 1963 and 1967 vetoed UK membership in the Community due to British economy, its alliance with the USA, and differences in their respective farming industries.

²⁹⁴ Brandt, 37.

²⁹⁵ Brandt, 37.

²⁹⁶ This following account of the media reception of the Declaration on European Identity is based on the press review made by the Commission of the European Communities. All translations from the German and the French are mine, and Martijn Wackers kindly helped me with the translation from the Dutch. All quotations can be found in Commission of the European Communities, “Revue de Presse”.

²⁹⁷ *Stuttgarter Zeitung* v. 15.12., S. 3/1–3. From the German: “Die Araber machten aus dem Gipfel eine Schau. Niemand interessiert sich mehr für die Deklaration über die europäische Identität oder für die großen Sorgen um die Zukunft der europäischen Institutionen”.

in the general press review. Besides from the German press, only the French, the Belgian, and the Dutch even mention the 1973-declaration. The Belgian newspaper *De Standard* simply notes its existence,²⁹⁸ whereas the Dutch newspaper *NCR Handelsblad* is critical and finds it “dangerous”:

The limitation of the cooperation to the Nine shows the illusion that some of the most important problems of our time could in principle still be solved regionally within a European framework. . . . Therefore, the document should already be regarded as completely outdated upon its publication.²⁹⁹

The French press notes the “hijacking” of the European Council by the “Arab diplomatic commando”, the general focal point of the press, but also briefly mentions the 1973-declaration in this summation: “This morning’s dailies insist to varying degrees on the renewed political unity and on the implementation, however difficult, of the European identity”.³⁰⁰

The German press review is both the most extensive and the most critical. Whereas *Frankfurter Allgemeine* is if not positive then at least open to the idea of a declaration of identity (“Even if numerous formulations were already contained in earlier official declarations, the Nine are the first to lay down the European identity in a kind of charter”),³⁰¹ other larger newspapers are generally critical. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, for instance, both critiques the minimal exposure the 1973-declaration received at the Council, emphasised by its character as “foundation for a future European constitution”, and its content: “What unites Europe is, for the time being, only an awareness of its weakness. This is particularly clear in the document on the European identity”.³⁰² *Die Welt* comments that the search for

²⁹⁸ In the press review, it says: “Ook in DE STANDAARD, p. 3: blauwdruk voor Europese identiteit”.

²⁹⁹ *NCR* 15–7. From the Dutch: “Uit de beperking van de samenwerking tot de Negen blijkt de illusie dat een aantal van de belangrijkste problemen van onze tijd in principe nog regionaal in een Europees kader oplosbaar zouden zijn. . . . Het stuk moet daarom bij zijn publicatie al als volstrekt verouderd worden beschouwd”.

³⁰⁰ *Le Figaro* 17, 1–1/*La Nation* 17, 1–1/*Herald Tribune* 17, 1–6. From the French: “Les quotidiens de ce matin insistent à des degrés divers sur l’unité politique retrouvée et sur la mise en pratique, même difficile, de l’identité européenne”.

³⁰¹ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* v. 15.12., S. 7/5–6. From the German: “Sind auch zahlreiche Formulierungen bereits in früheren offiziellen Bekundungen enthalten gewesen, so legen doch erstmals die Neun die europäische Identität in einer Art Charta nieder”.

³⁰² *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, S. 4/1–2. From the German: “Grundstock einer künftigen europäischen Verfassung”. And: “Was Europa eint, ist vorläufig nur das Bewußtsein seiner Schwäche. Dies wird besonders deutlich in dem Dokument über die europäische Identität”.

European identity is necessary, but “becomes nonsensical if the search consists primarily in demarcation from the USA”.³⁰³

All in all, the press review shows that the 1973-declaration did not receive much attention, neither at the European Council where it was signed, nor in the national press of the nine member countries. The little press coverage it received mostly focused on its illusionary character (the Netherlands) or how European identity is mostly envisioned through negative definition—a demarcation from the USA, a distraction from the Community’s own weakness (Germany).

In sum, at the time of the 1973-declaration, the Community was in the process of establishing and envisioning itself and its role in the world around it. It wanted to play a decisive role in matters of foreign affairs which, however, demanded internal agreement among the Nine as well as enlargement in order to be a valid counterweight in global affairs. In many ways, the 1973-declaration can thus be viewed as part of the process of interpellating itself, of coming into being, as a means of enabling the Nine to better understand their position in and relations with the world:

the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them [the Nine Member Countries of the European Communities] to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.³⁰⁴

What this passage indicates is thus, on the one hand, its audiences (the other global powers and the Nine member states of the Community), and on the other hand, its exigence: the Community wishes to make clear and simultaneously figure out its place in the world and, more concretely, to be able to take a stance in matters of foreign affairs as they affect the Community—in 1973, very concretely through the oil embargo.

³⁰³ *Die Welt*, S. 4/1–2. From the German: ”doch wird dies unsinnig, wenn das Suchen vor allem in der Abgrenzung gegenüber den USA besteht”.

³⁰⁴ Commission of the European Communities, “Declaration on European Identity”, 118.

‘A People’s Europe’ (1984–1985)

Five years after the first direct election to the European Parliament, the Adonnino committee for ‘A People’s Europe’ was founded at the European Council in Fontainebleau, June 25–26, 1984.³⁰⁵ The committee was chaired by Pietro Adonnino, Italian MEP until June 1984, who also had the function of representing the president of the European Council, Bettino Craxi, on the committee. The work of the committee resulted in two reports, the first report (11 pages, including paratext) was presented at the European Council in Brussels, March 29–30, 1985, and the second report (16 pages, including paratext) three months later at the European Council in Milan, June 28–29, 1985.³⁰⁶

While the first report concentrates on what we might understand as functional Community (de)regulations, such as the free movement of people, goods, and services, the second report considers proposals of a more symbolic nature: television shows, sports events, city twinning along with proposals for a European flag, anthem, stamps, and Europe Day. Many suggestions were offered, the majority of which were implemented shortly after and today constitute quotidian elements in the lives of EU citizens. That is, until recently: Brexit made explicit, first to the UK citizens, then to the EU citizens, the practical implications of leaving the EU. During Christmas 2020, Brexit debates no longer focused on migration and sovereignty but on very practical discussions of fishing quotas, trade agreements, taxation, and travel between the two parties.

‘A People’s Europe’ explicitly refers to the 1973-declaration and can be viewed as a political concretisation of the intentions formulated in the 1973-declaration: a more definite response to indefinite intentions. The vision of transforming the Community into ‘A People’s Europe’ had circulated in the Community institutions since the mid-1970s, and the draft Treaty Establishing the European Union from February 1984 articulated this aim as a concrete political goal.³⁰⁷ From this perspective, the project that crystallised during 1984 and 1985 was simply the culmination of these rhetorical and political efforts. Likewise, the “People’s Europe rhetoric”, as Sternberg terms it, circulated throughout the 1980s up until the Maas-tricht debates—years after the practical implementation of its proposals.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ The committee was officially named the *ad hoc* committee, but it is often referred to as the Adonnino committee and the Adonnino reports. I have therefore chosen this later more descriptive term.

³⁰⁶ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”.

³⁰⁷ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 78–79.

³⁰⁸ Sternberg, 79.

The explicit purpose of the initiative was to suggest measures to strengthen the identity and image of the Community based on “the expectations of the people of Europe” as well as the interest of the citizens.³⁰⁹ The reports do not explain how the committee came to know about these interests and expectations, however, or if they are rather just assumed expectations. The latter seems to be closer to the truth: ‘A People’s Europe’ sought the acceptance of the citizens, but it did not consult or invite its citizens to express their interests and will; rather, the Adonnino Committee was tasked with proposing concrete measures that could assure the will of the citizens and thus had “unequivocal agency in both interpreting and shaping citizen ideals”.³¹⁰

Why this rather new preoccupation with the interests of the citizens? First of all, the recession of the 1970s had not increased popular support, and to many, the Community was perceived as a technocratic and inefficient institution.³¹¹ Furthermore, the second direct European Parliament election in 1984 was less than a success, with a voter turnout even lower than the first one in 1979. This “disappointingly low turn-out”, Shore argues, was one of the reasons for founding the Adonnino Committee on ‘A People’s Europe’ only months after the election.³¹² Moreover, the Community made enlargements in 1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Spain and Portugal), and the Single European Act was signed in 1986, a crucial step towards completing the single market. In other words, European integration continued as planned, but citizens seemed to have been left behind. As a result, the Community was to transition from being a primarily financial and trade community—*A Trader’s Europe*—to being a community of culture, education, and labour as well: *A People’s Europe*.³¹³ According to Shore, the extension of its purview to include also culture and education as well as its citizens constituted “a major shift in elite approaches to European integration”.³¹⁴ As the second report states, it is

through action in the areas of culture and communication, which are essential to European identity and the Community’s image in the minds of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and must be sought.³¹⁵

³⁰⁹ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 5. See also 9, 11, 18.

³¹⁰ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 81–82.

³¹¹ Sternberg, 77.

³¹² Shore, “Imagining the New Europe”, 100.

³¹³ Deschamps, “A People’s Europe”.

³¹⁴ Shore, *Building Europe*, 25.

³¹⁵ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 21.

By suggesting promoting the institution culturally rather than solely through economic integration, this initiative marks the first time that the Community made advancements outside of its core areas as defined in the Treaty of Rome of 1957.

In terms of rhetorical exigence, the reports state that their proposals respond to the expectations of Community citizens while simultaneously seeking to improve its image no longer solely as a global political actor, but likewise in the minds of its citizens—through concrete political suggestions of both material and symbolic significance. ‘A People’s Europe’ aims at forging EU citizens by creating discursive and symbolic links between Europe, the Community, and culture,³¹⁶ as well as between European citizenship and Europeanness.³¹⁷ It thus anticipates the immense focus on culture we witness today.

Although ‘A People’s Europe’ centres on the life of Community citizens, the reports are first and foremost policy papers written with the purpose of reaching the consent of the Council, the Commission, and the member states; not citizens.³¹⁸ This intention is evident also when looking at the paratext of the reports: Both reports are framed by a cover letter from Pietro Adonnino, the chairman of the Adonnino committee, to the president of the European Council, Bettino Craxi,³¹⁹ and are concluded by a letter from Craxi to Adonnino, expressing gratitude for the work performed and reiterating the formal consent of the Council.³²⁰ Hence, there was—at least formally—a specific rhetor and recipient, although the paratext emphasizes that the Commission and Parliament had been valuable resources in the committee’s work.³²¹ Although making claims about the interests of the citizens as its reason for appointing the committee, this initiative was, in other words, an initiative with a performative, constitutive function first and foremost for the institutions (Council, Parliament, Commission) within the institution itself (the Community as a whole), not unlike the 1973-declaration.

³¹⁶ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 90.

³¹⁷ Sternberg, 99.

³¹⁸ The reports did receive some citizen response, though. In 1984 and 1985, an Irish and a French citizen wrote to the president of the Commission—Gaston Thorn and Jacques Delors, respectively—with proposals for a flag design, including thorough reflections on the symbolism of their chosen designs. Moreover, a German citizen and camping club president wrote a letter to Jacques Delors asking if he could have a large Community flag for a meeting with his camping club, and he even kindly offered to pay for it; to which a Commission official answered that it unfortunately did not exist yet, but had been agreed upon. See Commission of the European Communities, “Emblème et Logo Européens”.

³¹⁹ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 7-8, 17.

³²⁰ Adonnino, 16, 32.

³²¹ Adonnino, 8, 18.

This aim also seems clear in light of the media coverage. As Christiane Barth and Patrick Bijsmans notice, “despite their assigned significance for the emergence of a European public sphere, mediated debates on European integration in the early 1990s have hardly been studied”,³²² and there are grounds to believe that the same is true for earlier debates as well. I have not found any studies on the media coverage of ‘A People’s Europe’. Instead, my own small-scale study of the media coverage in *Jyllands-Posten*, the second largest newspaper in Denmark, during the three Councils in 1984 and 1985, respectively, lays the ground for the hypothesis that perhaps the lack of studies has to do with a lack of material: out of the total 158 articles mentioning the European Community in the immediate weeks before and after the three Councils, only six mention ‘A People’s Europe’.³²³ These six articles largely focus on what is termed the “lyrical elements” in contrast to the “heavy issues”.³²⁴ Especially the proposals for Community symbols are portrayed as unnecessary artifice. In an opinion piece by Jørgen Bøgh, MEP from the People’s Movement against the EU,³²⁵ ‘A People’s Europe’ is mentioned as an example of what he calls

bombastic European mythology with its dreams of resurrecting the Roman universal Empire, with its nonsense about European identity, its EC passport, EC flag, EC driving license, EC stamps, and EC football team—its military aspirations of becoming a superpower, and its propaganda for the United States of Europe.³²⁶

Bøgh thus accentuates its hyperbolic dimension and interprets these proposals as part of the desire by “the German and Italian union propagandists”³²⁷ to “distance themselves from the past and start anew”.³²⁸ Consequently, “they have contributed significantly to the fact that Danish politicians and editorial journalists have seen with forbearance on these

³²² Barth and Bijsmans, “Maastricht Treaty and Public Debates”, 215.

³²³ The articles are listed in appendix I.

³²⁴ June 28, 1984, see appendix I.

³²⁵ The People’s Movement against the EU is a cross-party movement founded in 1972 in connection to Denmark’s referendum on Community membership. Jørgen Bøgh was elected for the European Parliament in 1979 and again in 1984.

³²⁶ Bøgh, *Jyllands-Posten*, April 1, 1985, see appendix I. From the Danish: “Den flommeeuropæiske mytologi med dens drømme om genopstandelse for det romerske universal-kejserrige, dens tågetale om europæisk identitet, dens EF-pas, EF-flag, EF-kørekort, EF-frimærker og EF-foldboldhold—dens militære stormagtsaspirationer og dens propaganda for Europas Forenede Stater”.

³²⁷ From the Danish: “de tyske og italienske unionspropagandister”.

³²⁸ From the Danish: “lægge distance til fortiden og begynde på en frisk”.

pompous southern Europeans and hence on the union plans as a whole”.³²⁹ Bøgh is clearly critical of such mythological inventions, but at the same time he attributes to them the power to obscure the critical response to be expected from national politicians and the press. Johan Fornäs, who writes specifically about the EU’s symbols and their implementation in connection with ‘A People’s Europe’, notes the unfavourable reception in the political as well as public debate when these symbols years later were proposed to be part of the Constitutional Treaty.³³⁰ Even if the symbols were implemented many years before, their signification changed when they were about to become consolidated legally—which to this day is yet to happen.

The Maastricht Treaty (1992)

The Maastricht Treaty, “a milestone in the history of European integration”,³³¹ was in a concrete, material way a result of a geopolitically changing Europe. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, borders changed, nation states were rebuilt, and the idea of a united Europe across the East-West axis for the first time became a realistic possibility. As West German chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed it in the ruins of Dresden, only weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall: “The ‘house of Germany’—our common house—must be built under a European roof. That must be our political goal”.³³²

As a backdrop to the geopolitical events in Europe leading to unification and the, albeit temporary, end of a binary world order, the Yugoslavian Wars unfolded. Although the wars supported the argument that European integration was necessary in order to make sure Europe would not once again fall prey to nationalism and war, they also “firmly put a nail in the coffin of the peace narrative and the narrative of ‘Europe’ as saviour and solution to conflict”.³³³ The Community made a few efforts at diplomatic engagement, but the twelve member states could not agree on how to approach the civil war, besides denouncing the previous cooperation

³²⁹ From the Danish: “De har bidraget væsentligt til, at danske politikere og lederskribenter har set med overbærenhed på disse svulstige sydeuropæere og dermed på unionsplanerne i det hele taget”.

³³⁰ Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, 79.

³³¹ Medrano, *Framing Europe*, 1.

³³² Kohl, “Rede des Bundeskanzlers”. From the German: “Das ‘Haus Deutschland’—unser gemeinsames Haus—muß unter einem europäischen Dach gebaut werden. Das muß das Ziel unserer Politik sein”.

³³³ Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 189; Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 114.

agreement with Yugoslavia due to violations of human rights.³³⁴ Instead, they called on the UN Security Council in November 1991 to intervene, but the UN was reluctant as well.³³⁵ The Community simply did not have a foreign policy that could guide them in matters of this kind and allow the Community to speak with one voice. This ability, strained during the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, along with the peace narrative was tested once again.

These two issues—geopolitical changes in Europe and the need for a mandate that would allow the Community to act on the basis of a common foreign policy—were crucial to the Community and central to the efforts at European integration at the turn of the decade. As Sternberg argues, the fall of communism, German reunification, and the Yugoslavian Wars “could all be interpreted as manifesting greater-than-ever need for—but also the failure of—European integration. The biggest challenges to the EU and its legitimacy were also its greatest *raison d’être*.”³³⁶

The idea of a European Union was heavily debated already in the 1980s. In 1983, a Draft Treaty establishing the European Union was prepared with Altiero Spinelli, one of the founding fathers of the EU, as its main architect. It was adopted by the European Parliament in 1984 with a large majority (237 votes to 31, 43 abstentions), but the draft treaty was never even taken up for national debate and, consequently, never ratified by the member states.³³⁷

In April 1990, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand urged the European Council to, before the end of the year, initiate the process of drafting and proposing a new treaty of a political as well as economic and monetary union.³³⁸ “The profound upheavals in Europe” justified this urgency, as the two leaders urged:

³³⁴ They did this on November 25, 1991. See Council of the European Communities, “CELEX1, 91/602/EEC”. For instance, the Netherlands, during their presidency of the Council of the European Communities in 1991, wanted to send an intervention force to Yugoslavia, a proposal which was supported by France and Germany, but opposed by the UK, Denmark, and Portugal. See Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, “Vain Mediation Attempts”.

³³⁵ Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, “Vain Mediation Attempts”.

³³⁶ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 114.

³³⁷ Deschamps, “European Parliament’s Proposals”. The reason was that the Heads of State or Government had been circumvented during the process of drafting the draft treaty, and, as a consequence, the treaty was ignored by the member state parliaments who, in turn, did not want to circumvent their governments. In 1985, at the European Council in Milan during which the second ‘A People’s Europe’ report was presented, president of the European Council Bettino Craxi convened for an Intergovernmental Conference later that same year in order to draft a new treaty of a European Union. But due to Greek, British, and Danish protests, the attempt failed once again.

³³⁸ Mitterrand and Kohl, “Gemeinsame Botschaft”, 1.

we consider it necessary to accelerate the political construction of the Europe of the Twelve. We believe that the time has come to “transform relations as a whole among their States into a European Union and to invest it with the necessary means of action”, as envisaged by the Single European Act.³³⁹

Mitterrand and Kohl reiterated this message later that same year, in December 1990, and highlighted the need for a common foreign and security policy, whose aim should be “to promote the essential interests and common values of the Union and its Member States, to strengthen their security, to promote cooperation with other states, and to contribute peace and development in the world”.³⁴⁰

Although the UK, Portugal, and Denmark were reluctant, the timing seems to have been better. The Maastricht Treaty was drafted at two Intergovernmental Conferences in 1991, signed in February 1992 and ratified in May 1993 after difficulties in Denmark, France, and the UK. In France, the treaty was passed with a slight majority (51 percent) and sparked a debate “of a previously unseen force”, politically and publicly.³⁴¹ The UK was granted an opt-out clause from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which specified that the UK was not required to introduce the Euro. There was no popular referendum in the UK, but the treaty came close to be rejected by the British Parliament. In the case of Denmark, the difficulties had a more violent character. Following the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, which was rejected by a slight majority (50.7 percent), the Edinburgh Agreement was negotiated and accepted, again with a slight majority (56.7 percent). The agreement granted Denmark four opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty concerning the policies on security and defence, justice, European Citizenship, and the EMU, three of which are still in force.³⁴² The night of the vote, May 18, 1993, protests

³³⁹ Mitterrand and Kohl, 1. The quote in Mitterrand and Kohl’s statement is a merging of two passages following one another from the *Single European Act*. I have therefore used the official English version of the *Single European Act* in this translation. From the German: “Wir halten es für notwendig, den politischen Aufbau des Europas der Zwölf zu beschleunigen. Wir glauben, daß es an der Zeit ist, ‘die Gesamtheit der Beziehungen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten in eine Europäische Union umzuwandeln und diese mit den notwendigen Aktionsmitteln auszustatten’, wie es die Einheitliche Akte vorgesehen hat”. From the French: “Nous jugeons nécessaire d’accélérer la construction politique de l’Europe des Douze. Nous pensons que le moment est venu de ‘transformer l’ensemble des relations entre les Etats membres en une Union européenne et de doter celle-ci des moyens d’action nécessaires’, ainsi que l’a prévu l’Acte unique”.

³⁴⁰ Mitterrand and Kohl, 3.

³⁴¹ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 105.

³⁴² With the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999, the opt-out concerning Citizenship was nullified since it adopted the Danish opt-out phrase, saying that European citizenship does not replace national citizenship, which meant that the opt-out now applied

turned into violent encounters between protesters and the police, and for the first time in Danish history gunshots were fired against civilians in a time of peace.

From this perspective, how are we to understand the rhetorical audience of the Maastricht Treaty? As is typical of political communication and thus of all the initiatives studied in this thesis, multiple audiences are invoked at the same time. In the specific case of the Maastricht Treaty, the primary audience changes during the different steps of the process, beginning with the Heads of State or Government of the member states negotiating and drafting the treaty text and ending up in the hands of either the national Parliament or, in a mediated form, the population.³⁴³

Thus, processes of persuasion and identification vary accordingly. During the Intergovernmental Conferences in which the treaty was drafted, differing national and common interests were negotiated and prioritised. What was then presented to either the national Parliament or the general public for ratification was a combination of performative speech acts (for instance, the proclamation of the European Citizenship) as well as reciprocal promises made by the signing partners and more symbolic statements of common aims, visions, values, and principles, as we usually see in the preamble.

In the case of the Maastricht Treaty, this process became very pronounced due to the differing evaluations of the treaty by the Heads of State or Government, national parliaments, and national populations, respectively. Out of the three member states that held popular referenda on the Maastricht Treaty, two resulted in less than clear-cut results: in France, the treaty was marginally accepted, in Denmark, marginally rejected.

Another aspect of the relation between the treaty and its different audiences is highlighted by the public debate that arose. The Maastricht Treaty was widely debated and highly contested in the media and by citizens, but with national variations. Studying the struggles over EU legitimacy, Sternberg has mapped various discursive themes in the public debate in Germany and France preceding and following the Maastricht Treaty.³⁴⁴ She highlights how the discourse adopted with of ‘A People’s Europe’, which promised that the EU served citizen interests and

to all Member States. The justice opt-out was put to vote in December 2015, and the result was negative, meaning the exception is still in force. See The Danish Parliament EU Information Centre, “Danish opt-outs”.

³⁴³ A treaty must be ratified by each member state, and how this is done varies from state to state. Most often, the national Parliament votes on the treaty text, as in the case of the UK mentioned above, but some states have public referenda; in the case of the Maastricht Treaty, France, Ireland, and Denmark.

³⁴⁴ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, chap. 4.

expectations, was severely damaged by the debate about the EMU, because many viewed it as directly counterproductive to citizen needs for economic stability in times of recession and unemployment.³⁴⁵ In the French debate (and most others), opposition to the EMU framed it as a loss of national sovereignty; in Germany, as a loss of national identity, an identity “embodied in the Deutsche Mark as a symbol of German wealth, stability, and reconstruction . . . Losing it implied losing much more than just a national currency”.³⁴⁶

Another important issue raised in both countries was the EU citizenship. It was problematised especially in France, where many viewed it as a threat to the national citizenship. Democracy belonged within the nation state, it was argued.³⁴⁷ In Germany, the issue was framed somewhat differently and was connected to the lack of a European people; for that reason, democracy at a supranational level would be meaningless.³⁴⁸ This argument has since then circulated and become part of the topical map of the EU; not least in the EU scholarship on what is termed the “no-demos thesis”.³⁴⁹

The Maastricht debate reflected more than ever the gap between the political EU elite and the citizens, made visible especially by the Danish “no”, and caused by “the inherent distance and opacity of European decision-making procedures to the European citizens”.³⁵⁰ Both *Die Zeit* and *Le Monde* thus called for *Überzeugungsarbeit* and *pédagogie*, respectively,³⁵¹ which further accentuates the “communication deficit”-argument often circulated within the EU, as well as in EU scholarship: if only European integration was explained better to its citizens, they would realise its benefits.³⁵²

A more expansive survey of the media reception in all of the twelve member states shows that the Maastricht debate was, first of all, domesticised, and secondly, divided along a North-South axis, although with different approaches. In the fall of 1991, following the two

³⁴⁵ Sternberg, 126.

³⁴⁶ Sternberg, 107.

³⁴⁷ Sternberg, 127.

³⁴⁸ Sternberg, 109.

³⁴⁹ Sternberg, 127. For studies on the no-demos thesis, see, e.g., Jolly, “Demos for the European Union”; Risse, “No Demos?”; Mueller, “Public No Demos”; Wolkenstein, “Demoicracy, Transnational Partisanship”.

³⁵⁰ Sternberg, 124.

³⁵¹ Sternberg, 125.

³⁵² See Shore, “Inventing Homo Europaeus”, 57–59, for a discussion of the circulation within the EU. For scholarship on the EU’s communication deficit, see, e.g., Meyer, “Political Legitimacy”; Anderson and McLeod, “Great Non-Communicator?”; Martins, Lecheler, and De Vreese, “Information Flow and Communication Deficit”.

Intergovernmental Conferences during which the treaty was drafted, the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) conducted a survey of the European public opinion in relation to the Maastricht Treaty. Starting with observations about the German public debate, where “the chances and risk of the double jump into the Economic and Monetary Union and into a Political Union” as well as the loss of the national currency and “European centralism” were the main subjects,³⁵³ the FAZ journalists asked: “Sober considerations have replaced European pathos. Are the Germans alone in this attitude, or has the enthusiasm of their European partners also waned?”³⁵⁴ While the public debate was largely non-existent in Belgium and Portugal,³⁵⁵ in Ireland, the debate revolved around Ireland’s abortion ban and whether it would be possible to uphold this ban with the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, it also touched on the question of national sovereignty.³⁵⁶ In the UK, the debate was—quite surprisingly—during this period of drafting almost solely a political debate that centred on the pace of European integration and the common currency. The absence of the public debate was largely due to the concurrent national election during which the Maastricht debate did not receive much attention, thus leaving UK citizens with the impression of “having slept . . . through the entire Maastricht epoch”³⁵⁷—at least during this initial stage of the debate.

While debate in Greece, Italy, and Spain revolved above all around economy,³⁵⁸ sovereignty was central to the French and Danish debate. In general, the wealthier member states—France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany—worried about losing something, be that jobs and social security (the Netherlands), sovereignty (France and Denmark) or a stable currency—and, as mentioned, national identity (Germany). In France, the debate about whether the Maastricht Treaty would demand a waiver of sovereignty had turned into “a domestic policy game” and thus primarily

³⁵³ The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, “European Public Opinion”, 73.

³⁵⁴ The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 73.

³⁵⁵ The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 76, 79.

³⁵⁶ The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 80.

³⁵⁷ The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 78.

³⁵⁸ In summation, Greek citizens worried about harsher demands of austerity while national politicians did not want to risk losing the subsidies from the Community. The historically pro-EC Italy experienced a growing discontent among Northern Italians towards the government’s unwillingness to make political changes to Italian economy in order for Italy to be able to join the EMU, but their concern did not resonate with national politicians. The same mainly positive attitude to the Maastricht Treaty was observed in Spain, where the government was resolute in its wish to be among the first to join the EMU which resulted in a harsh convergence plan that was objected primarily by the trade unions, not the population. The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 74–77.

a debate at the political level,³⁵⁹ but this issue prevailed in the Danish population, which was largely sceptical about European integration. As the *FAZ* journalists note, Denmark had largely benefited from Community membership (strong currency, low inflation), but the idea of a political union was “exclusively linked to losses of sovereignty”.³⁶⁰

The public debate was extensive, and it was critical, in other words. But, as Barth and Bijsmans note with regards to the public debate in Germany and the UK in the immediate years before and after the Maastricht Treaty referenda (1990–1994),

While media representation of European integration in the early 1990s was characterised by a national rather than an ideological divide, media in both countries increasingly discussed the same issues of equal relevance at the same time. The increasingly critical debate was accompanied by cross-national convergence and did not mean a complete rejection of European integration, but rather more critical scrutiny of this process.³⁶¹

So, while increasingly critical, the debate also converged cross-nationally, and Barth and Bijsmans interpret this increased criticism as well as the convergence as signs of an emerging European public sphere; scrutiny is not the same as rejection. Still, in the years following the Maastricht Treaty, the EU had “historically low levels of support”.³⁶² These first traces of the EU’s legitimacy crisis thus lay the foundation for the public (and political) attitude towards the Constitutional Treaty a decade later.³⁶³

The Constitutional Treaty (2004)

Aside from their genre specific characteristics, the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty have other similarities. Both treaties aimed at fundamental changes to the legal structure and extended competences of the EU, and they both prepared for wider integration of Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe. With German reunification in 1990, the former German Democratic Republic was integrated into the Community. In

³⁵⁹ The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 74.

³⁶⁰ Conducting their study before the referenda had taken place, the *FAZ* journalists argued that “the result of the referendum in Denmark [the first of the three] is of special importance because it could have a signal effect on the other EC countries. For this reason, critics say it is unwise to hold the first referendum in a country which eyes the prospect of a European Union with particular scepticism”. See The Staff of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 79.

³⁶¹ Barth and Bijsmans, “Maastricht Treaty and Public Debates”, 230.

³⁶² Medrano, “The Public Sphere and the European Union’s Political Identity”, 85.

³⁶³ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 104.

1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU, and in 2004, the accession of another ten member states marked the largest in the EU's history: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; all besides Malta former members of the Eastern bloc. This new situation was, on the one hand, what the Constitutional Treaty aimed to manage; on the other, and paradoxically so, part of the reason that the Constitutional Treaty from the outset caused disagreements. Already before drafting had begun, the fifteen member states disagreed on how best to move forward—if moving at all.³⁶⁴ This disagreement on the political level was based largely on institutional structure and the delegation of competences between the Council, Commission, and Parliament.³⁶⁵ It also included the question of appointing a President of the Council and a Minister for Foreign Affairs.

As a result of these increasing debates and disagreements among member states, the fifteen Heads of State or Government decided to convene a Convention on the Future of the European Union which was a new step in the procedure; normally, drafting a treaty would take place at the Intergovernmental Conference. The Convention included not only representatives of the fifteen Heads of State or Government, but also members of national parliaments, members of the European Parliament, as well as the European Commission.³⁶⁶ Furthermore, the ten member-states-to-be were represented, though without the power to block a consensus, and citizens were indirectly involved through

organisations representing civil society (the social partners, the business world, non-governmental organisations, academia, etc.). It will take the form of a structured network of organisations receiving regular information on the Convention's proceedings. Their contributions will serve as input to the debate.³⁶⁷

Steps had, indeed, been taken to make sure everyone had, to a certain extent, been heard.

The Constitutional Treaty was drafted during this Convention in 2002–2003, making the necessary preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference in 2003–2004. On October 29, 2004, the treaty was signed by the now twenty-five Heads of State or Government at the European Council in Rome, after which a large majority (500 votes in favour, 137 votes against, 40 abstentions) of the European Parliament endorsed the

³⁶⁴ Gerbet, “European Convention”, 2.

³⁶⁵ Gerbet, 3.

³⁶⁶ European Union, “Laeken Declaration”, 23.

³⁶⁷ European Union, 23.

Constitutional Treaty through a resolution on January 12, 2005, which was another unusual step in the procedure to procure public endorsement.³⁶⁸ However, following France's and the Netherlands' rejections of the treaty in May 2005, a "period of reflection"³⁶⁹ was instigated after which the ratification process was postponed indefinitely.³⁷⁰

In other words, although a consensus on the political level was reached, that consensus was built on a fragile foundation, itself accentuated by the debate in the media and the general public. Like the Maastricht debate, the constitutional debate increased and was characterised by contestation; and like Barth and Bijsmans' conclusions about the Maastricht Treaty, Chiara Jasson notes that patterns of increasing debate in the EU member states can be interpreted as signs of an emerging European public sphere.³⁷¹ Based on empirical studies of news coverage in Spain, France, the UK, and Italy, she observes that both the quality and quantity of articles about the Constitution published in the countries that held a public referendum increased, and these, in turn, stimulated debate in other member states: "Articles about the Constitutional Treaty became more frequent, more analytical, EU-focused and polarised".³⁷² Jasson argues that critical debate and polarisation are not necessarily signs of weakness but rather signs of a Europeanisation of national public spheres.

Although the high-spirited debate about the Constitutional Treaty also attended closely to issues of institutional structure and competences, Medrano notes that we fail to see the complexity of the popular discontent if we "assume that the themes that motivated a majority of French and Dutch voters to vote 'No' on the Constitution are the same as those that pitted leaders of the EU member states against each other for two years".³⁷³ For example, one theme that resonated poorly in the national populations was the issue of enlargement, which was mainly opposed, not least in France, where only 31 percent supported the move from fifteen to twenty-five member states. The constitutional referendum was thus a "unique opportunity to express this rejection indirectly".³⁷⁴ While the Maastricht Treaty bore the promise of unification and the end of the East-West divide, it also imported this historical conflict and made it a business of the EU, which then became the background against which the 2004 enlargement and the Constitutional Treaty should be understood. In the

³⁶⁸ European Parliament, *Daily Notebook*, 2005.

³⁶⁹ European Council, "Declaration by the Heads of State or Government".

³⁷⁰ Maufort & Bribosia, *The Treaty of Lisbon*, 2016.

³⁷¹ Jasson, "Developing Discourse?", 171.

³⁷² Jasson, 4, 173.

³⁷³ Medrano, "The Public Sphere and the European Union's Political Identity", 85.

³⁷⁴ Medrano, 87.

same way as the Community prior to the Maastricht Treaty had successfully imported and defused conflicts between different Western European nations,³⁷⁵ one could expect that the member states would continue this praxis of importing and smoothing out conflicts after the 2004-enlargement, but the referenda results showed otherwise. And as present-day debates—such as the EU’s dilemma concerning whether or not to impose sanctions against Hungary due to breaches to the rule of law, and the Brexit debate about “the Polish plumbers”—show us, the East-West axis is alive and well.³⁷⁶

So, when Medrano argues that “popular discontent helped undo the fragile consensus that had been achieved by the European Union Elites around the constitutional project”,³⁷⁷ his point is twofold: Firstly, the political and the public debates did not revolve around the same issues, which means that the public debate was not simply an extension of the political, but also an enlarged debate in other areas as well. But, secondly, this increased engagement can be interpreted as a positive development: EU citizens are—albeit critically so—engaging in EU matters: “One should not conclude that when European citizens oppose an EU initiative, regardless of its scope, they are expressing their opposition to the European integration project”; rather, low voter turnouts and ‘no’ to referenda are “normal political outcomes in a democratic polity”.³⁷⁸

Another key issue during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty was the question of whether or not the treaty should declare a Christian origin and heritage. Philip Schlesinger and François Foret note that 9/11 and the fear of a “clash of civilizations” provoked a new impetus to the issue of religious identity during the constitutional debate.³⁷⁹ Although the issue of Christianity had been discussed before, the unusual and highly symbolic context of constitution-making raised the stakes of the matter.³⁸⁰ The specific debates were not only situated between different confessions of Christianity or different religions, but also between degrees of secularisation, all of which was complicated by the special procedure of the drafting

³⁷⁵ Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, 128.

³⁷⁶ The Hungarian government has enforced reforms to the constitution and to media and electoral law since 2012, and the country has the “highest percentage of financial irregularities in its handling of funds received from the EU”, as Bea Bakó writes. The central dilemma concerns “how to punish a country’s government without punishing the citizens and the opposition”? See Bakó, “Europe’s Sanctions Dilemma”. For a study on the figure of “the Polish plumber” from a critical race perspective, see Böröcz and Sarkar, “Unbearable Whiteness”.

³⁷⁷ Medrano, “The Public Sphere and the European Union’s Political Identity”, 81.

³⁷⁸ Medrano, 86.

³⁷⁹ Schlesinger and Foret, “Political Roof and Sacred Canopy?”, 60.

³⁸⁰ Schlesinger and Foret, 60.

that included the ten prospective new member states and even the larger civil society, many of which were active in this particular debate.³⁸¹ The proponents of including a Christian origin argued, for instance, that the EU populations were, and still are, predominantly Christian; that the founding fathers of the EU had—besides an economic and political community—envisioned a cultural and first of all Christian community; and that Christian morals had instilled in European societies the universal values of human dignity, equality, and social justice.³⁸²

Just as the debate among the EU leaders, the public debate about Christian heritage had different national faces. In France, how the Constitutional Treaty could affect Turkey's accession to the EU was very controversial,³⁸³ and the issue of whether to include a reference to Europe's Christian heritage was viewed in this context.³⁸⁴ In Poland, on the other hand, the issue of a Christian heritage was not connected specifically to Turkey-EU relations, but to the importance of Christian values to Polish culture.³⁸⁵

The compromise solution was to exclude any references to God and Christianity and instead include the phrase of a “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”.³⁸⁶ But, as Schlesinger and Foret note, the debate about Christian heritage,

most notably in respect of the negotiations over the Turkish candidacy for EU membership during the latter months of 2004, shows that while religion no longer entirely frames the debate, it can become strikingly relevant when it assumes a different role—that of demarcation.³⁸⁷

³⁸¹ Barbulescu and Andreescu, “References to God”, 209 ff.

³⁸² Barbulescu and Andreescu, 210.

³⁸³ Maatsch, “Struggle to Control Meanings”, 261.

³⁸⁴ Maatsch, 268.

³⁸⁵ Wyrozumska, “Who Is Willing to Die”, 330.

³⁸⁶ European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 9. Another important inclusion to the Constitutional Treaty—also included in the Lisbon Treaty—is the article on the relations between the EU and the church as well as other religious organisations. It stipulates: “1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. 2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations. 3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations”. See European Communities, 42. As Jo Hermann notes, with especially the third point churches and other religious organisations were given the opportunity to communicate regularly and on a formalised basis with EU politicians. See Hermann, *Hvis Gud er svaret—hvad er så spørgsmålet?*

³⁸⁷ Schlesinger and Foret, “Political Roof and Sacred Canopy?”, 76.

The issue with Christianity was not so much a question of heritage and foundation, but of difference in relation to, first and foremost, Turkey. And it was also in the debate concerning the accession of Turkey into the EU that the issue of a Christian heritage continued to circulate in the years after the Constitutional Treaty had been abandoned.³⁸⁸

Finally, although the EU symbols were not the main issue in the constitutional debate, they played an important part.³⁸⁹ The symbols had been in use since ‘A People’s Europe’, for almost two decades, when they were incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty. Still, they were left out of the treaty. As Risse notes,

interestingly, the latter [Lisbon] treaty which went into force at the end of 2009 strips the EU’s foundational texts of all symbols such as the flag. Whereas the failed Constitutional Treaty was full of identity talk and symbols, the Lisbon Treaty delivers a European “identity lite” in order to make the document acceptable to a skeptical public.³⁹⁰

To this day, the EU’s symbols are not legally consolidated, which indicates that these symbols constitute important points of dissension. Because the political content of the Constitutional Treaty is mainly intact in the Lisbon Treaty, one could argue that the symbols were largely unimportant; once they were left out (along with the notion of a constitution, a common destiny, and everything else reminiscent of a federal United States of Europe), the EU could continue as planned. But their absence also indicates their importance. In the constitutional debate, the symbols became not only signifiers of the EU, as intended, but also signifiers of the unresolved plans for the EU’s future: How far can integration go? As Armin von Bogdandy argues,

the terminology used to designate the document [the Constitutional Treaty] is remarkably ambivalent. Given the relevant public debate, ‘treaty’ suggests much less of a ‘we’ among Union citizens than does ‘constitution’. Thus, the ambivalence in the terminology is actually an ambivalence over the unions course of development.³⁹¹

Bogdandy’s article was published in May 2005, the same month the Constitutional Treaty was put to a vote in France and the Netherlands. He therefore could not have foreseen how it would end, but Bogdandy’s

³⁸⁸ Barbulescu and Andreescu, “References to God”, 211.

³⁸⁹ Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, 79.

³⁹⁰ Risse, *Community of Europeans?*, 3.

³⁹¹ von Bogdandy, “European Constitution and European Identity”, 304.

outlook is perhaps indicative of a broader sense of hope in the Constitutional Treaty:

If this term becomes commonplace . . . then the constitution will become a powerful entry in the dictionary of European collective identity. Union citizens will frequently come across a term that consistently promotes their self-concept as a group organized by the European Union.³⁹²

The referenda did not support this hopeful interpretation, though, and blame was largely placed on nationalist discourse. The EU leaders therefore took pragmatic measures to reduce fears of social dumping and to clarify “that despite the beginning of accession negotiations, Turkey’s membership would not happen any time soon”.³⁹³ The Turkey-question has since been put on ice, not least due to recent developments in Turkey under Recep Erdogan’s rule and the tense relations between the two parties of the EU-Turkey agreement from 2016.³⁹⁴ Both situations are connected to issues of democratic governance and the protection of human rights and thus to the criteria for EU membership. As recent topics of heavy debate, criticism has been raised of Erdogan’s ongoing attempts to boost his own powers,³⁹⁵ and the EU-Turkey agreement has met with disapproval by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International due to the poor living conditions in the refugee camps in Turkey as well as basic human rights, such as applying for asylum.³⁹⁶

Plans for other enlargements continued, though, and most of the content of the Constitutional Treaty was incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. In short, with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU ended up with a more transparent structure and a strengthened parliament as promised by the Constitutional Treaty, but without the federal connotations of a constitution.

As debates such as these show, the Constitutional Treaty instigated a rhetoric of origin, heritage, and belonging that has continued to circulate in the EU’s constitutive rhetoric. It is also central to the New Narrative initiative.

³⁹² von Bogdandy, 304.

³⁹³ Medrano, “The Public Sphere and the European Union’s Political Identity”, 88.

³⁹⁴ The agreement sought to relocate Syrian refugees arriving in Greece to Turkey, and then resettling Syrian refugees already in Turkey in the EU. See BBC News, “Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect”, *BBC News*, 20/3 2016.

³⁹⁵ This has been an ongoing effort enabled by a two years state of emergency pronounced after the failed coup d’état on July 15, 2016, which led to wide-going purges not only in the political sphere but also in the military, the media, and educational institutions. See Kenyon, “Turkey’s State Of Emergency Ends”, *NPR*, 26/7 2018.

³⁹⁶ Gogou, “The EU-Turkey Deal”.

New Narrative for Europe (2013–2014)

New Narrative was launched in April 2013, initiated by Morten Løkkegaard, MEP, who was shortly after supported by then-president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso. According to Barroso, the reason for initiating New Narrative was “the resurgence of populism, sometimes extreme nationalism” as well as the indifference towards the EU as a political project, which was attributed—among other factors—to a lack of historical awareness among young European citizens.³⁹⁷ Therefore, a new narrative was needed, “namely for the new generation that is not so much identified with this [the current] narrative of Europe”.³⁹⁸ According to Løkkegaard, younger generations must see that “Europe is more than just crisis and economy”.³⁹⁹ The Commission and Barroso therefore collaborated with the Centre for Fine Arts (Bozar), a prestigious cultural institution in Brussels, to appoint a cultural committee that was given the task to write “a manifesto” based on workshop debates during three general assemblies that were held over a period of one year.⁴⁰⁰ The cultural committee consisted of seventeen members, among whom were prominent figures such as the artist Olafur Eliasson and the architect Rem Koolhaas; but the activity of the members varied. Koolhaas quickly pulled out of the project (not on paper, but in practice), and the journalist Per Nyholm decided to leave the committee shortly before the manifesto (since then known as the “Declaration: The Mind and Body of Europe”)⁴⁰¹ was presented to the public on March 1, 2014.⁴⁰²

The general assemblies were held in Warsaw July 11, 2013, in Milan December 8–9, 2013, and Berlin February 28–March 1, 2014, with 250 invited artists, scientists, and intellectuals in total who were given the task to initiate the debate on a new narrative for Europe. In contrast to the other four EU initiatives, New Narrative explicitly turned to the citizen and, as a result, the general public was initially supposed to be included in the making of a new narrative through an online portal.⁴⁰³ However, this

³⁹⁷ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”, para. 11.

³⁹⁸ Barroso, para. 5.

³⁹⁹ Frid-Nielsen, “EU satser stort på kulturen”.

⁴⁰⁰ Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 367.

⁴⁰¹ Deventer et al., “Declaration”.

⁴⁰² Per Nyholm withdrew from the committee because he thought the declaration was “poorly thought and poorly written” and that “the work in the committee was dominated by insufferable artists and cultural entrepreneurs [from the Danish: *komitéarbejdet domineredes af utålelige kunstnere og kulturentreprenører*]”. *Jyllands-Posten*, November 2, 2014, see appendix III. Kaiser likewise notes that “Nyholm immediately distanced himself from the text and refused to endorse the declaration”. Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 371.

⁴⁰³ New Europe Online, “New Narrative for Europe Assembly”.

portal was not set up until the initiative had ended and therefore contained reactions to the New Narrative declaration rather than actual input. The assemblies were also supposed to consist of open debate, but, as Kaiser asserts—based on document analysis, interviews, and observation at the three general assemblies—these public events were “rigidly structured” and “nearly entirely staged” by European Commission officials: during the project launch in Brussels, participants were “warned in advance of the meeting to prepare statements on certain topics and ‘questions’ for the ‘debate’”;⁴⁰⁴ and, in Warsaw, panels were “chaired by committee members, which went overtime and left practically no space for questions from the floor let alone open discussion”.⁴⁰⁵ After criticism from the cultural committee of what was supposed to be a bottom-up procedure, eight workshops with eighty participants were organised for the second assembly in Milan.⁴⁰⁶ The Commission thus gradually surrendered some of the control with the public events, but all events that Barroso attended were strictly planned and orchestrated.⁴⁰⁷

The cultural committee, on the other hand, was left more or less to itself. The Commission let the members do their work as they saw fit; the only specific demand was that the aforementioned declaration was produced.⁴⁰⁸ This work turned out to be more difficult than expected, though. The composition of the declaration was in many ways chaotic. The cultural committee appointed three writing members (the two writers György Konrád and Tomáš Sedláček as well as the journalist Per Nyholm) to draft the declaration, but instead they each wrote their own—and thus competing—text. The cultural committee could not agree on any of the drafts, which meant that one month before the final general assembly in Berlin, at which the declaration was to be presented, there was still no draft:⁴⁰⁹

At this point, the Bozar team [the Centre for Fine Arts] was charged with writing it, and it in turn engaged Nicola Setari, who was formally employed by Teamwork, the French company that had won the tender for the project’s practical organisation. His draft drew on some of the ideas in the older texts. It was circulated to the committee members several times at

⁴⁰⁴ Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 371.

⁴⁰⁵ Kaiser, 371.

⁴⁰⁶ Kaiser, 371.

⁴⁰⁷ For example, “the participants who made short statements at the ‘informal’ dinner event in Berlin [at Olafur Eliasson’s art studio] were still selected and warned in advance and called up by the chair. In all the other meetings with Barroso over the course of the project, spontaneous exchange of views was equally absent”. Kaiser, 372.

⁴⁰⁸ Kaiser, 372.

⁴⁰⁹ Kaiser, 370–71. Kaiser’s argument about the work with the declaration builds on peer observation at cultural committee meetings.

short notice giving them an opportunity to voice any criticism before the final version was sent out on 26 February.⁴¹⁰

In short, although the declaration formally is signed by the committee members (all but Nyholm), they had little if anything to do with writing it.

In addition to the difficulties with the public events and the more private work of the cultural committee, the New Narrative process at large faced various obstacles. Initially, the unveiling of the New Narrative declaration was said to “mark the completion of the first stage of [*sic*] process to elaborate such narrative”, as the original website said.⁴¹¹ But apparently minds were changed, because on October 28, 2014, *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*⁴¹² (*Mind and Body*), which contains the “Declaration: The Mind and Body of Europe” (New Narrative declaration), was published on the platform Issue and unveiled at an event attended by, among others, Barroso.⁴¹³ On December 15, 2014, the website was taken down, and comments from citizens along with all other content were, as a consequence, no longer available. That is, until February 2016 when the initiative was relaunched with a new website,⁴¹⁴ together with an archived version of the previous one, which features citizens’ comments.⁴¹⁵ After this relaunch, the initiative continued its so-called second phase explicitly directed at young people.⁴¹⁶

What is puzzling about this process is the release of the publication and the closing down of the website. For instance, in a mail correspondence from August 23, 2016,⁴¹⁷ almost two years after the book was published, one of the Commission’s Policy Officers in charge of New Narrative, Inês Servulo Correia, sent me the New Narrative declaration, but not the publication and did not mention it either. Not until our second mail correspondence from October 3, 2018, did she mention the publication. Furthermore, in all of the fifty Danish articles and the three German articles mentioning the New Narrative initiative, only one article mentions the publication and that is an opinion piece by aforementioned cultural committee member Nyholm and the initiator Morten Løkkegaard a week after

⁴¹⁰ Kaiser, 371.

⁴¹¹ European Commission, “The Declaration on the New Narrative to Be Unveiled in Berlin (Archived on 15/12/14)”.

⁴¹² Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*.

⁴¹³ European Commission, “Tangible Literary Legacy”.

⁴¹⁴ European Commission, “New Narrative for Europe”. Accessed on January 8, 2019, but no longer available.

⁴¹⁵ European Commission, “New Narrative for Europe (Archived on 15/12/14)”.

⁴¹⁶ European Commission, “YOUrope for Youth”.

⁴¹⁷ Inês Servulo Correia, email message to author, August 23, 2016.

the publication was released.⁴¹⁸ These circumstances suggest that the attention to the publication was somehow unwanted, or, perhaps more likely, that there was no clear-cut plan with the initiative, including its funding. In the context of this study, it also means that although scholarly attention has been paid to the New Narrative declaration, *Mind and Body* has largely gone unnoticed.⁴¹⁹

There is generally very little information available about the initiative. For instance, there is no information about the assemblies (Who participated? Why were they chosen?) and the composition of the cultural committee (Why them?).⁴²⁰ The “miscellaneous contributions” at the end of *Mind and Body* are, except from one, not provided with a date, which obfuscates whether these contributions were made specifically for this publication or for different purposes. Several do, however, refer to the New Narrative initiative in the text, which indicates that they were written for this purpose. Likewise, the round table discussion summarised in *Mind and Body*, a “lively discussion, with over 30 people—participants, active observers and a moderator”,⁴²¹ was the result of “an effort to gather some responses and perspectives on the Declaration”.⁴²² Although the names and job description of the people who figure in the publication are listed, questions remain: What does it mean to be an active observer? Were they invited to the discussion or did they simply pass by? Although Kaiser fills in some of the gaps, these questions remain, by and large, unanswered.

Process aside, *Mind and Body* (249 pages) is a bricolage of scholarly, political, and artistic contributions, small and large, from fifty different contributors.⁴²³ The New Narrative declaration is a central part of the publication, appropriately located precisely in the middle of the book and appears as a subject of debate in many of the publication’s fifty contributions. Although it is a mix of both different genres and has contributors

⁴¹⁸ *Jyllands-Posten*, November 8, 2014. See appendix III.

⁴¹⁹ Even in Kaiser’s later article about the New Narrative initiative from 2017 in which he specifically refers to *Mind and Body*, he only briefly mentions it in the main text. He does not comment on the publication process or its content. See Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”, 222. Besides from Luis B. García referenced throughout this study, *Mind and Body* is also considered briefly by Caspar Pearson and Yudhishtir R. Isar and it is reviewed by Alina-Carmen Brihan, in strictly descriptive terms. See Brihan, “Imagining and Shaping the EU’s Future”; Isar, “Culture in EU External Relations”; Pearson, “Imaginative Struggles of Europe”; García, “Introduction”; García, “New Narrative Project”.

⁴²⁰ Kaiser notes, though, that the choice of members was biased towards the performing arts, according to the wishes of Barroso and the Bozar team. Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 367.

⁴²¹ Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 132.

⁴²² Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 131.

⁴²³ See appendix II for a list and description of the New Narrative contributors referred to in this study.

from different spheres, the publication has a logical composition in its chronological order: Foreword by Barroso; contributions from the launch; contributions from the three general assemblies; the declaration published at the last assembly; a round table debate about the declaration in May 2014; a domino conversation about the initiative at large in September 2014; posters made for that event; miscellaneous contributions; and, finally, afterwords by Løkkegaard and Paul Dujardin, Bozar director and chair of the cultural committee. It is available as a PDF and has been published in print with 2,500 copies, which have been distributed to “Members of the European Parliament, Members of the Commission, EC Representation Offices in the Member States, EU Delegations, EU Libraries and Documentation Centres, Historic Archives in the Member States, Universities” as well as to cultural institutions such as “Fine-Arts Schools and Faculties”, “cultural centres”, “Creative Europe Programme Desks in the Member States”, and “youth stakeholders”. Finally, “upon request it has been sent to individuals, mainly for academic purposes, and to institutions organizing debates on Europe’s today and tomorrow”.⁴²⁴ I have also obtained a printed copy after corresponding with Inês Servulo Correia, who co-organised the public events and made sure the declaration was written.⁴²⁵

Turning to the situational aspects of the initiative, “the resurgence of populism, sometimes extreme nationalism”⁴²⁶ as well as the indifference towards the EU as a political project in the younger generation were, as mentioned, the explicit exigences articulated by Barroso and Løkkegaard, who argued that “younger generations need to see that Europe is more than just crisis and economy”.⁴²⁷ Barroso and Løkkegaard perceive a rift between older generations who experienced World War II, the Cold War, and totalitarian regimes and therefore remember why the Community was established, and younger generations who have been spared these experiences and therefore might not see the importance of the EU in similar ways. The initiative thus reflects a perceived need to bind the generations in a common cultural European narrative in order to overcome nationalism and populism.

This exigence overlaps, to some extent, with that of ‘A People’s Europe’, as both initiatives reflect the notion that the Community/the EU needs to do and be more in the eyes of its citizens, and both explicitly

⁴²⁴ Inês Servulo Correia, email message to author, October 3, 2018.

⁴²⁵ Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 366. Correia was at the Bureau of European Policy Advisers and she reported directly to the Commission President. The other assigned official was Jaime Andreu Romeo from Citizens in the Directorate-General for Communication.

⁴²⁶ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”, para. 11.

⁴²⁷ Frid-Nielsen, “EU satser stort på kulturen”.

mention “young people” as a primary focus area; in the case of ‘A People’s Europe’, through education initiatives.⁴²⁸ Likewise, both assert that citizens must recognise the important role the Community/EU plays in their life. But while the spring 1984 issue of the Commission’s survey instrument, the Eurobarometer, in some ways supports the need to improve the visibility of the Community, the Eurobarometer from autumn 2012, in fact, does not support such a tendency.⁴²⁹ Although it does not pose questions capable of unveiling nationalistic tendencies, it does poll “a sense of belonging” and actually concludes that it has increased, especially among young citizens.⁴³⁰ Young citizens feel a greater sense of belonging to the EU, are more likely to feel they benefit from the EU’s achievements, and are more likely to actively participate in European politics.⁴³¹ This demographic picture is similar to the one exposed by the Brexit referendum, where older groups in the UK generally were more eager to leave the EU than young people.

Why, then, specifically target young people when it seems they are more on board than other demographics? One presumption would be that the Commission seeks to place its stakes with a group that already sympathises with the EU as a political project—and who, furthermore, represent the future.

In the process of writing this thesis, many debates and crises relevant to—or positioned in the midst of—the EU have come and gone: the refugee crisis, Brexit, the Trump Administration, the climate crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic, just to mention some of the most important ones. It is difficult not to view New Narrative’s efforts to counter populism and nationalism in light of perhaps especially the Brexit debate, but also the refugee crisis. However, in 2013–2014 one of the most prevalent debates in the general public centred around the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, which we see reflected in *Mind and Body* with its many references to the “economic crisis”, “financial crisis”, or implicitly “the current crisis”. Moreover, election to the EP was held on May 25, 2014, shortly after the third and final general assembly in Berlin on March 1, 2014. In the media, growing populism and nationalism were often brought into the

⁴²⁸ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 23.

⁴²⁹ The Eurobarometer is a quantitative and qualitative survey commissioned by the European Commission and performed twice a year since 1973. In spring 1984, 20% of the interviewed citizens failed to respond to survey questions concerning “Europe”, and in a section about the abundance of names for the Community, the report states that “journalists, for their part, have invented or sanctioned a number of simpler or shorter names . . . Such proliferation of terms could well generate or perpetuate confusion”. Commission of the European Communities, “Eurobarometer 21”, 32; see also 43, 50.

⁴³⁰ TNS Opinion & Social, “Standard Eurobarometer 78”, 22.

⁴³¹ TNS Opinion & Social, 18, 23, 37, 41.

election debate, as many feared that the political far-right would win more seats in the EP,⁴³² a fear solidly confirmed by the election result. Further, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 as recognition of its achievements in establishing and maintaining peace and democracy in Europe. Thus, the EU found itself in a position of simultaneous recognition and retribution, which is what New Narrative can be seen as attempting to address. Therefore, although some of Barroso's and Løkkegaard's worries seem partly misplaced, the situation was complex and offered no clear indication of a fitting response.

The New Narrative differs from the previous initiatives in terms of authorship and the character of its rhetorical agents. On the one hand, the declaration, for instance, is signed by sixteen of the cultural committee members; on the other hand, it was drafted by Setari, who is not one of the signatories but rather a ghost writer and indirectly appointed by the Commission to do this drafting. Furthermore, the initiative is financed, hosted (online and offline), and presented by the European Commission. It is born within an EU framework, but voiced by fifty different contributors who are mainly artists, intellectuals, researchers, and politicians. Agency and accountability are dispersed across various spheres of society, while the Commission provides the framework, the order, the selection, the distribution, and the invitations. The rationales guiding these decisions are not made public, and there is no explicit hierarchy between the contributors, aside from titles and space given: the contributions made in the round table debate and the domino discussion are rather short and represented in dialogue form. Most of these interventions are from citizens—handpicked and planned as they may be.⁴³³

In this sense, the bricolage nature of the publication *Mind and Body* enables the incorporation of a broad range of genres and types of contributors (artists, intellectuals, politicians, citizens) even as it diffuses the idea of a single, coherent rhetorical agent that we can hold accountable. As mentioned in the introduction, the contributors of publications such as *Mind and Body* may understand their task differently, but their participation and significance are constrained by interactions with other contributors and with interlocutors in the future and in other places.⁴³⁴ In this way, the result is an artefact that both induces polysemy and coheres at the same time.

This general distribution of agency is also reflected in the New Narrative declaration's call on its audiences. In the final call for action, the text

⁴³² Simons, "EU Elections 2014"; Handelsblatt, "Europawahl 2014".

⁴³³ Kaiser, "Clash of Cultures", 372.

⁴³⁴ Asen, "Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric", 133.

encourages efforts firstly from “political leaders” who need to understand that Europe is “energized by culture”; secondly, from “artists and scientists, educators and journalists, historians and sociologists, entrepreneurs and civil servants”, who need to take on undefined “new responsibilities”; and, finally, from “citizens” who need to

raise their voices and to take part in the European public space of debate by sharing their stories and concerns. These narratives will tell the story of what it means to be a European in the 21st century.⁴³⁵

What this effort entails and how citizens will be able to do it remain unclear, but the initiative calls on culture to help channel this engagement.

The public debate about the New Narrative initiative largely failed to appear.⁴³⁶ My own study of the press coverage in Germany and Denmark covering the time period from the launch to the presentation of *Mind and Body* shows that in Germany, only one of the seven national newspapers in Germany reported on the initiative,⁴³⁷ and when including international and regional newspapers, the number rises to three: *Die Zeit* (national), *Deutsche Welle* (international), and *Gießener Anzeiger* (regional).⁴³⁸ Each had one article on New Narrative. In contrast, the coverage was more extensive in the Danish national newspapers,⁴³⁹ with especially *Jyllands-Posten*’s twenty-six articles.

Both countries were featured in the New Narrative process and, consequently, coverage would be expected. Morten Løkkegaard, co-initiator and promoter of the New Narrative, is a well-known Danish MEP and a

⁴³⁵ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 129.

⁴³⁶ Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”, 227. Kaiser asserts that the press coverage of the assemblies and the declaration in European media was limited and delimited to the countries where the events took place, but he provides neither reference nor empirical data to support this claim.

⁴³⁷ Two important differences between the media landscape in Germany and Denmark are worth noting. Regional newspapers play a large role in Germany due primarily to its decentralized, federal tradition which is apparent when comparing the circulation figures of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (the largest national broadsheet newspaper with a circulation of 428,745) and *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (the largest regional newspaper with 27 local editorial departments and a circulation of 410,000). See Kleinstauber and Thomas, “The German Media Landscape”, 112–13. In contrast, national newspapers in Denmark receive very little competition from regional newspapers due to the size of the country. See Søndergaard and Jauert, “The Danish Media Landscape”, 84–85.

⁴³⁸ See appendix III.

⁴³⁹ Six out of the eight national newspapers in Denmark covered the initiative: *Jyllands-Posten* (26 articles), *BT* (9), *Berlingske Tidende* (6), *Information* (4), *Politiken* (4), *Weekendavisen* (1). *Børsen* and *Ekstra-Bladet* did not cover the initiative. See appendix III.

former journalist with a large network in Danish media.⁴⁴⁰ Likewise, Nyholm, journalist at *Jyllands-Posten*, the second largest newspaper in Denmark, was the only journalist member of the cultural committee. On the German side, the first stage of the project culminated in Berlin with the presentation of the New Narrative declaration in the presence of Chancellor Angela Merkel and Barroso. On a more general level, Germany and Denmark are also interesting to compare due to their different EU discourses and cultures—traditionally pro-EU and Eurosceptic, respectively. Therefore, the lack of press coverage in Germany is noticeable without any obvious explanation. One account could be that New Narrative simply did not seem important enough. There was a financial crisis, including a lurking North-South divide in the Eurozone. An initiative about narrative, identity, and belonging could, in this light, be perceived as a less pressing issue.

None of the German articles mentions the New Narrative declaration, and they all predate the publication of *Mind and Body*. The second article in *Deutsche Welle*⁴⁴¹ and the third in *Gießener Anzeiger*⁴⁴² are both reports from the third and final assembly in Berlin during which the declaration was unveiled. They do not take a critical or complimentary stance, but simply recount the main content of the speeches given. The first article in *Die Zeit*⁴⁴³ is of another character, though. It is published before the declaration is unveiled. The author Berthold Franke, then-leader of the Goethe Institute in Brussels and a frequent EU commentator, reacts to the idea of writing constitutive narratives:

If only it was that easy! “Narratives” that have the capacity to create meaning and understanding are not simply constructed, but result from historical experience . . . In order to seize people, narratives have to describe a positive future and be appreciated spontaneously. They are found, not invented.⁴⁴⁴

Franke is not critical towards the thought that people have and need such meaningful narratives, but in his view, they cannot be constructed; they

⁴⁴⁰ Løkkegaard was a member of the European Parliament 2009–2014 and again from 2016–present.

⁴⁴¹ *Deutsche Welle*, Deude, March 1, 2014, see appendix III.

⁴⁴² *Gießener Anzeiger*, Ganz, March 7, 2014, see appendix III.

⁴⁴³ *Die Zeit*, Franke, January 2, 2014, see appendix III.

⁴⁴⁴ *Die Zeit*, Franke, January 2, 2014, see appendix III. From the German: “Wenn es denn so einfach wäre! Sinn- und identifikationsstiftende ‘Erzählungen’ werden nämlich nicht einfach konstruiert, sondern ergeben sich aus historischer Erfahrung. . . . Um Menschen zu ergreifen, müssen Narrative eine positive Zukunft beschreiben und spontan einleuchten. Sie werden gefunden und nicht erfunden”.

are projected from history. Thus, he is critical of the idea that narratives have a constitutive potential.

The Danish media reception is of a different character. Three clear tendencies appear: Firstly, the coverage (31 articles out of a total 50) is centralised around the process *prior* to the unveiling of the declaration and the publication, respectively. Only three articles actually mention the content of the declaration, and the publication is mentioned only once by Nyholm after it was published, and only as a reference for the interested reader.⁴⁴⁵ Second, despite the work of key stakeholders such as Løkkegaard and Nyholm,⁴⁴⁶ the Danish press coverage is largely polemical and almost exclusively critical. Much like Franke in *Die Zeit*, the articles are critical towards the core project idea of composing constitutive narratives. While the critical nature of the reception is general, with the two newspapers *Information* and *Politiken* as the two exceptions, the polemical nature is dominant in *Jyllands-Posten* (26 articles) and *BT* (9 articles). Aside from articles in which Løkkegaard—the primary spokesperson for New Narrative in all the Danish newspapers—is given space as an interviewee or an author, both newspapers interview only politicians who are against the EU in general and the initiative particularly (Morten Messerschmidt and Anders Vistisen from the Danish People's Party, Rina Ronja Karl from the People's Movement against the EU). *BT* also conducted an opinion poll in which its readers were given the opportunity to answer the question: “What do you think about the fact that the EU has spent 10 million kroner on ‘the New Narrative for Europe’?”⁴⁴⁷ Two possible answers were given. 5,029 votes were cast, and 11 percent answered: “That’s good, such work can unite Europe”, whereas 89 percent answered: “Shame on them, that is a squandering of tax money”.⁴⁴⁸ Thirdly, and as a result, narrative is mainly understood as a deluding strategy. New Narrative was portrayed as an expensive, arrogant, elitist, and unnecessary initiative with the intention to convert the infidels and persuade them that the EU is indispensable. The central themes in this critique are the ideas of creating a narrative for Europe, the elitist character of the initiative specifically, and the EU generally; and the costs versus benefits of such a project.

⁴⁴⁵ *Berlingske*, Løkkegaard and Nyholm, November 9, 2014, see appendix III.

⁴⁴⁶ As mentioned, Nyholm ended up leaving the cultural committee, and his opinion pieces are therefore of a mixed kind: though he still expresses enthusiasm about the project idea, he is critical of the declaration.

⁴⁴⁷ *BT*, opinion poll, October 18, 2014, see appendix III. From the Danish: “Hvad synes du om, at EU har brugt 10 mio. kr. på Den nye fortælling om Europa?”

⁴⁴⁸ From the Danish: “Fint, arbejdet kan samle Europa” and “Føj, det er frås med skatte-kroner”.

This critique approaches the question of purpose: why are narratives of collective identity and collective identity formation important to the EU?

Why? The Purpose of European Identity Formation

Like no other continent, Europe is obsessed with its own meaning and direction. Idealistic and teleological visions of Europe at once inform, legitimate and are themselves informed and legitimated by the political development of something called the European Union.⁴⁴⁹

What my question above points to is the purpose of identity as such, and the purpose of identity formation as a process. Intuitively, we might view the process of identity formation as precedent to an identity formed, and we are thus led to believe that what is most important is the result: European identity. What is clear from the context descriptions given above, is that identity formation is an ongoing endeavour. Of course, this does not mean that European identity has not or does not exist, but simply that its purpose, shape, and content changes over time, which, in turn, suggests that the process of formation itself is the central endeavour of the EU.

We also see that European identity (formation) sometimes serves the purpose of giving meaning to a set of already-established policies, sometimes of enabling policies in the future: the purpose of the 1973-declaration was to craft an institutional European identity that would allow the Community to speak with one voice, first and foremost in global affairs. Recognising that such a position did not exist, identity was viewed as that which would enable the Community to do so in the future; ‘A People’s Europe’ sought to form European identity as a way of making meaningful what to many was perceived as a technocratic and inefficient Community with very little public support,⁴⁵⁰ but also to legitimise political integration in the near future; the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty calls for European identity and destiny in order to legitimise policies that literally would be implemented at the time of the call—deeper and wider integration, a changed legal structure, and extended competences; and, finally, New Narrative’s calls for a cross-generational sense of belonging built on a common cultural heritage and set of values with the aim to provide meaning to an EU in internal crisis of different dimensions.

European identity formation, then, serves the purpose of making sense of either future policies or policies already adopted, sometimes both, and

⁴⁴⁹ Garton-Ash, “Europe’s Endangered Liberal Order”, 51.

⁴⁵⁰ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 77.

in this way create popular legitimacy. Identity plays a role in areas such as enlargement (a horizontal widening of European integration), but also in the functional, core areas of the EU, such as the monetary union and security policy (a vertical deepening of European integration).⁴⁵¹ Or, in more polemical words, interventions in the domain of European culture serves the purpose of enlarging “the scope of EU governance and control”.⁴⁵² The purpose of European identity formation, in other words, relates to areas of governance and how wide and deep this governance is understood to be—or sought to become. It is thus closely related to the question of what kind of behaviour the EU seeks or even expects from its citizens. On this subject, Klaus Armingeon argues that

as long as the European Union does not require extensive and far-reaching solidaristic behavior from its peoples, full-fledged collective identity is hardly needed. This would change dramatically if the Union begins to levy high taxes and to redistribute major resources.⁴⁵³

This remark evokes Benedict Anderson’s notion of an imagined community and its behavioural consequences: “Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings”.⁴⁵⁴ In this understanding, then, the crafting and promotion of a collective identity is valuable insofar as it enables political action or substantial legislative changes, such as the Maastricht Treaty or the Constitutional Treaty. As Kaiser notes, EU politicians tend to presume that “greater cultural integration can provide a stronger foundation for its economic and political integration”;⁴⁵⁵ the former legitimises the latter. One particularly important means of cultural integration is narrative, which is understood to strengthen “feelings of cultural commonality and social community within the EU to foster a trans- and supranational collective identity”.⁴⁵⁶ Such feelings of commonality, in turn, are supposed to “help legitimize European integration and the EU and make it more popular among its citizens”.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵¹ Risse, *Community of Europeans?*

⁴⁵² Shore, “In Uno Plures”, 8; see also Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’”; Shore, “Imagining the New Europe”; Shore, *Building Europe*.

⁴⁵³ Armingeon, “From the Europe of Nations”, 236; as quoted in Kohli, “Battlegrounds of European Identity”, 119.

⁴⁵⁴ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7.

⁴⁵⁵ Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 374.

⁴⁵⁶ Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”, 215.

⁴⁵⁷ Kaiser, 215.

Legitimacy is also at the heart of Jürgen Habermas's work on the EU.⁴⁵⁸ In his view, the process of identity formation requires “the emergence of a European civil society; the construction of a European-wide public sphere; and the shaping of a political culture that can be shared by all European citizens”,⁴⁵⁹ all of which is, according to Habermas, yet to happen.⁴⁶⁰ In combination with a more democratic institutional structure, these conditions are crucial in order to authorise the EU to go beyond “market-enhancement policies”;⁴⁶¹ the indirect authorisation through national governments that is the reigning order today does not suffice for this purpose. To become legitimate as not only an economic union but also a more encompassing political union, the legitimisation of shared values is required in the form of a civic collective identity shaped as “a solidarity among strangers”.⁴⁶² In other words, the question of legitimacy in relation to identity formation is fundamentally a question of governance: how far does the EU want to go?

Concluding Remarks

Summing up the historical and rhetorical context of the five EU initiatives, two general characteristics appear. Firstly, the constitutive rhetoric of the five initiatives is interconnected. The specific constraints, rhetors, and audiences vary, but the rhetorical exigences and proposed responses are characterised by ongoing circulation and distribution. Language, concepts, and narratives circulate over time and in different spheres. In this sense, we can view each initiative within its own specific rhetorical and historical situation, but also as part of a larger rhetorical ecology “held together trans-situationally”.⁴⁶³ Because this study is a close reading of material stretching over forty years, this observation is important to bear in mind. Secondly, the character of rhetor and audience becomes increasingly complex over time.

In the most recent initiative New Narrative, both positions are less transparent, more encompassing, and, in terms of functionality and agency, less distinct. In the following analytical chapters, I discuss these

⁴⁵⁸ See, e.g., Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”; Habermas, *Crisis of the European Union*; Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”; Habermas, “Democracy in Europe”; Habermas, “Citizen and State Equality”.

⁴⁵⁹ Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, 16.

⁴⁶⁰ Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”; Habermas, “Citizen and State Equality”.

⁴⁶¹ Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, 14–15.

⁴⁶² Habermas, 21.

⁴⁶³ Edbauer, “Unframing Models”, 20.

issues of circulation and complexity in a diachronic and thematic perspective. I turn, first, to the making of a collective subject, and trace a change in scope over time as well as the different means of interpellation; I then turn to the crafting of a transhistorical collective subject and explore the EU's historical narrative and various temporalities; and, finally, I direct attention to the EU's visionary rhetoric of omnipresence and eternity and how it positions and constrains the collective subject: the EU citizen—the Eurostar.

4. From Institutional to Collective Identity Formation

When EU citizens visit a foreign university as Erasmus students or teachers—perhaps arriving in a car that has travelled through Europe with the EU emblem on its number plate—they probably do not think much about the EU as something other than a generous facilitator. But exchange programmes such as Erasmus+ and the EU symbols are not just policies and symbolic representation; they are effective parts of the EU's ongoing efforts at collective identity formation.

In this chapter, I aim to show that the EU's constitutive rhetoric not only performs through discourse, but also uses functional, symbolic, and physical resources. If ultimate identification allows subjects to engage with the world both as individual subjects and as members of a collectivity,⁴⁶⁴ we need to explore the various means and resources the EU employs and through which the EU seeks to realise such identification. To this end, we must broaden our view on the means of constitutive rhetoric and ask not only how this rhetoric transcends the individual subject and its particular interests in order to constitute a collective subject, but also, what are the means of such ultimate identification?

The constitutive character of the five EU initiatives studied in this thesis changes over time. One notable change is a shift in focus, from the shaping of an *institutional identity* to the formation of *collective identity*, and, ultimately, to their fusion, a transformation that coincides with a relatively fast and extensive growth within the EU. This growth illuminates the need, according to the EU, to create social cohesion: the more citizens, the more diversity, and thus the need to commit to one another. A massive apparatus of representative mechanisms has been designed with the purpose of coping with the growing number of citizens. Paradoxically, this apparatus is also partly why citizens feel distanced from their EU leaders and thus serves as a common point of critique. As a result, the EU has explored other ways of compelling the growing number of member states and citizens to commit to one another, many of which centre around the

⁴⁶⁴ Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives*, 195.

idea of European identity formation as a means of invoking a sense of belonging across national borders. In this chapter, I explore these efforts from a diachronic perspective and trace the transition from functional and structural measures to a broad range of physical and symbolic means of constitutive rhetoric—from a focus on the institution and its role in the world to a focus on citizens' daily lives and emotions. The eclectic mould of the EU's constitutive character is necessarily reflected in the character of this chapter as well, but I hope to have brought clarity through its chronological order.

The increased debate around and attention to *culture* within the EU and in EU scholarship during the last three decades is somewhat indicative of this transition. This cultural turn is significant, and indicates the origin of various identity formation practices of the EU that, according to Peo Hansen, are largely based on ethnocultural attributes (in contrast to identity based on social and political rights).⁴⁶⁵ Hansen and Cris Shore, who both pay attention specifically to the cultural and educational policies of the EU, identify the Maastricht Treaty as a clear evidence that these practices exist,⁴⁶⁶ but they both, along with Claudia S. Sternberg, see the Maastricht Treaty as the culmination of a process that began much earlier⁴⁶⁷—and, as I will show in this chapter—a process that has continually intensified in the decades following the Maastricht Treaty. Sternberg says:

A shift is notable between the early 1970s and the 1980s even within those discourses addressing the cultural underpinnings of European integration. In the early days, cultural measures tended to be referred to as instrumental, and subordinate, to achieving economic development and integration However, soon the competing discourse emerged that fostering a collective European identity and a feeling of belonging to a European culture was an 'objective' in itself.⁴⁶⁸

This emergence of a "People's Europe rhetoric",⁴⁶⁹ the first seeds of the EU's constitutive rhetoric, thus extends back to the Declaration on European Identity. Whereas Shore and Hansen assert the birth of an ethnocultural European identity, bread within the EU through cultural and educational policy, I propose viewing the EU's identity formation process from a perspective that highlights the change in subject (from institution to collective and, at the end, their fusion) and the diversity of constitutive

⁴⁶⁵ Hansen, *Europeans Only?*

⁴⁶⁶ Shore, "Inventing Homo Europaeus"; Shore, "In Uno Plures"; Hansen, "Europeans Only?", 36, 53.

⁴⁶⁷ Shore, "Inventing the 'People's Europe'"; Hansen, "Europeans Only?", 54, 119.

⁴⁶⁸ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 89.

⁴⁶⁹ Sternberg, 81.

rhetorical means and practices. These means and practices are varied and involve discursive changes, institutional arrangements, geographical, physical, and symbolic interweaving as well as narrative and cultural invocations. It is therefore important to notice how these resources diverge in order to see how they also overlap and intersect. Although I agree that the EU's identity formation practices contain ethnocultural components, they also involve principles and values that explicitly diverge and counter such components. This odd weave of identificatory threads distinguishes the constitutive rhetoric of the EU.

The three parts of the chapter follow chronological order. In the first part, I focus on the Declaration on European Identity (1973-declaration) and 'A People's Europe' (1984–1985), and trace the change in subject from a primarily institutional identity to a collective identity. In the second part, I further explore the efforts at collective identity formation in the invention of traditions and interweaving practices in 'A People's Europe' and follow their traces in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Constitutional Treaty (2004). Finally, in the third part, *New Narrative* (2013–2014) takes a central position. Here, I examine the topos of ominous crisis and the articulated need for a new narrative that understands the crucial role of culture in collective identity formation.

Facing the World, Facing the Citizens: Tentative Self-Interpellations

In the early EU initiatives, a collective subject is in the making while at the same time occupying a primarily peripheral position in the EU's rhetoric. Although mostly a subject spoken about, citizens are also articulated as a collective subject with power and responsibility to act. One such crucial role is to confirm the self-interpellation, the coming into being, of the EU itself.

The 1973-declaration was published at a time when the Community was still in the process of envisioning itself and its role in the world around it. It had just moved from the transitional stage to the final stage of integration as stipulated in the Treaty of Rome, and in many ways the 1973-declaration can be viewed as part of this process of interpellating itself. The purpose of the declaration was thus to make clear and simultaneously figure out the Community's place in the world. This process of self-constitution is visible in the continuous interpellation of "the Nine"—which unavoidably evokes images of superhero collectives such as the Fantastic

Four⁴⁷⁰—as the predominant and united actor in the declaration, on one occasion substituted by the indefinite “Europe”: “Europe must unite and speak increasingly with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world”.⁴⁷¹ Both the stance as “the Nine” and the argument that Europe must speak “with one voice”, which we recognise from Willy Brandt’s call in 1969,⁴⁷² should be viewed in relation to the geopolitical context and the need and wish to play a role as a global political power: forming European identity means creating a position for the Community in order, for example, to be a decisive factor in creating stability in the Middle East and thus financial stability in Europe, but also to be able to have a say among powers such as the USSR and the USA.

The declaration is short, and, in comparison with the latter initiatives, offers rather few insights into the constitutive rhetoric of the EU. But, although its most important contributions are as points of comparison and as the formal origin of the EU’s efforts at identity formation, a few points should be made about the declaration in its own right.

Indeed, the overarching orientation in the 1973-declaration is towards the world. It dedicates two-thirds of its total four pages to the Nine’s relations with every other part of the world—from “the countries of the Middle East” to “the USSR and the East European countries” and “the less favoured nations”. Although some are more prominent than others in this descending order of importance, no one is left out. This orientation is also made clear from the introductory statement recounting the reason for writing the declaration: it is the result of a wish to “achieve a better definition of their [the Nine’s] relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs”.⁴⁷³

In this statement, we also see the tentative self-constitutive nature of the aim of the text: to “achieve a *better definition* of their relations”, and, in the next line, the Nine have “*decided to define* the European identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind”.⁴⁷⁴ This stance is reflected in the final section of the declaration as well:

The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will

⁴⁷⁰ The Fantastic Four dates back to 1961. Like the EU, it grew and became the Fantastic Five (1977).

⁴⁷¹ Commission of the European Communities, “Declaration on European Identity”, 120.

⁴⁷² Brandt, “Statement by Willy Brandt”.

⁴⁷³ Commission of the European Communities, “Declaration on European Identity”, 119.

⁴⁷⁴ Commission of the European Communities, 118, my emphasis.

strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.⁴⁷⁵

European identity must be thought of “in relation to other countries”; this will “strengthen their own cohesion”.

In contrast to later initiatives, European identity, then, is first and foremost connected to the Community as an institution when facing the world; it is imagined neither as *belonging to* nor as *addressing* Community citizens. This is particularly clear in the following quote, in which we see how the institutional and legal framework—a whole “machinery”—is “an essential part of the European Identity”:

The Nine have the political will to succeed in the construction of a united Europe. . . . They have created a common market, based on a customs union, and have established institutions, common policies and machinery for co-operation. All these are an essential part [*sic*] of the European Identity.⁴⁷⁶

In other words, the 1973-declaration focuses on the institutional and constitutional arrangements of society, arrangements that do not involve citizens in any possible way—neither as political nor social, cultural beings.⁴⁷⁷ Elections for the European Parliament by universal suffrage was still to come, which is one of the reasons why peoples’ participation is imagined not as direct but as something enacted through their national representatives.

Finally, it is striking that all ten mentions of European identity—the one exception being the title of the declaration—are provided with the definite article: *the* European identity. The definite article brings a finitude and singularity to the concept, a contrast to the otherwise more indefinite, tentative, and very open conception presented in the text. This contrast gives the impression that one might not yet know *what* it is, boundaries and content are fluid and open for discussion, but *it* does exist. An element of stability is introduced “in order to cope with the fluidity of society and the world”;⁴⁷⁸ As Sine N. Just argues, “the idea of constituting the EU once and for all is not consistent with the purpose of the European political project. The EU may . . . be a content before it is a container, but it is also a process before it is a product”.⁴⁷⁹ In other words, process and product

⁴⁷⁵ Commission of the European Communities, 122.

⁴⁷⁶ Commission of the European Communities, 119.

⁴⁷⁷ “Europeans” (120) and “peoples” (119) are mentioned only once, respectively.

⁴⁷⁸ Eisenstadt and Giesen, “Construction of Collective Identity”, 82.

⁴⁷⁹ Just, “Constitution of Meaning”, 219. Just refers to Lionel Jospin, prime minister of France, who on May 28, 2001, said: “Europe is first and foremost a political project, a

are co-constitutive—European identity formation is just as important as European identity.

‘A People’s Europe’ marks a change in focus. As we shall see, in the two reports, not only institutions but also the civic and social codes of collective identity are in a very concrete way in the making.

Progress, Efficiency, and Simplification

Although ‘A People’s Europe’ in 1984–1985, like the 1973-declaration, first and foremost envisions an institutional identity, the strength of which is seen as an indication of the EU’s power and position in the world, this aspect becomes less prevalent and focus is directed towards the process of improving the lives of its citizens. ‘A People’s Europe’ thus marks a change in perception within the Community, demonstrated by a transition from *a trader’s Europe* to *a people’s Europe*. This change induced a new pre-occupation with the interests of the citizens, motivated by decreasing popular support of what many perceived as a technocratic and inefficient institution.⁴⁸⁰ Therefore, the Adonnino Committee was given the task of proposing concrete measures that could capture the will of the citizens.

This process demanded efficiency. The pure extent and width of the proposals in ‘A People’s Europe’ brings an air of energy and positivity in its outlook on the future; at the same time, this energy is often combined with a sense of urgency, even stress. Indeed, many of the proposals were implemented shortly after the reports had been presented first in Brussels, then in Milan. The committee wanted fast implementation, intended as a means to achieve another goal, namely recognition and presence in the minds of the Community citizens and, as a result, popular support.

Progress and efficiency are frequent topoi in the two reports which state that the committee offers “a combination of specific proposals to be implemented without further delay, and longer term objectives which would make the Community more of a reality for its citizens”.⁴⁸¹ However, most suggestions indicate that the Community needs to act on the short-term rather than on the long-term span, which is why it presents proposals that are “complete in themselves and susceptible of leading to concrete decisions here and now”.⁴⁸² Especially the second report encourages implementation of its proposals “in the most timely and effective manner”,

‘content’ before being a ‘container’”. From the French: “L’Europe est d’abord un projet politique, un “contenu” avant d’être un “contenant””. Just’s translation, see Just, 169.

⁴⁸⁰ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 77.

⁴⁸¹ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 19.

⁴⁸² Adonnino, 7.

seeking “earliest possible ratification”,⁴⁸³ implementation “without delay”,⁴⁸⁴ to “accelerate”,⁴⁸⁵ and “to demonstrate also an ability to take decisions within a short time”,⁴⁸⁶ which means that “within 12 months decisive progress should have been made on a considerable number of these proposals”.⁴⁸⁷

This sense of energy is, at times, accompanied by a stressful and displeased tone, reflecting irritation over the lack of practical implementation of integrative steps already agreed upon. This discontent is displayed in a passage about obsolete but still publicly visible border signs at internal borders that supposedly “ignore the existence of the common market and thus undermine the credibility of the Community”:

It cannot indeed be beyond the imagination of a Community which strives for a ‘Europe sans frontières’ and which should now endow itself with a common emblem . . . to abolish inadequate and obsolete signs at internal borders and devise border signs of a common design correctly reflecting the progress made towards a genuine single market and the unity of the European Community.⁴⁸⁸

Here is a combined embarrassment in the eyes of the world and displeasure of the Community member states’ inability or lack of interest in working to the advantage of the Community as a whole, implicitly asking: Is it really too much to take down outdated road signs? Progress does not signify what is to come, but what has already been achieved. Progress will not be recognised if member states keep displaying internal disunity; or simply a lack of effort.

The aggravation over member states’ reluctance to fully unite, politically but also in these concrete, material practices, is connected to the new impetus of the Community to be more closely connected to its citizens, which is a recurrent theme: to make “the Community more credible in the eyes of its citizens”,⁴⁸⁹ to give citizens a “clearer perception of the dimension and existence of the Community”.⁴⁹⁰ The Community needs “to point out to people what the costs would be if the Community did not exist”.⁴⁹¹ The cognitive link between the Community and everything it contributes

⁴⁸³ Adonnino, 18.

⁴⁸⁴ Adonnino, 5, 9, 24.

⁴⁸⁵ Adonnino, 20.

⁴⁸⁶ Adonnino, 18.

⁴⁸⁷ Adonnino, 30.

⁴⁸⁸ Adonnino, 30.

⁴⁸⁹ Adonnino, 9.

⁴⁹⁰ Adonnino, 30.

⁴⁹¹ Adonnino, 22.

to its citizens is missing because “the people of Europe do not receive satisfactory information about the construction of Europe”.⁴⁹² Hence, the Community needs to improve its visibility, to “make Europe come alive for the Europeans”—one of the more spectacular suggestions being a Euro-Lottery, because “an event with popular appeal could help promote the European idea”.⁴⁹³ In other words, the lack of popular support for the Community seems to motivate a reciprocal need to see each other: the Community needs to see its citizens, but citizens also need to see the Community. Now that the Community has made the people of Europe “its new reality”,⁴⁹⁴ the Community likewise needs to be “more of a reality for its citizens”.⁴⁹⁵ The topoi of progress and efficiency thus move in two directions: seeking to make what has already been achieved visible as progress and seeking to move forward at a pace that makes such efficiency visible to the world—but first of all to the citizens of the Community. This argument of a general communication/information deficit on the part of the Community circulates vividly especially in the decade to come,⁴⁹⁶ and ‘A People’s Europe’ thus instils a new paradigm of strategic communication within the Community.

These calls for progress and efficiency are justified as a response to “the expectations of the people of Europe”.⁴⁹⁷ Therefore, focus is on citizens’ concerns and irritations;⁴⁹⁸ in this way, “the European Community will respond to the views of its citizens only if it fully reflects their wish to work together more closely and provides a channel for their ideals”.⁴⁹⁹ However, this turn to citizens’ expectations and concerns was not founded on citizen consultations or similar invitations to express concerns or wishes.⁵⁰⁰ The Eurobarometer provided some statistical data, but, as Sternberg notes, it is “difficult to detect a popular will from statistical enquiries”.⁵⁰¹ The

⁴⁹² Adonnino, 23, see also 19.

⁴⁹³ Adonnino, 22.

⁴⁹⁴ Adonnino, 17.

⁴⁹⁵ Adonnino, 19.

⁴⁹⁶ Shore, “Inventing Homo Europaeus”, 57–59. Shore highlights the de Clercq Report from 1993, written on behalf of the president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, following the only marginal “yes” in French Maastricht referendum. Here, the problem is understood to be firstly, that the treaty is too difficult for people to understand, secondly, that “European identity has not yet been engrained in peoples’ minds”. Europe should therefore be viewed as a “brand product” and the EU as a “good product” with benefits to the individual. As quoted in Shore, 58.

⁴⁹⁷ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 5, 18.

⁴⁹⁸ Adonnino, 9, 12, 28.

⁴⁹⁹ Adonnino, 19.

⁵⁰⁰ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 81.

⁵⁰¹ Sternberg, 83. For a critical analysis of the measurement of attitudes towards “immigrants” in the Eurobarometer, see Essay IV in Hansen, *Europeans Only?*, 137–54.

Adonnino committee, in other words, had complete freedom to both interpret and shape citizens expectations: “The people’s will was a malleable object of instrumental benefit, rather than the location of popular sovereignty”.⁵⁰² It did not occur to the committee that the people might think differently; or that citizens, signified as a singular, coherent group, might not exist as such.

A further source of motivation and legitimation of ‘A People’s Europe’ is the improvement of the everyday lives of Community citizens: “The aim of the Committee is to propose arrangements which will be of direct relevance to Community citizens and which will visibly offer them tangible benefits in their everyday lives”.⁵⁰³ Hence, these arrangements must be “meaningful to the citizen in various aspects of his [*sa*] daily life”.⁵⁰⁴ They include proposals to simplify administrative formalities and procedures when crossing borders, moving goods, changing residence, needing medical assistance in another member state, and studying in another member state, as well as to simplify Community regulations generally and divergent national laws specifically.

This attention to deregulation, tangible, measurable (economic) benefits is an indicator of the neoliberal agenda of the 1980s that called, among others, for lowered trade barriers. Similarly, the reports exhibit an immense focus on simplification. As evidenced in the cases mentioned above, simplification is key to making “the Community more of a reality for its citizens”.⁵⁰⁵ In fact, the terms “simplify” or “simplification” occur sixteen times in the two documents, stressing the need to simplify in order to make politics more efficient and thus beneficial to Community citizens. Further, “legislation should be more easily understood and more accessible to citizens”,⁵⁰⁶ although “steps forward are not always a question of adopting new rules and regulations. Progress in the view of citizens is often best obtained by implementing decisions already adopted and by their administration in real-life situations”.⁵⁰⁷ This last statement suggests that citizens are interested in concrete results and fast implementation, in what they can see with their own eyes in favour of more time demanding and less tangible kinds of progress.

In short, ‘A People’s Europe’ gives significance to the daily life of the citizens, to their “real-life situations”, in order for the Community to become a reality to its citizens as they, reversely, are the Community’s new

⁵⁰² Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 81.

⁵⁰³ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 9; see also, 7, 11, 17.

⁵⁰⁴ Adonnino, 18; see also 20.

⁵⁰⁵ Adonnino, 19.

⁵⁰⁶ Adonnino, 7.

⁵⁰⁷ Adonnino, 9.

reality; it is a *quid pro quo*. The goal is to make a “substantial contribution to the realization of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”,⁵⁰⁸ which is achieved by displaying the worth of what the Community has already achieved and is to achieve in the future—in a simplified and thus comprehensible and efficient manner, because simplicity and efficiency are presumed to be expected by the citizens.

This reciprocity indicates a notable change in the years from the 1973-declaration to ‘A People’s Europe’ in 1985. We see a shift in the discourse on European identity within the EU as the formation of an *institutional identity* comes to include the formation of *collective identity*. The citizen is increasingly moving to the centre as the new reality of the Community, but this move entails reciprocal expectations to see the Community now that the Community sees its citizens. Citizens are thus given the crucial role of confirming the self-interpellation, the coming into being, of the EU itself.

Next, I bring attention to the new reality proclaimed by ‘A People’s Europe’: the invention of traditions as exemplified by the physical and symbolic interweavings in ‘A People’s Europe’ with outlooks onto how they have been legally consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty.

Inventing Traditions: Physical and Symbolic Interweavings

‘A People’s Europe’ can be viewed as a political concretisation of the rather vague intentions formulated in the 1973-declaration. As we have seen, the task to suggest “measures to strengthen its [the Community’s] identity and its image” resulted in extensive proposals in a wide range of areas.⁵⁰⁹ In this way, ‘A People’s Europe’ displays an energetic perspective on the future—deepening and widening integration, anticipating the end of the Cold War, and extending its reach to include culture and education as well the everyday lives of its citizens.

The first report concentrates on functional Community (de)regulations concerning the free movement of people, university credit transfer, improving the internal market, and easing the bureaucracy of the Community—again, we see the traces of neoliberal deregulation, articulated first and foremost as beneficial to Community citizens but also as a means to liberate “the Community from an endless carousel of meetings at various

⁵⁰⁸ Adonnino, 18.

⁵⁰⁹ Adonnino, 5.

levels” and thus to “break this vicious circle”.⁵¹⁰ The second report, though, makes proposals of a more symbolic nature and suggests what can be interpreted as “a reconfiguration of the ritual calendar”:⁵¹¹ it calls for annual Community sports events, recurring Community television events, city twinning, European Years and Europe Day, all of which are to be recognisable through symbolic representations of the Community in the forms of, among other proposals, a European emblem, flag, anthem, and stamps.⁵¹² Such suggestions can be seen as a catalogue of potential new traditions and rituals that we may understand as *invented traditions*, defined as “a set of practices . . . , which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”.⁵¹³ Such inventions are often of “a ritual or symbolic nature”,⁵¹⁴ and we therefore must explore the values and norms of behaviour connected to these invented traditions, ritual practices, and symbols in order to understand their function in the constitutive rhetoric of the EU.

Connecting (with) Citizens

A predominant aspect of the proposals in ‘A People’s Europe’ is the wish to connect and bring citizens closer together—in the first report in very literal ways (better transport services, free movement) and in more symbolic ways in the second report: through sports, education, television, and the Community symbols (flag, emblem, anthem). These proposals seek to weave Community member states and Community citizens together physically and symbolically; a vision that significantly distinguishes this initiative from the 1973-declaration. The aim to create an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe thus has a physical and symbolic dimension as well, both of which are based on movement—literal (tourism, border populations), metaphorical (audio-visual means), and both (sports, education).

Indeed, movement seems to be a general constitutive strategy of the EU: the parliament literally moves back and forth between its headquarter in Strasbourg and its Brussels campus, and, up until 2003, the European Council drew threads across the EU map when it moved from member state to member state every six months. Many of the proposals in ‘A People’s Europe’ focus on enhancing movement, though not for its

⁵¹⁰ Adonnino, 7.

⁵¹¹ Shore, “Inventing Homo Europaeus”, 57–58.

⁵¹² Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 21, 26, 29.

⁵¹³ Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, 1.

⁵¹⁴ Hobsbawm, 1.

institutions and politicians, but for its citizens and business sector: the policy of free movement of goods, money, and people as well as the single market enables mobility and, as a result, intertwinement and connectivity between EU citizens. Enhancing mobility means opening borders “to facilitate frontier traffic for the citizens of Europe”,⁵¹⁵ but also to improve the lives of citizens living in border areas:

By nature of the Community’s geographical structure, border areas occupy a large part of its surface area. . . . What for other citizens is an occasional or intermittent nuisance has the nature of a serious daily problem for the inhabitants of border areas.⁵¹⁶

Borders must be opened in order to enable physically interweaving citizens and member states. So, while tourism often is thought of as people coming to a country from abroad, in ‘A People’s Europe’, tourism is first of all articulated as tourism within the Community. Hence, the committee encourages “radio and TV broadcasts of news, weather and tourist information in languages of other Community States” and proposes making “efforts towards a more rational staggering of holiday periods across the national borders on the basis of a regional analysis of holiday traffic”.⁵¹⁷ These proposals encourage movement, not least by removing obstacles.

Others actively seek to create new types of movement. The reports suggest youth camps with physical, bodily interaction around a common cause and twinning “to be organized between towns or cities with similar features” with the participation of all parts of the population, but particularly schools.⁵¹⁸ The purpose is “to promote cultural and human links across frontiers”,⁵¹⁹ which has proven effective in the past: “Solidarity between the citizens of the Member States and mutual understanding and cooperation—essential for the building of Europe—have been widely promoted and facilitated by the twinning of towns and cities”.⁵²⁰ The suggestion, then, is to do this on a regular and formalised basis.

Physical movement across state borders also plays an important role in the sports proposals in ‘A People’s Europe’. Sports was mentioned as early as 1957 in the Treaty of Rome, but without any proper legal basis; prior to Maastricht, the EU could not be involved in matters of culture and

⁵¹⁵ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 9.

⁵¹⁶ Adonnino, 12.

⁵¹⁷ Adonnino, 10.

⁵¹⁸ Adonnino, 29.

⁵¹⁹ Adonnino, 23.

⁵²⁰ Adonnino, 29.

sports other than nonbinding proposals and declarations of intent made, for instance, in ‘A People’s Europe’.⁵²¹ The second report proposes the

- (i) . . . organization of European Community events such as cycle and running races through European countries;
- (ii) creation of Community teams for some sports to compete against joint teams from geographical groupings with which the Community has special links;
- (iii) inviting sporting teams to wear the Community emblem in addition to their national colours at major sporting events of regional or worldwide interest;
- (iv) exchanges of sportsmen, athletes and trainers between the different Community countries.⁵²²

In these four proposals, geographical and bodily movement and interweaving as well as visual recognition are integral. Human exchanges create physical, embodied links between member states and citizens (iv), and running and cycling (i) have the capacity to link member states geographically and to make this link visible in a very physical sense, both to the contestants but also to citizens watching such events in the media. The types of sport deemed suitable for Community events are thus significant. Likewise, the invitation to use Community emblems (iii) suggests creating a visual, symbolic connection between the Community and the individual member states as well as among the member states. At the same time, we can read these efforts as a radical attempt at federalism: weakening the strict national boundaries that normally apply to sports.

While these three proposals all thematise internal connection between member states and citizens, the second proposal goes further in suggesting Community teams. The Community is positioned opposite “geographical groupings with which the Community has special links”. The vagueness of this formulation is a striking contrast to the otherwise very carefully chosen types of sport and types of proposals. It suggests that emphasis is not on who the opposing team/community is but rather the internal loyalty—in war and sports alike—fostered by the actions of commonly defending one another against an enemy: when members of a community feel a sense of fraternity with people whom they do not know, they are willing to fight on behalf of these same people, which, in turn, accentuates the sense of fraternity.⁵²³

⁵²¹ Shore, “In Uno Plures”, 12.

⁵²² Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 26.

⁵²³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7.

Physical movement and feelings of fraternity are also invoked in the proposals for a “European dimension in education”, first articulated in ‘A People’s Europe’.⁵²⁴ This educational dimension continues to take form throughout the 1980s and 1990s, ushering in a movement that is both physical and metaphorical. The notion concerns the call for Community-wide information and education initiatives:

Information about the Community should aim to explain the fundamental themes which underly [*sic*] the crucial importance of the Community for the Member States—the historical events which led to the construction of the Community and which inspire its further development in freedom, peace and security and its achievements and potential in the economic and social field. Member States can show how national action is reinforced by Community action.⁵²⁵

This need for more—and better—information about the Community pertains to the aforementioned hope to be seen and recognised by its citizens; but it also has a more long-term concern with influencing the social imaginary of the citizenry. For instance, ‘A People’s Europe’ suggests preparing “appropriate school books and teaching materials”, setting up “voluntary work camps for young people”, which involves work “for social purposes, for the preservation of the heritage, or the restoration of historic buildings”,⁵²⁶ and establishing what we know today as the Erasmus programme (student exchange within higher education and cross country credit transfer).⁵²⁷ Accordingly, the “European dimension” implies both organised educational initiatives (education material) and a more implicit type of instruction (work camps, student exchange) that is bodily acquired; a social type of learning where norms and routines are embodied through social and physical interaction around a common project that many will recognise from school (decorating the class room together, fixing the school yard).

A similar implicitness is found in the suggestions for common European TV programmes and production:

In order to bring the peoples of Europe closer together, the Committee proposes . . . [to] consider which legal and technical steps . . . should be taken so that every citizen may have access to the greatest number of

⁵²⁴ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 24.

⁵²⁵ Adonnino, 22.

⁵²⁶ Adonnino, 24.

⁵²⁷ Adonnino, 25.

programmes broadcast by the various channels of the Community countries.⁵²⁸

As Benedict Anderson attends to the role of the printing press in creating national consciousness,⁵²⁹ the Adonnino committee focuses on television, both in terms of financially promoting the industry, but also by creating “joint television programmes”, with “emphasis being laid on the need for broadcasting to be multilingual”.⁵³⁰ Anderson notes how the printing press enabled the fixation of a common language (one French among all the varieties of French), but the Adonnino committee and, more generally, the Community focus on keeping the multilingual nature of the member states a positive characteristic.⁵³¹ This confidence in television can be interpreted as awareness of the medium’s potential to reach and influence a large audience. While theorists such as Marshall McLuhan and Pierre Bourdieu have argued that this potential is not without democratic and societal risks,⁵³² Shore asserts that the EU’s audio-visual strategy is “naïve” in its assumptions about a “causal connection . . . between media consumption and collective identity formation”;⁵³³ media consumers are not simply “passive recipients of televisual images and ideologies, devoid of agency or critical faculties”.⁵³⁴ Although the Community’s audio-visual policies (then and now) are certainly enthusiastic, I am not fully convinced that the motive ascribed by Shore has bearing. Instead of interpreting the motive as pacification for the purpose of ideological indoctrination, it could be seen as an encouragement to interact and engage with other countries’ cultures, languages, and norms. This, of course, is also a way of influencing citizens—making them co-creators of the common European weave, the outline of which is partly predetermined—that itself is ideological, but it is not built on agentic paralysis, as Shore suggests.

What characterises this type of influence is its elusiveness, which we recognise in all three types of proposals. It is a type of infra-power, in Cornelis Castoriadis’s words. As he explains, “the greatest conceivable

⁵²⁸ Adonnino, 21–22.

⁵²⁹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 44 ff.

⁵³⁰ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 22.

⁵³¹ The Eurovision Song Contest is a successful example of such joint ventures, although produced by the European Broadcasting Union, which is unrelated to the EU. For a study on how Europe has been narrated in Eastern European contributions to the Eurovision Song Contest, see Fornäs, *Europe Faces Europe*, 179–236.

⁵³² Either of damaging the political debate and thus public opinion formation, as Bourdieu suggests or, more generally, of changing the way people think, perceive, and act in the world we live in, as argued by McLuhan. See Bourdieu, *Om televisionen*; McLuhan, *Understanding Media*.

⁵³³ Shore, “Governing Europe”, 180.

⁵³⁴ Shore, 180.

power lies in the possibility of shaping someone in advance in such a way that they will do what one wants *of their own accord*, without any need for domination (*Herrschaft*) or *explicit power*".⁵³⁵ Infra-power is not governed by law or any specific state institution; rather, it is a more indirect type of influence of citizens' social imaginary significations—their norms, beliefs, and values—borne and thus instituted by the citizens themselves.⁵³⁶ Writing about civic codes of collective identity, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen note:

Considering the implicitness of most of the rules and routines, any special instruction and education will fail—except civil socialization whether the more informal daily or more organized civic education to participation in civic life.⁵³⁷

In other words, although civic codes such as those taught at a youth work camp or through public television are distinguished by a lack of clear instructions, 'A People's Europe' demonstrates the makings of such (otherwise tacit) codes with its specific proposals for civil socialisation and organised civic education from an early age. Such proposals make specific events, symbols, and the value system they are connected to parts of citizens' doxa, creating coherence through symbolic as well as physical connection, and to do so in rather implicit and elusive manners. The European dimension in education articulated in 'A People's Europe' was, quite simply, designed to "strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilization",⁵³⁸ in much the same way that sports has the symbolic function of representing a set of values connected to a specific society.

Historically, sport has played an important role in the invention of traditions and community formation, especially in European nation states; first, to show class affiliation (middle-class tennis, proletarian football)

⁵³⁵ Castoriadis, "Makt, Politik, Autonomi", 114. From the Swedish: "den största tänkbara makten ligger i möjligheten att på förhand forma någon på ett sådant sätt att denne *av sig själv* gör det man vill, utan något behov av herravälde (*Herrschaft*) eller *explicit makt*".

⁵³⁶ Rosengren, "Riconsiderando 'il Politico'", 33. I have consulted the unpublished English translation of Rosengren's text. We can also understand this type of power as the indirect ideological practices of the Ideological State Apparatus, in contrast to the more explicit Repressive State Apparatus. Althusser and Jameson, *Lenin and Philosophy*, 95 ff.

⁵³⁷ Eisenstadt and Giesen, "Construction of Collective Identity", 81.

⁵³⁸ Commission of the European Communities, "Commission Communication on a People's Europe", 13. For a historical trajectory and analysis of the European dimension in education, see Hansen, *Europeans Only?*, essay III. Hansen argues that the discourse on education has moved in an ethno-cultural direction and exemplifies this with, among others, the EU's discourse on multilingualism and its work to enhance "indigenous minority languages" at the dispense of "immigrant minority languages". See Hansen, 129.

and, thereafter, with mass sports events such as football and cycling, as “a medium for national identification and factitious community”.⁵³⁹ The choice of mass sports is thus an important characteristic of the EU’s sports policy and the sports proposals in ‘A People’s Europe’. These proposals are efforts to invent traditions that would physically and symbolically interweave member states within the Community, as emphasised by the joined emblematic visibility (national and community emblems together).

If we take a look at the status of these proposals today, many of them were never implemented, and while, for example, some of the sports suggestions would be feasible, one can easily think of reasons why tournaments between the European Union and, say, the African Union, are yet to appear. Furthermore, if we look at the legal status of these areas within the EU, they are all rather vague and often remains on the level of “promoting cooperation” and “encouraging development”.⁵⁴⁰ Nonetheless, all three areas have made their way into EU treaties, and this inclusion should not be underestimated; after all, it has turned sports, education, and audiovisual production into official EU policy.⁵⁴¹ Scholars have traced the EU’s work in these areas as means of collective identity formation back to ‘A People’s Europe’,⁵⁴² and they have all become large focus areas of the EU.

⁵³⁹ Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions”, 300.

⁵⁴⁰ Education received its own article in the Maastricht Treaty, which specifically mentions the aim to develop “the European dimension in education”, to promote “cooperation between educational establishments”, and to encourage “the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational instructors”; aims that since then are reiterated in the Constitutional Treaty. See Council of the European Communities, “Treaty on European Union”, 47; European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 133. Sports was mentioned for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty, and the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997, “emphasises the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together”. It was also included in the Constitutional Treaty and again in the Lisbon Treaty. See European Communities, “Treaty of Amsterdam”, 136.) European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 133. Culture also received its own article in the Maastricht Treaty that states that the Community shall work to bring “the common cultural heritage to the fore”, to improve “the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples” and support “artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector”. These formulations are reiterated in the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. See Council of the European Communities, “Treaty on European Union”, 48–49; European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 131–32; European Communities, “Treaty of Lisbon”, 83.

⁵⁴¹ Vermeersch makes this point about sport. See Vermeersch, “Future EU Sports Policy”, 5. Vermeersch distinguishes between the *indirect* sports approach (initiatives to remove barriers and obstacles) and the *direct* approach (e.g., to go beyond removal and creating a tournament or a cup). Shore argues, though, that the indirect approach is a manoeuvre to work in a policy area without legitimacy. See Shore, “In Uno Plures”.

⁵⁴² Regarding education, see Hansen, “Europeans Only?”, essay IV. Regarding audio-visual production, see Shore, “Governing Europe”. And when it comes to sports, see Hedetoft, “Nation-State Meets the World”; Roche, “Citizenship, Popular Culture”; Shore, “In Uno Plures”; Vermeersch, “Future EU Sports Policy”.

For example, the Creative Europe programme provides funding for audio-visual production, and these calls often come with very specific requirements—for example about cross-country cooperation.⁵⁴³ Likewise, the Constitutional Treaty (and since then, the Lisbon Treaty) stipulates that the EU shall aim at “developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and . . . by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially young sportsmen and sportswomen”,⁵⁴⁴ and today, the EU and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) cooperate on issues such as “youth development” and “sporting ethics”.⁵⁴⁵

We can, in other words, interpret the “European dimension in sport” quite literally, as competitions and exchanges performed in Europe; but these actions are signifiers of something more—a certain kind of integrity, values of fairness and openness, and as a social and cultural means of “forging identity and bringing people together”.⁵⁴⁶ So, while the EU’s legal basis in the cultural and educational sector may seem rather insignificant,⁵⁴⁷ it has ensured the EU’s ability to be an active and important actor in this domain—although through means of funding, not active cultural politics.

In sum, what I have shown in this section is how ‘A People’s Europe’ presents a wide range of different proposals that seek to interweave and connect citizens across nationalities. I suggest that we view these various and intersecting measures as means of ultimate identification—means that transcend the individual subject in order to constitute a collective subject. These connections are built on both *physical* movement through which citizens interact in youth work camps, in sports competitions, on holidays and *metaphorical* movement of the mind through which values and norms of behaviour are fostered: sports teaches a certain ethical code and it fosters a sense of belonging; education teaches children and young adults about the European dimension of their diverse histories and cultures; and audio-visual cooperation encourages citizens to engage with the cultures, languages, and norms of other EU member states.

The last and most extensive measure of ultimate identification in ‘A People’s Europe’ is of a purely symbolic nature.

⁵⁴³ See European Commission, “Creative Europe (CREA)”.

⁵⁴⁴ European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 133; European Communities, “Treaty of Lisbon”, 82. For an example of how the EU has removed obstacle and barrier, see Croci, “Taking the Field”. And for an overview of EU funded sports, see Parrish, “Judicial Intervention”, 365-366.

⁵⁴⁵ Chaplin, “UEFA-EU Agreement”.

⁵⁴⁶ European Communities, “Treaty of Amsterdam”, 136.

⁵⁴⁷ Gordon, “Great Expectations”, 109.

Symbolic Interweavings: Stamps, Anthem, and Emblem

The proposed symbols in ‘A People’s Europe’, include, among others, the EU emblem, flag, anthem, and stamps. They form part of the extensive catalogue of invented traditions, rituals, and various forms of symbolic representation: practice that ritualises certain norms and thus “implies continuity with the past”.⁵⁴⁸ How, then, should we understand the use of symbols in institutions such as the EU as means of constitutive rhetoric?

In much the same way as Barthes asserts that the primary function of myth—and thus the symbols it uses—is to naturalise history,⁵⁴⁹ Castoriadis states that a “symbol never imposes itself with a natural necessity, but neither does it ever lack all reference to reality”.⁵⁵⁰ The symbolic order of an institution such as the EU is not constituted completely arbitrarily; it is “built on the ruins of earlier symbolic edifices and uses their materials”,⁵⁵¹ since human beings are situated downstream. Our actions and understandings are conditioned and constrained by specific social, historical, and empirical contexts.⁵⁵² The power of symbols derives from their relatively independent character: a symbol does not belong exclusively to anyone or anything specific, which is why they are significant in building collective identity—they can be appropriated as points of identification by people from different national and cultural contexts. As means of ultimate identification, symbols allow subjects to engage with the world as individual subjects and as members of a collectivity, “to confront the world at once specifically and generally”.⁵⁵³ As an empty signifier, a symbol carries specific meaning that distinguishes it from other symbols even as it is emptied of this same specificity in order to float freely and thus carry a more universal meaning.⁵⁵⁴ This instability also indicates that symbols change over time.

The same dialectics between the general and the specific are visible in the symbolic function of consecration through which “the matter related to the sacred”⁵⁵⁵ is sanctified. We see this exemplified with the EU

⁵⁴⁸ Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, 1.

⁵⁴⁹ Barthes, *Mythologies*, 101.

⁵⁵⁰ Castoriadis, *Imaginary Institution of Society*, 118.

⁵⁵¹ Castoriadis, 121.

⁵⁵² Castoriadis, “Greek Polis”, 270. On the concept of being downstream, Mats Rosengren writes: “Even though we have the ability—always potential, sometimes actualized—to think and act against the general drift, we always have to start right where we are and work with the concrete as well as the conceptual tools available for us, right here and now. This is the essence of our *being downstream*”. See Rosengren, “The Need for an Imaginative Politic”, 27.

⁵⁵³ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, 195.

⁵⁵⁴ Laclau, “Death and Resurrection”.

⁵⁵⁵ Castoriadis, *Imaginary Institution of Society*, 119.

adopting the flag of the Council of Europe,⁵⁵⁶ which consecrates the EU that, in turn, provides the flag with new mythical significations. This adaptation is related to the perhaps most peculiar characteristic of the EU symbols, namely that they are all suggested and, for the most part, implemented within a year. Accordingly, and perhaps precisely because they are appropriated from the Council of Europe, they appear as a coherent system. As Castoriadis notes, “the conquest of the symbolic logic of institutions and its gradual ‘rationalization’ are historical processes”,⁵⁵⁷ meaning that the coherence we attribute today to a network of symbols and the institutions they represent—as for example the Christian institutions, their icons, and texts—is the result of a century-long rationalisation and, we might add, naturalisation process.⁵⁵⁸ Due to this immense time span, we fail to notice the strategic level in the formation of the system and tend to perceive both the symbols and the system as natural and static.

However, the EU’s symbols do not go unnoticed. In the context of further enlargement (Spain and Portugal), the ratification of the Single European Act, both in 1986, and the Community’s position in a divided Europe and world, the Adonnino Committee thought the Community needed a coherent group of symbols and, as a consequence, consecration of a unified Community. Therefore, the many proposals for symbolic representation of various kinds (music, image, sports) are not only presented simultaneously and thus as a group of symbols that indicates coherence; they are also presented as parts of a conscious strategy—assuming a place that is proper to the EU⁵⁵⁹—to increase public attention:

There is clearly a need, for both practical and symbolic reasons, for a flag and an emblem to be used at national and international events, exhibitions and other occasions where the existence of the Community needs to be brought to public attention.⁵⁶⁰

As mentioned, ‘A People’s Europe’ instilled a new paradigm of strategic communication within the Community that forms the foundation of the

⁵⁵⁶ The Council of Europe is an institution established in 1949 with forty-seven member countries, working to uphold human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe. It should not be confused with the European Council and the Council of the European Union, both of which are institutions within the EU.

⁵⁵⁷ Castoriadis, *Imaginary Institution of Society*, 123.

⁵⁵⁸ Castoriadis, 123.

⁵⁵⁹ I allude here to Michel de Certeau’s distinction between strategy and tactic. One of the defining functions of a strategy, according to him, is to assume “a place that can be circumscribed as *proper* (*propre*) and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it”. See de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, xix, emphasis in the original.

⁵⁶⁰ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 29.

general “communication deficit” argument prevalent in the EU, as well as in EU scholarship. The proposals for a set of EU symbols offer another example of the early stages of this paradigm.

If we briefly consider some of the proposals, Community stamps, although never implemented, were proposed as a way to “highlight the Community or its underlying values, or . . . commemorate particularly important events in Community history”,⁵⁶¹ such as the founding fathers, the first general election to European Parliament in 1979, and the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986. This proposal is a very concrete effort of creating collective memories. As Kendall Phillips writes, memories are living and dynamic, “suggesting that societies are both constituted by their memories and, in their daily interactions, rituals, and exchanges, constitute these memories”, which indicates that memories are continuously revised and sometimes even rejected. Creating and speaking of memory, then, is “a highly rhetorical process”.⁵⁶² The same is true when choosing which memories to represent the Community, its values, and its founding event(s).

Another proposal was for a Community anthem, implemented immediately (1985). The final movement and melody of Beethoven’s ninth symphony was already “recognized by the Council of Europe as being representative of the European idea”.⁵⁶³ The Adonnino Committee therefore recommended that it be adopted by the Community as well and “played at appropriate events and ceremonies”,⁵⁶⁴ and in this way become ritualised. The Community decided to include only the melody, though, not the text of Friedrich Schiller’s poem *An die Freude* (*Ode to Joy*), both to avoid having a monolingual anthem (highlighting the national rather than the European level of identification) and to avoid highlighting a universal rather than a European community (which Schiller’s poem arguably does with its vision of a fraternity of mankind).⁵⁶⁵ The choices around the

⁵⁶¹ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 29.

⁵⁶² Phillips, “Introduction”, 2.

⁵⁶³ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 29.

⁵⁶⁴ Adonnino, 29. The European anthem is also thematised in Krzysztof Kieslowski’s film, *Bleu* from 1993, the first film of the trilogy *Trois couleurs*, where the musical piece “Unity in Europe” forms the backdrop of the narrative of the film. It exemplifies the joyous spirit of unity in the time around the Maastricht Treaty (at least in some parts of the Community), but, at the same time, this piece is often played in scenes centring on the immense pain the main character is experiencing; and we rarely hear more than just a single chord or a short, unfinished piece taken out of the entirety. See Bradshaw, “Three Colours Trilogy”, for a revisit of all three films.

⁵⁶⁵ The fact that it was a German text also mattered, not least since the poem was one of Adolf Hitler’s favourites. It “was played at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, for Hitler’s birthday and in concentration camps”. Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, 155, see also 178. Even without Schiller’s poem, the melody invokes movement between people, but also between the

anthem thus exemplify the difficult balance between universality and Eurocentrism that the EU seeks to achieve: “In practice, the use of an identificatory anthem lies in using it, and in particular for crowds to sing it jointly”.⁵⁶⁶ The result, however, was an anthem that cannot be sung and thus has limited identificatory potential.

The EU Flag: Balancing the Terrestrial and the Divine

Perhaps the most well-known symbol of the EU is its emblem featured, among other places, on its flag. The Community flag was almost immediately implemented (1986). The Adonnino committee argued that a flag was needed “for both practical and symbolic reasons” with the purpose of using it at events where “the existence of the Community needs to be brought to public attention”.⁵⁶⁷ Moreover, the committee stated that the flag should be

basically that chosen by the Council of Europe. However, bearing in mind the independence and the different nature of the two organizations, the Committee proposes to the European Council that the European Community emblem and flag should be a blue rectangle with, in the centre, a circle of 12 five-pointed gold stars which do not touch, surrounding a gold letter E, of the design already used by the Commission.⁵⁶⁸

The result was an adaptation of the flag of the Council of Europe without the suggested golden E (see figure 2, the suggestion with a golden E in figure 3). By using the flag of the Council of Europe, the signification of the flag partly relies on former significations attributed to the international organisation, for instance in its work for human rights; partly on new meaning formed on the basis of the significations attributed to the Community and its use of the flag. Simultaneously, by virtue of being drawn from a somewhat broader and well-established context, the flag has a legitimising function for the Community in much the same way that the anthem borrows legitimacy from the Council of Europe, which had already recognised it as representative of “the European idea”.

terrestrial and the divine and thus performs the symbolic function of sanctifying the specific by relating it to the universal. Fornäs discusses this balance specifically in the pages 165–167. For an extensive analysis of both text and melody as well as the anthem in its entirety, see Fornäs, 158–80.

⁵⁶⁶ Fornäs, 177. The Council of Europe has gathered a range of different versions of the anthem, including a hip-hop version with lyrics. These are, however, not those of Schiller. See The Council of Europe, “The European Anthem”.

⁵⁶⁷ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 29.

⁵⁶⁸ Adonnino, 29.



Figure 2. Official flag of the EU.




Figure 3. The proposed flag in the second report of ‘A People’s Europe’.

According to the EU’s official description, the flag depicts a blue sky with the circle of twelve golden stars “representing the union of the peoples of Europe. The number of stars is fixed, twelve being the symbol of perfection and unity”,⁵⁶⁹ and therefore “the symbol par excellence of European

⁵⁶⁹ European Union, “Graphical Specifications for the European Emblem”.

identity and European unification”.⁵⁷⁰ In other words, the description is an instruction on how to decipher the denotations of the signs of the flag. It also hints at some of the mythical significations, but only its most obvious. In the following I explore the signs of the flag—the colour, the pentagram, the number twelve, the circle—and their connotations to the Virgin Mary as well as Europa (the mythical figure) on the level of myth.

With the controversial role of religion in the political imaginary of the EU in mind, it is striking how, while being (safely) anchored in mundane, earthly signification, all signs on the flag connote different aspects of divinity and transcendence. This connection is made explicitly by Arsène Heitz, the flag’s main designer, who stated that the twelve stars in a crown was inspired by the vision of the Virgin Mary in the Book of Revelation:⁵⁷¹ “And there appeared a great wonder in heaven: a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars”.⁵⁷² The Virgin Mary is also signified by the colour blue. Through its reference to the sky, blue has, since the twelfth century, signified “divine presence and intervention”, which is why it is associated with the Virgin Mary, who is often depicted wearing a blue mantle (figure 4).⁵⁷³ These religious connotations, however, also relate to worldly missions of promoting peace. As “the West’s favorite color”,⁵⁷⁴ blue has represented high nobility and elites since the Middle Ages and today is used by institutions to signify consensus, neutrality, and “the mission of promoting peace and understanding between peoples”.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷⁰ Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Communication on a People’s Europe”, 5.

⁵⁷¹ The Economist, “Real Politics, at Last?”. Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance de l’Europe also notes that “the number twelve together with stars, the crown of stars, reflects the vision of the Virgin Mary of the Book of Revelation (12:1) and is the symbol par excellence of popular Marian iconography”. See Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, “Flag of the European Union”, 3. This research database is run by the University of Luxembourg. No author name is provided in this document.

⁵⁷² Revelation 12:1 AV.

⁵⁷³ Pastoreau, *Blue*, 41, 50. See also Gercke, *Blau*, 87–88. Jesus, on the other hand, often carries red. Orthodox iconography, though, sometimes differ from this depiction and symbolism and depicts the Virgin Mary in red and Jesus in blue with opposite symbolic meaning as well. See Kushnirskiy, “Garments and Their Meaning in the Orthodox Icons of the Mother of God”.

⁵⁷⁴ Pastoreau, *Blue*, 179.

⁵⁷⁵ Pastoreau, 180–81.



Figure 4. The Wilton Diptych, c. 1395–1399, the National Gallery, London.

We can therefore understand the signification of blue in the EU flag in a dual mythical sense: representing a mission, something to be promoted in the world, and thus signifying the Community as a peace-promoting institution while simultaneously being a symbol of stability, eternity, and transcendence, underscored by the crown of twelve stars.

The circle of stars, the number of stars, and the five-pointed star all symbolise perfection.⁵⁷⁶ Because it can be drawn in a single, closed line, this star is “the symbol of man as an individual possessing five fingers and toes, five senses and five limbs”, which is why the Pythagoreans attributed the pentagram “a mystical meaning of perfection”.⁵⁷⁷ At the same time, we recognise the pentagram from mundane uses on military badges worn to communicate excellence, power, and status; and, although not five-pointed, the compass rose in NATO’s flag resembles a glowing star extending its reach to all corners of the world, thus signifying (universal) power, stability, and elevation. Consequently, the star signifies, on the one hand, the individuality of human beings and political institutions and, on the other hand, transcendence, eternity, and perfection.

This duality is underscored by the number of stars. Twelve has numerous mystical and religious connotations (twelve months, days, and hours; twelve signs of the Zodiac; the twelve sons of Jacob; the twelve apostles; etc.), while also symbolising the member states of the community. Although the EU does not explicitly make the reference to member states (because this number varies), this interpretation is easily made. The EU

⁵⁷⁶ Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, “Flag of the European Union”, 2.

⁵⁷⁷ Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, 2.

Commission's video campaign from 2012, *Growing Together*,⁵⁷⁸ is a good example, and shows that this is an interpretation difficult to avoid for the EU as well: the *Kill Bill*-style video begins with the image of a woman dressed in yellow walking through what resembles an abandoned train station. One by one, three men appear, each coded with different ethnicities (Asian, Middle Eastern, South American),⁵⁷⁹ seemingly with the purpose of attacking her. She closes her eyes and channels eleven other women looking exactly like her, each connected by the palms of their hands (though not touching, in the same way that the stars do not touch). Together, they are now capable of surrounding the three men. The video ends with the twelve women and three men sitting down in lotus positions in order to deliberate instead of fighting, after which the twelve women dressed in yellow metamorphose into the twelve stars in the EU flag. The twelve stars, then, symbolise the entities of the EU, who in community are capable of not only securing their own safety, but also helping others do the same: deliberate, not fight. Again, the twelve stars signify the individuality of human beings as well as the parity and community of citizens vis-à-vis citizens, member states vis-à-vis member states, and the transcendental realm of the eternal and sacred connected to the institution and its ability to foster dialogue and peace.

A final aspect worth paying attention to is the void of the circle and its feminine connotation. The Marian references in the flag are rather explicit, but they also allude to the mythical figure of Europa. The Virgin Mary generally signifies the relation between the human and the divine, a connection symbolised by her clothing as well: a blue mantle covering a red dress, the divine covering earthly and motherly love.⁵⁸⁰ In a similar manner, Europa was a woman in close contact with a deity. The daughter of Agenor and Telephassa, Europa was a princess in Phoenicia, an area that covers today's Lebanon, the southern part of Syria, and the northern part of Israel. Europa was abducted by Zeus in the shape of a bull (an abduction we see depicted on the Greek 2-Euro coin). He took her to Crete,

⁵⁷⁸ The purpose of the video was to visualise the benefits of both the 2004 Eastern Enlargement, and the upcoming enlargement in 2013 of Croatia which would increase the number of member states to twenty-eight. The campaign was, however, quickly withdrawn due to allegations of being racist: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKN67ImpO4k>. Accessed on February 5, 2022.

⁵⁷⁹ It is notable that Africa is absent among these ethnicities, not least in light of the "long-standing links" between Europe and Africa. See Commission of the European Communities, "Declaration on European Identity", 121. One possible explanation is that the different ethnicities should be seen as merely representatives of a broader range of potential friends and foes.

⁵⁸⁰ Although, as mentioned above, orthodox iconography sometimes reverses this symbolism and colour scheme.

where she became the first Cretan queen and gave birth to three of his children, among these, King Minos.

The affinity between the Virgin Mary and Europa can be traced back to the fourteenth century and it is visualised in the famous Renaissance map *Europa Prima Pars Terrae in Forma Virginis* by theologian Heinrich Bunting (figure 5), which shows Europe/Europa in the shape of a queen wearing a crown of twelve gems that represent the Virgin Mary, who has “upon her head a crown of twelve stars”.⁵⁸¹




Figure 5. Europa Prima Pars Terrae, by Heinrich Bunting, 1581.

Europa and the Virgin Mary were both mortal women in intimate relations with the divine. But the connection between their gender and the flag is invoked through the empty space at its centre. Fornäs argues that

the central ‘hole’ [of a circle] in several ways connote femininity, far from any phallic masculinity . . . Both in a material and a metaphorical sense,

⁵⁸¹ Revelation 12:1 AV. In a description of the map, it is stated that “the depiction of Europe as a queen began in the 14th Century. . . . The earliest depiction of Europe as a woman is believed to be by the 14th Century Pavian Cleric Opicinus de Canistris for the papal court, then at Avignon”. See Stanford Libraries and Stanford University, “(Europe in the Shape of a Queen)”. Geographer Jacques Keilo argues that the map functioned as an attempt to visualise and thus create a continental border according to a Habsburgian vision of European geopolitics. According to him, queen Europe is “wearing Charles V’s Spain as a crown and Ferdinand’s Austria as a medal at her waist, representing the triumph of the Hapsburgs. The queen’s crown (Spain), orb (Sicily) and heart (Bohemia) form a triangle that directs the viewer’s eye away from eastern Europe toward the West. The British Isles are a shapeless blob perched near her shoulder. Her skirt is composed of the Baltics and Greece; Turkey and Russia are beneath her feet”. See Keilo, “Europa Prima”.

the open circle seems to construct Europe as female gendered, in tune with the Europa myth.⁵⁸²

While it could be argued that the circle of stars surrounding this emptiness renders it closed, self-sufficient, and static,⁵⁸³ Fornäs maintains that the twelve stars form an open circle “with permeable space in between”.⁵⁸⁴ The circle, in this reading, symbolises the *agora*, the political space whose centre is void: “The public sphere has a centre, but, unlike the role of the absolute monarch in the feudal representative public domain, nobody permanently occupies it”.⁵⁸⁵ Fornäs exemplifies this meaning with the Tahir Square in Cairo in 2011 and the Syntagma Square in Athens in 2010–2012, concretely showing how an open space provides a centre to be occupied when needed. This interpretation is underscored by an anecdote Fornäs recounts: when visiting a conference in Istanbul, the organisers had “placed the Turkish crescent inside the European star circle as a temporary actor on the open arena”; and he therefore concludes that such symbolic use of the circle is “one of its main affordances. Is Europe primarily unified or diverse, egalitarian or elitist, empty or open? These are indeed open questions”.⁵⁸⁶

But even without a specific content at the centre (for instance, by removing the suggested E in the middle, see figure 3), the circular shape paradoxically highlights the centre. As the analysis of the signs of the EU flag shows, the empty circle indicates a desire on the part of the EU to impregnate it/her with transcendent signification in the form of divine elevation: the Virgin Mary’s and Europa’s interlinking of the human and the divine, the blue sky and golden stars connoting both the sky and the Virgin Mary, the perfection and unity symbolised by the number twelve, the geometrical shape of the circle, and the pentagram. The flag thus reflects a tension between the desire for transcendence and unity and an ideal of openness and diversity. The centre of the circle is neither static and fixed, nor completely free to be occupied, as Fornäs suggests. It expresses a desire for something unchangeable, a centre of “invariable presence”—be that “transcendentality, consciousness, God, man”,⁵⁸⁷ or harmonious perfection, unity, transcendence in the shape of both secular and divine elevation, and balance between the terrestrial and the divine. At the same time, an ideal of openness is conveyed through the open circle. This

⁵⁸² Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, 125.

⁵⁸³ Hersant, “Douze Étoiles d’or”, 103.

⁵⁸⁴ Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, 126.

⁵⁸⁵ Fornäs, 127.

⁵⁸⁶ Fornäs, “Symbols and Narratives”, 94.

⁵⁸⁷ Derrida and Bass, *Writing and Difference*, 353.

openness connects to the general constitutive strategy of the EU in terms of movement: an ever-closer and expanding union. If we understand the institutions of the EU to be its centre, the centre of the EU literally moves. Similarly, the emblem of the EU flag is used as a flag, but also as a logo in digital arenas, on printed material, road signs, and number plates. In this sense, the centre is never static. According to this ideal, it does not have to be in Brussels or Strasbourg; it is where one wants it to be, where one acts it into being—a function rather than a fixed locus.⁵⁸⁸

Fornäs likens the continuous distribution of moving number plates in the EU to “blood circulation with the roads as veins and arteries, and Brussels as the pumping heart”.⁵⁸⁹ In this comparison, number plates exemplify the interweaving of citizens and member states; they literally carry the European flag from state to state, from citizen to citizen on the network of the European routes—much like the Euro, carrying the same twelve golden stars in a circle. The same metaphor is invoked in the New Narrative declaration. After a historical narrative about the EU’s role in putting “an end to war” and transforming “a polarised Europe to a multi-polar Europe”, the section ends with a description of the EU, personified as the heart of Europe:

It was the European Union that provided the visionary framework and the sense of purpose that was necessary in responding to the tremendous challenge of reunifying Europe. Europe began to beat as one, its many arteries found a heart.⁵⁹⁰

Here, the EU is distinguished as the agent, who has provided a vision and a purpose for Europe: Europe was divided but reunified by the visionary framework of the EU. The EU is thus distinguished from Europe in order to become the centre that provides the vision for Europe as a whole.

The metaphor of heart and arteries alludes to Thomas Hobbes’s idea of the Commonwealth in *Leviathan*. The image of citizens and/or EU member states as arteries united by the heartbeat of the EU, both connotes the violent state of nature—the “war of everyone against everyone”⁵⁹¹—if no sovereign existed, and to the voluntary and thus legitimate handing over of power to the sovereign in order to avoid slipping back into the state of nature. Although the famous frontispiece of *Leviathan* (figure 6) shows the subjects looking towards the head, the rational mind, and not

⁵⁸⁸ Derrida and Bass, 353.

⁵⁸⁹ Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, 119.

⁵⁹⁰ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 127.

⁵⁹¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 84, XIII, 8. This phrase appears first in *De Cive (On the Citizen)* from 1642.

the heart, the imagery is very similar. The many arteries of the body searching for one central, unifying point of direction. The ambiguity of this image—who/what, exactly, are “the arteries” of Europe?—reflects the intertwined and close relationship between citizens and their representatives, between member states and the Union, linking both individuals and member states to the myth of the EU.



Figure 6. The top of the frontispiece to Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*, 1651.

What these metaphors and analogies show is that in the imagery of the EU, the centre is—in contrast to Fornäs's argument—not free to be occupied when needed; it is already occupied by mythical signification that invokes unchanging and invariable presence in the shape of transcendence, divinity, and eternity. As a substitute for substantial openness stands the EU's material forms: emblem, currency, flag, institutions. They move and are distributed to all corners of the union.

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Returning to the reports of ‘A People's Europe’ as a whole, the act of suggesting a set of symbols in order to better represent the EU in the minds of its citizens, clearly distinguishes ‘A People's Europe’ from the 1973-declaration and contributes a whole new dimension of the collective subject in the making. In his reading of ‘A People's Europe’, Shore argues that “the EC appears to have misunderstood the fluid and ambiguous

nature of symbols”,⁵⁹² and that each symbol could be “appropriated and repatriated by the nation states (i.e., Beethoven was German, Aristotle Greek, Erasmus Flemish)”.⁵⁹³ Although I am not convinced that the Community/the EU has misunderstood this nature entirely, what Shore rightly highlights is how the process of signification is less than stable: a symbol does not belong to anyone or anything specific, which is why they are significant in building collective identity—they can be appropriated by anyone as points of identification and thus, in the words of Habermas, make solidarity between strangers possible.⁵⁹⁴ Two recent examples demonstrate this mechanism. During the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, mayors in otherwise pro-EU Italy decided to take down the EU flag and replace it with the Italian flag in protest of what they found was a lack of solidarity from other EU member states;⁵⁹⁵ in Poland, on the other hand, the EU flag has been raised during protests as a symbol of pro-EU sentiment in the face of new laws that provide the governing party increased control over the national courts and are thus perceived as anti-democratic.⁵⁹⁶ These acts show the more than symbolic importance of the flag as a point of ultimate identification, and how its symbolism can be either appropriated or discarded; understanding the flag as an interpellation, it also exemplifies Butler’s argument about the possibility of rejecting an interpellation. Replacing a flag does not annul the initial interpellation, but the act of replacement does have agency of its own.

Omnipresent European identity: Institution, Collective, Individual

In this third and final part of the chapter, New Narrative takes a central position. The formation of an identity and a collective identity are brought together in New Narrative. One of the most striking aspects in New Narrative is how citizens are expected to “to feel the European project”⁵⁹⁷ and to partake in a particular “European state of mind”.⁵⁹⁸ While I discuss these phenomena in detail in chapter 6, in the chapter at hand, I want to stress how European identity is described as weaved into every fibre of

⁵⁹² Shore, “Imagining the New Europe”, 110.

⁵⁹³ Shore, 111.

⁵⁹⁴ Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, 21.

⁵⁹⁵ Hoe, “Coronakrisen viste”.

⁵⁹⁶ Reuters Staff, “Thousands in Poland Protest”; BBC News, “Mass Protests in Poland”; Gera, “Polexit”.

⁵⁹⁷ Eliasson, “Your Inner We”, 193.

⁵⁹⁸ Deventer et al., “Declaration”.

the European community: its institutions as well as its citizens, but not only as a point of identification that enables the emergence of political subjects; European identity is imagined as an embodied practice, possessing citizens' minds and bodies. In this discourse, it is no longer possible to distinguish the identity of the institution from that of its citizens.

In continuation of this development, European identity is in *Mind and Body* predominantly understood as something already existing that simply needs to be brought to citizens' awareness: "We must make the point, clearly and distinctly, that our European identity is diverse and open";⁵⁹⁹ that "the new European narrative should, first of all, make the European peoples aware of their postmodern, plural identity",⁶⁰⁰ "aware of the values of Christian civilisation, which is the basic source of our identity; aware of the frequent betrayals of these values by both Christians and non-Christians".⁶⁰¹ Open, plural, postmodern, at times even disruptive—European identity is there for EU citizens to discover.

The means for this ultimate identification is *culture*, understood as the arts, heritage, a common history, and a set of values. These aspects are communicated through narrative which thus constitutes another important resource. In the following, I examine the function of narrative and culture in the collective identity formation in New Narrative, but first, I explore the topos of crisis, which the contributors in *Mind and Body* articulate as the cause of this turn to culture.

A Permanent State of Crisis

Crisis has always been part of the EU. Different contextual elements of crisis have throughout the time period studied in this thesis been decisive to the EU and its discourse on European identity: the First and Second World Wars, the Arab-Israeli War and the oil crisis, the Cold War, financial crises, and so on. Likewise, there have always been elements of crisis within the union itself, both in terms of horizontal and vertical integration (how far, how soon, if at all?). But the frequent articulations of many different types of crises in *Mind and Body* suggest that the EU is searching for crisis as well. In *Mind and Body*, crisis is ubiquitous. Most prevalent is the

⁵⁹⁹ Barroso, "Interweaving Narratives", 25.

⁶⁰⁰ Arjakovsky, "How to Write a New Narrative", 189.

⁶⁰¹ Tusk, "Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013", 55.

“economic crisis”,⁶⁰² which has entailed “a moral crisis”⁶⁰³ as well as a “social crisis”,⁶⁰⁴ a “dramatic crisis”,⁶⁰⁵ and a “crisis of confidence and deep foreboding for the future”.⁶⁰⁶ These crises are joined by a “crisis of motivation and justification”,⁶⁰⁷ a “crisis of legitimacy”,⁶⁰⁸ and, finally, “an intimate identity crisis”.⁶⁰⁹ Furthermore, the urgency of the crisis is highlighted by underscoring how the crisis is unfolding today or poses a looming threat; the authors speak of “the current crisis”,⁶¹⁰ “the present crisis”,⁶¹¹ “today, in times of crisis and uncertainty”,⁶¹² “the threat of a looming environmental crisis”,⁶¹³ and “our current existential crisis”.⁶¹⁴ Crisis is, in other words, articulated as a spatial modus that permeates all spheres of society: economy, politics, culture, morality, and identity, and as a temporal modus that highlights the present moment. This extensive figuration functions as justification for the general turn to culture as the means through which European values, European identity, and a deeper sense of belonging among EU citizens is fostered.

As mentioned, it is difficult not to view New Narrative in light of more recent crises—refugee policies, Brexit, climate crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic, but the “today” the contributors refer to was 2014 and dominated by the aftermath of the financial crisis as well as growing populism and nationalism in the EP and national parliaments. Although the crises invoked in *Mind and Body* belong to different spheres, they are expressed as interrelated: the economic crisis has led to the crisis of confidence,

⁶⁰² Reding, “Stimulating the European Public Sphere”, 33; Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 77; Bratušek, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Slovenia at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 83; Merkel, “Translation of the Speech Delivered by the Federal Chancellor of Germany at the Academy of the Arts, Berlin, on 1 March 2014”, 116, 117; Quaedvlieg–Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”, 123; Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 128; Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”, 179, 181, 182, 184; Carras, “Revelation of Europe”, 207; Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 232.

⁶⁰³ Gescinska, “Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric”, 63; Portabella, “Europe as a Space”, 66.

⁶⁰⁴ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 34; Portabella, “Europe as a Space”, 66; Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 77.

⁶⁰⁵ Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 77.

⁶⁰⁶ Carras, “Revelation of Europe”, 207.

⁶⁰⁷ Ferry, “Telos, Nomos, Ethos”, 89.

⁶⁰⁸ Reding, “Stimulating the European Public Sphere”, 32.

⁶⁰⁹ Koollaas in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*, 161.

⁶¹⁰ Reding, “Stimulating the European Public Sphere”, 35.

⁶¹¹ Bratušek, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Slovenia at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 84.

⁶¹² Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”, 184.

⁶¹³ Dujardin, “Reinventing Europe”, 235.

⁶¹⁴ Carras, “Revelation of Europe”, 210.

identity, and existence, and thus laid the ground for the atmosphere of omnipresent crisis. As then-president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, argued in his launch speech, the economic crisis along with globalisation has led to unemployment, uncertainty, inequality, and anxiety, which, in turn, has led to the return of populism and nationalism.⁶¹⁵ Variations of this causal argument is reiterated by other contributors in the publication, such as philosopher Alicja Gescinska, philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and then-prime minister of Italy, Enrico Letta: Economic crisis leads to social crisis which leads to populism.⁶¹⁶

Crisis is a circulating topos, then, but we also see arguments in circulation, such as the argument that connects economic crisis to identity and/or social crisis. This argument, in turn, forms the basis of another pervasive claim, namely that this identity crisis is prevalent particularly among young people because they were affected most by the economic crisis.⁶¹⁷ The implicit reasoning that can be deduced from this is that (young) people are attracted to populism and nationalism because these discourses offer attractive narratives of stability and safety. Therefore, the EU needs to construct a narrative with the same appeal. Both of these assertions—that a crisis of economy leads to a crisis of identity and that this crisis is particularly prevalent among young people—were initially made by Barroso and Løkkegaard at the launch of the project and then circulated in *Mind and Body* by contributors from both the political and cultural sphere.

There is a general tendency among the EU representatives in *Mind and Body* to argue that (young) citizens are simply not getting the EU (right). For example, then-Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou states that “many Europeans hold the EU at fault for their financial woes, and this keeps them from seeing the shared benefits of our union”, which means that “Europe needs to have a human and social face that our citizens, the

⁶¹⁵ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”.

⁶¹⁶ Gescinska, “Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric”, 62; Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”, 185; Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 77. Habermas does, however, distinguish between two different ways of reacting to such crisis, namely “self-affirmation of a democratic society”, which, he believes, is a rational response, and “the reactionary response of clinging to invented features of the ethnic/national myth of origin that feeds right-wing populism”—although, as he notes, the first often leads to the second.

⁶¹⁷ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 27; Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 37–38; Tusk, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013”, 51; Bratušek, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Slovenia at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 83–84; Matjašič, “Perceptions Matter”, 103; Domingo, “Europe as Gesamtkunstwerk”, 212–13.

young in particular, can understand and associate themselves with”.⁶¹⁸ Løkkegaard similarly argues that

In times of crisis, a good many Europeans seem to have huge difficulties in relating to the whole idea of a more integrated Europe. And the EU became the ‘other’, the problem, the scapegoat and no longer the solution. All of which is to say that a new narrative is needed.⁶¹⁹

The argument of these EU representatives seems to be that these mechanisms of scapegoating and othering are grounded in misconceptions that can be remedied with a new narrative. “You have to go abroad, somewhere outside Europe, to get a valid image of who we are as Europeans”, as Løkkegaard says; “we cannot see ourselves through our own lenses any more [*svi*]”.⁶²⁰ Europeans cannot see themselves; or, citizens cannot see the EU in the way the EU wishes to be perceived. An example of such a misconception, according to Løkkegaard, is the idea that citizens need to choose between a national and a European identity, which has led to “false conclusions, such as the notion that Brussels is the ‘other’ and the EU the enemy imposing crazy decisions from on high”.⁶²¹

Related to such “false conclusions” is the idea expressed by then-MEP and former vice-president of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, that the European electorate has “forgotten” why the EU was built:

The fact that 25% of the European electorate voted for extremist and anti-European parties shows that they must have somehow ‘forgotten’ the reasons for which the European Union was built. This presents a particular challenge for a new narrative for future European integration. It needs to give ‘heart and soul’ to Europe and help prevent people from repeating the mistakes of the past as citizens are increasingly swayed by dangerous, populist rabble-rousers.⁶²²

In other words, in order to escape from the present crisis of legitimacy, the task of the EU is to remind citizens of their past and—once again—guide EU citizens in the right direction. As mentioned, this argument is widely circulated and debated in the scholarly literature as the EU’s “communication deficit”,⁶²³ the foundation of which we can trace back to ‘A

⁶¹⁸ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 36, 37.

⁶¹⁹ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 232.

⁶²⁰ Løkkegaard, 233.

⁶²¹ Løkkegaard, 233.

⁶²² Reding, “Stimulating the European Public Sphere”, 32.

⁶²³ See, e.g., Meyer, “Political Legitimacy”; Anderson and McLeod, “Great Non-Communicator?”; Martins, Lecheler, and De Vreese, “Information Flow and Communication Deficit”.

People's Europe' and subsequent initiatives.⁶²⁴ The circulation of this claim in the New Narrative discourse also received criticism in the Danish press coverage as arrogant and ignoring the views of the citizens.⁶²⁵ Indeed, this argumentation is fundamentally counterproductive to the explicit call for action stated in the New Narrative declaration that forms the premise of the initiative as a whole: citizens are encouraged to "tell their story", to engage, to let their voices be heard—but the EU seems interested in only a selected part of them.

Although Per Nyholm and Rem Koolhaas, both members of the New Narrative cultural committee, explicitly go against the grain of crisis mode, stating that it is "unwise" that the EU leaders persist in calling the economic and financial problems a "crisis",⁶²⁶ and that it is "crucial" that they abandon this "strange atmosphere of permanent crisis",⁶²⁷ on the whole, crisis in *Mind and Body* pervades every aspect of society: it is economic, it is moral, it is social, it is cultural. In this way, crisis is a spatial category (crisis is everywhere, it is all-encompassing) but also a temporal category (the "now" is prolonged), and it is sustained through circulation among the different authors of the publication. In this sense, as Nyholm and Koolhaas note, omnipresent crisis can be understood as stasis and immobility. In such a state, agency is compromised in light of surrounding danger, and the present is all there is. But crisis also entails that judgment is formed on how to act and, as a result, abandon the crisis.⁶²⁸ As Stathis

⁶²⁴ Shore, "Inventing Homo Europaeus", 57–59.

⁶²⁵ Particularly Morten Messerschmidt, member of the Danish People's Party, then-MEP, and one of the most active critics of the New Narrative initiative in the Danish press coverage. He said: "Europeans become more and more critical of the EU, not because they need a narrative about Europe, but because the political projects launched by the EU do not work. It is arrogant to believe that it is because the Europeans have not understood the greatness of the EU project as a whole" (BT, Messerschmidt, November 22, 2013; similar arguments in *Jyllands-Posten*, December 6, 2013 and *Berlingske*, April 26, 2013). In an article shortly before the 2014 election, Messerschmidt broadened the argument to the EU in general and said that the EU arrogantly neglects to take its citizens seriously—be that in elections, where treaties are turned down only to reappear under new banners, or in the understanding that such responses from the populations are merely "communications problem[s]" (*Politiken*, Messerschmidt, May 12, 2014). Messerschmidt explicitly refers to Nicole Fontaine, then-president of the European Parliament who, when the Irish population voted against the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008, explained: "We have a communications problem . . . We haven't explained enough the benefits of European construction". See Fontaine, "Speech at the European Commission Conference '35th Anniversary of the Eurobarometer.'" According to Messerschmidt, then, the "communication deficit" thesis is simply a way of elite-splaining citizens' critical response to the EU and its political work. Messerschmidt's appearance in the Danish media is listed in appendix III.

⁶²⁶ Nyholm, "Denmark in Europe", 42. An argument he reiterates in an opinion piece in *Jyllands-Posten* on October 13, 2013. See appendix III.

⁶²⁷ Koolhaas in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*, 161.

⁶²⁸ 'Crisis' is derived from the Greek *'krisis'* that can be translated as 'judgment'.

Gourgouris argues, the constant use of the word *crisis* “prevents us from pushing up against, not only what ‘crisis’—as a word with multiple meanings—might signify, but also what has been recently instituted in its name or even in reaction to its existence”.⁶²⁹ If crisis is either always just around the corner (thus indicating the need to hurry) or permanently present, how is it possible to act responsibly?

The Performative Power of Narrative and Culture

As the arguments above exhibit, narrative and culture play important roles in this escape from crisis. According to Barroso, while economic integration was once a means to overcome populism and nationalism, today something different is needed:

We need, for the new generation especially, to continue to tell the story of Europe. This is like a book: we have to push ahead past the first pages. We have to continue our narrative, to continue writing the book on the present and the future of the EU project.⁶³⁰

Løkkegaard circulates this claim in his numerous opinion pieces in the Danish newspapers as well.⁶³¹ In mind and body, narrative thus signifies the concrete practices of writing a new narrative and thoughts about what should be included and excluded, but it is also constitutes a metadiscourse about the performative power of narrative. In this metadiscourse, narrative is understood as belonging to the realm of strategic communication, as a form meant to have an effect on people, an instrument to carry some kind of content.

Indeed, García notes a recent narrative turn “in the literature on European studies and in institutional and political practice”,⁶³² and New Narrative exemplifies this turn, he argues. Although the strategic cultivation of narratives is not a new practice within the EU, New Narrative was the first initiative to explicitly use the label “narrative”.⁶³³ García explains this turn within the EU as a response to the lack of popular legitimacy which, in turn, is the result of a politicisation of the EU in national politics in recent years—above all in the wake of the financial crisis. The EU “has never been so present in the public sphere”,⁶³⁴ and thus neither as contested.

⁶²⁹ Gourgouris, “Crisis and the Ill Logic”, 67.

⁶³⁰ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 26.

⁶³¹ *Berlingske*, November 7, 2013, and November 9, 2014; *BT*, November 22, 2013, and October 16, 2014; *Jyllands-Posten*, November 28, 2013. See appendix III.

⁶³² García, “New Narrative Project”, 350.

⁶³³ Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”, 215.

⁶³⁴ García, “Introduction”, 286.

From this contestation rises a need for cohesion and community. According to Kaiser, “processes of narrative construction”, such as New Narrative, “are geared towards strengthening feelings of cultural commonality and social community within the EU to foster a trans- and supranational collective identity”, and the hope is that “such narrative will help legitimize European integration and the EU and make it more popular among its citizens”.⁶³⁵ On a more cynical note, García adds that the EU’s preoccupation with narrative is less surprising when considering that narrative’s benefits as a point of identification are brought up by scholars funded by the EU and responding to its calls for research on the formation of a European public sphere.⁶³⁶

From this scholarly perspective, the interest in a narrative approach to the EU is grounded in the argument that both “EU studies and institutions have for too long turned their back on cultural phenomena . . . and overlooked how European societies experience integration”,⁶³⁷ an argument we can trace back to ‘A People’s Europe’, which made citizens and their experiences and daily lives the Community’s new reality. Manners and Murray argue that a narrative approach is necessary in EU studies as a corrective to established narratives, such as the peace narrative, which may not be “at an end, but must be understood as one of several narratives”.⁶³⁸ A narrative approach, then, will enable researchers to better understand the EU’s trials and challenges, and, by extension, help the EU navigate these challenges.⁶³⁹ On a metalevel, what these explanations show, is how similar discourses of a need for narrative circulate among scholars and politicians; sometimes even enabled financially.

Turning to the EU, the contributors in *Mind and Body* argue that European culture exists as a resource for collective identity formation; what is missing is the narrative, the form, capable of reaching European citizens:⁶⁴⁰

You will never get the attention, the engagement and the trust of Europeans, unless you tell them the truth and engage them as Europeans. And that takes a narrative, a story about who we are, where we come from and where we are going.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁵ Kaiser, “One Narrative or Several?”, 215.

⁶³⁶ García, “New Narrative Project”, 344.

⁶³⁷ García, 344–45.

⁶³⁸ Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 186.

⁶³⁹ Manners and Murray, 199.

⁶⁴⁰ Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 75; Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 232.

⁶⁴¹ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 233.

In other words, we see a distinction between culture and narrative as content and strategy, respectively, but also interlinked: “Culture is the common field of narratives, the field for the construction of diversity and the field for the construction of identity and cohesion”,⁶⁴²

The notion of culture *Mind and Body* invokes is rarely defined. It is understood sometimes as a more general term that includes narratives, material objects, and concrete practices of artists; sometimes as more elusive phenomena such as values, beliefs, and norms. Since the incentive of the New Narrative initiative is to introduce culture into the conceptual framework of and about the EU with the help of a new narrative, narrative is generally believed to hold great power: it is a catalyst of change; it creates understanding, cohesion, and identity; and it holds the ability to communicate a broader picture and complex processes in an accessible language. Løkkegaard, for instance, sees the New Narrative initiative as a catalyst for action and calls on it to “to give voice and form to our common European destiny, and to act as a tool for the future, for making the right choices”.⁶⁴³ And the New Narrative declaration expresses a need for “compelling narratives” in times of financial crisis:

At a time when culture is perceived as optional rather than essential, it has become difficult to tell each other the simplest of stories, let alone articulate compelling narratives about the values that underpin our society. And yet the moment for compelling narratives rather than simple number crunching is now.⁶⁴⁴

In times of crisis, we need hope, and hope is disseminated through narratives that enable people to feel attached to the culture and values that connect them, especially after a financial crisis that may induce a sense of being scattered and a lack of social cohesion. Composer Jonathan Mills, one of the cultural committee members, paraphrases the formulation in the declaration:

Now is the moment for compelling narratives rather than narrow statistics. Narratives in which we make the case for culture and the arts, as an essential enlargement of the circumstances in which we imagine our lives; and in which we recognise the substantial advantages, in terms of education, infrastructure and traditions, which Europe enjoys over almost every other region or sovereign entity throughout the world. If Europe is not a cultural enterprise, then what is it?⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴² Xavier, “What Matters Is the Present”, 207.

⁶⁴³ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 232.

⁶⁴⁴ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 128.

⁶⁴⁵ Mills, “Some Reflections”, 202.

The argument is the same: we need to focus on the unifying and positive elements in times of disconnection: the importance of culture and the arts in our lives and “the substantial advantages” Europe enjoys over the rest of the world—a Eurocentric rhetoric I discuss in the following chapter.

The function of narrative, then, is to provide “a certain cohesion and sense of direction”,⁶⁴⁶ to build bridges. Artists and storytellers, author Elif Shafak argues, “have a more accessible language: we do connect, we can bridge those big gaps. Against the populist xenophobia that is seizing much of the world, what we need is to create accessible, cosmopolitan counternarratives”.⁶⁴⁷ To bridge a gap requires a broader perspective than a personal viewpoint. According to Shafak, storytellers have this capacity to identify connections where other people cannot, to see the cosmopolitan in what to other people appears as difference. Indeed, stories

give us the space to imagine being someone else, being many characters. Many of my readers in Turkey are very homophobic and xenophobic; and yet I know that they connect with the gay character in the book and feel for the Jewish one. I have seen this happen over and over and over again.⁶⁴⁸

Narrative has the ability to exemplify plurality and thus make other life situations accessible to its audience. They potentially serve as didactical *exempla*, without dictating to their readers how they are supposed to feel, think, and act. Accordingly, narrative transcends the perspective and experiences of the individual—narratives “show us what it means to put ourselves in the shoes of another”.⁶⁴⁹ They present an opportunity to connect with a person or a world view far from one’s own and, consequently, induce tolerance.

Culture is likewise understood to stimulate the ability to understand complexity; specifically, the arts. Art enacts complexity and, by extension, enables the audience to handle complexity. Artist Luc Tuymans and his studio director Tommy Simoons view visual arts as a means to handle the complexity inherently involved in the debate on identity. They ask: “How can contemporary art stimulate the debate about the perception of the EU’s identity?”⁶⁵⁰ and propose that the EU provide the framework for a recurrent exhibition of contemporary art that would show “how the arts constantly deal with and generate complex imagery, and would provide a

⁶⁴⁶ Quaedvlieg–Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”, 122.

⁶⁴⁷ Shafak in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 152.

⁶⁴⁸ Shafak in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 164.

⁶⁴⁹ Shafak in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 164.

⁶⁵⁰ Tuymans and Simoons in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 142.

platform wherein the issues that surround identity are always in question”, thus constituting a “celebration of complexity” that could “help the EU illuminate its ever-changing debates about identity”.⁶⁵¹ Imagery, according to Tuymans and Simoens, is uniquely capable of showing, describing, and questioning complexity in ways that are perhaps closer to the reality people live in compared to theoretical or political discourse.

This ability to engage with complexity is articulated in other contributions in which focus often falls on artistic practices and objects that induce tolerance. For example, artist and member of the cultural committee Olafur Eliasson says that “the aesthetic experience requires that there is not simply me, but also my mind, and not simply my mind, but a host of others”;⁶⁵² author and art historian Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev maintains that “art . . . brings doubts and uncertainties. It is not propositional”;⁶⁵³ Mills “believe[s] that the place occupied by the arts is a prism through which to perceive the equilibrium of any society”;⁶⁵⁴ and museum director and chair of the cultural committee Paul Dujardin proposes that artists can help citizens “think ‘out of the box’, develop new images and visions and forge open identities”. He adds, “I strongly believe in the performative and speculative strength of the arts”.⁶⁵⁵ In this way, “artists could be instrumental in enhancing a bottom-up approach towards top EU decision-makers and the whole EU administration”.⁶⁵⁶

Doubt, uncertainty, open identities, and the nonpropositional modus of art is echoed in Eliasson’s argument about “culture”:

Culture is one of those few systems that offer space for deliberation and interhuman exchanges. It trusts its users. It rarely operates only locally, stretching out instead to embrace global perspectives. This is why I am confident that culture is a reality-producing machine that may forge closer inter-European relationships without polarising the small ‘we’s against the big ‘we’s.⁶⁵⁷

The notion of culture as a ‘reality-producing machine’ is ambiguous. On the one hand, culture offers space for deliberation, and it trusts its users: it does not provide an answer or a solution to anything, it simply offers a free space. On the other hand, it produces reality, according to Eliasson,

⁶⁵¹ Tuymans and Simoens in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 143.

⁶⁵² Eliasson, “Your Inner We”, 192; quoting Timothy Morton speaking at a conference in 2011.

⁶⁵³ Christov-Bakargiev in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 155.

⁶⁵⁴ Mills, “Some Reflections”, 204.

⁶⁵⁵ Dujardin, “Reinventing Europe”, 236.

⁶⁵⁶ Dujardin, 237.

⁶⁵⁷ Eliasson, “Your Inner We”, 193.

and not just the reality reflected from the deliberations of its trusted users, but a reality with a specific purpose, namely that of “forg[ing] closer inter-European relationships without polarising the small ‘we’s against the big ‘we’s”. Culture in this understanding offers an open space for deliberation, while simultaneously projecting a specific, normative outcome: closer inter-European relationships.

These accounts of culture and the arts and their role in society invoke an understanding of culture as a means through which complexity is understood, tolerance induced, and identity formed. Like narrative, culture and identity formation are thus closely connected. For example, Vassiliou argues that culture, “as a vector of identity, citizenship and diversity, and as a vehicle of values, symbols and the imaginary, holds a fundamental, if sometimes overlooked and often misconstrued, place in the European project”.⁶⁵⁸ Eliasson also views culture as a catalyst for identity formation. “Identity does not simply grow from shared prosperity”, he says, “feelings of identity and identification with others require culture, history and trust. If we are to create a European ‘we’ for the future, we have to include culture and historical awareness”.⁶⁵⁹ Løkkegaard sums up the argument: “This time around, culture is the key word. It’s all about identity [*sic*] about who we are, how we see ourselves, how to live up to and fulfil our role in the world”.⁶⁶⁰ “The original narrative” of peace and prosperity, though still valid, needs “add-ons” in the shape of culture—identity grows from culture, not peace and prosperity.

A few contributors are critical of the connection between culture and identity. Philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry criticises this “inward-looking ‘identifying identity’ constructed around its spiritual roots and desiring above all to assert its distinctiveness” and warns against “turning them [heritage values] into a promotional catalogue to be used as grounds for excluding anything that is not ‘European’ from a cultural heritage perspective”.⁶⁶¹ A related argument is offered by architect Stefano Boeri. Florence in the fourteenth century, he argues, was at one and the same time a flourishing site of cultural exchange and a site of economic depression and looming civil war, an indication that cultural and economic capital do not necessarily correlate: “That precedent [the Florence example] could help us understand how Europe today might be able to play, in relation to the world, the role that Florence played in relation to Europe in the 14th century”.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁸ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 34.

⁶⁵⁹ Eliasson, “Your Inner We”, 193.

⁶⁶⁰ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 232.

⁶⁶¹ Ferry, “Telos, Nomos, Ethos”, 92–93.

⁶⁶² Boeri in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 139.

The role Boeri imagines for Europe is as a “hub for cultural exchanges”,⁶⁶³ and the analogy between Florence and Europe thus becomes a synecdoche in which Florence, the face of the Renaissance, is the part that represents the whole of Europe. In a similar synecdochical relationship between Europe and the world, Europe can provide the space for the Renaissance of the world.

At the same time, though, Boeri argues that understanding the situation in Florence in the fourteenth century can

help us escape from the obsession with European identity—that insistence on what it means to be ‘European’ is for me one of the weak points of the Declaration. If you want to strengthen European identity, nothing is more useless than to focus on European identity!⁶⁶⁴

What Boeri’s implicitly argues is that historical awareness about the lack of correlation between cultural and economic prosperity is key to realising that cultural prosperity and, by extension, European identity, is not something the EU can “create” in the same way as it can create integrative structures for economic prosperity. By calling attention to the obsession, the insistence that something distinctively European exists, Boeri highlights the inherent paradox of constitutive rhetoric: that creating European identity is a rhetorical endeavour that entails articulating European identity as an already existing, extra-rhetorical entity. Creating it means presupposing it. As Jorge Barreto Xavier, then-Secretary of State for Culture in Portugal, says: “We [European citizens] need to tell narratives we believe in, because if we do not believe in ourselves, how could others possibly do so?”⁶⁶⁵

Whereas the “we” in most of the passages cited—and throughout *Mind and Body*—is as versatile as the narrative (ranging from signifying EU citizens or EU politicians to artists and intellectuals), in this passage the “we” is contrasted to “others”: European citizens must believe in themselves; otherwise, “others” will not either. Recalling the self-interpellating function of the constitutive rhetoric in the 1973-declaration and ‘A People’s Europe’ discussed in the beginning of this chapter, we see a similar function articulated here: collective identity formation has an internal function (social cohesion, fostering tolerance) as well as an external (becoming a credible and united entity in the eyes of others).

⁶⁶³ Boeri in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 139.

⁶⁶⁴ Boeri in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 139.

⁶⁶⁵ Xavier, “What Matters Is the Present”, 207.

Although a few voices in *Mind and Body* express reservations towards illusory “great 20th-century narratives”⁶⁶⁶ and the need for “a grand narrative”⁶⁶⁷—notably both expressed by former citizens of the Eastern bloc—narratives are generally understood to be productive. They create meaning, they make their audiences aware of certain relations and interconnections that they otherwise would not be able to see. Creating a new narrative, then, is understood to be the spark that will hopefully initiate a larger process of identification and, as a result, cohesion. Narrative acts; it has performative power.

At the same time, the contributors do not always invoke the same notion when they speak of narrative. It takes many different forms, ranging from stories in novels and imagery to historiography and grand ideological narratives, and sometimes narrative is equated with storytelling and thus describes the specific act of telling stories. It is characteristic, though, that narrative is primarily discussed through its instrumental function. It is only partially valued through its epistemic function: narratives foster the ability to understand the complexity and hybridity of social and political identity and display other life situations that would perhaps otherwise be beyond one’s imagination. But these epistemic functions are appreciated primarily through their instrumental value: they foster tolerance and social cohesion, and thus are judged to be essential to European integration and collective identity formation—not least in light of the lack of popular legitimacy and increasing contestation of the EU in the national public spheres. Interestingly, we see a very similar pattern when it comes to culture. Likewise, culture is valued through its epistemic and normative function of enacting complexity and enabling the understanding and tolerance thereof, but first and foremost through its instrumental value: to forge European identity.

In this sense, the discourse on European culture in *Mind and Body* does not diverge from the direction laid out in earlier discourse and politics of the EU. Even though culture has an ambivalent status within the EU, and its specific cultural policies are often confined to different types of funding (e.g., cultural heritage preservation and audio-visual production), Shore and Hansen both show how the EU’s cultural policies and the discourse on European culture date back to ‘A People’s Europe’, invoked specifically as means of crafting collective identity.⁶⁶⁸ The immense focus on culture in *New Narrative* (after all, it is referred to 169 times in *Mind and Body*)

⁶⁶⁶ Tusk, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013”, 52.

⁶⁶⁷ Merkel, “Translation of the Speech Delivered by the Federal Chancellor of Germany at the Academy of the Arts, Berlin, on 1 March 2014”, 118.

⁶⁶⁸ Hansen, “Europeans Only?”; Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’”; Shore, “Governing Europe”; Shore, *Building Europe*.

can thus be read as a rather conservative substitute for socially progressive political visions.⁶⁶⁹ What differs, though, from previous initiatives is the rhetorical agent: where once the EU was the primary agent of this discourse, in *New Narrative*, this discourse circulates among contributors from the cultural, scientific, and political sectors.

We also see a duality between, on the one hand, culture as a means to initiate debate, and create uncertainty and doubt and, on the other, as projecting a specific outcome: closer inter-European relationships. As a result, when Dujardin says that “artists could be instrumental in enhancing a bottom-up approach towards top EU decision-makers and the whole EU administration”,⁶⁷⁰ it is questionable how much a bottom-up approach is actually wanted.⁶⁷¹

In sum, narrative and culture constitute the primary resources in the constitutive rhetoric of *New Narrative*. As Eisenstadt and Giesen posit, such cultural codes of collective identity invoke an “element of something unchanging, something sacred . . . in order to cope with the fluidity of society and the world”.⁶⁷² In times of seemingly ominous and permanent crisis, the idea of a common culture—be that artistic, heritage, norms, or values—can provide stability and, as I hope to have shown, points of identification capable of transcending the interests of individual citizens, allowing them to confront the world at once as individual subjects and as members of a larger community.⁶⁷³

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have explored the different resources of the EU’s constitutive rhetoric from a diachronic perspective. While the 1973-declaration focused on institutional arrangements of the community, ‘A People’s Europe’ along with the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty invoked a “European dimension” of education and sports, which introduced a measure of civil socialisation and physical intertwinement through literal and metaphorical movement. Symbolic interweaving also plays an important role in ‘A People’s Europe’ with the proposed and implemented set of symbols. As the analysis of the EU flag showed, the mythical significations of the flag communicate both the desire for invariable presence

⁶⁶⁹ Privot, “New (Progressive) Narrative”; Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 191.

⁶⁷⁰ Dujardin, “Reinventing Europe”, 238.

⁶⁷¹ I investigate this tension more closely in chapter 6.

⁶⁷² Eisenstadt and Giesen, “Construction of Collective Identity”, 82.

⁶⁷³ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 139.

in the shape of transcendence and divinity and the wish to promote openness and diversity. Finally, in New Narrative, the performativity of narrative and culture constitute the primary means of identification. Culture is not understood as cultural policy, but as a set of (artistic) practices that embody complexity and diversity and, as a result, induce tolerance and closer inter-European relationships. Narrative, in turn, makes culture understandable to EU citizens and helps build European identity on this foundation. Culture is, in other words, the means through which European identity is crafted and therefore the solution to the perceived ominous crisis. In New Narrative, then, European identity is figured both as something that needs to be crafted and as something already given. The material is there; the form is not.

Widening our analytical gaze to include not only text but also the invention of traditions, symbolic representations, and physical encounters as means of interpellation, allows us to capture various dimensions of constitutive rhetoric.

The second argument of the chapter concentrates on changes in scope and focus. The change in types of constitutive resources corresponds to a simultaneous transition from an initial focus on institutional identity to a focus on collective identity. Gradually, crafting collective identity and a sense of belonging became “an ‘objective’ in itself”.⁶⁷⁴ While ‘A People’s Europe’ aimed to break ground in new areas of policy-making, New Narrative has moved in a different direction by devising the emotional and physical embodiment of European identity, which is why it promotes culture as the predominant resource for collective identity formation. We thus see a transition from an invocation of a European *dēmos* to a European *ethnos*.⁶⁷⁵ As is clear from the metaphor of the EU as the heart connecting and providing a sense of purpose to the many arteries of Europe, citizens, member states, and the EU as an institution are intertwined and thus reciprocally constituted.

This change in scope and focus furthermore indicates two constitutive objectives that we recognize from ‘A People’s Europe’: to draw the contours of the EU as an institution “in the mind of its people” and to weave its citizens together in a cultural, collective identity. In New Narrative, the frustration with not being perceived correctly by its citizens persists. New Narrative might not, as Manners and Murray argue, “constitute a

⁶⁷⁴ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 89.

⁶⁷⁵ European *dēmos* signifies “the ‘people’ as the collective subject of representation, decision making, and rights” and European *ethnos* “the ‘people’ as an imagined community of membership and filiation”. Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 8.

recognisable story of what Europe is for most Europeans”,⁶⁷⁶ but it may provide a recognisable story for Barroso, Løkkegaard, and many other EU representatives as well as the scholarly community and thus provide ontological stability to the EU by circulating the same argument in these spheres. At the same time, the “communication deficit”-argument circulates across time and in different sectors: the citizens do not understand the EU properly, and the EU therefore need to communicate better. In both ‘A People’s Europe’ and New Narrative, although mostly a subject spoken about, citizens are articulated as a collective subject with power and responsibility to engage by confirming the self-interpellation, the coming into being, of the EU itself. In this sense, the lack of visibility in the eyes of the citizens reflects back on the EU: the process of coming into being, of interpellating itself, hinges on the gaze of its citizens, which is one reason that constitutive rhetoric is an ongoing endeavour within the EU whose effect is continuous. Indeed, European identity formation is just as important as European identity.

In the next chapter, I explore another important resource in the EU’s constitutive rhetoric: European history. In the EU’s invocations, the past is figured both as a burden to be relieved from and a Golden Age to revisit in order to overcome disconnection.

⁶⁷⁶ Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 191.

5. An Archive of Glory: Disconnection and Restoration

If you visit the House of European History, a project initiated by the European Parliament and situated in the European Quarter in Brussels, your visit takes you through four floors of European history, ending on the only floor about the history of the EU.⁶⁷⁷ The museum design in many ways illuminates how narratives of the past are crafted: they are always composed in retrospect; the present situation determines what origin and which events from foundation to the present are appropriate today—the end determines the beginning.⁶⁷⁸ The museum design and content also encapsulates the argument made in this chapter: the EU's constitutive rhetoric seeks to create a transhistorical collective subject by drawing on a history more extensive and more glorious than that of the EU itself.

The three ideological functions of constitutive rhetoric—creating a collective subject, positioning that subject within a transhistorical frame, and calling upon the subject to act in accordance with the narrative logic constructed—are intertwined and reciprocally interdependent.⁶⁷⁹ This chapter thus hinges upon and further develops arguments made in the preceding one. While the previous chapter explored a change in the scope and focus of European identity and different types of resources put into use in order to create such a collective identity, this chapter studies how this collective subject is positioned within a transhistorical frame. Consequently, I explore the historical narrative central to the rhetorical construction of a transhistorical collective subject in the five EU initiatives.

As explained in chapter 2, the collective subject is transhistorical in the sense that the creation of a past collective subject (Europeans of the past)

⁶⁷⁷ European Union, “House of European History”. Since its opening in May 2017, much research has been done about the House of European History. For a reception analysis focusing on the visitors of the museum, see Dupont, “Between Authority and Dialogue”. For a study on the representation of gender relations in the European history presented in the museum exhibition, see Ighe, “Never Mind Patriarchy”. And for an exploration of representations of colonialism and efforts at decolonization in, among others, the House of European History, see Turunen, “Decolonising European Minds”.

⁶⁷⁸ Forchtner and Kolvraa, “Narrating a ‘New Europe,’” 382.

⁶⁷⁹ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 139–41.

serves as the basis for the existence of a present collective subject (Europeans of the present) and the arguments made on the basis of this existence. That is, the collective subject is not only constituted but also gains rhetorical agency in the present moment from the sense that it extends through time. In this chapter, I further develop this theorisation of the transhistorical subject by elaborating and exploring this transhistoricity. The creation of a transhistorical subject does not simply extend through time; this creation invokes plural temporal imaginaries, and they intersect in various ways that create different foundations for transhistoricity.

A central argument in this chapter is that the EU initiatives, in different ways, position EU citizens in a state of disconnection: they have, according to the initiatives, been disconnected from the EU and/or from the European past. Such disconnection is, according to the initiatives, rectified by reconnecting with different times, places, figures, and ideas in the past. We therefore need to examine the EU's historiographical efforts to compose a founding narrative and a new narrative, respectively, and how these two narratives relate to one another: what are the central sites, epochs, figures, and ideas of the European past with which EU citizens need to reconnect? How are these historical resources made available in the construction of a narrative of the European past? How are different origins and legacies constructed? And what are the political and rhetorical implications of this historiography?

Central to this chapter are the concepts *historiography*, *transhistoricity*, and *temporality* that are related though not identical. When using the concepts *historiography* and historiographical work, I rely on the definition proposed by Conal Furay and Michael J. Salevouris, who simply state that it is “the study of the way history has been and is written When you study ‘historiography’ you do not study the events of the past directly, but the changing interpretations of these events”.⁶⁸⁰ In this sense, historiography is inevitably political as well as rhetorical: these interpretations are the foundation of political arguments and action. The same is true when it comes to constructions of historical relations (historicity) as well as temporal relations (temporality). While *historiography* is a specific practice, *historicity*, according to historian Christopher Clark, denotes “a set of assumptions about how the past, the present, and the future is connected”.⁶⁸¹ So, a collective subject said to be *transhistorical* indicates the assumption that a set of characteristics transcend the boundaries between past, present, and future. The connection, then, between past, present, and future is one of consubstantiality. As Maurice Charland explains, transhistoricity

⁶⁸⁰ Furay and Salevouris, *The Methods and Skills of History*, 223.

⁶⁸¹ Clark, *Time and Power*, 1.

signifies the extension of the present into the past, a consubstantiality “between the dead and the living. . . . Time is collapsed as narrative identification occur”.⁶⁸² Transhistoricity is not ahistorical or atemporal in the sense that it is beyond the influence of historical events or temporal movement; rather, transhistoricity signifies assumptions about sameness *despite* historical events and temporal movement.

Transhistoricity, in other words, indicates assumptions about *temporality*. Buhre understands temporalities as imaginaries of time and distinguishes between three levels of temporality: the material (the distribution of and, consequently, access to and experience of, e.g., work/leisure/travel time), the imaginary (the “clusters of connotations” that guide our understandings of time), and the rhetorical (specific tropes of time).⁶⁸³ As Buhre notes, these levels intersect and are reciprocally constituted.⁶⁸⁴ Particularly relevant to this study are the two latter levels: the imaginary and the rhetorical—although the imaginary takes precedence in the artefacts studied. To grasp these temporal and historiographical aspects of the EU’s constitutive rhetoric requires a close reading of the EU’s rhetorical practices and the patterns they compose.

Rhetorical Functions of the EU’s Historiography

In this first part of the chapter, I turn to the most important functions of the EU’s historiography: the politics of time, norms of selection, and discursive ambiguity. These three functions in different ways enable the historical narrative of Europe and the EU by providing access to a time and space that extends beyond that of the EU and, consequently, makes possible the creation of a transhistorical collective subject.

Chronopolitics: The Politics of Time

“The Other is Europe’s past (fragmentation), and those further away from the center are not defined as anti-Europe, only as less Europe”.⁶⁸⁵ This often-quoted argument of political scientist Ole Wæver indicates that those less Europe (either decentred or temporally set in the past) can become more Europe. In this way, temporality serves as a political and rhetorical tool, what has been termed *chronopolitics*—the politics of time

⁶⁸² Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”, 140.

⁶⁸³ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 14–16.

⁶⁸⁴ Buhre, 16.

⁶⁸⁵ Wæver, “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity”, 100.

through which certain temporal imaginaries “become implicated in processes of decision making” and political thinking.⁶⁸⁶

Particularly relevant to this chapter is the historiographical use of the past (how the past is depicted and the role it has in relation to the present), and how this historiography is used in political argumentation. In chapter 2, I discussed Buhre’s and Fareld’s reconceptualisations of Arendtian *remembrance* (*authoritarian* or *agonistic*) and *foundation*, both of which are key concepts in trying to understand present times’ recourse to the past. According to Buhre, institutions turn to the past as a means to become real; the reality and continued existence of, in this case, the EU, depends upon “the presence of others who have seen and heard and will remember”.⁶⁸⁷ Any relation to the past is inherently anachronistic, as both are “rhetorically produced as a trace in the present”.⁶⁸⁸ An anachronistic relationship to the past, then, is not necessarily problematic; if this relationship is plural, it can be freedom-enabling. It is this latter characteristic that fails to appear in authoritarian politics of remembrance. In authoritarian remembrance, the foundation—or constitutive event, origin (e.g., the birth of Christ)—is a “beginning for eternity”.⁶⁸⁹

Sara Edenheim similarly views anachronisms as inevitable in historiography, the recognition of which serves as a way “to acknowledge the otherness of the past”.⁶⁹⁰ In her study of temporal claims in Governmental

⁶⁸⁶ Clark, *Time and Power*, 14. The notion *chronopolitics* has been used most famously by anthropologist Johannes Fabian, but before him, George W. Wallis used the notion in his article “Chronopolitics: The Impact of Time Perspectives on the Dynamics of Change”. In Fabian’s seminal and at the time of its publication in 1983 much contested book, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology makes its Object*, Fabian studies “oppressive uses of time” in academia. See Fabian, *Time and the Other*, 2. The central argument Fabian makes is that anthropology (in 1983) rests on assumptions from the colonial, imperial era that conceived the West as existing here and now and the Other as existing then and there. He calls this mechanism a denial of coevalness (cf. the German *gleichzeitigkeit*) through allochronic discourse. As a contrast to anachronism, allochronism is a specific device: “Anachronism signifies a fact, or statement of fact, that is out of tune with a given time frame; it is a mistake, perhaps an accident. I am trying to show that we are facing, not mistakes, but devices (existential, rhetorical, political)”. See Fabian, 32. By calling these devices allochronic discourse, Fabian underlines its intentional, strategic dimension—the temporal allocation, the strategic devices that places other people in other places and other times. In this sense, time is political. Fabian, 144.

⁶⁸⁷ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 150. Buhre quotes Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 95.

⁶⁸⁸ Buhre, 24.

⁶⁸⁹ Buhre, 156. Buhre quotes Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political thought*, rev. edition, edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Penguin, 2006, 121 as well as *The Promise of Politics*, edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2005, 49.

⁶⁹⁰ Buhre, 24. Buhre draws on Edenheim in her own argument about anachronisms. Buhre, 23–24. See Sara Edenheim, *Anakronismen: Mot den historiska manin*. Glänta hardcore 05. Göteborg: Daidalos, 2011.

White Papers in Sweden,⁶⁹¹ Edenheim notes a specific type of anachronism, a “politics of double time”, in which *real time* and *ideal time* intersect: Real time is something that can be off-track,⁶⁹² a Shakespearean trope we recognise from *Hamlet*, who proclaims that “The time is out of joint. O cursèd spite, That ever I was born to set it right!”.⁶⁹³ Time is unhinged. But time is also imagined as something progressive, whereby the present is viewed as a restoration of an incomplete past.⁶⁹⁴ Hamlet is, albeit against his will, tasked to “to put things back in order, to put history, the world, the age, the time upright”.⁶⁹⁵

Edenheim exemplifies this latter progressive, ideal time with statements such as “unfortunately there *still* exists prejudice”,⁶⁹⁶ or in the idea that some people, societies, or systems are somehow *stuck* in the past, often iterated in colonial and imperial discourses (about Native Americans, the Middle East, etc.), but also in statements about countries in Eastern and Central Europe that have to *catch up* with the member states of the EU in order to become viable EU candidates.⁶⁹⁷ In the context of the artefacts studied in this thesis, then-president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, stated in his Nobel Lecture in 2012, which he held with then-president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy: “In the 21st century it is simply unacceptable to see parents powerless as their baby is dying of lack of basic medical care, mothers compelled to walk all day in the hope of getting food or clean water”.⁶⁹⁸ It is another way of saying that the world is not on schedule. Edenheim explains:

From this it is possible to discern a historiography based on determinism and teleology . . . where legal righteousness always has to be prepared to step in against the dark forces of ‘untimeliness’ that wishes to delay the determined path towards (the now already accomplished) perfection.⁶⁹⁹

In other words, knowledge belongs to the present; it is the job of the present to fix and restore time by discarding phenomena belonging to the past, such as prejudice and poverty. These examples highlight how linguistic choices such as “still” and “in the 21st century” reflect a progressive temporal imaginary in which both phenomena rightfully should be a thing

⁶⁹¹ From the Swedish: Statens Offentliga Utredningar.

⁶⁹² Edenheim, “Politics out of Time”, 38.

⁶⁹³ Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, Scene V.

⁶⁹⁴ Edenheim, “Politics out of Time”, 38.

⁶⁹⁵ Derrida, Bernd, and Cullenberg, *Specters of Marx*, 23.

⁶⁹⁶ Edenheim, “Politics out of Time”, 38.

⁶⁹⁷ Bottici and Challand, *Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory, and Identity*, 76.

⁶⁹⁸ Barroso and Van Rompuy, “The Nobel Lecture”.

⁶⁹⁹ Edenheim, “Politics out of Time”, 38.

of the past, because human kind today *knows better*; because that which comes from “the past in the form of ‘remains’ . . . is not only bad but can never, according to this logic, inhabit anything but the past”.⁷⁰⁰ Colonialism, for example, is generally condemned in the EU and beyond, so even though it does exist in the present, also within the EU, it necessarily has to be figured as a thing of the past.

Examples of double time exist, then, in the EU’s rhetorical practices as well. European history is figured both as a trauma in the European mind-set (real time), which the EU has helped overcome (ideal time), but also as a resource to mobilize a nostalgic longing for the past—practices of remembrance—that extends into the future.

Colonial Traces: Historiographical Exclusions and Inclusions

According to Hansen and Jonsson, the founding narrative of the EU, consolidated by and circulated among politicians and scholars alike, is colonial to its core,⁷⁰¹ but the EU remains largely silent about this foundation. Africa “is ‘a basket case of absences’ that calls for European presence”,⁷⁰² and this silence is a commonality in both the founding and the new narrative explored in this study. As the authors argue, colonialism’s role in the birth of the EU is both completely absent and “a controversial matter in EU scholarship”.⁷⁰³ The consequences of the EU’s colonial practices and foundation (manifested in the programme *Eurafrica*, active during the 1920s–1950s) are “still with us today”.⁷⁰⁴ In fact, it could be argued that colonialism—settler as well as exploitation⁷⁰⁵—might be one of the relatively few transhistorical characteristics of Europe. In a way, it unites Europe and the EU, which is why it should have a place in the EU’s historiography. Instead, it is what Philip Wander has termed the *third persona*.

⁷⁰⁰ Edenheim, 39.

⁷⁰¹ Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.

⁷⁰² Hansen and Jonsson, 11. Hansen and Jonsson quote Paul Zeleza, “Africa: the changing meanings of ‘African’ culture and identity”, in *Horizons: Perspectives on a Global Africa*, edited by Elisabeth Abiri and Håkan Thörn, Gothenburg: Museion, Gothenburg University, 2005, 43.

⁷⁰³ Hansen and Jonsson, 13.

⁷⁰⁴ Hansen and Jonsson, 16.

⁷⁰⁵ While settler colonialism means that inhabitants from the colonising country settle down and often take over the colonised land (the United States is a good example), exploitation colonialism signifies the exploitation of inhabitants and resources without emigration (for example, the Congo and the West Indies). This distinction is common and dates back to (at least) René Maunier’s *The Sociology of Colonies* from 1949 (trans. E. O. Lorimer, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). It is also problematised by, among others, Krautwurst on the grounds that it creates theoretically clear lines between practices that, indeed, often overlap. See Krautwurst, “What Is Settler Colonialism?”.

What is negated through the Second Persona forms the silhouette of a Third Persona—the “it” that is not present, that is objectified in a way that “you” and “I” are not.⁷⁰⁶

In this case, such negation is expressed as that or those “whose presence, though relevant to what is said, is negated through silence”.⁷⁰⁷ In contrast to the second persona (for example, figurations of the EU citizen), the third persona is found in the “silence of the text”.⁷⁰⁸

In the five EU initiatives, colonial silence is pervasive but also, to a certain degree, expected. The two first initiatives are not preoccupied with the past, and the two treaties are legal documents and thus the little historiography that is included is restricted to the preambles. Accordingly, apart from the Article II-65 of Title I: “Prohibition of slavery and forced labour” in the Constitutional Treaty, the only initiative that mentions colonialism and slavery is *New Narrative*, and it does so mostly through allusions and euphemisms or in passing that are addressed in this chapter. Thus, while Hansen and Jonsson focus on the interwar and immediate post-war period—prior to and around the establishment of the EU—I focus rather on the relation between the founding and the new narrative of the EU in a contemporary context. However, my analysis attends to what is visible in the texts, including visible omissions.

Discursive Ambiguity: The EU/Europe/Europa

The EU’s historiography is characterised by a general discursive ambiguity that allows for the interweaving and separation, respectively, of *Europa* (a mythical figure), *Europe* (a geographical area),⁷⁰⁹ and the EU (political project and institution). The titles of the initiatives—‘A People’s Europe’, *Constitution for Europe*, and *New Narrative for Europe*—are themselves examples of such ambiguity; what is meant is the peoples of the European Community and a constitution as well as a new narrative for the member states and the citizens of the EU, respectively. This is not necessarily problematic, but, as I will show, the rhetorical function of such ambiguity not only makes the past available by turning European history into a historiographical resource of the EU, but also has political consequences when

⁷⁰⁶ Wander, “Third Persona”, 209.

⁷⁰⁷ Wander, 210.

⁷⁰⁸ Wander, 215.

⁷⁰⁹ Whether or not Europe is a continent in the geological sense or not is much debated and a mine field I do not wish to tread; not least, since it is beyond my competences. I will simply remark that the outer borders of the EU as well as Europe throughout history have undergone much change (see, for instance, figure 5, chapter 4). I have chosen to use the term geographical area instead of continent in order to signify this indeterminate nature.

related to the EU's external borders (since they differ from Europe's) and the question of accountability (Europe or the EU?).

We can understand this ambiguity as a play between meaning and form. If we recall the two semiological systems (see figure 1, chapter 2) conceptualised by Barthes, the *linguistic sign* (*meaning*) and the *mythical signifier* (*form*) occupy the same slot: the linguistic sign is also (potentially) the mythical signifier. According to Barthes, myth functions through “a sort of rapid alternation”, a “game of hide-and-seek” between form and meaning. This alternation allows the mythical signifier to be rooted in the linguistic sign when needed in order to get “what nature it needs for its nutriment”.⁷¹⁰ This game enables us to read the EU sometimes as a *linguistic sign* of the political institution, sometimes as a *mythical signifier* of Europe (the *mythical signified*). But also, to sometimes read Europe simply as a *linguistic sign* of the geographical landmass, sometimes a *mythical signifier* of a specific past, history, culture, values, and the mythological figure of Europa (the *mythical signified*). These practices of intertwining and separating, respectively, at times serve important functions of denoting a broader historical epoch (when articulating a time before the 1950s, when the Community was not a reality, at least not in practice) or wider geographical area (when one needs to speak about the geographical area of Europe and thus denote something wider than the member states of the EU). Precisely this ambiguity allows for the play between the level of language and the level of myth, and I explore this play in the analysis of the founding and new narrative, respectively.

The discursive intertwining of Europa, Europe, and the EU is common; in the communication of the EU (e.g., its website, www.europa.eu), in the wider public and media terminology, but also in the initiatives studied here, with the exception of the 1973-declaration. Even though “Europe” in many European languages is actually termed “Europa” (German, Dutch, Polish, Italian, Spanish, Rumanian, the Scandinavian languages, and more), the ambiguity between Europa and Europe is often implicit. Besides from the depiction on the Greek 2-Euro coin, the story of Europa's abduction by Zeus is never fully retold. Her presence in the five EU initiatives is subtler: in the feminisation and general personalisation of Europe, which allows for the interweaving of Europa, Europe, and the EU. The metonymy the EU/Europe, on the other hand, is widespread and normalised to the extent that it often goes unnoticed, and it is amplified by the fact that it is paralleled in the naming of other parts and institutions of the world. One such example is “America”, which is more often than not used synonymously with “USA”, the same way an American citizen

⁷¹⁰ Barthes, *Mythologies*, 118.

most often is understood as a citizen of the USA, not of any of the South or Central American countries or Canada.

This normalisation renders it unimportant if not banal to even notice the metonymy, and we see this lack of attention in the scholarly literature as well, with a few exceptions. Claudia Wiesner notes that “most people (including scholars) rarely distinguish clearly between Europe and the European Union . . . thus, debating Europe today often means debating the EU and easily entails a mixture of different rhetorical objects and political levels”.⁷¹¹ And García notes the involvement of EU institutions in creating “museums intending to embody EU integration into the history of the continent”,⁷¹² such as the House of European History mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. What both of these scholars call attention to are the implications of the intertwining of Europe and the EU. This ambiguity creates a link between the EU and Europe which turns Europe into both a resource in the past and a future ideal for the endeavour of becoming. While the EU may be futile, Europe does not dismantle as easily—it has larger transhistorical value. In this chapter, I flesh out these implications and map the role they play in terms of gaining access to a past and a history and thus are crucial to the making of a transhistorical collective subject.

Finally, while it is quite clear what is meant with the more specific term “the EU”, “Europe” is inherently vague: The “word ‘Europe’ has been used and misused, interpreted and misinterpreted in as many different meanings as almost any word in any language”.⁷¹³ More often than not, the signification is ambiguous: It can signify the EU, a geographical area, a mythical figure, an historical political/geographical entity, a future entity, and so forth. Such discursive slips are easily made, and not always intended. However, the lack of intention does not make it any less interesting to explore how such slips work to open up the gates to a European past. Some of the most noticeable examples of this mechanism are discussed in the following part of the chapter.

Constructing an Archive of Glory

The historiographical account in the five EU initiatives materialises through continuous and performative repetitions of what is known variously as the EU’s *founding narrative* and a *new narrative* for Europe. A hypothesis of various European disconnections articulated in the three latter

⁷¹¹ Wiesner, “Rhetorical Construction of EU-Europe”, 129.

⁷¹² García, “New Narrative Project”, 347.

⁷¹³ Seton-Watson, “What Is Europe”, 9.

initiatives expresses a need to exceed the founding narrative and reconnect through a new narrative that reaches beyond the current constellation of the EU in time and place. That is, EU citizens have been disconnected from the political union, from their past, or from each other, and sometimes these disconnections intersect.

This hypothesis is not unfounded. As García notes, “it seems that EU integration has happened thanks to the lack of involvement of public opinion rather than because of a general consensus”.⁷¹⁴ In other words, the general public was never really invested in European integration—citizens were always, in a sense, disconnected—and had they been more invested, integration would probably not have happened as (relatively) smoothly. Among EU scholars, this disengaged acceptance or passive approval of European integration is often termed the EU’s “permissive consensus”.⁷¹⁵ Although the permissive consensus was for several decades not regarded as a problem,⁷¹⁶ Sternberg traces the EU’s dissatisfaction with the disengagement of its citizens as early as in the 1970s and 1980s, which is one of the reasons for the origin of the broader “People’s Europe rhetoric”, discussed in chapter 3.⁷¹⁷ Furthermore, the permissive consensus was not as permissive as often assumed; dissenting voices *did* exist both in the political and public debate.⁷¹⁸

The EU’s strategies to articulate and counter these various disconnections differ over time. While ‘A People’s Europe’ directs its attention towards its citizens, “its new reality”, as a way to bridge the perceived gap between the two parties—to “make Europe come alive for the Europeans”⁷¹⁹—the Maastricht Treaty, Constitutional Treaty, and New Narrative refocus attention on the disconnections brought about by past division and conflict. These disconnections and, importantly, the EU’s efforts to reconnect are central to the founding narrative, but also to the new narrative. In New Narrative, these two disconnections (with the EU and the past, respectively) are brought together and articulated as interrelated in that if citizens can once again reconnect with their past and thus reconnect with themselves, they will be able to see the benefits of the EU as well.

In the following, I begin by scrutinizing the founding narrative centring on the immediate post-war period and the strategies and resources

⁷¹⁴ García, “New Narrative Project”, 348.

⁷¹⁵ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 14.

⁷¹⁶ García, “New Narrative Project”, 348. García argues that it was the increasing Euro-scepticism in the late 1990s that caused the EU to worry and thus sets the date much later than Sternberg.

⁷¹⁷ Sternberg, *Struggle for EU Legitimacy*, 81.

⁷¹⁸ Sternberg, 15.

⁷¹⁹ Adonnino, “People’s Europe”, 22.

employed to preserve and dismantle it, respectively—by the EU, by scholars, and by public discourse exemplified by the Norwegian Nobel Committee. I end by examining the new narrative and the European heritage brought to the fore herein. While the founding narrative focuses on the event of Europe becoming the EU, the new narrative reverses this direction, turning from the EU to Europe in its search for a transhistorical collective subject. As discussed in the previous chapter, the turn from institutional towards collective identity formation in the rhetoric of the EU is particularly evident in New Narrative, and the same is true in terms of historicizing Europe and Europeans. New Narrative therefore takes a prominent place in the readings of the EU's archive of glory.

A Founding Narrative: Representing Peace

The idea of a “founding narrative” of the EU is a recurring topos in the rhetoric of the EU—along with related topoi such as “founding fathers” and “peace and prosperity”—and also a frequent point of reference in the construction of a new narrative.

The founding narrative is largely stable and normalised, not only within the EU but also in public and scholarly discourse: the EU is a project of peace beginning in the immediate post-war period. Peace was achieved and since then withheld through the union of, first, resources (The European Coal and Steel Union, 1951), then, trade (The European Economic Community, 1957). Peace and prosperity thus go hand in hand, as the latter is a precondition of the former; by tying national economies and trade together, it would be both irrational and unwelcome to wage war against each other. This narrative is disseminated in the political, public, and scholarly sphere and thus circulates across both time and spheres.

Not until fairly recently has this narrative been challenged in the scholarly community. For example, Manners and Murray argue that the narrative of peace, the “Nobel narrative”, is only one of several narratives that attracts different populations, competing narratives being, among others, the New Narrative for Europe (viewed as a replacement of the “old”), Economic Europe, Social Europe, and Global Europe. While the peace narrative served an important function during and immediately after the Cold War, both to the member countries of the Community and to the Central and Eastern European countries as an attractive and stable construction, the end of the Cold War and the EU's inability to take action and prevent the genocide in Yugoslavia has left “its [the Nobel narrative] reputation somewhat tarnished, as its central legitimizing role has

effectively ended”.⁷²⁰ Vincent Della Sala concludes that the founding narrative of peace has worked well for the constitution of the EU, but not for Europeans, for one, because it is challenged by very similar national narratives.⁷²¹ Münevver Cebeci maintains that the EU’s view of the past as an achievement of peace projects a normative model that shapes the EU’s present peacebuilding/statebuilding activities in a way that depoliticise fundamentally political questions.⁷²² And Anthony Pagden finds the normative dimensions of “the regulative idea” that liberal democracies by definition do not wage war against one another—simply because there has not been war within the EU since its foundation—empirically weak.⁷²³ He still, however, contributes to the circulation and thus preservation of the narrative of the EU as a peace project: “The founders of what was to become the European Economic Community sought above all to suppress the horrors of two world wars, initiated by Europeans and fought between European states and their overseas dependencies”.⁷²⁴

These “overseas dependencies” or, as they are called in proper EU language, “Overseas Countries and Territories”,⁷²⁵ are present-day colonies within the EU. These are, as Hansen and Jonsson assert, “fundamentally at odds with the EU’s dominant self-understanding”.⁷²⁶ This self-

⁷²⁰ Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 188.

⁷²¹ Sala, “Narrating Europe”.

⁷²² Cebeci, “Representing Peace?” Cebeci uses the terms “peacebuilding” and “statebuilding” in conjunction, because, as she argues, “The EU’s statebuilding efforts have remained confined to a liberal peace logic”, but “the EU usually refrains from using the term ‘statebuilding’ in its foreign policy discourse and employs the term ‘peacebuilding’ to define the same set of activities”. See Cebeci, “Representing Peace?”, 295. On the connection between building peace and building liberal/neoliberal states, see Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler, “Emerging EU Peacebuilding Framework”. On the general difference between statebuilding and peacebuilding, see Richmond, “Failed Statebuilding”. For another kind of view from the outside, see Natalia Chaban et alia, who argue that the peace narrative is contested among strategic Asian partners and therefore cannot be taken for granted. Chaban, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, “EU’s Peace and Security Narrative”.

⁷²³ Pagden, *The Idea of Europe*, 6–7. For example, Kohli states that “in modern democratic polities, citizens do well to conceive of their loyalties not as natural and boundless but as reflexive and conditional. This may be one of the key reasons why democracies have so far never waged war against each other”. See Kohli, “Battlegrounds of European Identity”, 119. This is, indeed, a truth in need of some modification.

⁷²⁴ Pagden, 7.

⁷²⁵ On the EU Commission’s website, it says: “As a result of Brexit, the number of Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU has been reduced from 25 to 13. As of 1 February 2020, they are: Aruba (NL), Bonaire (NL), Curaçao (NL), French Polynesia (FR), French Southern and Antarctic Territories (FR)*, Greenland (DK), New Caledonia (FR), Saba (NL), Saint Barthélemy (FR), Sint Eustatius (NL), Sint Maarten (NL), St. Pierre and Miquelon (FR), Wallis and Futuna Islands (FR)” See European Commission, “Overseas Countries and Territories”.

⁷²⁶ Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 2.

understanding is upheld by the scholarly community in its failure to scrutinise the colonial archive,⁷²⁷ including the EU's official story and the strategies employed to keep it intact—historiography being one of the most important such strategies.⁷²⁸ The peace narrative, then, both contrasts and neglects the colonial project that, according to Hansen and Jonsson, was just as foundational to the constitution of the EU as was the wish for continual peace.

If we turn to the rhetoric of the EU, the founding narrative is first and foremost focused on the origin and foundation of the EU in the immediate post-war period and thus the EU's quest for enduring peace: "What has been achieved until now [1985] in Europe has been the work of those who experienced the horrors and destruction of war".⁷²⁹ Therefore, the transcendence of these horrors is a salient part of the founding narrative:

The Nine European States might have been pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests. But they have overcome their past enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common.⁷³⁰

Here, the 1973-declaration draws a clear line between before and after, marked by the overcoming of past enmities and the decision to strive towards unity.

This effort to establish a ground zero is a general trait throughout the five initiatives, although with different ideas of temporal unfolding: one of continuity, and one of rupture. The Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty articulate rupture as caused by past division. In the Maastricht Treaty, the member states are "RECALLING the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent",⁷³¹ and in the Constitutional Treaty, Europe is "reunited after bitter experiences",⁷³² and "the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny".⁷³³ As a result, division is both articulated as something Europeans have *already* left behind (the divisions are "former"), and as something that Europeans *should* leave behind: they are determined to transcend them. Bitter experiences and division represent specific moments of rupture in

⁷²⁷ Hansen and Jonsson, 35.

⁷²⁸ Hansen and Jonsson, 4.

⁷²⁹ Adonnino, "People's Europe", 18.

⁷³⁰ Commission of the European Communities, "Declaration on European Identity", 119.

⁷³¹ Council of the European Communities, "Treaty on European Union", 3.

⁷³² European Communities, "Constitution for Europe", 9.

⁷³³ European Communities, 9.

the past, and they can be preserved in the past if these experiences are transcended. The disconnection can—in progressive, ideal time—be remedied.

At the same time, the historical account of Europe's violent past is characterised by continuity. The Maastricht Treaty marks this focus with verbs such as *confirming* attachment, *enhancing* further, to *strengthen*, *reaffirm*, and *continue*;⁷³⁴ the Constitutional Treaty describes continuity as *drawing inspiration* from the past, to *continue* along the path of civilisation, and to *remain* an open continent.⁷³⁵ As in the 1973-declaration, in which it was decided to strive towards unity instead of division, both treaties highlight the acts of decision-making and determination: the peoples of Europe are *determined* to transcend previous division, and Europe “*intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity*”.⁷³⁶

These examples show how the two World Wars and the Holocaust are constructed as ruptures in an otherwise continuous and progressive path of civilisation. Rather than articulating war and genocide as recurrent events or the concentration camp as the continuation of the historical development of the modern sovereign state,⁷³⁷ in the EU's rhetoric the two World Wars and the Holocaust constitute an extraordinary break from history. This double construction of rupture and continuity enables the EU to assert itself as a peace project. As Cebeci argues, the fact that the EU has achieved internal peace in the past is the key factor in the construction of the EU as representing universal peace. Cebeci argues that this founding narrative “helps dissociate it [the EU] from its past of violent conflicts and colonialism”.⁷³⁸ In this way, positioning WWI and II as ruptures in European history enables the “representing peace”-narrative, which, in turn, enables the EU's position as a normative model and actor for others to imitate, which legitimises present policies of peacebuilding in accordance with this specific model.

Distinguishing the EU from Europe/Europa

Turning to New Narrative, the main purpose of creating a new narrative is the fact that citizens have forgotten the founding narrative: They have forgotten the *raison d'être* of the EU (to prevent war from happening again) and are now repeating past mistakes (nationalism in the face of economic

⁷³⁴ Council of the European Communities, “Treaty on European Union”, 3–4.

⁷³⁵ European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 9.

⁷³⁶ European Communities, 9. My emphasis.

⁷³⁷ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, § 7, part 3.

⁷³⁸ Cebeci, “Representing Peace?”, 300. As Cebeci notes, this function is particularly evident in cases of “contested statehood” such as Kosovo where the EU has been a peacebuilding/statebuilding actor.

recession) because they are swayed by populism. This is the argument stated by Barroso at the project launch and circulated in *Mind and Body*.⁷³⁹ The disconnection between the EU and its citizens is thus grounded in a lack of memory of the two World Wars and the Holocaust, which is why citizens must be reminded of these events and the social, political, and cultural context within which they took place—“reminding people—especially the people who take it all for granted—of the historical path travelled by the European integration process, of recalling that Europe is at heart a peace narrative”.⁷⁴⁰

The discursive ambiguity between Europe, Europa, and the EU is central to this peace narrative as it is told in the New Narrative declaration. Both Europe/Europa and the EU are personified and as such ascribed the agency to be the driving force of war and the agent leading the way to peace, respectively. As mentioned, apart from the depiction on the Greek 2-Euro coin (figure 7), the story of Europa’s abduction by Zeus from Phoenicia to Crete and her life on Crete, her role as mother of future King Minos, and so on, is never fully retold. Her presence in the five EU initiatives is subtler: in the feminisation and general personalisation of Europe that allows for the interweaving of Europa, Europe, and the EU.



Figure 7. The abduction of Europa by Zeus, on the Greek 2-Euro coin.

In the New Narrative declaration, agency is enacted in a triangular relationship among these three parties, dramatised in a story about the European integration project and another mythical figure, the bird Phoenix:

The European integration project was born like a Phoenix out of the ashes of two world wars. A hundred years ago, Europe lost its soul on the battlefields and in the trenches. Later, it damned itself with its concentration camps and with the totalitarian systems associated with extreme nationalism . . . Since the World War II, however, the ideal of a Europe united by

⁷³⁹ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”; Barroso in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 165–66; Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”; Gescinska, “Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric”.

⁷⁴⁰ Quaedvlieg-Mihailovic in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 137.

the principle of mutual respect and the values of freedom and democracy has brought redemption. Europe's soul has been restored. Today the European integration process stands against all forms of war.⁷⁴¹

According to myth, the Phoenix is a bird (figure 8) continually reborn and arising from the ashes of its predecessor, existing only one at a time. The Phoenix is often depicted with a halo taken to indicate its connection to the sun, an attribute we recognise in Christian iconography (e.g., on the Virgin Mary, as discussed in chapter 4), but which was well-established in ancient Greek religion and myth, for example in descriptions of heroes in the *Iliad*,⁷⁴² and depictions of Greek deities such as Poseidon and Apollo.⁷⁴³

Importantly, the Phoenix arises not out of the ashes belonging to someone or something else; it arises out of the ashes of itself and thus keeps its identity intact; it is a rebirth not of something new, but of what (always) was. Therefore, in ancient Greek mythology and in Christian symbolism, the Phoenix is a symbol of continuity: "The phoenix could symbolize renewal in general as well as the sun, Time, the Empire . . . , life in the heavenly Paradise, Christ, Mary, virginity, the exceptional man, and certain aspects of Christian life".⁷⁴⁴

⁷⁴¹ Deventer et al., "Declaration," 127.

⁷⁴² In the *Iliad* (book V, trans. Alexander Pope), Diomedes is crowned with a helm of "celestial lightnings":

"But Pallas now Tydides' soul inspires,
Fills with her force, and warms with all her fires,
Above the Greeks his deathless fame to raise,
And crown her hero with distinguish'd praise.
High on his helm celestial lightnings play,
His beamy shield emits a living ray;
The unwearied blaze incessant streams supplies,
Like the red star that fires the autumnal skies,
When fresh he rears his radiant orb to sight,
And, bathed in ocean, shoots a keener light".

⁷⁴³ E.g., the mosaic "the Chariot of Poseidon", 2nd century, Bardo National Museum, in Tunis, Tunisia, and Apollo is depicted with a halo in a Roman floor mosaic the 2nd century in the Archaeological Museum Thysdrus in El-Jem, Tunisia.

⁷⁴⁴ Broek, *Myth of the Phoenix*, 9.



Figure 8. The Phoenix, Friedrich J. Bertuch's *Bilderbuch für Kinder*, 1806.

Given this symbolism, the Phoenix alludes to a personified Europe as the cause of war and destruction, underscored by the Phoenix bursting into flames, which is not the result of external events, but of its own doing: the Phoenix sets itself on fire. Likewise, the two World Wars were not inflicted upon Europe but were its own doing. In this conceit, the Phoenix is reborn as the new Europe. Therefore, the Phoenix also alludes to the EU. Accordingly, a close connection between *Europe* and the *European integration project* is articulated as they are both symbolised by the Phoenix, but if we turn our attention to the agency projected in this narrative, they are also distinct from one another: the European project is a product of Europe, but it is Europe that loses its soul and condemns itself. The European integration project rises from the ashes, brings redemption and rebuilds Europe's soul. Europe has sinned, but is redeemed through ideals of freedom and democracy, enabled by the political project, a reading which is supported by the shift from active to passive modus: "Europe lost its soul" → "Europe's soul has been restored" (by something other than itself). Animated as this mythical bird, the European integration project is the project capable of creating continuous peace in Europe. The EU is viewed not as the continuation of history, but breaking with history, initiating a new beginning. This is the weak link of the analogy: the Phoenix will, at some point, burst into flames once again. The separation of the EU from Europe means that when it happens, this fire will be the work of Europe, not the EU. But since the EU is dependent on Europe as its

primary resource, the interweaving of the two, both animated as the Phoenix, at the same time blurs this distinction.

The personification of Europe in this narrative can be interpreted as an analogy to the mythical figure Europa who, like Europe, exemplified excessive behaviour. Picking flowers is, as Susan Deacy notes, “an activity with strong sexual overtones, associated with imminent exposure to male sexuality”,⁷⁴⁵ and she does so in the unordered spaces of the meadows and the wild, antithetical to the polis, which makes them sites of divergent sexuality.⁷⁴⁶ But, as James E. Robson reminds us, young women like Europa are reintegrated into society after their fall:⁷⁴⁷ Europa marries the Cretan king Asterius, who adopts her children by Zeus. Likewise, in the story of the Phoenix, Europe is reintegrated into the world order through mortification and/or victimage: the EU—the integration project—rises from the ashes like a Phoenix and saves Europe/Europa, synecdoches of the European populations: crucial to the project, but also self-destructive, or, fiery.

Kenneth Burke’s notions of guilt and redemption help explain the process of redemption we see in this drama. He writes that

the negativistic principle of guilt implicit in the nature of order combines . . . the principles of thoroughness (or “perfection”) and substitution that are characteristic of symbol systems in such a way that the sacrificial principle of victimage (the “scapegoat”) is intrinsic to human congregation.⁷⁴⁸

In other words, guilt is the result of a disruption of the social order. Such guilt, in whatever form it appears (tension, anxiety, fear), is debilitating to society which therefore needs to be redeemed from this guilt. Redemption happens either through mortification or through victimage, the latter of which is a process of substitution and externalisation; substituting own guilt with that of a scapegoat, thus simultaneously externalising this guilt. Hereby, it becomes possible to rid society of this particular guilt (symbolically but also physically, exemplified with the Holocaust). This process will, however, repeat itself, as this cycle is “intrinsic to human congregation”.

⁷⁴⁵ Deacy, “Vulnerability of Athene”, 45.

⁷⁴⁶ Robson, “Bestiality and Bestial Rape”, 77. Robson further argues that in the ancient Greek world order gods may give into lust (Zeus had 100+ sexual partners), whereas humans may not which is why Zeus’s abduction and rape is not excessive or divergent—in contrast to Europa’s part in this sexual meeting. See Robson, 82. For an extensive list of Zeus’s partners, see Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 128–29.

⁷⁴⁷ Robson, “Bestiality and Bestial Rape”, 77.

⁷⁴⁸ Burke, “Dramatism”, 342.

Returning to the passage about Phoenix, Europe/Europa, and the EU, this process of redemption likewise works by means of both mortification and victimage. On the one hand, the separation between Europe and the European integration project is a way of externalising guilt by assigning Europe blame. On the other hand, though, a complete substitution and externalisation is not possible as Europe is fundamental to the European integration project. Therefore, we also see a process of mortification through expressions of self-damnation and the losing of one's soul.

In this sense, the guilt expressed through mortification is related to Althusser's notion of guilt in the act of interpellation: the subject turns around in self-recognition and/or guilt, which in Althusser's case, as Butler argues, is first and foremost religious guilt, compelled by conscience and/or a desire to be.⁷⁴⁹ through mortification, the subject receives a name, it is interpellated. In the analogy between the Phoenix and the EU, the EU names the guilty party (Europe), which is at one and the same time an object of victimage and mortification, part of itself and extrinsic to it. Europe is left behind and reborn at the same time.

A crucial component in this circle, not addressed by Burke, is forgiveness. As Fareld argues, forgiveness in Arendtian terms is conditioned by the act of remembering, not forgetting, and it "has the power of terminating something that otherwise would continue in infinity".⁷⁵⁰ Forgiving through remembering enables starting anew—again: Europe is forgiven, reintegrated, and rises again as the new Phoenix, a process that throughout is represented as an internal dynamic between Europe and the integration project. In the Phoenix analogy as composed in the New Narrative declaration, however, remembrance is not enacted in order to engage in a plural relationship with the past; rather, redemption fills the function of dissociating the EU from its violent and imperialist past;⁷⁵¹ to construct through fragmentation Europe's past as the Other.⁷⁵² In relation to Cebeci's critique of the EU's founding narrative as representing peace, this process of victimage and mortification thus gains a new meaning. The redemption offered by victimage and mortification is no longer simply a part of the process of healing society, but a stepping stone to the representation of the EU as a normative *exemplum* for the future and for other parts of the world that legitimises present policies of peacebuilding in those areas.

⁷⁴⁹ Butler, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects", 10–12.

⁷⁵⁰ Fareld, "Temporalt ansvar", 149. Quotes Arendt, *Människans villkor. Vita activa*, trans. Joachim Retzlaff (Göteborg: Daidalos 1998), 240. From the Swedish: "Förlåtelsen har kraften att 'avsluta något som annars skulle fortsätta i det oändliga'".

⁷⁵¹ Cebeci, "Representing Peace?", 300.

⁷⁵² Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity", 100.

If we explore the broader context of the New Narrative initiative, the personification of Europe with a soul to lose appears as a general frame of understanding. On March 3, 2014, two days after the New Narrative declaration was presented, Barroso gave a speech at a conference called “A Soul for Europe” in honour of an eponymous EU project, launched in 2004. In Barroso’s speech, he referred to the New Narrative initiative and declaration, and encouraged the audience to read and engage with the declaration. Furthermore, in her contribution in *Mind and Body*, Quaedvlieg-Mihailović cites “A Soul for Europe” as one of many platforms meant to promote New Narrative.⁷⁵³ Going back one year, Barroso stated in his New Narrative launch speech that “Europe calls on you because we cannot let people think that Europe is technocratic or bureaucratic. Europe has a soul, and that soul is its civilisation in all its rich creativity, its unity in diversity and, even, its contradictions”.⁷⁵⁴

Notably, this more general personification of Europe strikes a religious tone in the New Narrative declaration (Europe has lost its soul only to be redeemed and have its damaged soul restored) in conjunction with the image of the EU in the role of the saviour. The thought of losing one’s soul appears in three of the four gospels of the New Testament, here the Authorised King James Version (AV):

For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel’s, the same shall save it. For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?⁷⁵⁵

In the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV), the last phrase, “lose his own soul”, is replaced with the phrase “forfeit their life”.⁷⁵⁶ This change from soul to life displays a general affinity between life and soul in the different translations of the Bible into English, but also in Greek, as in each instance, life/soul is translated from the Greek *psychē* (ψυχή), meaning spirit, soul, or breath. The passage is often interpreted as a dissociation between a finite life in the material world and an eternal life in the city of God, in the words of Saint Augustine.⁷⁵⁷ Those who believe in God, and follow the values and norms laid out by his gospel may die, but live on in the heavenly realm. Those who care only for their earthly life die—or lose their soul.

⁷⁵³ Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”, 121.

⁷⁵⁴ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”, para. 30.

⁷⁵⁵ Mark 8:35–36 AV. Versions of these verses appear in Matthew 16:25–26 and Luke 9:24–25 as well.

⁷⁵⁶ Mark 8:35–36 NRSV.

⁷⁵⁷ Augustine and Merton, *City of God*.

In the New Narrative declaration, God has been replaced by the European integration project in the figure of the reborn Phoenix as the idea transcending individual human beings, the idea that has restored Europe, redeemed its peoples, and thus given back life and soul to Europe. In this way, the EU is figured as a transcendent, invariable presence, in much the same way as we saw in analysis of the myth of the EU flag in the previous chapter. However, through the discursive ambiguity between the EU and Europe specific to this engagement with the past, the character of Europe is ambivalent almost to the point of incongruency: Europe/Europa is, on the one hand, that which needs to be transcended; on the other, Europe/Europa functions as a gateway to a much larger context and history than the specific political union: Europe as a transhistorical idea, soul, and population.⁷⁵⁸

Restoring or Replacing the Foundation?

As I hope to have illustrated, the founding narrative plays an important role in the EU's constitutive rhetoric as the story of its inception. It centres on the immediate post-war period and the motivation to end war and the quest for enduring peace. But while none of the rhetorical agents in the initiatives explored here would disregard its importance, we see divergent opinions as to its significance today. Some contributors wish for a restoration of the founding narrative of peace. For example, Sneška Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, Secretary-General of the cultural heritage organisation Europa Nostra and member of the New Narrative cultural committee, states that "the entire European project . . . is a project for and about peace" and finds it necessary to recall "that Europe is at heart a peace narrative, a narrative about solidarity, mutual prosperity and, not least, about culture and a shared heritage".⁷⁵⁹ This is why it is important to repair the disconnection with the European values:

⁷⁵⁸ Forchtner and Kølvrå notes a very similar religious streak in a speech by Romano Prodi in 2003 when he was the president of the European Commission called *Europe: The Dream and the Choices*. Prodi states: "‘Never again’, said the founding fathers of Europe, and meant it, and so it was". As the two authors write, "On the one hand, ‘Never again’ (line 5) has—against the background of the Holocaust—become a rallying cry against contemporary anti-Semitism and evil in general. On the other, lines 5–6 contain an implicit biblical reference as Prodi aligns with the basic sentence structure of the story of Genesis (1:3), in which each account of an act of creation is introduced by the words ‘God said’ and concluded by ‘and so it was’". In much the same way as the personification of Europe and the discursive ambiguity between the EU/Europe, this reference to the story of the Genesis indicates "the sacredness of the founding fathers, making them the secular saints of the Union". Forchtner and Kølvrå, "Narrating a ‘New Europe’," 390.

⁷⁵⁹ Quaedvlieg-Mihailović in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, "Round Table", 137.

There's been a lot of discussion about disconnectedness. . . . [I]t's been used to pinpoint a disconnect between the EU and its citizens. When we were sort of working with this document [the New Narrative declaration], however, we had a different sort of disconnectedness in mind: our guiding sense was that there is, in Europe and especially in its political leadership, a disconnect with the values that are at the core of the European narrative.⁷⁶⁰

In other words, returning to the founding narrative and its core values of peace, solidarity, and prosperity is crucial in order for the EU citizens to reconnect, with each other and with the EU. Likewise, former prime minister of Slovenia Alenka Bratušek asserts that

Drafting a new narrative for Europe means we are recreating the moment in which the idea of a European Union was created. Its founding fathers wanted to build a better Europe — because they knew that war was not the answer. They dared to translate their dreams into reality. Peace became an absolute objective, cooperation a daily mission.⁷⁶¹

She ends her speech with an encouragement to not give up in times of difficulty, instead “we should look forward, always reviving anew the spirit of the founding fathers of the European Union”.⁷⁶² This wish to return to the moment of one's own foundation, to recreate the moment, to revive the spirit of the founding fathers, is contrasted to contributions that stress the fact that the founding narrative, at least partially, has lost its fundamental attraction. Economist and member of the cultural committee Tomáš Sedláček states that “war and peace were the issue in the old narrative. Thankfully, this is no longer the case: we now consider peace something normal and natural”, and concludes: “The original intent of the founding fathers of the EU is fulfilled”.⁷⁶³ Peace is “normal and natural”, it is “standard” and “automatic”, “not a goal but a starting point; so are freedom and trade”.⁷⁶⁴

Journalist and cultural committee member Per Nyholm makes similar, and rather bold, arguments, such as the following: “In the 21st century, war in Europe is no longer an option”,⁷⁶⁵ which he justifies by arguing that when “Europeans encounter problems”, they will be solved through discussion, not war: “Through the EU, we have made the transition from

⁷⁶⁰ Quaedvlieg-Mihailovic in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 136–37.

⁷⁶¹ Bratušek, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Slovenia at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 82.

⁷⁶² Bratušek, 84.

⁷⁶³ Sedláček, “Europe: Hidden in Plain Sight”, 191.

⁷⁶⁴ Sedláček, 191.

⁷⁶⁵ Nyholm, “Denmark in Europe”, 42.

canons to coffee tables”.⁷⁶⁶ These arguments are enabled by a conflation of Europe and the EU throughout his text. By Europe, he de facto means the EU, which he also terms “the Europe that works”.⁷⁶⁷ The allusion to Habermas (also one of the contributors to *Mind and Body*) in the transition from canons to coffee tables, underscores the conflation of area and institution by drawing on a much-idealised and normative view of a European public sphere of the eighteenth century. Consequently, the Europe in question signifies not simply the EU in its present form, but becomes a mythical signifier of a Europe that extends beyond the present moment: “This Europe is a never-ending story, and the unification of its many peoples, cultures and traditions will take time, possibly the rest of the 21st century”.⁷⁶⁸

Some of those who find the founding narrative outdated articulate a need for something new, something that can attract younger generations. According to then-Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou,

in the aftermath of World War II, the European founding fathers worked to build a community of people . . . in order to make peace an irreversible feature of Europe. . . . The power of western [*sic*] Europe’s founding narrative has, almost unsurprisingly, started to fade as the terrible story and pain of World Wars I and II started fading from our collective memory.⁷⁶⁹

Vassiliou proposes instead, in rather vague terms, a new vision, a new narrative, and a new legitimacy.⁷⁷⁰

In this way, the founding narrative in *Mind and Body* refers to an origin and a specific set of principles that are both given value and deemed outdated. It is thus problematised in a double sense: the founding narrative is regarded as valuable but has been neglected and fallen out of the collective memory even as it is viewed as outdated. It was a rightful place to begin, but has already been achieved and is thus less compelling today.

Others are more ambivalent about the state of the founding narrative. In his launch speech, Barroso seeks a “fresh impetus”: “We must also recognise that, while our Europe arose 60 years ago from the reconciliation between long-standing enemies, it must now find a fresh impetus in a new rapprochement”.⁷⁷¹ The notion of “our Europe” is worth noting, as he uses the same expression in his introduction to *Mind and Body*:

⁷⁶⁶ Nyholm, 42.

⁷⁶⁷ Nyholm, 42.

⁷⁶⁸ Nyholm, 43.

⁷⁶⁹ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 35.

⁷⁷⁰ Vassiliou, 34, 36.

⁷⁷¹ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”, para. 16.

Tearing down walls and building bridges has been our European story for the last six decades. We tore down the walls of mistrust, extreme nationalism and hatred, which had led to two world wars and to the worst genocide of the 20th century. And we built bridges. Working together, we have forged a new type of Union. A Union built on the shared values of peace, democracy, respect for human dignity and justice. That is the founding narrative of the European Union: to make war impossible among us by coming together through economic integration.⁷⁷²

Statements about “our Europe” and “our European story” function on two levels. They denote a demarcation of the member states of the EU in relation to Europe as a wider geographical area. But they also function as mythical signifiers of something more: an attitude towards each other, a wish for reconciliation, underlined by the idea of a “new rapprochement”, which indicates a previous rapprochement: we had the ability to reconcile before; we will be able to do it again. The second paragraph highlights similar traits: the ability to work together, tear down walls, and build bridges—this is the work of “our Europe”. In much the same way as the Phoenix analogy, “our Europe” and “our European story” exemplifies a discursive ambiguity that demarcates the boundaries between the EU and Europe while simultaneously intertwining the two. Barroso could simply have said “the EU”—so why does he not? The key is found in the pronouns *we/our*. Had he said that the EU built bridges and tore down walls, worked together and forged a new union, the message would, at best, be judged as slightly arrogant. Declaring that *we* built bridges and tore down walls, that *we* worked together and forged a new union allows Barroso to speak on behalf of not only EU supporters but also a wider range of citizens from old, new, and pending member states and to attribute all of these values and achievements to all of them.

Barroso continues to dwell on the importance of the values and achievements to “our European story”, arguing that we must not take them for granted. However, “without calling into question the validity of the European Union’s founding narrative, as a political project aimed at ensuring peace in Europe through economic integration, we should still ask: is that enough?”. He answers by saying that we need “to move beyond that”.⁷⁷³ The founding narrative is, in other words, still valid and useful, but needs to be amended.⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁷² Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 21–22.

⁷⁷³ Barroso, 23.

⁷⁷⁴ Another example of this ambivalent relationship with the founding narrative is found in the contribution of Michal Kleiber, who addresses “the overwhelming need to create a narrative that rightly interprets the past and successfully translates it into a prosperous future. Our strength lies in our past contributions and our contemporary ability, through

Accordingly, even if many of the contributors find it to be outdated and seek a new narrative, none except one contributor questions the peace narrative as the EU's founding narrative. During the round table debate on May 21, 2014, in which the New Narrative declaration was debated, Ritter turns to the section about the two World Wars and criticises the idea that war should be a thing of the past:

I don't see that. I see that the European Union, the member countries, are still very much involved in war. It is true that they may not be waging war, but they are selling weapons. There is, then, an indirect connection between the EU and the escalation of war situations outside of our so-called safe territory.⁷⁷⁵

Ritter refuses to recognise the dividing line between a before and after war and instead insists on a different kind of continuity than the one otherwise professed (to reaffirm values, to continue the path of civilisation, retrace the routes of European forefathers); the continuity Ritter insists on is a continuity of war. She views neither the two World Wars nor the enduring peace sought for by the EU as ruptures in history; war continued, and peace was never an irreversible fact.

Ritter's intervention receives no response, and the EU's contemporary involvement in war on foreign territory or weapon production⁷⁷⁶ is not brought up elsewhere in the publication.⁷⁷⁷ The only exception is then-German chancellor Angela Merkel, who similarly highlights how the motive of peacebuilding within Europe remains relevant:

Many people say that the peace mission has been accomplished. . . . However, we also know that the last war on our continent took place less than a generation ago—indeed, in the western Balkans, we are still trying to

art and science, to concentrate on the pursuit of wisdom and beauty, not destruction and violence". See Kleiber, "Humanistic and Scientific Sources", 100. Kleiber is keenly focused on the present and the future, and believes that the past is useful on the condition that it is useful to future endeavours. The "pursuit of wisdom and beauty" is, "destruction and violence" is not. This seems, according to Kleiber, to be the "right" interpretation.

⁷⁷⁵ Ritter in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, "Round Table", 134.

⁷⁷⁶ The weapon production in EU member states in the years 2015–2019, including the UK, holds a market share of 26% of the global weapon export, which places the EU at second place worldwide, only surpassed by the United States. See Kobešćak Smodiš and European Parliament, "EU Arms Exports".

⁷⁷⁷ Responses and other such interventions may have taken place during the live debates, which were edited for the purpose of the publication of *Mind and Body*. The debate on May 21, 2014, in which Ritter participated, lasted for two hours and the editors therefore "extracted a series of interventions that, between them, are representative of the range of reactions, positive and negative, offered that day". Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*, 132.

ensure lasting peace. We have to continue to stand up resolutely against extremism and inhumanity, which unfortunately are still present in today's Europe.⁷⁷⁸

In contrast to the general narrative in which war signified a time out of joint in the past meant to be unthinkable today, Merkel and Ritter both insist that time is still out of joint, that inhumanity is “still present in today's Europe”.⁷⁷⁹ As such, this narrative breaks with the politics of double time in which the present has restored ideal time. But in fact, though, the time of restoration has simply been moved from the present to the future. To Merkel, this restoration is a collective, political responsibility of the EU marked by a going forward and outward: “For peace in the western Balkans—and this must be said—can only be ensured via the promise of European Union membership”.⁷⁸⁰ Merkel's speech thus coheres with the founding narrative in general: the “representing peace”-narrative reaches beyond the past and into the present and future in Europe and elsewhere.

In sum, although none of the contributors opposes either the content of the founding narrative (representing peace) or its importance in terms of collective identity formation, its status in New Narrative is ambivalent (should it be restored or replaced?). The predominant view in the EU initiatives, most notably New Narrative, is that the EU/Europe is finished with violence and war and has entered a state of peace, which indicates a readiness to move forward, to continue the story, as Barroso phrases it. At the same time, we see a turn to the initial founding purpose in order to articulate visions of eternity: “to make peace an irreversible feature of Europe”⁷⁸¹ and “to make war impossible among us”.⁷⁸²

Exterior Validation of the Founding Narrative

In the same way as the scholarly literature, public discourse functions as exterior validation of the EU's founding narrative. The latter is perhaps most clearly and publicly manifested by the Norwegian Nobel Committee (NNC) who in 2012 awarded the EU the Nobel Peace Prize. The awarding of the prize corroborates that the quest for peace was and still is foundational to the EU and provides substance to the argument that the EU has succeeded in this endeavour:

⁷⁷⁸ Merkel, “Translation of the Speech Delivered by the Federal Chancellor of Germany at the Academy of the Arts, Berlin, on 1 March 2014”, 114.

⁷⁷⁹ Merkel, 114.

⁷⁸⁰ Merkel, 115.

⁷⁸¹ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 35.

⁷⁸² Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 22.

The union and its forerunners have for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe. . . . The dreadful suffering in World War II demonstrated the need for a new Europe. Over a seventy-year period, Germany and France had fought three wars. Today war between Germany and France is unthinkable.⁷⁸³

The NNC chairman Thorbjørn Jagland further states that the NNC wishes to “call to mind what the European Union means for peace in Europe”, because “what this continent has achieved is truly fantastic, from being a continent of war to becoming a continent of peace. In this process the European Union has figured most prominently”.⁷⁸⁴ In accordance with the Phoenix analogy, the EU is figured as the agent responsible for setting the time straight: the EU has turned the world on its head and restored ideal time.

In much the same way as the contributions in *Mind and Body*, peace is represented in a double sense in the NNC’s rhetoric: The EU both represents (*vertreten*) and re-presents (*darstellen*) peace, internally as well as externally. The prospect of becoming a member of the union is a driving force in the work for peace, democracy, and human rights which, in turn, means following the model laid out. This was so after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when “the new democracies, too, wished to become parts of the West, militarily, economically and culturally. In that connection membership of the EU was a self-evident objective”.⁷⁸⁵ Moreover, “the admission of Croatia as a member next year, the opening of membership negotiations with Montenegro, and the granting of candidate status to Serbia all strengthen the process of reconciliation in the Balkans” in the same ways as “in the past decade, the possibility of EU membership for Turkey has also advanced democracy and human rights in that country”.⁷⁸⁶ This view of the EU as the normative model is encapsulated in the Jagland’s final words: “Congratulations to Europe. In the end we decided to live together. May other continents follow”.⁷⁸⁷ The fact that the situation in Turkey today looks very different—both in terms of democracy and human rights and the status of their membership—only highlights the indeterminacy of “the end” to which Jagland pledges. Unfortunately, recent tensions in the Balkans might indicate a similar development.

⁷⁸³ The Norwegian Nobel Committee, “Nobel Peace Prize 2012 Press Release”, para. 1–2.

⁷⁸⁴ Jagland, “The Nobel Peace Prize 2012 Ceremony Speech”, para. 51.

⁷⁸⁵ Jagland, para. 26.

⁷⁸⁶ The Norwegian Nobel Committee, “Nobel Peace Prize 2012 Press Release”, para. 4.

⁷⁸⁷ Jagland, “The Nobel Peace Prize 2012 Ceremony Speech”, para. 55.

Both the purpose and realisation of EU's founding narrative as a project of continuous work for peace as well as the EU's normative aspirations in contemporary peacebuilding/statebuilding practices are thus enforced and validated through the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize.⁷⁸⁸ This narrative and its validation is problematic not only because it is misleading (the quest for peace was not the only founding purpose of integration, as Hansen and Jonsson show). It is also problematic because, as Cebeci argues, in places of contested statehood, such as Kosovo, the EU's normative model of peacebuilding is applied in ways that turn political questions into technocratic and thus depoliticised questions because the EU prioritises stability over reform,⁷⁸⁹ but also due to its normative model: "By imposing their own model and 'best practices' through a claim to be representing peace, Europeans maintain the right to decide about the future of the target societies and set what is normal for them".⁷⁹⁰

We can read these political and narrative practices as examples of the politics of double time through which redemption and forgiveness is sought by restoring a time out of joint in other places. "Today the European integration process stands against all forms of war",⁷⁹¹ as the New Narrative declaration announces. The real time of the EU's neighbouring countries and continents should be fixed.⁷⁹²

Finally, it must be noted that the prevalence and normalisation of this narrative obscures the possibility of other foundations at odds with the narrative of peace. For instance, many candidate countries and newer members from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements are members of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. The peace narrative does not represent their experiences and interpretations of the past. Although the "structural similarities in the way European identity has been formulated" in both Eastern and Western Europe are masked by the supposed opposition between the two,⁷⁹³ there is no getting around that Eastern and

⁷⁸⁸ Cebeci, "Representing Peace?", 301.

⁷⁸⁹ Cebeci, 305.

⁷⁹⁰ Cebeci, 306.

⁷⁹¹ Deventer et al., "Declaration", 127.

⁷⁹² Alexander Stagnell takes a different approach and argues that this effort to bring perpetual peace to Europe (and beyond) "should be approached as nothing more than a mirage so that out of its solution the proper contradiction, signified by the rabble, may emerge". See Stagnell, "Alliance of War and Peace", 212. In other words, the contradiction between war and peace serves as a distraction from the original, internal contradiction between—in my simplified account—neo-liberal and socialist forces within the EU institutions and among its citizens.

⁷⁹³ Case, "Being European: East and West", 131. Historian Holly Case argues that the diverging historiographies of East and West are false opposites because the understanding of 'Europeanness' is structurally similar in both 'halves', as she terms them: "Historically,

Central European countries have very different historical experiences and memories than their Western neighbours. Therefore, as Chiari Bottici and Benoît Challand argue, “when it comes to writing the history of Europe, the center of gravity must be readjusted, giving more space to Central and Eastern European experiences, voices, and projects”.⁷⁹⁴ Imposing “a certain past” and “a certain mode of dealing with it” on countries and populations that only recently were rid of external domination goes against the fundamental value of freedom and autonomy.⁷⁹⁵

As the recent conflict between EU member Bulgaria and EU candidate North Macedonia exposes, other disconnections (e.g., language, national identity, and national historiography) than the ones highlighted in the EU’s historiography are important to bear in mind. And in this case, they have very tangible consequences for North Macedonia’s aspirations to become a member of the EU.

In the next section, we turn our attention towards the new narrative. While the founding narrative focuses on the event of Europe becoming the EU, the new narrative reverses this direction and turns from the EU to Europe in search of a collective identity.

A New Narrative: Revisiting the Past

This turn to Europe and thus to a past beyond the EU may be one of the most noticeable characteristics of the search for a new narrative. In New Narrative, two disconnections—with the EU and the past, respectively—are articulated. The contributions in *Mind and Body* therefore propose to revisit the grandeur of a past, which seems to have been forgotten, in order for citizens to reconnect with their past, and by extension, the EU. Verbs such as “restore”, “reinstate”, “regain”, “reaffirm”, “retrace”, and “revive” are prominent and suggest a return to and retrieval of something glorious, which Europe—and, again by extension, the EU—has always embodied: “Confidence in Europe needs to be *regained*. In light of the current global trends, the values of human dignity and democracy must be *reaffirmed*”.⁷⁹⁶ And more elaborately,

attempts to conceptualize a European identity are rooted in these localized . . . experiences and initiatives” but “national elites [have] cast [them] in universalist terms”. Case, 111–12.

⁷⁹⁴ Bottici and Challand, *Imagining Europe*, 83.

⁷⁹⁵ Bottici and Challand, 67, 81. The authors rely on Cornelis Castoriadis’s concept of autonomy understood as “the ability to give the law to oneself through formal rights and, more generally, the capacity of autoinstitution on a cognitive level”. A society, then, needs “to be able to choose both the institutions by which to govern itself . . . and the cognitive ways through which it thinks and speaks of itself”. Bottici and Challand, 67. Collective remembrance is an example of the latter and therefore must not be decided upon by others.

⁷⁹⁶ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126, my emphasis.

Europe is a state of mind rooted in its shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law. Today, vigilance is required to continuously *reaffirm* and build upon those fundamental values and principles that, from the outset, have been deeply embedded in the “raison d’être” of Europe. They need to be *reactivated* and made relevant for the European citizens.⁷⁹⁷

The origin of these values (peace, freedom, democracy, and rule of law) is ambiguous: What does the prefix *re-* refer back to? To the “peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law” established in the post-war period and thus with the EU as a driving force? Or to Athenian democracy and Roman law? We see the implications of this ambiguity most clearly in the idea of a “‘raison d’être’ of Europe”. Europe is figured as much more than simply a geographical landmass or a collection of nation states; Europe has a purpose of its own, a characteristic underlined by the fact that the expression “raison d’être” most often is used in conjunction with the EU, a political agent—not Europe.

So, as we shall see in the following, even though the EU is inconsistent in its relationship with the past (should we transcend former divisions or should we remember and thus return to them in order to invoke the foundational values of the EU that helped us overcome these divisions?), the EU’s politics of remembrance is consistent in its search for a proper foundation—a beginning that has lasting potential, as the former no longer works, a beginning that can provide a whole and unified source of identification for time to come. For this reason, most of the contributions analysed in this section speak almost exclusively about Europe. In only very few places, when conclusions based on the historical narrative are made about the current state of affairs, is the discursive ambiguity—central to the founding narrative—present in the new narrative. In the context of the new narrative, then, the general and publicly normalised ambiguity between the EU, Europe, and Europa enables the construction of this historical narrative in the first place.

As Gerard Delanty observes, in ancient times, “the term ‘Europeans’ was rarely used. . . . This suggests that the notion of Europe was at most a geographical idea and was not yet a cultural idea of significance, still less a political identity”.⁷⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the rhetorical practice of creating a transhistorical community between, for example, Europe of Antiquity and contemporary Europe is a practice not solely within the EU, but in scholarship and public discourse as well. Historian Christopher Clark notes in the ZDF documentary *A Story of Europe*, that *Pax Romana*, the territorially extensive peace among the large and diverse population of the Roman

⁷⁹⁷ Deventer et al., 127, my emphasis.

⁷⁹⁸ Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, 22.

Empire, could be described as a “proto-European” civilization,⁷⁹⁹ although the territory of the Roman Empire looked very different from what we today call Europe—let alone the territory of the EU. Similarly, in his introduction to the anthology *The Idea of Europe*, historian and political scientist Anthony Pagden posits:

One feature of this difference [from other areas of the world], which in various ways has remained constant over time, is the belief that Europeans have always pursued roughly similar political ends. The forms of government . . . have, of course, varied widely. But all of the governments have subscribed to the idea that freedom of individual choice and protection by a universal system of law was the necessary condition for what the Greeks defined as ‘the good life’.⁸⁰⁰

Pagden proceeds to argue that “observers of the peculiar identity of Europe”, ranging from Strabo to Montesquieu, have identified “some conception of liberty as the defining feature of all the societies of Europe”, or, at least, “the Christian Latin West”.⁸⁰¹

Clark’s and Pagden’s much-idealised versions of European history is balanced by discussions about colonialism, religious wars, and other atrocities that have accompanied principles of liberty, freedom, and the rule of law. Clark allocates much time to explain imperialism, the triangular trade, enslavement, and colonialism. Likewise, Pagden critiques existing writings of European history, such as the idea that “only Europe possessed the ‘Faustian power’ to reconstruct it in its own image”,⁸⁰² which, according to Pagden, is founded on “shaky empirical and historical evidence”.⁸⁰³ As a result, he does not claim that the principle of liberty—or “the triumph of a conception of the world”,⁸⁰⁴ as he writes—is used solely for morally acceptable purposes; he simply claims its existence as a kind of transhistorical European ideology. In this way, Pagden constructs a red thread from Antiquity up until today by way of pointing out transhistorical European characteristics.

Of course, historical foundations exist and are important to historiography, but there is more than one thread, and they end at different places and at different times and interweave in various ways. As many before me have pointed out, what we include or leave out of our historical narratives

⁷⁹⁹ ZDF, 2018, first episode: <https://curiositystream.com/series/371/the-story-of-europe-with-historian-dr-christopher-clark>.

⁸⁰⁰ Pagden, *The Idea of Europe*, 3–4.

⁸⁰¹ Pagden, 4.

⁸⁰² Pagden, 11.

⁸⁰³ Pagden, 11.

⁸⁰⁴ Pagden, 10.

and how we frame and contextualise these parts, matters. And in this specific case, it matters to the EU's formation of a transhistorical collective subject.

The specific topoi and broader themes used as historiographical resources in these narratives are often difficult to separate in the reading and interpretation of the artefacts in which one topos can serve different functions. For instance, the Renaissance often signifies a specific, historical epoch and thus functions as the denotative, linguistic sign, but at times, it also signifies a certain way of thinking, a way of looking at the world—a transhistorical trait—and in this sense functions as a connotative, mythical signifier. Similarly, Antiquity often signifies an historical period or physical site (most often ancient Greece and Rome), but just as often figures in contexts that bring critical thinking, cultural richness, and democracy to the fore.

In the following, I explore the EU's revisit of the past in New Narrative and trace the most important heritage in order to unfold their significations and implications: a cultural and Christian heritage, and a critical, political, and philosophical heritage. At the end, I explore the rhetorical practices of managing the colonial heritage.

A Cultural and Christian Heritage

Important cultural epochs and origins, specific places and architecture, as well as a set of values and norms are at the centre of this heritage, often described in a romanticised and, in some cases, Eurocentric rhetoric. Costa Carras, president of the Hellenic Society for the protection of Cultural Heritage and Environment, exemplifies this tendency when he highlights a cultural legacy embodied by the Greek island Patmos that serves as a guiding figure throughout his contribution. Patmos thus functions as “a revelation of Europe”:

Patmos is an island of exceptional beauty. Its indented coastline rivals the finest lace-work. The houses of the world heritage site of Chora, densely clustered around the 11th century monastery fortress of St John the Evangelist, are each one very different yet all in harmony with one another. Patmos has a unique history of creative survival against long *[sic]* odds.⁸⁰⁵

This romantic description of Patmos serves as an analogy to Europe, after which Carras takes a step back and wonders where the cultural legacy on Patmos comes from:

⁸⁰⁵ Carras, “Revelation of Europe”, 208.

Assuming that it is indeed unique, does that mean that its culture is regional, or national? The more I examined this proposition, the more incorrect it appeared. The architecture of the houses in Chora reflects a mixture chiefly of Byzantine and Gothic features, combined with a few added elements from the Renaissance and the Islamic world, a style created in Rhodes under the Knights of St John between 1309 and 1522. The majority of icons on Patmos were painted between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries by artists from Crete, which at the time was under Venetian rule. These artists were used to painting in both the western and the eastern [sic] Christian styles.⁸⁰⁶

Carras shows how the cultural heritage on Patmos has accumulated over a long period of time and how it is marked by different styles (Byzantine, Gothic, Christian, Islamic), places (Crete, Rhodes), and persons (the Knights of St John, artists from Crete), all of which intersect on this small island. They function as linguistic signs, then, but also mythical signifiers: together, they turn Patmos into a synecdoche for Europe and a projection of how it could be in the future: diverse, but in harmony.

Several other *Mind and Body* contributors trace a European cultural legacy, often in similar romanticised descriptions. Composer Jonathan Mills, member of the New Narrative cultural committee, focuses on “moments throughout history when Europe has been at its most innovative”, moments characterised by a “close proximity and collaboration” between the arts and sciences:

We see this in Athens during the Golden Age, in Rome during the Augustan era; we see it in the openness and energy that was regained during the Renaissance, especially in Italy, and brought with it a ‘sudden efflorescence of creative life in the sciences and the arts’.⁸⁰⁷

The ancient Athenian and Roman world as well as the Renaissance are highlighted as especially useful eras that embody certain ways of thinking and interacting with the community. From this account, he turns to a description of a European cultural heritage in which Europe is measured against other places in the world:

Compared to places such as China or India, Europe enjoys a significant advantage, even in many less developed regions, due to centuries of careful nurturing and local patronage, with an impressive array of public buildings

⁸⁰⁶ Carras, 208–9.

⁸⁰⁷ Mills, “Some Reflections”, 202. Mills does not provide a reference to his quote, but in a text written in a different context, he refers to psychiatrist and literary scholar Iain McGilchrist’s book *The Master and His Emissary; the Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World*. See Mills, “Jonathan Mills”.

from ancient amphitheatres, mediaeval churches and monasteries, to baroque theatres and modernist museums. Europe is quite simply the envy of the world for the quality and authenticity of its cultural architecture.⁸⁰⁸

In this comparative setting, the idea of European exceptionalism is fundamental to his claim: Europe is the envy of the world. He presents the highly questionable claim that European architecture is not only more impressive than Chinese and Indian architecture, it is also more authentic. Mills refrains from considering that most of what we today call Europe, but certainly not the entire region, has been in the privileged situation to be able to go through “centuries of careful nurturing and local patronage”, while not extending the same privilege to former colonies—such as India and areas in China.

The New Narrative declaration also describes specific places worth revisiting and derives a cultural origin and genealogy. The declaration’s first part (out of three) is characterised by an anaphora, initiating six consecutive paragraphs with the phrase “Europe is a state of mind . . .”. In the third paragraph, this state of mind consists of

students, researchers, scholars, artists, professionals and politicians who live, study, work, think and travel across national borders . . . They retrace and revive the routes of the men and women who, since Antiquity, and increasingly during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, developed for Europe a shared grammar of music and art, a common body of science and philosophy, an astonishingly rich literature and a thriving trade networks.⁸⁰⁹

This appraisal of a European “state of mind”, which I examine more closely in the next chapter, draws upon two different temporalities. On the one hand, time is progressive (Antiquity → Renaissance → Enlightenment); on the other hand, this progression is cyclical and directs progression back to its origin. Contemporary EU citizens are reliving, retracing, and reviving the routes of men and women since Antiquity. As a result, time seems to be progressive and cyclical at the same time and aims at a restoration and repetition of both the initial foundation and the historical development.

Both progressive and cyclical temporality appear throughout the declaration. The movement *past-present-future* is especially ubiquitous:

Europe’s history has been marked by splendours and miseries. Its Jewish, Greco-Roman and Christian foundations were always confronted with the

⁸⁰⁸ Mills, “Some Reflections”, 203.

⁸⁰⁹ Deventer et al., “Declaration,” 126.

beliefs of other religions and systems of government. Europe's state of mind matured and found a balance only in the modern era and after the terrible disasters of the 20th century led to the idea of unity in diversity.⁸¹⁰

Strikingly here is how time is progressive and simultaneously comes to a halt in the present. Europe has been emancipated, Europe's state of mind has "matured and found a balance". Quaadvlieg-Mihailović similarly writes that Europe's *raison d'être* "has been in the making in the course of many centuries and crystallised in the last 100 years".⁸¹¹ We see a tension in these arguments between the image of a history in the making over several centuries and the claim that the twentieth century marks the time of maturity and balance, its crystallisation. The last century, then, stands out among all previous centuries as the one taking interpretative primacy of Europe's *raison d'être*. Recalling the prominent position of the founding narrative in both the declaration and in other contributions in *Mind and Body*, we can read this tension as a way of highlighting the founding narrative of the EU: the new narrative needs to be founded on European history in its entirety, but the founding narrative still constitutes its core, the break in history that enabled the current epoch of peace. But this historiography also exemplifies the ideal, progressive temporality in which knowledge and advancement characterise the present. From this position a restoration of the incomplete past is possible.

The movement *past-present-future* is also figured in the previously cited paragraph: "Europe is a source of inspiration from the past, emancipation in the present, and an aspiration towards a sustainable future".⁸¹² As described, Buhre uses this passage as an exemplification of temporal collapse. Although it seems to invoke a movement from the past into the future, the temporal imaginary in this passage sets limits both in terms of action and identity formation, and thus forms an "a-temporal political imaginary".⁸¹³ In other words, the seemingly temporal movement (*past-present-future*) in the two paragraphs above *do* suggest a going back to move forward, but of the authoritarian kind. The past, present, and future—inspiration, emancipation, aspiration—have collapsed and therefore political agency is impaired, because all that is left is a future repetition of what already was.

In short, the concurrence of progressive and cyclical time creates a sense of continuity and transhistoricity that enables the argument that EU citizens will find the future in the familiar, they need to go back to move

⁸¹⁰ Deventer et al., 127.

⁸¹¹ Quaadvlieg-Mihailović, "Towards Europe's New Renaissance", 122.

⁸¹² Deventer et al., "Declaration", 126.

⁸¹³ Buhre, "Speaking Other Times", 142.

forward, but not through critical engagement as envisioned in Arendtian remembrance. Rather, what is envisioned is an authoritarian and restorative engagement with the past.⁸¹⁴ The resources of this restoration are not figured solely as specific physical sites or heritage in the denotative sense of the word, but rather connote something esoteric—a spirit, a way of thinking, a mental space.

As presented in chapter 3, an issue of debate during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty in 2001–2004 was whether the treaty should declare a Christian origin and heritage. The compromise solution was to exclude any references to God and Christianity and instead include the paragraph

DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.⁸¹⁵

The debate continued, however, even after the Constitutional Treaty had been put on ice, and it continues today, most predominantly in the debate concerning the accession of Turkey into the EU,⁸¹⁶ the process of which, has grown increasingly tense and put on hold.

In *Mind and Body*, the question of a Christian foundation and its role in European identity formation is never discussed explicitly. The invocation of a Christian heritage is rather implicit. We see references to specific themes of Christian aesthetics, architecture, and co-existence with other religions⁸¹⁷ and to “the values of Christian civilisation”, which is a “basic source of our identity”⁸¹⁸ and part of Europe’s “Jewish, Greco-Roman and Christian foundations”.⁸¹⁹ Furthermore, although two of the primary symbols of transcendence and continuity in the publication, the Phoenix and Europa, are not Christian but rather taken from folklore and mythology, both myths have strong religious ties, as I hope to have made clear (Europa through her affinity with the Virgin Mary (see chapter 4), Phoenix through its figuration of the EU as the saviour, as explored earlier in this chapter).

Europa appears explicitly in Nyholm’s wide-ranging narrative of European history, although in this narrative, she is contrasted to Christianity.

⁸¹⁴ Buhre, 152.

⁸¹⁵ European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 9.

⁸¹⁶ Barbulescu and Andreescu, “References to God”, 211.

⁸¹⁷ Carras, “Revelation of Europe”, 209; Mills, “Some Reflections”, 203.

⁸¹⁸ Tusk, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013”, 55.

⁸¹⁹ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 127.

Nyholm identifies two origins: a mythical Antiquity and a real and Christian Middle Ages, here quoted in near entirety:

Real Europe emerges in the 7th century, a civilisation located along the eastern coast of the Atlantic. Gregory the Great is dead, Charlemagne not yet born. Byzantium is nearing its apogee, only to sink slowly. . . . Soon the Norse, the Balts, the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Hungarians and many in emergent Rus will join the new religion of the West. Suddenly Europe is there, the Europe of artists and artisans, of peasants and workers, of cities and universities, of Roman and Gothic churches, the Renaissance and the Baroque, the Europe of crusades and pogroms, of the plague and discoveries, of witch-hunts and humanists, of revolutions and liberties. The Europe of Antiquity was a Phoenician princess on the back of Zeus, the white bull; Medieval Europe turns her into a political idea and a continent of human flesh and blood. This Europe is a never-ending story, and the unification of its many peoples, cultures and traditions will take time, possibly the rest of the 21st century.⁸²⁰

In Nyholm's narrative, the emergence of "real Europe" coincides with the dawn of Christianity ("the new religion of the West") and the Middle Ages. Nyholm defines this realness as being "a political idea and a continent of human flesh and blood", manifested by a long list of examples from artists and peasants to witch-hunts and revolutions, the accumulation itself a testimony to the emergence and the realness. But he identifies another, much earlier, origin as well, namely the "Europe of Antiquity", ambiguously signifying a geographical area at a specific time, but also the mythical figure Europa. Nyholm juxtaposes Europe of Antiquity and Medieval Europe and describes a transformation from something purely mythological (a princess carried away by a god, in the shape of a bull) to something political and tangible (human flesh and blood), something opaque turning translucent: "Suddenly Europe was there", a place and civilisation arises. By specifying origin as the time when Christianity spread across Europe, space (Europe), time (seventh century), and religious world order (Christianity) to a large degree align.⁸²¹ We also see a transition from passivity to action: Europa was abducted, taken away against her will; Medieval Europe turns Europe around, it acts, builds, travels of its own will and force. In this way, "Europe" signifies a way of thinking that has the power to act in the world; we almost get the sense that history begins through this transformation.

⁸²⁰ Nyholm, "Denmark in Europe", 43.

⁸²¹ A good example of how easily continental delimitation coincides with a cultural and/or religious delimitation.

A very similar pattern unfolds in Nyholm's narrative about Denmark's role in Europe: "Denmark is an inseparable part of the European drama, which began with the disappearance of Western Rome in the 5th century. The following centuries are covered by darkness. But from 800 on, the Danes are there. As Vikings they give and they take".⁸²² Again, we see a transformation from a period of darkness to emergence, an emergence that aligns with that of the Vikings and Denmark's transition to Christianity.⁸²³ Interesting in this context is how the specified origins—Denmark's entrance into Europe and the emergence of the "Real Europe"—coincide with their Christianisation.

A Critical, Political, and Philosophical Heritage

As the previous examples have shown, Antiquity is a rich resource in the historiography of the EU, sometimes signifying a specific historical period or a physical place, other times connoting a broader meaning as a cultural and political dwelling point. For instance, "ancient times" is referenced briefly in 'A People's Europe' in relation to sports—it was "an important forum for communication among peoples", then as now.⁸²⁴ In the context of creating a transhistorical collective subject, the topos "ancient times" enthymematically becomes an argument about continuity and tradition, because something that has been part of European cultures for so long should probably continue to be so. This is of course not a particularly good argument, but nonetheless common.

A recurrent theme in *Mind and Body* is the critical, political, and philosophical heritage of Antiquity. Carras, for example, states that democratic legitimacy builds on "a model first formulated in ancient Athens and revived by radical thinkers of the Enlightenment" and "administrative and legal legitimacy, flowing from above, on the pattern set by Ancient Rome and developed in many European states over subsequent centuries".⁸²⁵ Antiquity is invoked to mobilise a political legacy, a practice as well as principle whose origin can be traced to a historical time and place. Editor of *Mind and Body* and curator Nicola Setari similarly resorts to a "Greek origin" to invoke a philosophical and critical legacy. Perhaps Euroscepticism is not the enemy it is made to be, he says: "What if instead we decided to subvert the negative understanding of scepticism and recover the critical legacy the word and philosophy vehicle starting from their Greek

⁸²² Nyholm, 42.

⁸²³ Denmark's Christianisation is generally thought to have happened around 950, testified on a runestone (*Jellingestenen*), but it followed from a long transitional period starting with the conversion of the Vikings.

⁸²⁴ Adonnino, "People's Europe", 26.

⁸²⁵ Carras, "Revelation of Europe", 210.

origin? [*sic*]”.⁸²⁶ In his view, this is the platform New Narrative seeks to create. Kleiber likewise invokes “the Greeks” to highlight how European philosophy has set “standards for the world”:

European philosophy and its daughter, science, come from the Greeks and, speaking broadly, from the systems created by Plato and Aristotle. . . . European philosophy and science have created standards for the world, whose indisputable foundations include rationalism, empiricism, thoroughness, courage and a never-ending search for truth.⁸²⁷

Kleiber furthermore claims that European philosophy, from Plato to Hegel, has been “a source of inspiration for humanity’s greatest discoveries and scientific achievements”.⁸²⁸ In this way, both Setari and Kleiber identify specific places, times, or persons from Antiquity as well as correlations between these origins and their legacies today. While Setari indicates a break in history (since this legacy needs to be recovered), Kleiber creates a continuous, transhistorical and Eurocentric narrative in which European philosophy has set “standards for the world”.

The different aspects of this heritage—political, philosophical, and critical—merge in the contribution by philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry, although he does not trace it all the way back to Antiquity. Ferry wishes to create a conceptual framework wherein an “open identity” that renounces the idea of roots and heritage values can be created. Such an identity

contains none of that inward-looking ‘identifying identity’ constructed around its spiritual roots and desiring above all to assert its distinctiveness. Political Europe would misjudge its philosophical principle if it were to fall back on its heritage values, turning them into a promotional catalogue to be used as grounds for excluding anything that is not ‘European’ from a cultural heritage perspective.⁸²⁹

Ferry therefore calls for a “decentred narrative” of Europe and a “critical history”, by which he means a narrative

which, contrary to a propagandist apology, does not overlook the urgent need for a critical history, that of an integration which, inspired by the noblest of energies, was also blighted by delusions, blindness and

⁸²⁶ Setari in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 133. The sentence is incomplete, probably due to the fact that it was part of an oral debate. What is meant is perhaps: “to recover the critical legacy, the word [rhetorical practices?] and philosophical vehicle”.

⁸²⁷ Kleiber, “Humanistic and Scientific Sources”, 98.

⁸²⁸ Kleiber, 98.

⁸²⁹ Ferry, “Telos, Nomos, Ethos”, 92–93.

disappointments, and is now opening up to challenges which have not yet been properly responded to.⁸³⁰

To perform such critical history, “the long-severed link with the philosophical Europe”⁸³¹ must be re-established, a Europe which, according to Ferry, begins in the Enlightenment and continues up until the end of WWII.⁸³² The continuity between these two points is established by “a civilisation of writing, dialogue, deliberation, argumentation and debate—this is where “the uniqueness of political Europe stands out”⁸³³

Ferry thus cites the failures of the EU in dealing and engaging with the past in a critical manner and its efforts at collective identity formation, and, instead, suggests an open identity paired with a critical history: one without the other will not do—“mutual recognition” is only possible if it follows from a “recognition of the violence . . . inflicted on each other in the past”.⁸³⁴ Ferry thus revisits the philosophical past with which he seeks to re-establish severed links, but he does not consider the role of this philosophical past in the blindness and delusions he criticises; blindness and delusions that he, furthermore, refrains from specifying and naming. Ferry seeks to engage with the past in an agonistic—plural and critical—manner; but he does so by reconnecting with and restoring a philosophical heritage that in many ways was instrumental to the violence and blindness of the past and thus with that which, according to Ferry, must be critiqued. It is, of course, possible to use those same tools in a critical history, but doing so requires that critique be directed towards not only the concrete actions of violence and blindness, but also towards the tools with which they were made possible.

A final example of the invocation of this heritage is made by philosopher Czesław Porębski, who argues that “Europe” has a responsibility to be an active participant in global politics:

Taking the appropriate share of responsibility is a duty that Europe has imposed on itself. This duty is grounded in centuries of European involvement in global politics, in culture that Europe brought to different parts of the world and in those basic values that Greeks and Christians bequeathed to Europe and the world. A very special ground for living up to this duty is to be found in Europe’s recent history, a history of totalitarian experiments, of two world wars and of the export of revolutions and

⁸³⁰ Ferry, 94.

⁸³¹ Ferry, 92.

⁸³² Ferry, 93.

⁸³³ Ferry, 93.

⁸³⁴ Ferry, 93.

virulent nationalisms. Europe then became the debtor of the rest of the world. It is high time to pay back one's debts.⁸³⁵

Porębski identifies a history of European involvement with the world, politically and culturally, emanating from the Greeks and Christians—involvement with both positive consequences in the distant past (bringing culture and “basic values” to the world) and negative consequences more recently with the beginning of the twentieth century (fascism, totalitarianism). According to Porębski, those negative consequences should not cause Europe to retreat as they make Europe “the debtor of the rest of the world”, in terms not of an economic but rather a moral responsibility to continue this history of involvement; to assume “a global role”; to “become a global player”, which, according to Porębski, is the hope and expectation of the “rest of the world”.⁸³⁶ Porębski's argument is based on the premise that “Europe's current role, that of a more or less hands-off observer and critic, will not be enough”,⁸³⁷ and that other candidates will step in and fill the vacuum if Europe fails to live up to this responsibility. Here, we see traces from the call made by Willy Brandt in the years before the 1973-declaration, and many EU politicians since then, to foster the ability to “speak with one voice”. Therefore, Europe needs to retrieve the substance of its former urge to involve itself; to turn a former negative urge to involve itself (colonialism, imperialism) into positive involvement (this positive involvement, the global role of Europe, is formulated in rather vague terms, but Porębski mentions facing and solving “the main, global, problems” and preventing “political and humanitarian catastrophes”).⁸³⁸

In other words, according to Porębski, to pay the debt resulting from global involvement in the past, Europe must recontinue this involvement, but in a better way, by retrieving and drawing on a positive heritage.

A Colonial Heritage? Euphemisms, Allusions, and Silences

Porębski and Ferry exemplify the general reluctance to specify the delusions and omissions of the past by using allusions and euphemisms instead (“European involvement” is an example of the latter). This tendency highlights the political nature of the practice of naming. In *Mind and Body*, the EU's relations with neighbouring countries and continents in the past and present in terms of colonial traces are first and foremost thematised through hints and allusions: There is a critique of “‘progress’, which

⁸³⁵ Porębski, “Borders of the European Union”, 59–60.

⁸³⁶ Porębski, 59.

⁸³⁷ Porębski, 59.

⁸³⁸ Porębski, 59.

implies the concept of conquering the (supposedly virgin) space before us”,⁸³⁹ “the costs” of past achievements are mentioned,⁸⁴⁰ and the aforementioned “delusions, blindness and disappointments”.⁸⁴¹

Even in more extensive examples, this ambiguity and ambiguity around naming is striking. For example, curator and museum director Okwui Enwezor asks Barroso about

the presence of subminorities, by which I mean those inhabitants of Europe whose connection to Europe are, at best, at least in the political sense, tenuous, indeterminate and extremely fragile. And so Mr President, my question is this: in this moment of what I would call intense proximity, proximity between different constructs, between citizens and inhabitants, how do we deal with subminorities, and not with the minorities encompassed by the New Narrative for Europe?⁸⁴²

Enwezor does not specify whom he means by “subminorities” with a fragile and indeterminate “connection to Europe” or “intense proximity”, and remains vague about these allusions to, in my interpretation, colonial relations between Europe and Africa that today are made visible through the presence of African migrants in the EU. Barroso answers Enwezor’s question in terms of xenophobia and nationalism in Europe, problems which the EU actively seeks to counter, not least through laws against discrimination, Barroso posits.⁸⁴³ In accordance with the Phoenix analogy, Europe—EU citizens who vote for anti-EU parties and xenophobic movements—are at fault while the EU is trying to make things right.

Architect and member of the cultural committee Rem Koolhaas, who also participated in the domino conversation, interacts tellingly with Barroso. Koolhaas says:

There are indeed problems in Europe, and perhaps one of them is that the European narrative is always constructed around achievement. . . . Of course, we have the right to be shocked by every ISIS beheading, but, at the same time, considering our own history, it would maybe be more sympathetic or more profound if we started to collaborate on the basis of our own terrible past, and not on indignation about how other people behave.⁸⁴⁴

⁸³⁹ Pistoletto, “Third Paradise”, 196.

⁸⁴⁰ Quaedvlieg–Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”, 123.

⁸⁴¹ Ferry, “Telos, Nomos, Ethos”, 94.

⁸⁴² Enwezor in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 160.

⁸⁴³ Barroso in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 160–61.

⁸⁴⁴ Koolhaas in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 162.

Further along, he says that “we are represented everywhere based on our colonial history. It would be a really great gesture if we stepped back from that”.⁸⁴⁵ Barroso answers this intervention by first agreeing that Europe should “be modest and not arrogant It’s a project built to avoid some of the problems of the past: extreme nationalisms, imperial and colonial visions of Europe and so on”.⁸⁴⁶ He ends his response, though, by highlighting how the worst and brightest moments in history needs to be in balance:

When the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize 3 [sic, it was 2] years ago in Oslo, it was recognition to some extent that the European Union had managed to overcome some of the problems we have in Europe. And we should be proud of that. I think this deserves some credit, and I still believe that the European Union is one of the best antidotes to ultra nationalisms [sic], or to the arrogance that has indeed also been a part of the European history and narrative. But that history is also one that has had amazing moments in terms of civilization and creativity. That this has come together with very awful and dark moments, including some of the worst moments history has known, like the Shoah, should not blind us to our bright moments.⁸⁴⁷

These silences, euphemisms, and balancing acts—Barroso’s assertion of the greatness of the EU when asked about the arrogance and extensive colonial representation of the EU; the calls for a new Renaissance in the *Mind and Body* without articulating the silent co-pilot through these great endeavours of the past;⁸⁴⁸ and the construction of euphemisms such as “costs” and “delusions” in order to be able to talk about enslavement, conquering of land, and the extinction of peoples through murder and illnesses brought from Europe—compose the texts’ *third persona* expressed as that or those “whose presence, though relevant to what is said, is negated through silence”.⁸⁴⁹ In conjunction with other kinds of heritage—cultural, Christian, critical, political, and philosophical—this third persona is part of a European historiography that promotes transhistoricity, stability, and balance. But in fact, as I noted in the beginning of this chapter, it could be argued that colonialism constitutes another and just as important fundamental transhistorical characteristic of Europe and the EU.

⁸⁴⁵ Koolhaas in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 162.

⁸⁴⁶ Barroso in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 163.

⁸⁴⁷ Barroso in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 163–64.

⁸⁴⁸ Quaedvlieg–Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”; Deventer et al., “Declaration”; Pistoletto, “Third Paradise”.

⁸⁴⁹ Wander, “Third Persona”, 210.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have explored how the collective subject is positioned within a transhistorical frame and the historiography central to this rhetorical construction. In the five EU initiatives, a transhistorical collective subject rhetorically manifests in three intersecting ways: through an argument about European disconnections, the construction and defence of a founding narrative, and the quest for a new narrative.

The hypothesis of European disconnections—sometimes with the EU, other times with the European past (culture, values, achievements)—is implicitly stated in ‘A People’s Europe’ and made explicit in the Maastricht Treaty, the Constitutional Treaty, and New Narrative, where division, war, and bitter experiences are articulated as something Europeans already have or should leave behind—something that ought to belong to the past. At the same time, though, the disconnection from the EU is the result of a memory lapse. Citizens have forgotten the EU’s central purpose: to prevent division and war from happening again. As a result, the two World Wars and the Holocaust play ambiguous roles: they represent specific moments in the past that can be preserved as such in so far as these experiences are transcended. But they are also central to the founding narrative of the EU, which is why younger generations must be reminded of these events and their social, political, and cultural context.

The founding narrative—normalised and stabilised within the EU and circulated and validated in scholarly as well as public discourse—thus centres on the successful actions of overcoming war and division and creating long-lasting peace. The First and Second World Wars and the Holocaust are constructed as ruptures in an otherwise continuous and progressive path of civilisation, as a break with history and the origin of a new beginning—not the continuation of centuries of war and atrocity. This relationship between rupture and continuity enables the EU to assert itself as a representation of peace—continuity is the norm, rupture is the anomaly. So, the achievement of peace in the past, the ability to return Europe to the norm, enables the EU to assert itself as a contemporary and universal representation of peace that extends into the future as a normative exemplum for others to follow.

A key mechanism in the efforts to create a transhistorical collective subject is a game of hide-and-seek between the linguistic sign (meaning) and the mythical signifier (form). Interchangeably shifting between meaning and form means that it is always possible to hide the connotations of Europe/Europa in the denotation of the EU. This play creates a discursive ambiguity between the EU, Europe, and Europa through which the three categories are separated or interweaved. They are separated as a way of

assigning guilt and thus distance to a violent past. By distinguishing the EU as the figure of the saviour that can bring redemption through the mortification and victimage of Europe and thus re-establishes continuity, Europe can continue to be a representative of peace. In other instances, they are interweaved in order to open up a window to an immense past beyond the EU. By incorporating Europe into its discourse on past and present identity and heritage, the EU gains access to an archive of glory otherwise inaccessible.

This relationship between rupture and continuity and between separation and intertwining constitutes a bifocal politics of double time. Redemption and forgiveness serve to internally restore the ideal time of the EU through the mortification of Europe; externally, they serve to restore time out of joint beyond the EU's borders. The internal redemption is thus not simply a part of the process of healing society, but also functions as a stepping stone to the representation of the EU as a normative exemplum elsewhere.

Neither the content nor the function of the founding narrative is opposed by any of the rhetorical agents in the initiatives studied here, but its status in the composition of a new narrative is ambivalent. While some contributors in *Mind and Body* articulate visions of eternity by seeking to recreate the founding moment in order to create everlasting peace, others indicate a readiness to amend this narrative with something new since peace has already been achieved, and the narrative has thus served its purpose. The former contributors exemplify an authoritarian remembrance that seeks to restore and thus repeat the past, whereas the latter turn away from remembrance and towards the present and the future. The foundation, however, remains intact. What is more, the insistence on *one* foundation obscures the possibility of other foundations at odds with the narrative of peace—for instance, in former members states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

While the founding narrative thus centres on the event of Europe becoming the EU, the new narrative reverses this direction, instead turning from the EU to Europe in its search for a transhistorical collective subject. The search for a new narrative is found in the most recent initiative, New Narrative, and the publication *Mind and Body*. The new narrative refers to the founding narrative, but citizens' disconnection from the EU and the European foundation requires a return to a more distant past that presents itself as more authentic than the present: they must to "regain" confidence in Europe and "reaffirm" values found in a cultural, Christian, critical, political, and philosophical heritage. Antiquity, Christianity, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment are some of the topoi invoked to connect specific

places, epochs, architecture, and events to properties and values such as critical thinking, deliberation, democracy, civilisation, specific values, and cultural richness. Again, we see a play between the linguistic sign (the Renaissance signifying a specific, historical epoch) and the mythical signifier (the Renaissance signifying a certain way of thinking, a way of looking at the world). In this way, they hold transhistorical value: Europe becomes a way of thinking, a mental space.

The readings presented in this chapter disclose a discrepancy between two differing temporal imaginations of the past. In the temporality of the founding narrative, the past is comprised of that which has been transcended: division, bitter experience, war, and totalitarian regimes. The present is figured as emancipation from the past (the ideal time), and EU citizens today fail to appreciate the value of the present, as they do not understand the past. Therefore, they, paradoxically, also must be reminded of this specific historical period and events.

In the temporality of the new narrative, the past is the solution to the present: citizens need to retrace the routes of their European forefathers. In this narrative, emancipation is still to come. The organic continuation from Antiquity until present times has been broken, by nationalism, populism, young generations without historical awareness, all of which continually causes further disconnection. The future is the time of reconnection and thus emancipation. But these two figurations of the past share the belief that the past is the ultimate resource of reconnection in the present, whether as a reminder in order to appreciate the present or as a resource in the crafting of a new narrative. The resources are already there, in the physical places, cultural heritage, values, and norms embodied by EU citizens; they simply need to be reactivated.

In accordance with Charland's theory, then, the creation of a past collective subject (Europe was the centre of cultural richness, civilisation, democracy, critical thinking; Europeans tore down walls, built bridges) becomes the ground for the existence of a present collective subject (Europe constitutes the centre of cultural richness, civilisation, democracy, critical thinking; Europeans are uniquely capable of tearing down walls and building bridges), and this transhistorical collective subject gains rhetorical agency in the present moment from a sense that it extends through time. However, as I have shown, the transhistorical subject does not simply extend through time; plural temporal imaginaries are invoked—rupture/continuity, circulation/progress, transcendence/eternity—and they intersect in various ways that create different foundations for transhistoricity. Engagement with the past through remembrance enables new beginnings, but in the EU initiatives studied here, this engagement is

characterised not by plurality, but by restoration and repetition. The interest is not in new beginnings, but rather in restoring the same, tried and tested, beginning—with crucial omissions, such as colonialism, slavery, and imperialism. In the vocabulary of Buhre, the revisit of the past is characterised by authoritarian rather than agonistic remembrance. The purpose of this remembrance is to reconstruct “the lost home”:⁸⁵⁰ to create a transhistorical community across different times, spaces, and ideas.

In this way, the remembrance of the past sets very strict boundaries on the present and future in terms of agency: to repeat what already was. This type of remembrance is problematic for several reasons. It is Eurocentric and romanticising and has political consequences for areas outside the EU in terms of peacebuilding policies. But it also has implications to the self-understanding of the EU and EU citizens as well as their agency. New Narrative in similar ways to ‘A People’s Europe’ positions the EU citizen as a crucial—and co-responsible—agent in the acts of remembrance: they have become disconnected, they need now to reconnect—in the manner proposed by the EU.

In this chapter, focus has rested on the historiographical functions and resources used in the EU’s collective identity formation—on what is *there*. As a contrast, Europe’s colonial past (and present, for that matter) appears first and foremost through silences, allusions, and euphemisms. The contributors in *Mind and Body* insist on the need for balance between the horrors and the greatness of the past. Consequently, we can view colonialism as the third persona in the EU’s historical narrative, the silhouette of the archive of glory.

In the next chapter, we turn from the EU’s historiography to its visionary rhetoric and how this rhetoric positions and constrains the rhetorical agency of the EU citizen.

⁸⁵⁰ Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, XVIII.

6. An End Beyond Europe? A European State of Mind

For most people, the Eurostar probably invokes images of trains and travelling through Europe.⁸⁵¹ For others, Eurostars do not signify moving trains, but moving EU citizens.⁸⁵² In this spirit, I suggest that the Eurostar can be seen as signifying the model EU citizen—the *second persona* of the EU's constitutive rhetoric. Like the train, movement is central to the vision of the EU citizen.

Accordingly, in this chapter I explore how the narrative of a transhistorical collective European subject—presented in the previous chapter—positions and constrains this subject and the types of practices and dispositions it is meant to embody and perform. In other words, I move from exploring the second ideological function of constitutive rhetoric to the third.⁸⁵³ While the previous chapter studied the EU's historiographical efforts to connect the past and the present, this chapter focuses on the visionary rhetoric connecting the present and the future and the projection and constraints of agency in this narrative.

This practice of connecting the present with the future is created through topoi of *omnipresence* and *eternity*. According to the five EU initiatives, however, these visions are blurred by a chain of crises that have developed into a seemingly permanent mode of crisis (chapter 4). In this framework, a spark must instigate, refocus, and thus confirm these visions: a specific type of citizen—the Eurostar.

Political visions are characterised by a certain temporality. They are composed of a vision—an image—of the future, of how society should be formed in an ideal future, but they also necessarily build on a narrative of today's situation; most importantly, they seek to enhance and further develop existing favourable and constructive characteristics of society.⁸⁵⁴ Jon Viklund defines vision as a rhetorical form that seeks to “exceed the

⁸⁵¹ The Eurostar is a high-speed train that has connected the UK, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands since 1994.

⁸⁵² Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*.

⁸⁵³ Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric”.

⁸⁵⁴ Viklund, “Den politiska visionens retorik”, 80–81.

limitations of objectivity—it aims at what we cannot yet see”,⁸⁵⁵ while simultaneously showing and narrating, “the ideas, aspirations, and values that characterize our society”.⁸⁵⁶ For example, the EU has since its origin been guided by several visions condensed in statements such as “peace and prosperity”, “Europe sans frontières”, and “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. Although interconnected, they seek different goals—perpetual peace through economic integration, the removal of internal borders, and horizontal/vertical integration, respectively. They also take as their starting point a common heritage of culture, values, and norms that is assumed to be foundational to the European communities at large and thus transcend their differences.

In this way, a political vision functions not only as a guiding point for politicians in policy-making, but also as a way to create political commitment among stakeholders and citizens more broadly. By blurring the boundaries between the political and the nonpolitical domain (for example, by using scholars, intellectuals, and artists as New Narrative ambassadors), political messages can be distributed by nonpolitical agents, and the language of nonpolitical agents can be used in political rhetoric.⁸⁵⁷ This makes it increasingly more difficult to distinguish different actors from one another: when the president of the European Commission appears alongside a renowned artist and a respected philosopher with similar messages, are their messages of a political nature or not? This kind of citizen involvement therefore runs the risk of depoliticising politics.⁸⁵⁸

Involving citizens in debates about specific political issues as well as a community’s foundational values can have positive implications in terms of democratic involvement and social cohesion, as Viklund argues; but the risk is that the political language becomes disconnected from the political actors as well as from their arguments: “The democratic conversation requires distance, between clearly distinguishable parties but also between politicians and citizens”;⁸⁵⁹ because, if it is no longer possible to distinguish political from nonpolitical arguments, it becomes difficult to hold someone accountable for the specific policies that are made.⁸⁶⁰ This does not

⁸⁵⁵ Viklund, 79. From the Swedish: “överskrida saklighetens begränsningar—den tar sikte på det vi ännu inte kan se”.

⁸⁵⁶ Viklund, 79. From the Swedish: “idéer, önskningsar och värderingar som präglar vårt samhälle”.

⁸⁵⁷ Viklund, 78.

⁸⁵⁸ Viklund, 88–92, 94.

⁸⁵⁹ Viklund, 94. From the Swedish: “det demokratiska samtalet kräver en distans, både mellan tydligt urskiljbara partier och mellan politiker och medborgare”.

⁸⁶⁰ Viklund, 94.

mean that certain issues are inherently private or political,⁸⁶¹ but rather that it is important to be able to distinguish the different roles citizens play in society—when do they speak as political agents, and when do they speak in their capacity as artists/scientists/private citizens?—in order to be able to identify political arguments from other arguments.

As I showed in chapter 4, we see many such tendencies of blurring the distinction between politicians and citizens, institution and collective, in *New Narrative* especially. In this most recent project, the institutional level and the collective level have even become intertwined. In this chapter, I explore, first, how this lack of distinction relates to the topoi of eternity and omnipresence and, second, to the role of the citizen and in terms of rhetorical agency. As in the previous two analytical chapters, I rely on Roland Barthes's theory of myth to explore and discuss these topoi and their function in the constitutive rhetoric of the EU. While I focused on a game of hide-and-seek between the linguistic sign and the mythical signifier in the previous chapter, in this chapter, focus is rather on the extent and variety of mythical signifieds connected to signifiers such as cosmopolitanism, universality, and destiny.

We can understand these constructions of myth as expressions of a dream of fullness. As discussed in chapter 2, in contrast to the Althusserian understanding of ideology as distortion, Ernesto Laclau argues that the primary product of ideology is not distortion but the idea that something undistorted exists in the first place. Only through the fiction of something undistorted, something complete, does the collective identity of the community acquire coherence.⁸⁶² This operation is both necessary to ideology (to create the fiction of fullness) and impossible (it is an illusion).⁸⁶³ The interesting questions to be asked, then, are not how distortion is created, but rather, how the dreams of fullness are created and the function such creations fill in the formation of collective identity. Both Barthes and Laclau are helpful in this endeavour.

As in the previous chapter, I examine all five initiatives, but *New Narrative* takes a more prominent position. I begin by exploring the topoi of omnipresence and eternity (the most extensive part of the chapter), and I end the chapter and the overall analysis by zooming in on the Eurostar

⁸⁶¹ This is arguably Habermas's argument in his theory of the public sphere: "Conflicts hitherto restricted to the private sphere now intrude into the public sphere", he writes. According to him, the boundaries between the public, technical, and private spheres should be reestablished so that we become capable of differentiating between publicly relevant and private issues. See Habermas, "Public Sphere", 54.

⁸⁶² Laclau, "Death and Resurrection", 302.

⁸⁶³ Laclau, 302.

and the role this model citizen plays in terms of recontinuing and confirming the visions of eternity.

Topoi of Omnipresence and Eternity

The vision of omnipresence and eternity invokes ideas of permanence that intuitively seem apolitical: politics is about deciding for the future in a context of uncertainty and contingency. We try to prepare for the future, but we will never know for sure. This is why political visions take favourable characteristics of the present as their starting point, but, as Frida Buhre argues, attempting to control and thus “robbing the future of its uncertainty” also potentially removes the contingency of political rhetoric simply because the beginning and end collapse.⁸⁶⁴ In the first part of this chapter, I explore such practices of connecting the present to the future by examining the topoi of *omnipresence* and *eternity*: A European cosmopolitanism, a common destiny, universality as European essence, a European state of mind.

European Cosmopolitanism as Physical Movement

What does it mean to be a citizen of the world? The idea of cosmopolitanism can be traced back to the Stoics of ancient Greece and Rome, and was reimagined by Enlightenment thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. In this philosophical tradition, cosmopolitanism takes on many different meanings. In moral conceptualisations, focus rests on the equality and equal worth of all human beings as members of a single moral community, whereas in political cosmopolitanism emphasis is on political institutions, systems of government, and human rights—but often such political ideas likewise rest on a set of moral assumptions, as for example in Kantian cosmopolitanism. More recently, rhetorical scholar Alessandra Beasley von Burg has proposed a specifically *rhetorical* cosmopolitanism that to a higher extent than the previous conceptions take emotions into account. Emotions can drive “fear, angst, and mistrust, [but] can also generate excitement, curiosity, and deep connections” and are not solely sensations that can and should be controlled through a process of rational training, as the Stoics and Kant argued.⁸⁶⁵ Emotions pull apart and bring together. They do, as Kant suggested, need

⁸⁶⁴ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 133, see 125–133 for theorisations of different anachronisms combining eternity and futurity.

⁸⁶⁵ Beasley Von Burg, “Toward a Rhetorical Cosmopolitanism”, 120.

to be trained, but it is possible to preserve “their legitimate place as a driving force for human action”, she argues.⁸⁶⁶ The locus of this positive, emotional drive is in the rhetorical cosmopolitan encounter between citizens. Taking the discrimination and prejudice against the Muslim population in the EU as her example, Beasley von Burg argues that if citizens actually encounter one another, speak with one another, the negative emotion of fear can be replaced with the positive emotion of “curiosity and deep connection”.⁸⁶⁷ We see traces of both Kantian and rhetorical cosmopolitanism in *Mind and Body*, in which cosmopolitanism plays an important role as a moral code, but is also reconceptualised; not as a cohesive theory formally presented, but implicitly in the sense that it is given different significations throughout the publication.

These significations range from spatial and visionary ideas of Europe as “one big city” as well as the doctrine of free movement and theoretical arguments about a cosmopolitan system of government to more explicitly morally coded conceptualisations.⁸⁶⁸ Exploring these significations visibilises how cosmopolitanism as an ideal is present in several of the previous initiatives as well and thus functions as a unifying vision within the EU on a more general level. I note two main strands: cosmopolitanism as *physical movement* with the purpose of creating social cohesion and cosmopolitanism as a *movement of the mind* with the purpose of guarding against nationalism. These conceptualisations form a particular European cosmopolitanism. This seemingly oxymoronic imaginary is proposed as a guiding logic for EU citizens both when facing each other and when facing the world. As a result, it positions and constrains the rhetorical agency of the citizens.

⁸⁶⁶ Beasley Von Burg, 121.

⁸⁶⁷ Beasley Von Burg, 120, 123–24.

⁸⁶⁸ Political cosmopolitanism in this sense is, however, surprisingly absent from the cosmopolitan ideal promoted in *New Narrative*. Two exceptions are the philosophers Jean-Marc Ferry and Jürgen Habermas. Ferry explicitly refers to cosmopolitan law in his contribution to *Mind and Body*. He does not explicate whether he believes the EU’s level of jurisdiction corresponds to the transnational/cosmopolitan level, but elsewhere he conceptualizes it as a way forward for the EU. See Ferry, “European Integration”; Ferry, “Telos, Nomos, Ethos”. Habermas’s construction of the double sovereign (*pouvoir constituant mixte*, see note 914) bears resemblance to Kant’s concept of cosmopolitan law developed in *Toward Perpetual Peace*, which is envisioned as a third pillar of the law that complements the national and international pillar, whereby citizens would consider themselves and have rights as “citizens of the earth” rather than separate individuals or national citizens. See Kant et al., *Toward Perpetual Peace*, 6:353, 7:333. Habermas does not directly refer to Kantian cosmopolitan law, but it is clear that he sees the EU as a kind of middle ground between the national and the international level. The EU, he says, “constitutes a form of democratic self-assertion against the constraints of a, so far, only systemically networked world community resilient to regulatory constraints”. See Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”, 180. For a review and critique of the link between the EU and Kant’s cosmopolitan law in scholarship, see Brown “European Union and Kant’s Idea”.

The scholarly debate about the EU and cosmopolitanism peaked around the turn of the millennium.⁸⁶⁹ This was a time of economic prosperity, forthcoming enlargement of the EU, a constitution in the making, and Turkey as an official EU member state candidate. Everything seemed possible. However, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 and the financial crisis in 2008 signalled an end to this cosmopolitan dream, which was replaced by a populist and nationalist turn in EU member states, thematised extensively in New Narrative; a nationalism that the contributors, in turn, imagine to replace with a reinvigorated cosmopolitanism.

Whether we think of cosmopolitanism as a moral stance or an urban environment of “anywheres”,⁸⁷⁰ it requires at its most basic level movement—either of the mind or of the body: urban, cosmopolitan environments require people to move, and tolerance is engendered through physical meetings with others that potentially lead to a movement of the mind. Very little of the literature on the EU and cosmopolitanism perceives cosmopolitanism in connection to movement and mobility, though. A telling example is Beasley von Burg, who has written about both movement and cosmopolitanism, both in relation to the EU, but she rarely makes the connection between these two strands.⁸⁷¹ Favell, in contrast, views the EU’s mobility programmes and free movement as intrinsically tied to a cosmopolitan vision. One of his main conclusions is that although the EU’s programmes and policies of movement are remarkable and unique to their form, very few EU citizens actually decide to reside in other EU member states, thus impairing a cosmopolitan Europe.⁸⁷²

As thematised in chapter 4, movement is a general constitutive strategy of the EU. The institutions of the EU literally move from country to country, drawing threads across the EU map. Likewise, the connectivity enabled by free movement is supported and enhanced by policies within the cultural and educational sector. The seeds of these policies were planted in ‘A People’s Europe’ in 1985, in which the EU actively sought to enable mobility and, as a result, intertwinement and connectivity between EU citizens—among others, through financial and political support for

⁸⁶⁹ Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*, 220.

⁸⁷⁰ I am alluding here to David Goodhart’s hypothesis that citizens today can be partitioned into *anywheres* (people with a global outlook) and *somewheres* (people who feel attached to a place and a nation), respectively. See Goodhart, *The Road to Somewhere*. Goodhart’s theory has received much attention, but also been criticised for being too simplified, reductionist, and strongly biased. See Rogaly, “Brexit Writings”; Bloomfield, “Progressive Politics”.

⁸⁷¹ See, e.g., Beasley Von Burg, “Public Discourse”; Beasley Von Burg, “Toward a Rhetorical Cosmopolitanism”; Beasley Von Burg, “Muslims and Multiculturalism”.

⁸⁷² Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*, 223.

European film production, through European sports events, and through different types of exchange programmes. The EU has since then continuously produced extensive amounts of information material that seek to encourage people to make use of their right to move freely within the union.⁸⁷³ *Mind and Body* is an addition. In a previously cited part of the New Narrative declaration, movement signifies a range of signifieds:

Europe is a state of mind shared by citizens across the continent. The students, researchers, scholars, artists, professionals and politicians who live, study, work, think and travel across national borders do so in order to deepen and expand their knowledge, unleash their creativity and widen their opportunities. They retrace and revive the routes of the men and women who, since Antiquity, and increasingly during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, developed for Europe a shared grammar of music and art, a common body of science and philosophy, an astonishingly rich literature and thriving trade networks.⁸⁷⁴

The visions and ideas of ‘A People’s Europe’ are echoed and connected to the rich cultural heritage that such movement has created from Antiquity to the present, notably embodied by the creative/EU elite (students, researchers, scholars, artists, professionals and politicians). The capacity to move—mobility—enables deepened knowledge, unleashed creativity, and opportunities, and in this way, the physical sense of movement is connected to a metaphorical—and mythical—level at which movement is understood as a movement of the mind. The former leads to the latter.

The connection between mobility and cultural enrichment/deepened knowledge is circulated by several of the *Mind and Body* contributors. They call for “communication spaces that enable the endogamic tendencies of national cultures to be overcome, so that, bit by bit, cultural debates take on a continental dimension”;⁸⁷⁵ they celebrate that “immobilities of every sort have been removed”,⁸⁷⁶ and cite the Erasmus programme and the Schengen agreement as important tools to enhance mobility as they provide the opportunity “to study, have friends and enjoy themselves in other parts of Europe”; such experiences enable people “to be aware of the concerns in other places”.⁸⁷⁷ Then-Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou makes a similar point about the benefits of travel: “Europe must continue to

⁸⁷³ Favell, 240. See, for instance, the brochure *It’s Your Europe: Living, Learning and Working anywhere in the EU*, published as a part of the *Europe on the Move* programme: “It’s no secret. Europe can change your life if you want to”. European Commission, *It’s Your Europe*, 3.

⁸⁷⁴ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

⁸⁷⁵ Portabella, 65.

⁸⁷⁶ Sedláček, “Europe: Hidden in Plain Sight”, 191.

⁸⁷⁷ Merkel, “Translation of the Speech Delivered by the Federal Chancellor of Germany at the Academy of the Arts, Berlin, on 1 March 2014”, 117–18.

provide creative opportunities for all Europeans to interact with one another, to travel, to get to know each other, to work together and to create networks that help talent, innovation and creativity to circulate”.⁸⁷⁸ Her first-hand evidence is derived from her meetings with Erasmus students and Marie Curie researchers:

Their vision of Europe, and of themselves in Europe, changes profoundly, and for the better: the EU means an opportunity to prove their worth and contribute to the collective good at the same time. It means developing a profound respect and appreciation for difference and for the other.⁸⁷⁹

In Vassiliou’s account, movement helps the circulation of talent, innovation, and creativity, but also fosters tolerance, as it entails a more profound appreciation of the other. Again, the types of citizens and ideas highlighted as the ambassadors and carriers of a better Europe represent mainly the creative and scholarly elite: students, Marie Curie researchers, talent, innovation, and creativity.

Erasmus and other EU mobility programmes first and foremost remove obstacles and make everyday life easier, but, as we have seen, they also seek to engender creative interaction, deeper knowledge, and a tolerant stance towards other people. According to Architect Pier Paolo Tamburelli, they embody a particular ideological project: “There was a project then [in the 1960s], a sort of hidden project: we sent all these kids to study abroad, hoping that they would marry someone from another country, and slowly micro-events would develop into Europe”.⁸⁸⁰ The same argument appears in the final pages of Favell’s book, which consist of an epistolary exchange between an interviewee called “Richard” and himself. To Favell, the free movement of people, goods, services, and money is “the most remarkable achievement of the EU”.⁸⁸¹ So when Favell, slightly disillusioned, says that he regrettably does not think a cosmopolitan Europe will ever happen, Richard, a retired mathematician, reassures him that “mobility *is* transforming Europe”, because “Europeans are marrying each other. . . . It will just take two or three generations to see it. Nobody understands the sweeping changes that have come from globalization”.⁸⁸²

Tamburelli does not share the disappointment, though. The hidden project, he says, is based above all on a fear of conflict; a fear that if the

⁸⁷⁸ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 37.

⁸⁷⁹ Vassiliou, 37.

⁸⁸⁰ Tamburelli in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 135.

⁸⁸¹ Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*, 3.

⁸⁸² Favell, 228.

EU appears conflicted, the perceived unity since its inception until today will be disrupted. Diversity is appreciated, but conflict is not. As former prime minister of Slovenia Alenka Bratušek says: “Mobility is the most reliable guarantee of creating a new European identity—overcoming centuries of national stereotypes, prejudice, egoism and intolerance”.⁸⁸³ According to this vision—or ideology, as Tamburelli calls it—movement will keep conflict at bay because it increases tolerance.

The New Narrative declaration likewise connects the EU’s legal framework for free movement to overcoming restricted mindsets:

The establishment of the free circulation of people, goods, services and ideas was an extraordinary victory over mindsets that sought to impose a single vision on reality and raise barriers. The transformation from a polarised Europe to a multipolar Europe led to a new era of interconnectedness and interaction amongst people and countries.⁸⁸⁴

Free movement, multipolarity, and interconnectedness are the tools needed to dismantle the singlemindedness of previous times and regimes. The most poignant example of this vision of connectedness—of fullness—appears in the idea of Europe as one “mega-city”. According to the architects Rem Koolhaas and Stefano Boeri, this idea was born in a conversation between the two at an encounter “about 15 years ago”. “Then”, Boeri notes, “it was only a metaphor. But if we look at a satellite image of Europe at night today, we’ll see that this metaphor is now a reality”.⁸⁸⁵ Similarly, the New Narrative declaration states:

Europe as a political body needs to develop a new cosmopolitanism for its citizens, one that includes dynamic and creative urban environments and healthy competition between cities. . . . Why not begin to imagine Europe as one great mega-city interconnected by means of transportation and communication?⁸⁸⁶

The image of “one great mega-city” embodies the vision of internal cohesion—that, when looking from abroad, in this case looking down from the sky, the particular lights of all the cities and places in the EU member states converge, forming one big shining city—an image that invokes the heart and arteries metaphor discussed in chapter 4 in which imagines

⁸⁸³ Bratušek, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Slovenia at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 83.

⁸⁸⁴ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 127.

⁸⁸⁵ Boeri in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*, 153.

⁸⁸⁶ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 129.

cohesion through the physiological metaphor of arteries leading to a central unifying heart.

The “new cosmopolitanism” described in this passage of the New Narrative declaration resembles what Ulrich Beck has termed banal cosmopolitanism⁸⁸⁷—a kind of cosmopolitanism found in cities characterised by “many-coloured mixtures of food, drinks, nourishments, restaurants, menus, music” but not reflected by the citizens and communities themselves.⁸⁸⁸ While banal cosmopolitanism is banal in the sense that it is superficial, an unreflective juxtaposition of things of different origin that form a diversity in name only, the image of one big city, a creative urban environment, does not simply envision the juxtaposition and transportation of people and cultures, it connects the banality with a *telos*: to “create dynamic and urban environments” and “healthy competition”.

The political vision of Europe as one big city furthermore relates to the oppositional pair urban/rural and the aforementioned elitist component in the EU’s cosmopolitan ideal of movement, in which the urban environment and the citizens inhabiting this environment is highlighted as the embodiment of this vision. These are the Eurostars. A very small portion of EU citizens practice this type of movement, though. Favell is convinced that, in order to achieve this cosmopolitan Europe, EU citizens must make use of their right to move (like himself, and myself, I should probably add). He is therefore puzzled by the fact that, despite the many efforts of the EU, so few Eurostars make use of their free movement. The explanation, according to Favell, is that what for the Eurostars in the beginning often seems like a liberating and romantic new chapter in life, later on is experienced as a “set of closed doors”⁸⁸⁹ and a feeling of having to “run up against the informal barriers of residual national cultures that fear their [the Eurostars] presence”.⁸⁹⁰ He therefore argues that these movers are the “pioneers of a better, more cosmopolitan Europe, they embody the kind of liberalism that is, in these darker days of the early twenty-first century, in danger of being lost”.⁸⁹¹

The Other Movement

But if movement is really what is sought, there is plenty in Europe. If we direct our attention towards the internal migration from East to West, we see that the post-enlargement East-West movers are frequent and, in many

⁸⁸⁷ Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*.

⁸⁸⁸ Beck and Grande, “Cosmopolitanism”, 72.

⁸⁸⁹ Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*, 215.

⁸⁹⁰ Favell, 223.

⁸⁹¹ Favell, 223.

ways, use their rights in the manner expected by the EU. Although Favell firmly believes in a cosmopolitan Europe, he is not blind to such differences. In a study published shortly after *Eurostars and Eurocities*, he writes that the East-West movers “arguably [mark] the biggest social change in Europe in half a century: the definitive end of the Cold War, and a European social experiment that will leave neither the West nor East unchanged”.⁸⁹² Along with postcolonial and guest-worker migrants, East-West movers take on types of jobs that the Eurostars—EU citizens from Western Europe—do not want: blue-collar, 3D jobs—dirty, dangerous, and demanding.⁸⁹³ And if we compare with the Eurostars, the East-West movers and the migrant workers face even worse challenges in terms of prejudice and exclusion, but they move anyway.

So, although mobility from East to West from an economic perspective is positively aiding European integration, since these movers enhance the “circulation of talent and capital flowing back into development”,⁸⁹⁴ they are, from a sociocultural perspective, considered as immigrants, threatening to take up school seats and medical facilities.⁸⁹⁵ According to this logic, it is crucial that they “take the secondary, temporary, flexible roles”⁸⁹⁶ so that they keep circulating and return home. Indeed, as we witnessed during the Brexit debate, “the Polish plumbers” were not invoked as a sign of cosmopolitanism, but rather as the enemy by nationalist movements.⁸⁹⁷

Another type of movement often overlooked in terms of free movement, is that of the Roma population, even though this group is already practicing freedom of movement. Often on the verge of citizenship, national as well as European, this population is ambiguous. Formally, many are EU citizens and thus have the right to move, but they are not considered as such because they move without looking to settle, and they often do not own a passport.⁸⁹⁸ As Beasley von Burg argues,

Roma are potentially the best example of EU citizens because of their long tradition of uprooting themselves and living beyond nations. However, they are not embraced as an EU model . . . even as the EU celebrates freedom of movement as a right for all EU citizens.⁸⁹⁹

⁸⁹² Favell, “Immigration, Migration”, 183.

⁸⁹³ Favell, 184.

⁸⁹⁴ Favell, 183.

⁸⁹⁵ Favell, 183.

⁸⁹⁶ Favell, 183.

⁸⁹⁷ For a study on the figure of “the Polish plumber” from a critical race perspective, see Böröcz and Sarkar, “Unbearable Whiteness”.

⁸⁹⁸ Beasley Von Burg, “Free to Move”, 84.

⁸⁹⁹ Beasley Von Burg, 84.

The same could be said about the “Polish plumbers” and other stereotypes about EU citizens from Eastern and Central Europe. In many ways, they are model EU citizens: they move, and they take the jobs that EU citizens from Western Europe do not want. Clearly, though, these practices are not what is meant by cosmopolitan Europe, focused as this vision is on the movement of the creative/scholarly elite. So perhaps the important question is not why Eurostars do not move, but rather why the EU seems so focused on this very small part of the EU population. Why is the very large part that actually moves not the embodiment of cosmopolitanism?

There is a tension, then, between an *abstract ideal* of cosmopolitanism and its *concrete practices* as performed by EU citizens from East-West movers and the Roma population. The cosmopolitan ideal often presents diversity as a positive value, but as Peo Hansen argues, when looking at concrete EU policy, or, as in this case, concrete practices, diversity is framed in “much more limited terms”.⁹⁰⁰

Free movement, then, when used by a designated few, signifies the cosmopolitan, liberal values of free interaction, cultural exchange, exchange without obstacles, and thus freedom at its core, and it is articulated as a means of enhancing tolerance, cultural enrichment, and social cohesion among the EU citizens—a generator of European identity, as Bratušek expressed it. When used by others, who constitute the large majority of movers, it signifies the flow of capital and workforce. In this way, the topos of cosmopolitanism establishes values of tolerance and creative interaction that are worth uniting around, while simultaneously creating division by assigning these values to a select few: the Eurostar should tolerate, the East-West mover should be tolerated.

European Cosmopolitanism as a Movement of the Mind

While the cosmopolitan ideal of concrete, physical movement seeks to forge social cohesion by physically bringing different nationalities together, the cosmopolitan ideal of abstract movement of the mind intends to forge social cohesion through mutual understanding. Both types of cosmopolitanism intend to (re)create unity, to expose a fullness out of

⁹⁰⁰ Hansen, “Europeans Only?”, 57. Historian of ideas, Maria Johansen, makes a similar point when she notes the threat of contamination posed by the concrete to the purity of the abstract, although in a very different context, namely *raison d'état* and the Swedish intelligence and security service. In concrete form (societal critique of and debate about intelligence and security service) transparency threatens transparency in its abstract purity (democracy in need of protection). In the context of this study, we could say that the abstract value of difference and diversity seems contaminated by the concrete enactment of said difference and diversity. See Johansen, *Offentlig skrift*, 244.

disparate phenomena; but as a signifier, cosmopolitanism connects to different signifieds: in the former, to cultural exchange, creativity, physical interaction; in the latter, to tolerance, empathy, and curiosity—they seek a physical and a mental unity, respectively. These two kinds of unity often overlap, however, and the movement of the mind hinges upon physical movement—tolerance is fostered in the meeting with people different from yourself. European cosmopolitanism thus signifies a European generosity towards the other, an ability to see oneself in the other. This ability will help EU citizens overcome their initial xenophobic sentiments following from globalisation and recognise that the EU is a help in the face of globalisation; not the enemy.

In other words, cosmopolitanism is understood in a triangular relationship with globalisation and nationalism in *Mind and Body*. Globalisation is perceived as an uncontrollable development that mandates a cosmopolitan rather than a nationalist perspective. The writer Elif Shafak says:

There was, 10 years ago, great optimism about the idea that the world would turn into a global village, that technological advances and the fast flow of capital would connect us all and render national borders redundant. None of that has happened. Still, we should not underestimate the fact that there are two tides today: we are indeed becoming more global souls, more cosmopolitan, and we're learning to appreciate this interconnectivity. Unfortunately, and at the same time, the countercurrent is also becoming very strong.⁹⁰¹

In the wake of Francis Fukuyama, who claimed “the universalization of Western liberal democracy” to be “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution”,⁹⁰² globalisation was the hope at the turn of the millennium, but nationalism is what seems to be replacing this hope today, Shafak argues. The problem is that nationalism views identity as “either/or”, whereas a “cosmopolite sees identity as plural: there are concentric circles of identity”.⁹⁰³ Shafak herself identifies as “Istanbulite”, “attached to the Balkans”, “Mediterranean”, “Middle Eastern”, and she would “like to think I’m European as well, why not?”.⁹⁰⁴ To this, Barroso answers: “What we need, more and more, is an attachment to the cosmopolitan order. The European Union is a great laboratory in the context of globalisation”.⁹⁰⁵ So, whereas cosmopolitanism is portrayed as the positive replacement of nationalism, globalisation is viewed both as a (positive) precondition but

⁹⁰¹ Shafak in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 150–51.

⁹⁰² Fukuyama, “End of History?”, 4.

⁹⁰³ Shafak in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 151.

⁹⁰⁴ Shafak in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 151.

⁹⁰⁵ Barroso in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 152.

also as an element of disruption. Jonathan Mills, composer and member of the cultural committee, notes that “ours is increasingly a world in which knowledge comes, simultaneously, from various and divergent technological, ethical, cultural and philosophical sources and locations. Such an unusual alignment of forces has the capacity to disrupt and dislodge many of our preconceptions”⁹⁰⁶—like “European hegemony” in the domains of science, technology, culture, philosophy, industrialisation, and finance during “the past millennium”.⁹⁰⁷

If we recall Mills’s characterisation of European cultural heritage—“the envy of the world”⁹⁰⁸—a noticeable sorrow characterises Mills’s description of European greatness and fall; he sees globalisation and Europe as metonymically related to one another—Europe the signifier of globalisation, and globalisation the signifier of Europe. Instead, it has caused a disconnection between the movement of the world economy (integrating more and more) and that of the social and political world (continuously fragmenting).⁹⁰⁹ As a result,

politicians and citizens start to feel powerless to act and define what is happening, with the result that, as a psychologically understandable but paradoxical defence mechanism, they cling ever more tenaciously to the nation state and its borders, which have long since grown porous.⁹¹⁰

So, citizens are not clinging to the nation state because they are racist, Habermas argues here, but because they are afraid of losing the rights fostered and guaranteed by the nation state, uncertainty caused by globalisation.⁹¹¹ Barroso both echoes and contradicts this diagnosis: “You know, one of the problems facing the EU is not that many people in Europe think the EU has made Europe too open. The main objection is that the EU does not protect enough”.⁹¹² Nevertheless, he continues by stating that, in Europe “populism simplifies complex issues and mobilises negative sentiments, like xenophobia and ultranationalism, which go against the values of those men, women and children in Europe who want peace and freedom”.⁹¹³ Echoing ‘A People’s Europe’ and its complaint that citizens do not really understand and appreciate the many achievements the Community has offered, Barroso argues that EU citizens do not *really*

⁹⁰⁶ Mills, “Some Reflections”, 202.

⁹⁰⁷ Mills, 202.

⁹⁰⁸ Discussed in the previous chapter. See Mills, 203.

⁹⁰⁹ Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”, 180.

⁹¹⁰ Habermas, 180.

⁹¹¹ Habermas, 185.

⁹¹² Barroso in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 165.

⁹¹³ Barroso in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 166.

think Europe is too open; they are simply swayed to think so by simplified, yet successful, interpellations of the advancing nationalist parties in Europe. Barroso thus implicitly suggests that what needs to be changed is EU citizens' perception, not the EU policies or the EU as such.

Habermas's argument bears similarities. Near the end of his contribution, Habermas proposes a "thought experiment" that challenges the audience to view the legal structure of the EU from a different perspective: Maybe it is, in fact, cosmopolitan? Maybe EU citizens simply need to change their perception of the EU to see that it is exactly what is needed?⁹¹⁴ In this sense, Mills, Habermas and Barroso are not negative towards globalisation as such, but rather towards its consequences—how it causes disconnection, disruption, and dislodgement and thus potentially invalidates our preconceptions. The problem is not globalisation, but citizens' reactions to this process. Not unlike Favell's argument, in which long-term Western European movement within the EU is thought to be impeded by prejudice and discrimination,⁹¹⁵ in *Mind and Body* nationalism is perceived as that which hinders the EU to reach its full potential.⁹¹⁶

So, instead, EU citizens need to go with the global flow. In an era of globalisation, cultural debate must take on a "continental dimension",⁹¹⁷ Europe needs "debate that transcends notions of exclusive national

⁹¹⁴ Habermas, "Europe, Hungary", 184–85. Habermas here proposes a simplified version of his recent conceptualization of a double sovereign, the EU's *pouvoir constituant mixte*: "I propose the thought experiment of imagining a developed EU as if its constitution had been brought into existence by a double sovereign. The constituent authority [of the double sovereign] should be composed of the entire citizenry of Europe, on the one hand, and of the sum of the citizens of the participating nation states, on the other". See Habermas, "Citizen and State Equality", 174. In the words of Mark Patberg, this means that "in the decision-making processes of the EU some institutions primarily represent the perspective of the community of European citizens, while others focus on channelling the interests of the citizen communities of the member states". See Patberg, "Introduction", 166. Conversely, citizens adopt different perspectives depending on whether they are voting as members of a nation state or of the supranational community. See Habermas, *Crisis of the European Union*, 137. Note the similar proposition of a thought experiment and also how Habermas refrains from consistently distinguish between European and EU citizen, which in this specific case has consequences for the interpretation. *European* in the meaning people living in Europe would provide a very different and radical argument: all Europeans, within and outside the EU, to be represented in the EU's institutional structure.

⁹¹⁵ Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*, 223.

⁹¹⁶ García makes a similar argument when he posits that New Narrative "emphasises the diversity of Europe, but not that of the EU integration project", exemplified with the previously quoted passage by Reding: "the fact that 25% of the European electorate voted for extremist and anti-European parties shows that they must have somehow 'forgotten' the reasons for which the European Union was built". García, "New Narrative Project", 347. See also Reding, "Stimulating the European Public Sphere", 32.

⁹¹⁷ Portabella, "Europe as a Space", 65.

characteristics and borders”,⁹¹⁸ and historiography must take a cosmopolitan perspective—which in this case means a European perspective—to see the bigger picture.⁹¹⁹ This perspective requires “open-mindedness” and accepting that the gain of a larger perspective requires a loss of the local perspective.⁹²⁰ In other words, a cosmopolitan vision entails that distinctive characteristics at the local level will be blurred and perhaps even lost, but it also effects the gain of a more important “truly continental dimension and global outreach”.⁹²¹

European cosmopolitanism thus signifies a set of values and norms of behaviour that embraces this larger perspective. György Konrád, writer and member of the New Narrative cultural committee, says:

Now that our countries are linked and travelling has become easier, we are beginning to feel like our cities, our great minds and their achievements belong to us all. European curiosity is receptive to the mysterious tastes offered by minorities, disparate peoples and diverse personalities. The literature of small nations is also European, even if their masterworks have yet to be translated. A single bookshelf can hold foreign classics and better-known modern works translated into one's national language, all marinating together.⁹²²

The synecdochical movement between part and whole, the marinade of nations and Europe, “our personal ego and our collective identity”,⁹²³ has fostered not only a feeling of like-mindedness and ownership among European nations, but also a “European curiosity”—although it is one-directional, from Europe towards minorities, from large nations towards small ones.

The movement between part and whole as fostering cosmopolitanism is also articulated by artist and member of the New Narrative cultural committee Olafur Eliasson. His contribution is titled “Your inner we” and

⁹¹⁸ Tuymans and Simoens in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 143.

⁹¹⁹ Arjakovsky argues that “historical research in Europe is still organized very much along national lines” and warns that “if, in the end, there has been no European history of Europe up to the present, this is because sovereign and Eurosceptic historiographical schools have dominated debates in Europe from 1990 to 2000. European historiographical schools favour the national novel over the cosmopolitan novel”. See Arjakovsky, “How to Write a New Narrative”, 188. His own research project “The past and future of European civilization”, presented briefly in his text in *Mind and Body*, sets out to rectify this, according to him, faulty historiography. See Arjakovsky and Arnaud, “Passé et avenir”.

⁹²⁰ Portabella, “Europe as a Space”, 65.

⁹²¹ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 23.

⁹²² Konrád, “European Ars Poetica”, 39.

⁹²³ Konrád, 39.

appeared on the front page of *Politiken*, a large, national Danish newspaper (figure 9). Eliasson explains:

The front page reads Dit (your) and vi (we); on the reverse of the front page, printed backwards, is the word indre (inner). The ‘inner’ shimmers through the normal newspaper page to form the phrase ‘Your inner we’ in varying intensities of black.⁹²⁴

The artwork thus embodies the different and changing relationship between the “I” and the various “we’s” we experience over time and in different settings: “There are large ‘we’s and small ‘we’s, inclusive and exclusive ‘we’s, static and transformative ‘we’s”.⁹²⁵ But the artwork is also normative in its quest for a European “we”, the fostering of which Eliasson ties to fostering an “ability to be empathically in the world with others”.⁹²⁶ The call for “a vision that transcends national borders”⁹²⁷ is linked to significations of generosity in the meeting with the other—either as an existing European curiosity and receptiveness, or as empathy waiting to emerge.



Figure 9. Dit indre vi, Olafur Eliasson, 2014. © Studio Olafur Eliasson GmbH.

Finally, traits such as curiosity and receptiveness are connected to descriptions of co-existence, tolerance, and European responsibility. Mills leans on Ulrich Beck’s definition of *cosmopolitan tolerance* when he envisions “a

⁹²⁴ Eliasson, “Your Inner We”, 192.

⁹²⁵ Eliasson, 193.

⁹²⁶ Eliasson, 193.

⁹²⁷ Eliasson, 192.

cosmopolitan, as opposed to multicultural, future for Europe”.⁹²⁸ Beck contrasts cosmopolitan tolerance to multiculturalism, understanding the latter as mere acceptance of the other as a necessary burden, whereas cosmopolitan tolerance “is more than that. It is neither defensive nor passive, but instead active: it means opening oneself up to the world of the Other, perceiving difference as an enrichment, regarding the Other as fundamentally equal”.⁹²⁹ Mills returns to the tenth and eleventh century to provide an exemplum for his vision of a future cosmopolitan Europe: “At the height of the Caliphate of Cordoba in 10th and 11th century Spain, Islam, Judaism and Christianity not only ‘coexisted’, but cooperated and collaborated harmoniously”.⁹³⁰ These three world religions enriched one another, Mills argues. Therefore, “the opportunity to participate in a genuinely new narrative for Europe requires us all to embrace the challenge of a cosmopolitan approach to the relation between ‘minds, mentalities and imaginations’ as well as to ‘nations, localities. . . and institutions’”.⁹³¹ Like many other contributors in *Mind and Body*, Mills’s cosmopolitan vision is imbued with a moral content—tolerance, openness, equality, and harmonious collaboration. Cosmopolitanism thus hinges on globalisation, but provides a moral content that is able to guide the vision for the future of the EU.

This vision is striking in its support of the status quo. Many of the contributors in *Mind and Body*, including Barroso and, to a certain extent, Habermas, seek explanations and solutions that reside with the citizens. In this way, change is bestowed upon the citizens, not the EU: nationalism, prejudice, and discrimination are citizen matters and should therefore be solved on a citizen level: if they change perspective, if they are informed better, then they will realise that nothing needs to change.

We see similar arguments in Favell’s and Beasley von Burg’s studies as well: the EU provides ample opportunities to move (Favell), and it provides cosmopolitan ideals (Beasley von Burg). The fact that Eurostars are so few, and that cosmopolitan ideals are not properly exercised in practice, is explained by turning to citizen behaviour (citizens are prejudiced). While Favell does not specify any concrete solutions, Beasley von Burg proposes the rhetorical encounter between citizens as the place where the negative emotion of fear can be replaced with the positive emotion of “curiosity

⁹²⁸ Mills, “Some Reflections”, 204.

⁹²⁹ Mills, 204. Mills quotes Ulrich Beck, *German Europe*, Translated by Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013.

⁹³⁰ Mills, 203.

⁹³¹ Mills, 205. Mills quotes Ulrich Beck, *German Europe*, Translated by Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013.

and deep connection”.⁹³² Although I too am convinced of the many benefits of the rhetorical encounter as a foundation for creating mutual understanding, Beasley von Burg’s account is simplified and, most importantly, it turns societal, institutional, and structural problems into an issue of interpersonal relations. The need to attend to interpersonal relations should not be underestimated, but the fact that one of Beasley von Burg’s own examples is the discriminatory rhetoric of Italian senator and former minister, Roberto Calderoli, only underlines its connection to an institutional level.⁹³³

Looking beyond this cosmopolitan discourse, one can find other explanations for why citizens “cling” to their nation state, as Habermas phrases it. Too often, Doreen Massey argues, place is understood as co-terminous with community, which is why longing for community is interpreted as a longing for a delimited, specific place and therefore “necessarily reactionary”.⁹³⁴ But communities are most often *not* gathered in one place, but rather a “particular constellation of social relations”, weaved “together at a particular locus”.⁹³⁵ A global sense of place of this kind is not necessarily a reactionary response to globalisation’s temporal and spatial disruptions, but could just as well be interpreted as a response to the uneven development of globalisation, perhaps even as a way to create connectivity and a sense of belonging.⁹³⁶

This perspective allows us to see a tension in the cosmopolitan vision of the EU: connectivity and a sense of belonging along with values such as tolerance and curiosity in many ways correspond to emotions the EU wants to foster within the framework of a postnational cosmopolitanism; but, at the same time, these emotions and values are tied to a specific place: Europe. The *Mind and Body* contributors wish for EU citizens to move to other EU countries and, in the face of difference, develop a sense of empathy and tolerance, which they can take with them back home. In this

⁹³² Beasley Von Burg, “Toward a Rhetorical Cosmopolitanism”, 120, 123–24.

⁹³³ In 2007, Calderoli (Northern League Party, served in two Berlusconi governments) called for a pig protest against plans of building a mosque in Bologna, Italy. According to Reuters, “he was ready to bring his own pig to ‘defile’ the site where the mosque is due to be built”. Aloisi, “Muslims Irked”.

⁹³⁴ Massey, “Global Sense of Place”, 258. As Massey points out, this idea of rapid change and, as a result, “a sense of dislocation” represent a Western, colonial view: it might be a new sensation to people living in the West, but not to colonised peoples who have felt it for centuries.

⁹³⁵ Massey, 262.

⁹³⁶ Massey, 263. Uneven in the sense that mobility is distributed unevenly; some can move (financial, social, and cultural means allow it), others not (restricted financial means or physical mobility). And yet others move involuntarily (refugees) or in ways that are unwanted (Roma). Massey develops this thought on 258–260.

way, diversity is highly appreciated, but needs to be embodied and enacted in a specifically European way—cosmopolitanism is first and foremost European. It is thematised as physical movement to create social cohesion, which we can trace back to ‘A People’s Europe’, and as a movement of the mind, primarily thematised in New Narrative. But the latter hinges upon the former: the purpose of physical movement is to serve a movement of the mind with tolerance and curiosity at its core. While physical movement is first and foremost envisioned as internal to the EU, movement beyond Europe is not necessarily physical, but rather an exportation of values and norms.

In conclusion, the ideological dream of fullness and unity in the EU’s cosmopolitan vision has both a physical and a metaphorical dimension to it that are reciprocally constituted: physical encounters increase tolerance, and tolerance facilitates physical encounters with the unfamiliar of globalisation. The cosmopolitan vision is based on characteristics considered specifically European, and we see how the citizen thus becomes the engine of the EU’s political vision. In this way, the distinction between the political domain and the public/private is blurred.

This cosmopolitan vision is an example of how the EU’s constitutive rhetoric positions and conditions the transhistorical collective subject and the types of practices and dispositions it is meant to embody and perform. The vision of the EU connects the present and the future through a vision of omnipresence: the political imaginary of the EU is envisioned as embodied by, and distributed and circulated within the EU first and foremost through its citizens, not its institutions.

A European Destiny

While the topos of European cosmopolitanism is first and foremost a spatial category signifying different types of movement, the topos of destiny projects both a temporal and a spatial vision that encompasses Europeans throughout time. The vision of a common European destiny first appears in the Constitutional Treaty and indicates a new orientation within the EU that has continued ever since. On January 9, 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that if he had to sum up his main goal for the French presidency of the Council of the EU, it would be the “need to move from being a Europe of cooperation inside of our borders to a powerful Europe in the world, fully sovereign, free to make its choices and master of its destiny”.⁹³⁷ Going back to the Constitutional Treaty, the

⁹³⁷ Macron, “Press Conference Speech”, para. 2.

preamble states that the Heads of State or Government of the Member States are

CONVINCED that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.⁹³⁸

The inclusion of “destiny” was controversial in the context of the EU and one of the passages that was excluded when the Constitutional Treaty was configured into the Lisbon Treaty. But “destiny” reappears in New Narrative, both through the specific term and through other related thoughts and concepts, such as “telos” and “sense of purpose”.

Destiny connotes necessity and predestination and thus something beyond the reach of human agency while simultaneously—and paradoxically—requiring human agency in order to be fulfilled. On an individual level, we have, for example, the notion of taking destiny into one’s hands, and on a collective level, this paradox is exemplified in the projection of a manifest destiny. In the United States, it connects to an expansionist, cultural imperialist vision and a set of virtues of the North-American people: it is the duty of the citizens to help forge this destiny.⁹³⁹ Destiny in the passage from the Constitutional Treaty is less determined; it negotiates a balance between national identities and European values, between national identity and European destiny. It calls on “the peoples of Europe” to *forge* a common destiny, thus emphasising the indeterminacy of this destiny.

In New Narrative, we witness a similar vagueness when it comes to the content of a European destiny. To Barroso and several contributors in *Mind and Body*, the articulation of a destiny provides a telos and a vision, a sense of purpose to the European integration project; but this rather open signification is accompanied by a fuller signification such as ensuring and promoting peace; and often both of these traits intersect. In Barroso’s New Narrative launch speech, destiny is both pre-given and open. He says:

We won’t have real unity until we acknowledge a sense of belonging to a community which is bigger than the nation or the region, a sense of a shared European destiny which we are ready to work together to achieve.⁹⁴⁰

⁹³⁸ European Communities, “Constitution for Europe”, 9.

⁹³⁹ Miller and Furse, *Native America*.

⁹⁴⁰ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”, para. 32.

Destiny is understood as a sense of belonging that, on the one hand, must be acknowledged (it already exists) and, on the other, has to be worked for (it does not yet exist in the desired form). We see a similar doubleness in his foreword to *Mind and Body* with a reference to the Constitutional Treaty and the phrase “to forge a common destiny”:

The fact is that it is not enough to say that we, Europeans, share a common destiny. A sense of belonging to Europe, to a community of values, culture and interests is essential to the effort of forging such a common destiny.⁹⁴¹

Again, destiny is both something pre-given, “a community of values, culture and interests” that Europeans already share, and something that needs work in order to be achieved. The call for a common destiny is linked to Barroso’s appeal to imagine and shape the future—in order not to “miss out” on the future:

it is now our turn to go on imagining and shaping our future as our predecessors did in their time. The world system is adapting itself as well, forging a new world order. Either we contribute to reshaping it—not by trying to impose our solutions, but by proposing some of our ideas—or we miss out on the future.⁹⁴²

Barroso underlines that agency exists and is necessary, that through imagination it is possible to shape the future—“we” should propose rather than impose. At the same time, he argues that “we” might “miss out on the future”. Barroso does not specify the content of this future. His focus rests on the process, but in order to not miss out on the future, “we” must contribute to reshaping it; otherwise, other parts of the world will overhaul Europe, and Europe will lose its position in the “new world order”. Therefore, “we have to give a telos, a renewed sense of purpose, to European integration in the age of globalisation, and to reflect on how we can move towards it”.⁹⁴³

The “we” in Barroso’s text is ambiguous, especially in this passage. The “we” is a continuation of “our predecessors”, and a couple of paragraphs later, he stipulates “we, Europeans”, but right after stating that we cannot miss out on the future, he says: “We can indeed have a leadership role in shaping this world”.⁹⁴⁴ As we saw in the previous chapter, ambiguities of this kind serve to expand the constitutive horizon: “predecessors” can, on

⁹⁴¹ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 25.

⁹⁴² Barroso, 25.

⁹⁴³ Barroso, 25. Emphasis in the original.

⁹⁴⁴ Barroso, 25.

a purely denotative level, signify the predecessors of the EU, the founding fathers, and today's EU leaders should thus follow in their footsteps and dare to imagine a better future; but since Barroso later stipulates "we, Europeans", "predecessors" can also signify European predecessors more broadly. The latter reading connotes a much richer past.

Many of the other contributors connect the idea of a European destiny to the question of survival. Then-prime minister of Italy Enrico Letta articulates a fear of becoming obsolete in the new world order in which "countries that are twice the size of the European Union are among the decisionmakers on the global scene".⁹⁴⁵ Today, "the European dream" is absent,⁹⁴⁶ and this is what needs to be reawakened: in order for the EU to have a seat at the table, member states must integrate fully, this is the European dream. Likewise, "Europe should be a shared purpose or, quite simply, it will not be at all",⁹⁴⁷ Vassiliou argues, without specifying exactly what it is that will not be—the EU? Peace? Democracy? The *raison d'être*, the justification of existence, is thus the fear of nonexistence. This has two closely connected meanings: on the one hand, it signifies the fear that, should the EU cease to exist, its member states might once again wage wars against another and thus pose a threat to their own existence. So, the existence of the EU is justified as a means to uphold the existence of its citizens. On the other hand, the fear of nonexistence can also signify a fear connected to the EU itself: that the existence and growth of the EU is justified as a means to sustain its institutional existence.

MEP and co-initiator of New Narrative Morten Løkkegaard's notion of destiny likewise revolves around the ambivalence of the EU's role in the social imaginary of its citizens and the rest of the world. According to him, the purpose of New Narrative is "to give voice and form to our common European destiny, and to act as a tool for the future, for making the right choices".⁹⁴⁸ Destiny needs a form, it is an agency to guide future decisions; but it is also a safeguard from what seems to be understood as a European disposition, namely self-destruction:

Like any other union or group of people with a common destiny, the EU needs a narrative, a common story that invests our daily lives as Europeans with a sense of purpose and togetherness. Without that, we'll end up doing

⁹⁴⁵ Letta, "Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013", 78.

⁹⁴⁶ Letta, 74–75.

⁹⁴⁷ Vassiliou, "Europe as a Shared Purpose", 38.

⁹⁴⁸ Løkkegaard, "Need for a Narrative", 232.

what we have been doing to each other for millennia, namely, slaughtering one another every second or third decade.⁹⁴⁹

Destiny, here, is pre-given (all communities have one) and provides “purpose and togetherness” mediated through narrative. What is needed is something that can remind EU citizens why they need each other. Much like Habermas’s vision of the catalytic effects of a constitution,⁹⁵⁰ destiny can be understood as a commitment to one another—regardless of what this destiny may be or bring; an idea echoed by Letta who states that influence hinges upon unity: “more things unite us than things that divide us. . . . We must ensure that the values that unite us influence the global decision-making”.⁹⁵¹ If “you emphasise only the differences, then you are being very short-sighted indeed”.⁹⁵² EU leaders/EU citizens must look at the bigger picture and form strategic commitments.

If we return to the first articulation of European destiny and consider the context of both the Constitutional Treaty and New Narrative, we find an EU undergoing institutional, political change and an EU in a changing Europe, respectively. The year 2004 was, on the one hand, marked by upcoming enlargement, the most extensive in the EU’s history in terms of member states, population, and territory; on the other hand, disagreements among existing member states that arose even before the drafting of the constitution text had begun, and which led to a markedly more extensive drafting process with the inclusion of civil society and the member states to-be, ran as a smouldering undercurrent to the EU’s success in terms of growth. In 2014, the EU had recently (2012) been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, acknowledging the EU for its peacebuilding and democratic work so far, but was also met by growing EU-sceptical, nationalist sentiments all across the EU member states, which influenced the composition of the EP. In this light, it may seem odd to insist on the existence and/or the crafting of a common destiny when the member states clearly disagree on how to move forward—if to move at all. But if we interpret the articulation of destiny as a sign of future commitment, we can understand the fact that the soon-to-be quite many and quite diverse parties in 2004 signed the Constitutional Treaty as a sign of commitment, not just in spirit but in a legally binding manner, to make past disagreements the less important narrative in favour of continued peace and prosperity. From this perspective, these formulations could be seen as performative

⁹⁴⁹ Løkkegaard, 233.

⁹⁵⁰ Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, 16–17.

⁹⁵¹ Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 78.

⁹⁵² Letta, 79.

speech acts, as examples of the constitutive paradox of needing to presuppose that which is simultaneously created through continuous interpellations—as a constitutive effort of writing into being. Thus, the mere fact that the Heads of State or Government of the existing member states actually agreed on these statements, is a significant achievement, despite the fact that the Constitutional Treaty was never ratified: since they agreed once and made this agreement public, the chance of their agreeing again is not inconsiderable. If we sign a treaty that ensures the forging of a common destiny, it is difficult to abandon that promise.

In short, destiny provides guidance, it is a tool to make “the right choices”, to “serve as inspiration” and thus a strategic commitment that potentially enables global influence, but also future commitment of the enlarged and increasingly diverse EU. European destiny is built on “a community of values, culture and interests”, and it should be true to the EU’s “original purpose” of peace and prosperity. Of course, this framework is rather vague—a community of which values, what culture, and which interests?—but, as shown in the two previous chapters, these rather vague categories are filled with historical, cultural, and symbolic meaning elsewhere.

Universality as European Essence

The European destiny has two sides, in other words. One focuses on internal commitment, the other on global influence. As Løkkegaard formulates it, “the EU has to be true to its original purpose” of peace and prosperity.⁹⁵³ This requires that the EU member states and Europeans alike stand together in solidarity so that they can “survive as a region, and as a culture”,⁹⁵⁴ but also that they can “fulfil our role in the world”,⁹⁵⁵ since the EU has “created a unique model that serves as inspiration to the rest of the world”.

Following the Second World War, the Community sought a neutral relationship with other parts of the world due to the risk of neo-colonial charges, and it was not until after 1989 that the EU once again took a more assertive and conditional stance in questions of human rights and democracy outside of the EU.⁹⁵⁶ Sanctions (e.g., trade agreements for human rights) go against the otherwise often promoted characteristic of the EU, namely its “soft powers”. Colonialism was, as Hansen and Jonson argue

⁹⁵³ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 233.

⁹⁵⁴ Løkkegaard, 233.

⁹⁵⁵ Løkkegaard, 232.

⁹⁵⁶ Smith, “Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism”, 156.

never not part of the EU's political imaginary,⁹⁵⁷ and we can also speculate about the meaning of the wish to “play its proper role in the world”,⁹⁵⁸ as the 1973-declaration states, but the more explicit proactive stance is fairly new.

This stance can be conceptualised as “proactive cosmopolitanism”, Poul Taylor argues. It is “a deliberate attempt to create a consensus about values and behaviour—a cosmopolitan community—among diverse communities”, which means promoting “the civil and political values of Western liberal states in other parts of the world”.⁹⁵⁹ As Hansen and Jonsson phrase it: “Whereas Russia, China and the US continue to play the old game of power politics, the EU travels the world on soft power; it does not make adversaries, it negotiates, it creates partners, it associates”.⁹⁶⁰ Proactive cosmopolitanism is thus a “long-term security strategy”, founded on the often-cited belief that democracies do not wage war against each other. But “it also reflects the belief, shared by the member states and EU institutions, that human rights and democracy must be promoted internationally, for their own sake”, Karen Smith argues.⁹⁶¹ We can understand this universalistic and missionary orientation as an effort to cope with the fluidity and ever-changing nature of society by invoking elements of something unchanging and eternal.⁹⁶² In the EU initiatives studied in this thesis, this orientation is reflected in the assertion of the EU's soft powers and in the invocation of European, universal values. Bernhard Forchtner and Christoffer Kølvråa write:

*The ‘standard narration’ of Europe’s transition from war to peace, comes to serve as ‘beginning’ and ‘middle’ for a whole new narrative ‘end’. The end which ‘finds’ its beginning in Europe’s tragic history is no longer simply the goal of unifying the continent, but an emerging ambition to play a role beyond Europe.*⁹⁶³

Their argument springs out of the EU receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 and thus relates to the narrative of the EU as a peace project in general. This narrative is two-directional: it has an inward direction—the EU has created peace in Europe and must make sure it stays peaceful—and

⁹⁵⁷ Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.

⁹⁵⁸ Commission of the European Communities, “Declaration on European Identity”, 120.

⁹⁵⁹ Taylor, “United Nations”, 540.

⁹⁶⁰ Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, xv.

⁹⁶¹ Smith, “Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism”, 175. It is beyond the scope of this study to explore how the EU succeeds in its proactive cosmopolitan engagement. See Smith for an analysis of the EU's policies towards Burma, Cuba, and Zimbabwe.

⁹⁶² Eisenstadt and Giesen, “Construction of Collective Identity”, 82.

⁹⁶³ Forchtner and Kølvråa, “Narrating a ‘New Europe,’” 394. Emphasis in the original.

an outward direction as a normative model worth exporting due to its universal value. While chapter 5 focused on the EU's past achievements (its founding narrative) and the ambition to teach the world how to live in peace, the proactive cosmopolitanism thematised here centres on the ambition to transform universal values into European values that are then exported to the rest of the world—to turn universality into a European essence. This dream of fullness, the vision of an original meaning to the constitution of the EU, is temporally and spatially expanded.

In *Mind and Body*, the EU's soft power is interpreted as a benefit both to the EU itself and beyond. Internally, it is a strength that enables Europeans “to concentrate on the pursuit of wisdom and beauty, not destruction and violence”,⁹⁶⁴ and therefore it is crucial to the future of the EU. Externally, it is a power that reaches beyond the borders of the EU. For example, in a notably economicist, new public management language, Letta foresees that European values “will be winning values thanks to our extraordinary soft power”;⁹⁶⁵ although “small in geographical terms”, Europeans are “extraordinary in terms of soft power”.⁹⁶⁶ But only if used together, he warns; the basis of this soft power is the fact that “we have managed to do away with war”,⁹⁶⁷ and Europeans therefore owe it to future generations to make sure “European values prevail” in the time to come but also throughout the world.⁹⁶⁸

There is no shortage of claims about European values in *Mind and Body*. “Tolerance is something like the soul of Europe”,⁹⁶⁹ and “Europe's essence” is “the desire for freedom”.⁹⁷⁰ We also see invocations of “those basic values that Greeks and Christians bequeathed to Europe and the world”⁹⁷¹ and a “return to Europe's ‘fundamentals’—to its corpus of cultural values, based on ethics, aesthetics and sustainability”.⁹⁷² Letta argues that “we [Europeans] all share the same values and we must ensure that these values are expressed in a European way”⁹⁷³ and, as quoted earlier, the “European state of mind” is founded on a certain set of values:

⁹⁶⁴ Kleiber, “Humanistic and Scientific Sources”, 100.

⁹⁶⁵ Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 78.

⁹⁶⁶ Letta, 78–79.

⁹⁶⁷ Letta, 79.

⁹⁶⁸ Letta, 79.

⁹⁶⁹ Merkel, “Translation of the Speech Delivered by the Federal Chancellor of Germany at the Academy of the Arts, Berlin, on 1 March 2014”, 116.

⁹⁷⁰ Konrád, “European Ars Poetica”, 40, 41.

⁹⁷¹ Porębski, “Borders of the European Union”, 59–60.

⁹⁷² Quaedvlieg–Mihailović, “Towards Europe's New Renaissance”, 122.

⁹⁷³ Letta, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Italy at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 78.

Europe is a state of mind rooted in its shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law. Today, vigilance is required to continuously reaffirm and build upon those fundamental values and principles that, from the outset, have been deeply embedded in the *raison d'être* of Europe.⁹⁷⁴

These references to *European* values can signify either that they are originating from Europe (as when referring to Roman law or Athenian democracy as fundamentally European), or they can signify values to which Europe adheres (thus potentially also African, Asian, Australian, etc.). In the five EU initiatives, we find both functions in the articulation of European values. The difference between them, however, is not always clear. Although taken from a different context, Christian Joppke's examination of the British state rhetoric on immigration and citizenship serves as a clarifying example:

The British state is caught in the paradox of universalism: it perceives the need to make immigrants and ethnic minorities parts of *this* and not of *any* society, but it cannot name and enforce any particulars that distinguish the 'here' from 'there'.⁹⁷⁵

Difference between this/here (Britain, Europe) and any/there (the universal) is evoked, but without substantial difference. It is this ambiguity that I seek to explore in this section.

Ambiguous articulations of values appear in all five initiatives. Whereas the 1973-declaration, 'A People's Europe' (by quoting the 1973-declaration), and the Maastricht Treaty speak of attachment to a set of *principles*, the Constitutional Treaty and the New Narrative are concerned with *values* as well. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, specifies that the EU is founded on universal values:

Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe.⁹⁷⁶

According to the logical principle that what inspires a creation must pre-exist this creation, these values are a resource to the EU, but are not

⁹⁷⁴ Deventer et al., "Declaration", 126–27. Emphasis in the original.

⁹⁷⁵ Joppke, "Immigration and the Identity of Citizenship", 538.

⁹⁷⁶ European Communities, "Constitution for Europe", 47, see also 432. The Charter is part of the Constitutional Treaty, today a separate charter alongside the Lisbon Treaty.

essentially European. We see the same order elsewhere in the Constitutional Treaty,⁹⁷⁷ but in the preamble the order is reversed. The member states are

DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.⁹⁷⁸

Here, the principles described in the 1973-declaration, referred to in ‘A People’s Europe’ and again in the Maastricht Treaty are no longer universal and then European, but European and then universal. They have developed from a European cultural, religious, and humanist inheritance and since proved to have universal validity and therefore spread to the rest of the world. The preamble, in other words, claims a European origin of the universal values “inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”.

Turning to *Mind and Body*, the contributions for the most part follow this recasting of the order of events: values are first and foremost essentially European and, consequently, values of universal worth. For example, as previously quoted, scientist and member of the New Narrative cultural committee Michal Kleiber argues that “European philosophy and science have created standards for the world” that form the basis of a set of values, among these “a never-ending search for truth”.⁹⁷⁹ Konrád regards freedom as part of Europe’s essence: “Two centuries after the outbreak of the French Revolution . . . we will only be worthy of the name ‘European’ if we remain unified in support of each other’s individual right to freedom”.⁹⁸⁰ Implicitly, he indicates that the yearning for these freedoms is specifically European—there is a reason that the French Revolution happened on European soil: “Our [Europeans] history is an uncompleted path to freedom, which constitutes humanity’s gradually unfolding essence”.⁹⁸¹ And, finally, he ends his text by declaiming: “You can stave off the desire for freedom, but never bury it. Unless you bury all Europeans along with it”.⁹⁸² European history is a continuous striving for freedom; in fact, if Europeans were eviscerated from the planet, so too would the

⁹⁷⁷ European Communities, 137.

⁹⁷⁸ European Communities, 9.

⁹⁷⁹ Kleiber, “Humanistic and Scientific Sources”, 98.

⁹⁸⁰ Konrád, “European Ars Poetica”, 40.

⁹⁸¹ Konrád, 38.

⁹⁸² Konrád, 41.

desire for freedom, he says. In this way, the desire for freedom—the essence of humanity—is turned into a specifically European characteristic.

Others are more explicit in their claims for European universality. Then-president-elect of the European Council Donald Tusk states:

We must not forget that, as Europeans, we have patent rights: it was here, after all, that democracy, free economy and the rule of law were invented and worshipped the most. And this patent, once adopted by others, also changed their lives for better.⁹⁸³

The notion of patent rights as a frame for European principles and values turns these values and principles into intellectual property, something that the owner has exclusive rights to make, use, and sell. Tusk does not suggest that non-Europeans are excluded from adhering to these principles (others adopt it), but the sense of ownership is inescapable: they were invented and even worshipped the most in Europe.⁹⁸⁴

Claims of this kind are not representative of *Mind and Body* as a whole, but they foreground a tendency to essentialist articulations of European values and principles. Tusk's origin narrative and Konrád's invocation of the French Revolution and the European search for freedom provide contexts and thus function as narrative anchors of universal values of freedom, democracy, and tolerance. Europe is often characterised as a community of various values, but “democracy, freedom, the rule of law, peace and tolerance” recur.⁹⁸⁵ To frame these universal values as European, these values are therefore tied to a specific event in European history.⁹⁸⁶ In his reading of the New Narrative declaration, philosopher Carl Cederberg similarly argues that “the ‘new narrative’ unproblematically assumes and accepts that universality is a European property”.⁹⁸⁷ Through Hegel and Husserl, Cederberg wishes to “understand the seeming paradox of a people who hold [*szé*] universality as their particularity”,⁹⁸⁸ who holds the universal as its essence. Cederberg does not disentangle the text, but the following previously-cited passage can serve as an example:

⁹⁸³ Tusk, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013”, 54.

⁹⁸⁴ A very similar imagery was used by Macron in his speech marking the French takeover of the presidency of the Council of the EU in January 2022, when he claimed that concept of asylum “was invented on the European continent”—after which he presented three concrete proposals that are to enforce the EU's borders. See Macron, “Press Conference Speech”, para. 3.

⁹⁸⁵ Forchtner and Kolvraa, “Narrating a ‘New Europe,’” 387.

⁹⁸⁶ Forchtner and Kolvraa, 387.

⁹⁸⁷ Cederberg, “Europe as Identity and Ideal”, 39.

⁹⁸⁸ Cederberg, 39.

Europe is a state of mind that also exists beyond its borders. Multitudes of people are attracted to Europe by its common values and principles.⁹⁸⁹

As the European state of mind and its common values extend in space, the declaration defines a border (Europe) and confines the ownership of certain principles and values within it, while reaching beyond this border in its claims of universality.

In conjunction with these examples, this passage shows how many of the contributors in *Mind and Body* promote European values that often signify a primordial characteristic, not in the sense that these values are founded in the biological nature of Europeans, but rather in the sense that they existed from the beginning, as part of the formation of Europe, and are passed on across generations in the cultural community. Thus, others can accept and abide by them: European values are universal and express an ambition to shape the world in the image of Europe—a proactive cosmopolitanism in which European values, principles, and a European model of peace are both means to an end (mutual understanding, peace) and ends in themselves (promoted for their own sake). We see this proactive role particularly clearly in Letta’s idea of the “winning values in the world” expressed in a “European way”; in Kleiber’s thoughts about Europe’s contribution to world civilization; and in philosopher Alicja Gescinska’s formulation of Europe as “a moral project” founded on “moral values”.⁹⁹⁰ But we also see it in the cosmopolitan vision discussed earlier in this chapter, of Europe “as one great mega-city interconnected by means of transportation and communication”.⁹⁹¹ The image invokes the biblical analogy of a “city on a hill” from the Sermon on the Mount, a very common phrase in US politics, invoked by Democrats and Republicans alike.⁹⁹² Jesus says to his followers:

You are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hidden. Nor do they light a lamp and put it under a basket, but on a lampstand, and it gives light to all who are in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father in heaven.⁹⁹³

⁹⁸⁹ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 127.

⁹⁹⁰ Gescinska, “Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric”, 60–61.

⁹⁹¹ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 129.

⁹⁹² For example, John F. Kennedy, Barack Obama, Ronald Reagan, Mitt Romney, and Mike Pompeo. It was also invoked by Amanda Gorman in her poem “The Hill We Climb” which she recited at the inaugural of Joseph Biden on January 20, 2021. The final lines read: “For there is always light / if only we are brave enough to see it / if only we are brave enough to be it”.

⁹⁹³ Matthew 5:14–16 AV.

This light—signifying Christian faith—on the top of a hill indicates both the impossibility of hiding it (because it is too powerful) and a summoning of Jesus’s followers to jointly shine for those in the dark: let your light so shine before men. As a political vision in a US context, the city on the hill signifies the United States as a beacon for others to be inspired by, both referring back to the first settlers and their vision and also as a vision of the future—to continue to be or to be again that shining city on the hill.⁹⁹⁴ *Mind and Body* conjures a similar image; the founding narrative of the EU serves as a normative exemplum, a beacon for others to follow.⁹⁹⁵ We see the same function in the proactive cosmopolitan ideal exemplified here: the vision of the EU as a cosmopolitan ideal, showing the people everywhere how to be citizens of the world.

It follows, then, that not only EU citizens and prospective citizens, but also citizens of the world (literally, not in the cosmopolitan sense) are inscribed in the universalism promoted by the EU most explicitly in New Narrative—as a moral project⁹⁹⁶ that impels the EU to shape a more civilized world.⁹⁹⁷ This, however, does not mean that citizens of the world are the intended audience of the EU’s constitutive rhetoric. Rather, as I return to at the end of this chapter, it is a specific segment of the EU citizens, the Eurostars, who are invited to identify with a narrative in which Europeans are the originators and distributors of universal and cosmopolitan values; in which Europe is the city on the hill.

Both Hegel and Husserl saw a concurrence between the development of universal reason and the history of Europe which led to the belief that Europe constitutes the beginning, the foundation of the world, as Cederberg explains. Husserl believed that universal reason should and could be distributed into the world, but, as Cederberg comments, the colonial project of civilizing the world has shown “how aggressive the generosity of universalism can be”.⁹⁹⁸ The problem with the New Narrative declaration, Cederberg concludes, is that it does not differentiate between idea (in the Platonic sense), ideal (that which you strive for) and identity (the sensible things, that which is). In his reading of the passage also

⁹⁹⁴ For example, in Reagan’s farewell speech to the nation on January 11, 1989, he described how he had always envisioned this city: “But in my mind it was a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind-swept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here. That’s how I saw it, and see it still”. Reagan, “Farewell Address”.

⁹⁹⁵ I discuss this in chapter 5.

⁹⁹⁶ Gescinska, “Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric”, 60.

⁹⁹⁷ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 24.

⁹⁹⁸ Cederberg, “Europe as Identity and Ideal”, 44.

discussed by Buhre,⁹⁹⁹ which states that “Europe is a source of inspiration from the past, emancipation in the present and an aspiration towards a sustainable future. Europe is an identity, an idea, an ideal”,¹⁰⁰⁰ Cederberg suggests that

it is better not to talk of Europe as harbouring the idea of universality, and not to confuse ideal with identity. Or to put it otherwise, in order for the idea of universality to be Europe’s ideal, it cannot be thought of as constituting its identity.¹⁰⁰¹

If universality is that which Europe strives for, it logically cannot simultaneously be what Europe stands for at this moment, Cederberg argues. This supposition is true when taken at face value, but as Buhre’s analysis shows, identity (past, inspiration), idea (present, emancipation), and ideal (future, aspiration) are both temporally separated and collapsed, as all that is left to do is a future repetition of what already was.¹⁰⁰² As such, the separation is only seeming, and political agency is impaired. But we can add to this a spatial separation. What Cederberg misses in his interpretation is the possibility that the idea of universality is an ideal that encompasses not only Europe, but the rest of the world as well. When the declaration says that “Europe is an identity, an idea, an ideal”,¹⁰⁰³ it does not have to be illogical, if we understand it to mean that Europe is an idea and an ideal for others to strive for. As Viklund highlights, as a rhetorical form, the political vision builds on a community’s existing, positive characteristics; this is a way to demonstrate that although the vision “aims at what we cannot yet see”,¹⁰⁰⁴ it is nonetheless realistic. It is founded on the existing (identity) while seeking the not-yet-existing (ideal).

Cederberg is right when he argues that idea, ideal, and identity must be disentangled and, more specifically, that “Europe needs to be disconnected from the notion of universality”;¹⁰⁰⁵ they need to be separated from one another, but not for the reasons Cederberg provides. European universality *can* be all three at once, but for different subjects and with different implications. Only by disentangling these subjects, does the missionary attitude become visible: European universality marks the temporal and spatial expansion of the dream of fullness. This tension between

⁹⁹⁹ See chapter 5.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 141. Buhre quotes Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

¹⁰⁰¹ Cederberg, “Europe as Identity and Ideal”, 57.

¹⁰⁰² Buhre, “Speaking Other Times”, 141.

¹⁰⁰³ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Viklund, “Den politiska visionens retorik”, 79.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Cederberg, “Europe as Identity and Ideal”, 56.

universality and essentialism is reflected in the Constitutional Treaty and reinforced in the New Narrative declaration with its articulation of universal, borderless, yet fundamentally European values. As we shall see in the next section, these values are embodied by EU citizens as a state of mind.

“Europe is a state of mind”

Universality as European essence thus combines visions of omnipresence and eternity, spatiality and temporality. With the metaphor of a European state of mind, this intersection is complete, as this vision permeates even the private sphere of the human being. This quest to enter the hearts and minds of its citizens, which these four *topoi* exemplify, distinguishes New Narrative from the four previous initiatives.

The metaphor “Europe is a state of mind” functions as an anaphora that initiates six consecutive paragraphs in the first part of the New Narrative declaration, here in abbreviated form: “Europe is a state of mind, formed and fostered by its spiritual, philosophical, artistic and scientific inheritance, and driven by the lessons of history”;¹⁰⁰⁶ “Europe is a state of mind shared by citizens across the continent”;¹⁰⁰⁷ “Europe is a state shared by the men and women who, with the force of their beliefs both religious and secular, have always provided light in the darkest hours of European history”;¹⁰⁰⁸ “Europe is a state of mind rooted in its shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law”;¹⁰⁰⁹ “Europe is a state of mind that exists also beyond its borders”;¹⁰¹⁰ and, most noticeable,

Europe is a state of mind that goes beyond a grouping of nation states, an internal market and the geographical contours of a continent. Europe is a moral and political responsibility, which must be carried, not only by institutions and politicians, but by each and every European.¹⁰¹¹

Grounded in history and spiritual, philosophical, artistic as well as scientific inheritance, founded on shared values, shared by citizens all over the continent but also beyond and by determined men and women throughout time, the European state of mind turns Europe into a moral and political responsibility. This responsibility is connected to a geographical (as well as political, cultural, financial) space (Europe, not the EU) and rests with

¹⁰⁰⁶ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Deventer et al., 126.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Deventer et al., 126.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Deventer et al., 126.

¹⁰¹⁰ Deventer et al., 127.

¹⁰¹¹ Deventer et al., 126.

institutions, politicians, each and every European, from the past into the future. The vision of a European state of mind is, in other words, spatially and temporally all-encompassing and permeates both the public and the private spheres. We can understand this vision as an expression of “the illusion of fullness”¹⁰¹² that, according to Laclau, is the primary object of ideology: to project onto divided phenomena the illusion of a pure, original fullness or wholeness. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the questions are, then, how the idea of pure, coherent, and unifying meaning is created, and what function such creation fills to the formation of collective identity.

The state of mind metaphor is central to the New Narrative declaration, but it is also circulated elsewhere in *Mind and Body*, among others by Vassiliou, who comments:

The authors’ [of the declaration] ambition is to forge an inspiring sense in our citizens’ minds of an inclusive Europe: an economic project to deliver growth and prosperity, but also a political and cultural project that embodies shared values and emotions about who we are and where we stand as Europeans. Europe is not just an economic project, but ‘a state of mind’, as the authors aptly put it.¹⁰¹³

Vassiliou’s interpretation focuses on the importance of being able to reach citizens’ hearts and minds and investing them with inspiration—culture, shared values, and emotions. Culture is important, because it is viewed as the gateway to a more emotional attachment to Europe and/or the EU. As Bratušek says: “We fear our Union will suddenly become something nobody really identifies with—estranged from our minds and hearts”,¹⁰¹⁴ and Gescinska in a similar vein notes that recognizing the true value of intellectual debate “is not only a matter of opening one’s mind, but also one’s heart” and continues by arguing that Europe “is a moral project and a representation of values . . . The only true measure of Europe’s success is the good that lives in the hearts and minds of its citizens”.¹⁰¹⁵ Both Bratušek and Gescinska thus extend their call for identification to include the hearts of the EU citizens, and even if Gescinska does not establish what goodness is or who the rightful judge of that should be, she goes as far as to make the good of EU citizens’ hearts and minds the measure of

¹⁰¹² Laclau, “Death and Resurrection”, 301.

¹⁰¹³ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 36.

¹⁰¹⁴ Bratušek, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Slovenia at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013”, 82.

¹⁰¹⁵ Gescinska, “Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric”, 64.

the EU's success. Indeed, the EU and its citizens have become intertwined, if not inseparable.

After the six consecutive paragraphs initiated by "Europe is a state of mind" comes a short paragraph about "Europe's evolving narrative". It says: "Europe's state of mind matured and found a balance only in the modern era and after the terrible disasters in the 20th century led to the idea of unity in diversity".¹⁰¹⁶ Comparing this passage to the previous six, we see how Europe is imagined as both *possessing* a "state of mind" ("Europe's state of mind matured") and *being* a "state of mind" possessed by others ("Europe is a state of mind shared by citizens"). European identity is embodied by the individual *and* shared by the collective in a common state of mind, and in this way becomes a physical category: the citizen takes part of, embodies a collective mindset. In chapter 4, we saw how member states, citizens, and the EU were interwoven in various images and figures, one of them the heart and arteries metaphor which depicts the EU as the heart and the member states/EU citizens as the arteries finding their way to the heart. This image exemplifies how the EU, EU member states, and EU citizens are interconstituent and inseparable, and we see a similar intertwining when the imagery in this section shifts from heart to mind. Europe's state of mind is institutional, but also individual, and these two levels reciprocally constitute one another.

A less prevalent theme related to the state of mind metaphor is Europe as a "way of life". In his launch speech, Barroso declares that "we must never give up any of our values, our culture or our way of life, our European way of life",¹⁰¹⁷ which is then echoed by Vassiliou: "Europe is not presented simply as a means to an end, but as a way of life based on such shared values as the commitment to freedom, democracy, equality, solidarity and respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law".¹⁰¹⁸ These statements resemble George W. Bush's 9/11 statement that terrorism is "a threat to our way of life"¹⁰¹⁹ and Barack Obama's insurance that "we will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense".¹⁰²⁰

¹⁰¹⁶ Deventer et al., "Declaration", 127.

¹⁰¹⁷ Barroso, "Speech by President Barroso", para. 14.

¹⁰¹⁸ Vassiliou, "Europe as a Shared Purpose", 37.

¹⁰¹⁹ Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress"; Bush, "Address to the Nation on 9-11-01". Bush uses this phrase in the first sentence of the address from September 11, 2001, and reiterates it on September 20, 2001.

¹⁰²⁰ Obama, "President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address". Both Donald Trump and Joseph Biden have used this same phrase; Trump warned that Biden would destroy the "American way of life" if he were elected president, and in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, Biden reminded his audience that there is "nothing guaranteed about our way of life. We have to fight for it, defend it, earn it". See Quinn and Watson, "Trump Accepts GOP Nomination"; Biden, "Remarks by President Biden".

“Way of life” signifies something more than simply the mundane day-to-day activities or the institutional structure of our societies; “way of life” connotes, in Barroso’s example, certain cultural attributes, that are, however, unspecified, and in Vassiliou’s statement, it connotes a range of abstract values and principles. Like a state of mind, a way of life is enacted both on an individual and a collective level; it is constituted by the physical actions performed in everyday life, although these actions are not specified.

In this way, New Narrative reminisces of ‘A People’s Europe’, but in a distinctly different manner. ‘A People’s Europe’ focused on the everyday life of EU citizens as something citizens *do* and therefore the suggestions made in the two reports are concrete proposals intended to enhance their quality of life. By contrast, citizens and their lives are purely abstractions in New Narrative. Furthermore, while ‘A People’s Europe’ may be said to enter the private sphere in the sense that it tried to deregulate obstacles and make certain things, such as traveling, studying, and working abroad, easier, New Narrative goes further by making claims on citizens’ minds and hearts and seeking to become one with its citizens.

In the next and final part of the chapter, we direct our attention towards the EU citizens.

Eurostars

In combination, European cosmopolitanism, a common European destiny, universality as European essence, and a European state of mind further establishes the transhistorical community discussed in the previous chapter, in which I focused on the historiographical use of the past as a resource to create a coherent, transhistorical European subject. In this chapter, focus has so far rested on how the transhistorical subject in the EU initiatives extends into the future, thus connecting past, present, and future through topoi of eternity and omnipresence. According to the initiatives, however, these visions have been interrupted by a seemingly permanent mode of crisis (chapter 4). Therefore, something new is needed in order to instigate, recontinue, and thus confirm these visions: a new narrative that can spark the involvement of EU citizens.

New Narrative is a potential “catalyst, a platform of cultural exchanges across languages, disciplines, practices, etc”,¹⁰²¹ the purpose of which is to “trigger” debate.¹⁰²² Some claim that “the future cannot be predicted, it

¹⁰²¹ Boeri in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 139–40.

¹⁰²² Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

must be invented. Let us start inventing it!";¹⁰²³ others call for "a second, and secular, revolution, which smashes the nationalist endogamy of EU states".¹⁰²⁴ Crises are potential for change. They "have the virtue of being revealing. The current crisis has brought to light something of a cultural and moral crisis in Europe".¹⁰²⁵ In this sense, crisis in itself is the spark that instigates change and, as such, is a potentially positive force. Still others call for "positive shocks and positive symbols" for Europe,¹⁰²⁶ and invite the reader to "join forces, let us work together to give to the entire process of European integration a 'positive shock' through the creative energy and inspirational power of our culture and heritage".¹⁰²⁷

In short, the contributors of *Mind and Body* invoke a "now" that demands catalysts, triggers, positive shocks, a revolution in order to live up to its potential—the time is ripe for change. García argues that the motivation behind New Narrative was to "re-create a new form of permissive consensus",¹⁰²⁸ the tacit acceptance that characterised the early days of the EU when citizens were mostly indifferent about the EU and thus complaisant. As this old paradigm is beginning to be—or already has been—replaced by a new constraining dissensus, New Narrative is thought to be a counteract and sets out to instigate the process towards a new renaissance, a new narrative, a new cosmopolitanism, a new type of citizen. In this sense, both citizens and the EU are catalysts who can create such a spark—the EU is the catalyst for its citizens through initiatives such as New Narrative, and citizens (laymen and cultural protagonists alike), in turn, are legitimising catalysts for the EU.

Citizens thus perform a salient role in New Narrative but also in the previous initiatives, although in very different ways. Whereas the Declaration on European Identity (1973) does not focus on the citizen at all, but rather on the institution and its role in relation to global powers such as the United States and the USSR, 'A People's Europe' (1985) places the citizen at the centre. It does not speak *to* the citizen, but it is designed to enhance the quality of life *for* the citizens within the Community in very concrete ways by making it easier to move within the Community—be it to work, travel, or study abroad. As thematised in the beginning of this chapter, movement has been central to the EU since its inception, which is why these life-enhancement policies come with certain expectations: by moving, citizens are expected not only to enhance their life quality, but

¹⁰²³ Kleiber, "Humanistic and Scientific Sources", 101.

¹⁰²⁴ Portabella, "Europe as a Space", 67.

¹⁰²⁵ Portabella, 66.

¹⁰²⁶ Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, "Towards Europe's New Renaissance", 121.

¹⁰²⁷ Domingo, "Europe as Gesamtkunstwerk", 214.

¹⁰²⁸ García, "New Narrative Project", 347.

also to reinforce and strengthen values such as tolerance and intercultural understanding.

Although the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the Constitutional Treaty (2004) do not focus on the citizen in the same manner, their epideictic celebrations of European inheritance, religious and cultural values, and norms of transcending division provide a framework for citizen's action and behaviour. In New Narrative, citizens are central as the carriers of European values distributed and circulated in the EU. But citizens are also called upon to engage in the public sphere, which is articulated as a moral responsibility, enacted rhetorically through conversation and debate. In the following, I explore the call on the collective subject, the EU citizen, to engage themselves, to live up to their moral responsibility, and to do so by debating within a plural and diverse but highly structured frame.

The Moral Responsibility of Citizens

The two afterwords in *Mind and Body* call upon the citizen as a welcome and needed contrast to politicians and bureaucrats. Museum director and chair of the New Narrative cultural committee, Paul Dujardin, writes that New Narrative is a way to “reach out and listen to citizens” and proposes a “‘listening’ approach” in order to “restore trust”.¹⁰²⁹ One of the more concrete outcomes of the initiative, aimed specifically at EU citizens, was four posters (figure 10),¹⁰³⁰ distributed during the 14th International Architecture Exhibition in Venice, September 2014. The first poster simply says: “EUROPE IS”. This poster is meant to be paired with one of the three other posters, where the following statements are printed, respectively: “A STATE OF MIND. What ideas can you share?”/“A POLITICAL BODY. Can you help shape it?”/“A PUBLIC SPACE. Where is your voice?” When the first poster is put on top of one of the three others, they together form the message: “EUROPE IS A STATE OF MIND. What ideas can you share?”, and so on.

¹⁰²⁹ Dujardin, “Reinventing Europe”, 237. See also, Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 233.

¹⁰³⁰ New Narrative for Europe Posters in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*, 173–75.



Figure 10. Poster campaign for New Narrative for Europe. © Leftloft.

Mind and Body does not supply any information about the design, distribution, or purpose of the posters, but the Lara Caputo, who co-designed the posters with Leftloft, reiterates the words and purpose stated in the *Mind and Body* colophon. She writes that New Narrative “provides [*sic*] a platform in which cultural practitioners shared their views on and for the development of a European social imaginary and public space for debate”.¹⁰³¹ Furthermore, Caputo states that their purpose was to promote “european [*sic*] engagement via asking questions”.¹⁰³² This listening approach is intended, then, for an audience that ranges from Europeans in general to cultural practitioners, and, more specifically, to those attending the exhibition.

The poster design resembles Eliasson’s intervention “Your inner we”,¹⁰³³ described earlier in this chapter (see figure 9). He also plays with transparency through the use of transparent paper and letters with the purpose of exemplifying and encouraging reflection about the intertwined relationship between the individual and the collective. The transparency

¹⁰³¹ Caputo, “New Narrative for Europe”. See also Leftloft, “New Narrative for Europe”, for a similar formulation. The idea of a European social imaginary appears only two times in *Mind and Body*, in the colophon cited here and in the afterword by Dujardin. See Dujardin, “Reinventing Europe”, 236. It is not further explained, but gives impression of something worthy of striving for; an end in itself, regardless its content. In Cornelius Castoriadis’s theory of the social imaginary, it is composed by the collective social imaginary significations and thus should be understood as a snapshot of what a specific community holds true at a specific time, but a state that is constantly changing. It is however, difficult to think of it as an end itself; it simply is. Instrumentalised as something to strive for, *Mind and Body* highlights the ambiguous nature of European community—that it might not exist. See Castoriadis, *Imaginary Institution of Society*, 135–45.

¹⁰³² Caputo, “New Narrative for Europe”.

¹⁰³³ Eliasson, “Your Inner We”.

of the first poster highlights the multifaceted and omnipresent nature of Europe—it is a state of mind, a political body, and a public space all at once. In both designs, the purpose seems to be reflection. Art “verbalizes something that you may or may not have already discovered inside you”.¹⁰³⁴ In Løkkegaard’s words: “Culture broke the silence, made a move, decided to act. The next step will be for the citizens of Europe to react: to speak up, join the discussion, give their take on what it means to be European”.¹⁰³⁵ Culture sets a development into motion—now it is up to the citizens to respond to its call.

Whether New Narrative actually did break the silence is questionable if we look at the media reception¹⁰³⁶ and circulation on social media,¹⁰³⁷ but according to the *Mind and Body* contributors, responding to this call is not just an option, it is a responsibility. The New Narrative declaration states: “Europe is a moral and political responsibility, which must be carried, not only by institutions and politicians, but by each and every European”,¹⁰³⁸ a formulation reiterated by Barroso in his introduction¹⁰³⁹ and by Vassiliou as well.¹⁰⁴⁰ “Europe is us, each of us”, Barroso continues, “Europe is ours to make or break, never to take for granted”,¹⁰⁴¹ and we find a similar formulation in Sneška Quaedvlieg-Mihailović’s text: “Europe is us, all of us. And we have a shared responsibility to tend to the positive results already achieved and to nurture future ones”.¹⁰⁴² Tusk argues that what is “missing the most” in Europe is “the sense of shared responsibility for Europe . . . a shared responsibility founded . . . on the deep, profound belief that we want and need to be co-responsible for Europe as a whole”.¹⁰⁴³

These contributions share a vagueness when it comes to designating a subject—who shares this responsibility? Who is this *we* and *us*? And what

¹⁰³⁴ Eliasson, 193.

¹⁰³⁵ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 234.

¹⁰³⁶ See overview of the press coverage in chapter 3.

¹⁰³⁷ I have not conducted any extensive research on the social media circulation, but searches on the official hashtag #EUnarrative on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram during 2014 shows little circulation and minimal interaction. However, the hashtag has spread to a variety of other projects such as Open European Societies (civil, but co-funded by the EU) as well as EU projects such as Creative Europe and European Youth. Interaction on these posts are minimal as well, though. This bears witness of a circulation among the creative elite, but not the intended trickle-down effect. See, e.g., <https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/eunarrative/>.

¹⁰³⁸ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

¹⁰³⁹ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 25.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Vassiliou, “Europe as a Shared Purpose”, 37.

¹⁰⁴¹ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 26.

¹⁰⁴² Quaedvlieg–Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”, 120.

¹⁰⁴³ Tusk, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013”, 54.

does it mean that “Europe is us, each of us”? The phrase creates a metonymical bond between *us* and a place/set of values/moral code/critical legacy, and so on, while never specifying who *we* are. As a result, responsibility is with everyone—with the citizens in general, but also the cultural practitioners that are positioned as the ambassadors of the project, capable of developing “a European social imaginary and public space for debate” through what we may view as a trickle-down effect.

Viewed as an example of strategic communication, it fails (in Bitzerian terms: who are the mediators of change?). But viewed as an example of constitutive rhetoric, its success is more difficult to evaluate: it calls upon whoever identifies as European to comply with the narrative provided by acting in accordance: accepting a moral responsibility for the future of Europe by engaging in public deliberation.¹⁰⁴⁴

A Responsibility to Debate

Europe calls on you because we cannot let people think that Europe is technocratic or bureaucratic. Europe has a soul, and that soul is its civilisation in all its rich creativity, its unity in diversity and, even, its contradictions. In a word, Europe needs you and your ideas, your creativity to realise its full potential as a project in which every citizen is an actor. . . . Let the debate begin!¹⁰⁴⁵

As I hope to have made clear by now, *Mind and Body* contains input to a new narrative, speeches about the idea of writing a new narrative, a declaration on a new narrative, reactions to and debate about this declaration. What comes closest to actually being a new narrative is the New Narrative declaration. And this is exactly the point, as Løkkegaard continuously states in the Danish press coverage; a new narrative will evolve from the debate created by the initiative.¹⁰⁴⁶ In this way, talk of a European debate becomes a narrative in itself that seems to be almost self-fulfilling; the call for debate is the primary function, not what or if it actually follows.

Parallel to this narrative are visual enactments of debate by the members of the cultural committee and the invited participants at the three general assemblies—the New Narrative ambassadors. The images in figure 11 show different types of debate (the singular speaker, the round circle debate, informal conversation), and presents different types of roles in

¹⁰⁴⁴ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 234.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Barroso, “Speech by President Barroso”, para. 30–31, 40.

¹⁰⁴⁶ In *Jyllands-Posten*, November 28, 2013; *Berlingske*, November 7 2013, and November 9, 2014. See appendix III.

a debate. The image in the top left corner, for example, shows a speaker in the foreground, but he is blurred, which means that focus is directed towards the listening parties in the background. These images—which are representative of the rest of images from the general assemblies—are also characterised by a notable 1960s or 1970s aesthetic: the style of the interior, the editing style of the images, but most of all the appearance of the participants invoke the past. If we consider these epochal signs in conjunction, they function as mythical signifiers of an idealised debate reminiscing of what often seems a simpler time: before enlargement, before globalisation, before the fall of the iron curtain.



Figure 11. Pictures of the debates during the Second General Assembly of New Narrative for Europe, December 8–9, 2013.¹⁰⁴⁷

The talk about, and visualisation and enactment of debate thus fill important functions in New Narrative as a whole and play a central role in *Mind and Body* as the projection of a specific deliberative model in which debate itself is the ideal: “Through the EU, we have made the transition from canons to coffee tables”.¹⁰⁴⁸ But it also needs participants outside the institutions of the EU. As Løkkegaard says, New Narrative “is not about telling people something, but about asking them . . . to ask Europeans to tell the European story”.¹⁰⁴⁹ This chiasmus reverses the relationship

¹⁰⁴⁷ Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, *Mind and Body of Europe*, 72.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Nyholm, “Denmark in Europe”, 42.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Løkkegaard, “Need for a Narrative”, 234.

between the EU and its citizens otherwise the norm: the EU should not tell citizens their story top-down; rather, the story should arise bottom-up. Citizens should “give their take on what it means to be European”¹⁰⁵⁰ and “share ideas”, an activity that is, according to Barroso, the responsibility of “each and every European”.¹⁰⁵¹ Likewise, the declaration states: “As artists, intellectuals and scientists, and first and foremost as citizens, it is our responsibility to join the debate on the future of Europe, especially now, when so much is at stake. Confidence in Europe needs to be regained”.¹⁰⁵² Quaedvlieg-Mihailović recalls that the declaration was imagined

as a kind of manifesto; a sort of wake-up call to all European citizens, and especially to those working in the wider field of culture (arts, heritage, science) and education; an invitation for them to get engaged in formulating and implementing a New Narrative for Europe.¹⁰⁵³

Further on, she states that “a new renaissance of Europe is possible, provided that all of us ‘occupy’ the European public space”.¹⁰⁵⁴ These contributors call upon the citizens, requiring that they live up to their moral responsibility and engage in debate—that they wake up and occupy the European public space. Other contributors focus on how to create the necessary preconditions for such encounters to happen, how to empower citizens to take part in the debate. Former president of the European Youth Forum Peter Matjašič states, “Europe needs to become a synonym for participatory democracy. Its citizens should be heard and respected, but also empowered to fully take part in society”,¹⁰⁵⁵ something Portabella likewise finds lacking in Europe, where there is “barely any space at all for citizen participation, for democratic legitimacy”.¹⁰⁵⁶ Koolhaas says that the problem is not how to make “this or that public space available” but rather how to create “connections between them”.¹⁰⁵⁷

This deliberative ideal is paralleled by an ideal of diversity and plurality. Pluralism is “Europe’s strength”,¹⁰⁵⁸ it is one of the “undeniable values of our European heritage”,¹⁰⁵⁹ and it is the basis of “European unity”,

¹⁰⁵⁰ Løkkegaard, 234.

¹⁰⁵¹ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 25.

¹⁰⁵² Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

¹⁰⁵³ Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”, 121.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, 123.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Matjašič, “Perceptions Matter”, 103.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Portabella, “Europe as a Space”, 67.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Koolhaas in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 165.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Portabella, “Europe as a Space”, 64.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Tusk, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013”, 53.

achieved “through a fruitful blending of differences, contrasts and, sometimes, even tensions”.¹⁰⁶⁰ Europe must, quite simply, care “not only for biodiversity but also for cultural diversity and pluralism”;¹⁰⁶¹ Europe is where “the culture of war was replaced by a culture of peace, with its recognition of the diversity of human acts”, as Tusk argues.¹⁰⁶²

Mind and Body thus projects a particular frame of plurality and diversity for the debate in which citizens are expected to engage.¹⁰⁶³ This deliberative space foregrounds a norm of openness and accessibility: everyone can (and should) participate, the approach is to ask questions and to listen, diversity and plurality are appreciated. This deliberative ideal is highly informed by the political theory of Habermas, not only through his contribution to *Mind and Body*,¹⁰⁶⁴ but, above all, through his theory and historical analysis of the public sphere. This work focuses on the (ideal) characteristics, norms, and functions of public debate, and one of the most fundamental of these is to guarantee access “to all citizens”, who can “confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions”.¹⁰⁶⁵ In other words, protected by civil liberties, all citizens are given the opportunity to confer unrestrictedly.

The problem is that the public sphere is not accessible to all—neither as historical fact nor as a realistic vision. Declaring it so only obscures “strategies employed to maintain exclusion of certain marginalised

¹⁰⁶⁰ Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives”, 23.

¹⁰⁶¹ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 128.

¹⁰⁶² Tusk, “Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Poland at the Copernicus Centre, Warsaw, on 11 July 2013”, 53. See also, Xavier, “What Matters Is the Present”, 205; Konrád, “European Ars Poetica”, 39, 40; Boeri in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Domino Conversation”, 153.

¹⁰⁶³ The ideal of plurality is also expressed in the visual contributions in *Mind and Body*. Whereas the pictures visualizing the debates during the events of the initiative show predominantly white people, especially the last contribution before the afterwords is a visualization of diversity and plurality. *One Day (Rue Neuve, Brussels, June 2014)* by photographer Beat Streuli shows fourteen whole page pictures taken on a street in Brussels, one person per picture. Although predominantly young, all colours, genders, and ethnicities are represented, and the same applies in terms of their emotional state: some look worried, some thoughtful and in the middle of a conversation, a majority is wearing headphones, and some look happy. The totality—the place (one of the EU headquarters), the representational plurality—gives the impression of an ideal EU microcosmos; in contrast to the visualisations of the actual debates. See Streuli, “One Day”.

¹⁰⁶⁴ His main concern in this contribution is his perspective on the governmental structure of the EU and the previously discussed thoughts on how to properly understand the rise of the far-right in Europe. Habermas, “Europe, Hungary”; see also Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”; Habermas, “Democracy in Europe”; Habermas, “Citizen and State Equality”.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Habermas, “Public Sphere”, 49.

communities from public deliberation”, as Kendall Phillips argues.¹⁰⁶⁶ Such discourse projects an idealised vision of public deliberation in which rhetorical agency is taken for granted: if a platform is provided, citizens will automatically step onto the stage. But, as Erin Rand points out, rhetorical agency “can be exercised only through available and socially recognizable forms of discourse”¹⁰⁶⁷ which is why not only *who* is speaking but also how debate is conducted, the norms of rhetorical practice, require scrutiny.¹⁰⁶⁸ In *New Narrative*, such norms are projected as a moral responsibility to debate, share ideas, and engage oneself within the framework set by the EU: embracing plurality, diversity, and a cosmopolitan mindset and practices—moving, tolerating, being curious, engaging in creative exchange. The EU has opened up a deliberative space; now it is up to the citizens to use it. But, as I have shown in this chapter, the model EU citizen, the Eurostar, make up a very little part of the EU citizenry, and, what is more, participation is more structured than the invitation to free and open deliberation suggests.¹⁰⁶⁹

The deliberative space given, in other words, comes with certain rhetorical expectations. Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, whom I quoted above for saying that the declaration was an invitation to occupy the European public space, also explicates, partly in the words of the declaration, the purpose and expected result of this occupation. It is “with the aim to achieve the necessary ‘realignment of emphasis’ that leads to the acknowledgment that ‘culture is a major source of nourishment and supply for Europe as a social and political body’”.¹⁰⁷⁰ Kleiber is surprisingly explicit in his motive to shape the awareness and appreciation of the collective subject: “How should we shape young people’s awareness of their cultural affiliation and

¹⁰⁶⁶ Phillips, “Spaces of Public Dissension”, 237. In his critique of public sphere theory, Kendall Phillips deduces six characteristics or ideals of the public sphere: It is (or should be) open, impartial, intersubjective, rational, it should establish boundaries between spheres, and it projects consensus as a cure to misunderstanding and fragmentation. Phillips describes and critiques the public sphere theory not only of Habermas, but also of G. Thomas Goodnight and Gerard Hauser, but I focus on Habermas because he plays an important role in *New Narrative*.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Rand, “Inflammatory Fag”, 299.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Such norms are one of the focal areas of studies in rhetorical citizenship. Christian Kock and Lisa S. Villadsen propose rhetorical citizenship as a fourth and complementary perspective on citizenship to more traditional perspectives of status, rights, and identity. They define rhetorical citizenship as “a conceptual, analytical, and critical approach to studying the discursive aspects of civic life” and as signifying “‘real life’ communicative practices” See Kock and Villadsen, “Rhetorical Citizenship”, 571, 574. See also Kock and Villadsen *Rhetorical Citizenship and Public Deliberation*.

¹⁰⁶⁹ In much the same way as the EU’s concept of intercultural dialogue aims “at generating a particular kind of civic engagement”. See Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”, 276.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance”, 123; quoting the declaration by Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 128.

sense of belonging so that they successfully operate on the global scene and still remain European?”¹⁰⁷¹ And Mills states that

As artists and cultural leaders, it is our particular mission to offer ideas and inspiration as to . . . how the contours of our imaginations must inspire each and every citizen of our Union to appreciate that a new narrative is an essential part of being European in the 21st century.¹⁰⁷²

What Tamburelli notes about the declaration, we can use to describe the New Narrative initiative on the whole: “It’s very institutional. As if the one thing the European Union didn’t want was conflict. It doesn’t want to appear conflicted”.¹⁰⁷³ But conflicting visions of Europe do exist, and such conflict is constructive, he says.¹⁰⁷⁴ Considering rural areas where the EU first and foremost signifies cheap and competing labour from other parts of the region, the EU needs to be able to speak honestly about these issues. It needs “to reach these people and say something, say something that is in fact conflictual”, and be able to discuss these issues in an honest manner, “without saying: ‘Don’t worry, it will all end well’”.¹⁰⁷⁵ Because, as Tamburelli remarks, it might not end well for everyone. Conflicting visions exists, and they must not align.

We recognise these expectations from Habermas public sphere theory as well: citizens should “confer in an unrestricted fashion . . . about matters of general interest”.¹⁰⁷⁶ The question is who will be in a position to decide what matters are of general interest or not. If such matters are based on what citizens have in common, then “resistant communities have little hope of overturning oppressive structures”;¹⁰⁷⁷ not least because rhetorical agency is restricted to available and socially recognisable rhetorical practices.¹⁰⁷⁸

Elsewhere in *Mind and Body*, citizens are invited to take part and have their say in the content of the new narrative—communicated, for instance, through the three posters: “What ideas can you share?”/“Where is your voice?”/“Can you help shape it [the political body]?”—but the question of whether a new narrative is needed is not up for discussion. Consequently, a tension appears between the abstract ideal of plural, open, and accessible debate and the concrete enactments and practices of the EU—

¹⁰⁷¹ Kleiber, “Humanistic and Scientific Sources”, 100.

¹⁰⁷² Mills, “Some Reflections”, 205.

¹⁰⁷³ Tamburelli in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, “Round Table”, 135.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Tamburelli in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 135.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Pier Tamburelli in Battista, Setari, and Rossignol, 135.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Habermas, “Public Sphere”, 49.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Phillips, “Spaces of Public Dissension”, 241.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Rand, “Inflammatory Fag”, 299.

between the *intention* of a bottom-up procedure and the *reality* of the public events that were “rigidly structured” and “nearly entirely staged” by officials of the European Commission:¹⁰⁷⁹ a space for free deliberation is offered (debate and diversity are valuable), but it comes with a frame of mind (a specifically European cosmopolitanism, a common destiny, a state of mind, European values) and certain expectations (movement of the body and mind, identification with and care for Europe and/or the EU)—even though the concrete outcomes are rarely defined in terms of specific formats, genres, or plans for action.

Citizens’ practices—deliberative engagement (or not), physical and cognitive movement (or not)—interpellate the EU as an institution; such practices (or nonpractices) are the face of the institution.¹⁰⁸⁰ Moving focus from the citizens to the EU institutions clarifies the crucial role of the citizens in terms of calling the EU into being. The need for ontological stability,¹⁰⁸¹ and thus the need for citizens to recognise the EU in its right capacity, creates a tension between invitation and projection, unconstrained debate and ready-made solutions. Speaking with Charland, the new narrative does not provide any particular closure, but it constrains and projects its own continuation. And the Eurostar is the citizen capable of continuing this process, providing ontological stability and thus fullness to the EU.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have argued that the collective subject, the EU citizens, is positioned and consequently constrained by topoi of omnipresence and eternity—European cosmopolitanism, a European destiny, universality as European essence, and a European state of mind—that, in conjunction, provide a frame for what it signifies and entails to be an EU citizen. As a result, it positions and constrains the rhetorical agency of the citizens.

I note two main strands of the cosmopolitan vision: cosmopolitanism as *physical movement* with the purpose of creating social cohesion and cosmopolitanism as a *movement of the mind* with the purpose of guarding against nationalism. Physical movement is first and foremost envisioned as internal to the EU, whereas movement beyond Europe is not physical, but rather an exportation of values and norms. But the latter hinges upon the former: the purpose of physical movement is to serve a movement of the

¹⁰⁷⁹ Kaiser, “Clash of Cultures”, 371.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 33.

¹⁰⁸¹ Manners and Murray, “End of a Noble Narrative?”, 191.

mind with tolerance and curiosity at its core: EU citizens are expected to move to other EU countries and there, in the face of difference, grow a sense of empathy and tolerance which they can take with them back home.

The spatial and temporal topos of a common European destiny provides guidance and serves as “inspiration”—it is a tool to make “the right choices” and thus positions and constrains citizens to actively choose and shape their common future, envisioned within the narrative frame put forward by the EU. This narrative extends beyond Europe through a Europeanisation of universal values and a proactive cosmopolitanism. By turning universal values of freedom, tolerance, democracy, and the rule of law into essentially European values, the EU claims originality and ownership of these values. They become ends in themselves, the exportation of which is articulated as the political and moral responsibility—of the EU, EU leaders, national politicians, and EU citizens.

With the metaphor of a European state of mind, the institution, the collective, and the citizens have become intertwined. Europe’s state of mind is institutional, but also embodied by the individual, and these two levels reciprocally constitute one another: A personified Europe is imagined as possessing a state of mind even as this state of mind is shared and embodied by its citizens. This vision is, in other words, spatially and temporally all-encompassing and permeates even the private spheres of its citizens.

This quest to enter the hearts and minds of the citizens of the EU distinguishes New Narrative from the four previous initiatives. While ‘A People’s Europe’ takes an interest in the private lives of its citizens by seeking to deregulate obstacles and make traveling, studying, and working abroad, easier, New Narrative makes claims on citizens’ minds and hearts and seeks to become one with its citizens.

In this way, citizens, member states, and the EU as an institution are mutually imbricated, and the distinction between the political domain and the public/private is blurred. Diminishing the distance between politicians and citizens can have positive implications in terms of democratic involvement, political commitment, and social cohesion,¹⁰⁸² but in New Narrative, the citizen becomes the engine of the EU’s political vision: the political imaginary of the EU is envisioned as embodied by and distributed within the EU first and foremost through its citizens, not its institutions. We see this referral of political responsibility in the narrative about globalisation and nationalism. Globalisation as such is not the problem; rather, the social imaginary of the citizens, what the community holds true, is at fault.

¹⁰⁸² Viklund, “Den politiska visionens retorik”, 94.

The nationalist response to globalisation is a citizen matter, not a matter of the EU, and as such it is depoliticised.

If we understand New Narrative as an attempt to recreate the permissive consensus of the earlier days of the EU¹⁰⁸³—a consensus built on deliberation instead of tacit acceptance—it is impaired by the Commission's normative and restrictive top-down approach to deliberation. It may, then, instead lead to a strengthening of the constrained dissensus. This is not necessarily problematic. The notoriously contested nature of the EU is often claimed to be a key element in the EU's identity—and a legitimating one.¹⁰⁸⁴ As Just shows, citizens often do not respond to any singular invitation in a unified fashion as one might hope for. This plurality may impede the formation of unified European public opinions, but not European public opinions as such.¹⁰⁸⁵ What my analysis has shown is that the will on the part of the EU to control this meaning is strong: EU citizens are the engines of a political vision already decided upon. This kind of inclusion is problematic from a democratic perspective, as it is only seeming. It thus not only weakens the political engagement of the citizens, but also impairs the more long-term democratic legitimacy of the EU.

This tension between unconstrained debate and ready-made solutions exemplifies how the temporality of this political vision depoliticises politics. As I wrote in the beginning of this chapter, the vision of omnipresence and eternity invokes ideas of permanence, which can be viewed as tools to grapple with the uncertainty and contingency of the future. But attempting to control the future by eliminating uncertainty potentially removes the contingency of political rhetoric: if uncertainty is eliminated, deliberative rhetoric is meaningless, simply because the present and the future collapses. The political character of a temporal vision is assessed based on its measure of plurality: just as a relationship with the past must be plural to be emancipatory (going back to the beginning to begin anew), the relationship with the future must be plural as well;¹⁰⁸⁶ otherwise, visions of eternity may be dominative. The constitutive rhetoric of the EU explored in this chapter does contain measures of plurality: the content of the future, of European destiny, is left partly open, and exactly what will

¹⁰⁸³ García, "New Narrative Project", 347.

¹⁰⁸⁴ See, e.g., Jasson, "Developing Discourse?"; Medrano, "The Public Sphere and the European Union's Political Identity"; Barth and Bijsmans, "Maastricht Treaty and Public Debates". Just, however, notes that although this perspective is valuable due to its focus on communicative processes, otherwise often neglected in EU studies, it is problematic since it "depends on an idea of consensus whose realisation, however, is denied". See Just, "Indirekte kommunikativ konstituering", 27. From the Danish: "afhængige af en forestilling om enighed, hvis realisering imidlertid benægtes".

¹⁰⁸⁵ Just, "European Public Debate", 92–93.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Buhre, "Speaking Other Times".

bring a sense of purpose and belonging is undetermined, but these points of uncertainty are maintained within a highly structured frame that projects a model for how to act.¹⁰⁸⁷

The readings in this chapter have aimed at showing how the topoi of European cosmopolitanism, European destiny, universality as European essence, and a European state of mind function as mythical signifiers of a variety of mythical signifieds that provide a moral content to collective European identity: it signifies a certain way of thinking, a certain way of approaching the other, a certain way of life. These invocations serve to further extend the EU's temporal horizon (into the future) and its spatial horizon—to create identification with a cosmopolitan, universal, yet European state of mind.

Taken together, we can understand these constructions of myth and the collapse of institutional, collective, and individual identity as efforts to create fullness—to project onto divided phenomena the illusion of a pure, original wholeness.¹⁰⁸⁸ But, as indicated by the word *illusion*, this pureness is easily tarnished. A tension arises between *abstract ideals* of mobility, plurality, and deliberative democracy and the *concrete practices* of both the EU and its citizens: mobility is not accessed equally and not used by those intended; plurality in practice is restricted to a certain European mindset; and deliberative practices are rigidly structured.¹⁰⁸⁹

The search for original, pure meaning exemplified in the readings in this chapter gives us reason to believe that we must broaden our view of the practices projected in constitutive narratives to include not only concrete political practices but also epideictic practices of normative and moral orientation that can confirm and continue the EU's visions of omnipresence and eternity.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Buhre connects this way of coping with the uncertainty of the future to Plato's concept of *techné*. See her discussion in Buhre, 129–31.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Laclau, "Death and Resurrection", 301.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Hansen, "Europeans Only?", 57; Kaiser, "Clash of Cultures", 371.

7. Conclusion and Further Discussion

European identity has become an increasingly central issue in the EU's political imaginary. In recent years, European identity—and related notions of a European destiny, European culture, and a European narrative—has been deployed as a weapon against the rise of the political far-right across Europe. This political landscape has prompted the EU to seek effective ways of countering the mythologies of the far-right that often concentrate on origin, the nation as the fundamental and delimited unit of community, and thus on values of continuity, tradition, and stability. Based on the rationale of counteracting nationalism with its own tools, these counter-strategies focus on promoting European culture and a shared destiny, creating a common cultural narrative and, as a result, a collective European identity: if populist national parties are successful in creating myths of cultural unity and national origin, then the EU must create its own myths. Andrew Breitbart, journalist and founder of the alt-right platform *Breitbart News*, has diagnosed today's political situation as one in which "politics is downstream from culture".¹⁰⁹⁰ In rhetorical terms, we could claim that epideictic rhetoric is at the heart of today's political debate, and not only in the metapolitical rhetoric of the far-right,¹⁰⁹¹ but in the strategy of the EU to challenge the far-right as well.

The purpose of this study has been to investigate how the EU works rhetorically with collective identity formation from a thematic as well as diachronic perspective (1973–2014), and to examine the implications of such formations for both the EU and its citizens. In this final chapter, I summarise and discuss the main results of the study and point to tensions and tendencies that warrant further discussion and research.

¹⁰⁹⁰ This quote is attributed to the late far-right journalist Andrew Breitbart, founder of *Breitbart News*, where former Trump strategist Steve Bannon was also employed before working in the Trump Administration. I have not been able to find the original source, but it is mentioned in several other sources. See for instance Weatherby, "Politics Is Downstream from Culture, Part 1".

¹⁰⁹¹ For example, rhetorical scholar Karl Ekeman explores the role of culture in the metapolitical strategies of the European alt-right. See Ekeman, "Solecism or Barbarism"; Ekeman, "On Gramscianism of the Right".

Since the advent of the European Community, the prospect of crafting European identity has been and still is conceived of as a positive and desirable quest with an almost self-evident justification:¹⁰⁹² It is viewed as a necessary step to further integrate member states and, simultaneously, as a marker of the plurality as well as the unresolved and always-in-the-making nature of the EU. Thus, varying, if not even contradictory, demands and hopes are invested in the notion of European identity: it shall create unity while reflecting diversity.

But, as I have shown, while the quest for European identity was formalised already in the founding days of the EU, its scope has changed over time. The identity formation practices in the geopolitically unstable 1970s and 1980s revolved around the image of the institution on the global scene and in the face of its new reality, the Community citizens. However, following the reunification and the end of the Cold War, the scope of European identity gradually became the collective citizenry and has today become an endeavour to reach the mind and body of EU citizens. This move is particularly visible in the visionary rhetoric of the New Narrative initiative: citizens are expected to take part in a European state of mind and a cosmopolitan way of life—more concretely, it is their political and moral responsibility to identify with, advance, and confirm the European integration project.

Concurrently with this change, the means of constitutive rhetoric have both altered and increased—functional and structural instruments have been supplemented with practices of interweaving the citizenry through physical movement, social education, sports exchange, and a range of EU symbols. In the most recent initiative, the performative power of narrative and cultural practices is brought to the fore; through narratives about European culture (heritage, artistic practices, norms, and values), EU citizens will reconnect with each other and with the EU—they are “cultured by culture”.¹⁰⁹³ These different types of constitutive means replace one another while also accumulating: EU citizens today move freely across the internal borders, they go abroad to work and study, they watch EU-funded film productions, and they have accepted and incorporated the EU emblem into their daily lives (driving their cars) and political practices (protesting). The current move towards the mind and body of its citizens thus further develops this direction towards an all-encompassing identity.

These findings suggest an intertwinement of the institutional, collective, and individual levels of identity formation. Although the primary focus changes, the institutional level never completely disappears. The

¹⁰⁹² García, “New Narrative Project”, 345.

¹⁰⁹³ Sedláček, “Europe: Hidden in Plain Sight”, 192.

institutional identity is confirmed by the existence or formation of collective identity—the collective subject exists as a confirmation of the Subject, in Althusserian terms. So, the questions arise: what if the collective subject refuses? If the scope of the EU's identity formation already includes the institution, the collective, and the individual, how, then, can the EU proceed? Will the EU return to its former means of identity formation through functional and symbolic policymaking or will it try even harder to capture the European state of mind? This balance will need to be monitored closely.

Furthermore, this intertwinement blurs the distinction between the citizen as a political agent and the citizen in their own public or private life. This envelopment can have positive implications in terms of democratic involvement and social cohesion; but the risk is that the political language becomes disconnected from the political actors as well as their arguments: if it is no longer possible to clearly discern the political agent, holding a specific someone accountable for the specific policies that are made becomes difficult.¹⁰⁹⁴ The consequence is a partial relocation of political responsibility onto the citizens: globalisation is only a problem insofar as we perceive it to be the cause of nationalism; if, contrarily, it is perceived as the counterpart of cosmopolitanism, globalisation is an enrichment. Nationalism, in other words, becomes a citizen matter.

Another central component of the EU's constitutive rhetoric highlighted in this study is the historiographical work with a founding and a new narrative, respectively. Both narratives focus on locating a proper origin as the foundation for the EU—in the founding events of the first half of the twentieth century and in a more distant, broader, and richer past—Antiquity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment. Similarly, both operate with a discursive ambiguity between Europe, Europa, and the EU that, on the one hand, helps distinguish the EU from Europe/Europa, thus providing the EU with the role of the saviour—in the founding narrative, the saviour of Europe; in the new narrative, the saviour of the world beyond. On the other hand, though, this ambiguity allows for an intertwinement of Europe and the EU, which enables the latter to reach beyond its own lifetime in search of a more authentic past to reconnect with: a set of values and a cultural, philosophical and scientific heritage. An archive of glory.

In this archive, twentieth-century European history is figured as a trauma that the EU can help overcome (the founding narrative), while what came before the twentieth century is figured as a cultural resource in present and future mythology (the new narrative). While the founding

¹⁰⁹⁴ Viklund, "Den Politiska Visionens Retorik", 94.

narrative thus directs its attention towards the event of Europe becoming the EU, the new narrative reverses this direction and turns from the EU to Europe in its search of cultural collective identity.

The relationship between these two narratives exposes a tension in the EU's understanding of the past. The new narrative is built on the assumption that (especially young) EU citizens have become disconnected from their European past. They have forgotten the atrocities of war and division during the First and Second World Wars and thus the *raison d'être* of the EU. As such, EU citizens are encouraged to remember and thus return to these founding events to invoke the foundational values of the EU that helped Europe overcome these divisions in the past. At the same time, war and division are generally figured as events of the past that has been or should be transcended. In this historiography, remembering the past has the overall purpose of locating and reconnecting with European traits and capacities that can get Europe back on the track of civilisation.

In other words, the EU constructs the First and Second World Wars and the Holocaust as ruptures in an otherwise continuous and progressive path of civilisation. The historiography of the EU thus invokes plural temporal imaginaries that enable the EU to assert itself as a representation of peace: a past achievement of peace has empowered the EU to become a general representative of peace and, as a result, a normative exemplum that extends beyond the EU. The redemption of Europe after the Holocaust is thus not simply a part of the process of healing society after its decay, but also functions as a stepping stone to the depiction of the EU as a universal representative of peace that, in turn, is framed as an essentially European trait.

Crucial to this temporal logic is the idea of historical rupture. If war and genocide were articulated as recurrent events (as history would suggest), or the Holocaust figured as the culmination of a historical development rather than an extraordinary break from history,¹⁰⁹⁵ the narrative of the EU as a universal representation of peace would be weakened. This selective historiography suggests that, while peace is generally a desirable goal, the “representing peace” narrative and its implications for peace-building practices beyond the EU is problematic. Essentialising the universal reveals an imperialist tendency improper to the political imaginary of the EU, but, on a more pragmatic level, the narrative is quite simply misleading: without underestimating the achievements of the EU during the past seventy years, calling Europe a representative of peace would be historically inaccurate. Of course, it might be argued that it is not Europe, but the EU that represents peace. The question is, then, is it acceptable to

¹⁰⁹⁵ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, § 7, part 3.

incorporate Europe into the historical narrative of the EU only when it fits the overall purpose of collective identity formation? It seems the EU deploys the figure of Europe when in need of historical and mythical richness in both its historiographical and visionary rhetorical practices. When it comes to the founding event, Europe is redeemed for its own atrocities, but still identified as the guilty party, which is why it cannot represent peace.

It is certainly not clear-cut whether the EU's exertion of its soft powers in other countries—member state or not—is valuable or problematic, but while the analysis of the EU's historiography in this study cannot yield a clear answer to this dilemma, it does reveal tensions that further problematise such endeavours.

The EU's urge to be of importance beyond its own borders, I have argued, is driven by visions of eternity and omnipresence that constrain the agency of the model EU citizen: the Eurostar. Topoi of European cosmopolitanism, destiny, and universality create visions of fullness by incorporating the whole world into its own imaginary, while simultaneously projecting a specific set of norms with which the Eurostar is expected to comply: a space for free deliberation is offered (debate is valuable), but it comes with a frame of mind (a specifically European cosmopolitanism, a common destiny, a state of mind, European values) and certain expectations (movement of the body and mind, identification and appreciation).

As noted in the introductory chapter, the inconsistent, differentiated, and always potentially changing nature of the EU citizenry makes it “difficult to articulate narratives of belonging beyond the thin notion of ‘unity in diversity’”.¹⁰⁹⁶ From this perspective, it is not surprising that the analysis has shown that although the categories used—EU citizens, Europeans—are inclusive, the interpellations are not for all citizens, but for the model EU citizens. What is surprising, though, is the narrowness of this group (Western movers) and the fact that other, much larger groups in the EU citizenry, would make for better candidates (Eastern movers). EU citizens from Western EU member states have been part of the union for a much longer period of time; still, few move on a long-term basis. In contrast, EU citizens from Eastern EU member states have shown an incredible incentive and motivation to move and circulate capital back into the developing regions of the union, thus enacting the ideal envisioned by the EU's economic policies. One of the crucial differences is that that Western and Eastern movers usually take different types of jobs (well-paying white collar vs. low-paying blue collar jobs) and thus fill different functions in society.

¹⁰⁹⁶ García, “New Narrative Project”, 346.

What is at stake is the issue of culture, “a major source of nourishment and supply for Europe as a social and political body”.¹⁰⁹⁷ The culture figured in the New Narrative initiative does not include citizens with blue collar jobs. The Eurostar moves for studies and cultural exchange, for urban creativity and cosmopolitan meetings among strangers. They do not move for a job that pays the bills.

If we take a broader look at the contemporary context, culture has become an omnipresent topos in EU rhetoric. In much the same way as the founding narrative of the EU as representing peace is externally validated by, for example, the Norwegian Nobel Committee, New Narrative has exemplified how this rhetoric of culture is circulated by scholars, journalists, and cultural agents, making it all the more difficult to locate the centre. In this way, the performative power of the EU’s language, already defused due to the EU’s complex structure and different centres, is further dispersed. In the years following New Narrative, a range of initiatives and campaigns have emerged that circulate this rhetoric and its attention to European culture and identity. These campaigns sometimes stem from the EU (most often, the European Commission),¹⁰⁹⁸ at other times they are in different ways affiliated with but not, on a formal level, products of the EU (e.g., *Why Europe?*, *EU & U*).¹⁰⁹⁹ This distribution and circulation of the EU’s rhetorical practices further complicates the search for a coherent rhetorical agent. If we understand the EU as both a strategic agent assisting in creating a specific language and an agency of this language, what are the words of the EU? Whom do we hold accountable for rhetorical practices that circulate among different agents from both the political domain and civil society?¹¹⁰⁰ Is this vagueness an expression of inclusion and democratic legitimacy or is it a strategy to disperse political responsibility and thus counter claims of top-down identity formation? This balancing act is worth paying more scholarly attention to in the future.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Deventer et al., “Declaration”, 126.

¹⁰⁹⁸ See, for example, the Instagram profile of the Commission: <https://www.instagram.com/europeancommission/>. Most posts are accompanied by the hashtag #ThisIs-TheEU, which we see used by the two initiatives mentioned below, *Why Europe?* and *EU and U*. We also see examples of smaller platforms, seemingly consisting only of a few people, such as *Realize Europe*, that circulate the New Narrative rhetoric. On its “about” page on Facebook, *Realize Europe* says: “Dialogue with Europe’s cultural pioneers, to REALIZE the narrative that is present in their hearts and minds”. See <https://www.facebook.com/RealizeEurope/>.

¹⁰⁹⁹ See the *Why Europe?*-website: <https://www.whyeurope.org> and the *EU & U* website: <https://www.euandyou.eu/>

¹¹⁰⁰ Berg, “Intercultural Dialogue”, 23 ff; Segal, *Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine*, 14. See also Viklund, “Den Politiska Visionens Retorik”.

So, to conclude on this first part: what language is this EU language? Politics is a constant mutual interpellation that amounts to several layers of interpellations. Contradictory rhetorical practices—on the one hand approaching mythology, on the other hand refraining from ideology; working with ethnocultural components while involving principles that explicitly counter such components—create a peculiar mythical but anti-ideological language specific to the EU that reflects the EU's ambivalent relationship to ideology. This odd weave of identificatory threads distinguishes the constitutive rhetoric of the EU.

The same ambivalence is visible in the figuration of the EU as a rhetorical agent. On the one hand, the constitutive rhetoric of the EU suggests a desire to become recognised and mythologised as the Subject (with a capital S)—as the heart of Europe, as a state of mind, as a symbol of transcendence, eternity, peace, and tolerance in the social imaginary of the citizens. On the other, it seeks to be viewed as the silent benefactor and facilitator of peace and deliberation, the arbiter of soft, nonideological power.

At the centre of this ambivalence is the Eurostar. It is their job to confirm the self-interpellation of the EU's ambivalent position and to embody the culture of nonideological deliberation in the face of the ideology of others.

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While this study primarily aims to contribute to rhetorical scholarship by providing a deeper understanding of the relation between the EU's rhetorical efforts at collective identity formation and the specific narrative and discursive tensions, it also contributes to EU studies. Despite recent turns to narrative and discourse in the social sciences and humanities, one of the most important contributions of rhetorical scholarship is its concern with communication's concrete manifestations, its explicit and close engagement with the symbolic—discursive as well as nondiscursive—practices of, in this case, the EU.¹¹⁰¹ Rhetoric's contribution is thus also methodological and an important supplement to both quantitative and theoretical-deductive approaches. So, while adding to the growing body of literature on the subject within political science, sociology, anthropology, history, and philosophy that valuably informs this study, my aim has also been to offer a different perspective than what these disciplines more familiar to EU studies present. I have done so by highlighting the rhetorical and

¹¹⁰¹ Just, "Indirekte Kommunikativ Konstituierung", 28.

symbolic dimensions of collective identity formation as well as the inter-connections between discourse and its sociocultural context. Rhetorical analysis, then, is important if we want to understand *how* political myths and narratives of collective identity are rhetorically crafted and the different ways in which they work.

The specific analytical approaches I have chosen for this purpose have advantages and disadvantages. I have focused, on the one hand, on how the discourse of European identity evolves over time, and, on the other hand, explored different thematic topologies. To this end, the combined rhetorical and topological reading has proven fruitful, because it has allowed me to attend to the specific artefacts and their plurality while at the same time taking a step back from their chronological order and viewing the body of texts as an entity, a topology with uniting features as well as tensions. As noted earlier, these two approaches may seem contradictory, one pulling critical attention to the specific object of study, the other to uniting features and tensions in a body of artefacts. We can view it as a combination of macro and micro level analyses in which “the statements of individuals may be mixed and matched to reconstruct larger themes” while, at the same time, “particular exchanges obtain significance for both their representativeness and their exceptionalism”.¹¹⁰²

The crucial question is whether I have done the singular artefacts justice when representing them in the larger thematic structures. Have my readings been generous enough? Regardless of how truthful I have tried to be in the presentations and interpretations of the singular artefacts, I will undoubtedly have missed something. This is true both when it comes to the singular initiatives and to the singular contributions to New Narrative. The diachronic perspective has prompted me to look at the larger contexts and not to dwell on a specific theme or contextual element salient to a couple of New Narrative contributions but not to the initiative at large. For example, a speech by a former Slovenian prime minister could have been read in its own right and informed us on specific Slovenian-EU questions, and, in a larger perspective, enhanced our understanding of East-West dynamics within the EU. Another approach would have been a synchronic study focusing specifically on New Narrative in a context of renewed focus on European culture. Instead, through a long-term perspective on the constitutive rhetoric of the EU, the most recent initiative, in which the motive of European identity formation appears most clearly, has helped me perceive similar, but weaker tendencies in the earlier initiatives.

¹¹⁰² Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric”, 134.

At the end, “*inventing a text suitable for criticism*”¹¹⁰³ is the critic’s job. The body of artefacts chosen in this study and explored through rhetorical and topological readings are suitable for criticism due to their ability to inform us about larger thematic tendencies in the EU’s constitutive rhetoric as well as its development over time. Although I may not have read the singular contributions in their own right, I have sought to represent their arguments and views truthfully when reading them as part of larger discursive patterns.

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The theoretical frame for this study is constitutive rhetoric, informed and enhanced by various other theories. I have suggested a set of extensions and alterations to Maurice Charland’s theory that, on a general level, suggests that incorporating a more dynamic view on interpellation that centres reciprocity, dispersion, and agency allows us to question and better understand the indeterminate, decentred, and processual character of collective identity formation: who is hailing whom? To which tensions is collective identity a response, and who perceives these tensions? By highlighting the ontological and agentic instability of both the Subject and subjects we will be better qualified to understand why calls for collective identity are continuous and changeable.

The analytical findings further indicate the need to broaden the scope of constitutive rhetoric. Firstly, dissociating the constitutive power from uniquely pertaining to the voice and the text entails that we widen our gaze to include not only text, but also other symbolic, geographical, and physical means of interpellations. This process, in turn, allows us to include the invention of traditions, symbolic representations, and physical encounters as resources for constitutive rhetoric. If we want to capture various dimensions of constitutive rhetoric, we must attend to all of these aspects of the socially imaginary. Of course, constitutive rhetoric does not always have this multidimensional character, and even if it does, not all dimensions are equally important. But understanding how these dimensions might work will help us notice them in the first place. In addition, dissociating the interpellation from the voice means that we dissociate it from the present moment. This step enables us to understand that constitutive rhetoric takes time. Sometimes it works surprisingly fast, but most often crafting collective identity is an ongoing endeavour and the effect is continuous while simultaneously difficult to measure. This study exemplifies this ongoing, continuous character.

¹¹⁰³ McGee, “Text, Context”, 288. Emphasis in the original.

Second, including plural and intersecting temporal imaginaries in the analysis of the transhistorical subject helps us achieve a more complex understanding of the different foundations for this transhistoricity. In this study, transhistoricity is formed primarily through the temporal imaginaries of remembrance, rupture, continuity, and eternity, but others could be included. Tuning in to how these imaginaries function and how they converge or diverge can help us understand how these foundations of transhistoricity are crafted rhetorically.

Finally, the search for original, pure meaning exemplified in the readings in this chapter gives reason to believe that we must broaden our view of the practices projected in constitutive narratives. These practices include not only concrete political practices (such as voting and debating), but also epideictic practices of normative and moral orientation. This broadened view indicates the need to adjust the ideological perspective of constitutive rhetoric to permit us to explore the functions through which dreams of undistorted, pure, and full identities are created.

In this thesis, I have studied how such dreams are crafted rhetorically within the EU in its search of European identity. I have shown that epideictic rhetoric works in tandem with politics. But dreams of fullness are not restricted to a specific political ideology—they are crafted in the alt-right movement, in party politics on both sides of the spectrum, in parliaments all over the world. We need to be better equipped to understand these rhetorical practices and, on a more general level, how epideictic and deliberative rhetoric increasingly intersect. This tendency is worth paying more scholarly attention to in the future.

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Appendices

Appendix I: List of articles mentioning A People's Europe in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, 1984-1985

Jyllands-Posten	Author	Title
June 27, 1984	Journalist not specified	Mitterrand: Europes borders must be opened [<i>Mitterrand: Europas grænser skal åbnes</i>]
June 28, 1984	Editorial, Journalist not specified	Europe on course – again? [<i>Europa på vej – igen?</i>]
June 28, 1984	Correspondents Per Nyholm/Niels Levinsen	Victory rush after settlement in the EC [<i>Sejrsrus i EF efter forlig</i>]
April 1, 1985	Opinion piece, Jørgen Bøgh	The EC is entitled to a critical press [<i>EF har krav på kritisk presse</i>]
July 1, 1985	Journalist not specified	Schlüter denies that the EC is threatened by division [<i>Schlüter afviser, at EF trues af splittelse</i>]
July 4, 1985	Opinion piece, Knud P. Pedersen	Denmark's course after the coup in Milan [<i>Danmarks vej efter kuppet i Milano</i>]

Appendix II: List of contributors in *Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative* cited in the study

The descriptions are derived from *Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*. Those marked with an asterisk (*) were also members of the New Narrative for Europe cultural committee and signed the declaration as co-authors. Besides from those listed below, the following persons were also members of New Narrative cultural committee:

Kathrin Deventer, **Rose Fenton**, **Cristina Iglesias**, **Yorgos Loukos**, **PLANTU** (associate member), and **Luisa Taveira**.

Antoine Arjakovsky, historian and Research Director at the College des Bernardins, Paris.

José Manuel Durão Barroso, then President of the European Commission. Spokesperson for the initiative.

Stefano Boeri, architect and one of the initiators of the project the Tomorrow.

Alenka Bratušek, former Prime Minister of Slovenia.

Costa Carras, President of Hellenic Society for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and Environment.

Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, Italian-American author, art-historian and curator; artistic director of dOCUMENTA (13) in Kassel and is drafting the 14th Istanbul Biennial in 2015.

Paul Dujardin,* Director of the Centre for Fine Arts, Brussels, and hosted the event on October 28, 2014 when the publication *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative* was released. Chair of the cultural committee.

Plácido Domingo, opera singer and conductor, the President of Europa Nostra.

Olafur Eliasson,* artist.

Okwui Enwezor, curator, art critic, writer, and director of Haus der Kunst, Munich, Was the curator of Documenta 11 and is the Director of the 56th International Art Exhibition, Venice.

Jean-Marc Ferry, philosopher, professor at the University of Nantes.

Alicja Gescinska, philosopher, former post-graduate fellow at Princeton University.

Jürgen Habermas, philosopher.

Michał Kleiber,* professor of Computational Science and Engineering has twice served as President of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

György Konrád,* novelist and essayist.

Rem Koolhaas,* architect and the curator of the 14th International Architecture Biennale, Venice. Associate member of the New Narrative for Europe cultural committee.

Enrico Letta, politician and former Prime Minister of Italy.

Morten Løkkegaard,* journalist and MEP (ALDE), promoter of New Narrative for Europe. Observing member of the New Narrative for Europe cultural committee.

Peter Matjašič,* former President of the European Youth Forum, currently programme officer at OSIFE, in Barcelona.

Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor of Germany.

Sir Jonathan Mills,* composer, former Director of the Edinburgh International Festival.

Per Nyholm,* journalist at the Danish daily, the Jyllands-Posten. Nyholm decided to step out of the cultural committee and did not sign the declaration.

Michelangelo Pistoletto,* artist.

Czesław Porębski, professor of philosophy.

Pere Portabella, film director and producer, as well as a politician.

Sneška Quaedvlieg-Mihailović,* Secretary-General of Europa Nostra.

Viviane Reding, former Vice-President of the European Commission and then MEP.

Luea Ritter, curator whose work focuses on community building and questions of sustainability.

Tomáš Sedláček,* economist and university lecturer.

Nicola Setari, curator. Setari moderated the round table discussion, he co-edited *Mind and Body*, and drafted the New Narrative declaration on behalf of the cultural committee.

Elif Shafak, novelist.

Tommy Simoens, Director of Studio Luc Tuymans.

Beat Streuli, Swiss photographer.

Pier Paolo Tamburelli, architect and one of initiators of the project the Tomorrow.

Donald Tusk, former Prime Minister of Poland and President of the European Council.

Luc Tuymans, artist.

Androulla Vassiliou, then Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth.

Jorge Barreto Xavier, Professor of Cultural Policy at the Lisbon University Institute (ISCTE-IUL) and Secretary of State for Culture.

Appendix III: List of articles mentioning New Narrative for Europe in Germany and Denmark

Newspaper/ Date	Genre, author	Title
Zeit 02-jan-14	Opinion piece, Berthold Franke, the leader of the Goethe Institute in Brussels	On size and stupidity [<i>Größe macht dumm</i>]
Deutsche Welle 01-mar-14	Journalist Deude	A new narrative for Europe [<i>Ein neues Leitmotiv für Europa</i> . ‚Leitmotiv’ would normally perhaps rather be translated into ‘leitmotif’ or ‘theme’, but this is the official translation of the name of the initiative into German.]
Gießener Anzeiger 07-mar-14	Reportage, journalist Gianz	New renaissance for Europe [<i>Neue Renaissance in Europa</i>]
Weekendavisen 03-jan-14	Opinion piece, Catja Gaebel, Candidate for the EP	For ordinary people [<i>For de almindelige mennesker</i>]
Information 17-aug-13	Article, journalist Michelle Færch	The search for the European narrative [<i>Jagten på den europæiske fortælling</i>]
26-sep-13	Chronicle, Lene Otto, researcher	Remembering Hitler and Stalin cannot unite Europe [<i>Erindringen om Hitler og Stalin kan ikke samle Europa</i>]
26-sep-13	Interview, journalist Ditte Jensen	The EU needs a common starting point [<i>EU mangler et fælles udgangspunkt</i>]

01-mar-14	Ritzau telegram	Løkkegaard: We need a new Enlightenment in Europe [<i>Løkkegaard: Der skal være en ny oplysningstid i Europa</i>]
Politiken		
11-dec-13	Signature, Journalist Christoffer Emil Bruun	The EU should face the Europeans where they are [<i>EU skal møde europæerne, der hvor de er</i>]
01-mar-14	Danish translation of the <i>New Narrative</i> declaration, signed by the cultural committee	Calling for a new Renaissance in Europe [<i>Vi efterlyser en ny renæssancetid i Europa</i>]
12-may-14	Opinion piece, Candidate for EP Morten Messerschmidt	EU citizens feel powerless [<i>EU's borgere er fulde af afmagt</i>]
25-may-14	Interview with Olafur Eliasson, journalist Birgitte Kjær	Why the newspaper has switched to art on the front page [<i>Derfor er avisen gået over til kunst på forsiden</i>]
Berlingske		
26-apr-13	Correspondent Morten Crone	Distrust of the EU has never been greater [<i>Mistilliden til EU har aldrig været større</i>]
09-oct-13	Opinion piece, Nicholas Vind and Josefine Kofoed Christiansen, EP-candidates	Are the liberals the party of the Super-Europeans? [<i>Er venstre super-europæernes parti?</i>]
12-oct-13	Opinion piece, Ellen Trane Nørby and Jens Rohde, EP-candidates	Conservative change of course? [<i>Konservativt kursskifte?</i>]
07-nov-13	Opinion piece, Morten Løkkegaard	Europe – a common responsibility and a narrative [<i>Europa som opgave – Europa som fortælling</i>]
09-nov-14	Opinion piece, Morten Løkkegaard and Per Nyholm	The narrative of Europe – the beginning of success [<i>Fortællingen om Europa – en succes starter</i>]

20-nov-14	Opinion piece, Danny Malkowski, national politician	Fantasies of Europe [<i>Fantasier om Europa</i>]
BT		
12-july-13	Note, no journalist specified, edited by Mette Fleckner and Søren Henrik Jacobsen	A new narrative of Europe must reflect the reality of its citizens [<i>Ny Europa-fortælling skal afspejle borgernes virkelighed</i>]
22-nov-13	Morten Løkkegaard and Morten Messerschmidt have been asked the same question, answer in opinion pieces	Controversy: Is it good that the EU has put 20 personalities from the cultural sphere in charge of writing 'a new narrative of Europe'? [<i>Kontrovers: Er det godt, at EU har sat 20 kulturpersonligheder til at skrive 'en ny fortælling om Europa'?</i>]
16-oct-14	Interview with EP-candidates Rina Ronja Kari and Anders Vistisen, Journalist Uffe Jørgensen Odde	Angry politicians [<i>Vrede politikere</i>]
16-oct-14	Interview with Morten Løkkegaard, Journalist Uffe Jørgensen Odde	'Nonsense' and 'ridiculous' [<i>'Vrøvl' og 'latterligt'</i>]
16-oct-14	Interview with Per Nyholm, Journalist Uffe Jørgensen Odde	Author: A failure [<i>Forfatter: En fiasko</i>]
16-oct-14	Journalist Uffe Jørgensen Odde	EU narrative for 10 million kroner: Morten Løkkegaard's EU project is met with sharp critique [<i>EU-fortælling til 10 mio. kroner: Morten Løkkegaards EU-projekt møder skarp kritik</i>]

18-oct-14	Opinion poll	What do you think about the fact that the EU has spent 10 million kroner on ‘The new narrative of Europe’? [<i>Hvad synes du om, at EU har brugt 10 mio. kr. på ‘Den nye fortælling om Europa’?</i>]
23-oct-14	Columnist Lotte Reimar	There is so much women do not understand! [<i>Der er så meget, kvinder ikke forstår!</i>]
23-oct-14	Journalist Uffe Jørgensen Odde	Spent 10 millions on 5 pages of text: Løkkegaard's EU project receives more funding [<i>Brugte 10 millioner på 5 sider tekst: Nu får Løkkegaards EU-projekt nye millioner</i>]
Jyllands-Posten		
07-may-13	Translation of Barroso's speech at the launch of <i>New Narrative</i>	A new narrative of Europe [<i>En ny fortælling om Europa</i>]
08-may-13	Opinion piece, Per Nyholm, journalist at JP	Europe, a global hope [<i>Europa, et globalt håb</i>]
10-may-13	Letter to the editor, Johannes Bundgaard, priest	Narratives of Europe [<i>Europa-fortællinger</i>]
06-june-13	Correspondent Jette Elbæk Maressa	The wings of history are beating against the crisis in Europe [<i>Historiens vingesus slår mod krisen i Europa</i>]
13-oct-13	Column, journalist Per Nyholm	No truth checking in the EU [<i>Ingen sandhedskontrol i EU</i>]
15-nov-13	Chronicle, Cecilie Banke, researcher	Does a new narrative of Europe exist? [<i>Findes der en ny fortælling om Europa?</i>]
21-nov-13	Correspondent Jette Elbæk Maressa	Europe's new right challenges the EU [<i>Europas nye højre udfordrer EU</i>]

21-nov-13	Correspondent Jette Elbæk Maressa	Narrative of Europe receives critique even before it is ready [<i>Europa-fortælling får kritik før den er klar</i>]
21-nov-13	Correspondent Jette Elbæk Maressa	Can culture save the EU? [<i>Kan kulturen redde EU?</i>]
21-nov-13	Opinion piece, Morten Messerschmidt	A cure that does more harm than good [En kur, der gør mere skade end gavn]
28-nov-13	Opinion piece, Morten Løkkegaard	Invitation to Dr. Doom [Invitation til Dr. Doom]
30-nov-13	Letter to the editor, A. Martin Jensen	Populism and ropaganda [<i>Populisme og propaganda</i>]
02-dec-13	Letter to the editor, Kjeld Mogensen	Who is who?
05-dec-13	Chronicle, Johs. H. Christensen	Spread the old message in Europe [<i>Udbred det gamle budskab i Europa</i>]
06-dec-13	Opinion piece, Morten Messerschmidt	Those who pay decide [<i>De, der betaler musikken, bestemmer</i>]
14-dec-13	Column, journalist Henrik Jensen	A common narrative of Europe [<i>En fælles fortælling om EU</i>]
15-dec-13	Correspondent Jette Elbæk Maressa	Cheers to Europe [<i>Skål for Europa</i>]
18-dec-13	Column, journalist Palle Weis	Oh, Europe [<i>Åh, Europa</i>]
21-dec-13	Opinion piece, Povl Henningsen	A new narrative of Europe – report from Milan [<i>En ny fortælling om Europa – rapport fra Milano</i>]
27-dec-13	Opinion piece, Ole Schmidt	The EU debate is almost dead [<i>EU-debatten er næsten død</i>]

01-mar-14	Ritzau telegram	Løkkegaard: We need a new age of Enlightenment in Europe [<i>Løkkegaard: Der skal være en ny oplysningstid i Europa</i>]
13-mar-14	Correspondent Jette Elbæk Maressa	Yes please, dear José Manuel [<i>Jo tak, kære José Manuel</i>]
28-apr-14	Editorial, Journalist not specified	Denmark in the EU [<i>Danmark i EU</i>]
28-may-14	Editorial, Journalist not specified	European severity [<i>Europaisk alvor</i>]
13-june-14	Chronicle, Cecilie Banke, researcher	Europe is more than war and peace [<i>Europa er mere end krig og fred</i>]
02-nov-14	Column, journalist Per Nyholm	The future has arrived [<i>Fremtiden er ankommet</i>]

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