Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

ISSN: 1369-8230 (Print) 1743-8772 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fcri20

Contributivist views on democratic inclusion: on economic contribution as a condition for the right to vote

Jonas Hultin Rosenberg & Fia Sundevall

To cite this article: Jonas Hultin Rosenberg & Fia Sundevall (2025) Contributivist views on democratic inclusion: on economic contribution as a condition for the right to vote, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 28:2, 261-285, DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2022.2104552

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2104552

Published online: 31 Jul 2022.

CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
2025, VOL. 28, NO. 2, 261–285
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2104552

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Contributivist views on democratic inclusion: on economic contribution as a condition for the right to vote

Jonas Hultin Rosenberg[a] and Fia Sundevall[b]

[a]Department of Government, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; [b]Department of Economic History and International Relations, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

ABSTRACT

Prior to the democratic breakthrough in most Western countries, the right to vote was premised on a person's economic contribution. No country today reserves voting rights exclusively to contributors, but economic contribution matters once again. It matters for immigrants' access to citizenship and its associated political rights, and it matters for emigrants' attempts to keep the right to vote in their 'home country'. Economic contribution has attracted very little attention in the literature on democratic inclusion. The few scholars who have discussed it have rejected it based on its expected implications, without going into detail about its different instantiations and normative underpinnings. This paper lays the foundation for a more thorough critique. Informed by historical practices, we distinguish between two main types of economic contributivist regulations: those that condition the right to vote on the size of the contribution, and those that condition it on compliance with legally required contributions. We suggest that contributivism can be based either on property rights or on reciprocity. We conclude the paper by contrasting contributivism with established principles of democratic inclusion (such as the all-affected principle), and by arguing that, unlike these other principles, contributivism is incompatible with the democratic ideal of self-rule.

KEYWORDS Democratic inclusion; contributivism; economic requirements for voting rights; reciprocity; property rights

Introduction

Prior to the democratic breakthrough in most Western countries, the right to vote was premised on a person's economic contribution. Those with low or no taxable income or property, those with unpaid taxes or poor-relief debts, and those in a legal state of bankruptcy were excluded from the demos (Katz, 1997). These *contributivist regulations for voting rights* were abolished, either in a slow step-by-step transition or through a rapid transformation (Katz,

CONTACT Jonas Hultin Rosenberg jonas.hultin_rosenberg@statsvet.uu.se

1997; Piketty, 2020). Sometimes, but not always, such regulations were justified by reference to *contributivist arguments*: i.e. those who do not contribute economically by paying taxes (having taxable income or taxable property) or by repaying their debts to the state (not having unpaid taxes or poor-relief debts) should not be able to vote, because they do not make an economic contribution.

Today, in a way that echoes these pre-democratic practices, economic contribution again matters for the right to vote. Although no state nowadays reserves voting rights exclusively to contributors, economic contribution is pivotal in the context of migration and democratic inclusion. This merits attention from scholars of democratic theory. Economic contribution matters for the ability of immigrants to vote in their country of residence, since it increasingly matters for immigrants' path to citizenship – and citizenship is necessary for the right to vote in national elections in almost all democratic countries (Earnest, 2008). In some countries money offers a fast-track route to citizenship by allowing non-citizens to 'buy' citizenship (Christians, 2017; Joppke, 2019), and proof of income or employment is required to become naturalized in many countries (Shachar, 2021; Stadlmair, 2018). Moreover, the economic contribution of resident non-citizens has been cited as an argument for relaxing the citizenship requirement and extending the right to vote to this group (Song, 2016). Money also matters for the ability of emigrants to keep the right to vote in their country of citizenship. Citizens living abroad contribute financially through remittances, investments, and (in exceptional cases) through taxes to their 'home countries'. At least partly in response to these arguments, more and more countries now extend the right to vote to those of their citizens who reside abroad (Bauböck, 2007; Ellis et al., 2007). This view is reflected in the slogan 'No Vote, No Money' (a recycling of the slogan 'No Taxation, Without Representation' which is used by Mexican citizens living in the US to support their right to vote in Mexican elections (see, López-Guerra, 2014).[1]

Issues pertaining to the problem of democratic inclusion have attracted significant attention in contemporary scholarly debates. Much has been written both on voting-rights requirements, such as that of citizenship (which excludes immigrants), and the residency requirement (which excludes emigrants) (see, e.g. Beckman, 2012; Lopez-Guerra, 2005; López-Guerra, 2014; Owen, 2018; Rubio-Marín, 2006). More basic principles of democratic inclusion have also drawn attention, among them the all-affected principle (for an overview see, Hultin Rosenberg, 2020), the all-subjected principle (for an overview see, Goodin, 2016), and the citizenship stakeholder principle (see, Bauböck, 2018a). However, notwithstanding this focus on democratic inclusion in scholarly debates, contributivism has not yet been the subject of any thorough scrutiny. The few contemporary democratic theorists who discuss economic contribution as a requirement for the right to vote (see Angell &

Huseby, 2017; Bauböck, 2007; López-Guerra, 2014; Rubio-Marín, 2006) have mainly focused on the implications of such requirements and regulations. To use a term coined by Amartya Sen (1979), the relationship of contributivism to democratic inclusion has mainly been subjected to a *case-implication critique*. However, the implications of contributivism in this context depend on what more precisely such requirements demand. In order to advance this critique, we distinguish in this paper between several different contributivist requirements. We also lay the foundation for a more fundamental *prior-principle critique*, by uncovering the normative basis for determining the franchise on the basis of economic contribution, and by articulating the difference between contributivism and other principles of democratic inclusion – such as the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the citizenship stakeholder principle.

We have two aims in this paper. The first is conceptual: to examine contributivism in the context of democratic inclusion. We do this by mapping contributivist requirements for voting rights, as well as contributivist arguments for such requirements; and by articulating the difference between contributivism and established principles of democratic inclusion. This conceptual mapping is particularly important, because contributivism is seriously under-theorized in the scholarly literature on democratic inclusion. Our second aim is normative: to lay the foundation for a democratic critique of contributivism. We do this by demonstrating the limited importance of the existing case-implication critique, and by suggesting a more fundamental prior-principle critique based on the democratic ideal of self-rule.

Historical practices inform our study. We take particular advantage of historical studies conducted in Sweden, a nation which established a reputation in the 20th century as one of the most egalitarian nations in the world, with a high level of economic equality. In the late 1800s, however, Sweden was among the least egalitarian societies in Europe. A small wealthy elite ran the country. As Bengtsson puts it, citing Mellquist: 'all countries in Europe restricted the franchise of the poor, but none were as extreme as the Swedish system' (Bengtsson, 2019, p. 138). During that time, a larger share of adult citizens were disenfranchised in Sweden than in most other European nations. In the 1890s, only 24% of adult Swedish men had the right to vote in national elections – a striking difference from the situation in Germany, for example, where 82% of adult men could vote, or in Norway,[2] where 77% could do so (Bengtsson, 2019).

This paper is structured as follows. The first section focuses on *economic contributivist requirements for voting rights*. Informed by historical examples, we map different types of such requirements, distinguishing between those that condition the right to vote on the size of the contribution and those that condition said right on compliance with legally required contributions. The second section focuses on *contributivist arguments* for contributivist or

non-contributivist requirements. We suggest that contributivism can be based either on property rights or on reciprocity. The third section focuses on contributivism as a principle for democratic inclusion. In this section, we articulate the difference between on the one hand contributivism and on the other hand the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the citizenship stakeholder principle. We do this by articulating the relational requirement of contributivism, and by comparing it to the relational requirements of these other principles. The fourth and last section demonstrates the limited importance of the existing critique of contributivism, which focuses on the implications of specific contributivist requirements for voting rights. We propose a more comprehensive democratic critique focused on the incompatibility between the relational requirement of contributivism and the democratic ideal of a government in which those who are governed govern.

Contributivist requirements for voting rights

Contributivist requirements for voting rights are requirements that condition the right to vote on contribution to society. Such requirements can be applied instead of other voting-rights requirements, or in combination with them. Among such other requirements are the citizenship requirement, which conditions the right to vote on the legal status of citizenship, and the residency requirement, which restricts the right to vote to those living within the territory of the state in question.

Our focus in this paper is on contributivist requirements that condition the right to vote on *economic contribution*. However, an individual can contribute to society in a number of different ways, and the right to vote can also be conditioned on such non-economic contributions. Various forms of national service, including military conscription, are a paradigmatic example historically of such non-economic contributivist requirements in connection with the right to vote (Ahlbäck & Sundevall 2021).

Contributivist requirements as necessary or sufficient conditions for inclusion

The inclusive scope of economic contributivist requirements depends on whether they function as a necessary or a sufficient condition for inclusion. If they serve as a necessary condition for inclusion, *only* those who meet them will be included. If they serve instead as a sufficient condition, *all* those who meet them will be included. If, finally, they function as a necessary and sufficient condition, *all* and *only* those who meet them will be included.

Historically, contributivist requirements have never served as a necessary and sufficient condition for inclusion. It has thus never been the case that all and only those who contribute economically have been included in the demos. Contributivist requirements were typically combined, namely, with age limits on the one hand, and with citizenship or residency requirements on the other. Making an economic contribution was often a necessary but not sufficient for inclusion. Those with low income, with no property, or with unpaid taxes were excluded; but those with high income, with property, and with no unpaid taxes were not necessarily included. In many cases, the right to vote was reserved to contributing adult resident citizens (Katz, 1997). The contributivist requirements for naturalization which are widely practiced today are also of this kind. They are usually combined with some form of residency requirement.

The granting of citizenship in return for purchase or investment differs from such contributivist requirements for naturalization, in that economic contribution is a *sufficient* condition for citizenship in such cases. In that sense, programs of this kind make citizenship more accessible for immigrants. There are historical examples of contributivist requirements for voting rights that worked in a similar way. In such cases, economic contribution was sufficient to obtain the right to vote for groups of people who were otherwise excluded (Katz, 1997). More than six decades before the introduction of so-called universal suffrage in Sweden, for example, wealthy unwed and widowed women were granted municipal voting rights (Karlsson Sjögren, 2006). In this case, economic contributivist requirements extended the scope of inclusion by overriding exclusion based on sex.

Another important difference between different contributivist requirements concerns what type of economic contribution is required for inclusion. In the following two sections, we review contributivist requirements of several different types.

The size of the contribution

One type of contributivist requirement conditions the right to vote on the *size of the contribution*. In the late 19th century, Swedish plutocracy was based on a censitary suffrage system, with proportional representation in municipal elections. Moreover, since the first chamber of the national parliament was elected by the municipalities, the system upheld plutocracy on the national level as well as the local one. In this system, the right to vote was based on the amount of income tax paid and the assessed value of property owned. Furthermore, the number of votes possessed by enfranchised individuals varied: the higher their taxable income or property value, the higher the number of votes they had. Citizens whose income or property did not reach

the required level were excluded from suffrage altogether, as were those who had not paid their taxes. Private companies also had voting rights (Swedish Code of Statutes, 1862, 1866). Not only did this system exclude a large majority of citizens from the suffrage; it also meant that a single person, or company, could cast the majority of votes in a municipal election – which was the case in a number of rural towns (Bengtsson, 2020).

Contributivist requirements that condition the right to vote on the size of the contribution can either allocate votes *in proportion* to the size of the contribution, or equally among all who contribute over a certain *threshold*. The censitary system practiced in Sweden and described above combined these two patterns, distributing votes proportionally among those who contributed over a certain threshold.

Two different thresholds for the necessary contribution are mentioned in the normative literature on democratic inclusion: the any-contribution threshold and the net-contribution threshold (Angell & Huseby, 2018). The any-contribution threshold uses a no-contribution baseline, and it treats any economic contribution regardless of its size as sufficient for enfranchisement. On this account, most people within any of the polities of the contemporary West would count as contributors, and many of those outside would qualify as well. It is enough, for namely, to purchase a product liable to VAT in order to qualify as a contributor by the any-contribution baseline. Hence, a contributivist requirement that uses the any-contribution threshold will be highly inclusive.

By contrast, the net-contribution threshold fastens on the public costs of the programs and services for which an individual is eligible as the threshold for inclusion, and it excludes all who contributes less than these costs. The threshold for inclusion is set in such a way as to include net contributors and to exclude net recipients. The idea of distinguishing between net contributors and net recipients of cooperative practices is familiar from, among other places, the discussion about what EU member states pay in and what they get in return. Determining who is a net contributor and who a net receiver is arguably more difficult on an individual level, even if such calculations have figured in contributivist discussions about immigration (see, Ruist, 2017). Requiring a net contribution for democratic inclusion would exclude a large part of the population, and would result in a demos consisting mainly of people of working age – at least if the contribution is calculated as the economic contribution over a short time period (for example, one year), and not as accumulated or expected economic contribution over a longer time period (for example, expected lifetime contributions).

In the history of economic contributivist requirements for voting rights, a number of thresholds for inclusion have been used (Katz, 1997). These have ranged from high thresholds that disenfranchised a majority of the adult population, to low thresholds that excluded only the poorest part of the

population. An example of the former can be seen in the contributivist requirements that one applied in Sweden (until Swedish Code of Statues, 1909 in elections to the second chamber of parliament, and until 1918 in municipal elections). These conditioned the right to vote on the amount of income tax paid and the assessed value of property owned. An example of the latter is the poll tax requirement used in some states in the US up until 1964. This practice was the subject of extensive criticism during the 20th century (Podolefsky, 1998), and it was abolished by the 24th Amendment of 1964.

Contributivist requirements that focus on the size of the contribution are staging a comeback today, in the context of migration and citizenship. Some of the contributivist requirements that condition immigrants' access to citizenship on economic contribution fall within this category. A few countries sell citizenship or offer a fast track to it to persons who make investments above a high threshold (Christians, 2017; Dzankic, 2019; Hirschl & Shachar, 2014; Joppke, 2019). A more common arrangement is that countries require a certain contribution for naturalization. These range from a requirement not to draw on welfare benefits (as for example, in Denmark) to a requirement to have a relatively high income (e.g. Austria; Stadlmair, 2018).

Compliance with legally required contributions

In Sweden and elsewhere, other contributivist requirements – which did not focus on the size of the contribution – were used as well. Rules that disenfranchised people with unpaid taxes or poor-relief debts are an example. It should be noted here that being in receipt of poor relief did not in itself constitute grounds for disenfranchisement; however, failure to repay the relief did (poor relief was technically a loan; Sundevall, 2021). In Sweden, poor relief as a basis for exclusion was introduced in (Swedish Code of Statues, 1909), as part of the suffrage reform that did away with censitary suffrage for second chamber elections (Swedish Code of Statues, 1909). Regulations of this kind had counterparts in many European nations at the turn of the 20th century. In some cases, such restrictions remained for decades after the introduction of so-called universal suffrage – in Sweden, for example, until the 1940s (Sundevall, 2021), and in Denmark until the 1960s (Christiansen, 2019).

Those with unpaid taxes or poor-relief debts were disenfranchised regardless of how much or how little they had otherwise contributed. These contributivist requirements were thus different from those that conditioned the right to vote on the size of the contribution and thus distributed votes in proportion to contribution, or which divided votes equally among those who contributed over a certain threshold. These rules excluded those with unpaid taxes or poor-relief debts, because they had failed to comply with a *legal*

obligation to contribute. In the case of these requirements, democratic inclusion was not determined by the size of the contribution but by the need to comply with a legal obligation. In one sense, all contributivist requirements condition the right to vote on legally required contributions, in that they condition the right to vote on the contribution that one is legally required to make in order to enjoy the right to vote. However, the requirements addressed in this section differ from those discussed in the previous section, in that they condition the right to vote on contributions one is legally obliged to make irrespective of what one is legally required to do in order to obtain the right to vote. The difference can be illustrated by the disenfranchisement of those with poor-relief debts in Sweden between (Swedish Code of Statues, 1909) and 1945. If being in receipt of poor relief had in itself constituted grounds for disenfranchisement, the rule would have been an example of a requirement that disenfranchised on the basis of the size of the contribution. The net contribution of persons on poor relief is negative. As mentioned above, being a poor-relief recipient did not in itself constitute grounds for disenfranchisement, but failure to repay one's poor relief did. Hence, those who were disenfranchised as a result of this requirement were not disenfranchised because of their negative net contribution. Instead, they were disenfranchised because they had failed to comply with the legal obligation to repay a loan (the poor-relief loan).

With these types of contributivist requirements, the outer boundaries of inclusion are set by the scope of the legal obligation to contribute meaning that those who have no legal obligation to contribute would be excluded. In this sense, the inclusive scope of this version of contributivism is similar to that of requirements that condition the right to vote on subjectedness to the law. Those who have a legal obligation to contribute are subjected to the rules and laws of the political entity. The important difference is that contributivism, unlike requirements that condition the right to vote on subjectedness, excludes those who fail to contribute what they are legally obliged to contribute.

We can thus distinguish two types of contributivist requirement: one that focuses on how much someone contributes, and one that focuses on whether or not someone contributes what they are legally required to contribute. As indicated above, these two requirements can be formulated in turn in different ways, with far-reaching implications for inclusion and exclusion. Nuances aside, the general difference between these two interpretations of contributivism is important. It relates centrally to the different justifications for contributivist requirements that we address in the next section.

Contributivist arguments for contributivist and non-contributivist regulations

Thus, several different economic contributivist requirements for voting rights were applied in Sweden and elsewhere from the 19th century up until the middle of the 20th century. Contributivist regulations excluded those with low or no taxable income or property, those with unpaid taxes or poor-relief debts, and those in a legal state of bankruptcy. Some economic contributivist regulations were not based on the view that those who contribute economically should be granted the right to vote by virtue of their contribution. Arguments in support of Sweden's disenfranchisement of voters in a legal state of bankruptcy (between Swedish Code of Statues, 1909 and 1945) typically fastened on concepts of competence and autonomy; such persons were not only considered financially incompetent; they were also, and more importantly, seen as being dependent on and under the direct influence of the bankruptcy administrator (SPCCA: Swedish Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 1921, p. 1944; Sundevall, 2021). The 'criterion of autonomy' (Katz, 1997) was also used to justify the exclusion of women from the suffrage (until 1921) – in particular married women, who were not of legal majority status and who were considered economically dependent on their husbands. The same criterion underpinned the disenfranchisement, between 1921 and 1945, of elderly citizens in public retirement homes (Sundevall, 2021). Other economic contributivist regulations were justified by reference to the idea that those who contribute economically by paying taxes (having a taxable income or taxable property) or by repaying their debts to the state (not having unpaid taxes or poor-relief debts) qualified for the right to vote *by virtue of* their economic contribution. This latter argument is the focus of this section. We refer to this idea – that contribution should matter for democratic inclusion, not as a proxy for something else but for its own sake – as *contributivism*. In general terms, to contribute is to provide a good that others value. For the sake of simplicity, we understand 'contribution' as economic contribution, although as noted above one can of course contribute in other ways as well.

Contributivist arguments can be cited to justify regulations of the kind described in the previous section. They may also be thought to justify other types of regulations. As mentioned at the outset of this paper, the economic contribution of immigrants and emigrants has been put forward as an argument for extending the right to vote to resident non-citizens (immigrants) and to non-resident citizens (emigrants). In this case, the individual's economic contribution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient requirement for inclusion. The economic contribution of the entire group (of non-resident citizens or of resident non-citizens) is presented as a reason for enfranchising

the group. The citizenship of non-resident citizens or the residency of resident non-citizens delimits the group, but it is the economic contribution of the group that is held to justify democratic inclusion.

In the sections that follow, we suggest two possible normative underpinnings for contributivism. Otherwise put, we offer two different suggestions as to how economic contribution might be thought, wholly or in part, to justify democratic inclusion.

Property-based contributivism

Our first suggestion is to treat the right to political influence for those who contribute economically as an extension of individual property rights (see, Beckman, 2006). This idea that those who contribute ought to be included fits well with a contributivist requirement that includes or excludes based on the size of the contribution, either by distributing influence in proportion to the size of the contribution or by setting a contribution threshold for inclusion and allocating influence equally among those who contribute above the threshold. The idea here is that those who contribute economically to public resources by paying taxes or in other ways should have influence over how these resources are used, just as stockholders in a corporation have the right to vote on matters of company policy by virtue of their investments (for this analogy see, Beckman, 2006). As Piketty points out (Piketty, 2020), a suffrage system of this kind is 'analogous to the voting system in a meeting of corporate stockholders, where votes are apportioned according to the number of shares each person owns' (p. 191). The parallels do not end there. In the late 1800s, Swedish politicians tended to view municipalities as akin to joint-stock companies. Suffrage was therefore based on the underlying premise that the right to vote – and the number of votes one could cast as well – should be based at least in part on the size of the economic contribution in terms of taxes that one makes (Mellquist, 1974; Waldermarson & Östberg, 2002). Far into the 20th century, arguments of this kind were prevalent both in Sweden and in many other nations (see, e.g. Sundevall, 2021; Yee-Fui et al., 2017). In some democracies, moreover, various forms of business and property franchise are found to this day. In Australia, for example, a majority of states grant votes to corporations in local government elections, as well as applying plural voting and a property franchise (Goss, 2017).

On this understanding of contributivism, those who contribute ought to be included in the demos because the public's resources are theirs. For this reason, John Stuart Mill argued for a poll tax – 'a direct tax [. . .] levied on every grown person in the community' (Mill, 1861, ch. 8) – on the grounds it ensures that everyone contributes, thereby entitling everyone to vote (Katz, 1997). The threshold for the needed contribution should be low, but some economic contribution should be required in return for having the right to vote:

'[R]epresentation should be co-extensive with taxation, not stopping short of it, but also not going beyond it' (Mill, 1861, ch. 8). By this account, influence over the use of public resources should be reserved to those who contribute, because public resources are their property. In the following passage from his argument for a poll tax, Mill emphasizes this view of public resources:

> It is also important, that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay something towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economise. As far as money matters are concerned, any power of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government; a severance of the power of control from the interest in its beneficial exercise. It amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people's pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one (Mill, 1861, ch. 8)

In suggesting that enfranchising persons who pay no taxes would amount to 'allowing them to put their hands into other people's pockets,' Mill gives clear expression to the 'property argument' for contributivist voting requirements.

Reciprocity-based contributivism

Our second suggestion is to treat the right to political influence for those who contribute as a matter of reciprocity. The point of departure for this argument is that everyone who benefits from the common tasks carried out by the political entity ought to contribute, economically or otherwise. Reciprocity and contribution have not drawn much attention in the literature on democratic inclusion, but they are widely discussed in the literature on related topics in political theory. Reciprocity, fair play, and contribution are key concepts in the literature on political obligations and contributive justice. They form the foundation for an account of political obligations according to which those who have benefited from a cooperative scheme, or more generally from the contributions of others, have an obligation in return to contribute in a way that benefits others (see, Dagger & Lefkowitz, 2021; Furendal, 2020; Klosko, 2020; Lister, 2011). This idea has been taken to mean that *only* those who contribute have a right to benefit from the contributions of others, and that those who benefit without contributing are free riders on the efforts of others (see, Furendal, 2020).

Sarah song (2016) has developed this general view on the relationship between contributions and obligations into an argument about the political obligations of states vis-à-vis resident non-citizens. As Song sees it, these state obligations follow from the view that those who benefit have an obligation to contribute, and that those who contribute have a right to benefit. She argues that, 'by contributing toward the maintenance of the state in whose territory we reside, each of us is entitled to the public goods

provided by that state' (Song, 2016, p. 234). Song discusses public goods and social rights in the main, but she also suggests that the contribution of resident non-citizens, together with their affiliation to their country of residence, justifies their claim to enfranchisement (Song, 2016). By this account, contribution in itself is not sufficient for enfranchisement, but it adds to the argument for enfranchising resident non-citizens. Here political rights, including the right to vote, are seen as a good or benefit to which those who have contributed to the commonweal are entitled.

However, this reciprocity-based account of contributivism is not dependent on the controversial view of the right to vote as a good or benefit. Based on the same general idea, another argument for democratic inclusion on the basis of contribution is possible – if we shift the focus from the distribution of benefits to the distribution of influence over the distribution of benefits. According to this argument, all who benefit from the political entity (cooperative scheme, etc.) have an obligation to contribute – either in absolute terms or in relation to their potential (for this distinction see, Furendal, 2020) – to the political entity, and those who contribute ought to be included in the group (the demos) which controls the distribution of these benefits. Put differently, those who contribute what they are obliged to contribute to financing these common tasks ought to be included in the demos governing the political entity; that is, they are entitled to take part in deciding on how to handle the common tasks, including the distribution of benefits and burdens. Those who fail to contribute what they ought to are free riders, and as a matter of reciprocity they should be excluded from the demos. As indicated above, the required contribution may be either absolute (a fixed level equal for everyone) or relative to the potential or ability of each person. In order to determine who has contributed their fair share, we need a theory of moral obligation or contributive justice.

Thus, this argument for determining inclusion and exclusion on the basis of contribution can be adduced in support of contributivist requirements that include people who contribute differently. Such a reciprocity-based argument for contributivism fits well with the versions of contributivism suggested in the previous section, with their basis in legal obligations. One democratic problem with these latter versions of contributivism is that they make the right to vote dependent on what is legally required without regard to the reasonableness (or lack thereof) of these legal requirements. To say someone has a legal obligation to contribute is a descriptive claim about what the legal system requires. If the legal system is unfair – if, for instance, it requires unreasonably large contributions from one particular sub-group within the population – then it would seem highly problematic to exclude this group because they have failed to contribute what they are legally obliged to contribute. One way to avoid this problem is to include or exclude on the basis of moral rather than legal obligations. When contributivism is

interpreted in this way, those who have a moral obligation to contribute to a political entity, and who contribute what they are morally obliged to contribute to it, should be included in the demos governing this entity.

We can thus distinguish two very different arguments for including or excluding on the basis of contribution: namely, the property argument and the reciprocity argument. These correspond to two very different interpretations of contributivism: one that focuses on the size of the contribution; another that fastens on the obligation to contribute.

Contributivism and its alternatives

It has been suggested that the economic contributivist requirements for voting rights that were common a century ago 'were justified in terms of the criterion of affected interest' (Katz, 1997, p. 230). However, as we understand the concept of contributivism in this paper, it differs not only from the all-affected principle but also from the all-subjected principle and the citizen stakeholder principle. Contributivism offers reasons for or against inclusion that are different from those provided by these other principles. The fact that someone contributes economically does not in itself make her affected by the decisions taken or subjected to the laws enacted. Nor are economic contributions, regardless of how extensive they are, in themselves sufficient for someone to count as a member of a political community, according to the stakeholder citizenship view of membership as formulated by Rainer Bauböck (2007, 2018a). Net contributors are no more affected than net recipients. Those who contribute economically are typically affected by political decisions and subjected to laws enacted, so they should be included in the demos taking these decisions and enacting these laws, according to the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle. However, it is not the case that those who contribute economically are in general more affected or more subjected than are those who do not contribute. In any case, it is not these persons' contribution that justifies their inclusion, but rather their affectedness and subjectedness. The same applies in the case of the citizenship stakeholder principle. Economic contribution can add to the link between the individual and the political community, and thereby enhance one's claim to membership and democratic inclusion (see, e.g. Song, 2016). One could even imagine a version of the citizenship stakeholder principle according to which economic contribution is a necessary and sufficient condition for having a 'genuine link' and thereby a claim to membership, although Bauböck himself explicitly rejects such a requirement (see, Bauböck, 2018a, 2018b). In any case, it is the link and not the contribution that justifies inclusion (Bauböck, 2007). Thus, a person that contributes economically

can be affected, can be subjected, and can be a citizen stakeholder – and thereby have a justified claim to inclusion from the perspective of these principles. However, it is not the economic contribution here that forms the foundation for the right to vote, but rather the fact that the contributing individual is affected, is subjected, or is a stakeholder citizen. In the following section, we identify the difference between contributivism and these other principles in greater detail.

The relational requirement of contributivism

The point of departure for contributivism is the fact that a political entity (e.g. a state) handles some common tasks for the benefit of those within its jurisdiction. Handling these tasks in turn requires money. This is certainly true of a welfare state that performs a wide range of tasks, but it is also true of a night watchman state that only carries out a minimal set of tasks. Those that benefit from the political entity's performance of these tasks contribute differently to its financing. According to contributivism, these differences in economic contribution justify differences in political power. As we saw in the previous section, this difference in political power (or votes) can be justified on the basis of either property or reciprocity.

Lately, issues pertaining to the problem of democratic inclusion have drawn significant scholarly attention. At a high level of abstraction, there is a great deal of agreement within this debate that the scope of democratic inclusion should be determined by a 'relational requirement.' The idea is that only those in a particular relationship to the democratic state ought to be included in the demos governing the state. Bauböck (2018a) suggests a distinction between two such relational requirements. This distinction is intended to capture the difference between on the one hand the all-affected and all-subjected principles, and on the other the stakeholder citizenship principle that he defends. We must distinguish, Bauböck contends, between principles that focus on the relationship between the *individual* and *the political community*, and principles that focus on the relationship between the *individual* and *the state*. Contributivist relationships can be understood as incorporating both kinds.

Economic contribution and membership in the political community

According to the stakeholder citizenship principle elaborated by Bauböck (2007, 2018a), membership in the political community is determined by the strength of the relationship between the individual and the political community. As mentioned above, non-resident adult citizens may qualify as members of the political community. Their economic contribution can be cited in support of this conclusion. In itself, however, economic contribution is not

sufficient for membership. By Bauböck's (2007, 2018a) account, membership in the political community is connected to citizenship. But citizenship is not sufficient for membership either. The democratic inclusion of non-resident citizens should be determined according to whether or not they maintain a 'genuine-link' to their 'home country' (Bauböck, 2018a). Economic contributions through remittances, investments, or taxes can be an indicator that such a link is maintained. A membership principle that focuses on citizenship may thus be 'weakly contributivist' in this respect. Such a principle may also be 'indirectly contributivist,' if economic contribution is a requirement for acquiring citizenship through naturalization – which is often the case (Stadlmair, 2018). On the stakeholder citizenship principle, however, economic contribution is neither necessary nor sufficient for membership and democratic inclusion. Adult resident citizens qualify as members even if they do not contribute financially, and non-citizens do not qualify no matter how great their economic contribution is. According to the contributivist version of the membership principle, by contrast, economic contribution replaces citizenship as the decisive denominator of membership. As a member of the first chamber of the Swedish parliament put it in 1921 in a debate on taxes and suffrage: 'The obligations incumbent on me as a member of the municipality are really nothing more than tax liability. That is what constitutes me as a member of the municipality' (af Ekenstam, 1921, p. 68). In other words, it was his economic contribution that entitled him to membership in the municipality, and this membership in turn granted him the right to vote.

Economic contribution as a relationship between the individual and the state

If, however, we interpret contributivism as something that focuses on the relationship between the individual and the state instead of on that between the individual and the political community, we will conclude that those who contribute to public resources should have influence over those resources (i.e. over how they are collected and used). This is perhaps most easily illustrated with taxes. Taxpayers contribute to public resources by paying taxes, so they should be able to decide the level of these taxes and the manner in which the revenues are used. This does not preclude the possibility of using public resources for the benefit of non-contributors. However, it does exclude non-contributors from the demos that decides on the use of these resources.

Understood in this way, contributivism forms a contrast with the much more widely discussed all-affected principle. Both principles determine inclusion and exclusion according to the relationship between the individual and the state. However, contributivism is not by virtue of that a version of the all-affected principle (cf., Beckman, 2006; Katz, 1997). The relationship between

the individual and the state is different in the two cases, and this difference is important. Rather than being a version of the all-affected principle, contributivism is sooner its flip side. The all-affected principle requires inclusion of those who are affected by the state; contributivism requires inclusion of those who contribute (economically) to the state.

According to the all-affected principle, the scope of democratic inclusion should be determined by the *consequences* of democratic decisions. On the standard interpretation of the all-affected principle, the scope of inclusion should be determined by the consequences of actual decisions (Goodin, 2007). On alternative interpretations, it should instead be determined by the consequences of probable decisions, of possible decisions (Goodin, 2007), or of decisions that the political entity is in a position to take (Hultin Rosenberg, 2020). The relationship that justifies inclusion here is that between an individual, A, and a political entity, B, such that A is better or worse off as a consequence of what B does. The relationship that justifies inclusion on a contributivist basis is between an individual, A, and a political entity, B, such that A contributes economically to B. Here, it is the contribution to B and not the consequences of what B does that justifies inclusion. Phrased differently, the state distributes benefits and burdens. According to the all-affected principle, all those and only those who benefit from or are burdened by this distribution should be included in the demos that determines the distribution. Ideally, there will be a perfect overlap between on the one hand the group that enjoys benefits and bears burdens, and on the other the group that is included in the demos which decides on the distribution of benefits and burdens. Instead, according to contributivism, those who contribute to the goods to be distributed ought, by virtue of their contribution, to be included in the demos which decides on the distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with generating these goods. Ideally, there will be a perfect overlap between the group that contributes and the group that is included in the demos.

The problem with contributivism

Undemocratic implications of contributivist requirements for voting rights

It has been argued that contributivism – with its requirement that votes be allocated in proportion to contribution, so that those who contribute more have more votes than those who contribute less – is incompatible with *political equality* (Bauböck, 2007). Contributivist rules that allocate votes in proportion to the size of one's economic contribution are incompatible with political equality understood as something that necessitates *numerical equality*. There are historical examples of contributivist rules that allocated

votes in this way. However, contributivism does not necessarily require an unequal distribution of votes among those who are included in the demos. There are also historical examples of contributivist requirements that distributed votes equally among all who contributed over a certain threshold. The problem with such solutions is that the small difference in contribution between those who barely contribute above the threshold and those who contribute just below it does not seem to justify the difference in political power between the two groups. Irrespective of which threshold is chosen, moreover, the difference it introduces between those who are included and those who are excluded can seem arbitrary. This problem is not unique to contributivism, however: it applies to all requirements that determine inclusion based on something that is not an either/or. The all-affected principle, for example, has been argued to require a proportional distribution of influence, thereby violating the principle of political equality (see, Hultin Rosenberg, 2019). By contrast, contributivist requirements that distribute votes equally among all who comply with the legal (or moral) obligation to contribute would appear to avoid this problem. That is, they avoid the problem of 'arbitrariness,' because the difference between complying and not complying with a legal or moral obligation is not an arbitrary difference.

Contributivism has also been argued to be both *over-inclusive* – including people that reasonably should not be included (see, Bauböck, 2007; López-Guerra, 2014; López-Guerra, 2005) and *under-inclusive* – excluding people that reasonably should be included (Angell & Huseby, 2018). As we have seen in this paper, contributivist requirements can be both highly inclusive and highly exclusive. Contributivist rules that set a low threshold for inclusion would probably be more inclusive than the citizenship requirement applied in most democracies today; those that set a high threshold for inclusion would be far less inclusive. Specific contributivist requirements, then, can be portrayed as over-inclusive or as under-inclusive. Contributivism as such, however, cannot be rejected solely because of its implications in this regard.

Scholars of democratic inclusion have often suggested there is something democratically dubious about conditioning the right to vote on economic contribution (see Angell & Huseby, 2018; Bauböck, 2007; López-Guerra, 2014; López-Guerra, 2005). As López-Guerra (2005, p. 230) puts it, 'political rights should not be for sale.' This view is also reflected in international human rights law, where disenfranchisement on the basis of property is regarded as being on a par with disenfranchisement on the basis of race or sex or the like: 'No distinctions are permitted between citizens in the enjoyment of these rights on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status' (HRC, 1996, pp. 25(3)).

One way in which contributivism might be thought democratically dubious is that its requirements for voting rights may have undemocratic implications in some cases. As indicated above, this is truer for some such requirements than for others. However, the complaint that voting rights should not be for sale seems to express the intuition that contributivism has a deeper problem: namely, that conditioning the right to vote on economic contribution is democratically dubious even in cases where the implications of specific contributivist requirements or arguments are as inclusive as those of non-contributivist requirements or arguments. The democratic problems with contributivism go beyond the implications of its requirements for voting rights.

The relational requirement of contributivism and the democratic ideal of self-government

A common feature of the different *contributivist requirements* discussed in section one, and the different *contributivist arguments* for contributivist and non-contributivist requirements discussed in section two, is that they condition democratic inclusion on economic contribution. If we are to provide a comprehensive democratic critique of contributivism, we must target this connection. The thing that is wrong with contributivist requirements and arguments is that they connect democratic inclusion with economic contribution. The right to vote should not be a *quid pro quo* for economic contribution.

Contributivism is similar to other principles of democratic inclusion in that it conditions such inclusion on a particular relationship between the individual and the political entity/political community. A possible point of departure for a democratic critique of contributivism concerns the difference between the relational requirement of contributivism and the relational requirements of established principles of democratic inclusion.

One way of evaluating a principle of democratic inclusion without either focusing on its implications or going into detail about the normative underpinnings of democracy is to assess how well the principle captures the democratic ideal of self-government (see for example, Andrić, 2022). This may offer a way of addressing the question of democratic inclusion from within the framework of democratic theory (Andrić, 2022). Simply put, the idea is that what makes democracy valuable is the fact that, in a democracy, those who are governed govern. No one is solely ruler or ruled.

Both the all-affected principle (Lampert, 2015) and the all-subjected principle (Abizadeh, 2012) have been argued to capture this ideal. The relational requirements of the two principles can be said to capture two different notions of what it means to be ruled. According to the all-affected principle, those who are affected are ruled by the state, so they should be included in the demos governing the state. As Lampert contends, 'delineating the demos

according to affected interests is a required precondition for people to be able to rule themselves' (Lampert, 2015, p. 54). 'I cannot rule myself,' namely, 'if the decisions that affect my interests are determined by associations or institutions from which I am excluded' (2015, p. 54). According to the all-subjected principle, those who are subjected are ruled by the state, so they should be included in the demos governing the state. As Abizadeh argues, 'democratic self-rule means that the exercise of political power conforms to the collective will of those subjected to it' (Abizadeh, 2012, p. 878).

The all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle offer two competing but plausible interpretations of the democratic ideal of self-rule.[3] To be 'ruled' by a political entity (e.g. a state) can plausibly be taken to mean 'being affected by its decisions.' It can also plausibly be taken to mean 'being subjected to its rules and laws.' Contributivism, by contrast, seems to fit poorly with the democratic ideal of self-rule. The relationship between the political entity and the individual at the heart of contributivism is not one in which the former governs the latter; rather, it is a relationship in which the latter contributes (economically) to the former. One can contribute economically without being ruled, and one can be ruled without contributing economically. A government by those and only those who contribute economically is not a government by those who are governed. Robert Dahl (1989) argued that 'stockholder democracy' is an oxymoron, since votes are not distributed proportionally among stockholders. We can add that it is an oxymoron because it is not government by those who are governed.

Unlike the relational requirements of the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the stakeholder citizenship principle, the relational requirement of contributivism does not capture the democratic ideal of self-rule. Being affected, being subjected, or having a stake in the future well-being of the political community are all plausible interpretations of what it means to be governed. Contributing economically is not. With contributivism, some will govern without being governed, while others will be governed without governing.

Justified and unjustified restrictions

One democratic problem with making economic contribution a condition for inclusion is that it means some people will govern without being governed. It might be argued, however, that this problem can be avoided by a contributivism that requires the inclusion in the demos of those and only those who have a legal (or moral) obligation to contribute to a political entity, and who contribute what they are legally (or morally) obliged to contribute. All who have an obligation to contribute are governed, at least if this obligation is

established by law. The democratic problem with this version of contributivism is that those who fail to contribute what they are obliged to contribute will be governed without being included in the demos that governs.

Defenders of contributivism might object that there is nothing unique about this. There is never a perfect overlap between the group that is governed and the group that governs. All democracies, for example, deny children the right to vote. Most also deny the right to vote to resident non-citizens. Many deny it to convicted felons and people with intellectual disabilities. Moreover, at least some of these rules – especially where children are concerned – are usually considered democratic, and defended or taken for granted by adherents of the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the citizenship stakeholder principle alike.

In this respect, this version of contributivism is no different from other principles of democratic inclusion. All who are governed in the sense of having an obligation to contribute have a *prima facie* claim to the right to vote, while those who fail to contribute what they are obliged to contribute have at least temporarily forfeited this right. The crucial difference between this restriction and the disenfranchisement of children is that the latter rule, unlike the former, can be argued to be compatible with the democratic ideal of self-rule. The rule that disenfranchises children is justified because children cannot govern even if they are included in the demos. Children (at least young children) lack the capacities needed to benefit from having the right to vote, and so may be excluded (see for example, López-Guerra, 2014). The same cannot be said of those who fail to contribute what they are obliged to contribute.

Disenfranchising the latter group is more akin to disenfranchising convicted felons. The contributivist argument for restricting the right to vote for those who have not contributed economically what they are obliged to contribute bears similarities with some versions of the retributivist argument for criminal disenfranchisement (see, Zimmermann, 2019). The problems that contributivism faces are also similar. It is hard to justify a blanket disenfranchisement of those who fail to contribute what they are obliged to contribute, just as it is hard to justify a blanket disenfranchisement of convicted criminals. One might contend that those who fail to contribute what they are obliged to contribute are free riders on the contributions of others, and so are less deserving of the goods that others' contributions have generated. But this does not justify excluding this group from the demos that decides on the contributive and distributive schemes adopted by the political entity in question – especially not in a situation where there is disagreement on issues pertaining to what contributions should be required of members of the political community, and what the relationship should be between contribution and distribution (cf., Zimmermann, 2019). This would appear to be a type of disagreement that ideally should be resolved within

a democracy that includes all those and only those who are affected by, who are subjected to, or who have a stake in the resolutions chosen for these disagreements.

Conclusion

Economic contributivist requirements for voting rights condition the right to vote on economic contribution. Historically, there have been examples where economic contribution was a sufficient condition for enfranchising individuals who would otherwise have been excluded. However, economic contribution was mainly used as a necessary condition for excluding individuals who would otherwise have been included. Informed by these historical practices, we have distinguished between two main categories of contributivist requirements: on the one hand, requirements that condition the right to vote on the *size of the contribution*, or which distribute votes among those included in accordance with said size; on the other, requirements that condition the right to vote on *legally mandated contributions*.

These economic contributivist requirements can be based on contributivist arguments for democratic inclusion. We have distinguished between two such arguments. One, based on property rights, sees public resources as something that belongs to those who have contributed. The other is a reciprocity-based argument, according to which those and only those who contribute have a right to benefit from the contributions of others, and to decide on the distribution of goods thereby generated.

Thus, economic contributivist requirements for voting rights are an alternative to the requirements of citizenship or residency. Moreover, contributivist arguments for contributivist and non-contributivist requirements offer an alternative to other principles of democratic inclusion, such as the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the citizenship stakeholder principle.

Today, both contributivist arguments and economic requirements for voting rights are common in the context of the democratic inclusion (or lack thereof) of immigrants and emigrants. If we are to address these and other possible contributivist requirements and arguments from a democratic perspective, we must not focus solely on the implications of these requirements and arguments. In some cases, as in that of contributivist arguments for extending the right to vote to resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens, such arguments are as inclusive as those based on the all-subjected principle and the citizenship stakeholder principle. Instead, we should assess the relational requirement of contributivism and the normative underpinnings of democratic inclusion according to the relationship between the individual and the political entity/political community. This paper has laid the foundation for such a prior-principle critique, by uncovering the

normative implications of contributivism for democratic inclusion, and outlining a possible democratic critique of contributivism focused on the democratic ideal of self-government.

Notes

1. A recent empirical study also indicates unexpectedly strong popular support for connecting the right to vote to economic contribution. Support for contributivist requirements for voting rights are on a par with support for the residency requirement (Hultin Rosenberg & Wejryd, 2022).
2. Sweden and Norway were in a personal union at the time (i.e. they shared the same monarch).
3. The stakeholder citizenship principle may be said to offer yet another interpretation, according to which all those whose future well-being is linked to a particular polity are governed in the relevant sense, and so should be regarded as members of the political community with a justified claim to citizenship – and through it inclusion in the demos that governs. As Bauböck puts it: 'Individuals whose circumstances of life link their future well-being to the flourishing of a particular polity should be recognized as stakeholders in that polity with a claim to participate in collective decision-making processes that shape the shared future of this political community' (2007, p. 2422).

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for comments on an earlier version of this article from Annika Berg, Jonathan Josefsson, Anna-Sara Lind, Patricia Mindus, Julia Nordblad, ElenaPrats, Bengt Sandin, and Johan Wejryd, as well as from two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This study was supported by Vetenskapsrådet [2018-01192; 2017-00778].

Notes on contributors

Jonas Hultin Rosenberg is a researcher at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, and a visiting researcher at Centre for Multidisciplinary Research on Religion and Society (CRS), Uppsala University.

Fia Sundevall is Associate Professor of Economic History at the Department of Economic History and International Relations, Stockholm University, and a researcher at the Swedish Labour Movement's Archives and Library.

References

Abizadeh, A. (2012). On the demos and its Kin: Nationalism, democracy, and the boundary problem. *American Political Science Review*, *106*(4), 867–882. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000421

Ahlbäck, A., & Sundevall, F. (2021). Värnplikt, rösträtt och kön. Värnpliktsstrecket i debatt och praktik. [Conscription, Suffrage, and Gender. In A. Berg & M. Ericsson (Eds.), *Allmän rösträtt? Rösträttens begränsingar i Sverige efter 1921* (pp. 41–63). Makadam.

Andrić, V. (2022). The Boundary Problem and Platitudes About Democracy: A Conceptual Argument for the All Subjected Principle. In P. Bowman (Ed.), *Studies on the boundary problem in democratic theory* (pp. 47–68). Institute for Futures Studies Working Papers 2022(1-11).

Angell, K., & Huseby, R. (2017). Should irregular immigrants be (Rapidly) Enfranchised? *Political Research Quarterly*, *70*(2), 363–373. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917695188

Bauböck, R. (2007). Stakeholder citizenship and transnational political participation: A normative evaluation of external voting. *Fordham Law Review*, *75*(5), 2393–2448.

Bauböck, R. (2018a). *Democratic inclusion: Rainer bauböck in dialogue*. Manchester University Press.

Bauböck, R. (2018b). What is wrong with selling citizenship? It Corrupts Democracy! In R. Bauböck. (Ed.), *Debating transformations of national citizenship* (pp. 5). IMISCOE Research Series. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92719-0_8

Beckman, L. (2006). Citizenship and voting rights: Should resident aliens vote? *Citizenship Studies*, *10*(2), 153–165. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020600633093

Beckman, L. (2012). Is residence special? Democracy in the Age of migration and human mobility. In L. Beckman & E. Erman (Eds.), *Territories of Citizenship* (pp. 22). Palgrave Macmillan .

Bengtsson, E. (2019). The Swedish Sonderweg in Question: Democratization and inequality in comparative perspective, ca. 1750–1920. *Past & Present*, *244*(1), 123–161. https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtz010

Bengtsson, E. (2020). *Världens jämlikaste land?* The World's Most Equal Country? Arkiv förlag.

Christians, A. (2017). Buying in: Residence and citizenship by investment. *St. Louis University Law Journal*, *62*(1) , 51–72.

Christiansen, N. F. (2019). Borgerret i Danmark. En fortælling om køn, fattigdom, etnicitet og politisk træghed [Civil Law in Denmark. A story of gender, poverty, ethnicity and political inertia. In M. Hommerstad & B. A. Steine (Eds.), *Stemmerettens grenser: Fattigdom og demokratisk utestengsle 1814–1919*. Scandinavian Academic Press.

Dagger, R., & Lefkowitz, D. (2021). Political obligation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Edition, ed). Spring. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/political-obligation

Dahl, R. A. (1989). *Democracy and its Critics*. (to the reference list). Yale University Press.

Dzankic, J. (2019). *The global market for investor citizenship*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Earnest, D. C. (2008). *Old nations, new voters: Nationalism, transnationalism, and democracy in the era of global migration*. Suny Press.

Ekenstam, T. (1921 April 6). contribution to the debate. *Minutes of Swedish parliaments' second chamber*. Swedish Parliament Prints.

Ellis, A., Navarro, C., Morales, I., Gratschew, M., & Braun, N. (2007). *Voting from Abroad: The international IDEA handbook*. International Idea.

Furendal, M. (2020). *Do your bit, claim your share: Justice, ethos, and the individual duty to contribute*. [Doctoral dissertation]. Department of Political Science, Stockholm University.

Goodin, R. E. (2007). Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, *35*(1), 40–68. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00098.x

Goodin, R. E. (2016). Enfranchising all subjected, worldwide. *International Theory*, *8*(3), 365–389. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971916000105

Goss, R. (2017). Voting rights and Australian local democracy. *University of New South Wales Law Journal*, *40*(3), 1008–1034. https://doi.org/10.53637/OXFN8337

Hirschl, R., & Shachar, A. (2014). On citizenship, States, and market. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *22*(2), 231–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12034

HRC. (1996). General comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25). 12/07/96. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7.

Hultin Rosenberg, J. (2019). Equality, proportionality and the all-affected principle. *Democratic Theory*, *6*(1), 73–96. https://doi.org/10.3167/dt.2019.060105

Hultin Rosenberg, J. (2020). The all-affected principle reconsidered. *Social Theory and Practice*, *46*(4), 847–867. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2020112107

Hultin Rosenberg, J., & Wejryd, J. (2022). Attitudes toward competing voting-right requirements: Evidence from a conjoint experiment. *Electoral Studies*, *77*, 102470. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102470

Joppke, C. (2019). The instrumental turn of citizenship. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*(6), 858–878. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440484

Karlsson Sjögren, Å. (2006). *Männen, kvinnorna och rösträtten: Medborgarskap och representation 1723–1866*. Men, Women, and Suffrage: Citizenship and Representation 1723–1866. Carlsson.

Katz, R. (1997). *Democracy and elections*. Oxford University Press.

Klosko, G. (2020). Fair play, reciprocity, and natural duties of justice. *Ratio Juris*, *33*(4), 335–350. https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12297

Lampert, J. (2015). Democratic inclusion and the governance of immigration. *Social Theory and Practice*, *41*(1), 51–76. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20154113

Lister, A. (2011). Justice as fairness and reciprocity. *Analyse & Kritik*, *33*(1), 93–112. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2011-0108

López-Guerra, C. (2014). *Democracy and disenfranchisement: The morality of electoral exclusions*. Oxford University Press.

López-Guerra, C. (2005). Should expatriates vote?*. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *13*(2), 216–234. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2005.00221.x

Mellquist, E. (1974). *Rösträtt efter förtjänst? Riksdagsdebatten om den kommunala rösträtten i Sverige 1862–1900*. Suffrage Based on Merits? The Parliament Debate on Municipal Suffrage in Sweden 1862–1900. Stadshistoriska institutionen.

Mill, J. S. (1861). *Considerations on representative government* (People's ed.). Longmans.

Owen, D. (2018). Populus, demos and self-rule. In R. Bauböck (Ed.), *Democratic inclusion: Rainer bauböck in dialogue* (pp. 25). Manchester University Press.

Piketty, T. (2020). *Capital and Ideology*. Harvard University Press.

Podolefsky, R. L. (1998). Illusion of suffrage: Female voting rights and the Women's poll tax repeal movement after the nineteenth amendment. *Notre Dame Law Review*, *73*(3), 839–888.

Rubio-Marín, R. (2006). Transnational politics and the democratic nation-state: Normative challenges of expatriate voting and nationality retention of emigrants. *New York University Law Review*, *81*(1), 101–131.

Ruist, J. (2017). The fiscal impact of refugee immigration. *Nordic Economic Policy Review*, 211–233. doi:10.6027/TN2017-520

Sen, A. (1979). Equality of What. *The Tanner Lecture on Human Values*, 1.

Shachar, A. (2021). Unequal Access: Wealth as barrier and accelerator to citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*, *25*(4), 543–563. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2021.1926076

Song, S. (2016). The significance of territorial presence and the rights of immigrants. In S. Fine & L. Ypi (Eds.), *Migration in political theory: The ethics of movement and membership* (pp. 225–248). Oxford University Press.

SPCCA: Swedish Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs. (1921)

Stadlmair, J. (2018). Earning citizenship. Economic Criteria for Naturalisation in nine EU countries. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, *26*(1), 42–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2018.1437025

Sundevall, F. (2021). Ekonomi och rösträtt. Skatteskulder, konkurs och fattigvård som rösträttshinder. [Economy and suffrage. Disenfranchisement due to tax debts, bankruptcy and poor relief. In A. Berg & M. Ericsson (Eds.), *Allmän rösträtt? Rösträttens begränsingar i Sverige efter 1921* (pp.33). Makadam Förlag.

Swedish Code of Statues. (1909). *Act no 36 on parliament elections (Stockholm)*.

Swedish Code of Statutes. (1862). *Act no 13–16 on local governance (Stockholm)*.

Swedish Code of Statutes. (1866). *Act no 27 on parliamentary governance (Stockholm)*.

Waldermarson, Y., & Östberg, K. (2002). Att styra en stad. Kommunalpolitiken 1850–2002 [To Rule a City. Municipal Politics 1850–2002]. In L. Nilsson & T. Hall (Eds.), *Staden på vattnet. D* (Vol. 2, pp. 1850–2002). Stockholms stadsarkiv.

Yee-Fui, N., Coghill, K., Thornton-Smith, P., & Poblet, M. (2017). democratic representation and the property franchise in Australian Local Government. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, *6*(2), 221–236. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12217

Zimmermann, A. (2019). Criminal disenfranchisement and the concept of political wrongdoing. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, *47*(4), 378–411. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12153