Katrin Uba

Do Protests Make a Difference?

The Impact of Anti-Privatisation Mobilisation in India and Peru

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UNIVERSITET

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Abstract

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The mobilisation of protests has become more visible during the last few decades and the amount of literature focusing on the links between protest and policy has significantly increased. Nevertheless, scholars acknowledge that there is a lack of theoretical advancements, careful empirical analysis and attention to developing countries regarding these links. In this thesis I endeavor to address the above shortcomings. I elaborate on and evaluate existing theories on social movement outcomes by applying an event history analysis to my data on anti-privatisation struggles in India and Peru. The thesis consists of a comprehensive introduction and three interrelated essays.

Essay I provides a systematic description of labor movements' reactions to privatisation processes in India. I demonstrate that the Indian trade unions which were affiliated with pro-privatisation parties avoided protesting even when their party was not in the government. Of two Communist-ruled states – Kerala and West Bengal, only the first accepted the protests of the affiliated union.

Essay II discusses how the anti-privatisation struggle in India affected privatisation processes during the years 1990-2003. It focuses on mechanisms explaining the impact of a social movement's mobilisation, and on the role of protest characteristics. I demonstrate that challengers to privatisation were more successful in gaining favorable policy outcomes in those cases where they used large or economically disruptive protests.

Essay III seeks to explain the varying outcomes of anti-privatisation protests in India and Peru. I test the prevalent theory on the conditionality of the protest impact in a novel empirical setting – that of developing countries. In contrast to previous studies, my results show that the impact of protests is not necessarily dependent on public support nor on support from political allies. However, the outcomes of mobilisation depend on political regime as protests are shown to be more influential within democracies.

Keywords: social movements, trade unions, protests, privatisation, India, Peru

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To the memory of my grandfather

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II Uba, K., 2005. Political protest and policy change: the direct impacts of Indian anti-privatization mobilizations 1990-2003, *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 10(3): 383-396.

III Uba, K., 2007. Why the struggle against privatisation sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails. A comparative study on India and Peru. Working Paper. Department of Government, Uppsala University.

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Katrin Uba
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1. Introductory essay

> "Not only is [citizens' participation] supposed to keep government honest and open; participation is also supposed to produce more informed and thus "better" decisions, and in the process build greater civic capacity, trust, and legitimacy. Given the degree, to which these expectations go unfulfilled, it is small wonder that ... we still ask: Does participation make a difference?"
>
> C. J. Bosso in *Perspectives on Politics* pp.181-182, (2003)

Does participation make a difference? Sure it does! would be an easy answer, but this response leaves one wondering whether all forms of citizens' participation make a difference, as well as what factors determine the varying outcomes and which mechanisms explain the link between political actions and public policy. The aim of this thesis is to provide responses to parts of these questions by focusing on the outcomes of protest mobilisations.

In the early 1960s scholars developed an image of the "irrational protester", someone who was more interested in expressing her frustration than in achieving any explicit goal (e.g., Kornhauser 1959), but this image has evolved. Media reports on widespread and frequent protest mobilisations suggest that protests are not unconventional rare events. Studies on protest participants add that people on the streets are as rational as those in the polling-booths (e.g., Walgrave & van Aelst 2001). Obviously, these two forms of citizens' political actions differ. Elections are regular events organised by the polities, while protests can be mobilised at any time by any group. More importantly, the outcome of elections is determined by the principle of "one citizen, one vote", which is expected to guarantee the equal representation of citizens' interests. Such a rule, however, does not apply to protests or the social movements which mobilise these actions, and therefore the consequences of protest mobilisations have been a topic of heated debates since the 1970s (e.g., Gamson 1975, Lipsky 1968, Piven & Cloward 1977).

Scholars agree that citizens' mobilisation generally matters and focus on three types of questions instead: Which strategies or protest characteristics are the most effective in order for a group to achieve its goals? In which social and political environments do protests make a difference? and Which mechanisms can be used to explain the success and failure of protest mobilisation? One of

the well-acknowledged responses to these questions states that the impact of different forms of mobilisation strategies depends on the political context and the type of influence sought by these actions (Amenta, Carruthers & Zylan 1992). Empirical analysis, however, has provided inconsistent results, and has led to two kinds of criticism. First, the concept of political context is often unclear, and too little attention is paid to the mechanisms which explain how the mobilisation of protests could influence public policy (Meyer 2004, Cress & Snow 2000, McAdam & Su 2002). Secondly, the empirical studies focus on a narrow set of movements in limited political settings, which decreases the opportunities of examining the role of an array of political contexts (Burstein & Linton 2002).

These shortcomings became the starting point of this thesis. I aim at examining how the mobilisation of protests affects public policy and why decision-makers' responses to challengers' demands vary depending on the particular strategy and the environment of mobilisation. In the basic theoretical argument of the thesis, mobilisation is treated as a signal which informs policy-makers as to their prospects of re-election, but also threatens them with further insurgencies. The outcome of mobilisation could therefore be explained by two not necessarily exclusive processes, in which policy-makers choose between competing proposals of different interest groups, and respond directly to any threats of instability. As in prior research, the leverage of protest mobilisation is seen as dependent on protest characteristics and contextual factors. However, in contrast to several previous studies, I propose that the impact of disruptive actions is independent of the support of public opinion or political allies, although it is conditioned by structural contexts such as political regime.

My arguments are tested by utilising an unique database on privatisation and protests mobilised against privatisation in India and Peru during the years of 1991—2004. Data and analyses are presented in the three essays that form the body of this thesis: (1) a description of the mobilisation of anti-privatisation struggles in India and a discussion on the important role of the trade unions' affiliation with political parties; (2) an examination of the role of different protest characteristics in explaining the impact of anti-privatisation struggle in India; and (3) an analysis and comparison of the contextual factors that facilitate the impact of anti-privatisation protests in India and Peru. Results demonstrate that protests which disturb public life and cause significant economic disruption have an independent impact on policymaking even in a democratic environment.

Why privatisation?

Privatisation is a part of a broader set of liberal economic reforms that could be seen as a specific process of selling state owned enterprises, or a more general process of a state devolving its economic and financial activities to the private sector (Parker & Saal 2003). It is also seen as a hard-to-sell policy due to the

unclear long-term consequences on the society and more obvious short-term costs for vulnerable groups in a society (Megginson & Netter 2001). Yet, starting within United Kingdom in the early 1980s, the process accelerated in the 1990s, and today there are almost no countries which have not privatised part of their public sectors (Kikeri & Kolo 2004). In 2007, the process is occurring not only in China, Georgia and Turkey but also in Sweden, where the newly elected government broke a 5-years quiescence and proposed privatisation plans for six public-owned companies. Empirical studies on the consequences of privatisation have not demonstrated only the benefits of the process (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005). Research does report on a significantly improved economic performance or increased production efficacy (e.g., Chong & Lopez-de Silanes 2005), but also emphasises an increasing insecurity among workers, rising commodity prices and increased environmental risks (e.g., Hall, Lobina & de la Motte 2005). Thus, it is not surprising that privatisation has led to divergent public opinion in many countries. Public discontent and protests mobilised against privatisation processes have taken place in for example South Africa, Asia (India, South Korea), Europe (France, Greece, Romania, Hungary), Latin America (Bolivia, Peru, Mexico), and the U.S. and Canada. The main opposition have always come from labor movements which have been negatively affected by the retrenched public employment. Still, their mobilisation is also supported by environmental movements and consumer organisations. Although challengers' demands could be motivated by their ideological beliefs, self-interest or willingness to protect the public interests, these actions also signal a certain concern about the uncertain consequences or a feeling of being left out of the decision-making process.

The way different governments respond to these actions varies. Some use brutal repression or disregard the entire struggle, while others opt for the accommodation of some challengers' demands, or concede and re-nationalise an already sold enterprise. Thus, studying the reasons behind these variations allows us to better understand the developments and eventual durability of privatisation processes not only in the countries examined here, but also in a wider context.[1]

Why India and Peru?

The major part of this thesis is devoted to privatisation and protests mobilised against privatisation in India. The case selection has both empirical and theoretical reasons. First, India is one of the few developing countries where lib-

[1]There are few studies analysing the outcomes of protests mobilised against privatisation and mainly these have focused on a few empirical examples in a single country — Bolivia (Kohl 2002), Colombia (Novelli 2004), El Salvador (Almeida 2002), Mexico (Williams 2001, Murillo 2001), Japan (Hayakawa & Simard 2001) and United States (Chandler & Feuille 1991). Even the few existing comparative studies have not examined the impact of protests systematically but have focused on some specific examples instead (See e.g., Druk-Gal & Yaari 2006, Greskovits & Coreskouits 1998, Hall, Lobina & de la Motte 2005).

eral economic reforms did not coincide with the transition to a democracy or where such reforms were not initiated by an authoritarian government.[2] This has allowed me to apply theories on social movement outcomes, developed and usually examined in the context of stable democracies, without adjusting the assumptions on the important role of a political regime. Secondly, in order to study the impact of protests, some mobilisation against privatisation as well as a variation of protest outcomes are both necessary. India's historically active labor movement, and political and economic development allowed me to expect such a variation and a small pilot study undertaken before starting the project confirmed it. However, the analysis on the impact of protest mobilisations in India did not allow me to examine the robustness of the proposed theoretical arguments thoroughly. Thus, in order to study the potential effect of those contextual factors that did not vary in India, especially public opinion and the political regime, I have included another case into the analysis — Peru.

On the one hand, the political institutions, economic situation, culture and size of India and Peru are very different. On the other hand, the governments of both countries announced plans to reform their public sectors almost simultaneously (in the summer of 1991) allowing for the assumption that reforms were affected by similar global processes. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have been confronted with a remarkable amount of anti-privatisation protests, and their reactions vary based on protest strategies and their environment. Finally, the reason for choosing to focus on developing countries in the first place is related to the above-mentioned criticism over the lacking systematic studies on the outcomes of social movement mobilisation in this region.[3] As the struggle against privatisation is mobilised by the trade unions in a majority of cases, this study would also contribute to research on labor movement activism and its role in developing countries.[4]

I will return to these empirical cases in section two, but first I will introduce the theoretical framework of this thesis. The following section places protest impact into a broader context, and gives an overview of earlier research on social movement outcomes. In section two, I present a review of privatisation in India and Peru, briefly describe the mobilised protests and introduce the

[2]Privatisation in Eastern Europe and Russia occurred along with the transition from a Communist regime; in Latin America the experiences vary from authoritarian Chile and Mexico to democratising Brazil and Argentina. China is an example of a non-democracy, and South Africa initiated its privatisation program during its democratisation process.

[3]The author is aware of a few studies that have focused on the consequences of social movement mobilisation in Korea (Shin 1983), Thailand and Philippines (O'Keefe & Schumaker 1983), China (O'Brien & Li 2005), Chile (Franceschet 2004), and Brazil (Alston, Libecap & Mueller 2005).

[4]There are many excellent case studies on Indian labor movements (See review in Shah 2004) and some on Peruvian labor movements (e.g., Balbi 1997, Grompone 2005, Remy 2005). However, I am not aware of any systematic quantitative study on their mobilisation or influence on policy-making.

quantitative method used for evaluating the impact of protests. The third section presents a summary of results and points out the contribution made by this study.

1.1 Theoretical framework

1.1.1 Why is it important to study the outcome of protest mobilisation?

To understand the importance of the consequences of protest mobilisation, one has to take a broader look at the phenomenon that sociologists call "state-oriented collective action" and political scientists label "political participation".[5] The first refers to the mobilisation of collective action for achieving goals that can only be achieved via state action, or more generally, via "policy change" (Stearns & Almeida 2004). The second is generally understood as actions taken by individuals aiming to influence the composition of the government, or eventually affecting the decisions made by the government (Verba & Nie 1972).[6]

The similarity between these two approaches is striking, especially if one knows that scholars of social movements rarely cite any studies on political participation and vice versa (See also Burstein 1998, McAdam & Su 2002). Certainly scholars of political participation talk about *individual* rather than *collective* action, but the major goal of these actions is the same: to inform policy-makers on public preferences regarding some specific or more general issues.

From a normative perspective of democratic theory, one would expect that policy-makers are open to the demands voiced through these mediums, and that the final policy takes into account the interests of all, not only the interests of those who are shouting the loudest (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). Thus, knowing who participates, how well the activists represent the general public, and how policy-makers respond to participants' demands all allow us to evaluate if the state is a responsive democracy.

The issues of who participates and their representativeness are mostly discussed in the studies on individual level political participation (e.g., Verba &

[5]It is important to note that the definition of social movements varies greatly in the literature and that social movements could also have other goals than policy change (See e.g., Della Porta & Diani 2006). Narrow definitions of social movements do not include such interest groups as trade unions due to their hierarchical structure (e.g., Tarrow 1994). The broadest definitions, however, do not even distinguish political parties from grass-root movements (e.g., Burstein 1999). I use the terms "social movement", "interest group" or "advocacy coalition" interchangeably throughout this thesis, and use these terms to refer to an organisation that is mobilising people for collective action.

[6]The discussion of the "proper" definition of political participation has been as lively as the one on the definition of social movements. The curious reader could find interesting reviews in e.g., Conge (1988), Brady (1999), or Norris (2002).

Nie 1972, Barnes & Kaase 1979, Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, Norris 2002, Walgrave & van Aelst 2001), but this literature has almost entirely neglected the question of policy-makers' responsiveness to citizens' actions (Teorell 2006).

Still, knowledge about the representativeness of protest participants would be even more interesting if we could relate it to the outcomes of protest mobilisations. It is particularly important in the light of studies demonstrating that the perception of an action being influential is one of the most important factors in explaining the individuals' protest participation (Muller, Dietz & Finkel 1991, Finkel & Mueller 1998).

A partial response to the question on policy-makers' responsiveness to citizens' collective actions is, however, offered by those scholars interested in social movement outcomes. They regard mobilisation to be influential if it is responded to by policy which coincides with challengers' demands or guarantees collective goods to a movement's constituency (e.g., Giugni, McAdam & Tilly 1999, Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005).[7] Although this relates the consequences of mobilisation to the benefits of some specific groups, it should not be problematic for a responsive democracy *if* a mobilising group represents the interests and preferences of non-participants as well.

Still, while scholars of political participation have neglected the issues of the consequences of participation, the literature on social movement outcomes has not paid much attention to the representativeness of mobilising groups (Burstein 1998, Burstein & Linton 2002). The question has only been addressed recently and it is suggested that in a democratic context social movement's mobilisation would be influential only if challengers' demands are considered salient and supported by public opinion (Ibid.).

As public opinion surveys do not cover every issue raised by the numerous interest groups, the mobilisation of collective actions could be perceived by policymakers to be indicators of public opinion. Hence, by studying what kind of social movement mobilisation strategies are influential and how this depends on the environment in which they are operating, allows us to say something about the health of a representative democracy as well.

However, democratic theory would not be helpful for explaining the impact of protests which are mobilised within a restricted democracy or an authoritarian regime. Despite the high probability of repression, social movements also mobilise in non-democracies, and are sometimes even successful (See O'Brien & Li 2005, Almeida 2003). Still, even in this context knowledge of protest outcomes might inform us of the health of the political regime.

Hence, studying the consequences of collective actions in diverse countries such as India and Peru improves our understanding of the processes of how citizens' needs and preferences are translated into the public policy in differ-

[7] "Collective goods" have a very broad meaning here, referring to both material as well as less tangible benefits (See more in Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005).

ent political environments. Additionally, knowledge of effective mobilisation strategies and the context which facilitates their impact might also be valuable from the practitioners point of view.

1.1.2 Prior research on the impact of protest mobilisation

It was noted above that the field of research on protest outcomes has been popular since the 1960s and 70s and today many excellent reviews are available (e.g., Amenta, Carruthers & Zylan 1992, Andrews 2004, Burstein & Linton 2002, Giugni 1998, McAdam & Su 2002, Meyer & Minkoff 2004). Therefore, I will focus the following discussion on the theoretical aspects that have the foremost relevance for this thesis. Although many previous studies suggest that the characteristics of social movement organisation such as leadership, internal structure, and resources have an important role in explaining the mobilisation and indirectly even the impact of mobilisation, these factors are omitted because of the major interest in the impact of mobilisation per se (But see e.g., Gamson 1975, Andrews & Edwards 2004, McVeigh, Neblett & Shafiq 2006, Meyer & Minkoff 2004).[8] Thus, I start by discussing the definition of influential mobilisation and then focus on the ways by which the potential impact of protest mobilisation have been explained in prior research. It is, however, important to remember that a single protest does not constitute a social movement. The discussion here applies to the influencing attempts that are mobilised by groups which are involved in a sustained struggle rather than a single action.[9] Moreover, the following discussion applies to groups that do not raise displacement goals, that is the mobilisation is not aimed at overthrowing the existing regime. Scholars also agree that groups with radical demands would be less influential than group with more moderate claims (Giugni & Passy 1998, Gamson 1975).

The first challenge for a scholar interested in social movement outcomes is arriving at a definition of influential mobilisation (Giugni 1998). One of the oldest and still-used suggestions involves defining the impact of social movement mobilisation according to the extent of a government responsiveness to challenger's demands (Schumaker 1975). However, a movement might have many different demands and aim at influencing policy-making at its different stages. For example, Gamson (1975) suggested that the mobilisation is successful if the movement gains acceptance as a legitimate player in the policy

[8] The question will be briefly touched upon in Essay I. Moreover, acknowledging their importance I have also omitted the discussion on how the framing of the issue affects the impact of social movement's mobilisation (Cress & Snow 2000), the role of unintended outcomes (Andrews 2002*a*, McVeigh, Neblett & Shafiq 2006), the importance of symbolic concessions (Santoro 2002) and the role of participants' perceptions of success (Finkel & Mueller 1998, Opp 1989).

[9] Although interest groups tend to use the multiple strategies of actions from lobbying to demonstrations (Meyer 2004, Grossmann & Helpman 2001), my attention is on the actions that are visible to the general public and this excludes lobbying.

process or is responded by a policy that guarantees some "new [demanded] advantages" for the group's constituency. In order to distinguish between potential influences occurring at different stages of policy-making, Schumaker (1975) presented six still-used criteria of responsiveness: access, agenda, policy, output and impact responsiveness. Accordingly, the majority of recent studies focus on the policy and output responsiveness, which refer to the adaptation of a legislation or implementation of a policy that is congruent to social movement demands (See also Giugni 1998).[10] The empirical cases of this thesis follow this pattern and I examine the impact of protest mobilisation on the implementation of privatisation policy.[11]

As the majority of early studies focused on movements that aimed at gaining some specific rights, e.g. civil rights movement, Gamson's category of "new advantages" was well-applicable. However, in reaction to real-world developments of protests mobilising against the nuclear powerplants in Western Europe, Kriesi (1995:172) added a further category of "preventing new disadvantages" to the definition of successful movement. If movements aiming at new advantages could be seen as "pro-active", then groups which aim at preventing further disadvantages could be labeled "re-active" (Ibid.). The mobilisation against privatisation corresponds to the last type of movement, because their goal is to avoid potential negative consequences of the process. In sum, one could say that a movement's mobilisation has an impact on policy-making to the extent that the policy in question grants certain requested advantages or prevents certain insisted disadvantages on the part of the movement constituency. The operationalisation and the measurement of the impact of protest mobilisation is another challenge, but this will be taken up in detail in the second and third essay. Here, it suffices to note that I consider a mobilisation against privatisation influential if the government, as a result of the protest, decides to discontinue the privatisation process for at least some period of time.

The second, and even more important challenge is to explain how social movements matter (a title of an influential book by Giugni, McAdam & Tilly (1999) or when movements matter (another title of a recent book by Amenta (2006)). Disagreements over definitions in earlier studies have also affected the development of models by which the movements' potential impact is explained. This quite frequent problem in social sciences has led to a situation where reviewers repeatedly acknowledge that there is a lack of systematic analysis and little discussion on the mechanisms that explain why social

[10] It is also named as "substantial success" (Kitschelt 1986, Kriesi 1995*b*).

[11] Focusing on implementation rather than the enactment of a law allows me to neglect the recently proposed discussion on the difference of movements' impact at different stages of policy process. Especially, Soule & King (2006) demonstrated that social movement organisations matter more in the earlier rather than in the latter stages of the policy process i.e. they affect the introduction of a bill but not the final ratification of it. However, due to the lack of data they could not study how the impact of protest mobilisation varies across the different phases of policy-making.

movements would be able to affect public policy (e.g., Amenta, Carruthers & Zylan 1992, Burstein, Einwohner & Hollander 1995, Giugni, McAdam & Tilly 1999, Cress & Snow 2000, McAdam & Su 2002). However, some studies that pay attention to the question do exist, for example Andrews (2004), McAdam & Su (2002) and Amenta, Caren & Olasky (2005). I would argue that the problem is not so much related to a lack of discussion on how movements matter, but rather relates to unclear concepts and the lack of careful empirical studies that test the proposed claims.

Figure 1.1 combines the most frequently studied models of social movement outcomes, which are often labeled as direct, indirect and interaction models (See also Giugni 2004).[12] I have related these models to the mechanisms by which different scholars explain the impact of movement's mobilisation i.e. the threatening and persuasion process. The third — mediation theory — combines these processes together. The three models also present a certain historical time-line of the developments in the social movement research. While earlier studies were mainly interested in the varying impact of different mobilisation strategies such as large, peaceful or violent protests, contemporary scholars pay more attention to the environment in which the mobilisation takes place (Giugni 1998).

Direct impact

The dependent variable on the figure — "policy change" refers to the outcome of a decision which is usually made by the majority of the parliament or by the executive, and therefore the term "direct impact" might sometimes be misleading (Burstein, Einwohner & Hollander 1995). In empirical analysis, however, the direct impact is usually referred to as the strength of the relationship between measures of collective action and a policy outcome, controlling for the effect of other possible influences on the policy (Burstein 1998).[13] However, the direct model could also be related to theories of social control and the threatening process. Accordingly, the protest mobilisation threatens the stability of the polity and policymakers might concede to challengers' demands in order to control the current unrest or avoid any further insurgency (See Fording 2001, McAdam & Su 2002). Two classical studies in the field, Gamson (1975) and Piven & Cloward (1979), provide empirical support to the argument by demonstrating that disruptive or violent protests are sufficient for a social movement's success. Other authors, however, have found an opposite relationship or have shown that the impact of different mobilisation strategies

[12] Giugni actually uses a "joint model" instead of the interaction model, but the last is more usual in the jargon of empirical analysis and I use it for the sake of clarity. Moreover, it is important to note that the presented models are not exclusive, as the direct impact could well be a certain part of the interaction model.

[13] Dashed lines in the figure 1.1 signify these control-relationships. Although it is not discussed explicitly, the need for such a control is based on the assumption that dynamic and structural contexts influence the mobilisation of collective action.



Figure 1.1: Models that explain the relationship between movement actions and policy change; the t_0, t_1 and t refer to the time-sequence of events.

does not vary significantly (e.g., Colby 1982, Kelly & Snyder 1980). Although many of the early studies could be criticized because of the omitted variables, the threatening mechanism has found empirical support even in recent studies, which use "proper" control variables (e.g., McAdam & Su 2002).

These inconsistencies might be related to the incoherent definition of disruptive mobilisation strategies. Some authors define disruptiveness as extreme violence by protesters or by the police, while others label protest as disruptive when it causes some property damage or economic loss (See also McAdam & Su 2002). The definition is even broader in the framework of mediation theory, where mobilisation strategies are distinguished according to their "assertiveness" (e.g., Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005). An assertive action means the use of increasingly strong political sanctions which threaten to increase or decrease the likelihood of political actors gaining or keeping something they see as valuable or to take over their prerogatives (Ibid.:521). Still, this general definition seems to decrease the reliability of the measure and eventually complicates the analysis of strategies' impact even more. Therefore, in the following essays, I continue in the track of those studies which make a more simple distinction between mobilisation strategies (e.g., McAdam & Su 2002). In particular, the entire Essay II is focused on studying the impact of different protest characteristics such as size, duration and economic disruption.

Indirect model

Social movement mobilisation could influence policy-making also indirectly, and the major criticism towards the direct model and threatening process has been related to the theory of representative democracy. Proponents of this approach suggest that the impact of social movement mobilisation is not direct, but is instead mediated by third parties (See e.g., Giugni 2004). The last is also labeled "dynamic context" and refers to two significant players — public opinion and political allies (Tarrow 1994). The role of the public opinion is closely related to a normative perspective of democratic theories and it is argued that policymakers in a democratic context respond only to those groups and demands that are supported by the majority of citizens (Burstein 1999). Policymakers and social movements are considered to be interdependent: mobilisation is perceived by politicians to be an indicator of public opinion (votes) and challengers have to persuade decision-makers to change the policy according to their demands (See more in Burstein, Einwohner & Hollander 1995, McAdam & Su 2002). Therefore public support to challengers' demands would help a movement only if the issue was salient enough and if policy-makers perceive that it might affect the election results (Burstein 1998). However, empirical studies have provided only partial support to this part of the persuasion process, although it should be noted that relatively few scholars have studied the impact of public opinion on policy change along with protest mobilisation (Burstein & Linton 2002). This is not

surprising, as empirical data on public opinion regarding the issues raised by the numerous interest groups at the time before and after a mobilisation are not always available. Moreover, it is suggested that different mobilisation strategies might affect public opinion differently: violent or disruptive actions might led to a negative rather than a supportive opinion, while peaceful large protests might persuade public to support movement's goals (McAdam & Su 2002).

The role of public opinion is related to the theory of representative democracy, whereas the role of political allies is sometimes related to the elitist view of democracy (e.g., Giugni 2004). Proponents of this approach suggest that challengers can increase their prospects of success by persuading the members of the political elite to support them. The argument is derived from studies of social movement mobilisation and it is asserted that a certain "political opportunity structure" facilitates mobilisation and even the impact of mobilised actions (Meyer & Minkoff 2004, Kriesi 1995*b*, Kitschelt 1986). The definition of POS is disputed, but could be defined as the particular configuration of power relations within the institutional arenas (Kriesi 1995*b*).[14] Generally, POS might refer to the dynamic and to the structural contexts, but scholars usually distinguish these two as in figure 1.1 (See also Gamson & Meyer 1996).

Political allies usually are equated with politicians or a party which has the closest policy-preferences to the challengers' demands. For example, in the case of an anti-privatisation struggle these are usually left-wing parties, although even nationalist or populist parties might oppose privatisation because of their negative attitudes towards foreign investors. Interestingly, the presence of political allies as such does not guarantee the impact of a movement, but the position of political allies in respect to the government makes them helpful to the movement. Thus, mobilisation exerts an indirect impact on policy change by obtaining allies who are in the position of implementing their demands (Kriesi 1995*b*, Tarrow 1994). Similarly to the above-discussed case of public opinion, the mobilisation at time t_0 would persuade politicians to become a movement's allies or help existing allies to an influential position at time $t_0 + 1$, and then any policy change would take place at time t (See also Giugni 2004).

Empirical studies, however, have again demonstrated incoherent results and the role of influential allies is unclear for both movement mobilisation and its impact (Meyer & Minkoff 2004). Left-party governments might encourage as well as discourage the mobilisation of movements whose goals overlap with the preferences of left-wing voters (Jenkins, Jacobs & Agnone 2003). Moreover, movements ability to obtain political allies and indirectly affect policy change differs across movements and probably depends on the policy issue (Giugni 2004). Similarly to the impact of different protest strategies, the in-

[14]The concept of POS is frequently criticised for being too broad, the curious readers would find an interesting discussion on the subject in Meyer & Minkoff (2004) and Meyer (2004).

coherence of results might be related to unclear operationalisation of political allies in multi-party systems or the initial political status of the group (Ibid.).[15]

Interaction model

The need for clear definitions becomes even more important in light of mediation theory, which suggests that different mobilisation strategies are more influential in some political contexts than in others (Amenta, Carruthers & Zylan 1992, Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005, Amenta 2005). Although even studies from the 1970s suggested that there is a certain curvilinear relationship between the degrees of disruptiveness and the effectiveness of movement mobilisation (e.g., Schumaker 1978), these failed to demonstrate this relationship empirically. The major argument of mediation theory suggests that the mobilisation of collective action alone is not sufficient for a policy change. Rather, it is necessary that mobilisation takes place in a favorable political context, although more assertive mobilisation strategies could partially compensate for the unfavorableness of the environment (Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005). This refers to the probability that both threatening and persuasive mechanism could explain the impact of mobilisation within the framework of this theory, although authors do not state that explicitly. Moreover, one could differentiate between two version of mediation model as Amenta, Dunleavy & Bernstein (1994) suggest that favorable context is necessary for influential mobilisation and Soule & Olzak (2004) argue for an amplifying effect of political context.[16] Still, it all boils down to defining the more or less assertive actions and the components of the favorable and unfavorable political context. In figure 1.1 I provide a further developed version of the initial discussion of mediation theory by adding the role of public opinion.[17]

Proponents of the mediation theory combine the arguments of previous studies which emphasise the importance of both dynamic and structural context (e.g., Kriesi 1995*b*, Kitschelt 1986). A favorable context which amplifies the impact of collective action is defined through the presence of four factors: a democratic regime, a programmatic party system,[18] a polity open to the challengers' claims, and bureaucrats open to the challenger's claims (Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005). While the first two factors are necessary for the impact of any mobilisation strategy, the absence of sympathetic political allies or bureaucratic actors could be compensated by more assertive strategies (Ibid.). Amenta, Caren & Olasky's (2005) empirical example of the impact of the

[15] In the following essays, I will discuss the role of political allies from two perspective — trade unions' affiliation with political parties and the opposition to privatisation by particular members of political elite.

[16] Note that Soule & Olzak (2004) and Soule & King (2006) did not examine the impact of movement's actions but examine the effect of women's movement organizational strength.

[17] Amenta et al. (2005) include the variable for control purposes, but do not treat it as a factor that could affect the favorableness of the political context.

[18] This refers to the opposite of patronage-oriented party system, where politicians take more interest in the individualised than public benefits (See more in Amenta 2005).

pension movement in the U.S during the 1930—1950s provides strong support for the model. However, assuming that the sustained political action with the aim of unseating a representative is more threatening than occupying that representative's office, they relate assertive strategies to the electoral activities of the movement and do not discuss the conditional impact of protest mobilisation.

In contrast to the direct and indirect models, there are a few empirical analyses that employ a systematic test to the mediation theory or explicitly examine the interaction of mobilisation and contextual factors.[19] Giugni (2004) examined whether the presence of public support and political allies amplifies the impact of mobilisation by peace, ecology and anti-nuclear power movements in the U.S, Italy and Switzerland. He found that the impact of the ecology movement was intermediately and the impact of other movements only weakly strengthened by the public opinion and political allies.[20] Agnone (2007), on the other hand, studied the interaction effects of public opinion and environmental protests in the U.S. His analysis demonstrates that protest mobilisation raises the salience of the public opinion for policy-makers, and therefore protests amplify the impact of public opinion. However, both of these studies examined the impact of protest mobilisation in a democratic country with programmatic party systems. The few studies that do focus on the impact of protests in a non-democratic context or in a country with patronage oriented party system, however, have not taken into account the role of public opinion or applied only qualitative methods of analysis (e.g., Almeida & Stearns 1998, O'Keefe & Schumaker 1983, Shin 1983, O'Brien & Li 2005).

This thesis takes up both questions, and contributes to the literature on social movement outcomes by elaborating and testing the above-presented models in two different and in this theoretical context rarely studied environments.

1.2 Empirical framework

This thesis places the theoretical discussion on the processes by which the mobilisation of collective actions affects public policy into the empirical framework of struggles against privatisation in India and Peru. For that purpose, I have collected and combined two kinds of data: specifications of the privatisation process with the focus on when the respective governments started and finalised privatisation of its public sector enterprises; and details on the protest actions that were mobilised against privatisation in the respective countries

[19] Obviously, all studies examining the direct effect in one county could be regarded as a partial test of interaction model, but in order to know more about the effect of structural factors we need comparative studies.

[20] These findings, however, could be related with the misspecified model, as Giugni includes only interaction and no original variables into the model. Moreover, no other control variable that could have affected the policy-making in these countries were used in Giugni's analysis.

during the period of 1991—2004.[21] The following three essays will describe the research design and data in detail, so I use the two subsequent subsections to provide a more general picture of privatisation and the struggle against it both of the examined countries. The third subsection introduces the methodological aspects of the analysis of social movement outcomes, and provides a brief overview of the applied method — the event history analysis.

1.2.1 Privatisation in India and Peru

> "Three interrelated policies created the foundation for globalisation: deregulation of domestic economic activity [...]; liberalisation of international trade and investment; and privatisation of publicly controlled companies [...]."
>
> Manuel Castells, *The Raise of Network Society* pp. 137, (2000).

Privatisation has been promoted in developing as well as in developed countries since the 1980s, although in academia there seems to be no clear agreement on the benefits or costs this process might produce (See excellent reviews in Kikeri & Kolo 2004, Megginson & Netter 2001, Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005). Disagreements are not surprising, as the term "privatisation" is used to denote an array of different policies which do not necessarily have similar outcomes (Megginson & Netter 2001). Although in my study the process of privatisation is defined very narrowly — a transfer of state assets to the private sector — the discussion in this section looks at the process from a broader perspective. In particular, privatisation could be seen a part of the general "neoliberal package of structural adjustment programs" promoted by the World Bank (Harris 2003) or a characteristic of the retrenched welfare state (Hacker 2004).[22] More neutrally, the liberal market reforms could refer to the policies of deregulated foreign trade and labor markets, tax reforms, competitive exchange and interest rates, and the restructuring of state-owned enterprises. The structural adjustment program is often related to short-term stabilisation measures, because developing countries tend to adopt liberal reforms as

[21] A major difference between the data used in this thesis and the data employed in previous studies on the economic reforms that influenced the mobilisation of protests in developing countries is the source of information. E.g. Auvinen (1996) used a single source— *The New York Times* for collecting the information on protest mobilisation. For the purpose of this study, I used an electronic database which covers over 500 new-channels all around the world which thereby minimises the potential problems of over-represented larger events and infrequent information on events in the remote areas (See also Earl, Martin, McCarthy & Soule (2004) and the discussion in Essay I.

[22] While writing this thesis, I have tried to avoid pro- and anti-privatisation statements, but due to the specifics of the literature I might utilize the vocabulary used by the opponents more frequently.

a response to severe economic crisis (Biglaiser & Brown 2003). This was also the case in India and Peru. Although the Indian government had initiated some liberal reforms in the 1980s, the major shift was made in 1991, when the country faced increasing fiscal difficulties and problems of the balance of payments (Kohli 2006). The situation in Peru was even worse, as economic conditions had declined since the mid-1980s, and peaked with an inflation of 7649 percentage in 1990 (Torero 2003). The initiation of reforms was also related to changes in the global economy, e.g. the collapse of the Soviet market and the promotion of privatisation by international financial organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF (Ghosh Banerjee & Rondinelli 2003, Stokes 1996).

Thus, both countries began with pro-market reforms almost simultaneously (in 1991), when the Congress Party government in India announced a new economic policy and the newly elected Peruvian president, Alberto Fujimori, published his radical structural adjustment plan. However, India's reform process has been much slower and less radical than the one in Peru. For example, by 2006 India had sold 14 federal government owned public sector enterprises, while Peru privatised its first 13 enterprises by 1993 (Naib 2004, Torero 2005).[23] Still, in India reforms also took place beyond the federal level and some states, such as Andhra Pradesh, have been much more enthusiastic in restructuring their public sector than the federal government (Mishra & Kiranmai 2006). Table 1.1 brings out some of the interesting facts regarding the reforms from a comparative perspective.

While the narrow privatisation could be illustrated by the number of sold enterprises and involved financing, reforms in other sectors cannot be summarised by such "achievement" numbers. However, some changes are noticeable. For example, India's social expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined in the 1990s in comparison to its level in the 1980s, although it increased again in the beginning of 2000 (Mooij 2005). Peruvian expenditures on health, education and poverty programs as a percentage of GDP fell from 4.6 (1980s) to 2% in the early 1990s, but increased in 1996 due to the received privatisation revenues (Graham & Kane 1998). A similar decline in public funding took place in the health-care sector after Peru adopted its private-insurance promoting Health Law (in 1997) (Kim, Shakow & Bayona 1999) and India adopted the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) Bill (Sinha 2002). Again, as a result of the federal system, health-reforms in India vary across states. Some, such as Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, have clearly opted for privatisation and private-public partnerships of the public health facilities (Purohit 2001).

The third sector that is closely related to liberal economic reforms is the labor market. It is interesting to note that pre-reform labor legislations in In-

[23] To place the numbers into perspective — India had 244 and Peru 180 state owned enterprises in 1991. India also has a 40 times larger population and a 100 times larger gross domestic product than Peru. E.g. India's GDP in 2005 was 785 billion US $ versus 78 billion US $ in Peru (World Banks Data).

Table 1.1: *A few facts on privatisation in India and Peru.*

	India	Peru
Start of pro-market reforms	1991	1991
Private insurances allowed	2000	1997
Pension privatisation	-	1993
New labor-legislation	-	1991
No. of privatisation transactions, 1991-2004	110	185
Transaction values, 1991-2004 (millions USD)	13 040	6 394
Intensively reformed sector	telecom, finance electricity, industry	telecom, finance electricity, mining

Sources: World Bank Privatisation Database, Author's database

dia and Peru were considered to be the most protective and restrictive ones in their respective regions (Asia and Latin America) (Kuruvilla, Das, Kwon & Kwon 2002, Saavedra & Torero 2002). However, in India scholars have acknowledged that these protective laws are not fully functioning in reality because they apply only to the organised sector, which comprises only a minor part of the Indian labor force (Bhattacherjee 1999). The Peruvian government aimed at abolishing the existing job security in 1991, but the requirement was written into the constitution. Thus, major labor-reforms became possible only after president Fujimori made a self-coup in 1992 and the Peruvian citizens approved the new constitution with a referendum in 1993 (Saavedra & Torero 2002). Consequently, while in India the entrepreneur with more than 100 workers needs government's permission, in Peru the advance notification period for dismissal is equal to zero months (Heckman & Pages 2000). This legal environment also describes the change in public sector employment which coincided with the privatisation process. E.g. in India 15% of workers in the organised, mostly public, manufacturing sector lost their jobs and in the Peruvian public sector, employment declined by 35% between 1991- 2000 (Sharma 2006, Saavedra & Torero 2002).

Thus, it is not surprising that trade unions and workers opposed this process and I will describe this mobilisation further in the following section. First, however, it should be noted that a significant amount of research has been done which describes the cross-country variations of the timing and intensity of a privatisation process (e.g., Bortolotti & Pinotti 2006, Biglaiser & Brown 2003,

Bortolotti & Pinotti 2006, Ghosh Banerjee & Rondinelli 2003). Although the authors tend to agree that economic crisis is one of the most important triggers for reforms, there is considerable disagreement on the role of particular domestic political factors. Especially, both authoritarian and democratic governments are seen as beneficial for initiating and implementing pro-market reforms (See more in Biglaiser & Danis 2002, Banerjee & Munger 2004). Other frequently emphasised factors that increase the probability of privatisation are right-wing governments, a small number of political parties and a majoritarian election system (e.g., Bortolotti & Pinotti 2006). Interestingly, most of these analyses avoid any discussion on the probable importance of public discontent with such reforms or on the role of possible resistance from the labor movement (But see Ramamurti 2000). This is even more curious as scholars evaluating the consequences of privatisation process have noted that public opposition to pro-market reforms has increased since the mid-1990s (Chong & Lopez-de Silanes 2005). For example, 72% of Peruvian survey-respondents did not agree with the privatisation of state enterprises in 2002 (APOYO 2002).

However, the role of potential opposition from trade unions is more frequently discussed in studies that examine the privatisation process at a regional or country level (e.g., Madrid 2003, Murillo 2001, Dinc & Nandini 2005, Remmer 2002). These authors acknowledge that the data on trade union membership and industrial conflicts in developing countries is often unreliable and use a number of workers in a public sector as a proxy for labor opposition. However, previous studies on labor movement mobilisation suggest that this measure does not sufficiently describe the actual dynamics of labor unrest (See e.g., Silver 2003). Information on the mobilisation of anti-privatisation protests, on the other hand, allows for more detailed and precise analysis of unions' role in privatisation processes. Although this study does not aim at explaining the different privatisation policies in India or Peru, through its examination of the impact of citizen's anti-privatisation mobilisation it might make an indirect contribution to this field of research as well.

1.2.2 Overview of the anti-privatisation mobilisations

Mobilisation against privatisation in India and Peru dates back to the first attempts to reform the public sector. For example, in June 1991 India's police killed 12 workers, who were demonstrating against the sell-out of three local cement factories in Uttar Pradesh (Mukul 1991*a*). Workers had not been consulted during the privatisation process between May 1990-February 1991, and did not agree with the eventual retrenchment or closure of the enterprise. It is not clear whether the decision was reversed due to these protests or the fact that meanwhile a party opposing the sell-out attained power (Mukul 1991*b*), but one could suggest that without such a struggle, the cement company would have remained private. Curiously, two cement factories were closed by the

state government in 1995 and the company was re-privatised in 2002. This case clearly describes the unsteady "successfulness" of an anti-privatisation struggle, and therefore my empirical analysis has operationalised the impact of protests as a postponement rather than final stop or reversal of privatisation. Thus, in order to keep the time-order of the process, the examined protests has to take place before the government had finalised the process. Certainly, some protests were mobilised after the private company had taken over the formerly public enterprise, but at that point protesters were usually arguing against the eventual price-hikes rather than the reversal of privatisation (e.g. protests against increased electricity prices in Orissa in 1996-7).

Figure 1.2 gives a brief view of the intensity of the struggle against privatisation in both countries.[24] The fluctuation is significant in both countries, and usually workers mobilised directly after the government announced any new plans to reform a public sector enterprise. For India, peaks in the figure denote the anti-federal government mobilisation of bank-and insurance sector unions and protests against the privatisation of electricity enterprises by various state governments (e.g. Uttar Pradesh). Similarly, the two most recent peaks for Peru reflect the mobilisation against the sell-out of electricity and water companies, while the earlier ones are the campaigns mobilised by trade unions representing education and oil workers.

Table 1.2: *Anti-privatisation protest strategies in India and Peru*

Protest tactics, as % of total actions	India	Peru
Road blocking, occupying buildings	3.0	3.7
Demonstrations, marches or rallies	27.0	24.0
Strikes, slow-downs	45.5	64.8
Sit-ins (*dharna*)	8.5	-
General nation-wide protests	16.0	7.4
Total	100 %	100 %
Total number of protests	200	54

Source: Author's database, number of actions in parentheses.

The comparison of protest strategies in Table 1.2 shows that strikes are, as expected, the most typical forms of actions for the opponents of privatisation. One specific difference between protests, however, was the protest-related violence. The relatively small number of actions in Peru were more frequently responded to by violent police actions. This is partially explained by the char-

[24]The data for this figure, like the majority of the examples are based on my protest-database. Data collection is described in all of the essays, although the most detailed picture is provided in the appendixes of the Essays I and III.



Figure 1.2: Trends in the mobilisation of anti-privatisation protests in India and Peru, 1991—2004.

acter of the non-democratic regime between 1992- 2000, but also by the close relations between certain trade union activists and Marxist guerrilla groups in the early 1990s (Sanchez 2003).

The number of participants in any protest varies significantly. The average in India was around 700 000, and in Peru the average was 40 000 participants. However it is important to note that media reports on the size of the protests were often very general. The same holds for protest duration, which in general did not last very long. Only Peruvian education and health workers' unions who tied their anti-privatisation demands to the claims for higher salaries had longer strikes than other trade unions. As the Peruvian public did not perceive health-reforms as a clear threat, and as frequent strikes in hospitals were very disturbing, the general public attitude towards trade unions in public health-care was negative (Arce 2005). In other sectors, such as water and electricity, the consequences of privatisation were very visible, and protests mobilised by trade unions also involved other civil society organisations. E.g. protests against the planned privatisation of two electricity companies in southern Peru in July 2002 were mobilised by the network of local grass-root organisations, trade unions, and consumer groups (See also Ballon 2002). The actions also had significant influence on the government's policy, as President Toledo had to postpone the sell-out, and the enterprises have remained public utilities at this point in time (Hall 2005).

The alliances between civil society and labor organisations were most frequent in the case of water and electricity privatisation in India as well. On some occasions, social movements had an opportunity to use each others success. In particular, the achievements of the "Right to Information Movement" in New Delhi led to the publication of the documents related to the privatisation of the city's water utilities. This helped the mobilisation of the anti-privatisation network of trade unions and consumer organisations by allowing them to use concrete facts in their campaigns, which in the end persuaded the government to shelve the plan (See also Hall, Lobina & de la Motte 2005, Deshmukh 2006). However, cooperation between the Indian labor unions who were affiliated with competing political parties took place only in the case of very large nation-wide campaigns. The majority of the actions were mobilised by two left-wing trade unions, which on some occasions, such as in Kerala in 1999, struggled even against the pro-market policies of the Communist Party ruled state-government. Although such actions were not common in other states, it clearly shows the problems one faces when one tries to determine the political allies of such a social movement.

1.2.3 The method of analysis — why Event History Analysis?

Scholars of social movement outcomes have used many different methods for evaluating the impact of movement's mobilisation since the 1970s. In addition to excellent case studies (e.g., Piven & Cloward 1977, Almeida & Stearns 1998, Franceschet 2004), the use of quantitative methods has increased together with widespread opportunities for collecting media-based data on protest events.[25] However, earlier studies often suffered from several methodological problems. For example, many of them used social movement as an unit of analysis and took a movement's membership and mobilisation during specific time-period as an independent variables; the dependent variable was then dichotomous or continuous measure of movement's success or failure (See e.g., Gamson 1975, Frey, Dietz & Kalof 1992).[26] Although this allows one to say which kind of movements are more influential, it complicates the determination of what the policy might have been in the absence of the mobilisation (See also Klandermans & Staggenborg 2002). A similar problem would have occurred if I had examined the process of privatisation of only those public enterprises where some anti-privatisation mobilisation took place.

The latter studies, however, have solved these problems and focus on the policy-process across different geographical units and/or time-periods. As

[25] There are very few studies that successfully combine the qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis (But see Andrews 2004).

[26] It is worth noting that Gamson's analysis was based on the random sample of social movements and there are very few social movement studies that have managed to replicate this type of research-design (the closest might be Dalton, Recchia & Rohrschneider 2003).

common ordinary least square (OLS) and logit models are not suitable for analysing dynamic processes, scholars have moved towards the use of different models of time-series analysis (e.g., Santoro 2002, McAdam & Su 2002, Agnone 2007). This analysis is sometimes combined with the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (e.g., McVeigh, Neblett & Shafiq 2006, Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005), which is commonly used to analyze small-N datasets like the ones of social movement outcomes (See more in Ragin, Shulman, Weinberg & Gran 2003).[27] As the options for incorporating the time-sequence of events into the framework of QCA were developed only very recently (See Caren & Panofsky 2005), it has been common to use it in combination with time-series models.

Nevertheless, by following the recent trend I have chosen to use the method of Event History Analysis (EHA) for examining the impact of protest mobilisation on the privatisation process.[28] Although the popularity of EHA has grown among political scientists and sociologists since the early 1990s, there are only a few studies that have applied the method for examining how social movements affect public policy (e.g., Kane 2003, McCammon, Campbell, Granberg & Mowery 2001, Soule 2004, Soule & King 2006). Moreover, to my knowledge there are no studies that use EHA to evaluate of the impact of protest mobilisation. The reasons for using EHA instead usually applied time-series models are closely related to the above-discussed definition of protest impact, to the character of my empirical material and to certain virtues of EHA in comparison to other models.

The struggle against privatisation was considered to be influential if the government, as a result of protests, decided to discontinue the announced privatisation process for at least some period of time. Thus, the unit of analysis is a public sector enterprise that a government plans to privatise, and I am therefore interested in how protest mobilisation influences the duration of privatisation process of every unit. This makes the events of initiation and finalisation of privatisation as well as the timing of these events particularly important; this type of data-structure is also known as "duration data" and examined with the help of EHA (See more Alt, King & Signorino 2000). The traditional data-format used for time-series or time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis, where single or multiple entities are examined over certain periods of time (e.g., year), might suffer from aggregation problem. For example, if we had only annual accounts of protest events, and relate these to the government's

[27] Although very helpful for small-N studies interested in contextual factors, this method has difficulties in assessing the net-effect of single variables. The use of this method has also encouraged an intensive discussion on problems of probabilistic and deterministic research, clearly described in Mahoney (2003).

[28] The terminology of this type of analysis is suggestive. The "event" refers to the fact that this analysis is used for studying whether and when some interesting event takes place. The synonyms — "survival" and "duration" analysis imply that one could also apply the method to examine how long one process survives before it terminates (dies) (See also Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004).

annual expenditures, we would not be able to take into account the effect of the events that take place throughout the year. In the coding of duration data, on the other hand, the information of the precise time when the change of variables occurs could be taken into account more easily (Ibid.). Additionally, time-series analysis is the best applicable for data with continuous dependent variables, which rarely is the case for studies interested in policy-change (See more in Beck 2001).

EHA is particularly suitable for studies interested in the duration of some process, or the time until some specific event takes place (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, Blossfeld & Rohwer 2002). Here, the event of interest is the privatisation of a public sector enterprise which has been included in a privatisation program by the government of India or Peru. If privatisation is finalised, the process "dies", but if no privatisation takes place the enterprise "survives" until the end of the observation time. Protest mobilisation against privatisation could be then seen as a "treatment" which aims at prolonging the life-time of a public sector enterprise which otherwise risks "death". In contrast to OLS models, EHA allows for the study of subjects not observed for the full period until the occurrence of the event of interest i.e censored cases (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). Thus, one could examine even all of these enterprises that were not privatised for the end of observation time. This is especially important for this study, as many enterprises that the government wanted to privatise remained public at the end of observation period.

Another benefit of EHA is that it can take into account the effect of factors that change over time, so-called time-varying covariates (Blossfeld & Rohwer 2002).[29] Changing the value of a protest variable exactly at the time at which it takes place allows for examination of the effect this change has on the duration of privatisation. The same accounts for the effect of other independent variables. In sum, EHA allows us to estimate a risk or hazard of privatising an enterprise that was inserted into the privatisation program at some time t, given that it has not been privatised before.

It is worth noting that EHA is suitable for examining the daily as well as more aggregated annual data and there are different methods for analysing continuous- and discrete-time data sets (See more in Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). As data for this thesis is collected in a daily format, I chose to treat it as continuous-time data. This allowed for the simple application of a model of Cox proportional hazards for estimating the hazard rate of privatisation. While an estimation with other models demands pre-determining the distribution of hazard, the Cox model allows it to remain unspecified. This makes the model very suitable for cases where one has no theoretical expectations of duration-dependence of the studied process as such (Blossfeld &

[29] It is even suggested that because of EHA's ability to account for time-order, it is more suitable for establishing empirical evidence for theoretically grounded causal relationships than other methods (See discussion in Blossfeld & Rohwer 2002).

Rohwer 2002).[30] This is precisely the case with the privatisation processes examined in this thesis. Knowing the actual duration t of privatisation process for every unit i and the value of independent variables X, Cox model allows us to estimate the risk of privatisation of i-s enterprise $h_i(t)$:

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t)\exp(\beta' X).$$

The h_0 is an unspecified base-line hazard and β' denotes regression parameters (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). It is common to report the effect of particular individual variables in the terms of hazard ratios $\frac{h_i(t)}{h_0(t)}$, and a ratio smaller than 1 means that the respective independent variable prolongs the privatisation process. Essays II and III provide more concrete discussion on specific models and problems in relation to the use of this method. Here, one could just sum up and say that by using EHA, I was able to show that protest mobilisation prolonged the life-time of public enterprises in both studied countries.

1.3 Summary of essays — results and contributions

The three subsequent essays form the heart of this thesis. They are intended to provide a coherent theoretical approach for studying the outcomes of protest mobilisation, and to describe and examine the impact of protests mobilised against privatisation in India and Peru.

Essay I focuses on the struggle against privatisation in India and describes the differences between state and federal level developments. It introduces India's privatisation policy, which have created active discussions on its consequences among academics and politicians since the early 1990s. One argument that is frequently emphasised in these debates concerns the restrictive role of the Indian labor movement. However, there is no agreement and systematic analysis on whether unions which organise only about 2% of the labor force could actually do it.

Therefore, the first aim of this article is to provide a systematic description of labor movements' reactions to initiated reform policies by using an unique data-set that covers most of the protests mobilised against privatisation between 1991-2003. The data allows me to demonstrate an interesting pattern of declining officially registered strikes and an increasing anti-privatisation mobilisation.

Secondly, this essay discusses the reasons for apparent variation of mobilisation targeting the federal and state governments by focusing on how the alliances between political parties and trade unions affect the mobilisation of the Indian labor movement. Literature on social movement mobilisations have shown diverging results about the role of political allies, although research on

[30]This aspects makes the use of EHA also more effective than the use logit-models which are often applied to TSCS data with binary dependent variables (See more on duration dependence in Bennett 2006, Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004).

pro-market reforms in other developing countries suggest that unions would mobilise against non-allies and avoid mobilisation against their own allies. My study, however, demonstrates that the Indian trade unions which were close to the pro-privatisation parties avoided anti-privatisation protests even at the time when their party was in opposition. The pattern was more complex in relation to left-wing unions. An affiliation with the governing political party hindered the mobilisation of anti-privatisation struggles in Communist West Bengal, but not in Communist Kerala. This suggests that the role of political allies in facilitating or hindering protest mobilisation in federal countries might be more complex than previous studies suggest. However, by presenting the increasing mobilisation of anti-privatisation protests this article supports the argument that the Indian labor movements have intensively tried to affect the path of liberal reforms proposed by the government. Whether, when and how these protests succeed is the main point of departure of the two following essays.

Essay II explores the mechanisms of how social movements' activities influence public policy. It focuses on the impact of different mobilisation strategies, or more concretely, on the role of protest characteristics. By analysing how the impact of protests depends on their size, duration, and the degree of created economic disruption in India, I evaluate how well the previously proposed mechanisms of threat and persuasion explain the outcomes of protest mobilisation in a novel context — that of developing country. The study is made by applying an event history analysis to the data on India's anti-privatisation mobilisations between 1990—2003. Results demonstrate that even if protesting does not guarantee that a public sector enterprise would not be privatised, mobilisation against privatisation is sometimes responded to by concession in terms of the postponed process. This in turn provides unions with better bargaining-opportunities or allows the public to fight for more reasonable service prices. Although the implementation of a privatisation process is strongly related to economic factors, protest mobilisation has also a direct impact on this process. In particular, I show that favorable policy outcomes are more likely in cases where the movement uses large or economically disruptive protests. These mobilisation strategies are perceived by policymakers as threatening and challengers' demands are responded to by concession in order to prevent further insurgencies. Hence, the results of this analysis emphasise the importance of threatening rather than persuasive mechanisms in explaining the impact of social movement mobilisation.

Essay III develops the models of protest impact further and focuses on probable conditionality of protest outcomes. Previous essay showed that economically disruptive protests prolong privatisation process in a democratic country, where citizens disapprove the process. Thus, it provided only a limited possibility to evaluate the potential impact of dynamic and structural contexts which have been emphasised by scholars of social movement outcomes.

In this essay I especially aim at examining these factors and for that purposes include also another country — Peru. This allows me to examine by which way the potential impact of protest mobilisations depends on contextual factors such as the political regime and public opinion. Peru and India are also countries with a patronage-oriented party system, which has been shown to dampen the impact of social movements in the prior research (e.g., pension movement in the U.S). Thus, this empirical context allows me to test the robustness of theoretical models proposed in the literature in a way, which to my knowledge have not been done before.

By following and developing further the main arguments of mediation theory, the discussion focuses on three interaction models which hypothesise that a democratic regime, public support to challenger's demands and political allies amplify the impact of anti-privatisation protests. Although the method of analysis is the same with my previous study, the tested models are more complicated due to the interaction effects of protest and contextual factors. Results demonstrate that the mobilisation against privatisation is clearly more influential in a democracy rather than under a restricted democracy. However, the amplifying effect of public support to challengers' demands was more complex. It is shown that the inclusion of public opinion into the analysis does not cancel out the impact of protest mobilisations as suggested by some previous studies and argued by the proponents of democratic theory. Public opposition to privatisation decreased the risk of privatisation when it could affect the results of elections i.e. within a democratic rule, but it did not amplify nor supersede the impact of protests. This allows for an argument that collective actions and public opinion might affect policy change by different mechanisms. While public opinion gives to politicians a clear signal of their prospects of re-election, protests involve additional information on the threat to stability and the direct costs of the continuing mobilisation.

The third factor, political allies, did not facilitate the impact of anti-privatisation mobilisations, but had a strong independent prolonging influence on India's privatisation. This confirms the relationship found also by other scholars. The lacking amplifying impact could be related to specific character of Indian trade unions which are affiliated with a parties opposing as well as with a parties supporting privatisation. Indian labor movements rarely cooperate across party lines and therefore the potential positive impact of political allies on the impact of protest mobilisation might be canceled out by the rivalry of party-affiliated trade unions.

To summarize, the analysis presented in this thesis demonstrates that there has been significant mobilisation against privatisation in India and Peru during the period of 1991—2003, and this has had a clear impact on privatisation processes in those countries. Demonstrating that large or economically disruptive protests in a democratic environment have a high opportunity to halt the privatisation process, this study suggests that the impact of protests could

be explained by the threatening rather than persuasive effects of mobilisation. Although public discontent with privatisation, alliance with high positioned politicians and certain economic factors play a significant role in implementing the decisions on privatisation, these factors do not invalidate the power of anti-privatisation struggle. Endorsing the argument of mediation theory, this study also demonstrates that a democratic regime has an amplifying effect on the impact of protest mobilisation. Hence, the thesis has made two distinct contributions to the literature on social movements:

- In contrast to previous studies it applied event history analysis to data on protest mobilisation in diverge polities. This study shows that such an approach allowed for an explicit test of the role of protest characteristics and contextual factors in the policy-making process.
- This study makes up the deficiency in the knowledge on the outcomes of protests and the impact of labor mobilisation on policy-making in developing countries.

Ideas for further research

Many aspects such as the role of political allies could be studied further for improving our knowledge on the role of citizens' mobilisation in policy-making and policy implementation. It would be especially important to study how social movements affect the policy-making in the countries with different party systems. Future work might also focus on the role of public interest litigation, as people in developed as well as developing countries use these actions in combination to other forms of political participation. These analysis would benefit from combining the methods of process-tracing and in-depth case studies with further developed models of event history or time-series analysis.

Furthermore, more comparative studies based on the data on different policy-issues and movements in different countries are necessary for complementing the presented findings on the impact of disruptive protests. Reviews, e.g. Burstein and Linton (2002), have demonstrated that there are still only few comparative analysis on the impact of social movements' mobilisation on public policy. It would also be interesting to compare the estimated impact of social movement mobilisation with the impact perceived by participants in these mobilisations. This would help us to better understand the reasons why people take part in political actions such as protests.