Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies
7
Editor: Sten Hagberg

Security from below in Burkina Faso

Citizen perceptions and perspectives

By
Sten Hagberg, Ludovic O. Kibora, Sidi Barry,
Yacouba Cissao, Siaka Gnessi, Amado Kaboré,
Bintou Koné and Mariatou Zongo

Translated by Anna Harrison

UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Uppsala 2023

ISBN 978-91-506-2980-4
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-487945

Distribution: Forum for Africa Studies,
Dept. of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University,
Box 631, SE-751 26 Uppsala, Sweden

Cover photo: Sten Hagberg
Production: Graphic Services, Uppsala University
Printed in Sweden by Exakta Print, Malmö 2023

Table of Contents

Acronyms

ADF/RDA:	Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération/Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
APAD:	Association pour l'Anthropologie du Changement Social et du Développement
CCVC:	Coalition nationale de lutte contre la vie chère, la corruption, la fraude, l'impunité et pour les libertés
CDP:	Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès
CVD:	Conseil villageois de développement
ECRIS:	Enquête Collective Rapide d'identification des Conflits et des Groupes Stratégiques
FDS:	Forces de Défense et de Sécurité
FFS:	Front des Forces Sociales
MANSA:	Mande Studies Association
MPP:	Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès
MPRS :	Mouvement Patriotique pour la Sauvegarde et la Restauration
NAFA:	Nouvelle Alliance du Faso
NTD:	Nouveau Temps pour la Démocratie
PDS/Metba:	Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme/Parti des bâtisseurs
PRDF:	Parti pour la Renaissance de la Démocratie au Faso
RSP:	Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle
Sida :	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
CONASUR	Conseil national de secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation
UFC:	Union Fraternelle des Croyants
UNRB:	Union Nationale des Roughas du Burkina
UNIR/PS:	Union pour la Renaissance/Parti Sankariste
UPC:	Union pour le Progrès et le Changement
VDP :	Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie

Preface

The present study has been conducted within the framework of the research programme "Burkina Faso Seen from Below" led by the Forum for Africa Studies at Uppsala University (Sweden) and the Institut des Sciences des Sociétés (INSS) of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technologique (Burkina Faso). The programme is funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) through the Embassy of Sweden in Burkina Faso. Its aim is to describe, analyse and put into perspective how daily realities are "seen and lived" by local actors and the general public, or simply "ordinary citizens," as well as relevant social and political actors on the local level. Based on qualitative anthropological research conducted in different Burkinabe municipalities, the analyses aim to better understand the social and political challenges of major development issues and of Burkinabe society at large. Furthermore, the issues covered by these studies are at the heart of strategic questions for Swedish development cooperation in Burkina Faso. These studies also aspire to reinforce political dialogue between the Embassy of Sweden and the public authorities in Burkina Faso. Since 2017, three collective anthropological studies between have been published on Burkina Faso by Forum for Africa Studies and the INSS (Hagberg et al. 2017b, 2018, 2019b, 2021). The French version of the current study was published in 2019.

This study has the theme security from below, and covers the perceptions and perspectives of Burkinabe citizens. The ambition has been to document and make a qualitative analysis of security and safety challenges on the local level, more specifically in the selected municipalities. Two points of departure have guided this research: firstly, it is important to integrate citizens' perceptions of security and insecurity in a global analysis of security and safety challenges; secondly, security as seen from below makes it possible to conceive of military and police security as one perspective among several others.

The study has benefited from comments from several people, especially during the validation workshop in Ouagadougou on 12 December 2018. The workshop brought together around 60 participants specialised in security questions in Burkina Faso. Notably, Professor Yaouaga Félix Koné from the Institut des Sciences Humaines in Bamako acted as discussant at the workshop that was chaired by Professor Serge Théophile Balima from the Joseph Ki-Zerbo University of Ouagadougou. The participants at this workshop contributed considerably to our reflections. The preliminary conclusions also benefited from comments and

constructive criticism during different academic encounters, such as the Research Seminar in Cultural Anthropology at Uppsala University in March 2019, a symposium at Florida State University and a seminar at the Centre for African Studies at University of Florida in November 2018, the Nordic Africa Days in September 2018, organised by the Nordic Africa Institute, a round-table discussion in Copenhagen organised by the universities of Copenhagen and Roskilde in September 2018, as well as a workshop at the University of Leipzig in June 2019.

The partnership with the Embassy of Sweden in Burkina Faso has chiefly been driven by Mats Hårsmar, chargé d'affaires and head of cooperation until July 2018 and Aboudoulaye Sanou, programme officer. Other colleagues have also offered their comments and reflections individually. We would like to thank the following people: Mats Hårsmar, Yaouaga Félix Koné, Aboudoulaye Sanou, Elisabeth Sköns, Per Brandström, Rosa de Jorio, Joseph Hellweg, Susanna Hughes, Susanne Alldén, and Florence Ouédraogo.

Foreword to the English version

On 24 January 2022, a coup d'état ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré from power. After more than 36 hours of shootings and rumours, a declaration was read on the national television, *Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina* (RTB). 14 soldiers from different units of the armed forces sat in the TV-studio. Captain Sidsoré Kader Ouédraogo, pilot in the Burkinabe Air Force, read the declaration, which stated that the *Mouvement patriotique pour la Sauvegarde et la Restauration* (MPSR) – the patriotic movement for rescue and restoration – had assumed power under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba. No blood was spilt during the seizure of power, and the detainees (including President Kaboré and the Speaker of the National Assembly, Alassane Bala Sakandé) were said to be well and safe. Earlier that day, President Kaboré had been forced to resign, as stated in a handwritten letter that he had signed and addressed to the President of MPSR, and which had already been shared and circulated on social media. This first declaration of the coupists stated that the aim was to "save the Nation" from the deteriorating security situation and establish a roadmap for a return to a constitutional order. In a second declaration read immediately after the first, the President of the MPSR announced that the Constitution had been suspended and that the Government, and the National Assembly had been dissolved. It was also announced that all borders had been closed and that a curfew had been imposed. The coup d'état was a fact.

To understand the dynamics of the coup and the seizure of power, we need to contextualise the last few years of deteriorating security and safety situation in the country At the beginning of 2022, the security problems included 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and terrorism which was gaining ground all the time – which inevitably meant that many saw the military takeover as the only possibility. At the time of writing this foreword, Burkina Faso counts close to two million IDPs, that is, approximately 10 percent of the country's population.

In November 2020, President Kaboré was re-elected in the first round for a second and last five-year term. The deteriorating security was a key concern for his second term. Even though there was little enthusiasm when it came to Kaboré's re-election, his new government included his main political opponent, Zéphirin Diabré, as Ministre d'État in charge of national reconciliation and social cohesion. This was a new, special portfolio attached directly to the

President's Office. With the second term, many hoped that it would be possible for Kaboré to invest largely in addressing the insecurity across the country.

Yet, the security situation continued to deteriorate. The attack that took place in the municipality of Solhan in north-eastern Burkina Faso on the border with Niger in June 2021 was a major strike. According to official figures, 173 people, mostly civilians, were killed in an attack on the night of 4–5 June 2021. As one of the deadliest attacks that Burkina Faso had experienced, Kaboré's election promise when he was re-elected at the end of 2020 – to do everything in his power to fight insecurity and terrorism – was increasingly questioned by the public opinion. The president declared three days of national mourning, and the government was reshuffled.

On 14 November 2021, an attack took place in Inata in north-western Burkina Faso in which 53 gendarmes and four other people were killed. This marked the beginning of the end for Kaboré, when it became clear that this military camp had experienced major logistical problems – soldiers who did not receive food and who were waiting for replacement, could not defend themselves against the assailants – questions of corruption and bad governance were added to the list of the major security problems. Despite President Kaboré addressing the Nation at the end of November 2021, and then dismissing the prime minister, reshuffling the government once again, and promising to crack down on corruption, trust was "consumed," as the Burkinabe expression goes. Few if any stepped forward to defend Kaboré after the January 2022 coup, a marked difference from the coup attempt in September 2015 when the Burkinabe resisted and managed to stop the coup by General Diendéré (Hagberg 2015, 2023; Hagberg et al. 2018). The security situation, however, remains extremely serious even after the assumption of power by MPRS.

On 1 April 2022, Lieutenant Colonel Damiba, who had been appointed Transition President in February 2022, addressed the Nation. He gave the Burkinabe people the assurance of five months for him to address the security concerns, as well as strengthen the Defence and Security Forces (FDS).

Yet on 30 September 2022, a new coup d'état took place which toppled Damiba and brought Captain Ibrahim Traoré to power as the new president of MPSR. In a TV-broadcast declaration to inform the public, it was stated that Damiba seemed to be abandoning the security focus to enter into politics, and working to bring back the old order. The declaration alluded to the bringing back of Blaise Compaoré to Burkina Faso in early July 2022 as a way to promote national reconciliation. This was a serious mistake that marked the beginning of the end of Damiba's presidency.

The year 2022 has therefore been particularly dramatic for the Burkinabe: two coups d'état, continuous insecurity, community conflicts, mobilizations against the French army, pro-Russian demonstrations, etc. Prospects look rather grim when one considers the fragility of state power and of society at large. What was unthinkable a few years ago – armed groups controlling a large part

of the national territory, successive coups d'état, and the suspension of the democratic regime – is now a reality.

*

The publication of the French version of the book *Sécurité par le bas: Perceptions et perspectives citoyennes des défis de sécurité au Burkina Faso* (Hagberg et al. 2019b) in December 2019 was met with great interest. An English version was planned to be published a year later. Yet given the continuously deteriorating security situation, combined with the difficulties in pursuing research during the COVID-19 pandemic, our attention was oriented to the situation on the ground. How should we handle the changing situation? Was it better to rewrite the whole book? Should we update the study according to the current situation?

A large part of the English version is a translation of the French version published in 2019, with some important exceptions: we have rewritten the concluding chapter to integrate the more recent developments in terms of insecurity; and we have added a longer epilogue, as to reflect upon recent developments and prospects in terms of security as seen from below. Given that research on security is ongoing, we thought that it would be useful to make these reflections. Unfortunately, things have indeed deteriorated; what were seen as major security concerns for conduct of fieldwork for this study which took place in 2018–2019, turned out to pale in comparison with much more serious and wide-reaching challenges, including perhaps even a question mark on the very existence of Burkina Faso as we know it.

Despite these more recent parts, the empirical parts – that is, the observations emanating from joint ethnographic fieldwork – are still largely based on research carried out in 2018–2019. This is because the nature of the issues that we address – security as seen and experienced from below – have not fundamentally changed. While it is true that many things have gotten worse, we think that publishing the book with the above-mentioned additions, changes, and updates, is a reminder that as researchers we are not always supposed to be drawn into the "breaking news" syndrome, to comment on burning actualities, but to explore the mid- and long-term processes at work. Obviously, we have updated relevant facts, but we have tried to adhere to the original format and the main themes discussed. We thereby hope to contribute to a discussion about the processes at work that are social and cultural, rather than military and geo-political.

Special thanks to Anna Harrison, who translated the study from French into English, as well as to the many colleagues who have contributed to the ongoing reflections on how to understand security from below.

Uppsala, March 2023
Sten Hagberg and Ludovic O. Kibora

Chapter 1: Introduction

This study is about citizens' perceptions and perspectives of security in Burkina Faso. The initial ambition has been to document and make a qualitative analysis of security and safety challenges on a local level, particularly in the Burkinabe municipalities. Two points of departure have guided this research from the beginning. It is important to integrate popular perceptions about security and insecurity into a global analysis of security issues. Conventionally, security is defined by its absence or by the mechanisms ensuring that it is implemented. Hence, our first point of departure is that the perspectives and the perceptions of citizens of (in)security issues are as important as "the facts of insecurity" as defined by national and international actors. Secondly, by adopting the concept of security from below, the military and police security can be understood as one perspective among many others; security from below is a fundamental element of the (in)securities. Burkinabe citizens have first-hand experiences of the defence and security forces, especially how "men in uniform" act or do not act when faced with insecurities in the locality. In the same way, the many facets of security and insecurity that exist on a local level exceed the conventional definition of physical and military security (Buzan and Hansen 2010). The aim is also to understand Burkina Faso as a country through its different actors and institutions on a local level.

Objectives

The main objective of the study is to provide a better understanding of the realities and perspectives of local actors – the populations, the traditional and religious authorities, the municipal councillors, even "ordinary citizens" – with regards to security challenges. It entails using the municipality as a point of entry, a public space, a cultural representation, a new institution and a stake (Hagberg 2010; Hagberg et al. 2019). More specifically, through qualitative anthropological fieldwork in the selected municipalities the study aims to:

1. Describe the sources of existing or perceived security;
2. Describe the mechanisms of security services – existing and/or perceived – through public authorities and non-governmental players, including traditional and religious institutions and actors;

3. Analyse the capacities, the potentials and the constraints of these institutions and actors to confront the challenges of security and peace; and
4. To identify the possibilities, locally relevant, to reinforce the citizens' contributions to security and peace.

Methodological approach

The study is based on qualitative anthropological short-term fieldwork, building upon a methodological approach that has been developed in previous studies (Hagberg et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2018). It falls within the category of collective fieldwork methods, such as the ones used in the Rapid Collective Inquiry for the Identification of Conflicts and Strategic Groups (ECRIS) and other field methods that have been developed in the network of the Association for the Anthropology of Social Change and Development, APAD (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997; Olivier de Sardan 2008; see also Hagberg 2021). This type of research aims to combine individual and collective fieldwork alongside ethnographic expertise with case studies. The research teams are composed of senior and junior researchers.

In this approach, qualitative fieldwork is complemented by intensive workshop sessions between the members of the team, during which the interviews and observations are discussed and validated through a process of review and comparison. The methodological innovation of the research that we run with the teams in Burkina Faso and Mali have been described in several publications (Hagberg 2011a, 2018, 2021; Hagberg and Körling 2014). Thus, the methodological approach is rooted in the strong qualitative methods and techniques of fieldwork but is adapted to be relevant for societal needs and development challenges. This methodology requires the combination of long-term empirical research and targeted research over a short period. This is why the fieldwork is conducted in "well-known" research sites and in new, "unknown," sites simultaneously. This combination of old and new field sites for the researchers involved is an integral part of the methodology.

During the study of citizens' perceptions and perspectives of security and safety challenges in Burkina Faso, we formed a team of eight members who worked in 13 municipalities. This has involved covering the different security challenges and the numerous insecurities faced by the citizens of Burkina Faso. In total, fieldwork was conducted in the following municipalities: Barsalogho; Bittou; Bobo-Dioulasso (District 2); Djibasso; Djibo; Doro; Kaya; Ouahigouya; Saaba; Samorogouan; Sidéradougou; Tenkodogo; and Tiébélé. The selection was made on the basis of the security and safety challenges of each municipality, the geographic distributions and the familiarity of the field sites. The selection is therefore representative of the national security situation, without the need to cover all the regions or all the localities exposed to insecurities (Hagberg et al. 2017a; Hagberg 2021).

Another innovation concerns the publication of the research results. This methodological approach helps to develop a strategy for intermediate publishing in-between the conventional scientific publication *à froid* in academic journals, often years after the fieldwork was conducted, on the one hand, and the quick publications of articles and blogs *à chaud*, at the time of events, on the other. This intermediate publication bridges the involvement in the heat of the moment (*à chaud*, hot) and the scientific analysis at a later date (*à froid*, cold). We call this intermediate strategy a lukewarm approach *à tiède* (Hagberg 2021).

The fieldwork is based on conventional anthropological methods, particularly semi-structured and informal interviews, participant observation, focus groups and case studies. It mostly took place in March, June, and July 2018, with two weeks spent in each municipality, and was complemented by additional fieldwork in early 2019. It was executed by a research team composed of experienced field workers (junior researchers with master diplomas or PhDs) working together with and under supervision of two senior researchers. Apart from leading the field research on sites familiar to them, the latter were in charge of supervising the research in the 13 municipalities. They also took responsibility for coordinating the summary of field reports produced by the junior researchers. The result of this is a truly collective effort to document and analyse security from below in Burkina Faso.[1]

An interview guide has been developed in regard to the local perceptions and definitions of the concepts of security, safety, and tranquility. The guide has facilitated the identification of key issues of the insecurities, according to our interlocutors, and has reinforced the comparative dimension of the study.

Before the fieldwork was conducted, the members of the research team took part in a workshop where they were trained to make the approach operational. Such a workshop is a fundamental part of our approach (Hagberg 2021). During the fieldwork, the researchers who worked in the same region met at times, especially when a senior researcher had been following up the work in the field. A one-day workshop was conducted mid-term to present the results from the first municipalities and to evaluate the progress of the research. After the fieldwork, a weeklong workshop reunited the whole team to work on the different field reports, as well as the interviews and the observations, to thereafter discuss possible conclusions. But before that, field reports had been drafted in order to systematise the empiric material on which to construct the analysis. Finally, the preliminary report of the study was presented during a workshop in

1 From 2013 onwards, we have increasingly used collective field research, in particular in the framework *Party politics, socio-political opposition and grassroots democracy in West African Municipalities* (Swedish Research Council/Sida Swedish Research Links). With the popular insurrection in October 2014, this methodological approach has resulted in numerous conjoint publications (Hagberg et al. 2015, 2017b, 2018, 2019b, 2021).

Ouagadougou in December 2018[2] where the results were presented to different national and international stakeholders (Lefaso.net 13/12/2018).

The scope of the study

This study looks into how citizens perceive and experience security challenges in the municipalities in Burkina Faso. In a context of multiple insecurities – armed attacks, terrorism, organised crime, delinquencies, exactions, police brutality, poverty, droughts, etc. – as well as the new security initiatives (the National Security Forum, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, self-defence groups etc.), the objective is to understand the realities and the perspectives "seen and lived" by local socio-political actors and ordinary citizens.[3]

The field research has used the municipality as the point of entry since local issues and security challenges often concern the municipal representatives and the local officials. In this study, the municipality is conceptualised as a socio-political arena, a public space and a cultural representation (Hagberg 2010: 14; Hagberg et al. 2019).

The security and safety challenges are most often gendered, since girls and boys, women and men, experience and perceive them differently. The inclusion of a gender analysis is therefore indispensable, particularly because the security sector is typically associated with the male gender. The deconstruction of masculinities and femininities in terms of security therefore becomes important for our analysis (cf. Coulter 2009; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; Eriksson Baaz and Vermeijen 2013; Hagberg et al. 2021). To be more precise, a number of actors have asserted that "security is the business of men!" Yet, these remarks must be contextualised and understood as normative points of view rather than being accepted at face value. As a matter of fact, this study, like similar research on the matter, is interested in the construction of masculinities and femininities as a way of understanding these types of comments.

---

2 A preliminary version of the report received sharp comments during the validation workshop in Ouagadougou on 12 December 2018. The workshop had gathered around 60 participants specialised in security questions in Burkina Faso. Notably, Yaouaga Félix Koné, from the Institut des Sciences Humaines in Bamako, acted as discussant and his remarks considerably enriched the finalisation of this study. On 10 November 2020, a book launching (of the French version), followed by a public debate was organized in Bobo-Dioulasso, gathering around 60 participants, including staff and students from the Nazi Boni University..

3 The concept "ordinary citizens" aims at capturing the perspectives of people living in municipalities far away from the official spheres of decision-making. The concept has nevertheless important limits, in particular when it comes to its possible depoliticisation (Carrel and Neveu 2014), giving the impression that "ordinary citizens" are outside of the "dirt" of politics. At the same time, it is necessary to shed light on viewpoints and perspectives of people situated far away from decision-making authorities and power-holders. For a discussion on methodological populism vis-à-vis ideological populism, see Olivier de Sardan (2008) and Hagberg et al. (2017b).

Ethnicity is increasingly exploited in the Sahel, in terms of an "Us"-and-"Them" mentality. For example, the conflict in the centre of Mali is rooted in tensions between the "Bambaras" and "Fulbe"[4], by associating the Fulbe with "jihadists" and the Bambaras with "the state of Mali" (Hagberg et al. 2017a: 58; Benjaminsen and Ba 2018, 2021; Hagberg et al. 2023b forthcoming). Likewise, the incidents in Yirgou in the Barsalogho municipality on the night of 31 December 2018 that officially caused 47 deaths, adhere to an ethnic instrumentalisation of terrorist attacks and counter attacks by self-defence groups. This was a terrorist attack that caused the death of six persons, one of whom was a Moaaga village chief, a fact that was provoking retaliation by the Koglweogos who belong to the Moaaga community. In response, the Koglweogos went after the Fulbe, who are accused of being involved with the jihadists.[5]

To complete the more general description of security perceptions, we have developed specific case studies to explore certain themes, such as community mobilisation and the exploitation of ethnicity (for example: farmers-herders), self-defence groups and the rule of law (for example: Koglweogos, Dozos, etc.), land and governance of natural resources, "gendered" insecurities and community initiatives.

In every municipality, the researchers have also documented specific experienced incidents (for example: attacks, hostage-taking, terrorism, thefts, political violence) as a kind of local micro-history.

Organisation of the study

After this general introduction, Chapter 2 addresses security issues and socio-political transformations in Burkina Faso. The aim is to give a historical overview of multiple security crises followed by conceptual remarks about human security, in order to achieve working definitions of security and insecurity. Chapter 3 on the municipality as a point of entry is a synthetic description of 13 municipalities where the research took place in order to provide a general understanding of the security challenges that citizens are faced with. This is also a way

4 In this study we use the term Fulbe (in both singular and plural) to include people included in the French category "Peul(s)" or the English-Hausa term "Fulani."

5 First, a terrorist attack killed six people, one of which was a traditional Moaaga village leader, in the village of Yirgou. This attack was followed by retaliation by the Koglweogos, who belong to the Moaaga community. The Koglweogos attacked the Fulbe who are accused of being involved with the jihadists. The Yirgou massacre in the municipality of Barsalogho caused strong reactions from the citizens with marches in Ouagadougou and in Dori with placards such as: "Justice for Yirgou", "The right to live for everybody in Faso", "Don't touch our coexistence", "No to communal violence" or "Several communities, one Faso." The number of deaths was also disputed. In the beginning of February 2019, the *Collectif contre l'Impunité et la Stigmatisation des communautés* documented 210 dead, that is four times the figure of 49 dead put forward by the government several weeks before (VOA 4/2/2019). Justice was carried out, although much later, with the arrest of the responsible Koglweogos in July 2019.

of illustrating the great variability of the situations. The subsequent chapters involve the presentation and the analysis of the results of the fieldwork. Chapter 4 focuses on insecurities from the past and elsewhere, that is, the tendencies of actors to see the insecurities as coming from elsewhere, such as the crisis in Mali, cross-border criminality, drugs, etc. Chapter 5 addresses popular perceptions of the state, including the defence and security forces, the judiciary and education. Chapter 6 focuses on self-defence groups, especially how the movements of Dozos, Koglweogos and Ruggas challenge the state's monopoly of legitimate violence. Chapter 7 analyses the daily initiatives of citizens to ensure their own security, such as family education, the fight against radicalisation as well as the mobilisation of women. How insecurities are experienced is described in Chapter 8, in particular questions relating to food security, unemployment and job opportunities as well as permanent fear. This chapter also analyses how the terrorist is depicted locally. Chapter 9 seeks to make a cross-cutting analysis of how the local political arena has been recomposed as a result of the multiple insecurities. Municipal councils, local leaders and civil society are all affected by the attacks. The perceptions of the migrant and the stranger are also analysed here. The study concludes with a summary of the major points, culminating in a general reflection on how security from below could be mobilised against the multiple insecurities to which the Burkinabe citizens are exposed.

Chapter 2: Security issues and socio-political transformations in Burkina Faso

In this chapter, we first give an overview of the security challenges, in particular with regard to the country's post-colonial history. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the colonial period was in itself marked by general insecurities for the population, with widespread abuse such as forced labour, and a regime of arbitrary and violent governances. The colonial state was founded on violence and domination (Mbembe 2001). Thereafter, we describe the multiple security crises that Burkina Faso has faced these last years. Finally, the chapter embarks upon a discussion on the concepts of security and insecurity in order to achieve working definitions that are rooted in our body of empirical research, all the while maintaining an analytical capacity.

Historical overview

Since the country's independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has known a turbulent socio-political life with a succession of constitutional regimes and states of emergencies. The security problems have mainly been related to regime change, often in the context of violence and harassment of political opponents by the current leaders (Harsch 2017; McFarland and Rupley 1998). This form of targeted insecurity has resulted in a multitude of victims in terms of dead, injured and exiled persons. From the 1990s, a rise in criminality has been observed, characterised by armed robberies on major roads as well as in cities and in the countryside (Bayala 2011; Hagberg 2004; Hagberg and Ouattara 2010). The relative absence of the state in certain parts of the country combined with dysfunctional security systems, are seen as causes for increased insecurity in the form of robberies and other armed attacks, in addition to political violence. This decade in particular has been marked by a multitude of violent crimes, in which powerholders of the top of the State have been involved. The most significant of these being the assassinations of Dabo Boukary (May 1990), the leader of the Burkinabe student association (*Association National des Étudiants du Burkina*), the former leaders of the Sankarist revolution (1983–1987), Henri Zongo and Jean-Baptiste Lingani (September 1989), and of the investigative journalist Norbert Zongo (December 1998). And the assassination of President Thomas Sankara and 12 of his companions on 15 October 1987 in the army camp Conseil de l'Entente in central Ouagadougou, where today a Thomas Sankara Memorial has been built.

The popular insurrection of 30 and 31 October 2014 that put an end to 27 years of rule by President Blaise Compaoré, with the ambition to create a "new Burkina Faso", created a socio-political context where security issues were taken to another level. In the immediate moments after the fall of the regime, the streets, marked by the absence of security forces to maintain order and discipline, became the de facto authority (Hagberg et al. 2015; Chouli 2015; Engels 2015; Frère and Engelbert 2015; Kibora et al. 2017). At the end of the insurrection, the insurgents almost went to get the military to come and re-establish order "because the power was in the street" (Hagberg et al. 2015: 210). Since then, the construction of the new Burkinabe democracy found itself confronted with increasingly aggravated security challenges.

The question of national security arises on different levels: sub-regional, terrorism, internal public security and military security. From the political transition in November 2014-December 2015 that led to the election of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, the security challenges have increased considerably. The re-election of Kaboré in November 2020 was done without enthusiasm, because many were so disappointment that finally very little of past governance practices had changed. And, yet, voters put the hope in Kaboré's promise to set the security question as the top priority of his second and last term. On 24 January 2022, President Kaboré was ousted from power in a coup d'état led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba. According to the coupists, the main reason was the deteriorating security situation that even threatened the existence of Burkina Faso.

But let us return to the popular insurrection in 2014. On 30 December 2014, when members of the Presidential Security Regiment (*Régiment de sécurité présidentielle*, RSP) threatened the Council of Ministers due to compensation claims, the precariousness of the interior security was acknowledged for the first time. On 4 February 2015, the transitional Prime Minister lieutenant-colonel and Ex-No 2 of the RSP[6], Yacouba Isaac Zida, had to seek refuge with Moogho Naaba, the Emperor of Moosé, as a result of a second revolt by "his brothers in arms", the RSP. A third attempt to destabilise the government was carried out in June 2015 and a fourth on 16 September 2015, that is, the coup d'état led by General Diendéré. Yet popular resistance disabled this September coup (Hagberg 2015). Although these security upheavals were attributed to the collapse of the RSP, ex-RSP soldiers attempted to take the powder keg of Yimdi, to the west of the capital, during the newly elected president's oath-taking ceremony in January 2016. This highlighted the fragility of the national security situation. (Hagberg et al. 2017b).

If this September 2015 coup d'état failed due to popular mobilisation, this same population became confronted with a new form of insecurity. In the midst of the transitional period, on 4 April 2015, the kidnapping of a European national took place for the first time on Burkinabe territory. On 23 August 2015, in

6 Hierarchically he was in fact placed just after General Gilbert Diendéré, the Chief of Staff of RSP directly attached to the presidency.

Oursi in the north, a brigade of gendarmes was attacked. Another attack by an armed group of terrorists took place in Samorogouan on 9 October 2015. The height of this new security problem was reached with the terrorist attack on 15 January 2016 that took place in the centre of Ouagadougou at the Hotel Splendid and at the restaurant Cappuccino on Avenue Kwame N'Krumah (Kibora 2019). This attack claimed 30 lives, with more than 14 different nationalities among the dead. At the same time, the kidnapping of an Australian couple, a doctor and his wife having lived in Djibo (in the Soum province) since the 1970s, took place. This new form of insecurity spreading across the national territory is today the main concern for development and democracy in Burkina Faso.

Multiple security crises

At the beginning of the 21st century, the security question circled around the upsurge of armed attacks on public roads as well as in private homes. The rural environment was affected by this form of insecurity as farmers and shopkeepers were regularly stripped of their goods. The eastern region was known for being inundated with insecurity due to the existing borders with Niger, Togo and Benin, which made cross-border criminality easier. The landscape and vegetation (small hills and large zones of forests), the faulty road network and the difficulty for the defence and security forces to cover this vast territory also facilitated criminal activity. This form of insecurity has today been changed with the setting up of terrorist groups in this zone. The meticulous planning of these almost daily actions raises many questions. The Kwame N'Krumah Avenue was hit again a second time in August 2017 by a terrorist attack. The Chief of the Defence Staff as well as the Embassy of France in the centre of Ouagadougou were attacked in the middle of the day on 2 March 2018. Reviewing the situation, the Prime Minister at the time, Paul Kaba Thiéba, acknowledged in a speech held at the National Assembly on 17 September 2018 that the security situation had considerably worsened. After listing the large amount of civilian and military victims of different terrorist attacks, he declared:

> This year, 2018, besides the attack on 2 March in Ouagadougou, the attacks have moved beyond the region of the Sahel to hit the south-west and especially the east of our country. Beside the menaces already known in other regions of the country, we note attempts to establish Groupes Armées Terroristes (GAT) [Armed Terrorist Groups] in the east. In view of the different events that have been recorded in this region, all this leads us to believe that terrorist groups try to establish themselves in the eastern region. This resurgence of activity by Groupes Armés Terroristes is coupled with a change of their operational procedures, which demands adaption [on our part]. (Netafrique 17/9/2018)

This official picture of the situation shows at which point the security question took another dimension. The attacks in border zones and the dismantling of a terrorist group in the outer suburbs of the city of Ouagadougou (Jeune Afrique

22/5/2018) puts the country in a "war-like situation" with the consequences of an economic downturn, incidents of psychosis and the presence of permanent risk, everywhere and at all times. The terrorist groups appear increasingly determined, with strong connections being established through a mix of "jihadism" and organised crime. Then Burkinabe Prime Minister at the time, Paul Kaba Thiéba, declared:

> The north of the country remains a zone of major concern in spite of a relative calm on the security scene. The activities of the armed groups take the form of subversive sermons, intimidations of the population, attacks on FDS posts and targeted actions like kidnappings and assassinations. The zone stays under the influence of Ansarul Islam, especially in the Soum Province and of groups of bandits (for example the Boly brothers,…) and traffickers. In this zone one has noted a strong connection between the group around Ansarul Islam and certain groups based in Mali, like le Front de Libération du Macina (FLM), the group 3A (Al Mansour Ag Alkassam), l'Etat Islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) and the Groupe de Soutien à Islam et aux Musulmans (GSIM). (Netafrique 17/9/2018)

It is in this security context that the G5 Sahel Joint Force was born. It has as an objective to set up a permanent army consisting of soldiers from the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Tchad), in order to fight against the terrorist groups that plague the Sahel Belt. According to certain sources, the attack on 2 March 2018 that hit the Chief of Defence Staff targeted a reunion of military leaders who were discussing this very question.

Even though the recurrence of terrorist attacks is at the centre of the problem with armed security, different kinds of physical aggression are also omnipresent. The difficulty of the defence and security forces to cover the whole national territory has encouraged the growth of self-defence groups, Koglweogos, in many rural zones as well as in the suburban areas of the capital. Apart from fighting against delinquency and criminality, these groups have been noted for their unorthodox methods that violate the fundamental rights of the alleged offender (Kibora et al. 2016, 2018; Hagberg 2019b). Furthermore, the Koglweogos were at the heart of violent confrontations with the populations in certain neighbourhoods and villages who were appalled by their methods (e.g., Tialgo in the province of Sanguié in the central-west region, Tiébélé in Nahouri in the central-south region, in 2017, Tanghuin district in Ouagadougou in 2018, Yirgou in the Sanmatenge province in the central-north region in January 2019, etc.) or with other self-defence groups like the Dozos in Karangasso-Vigué in the west (Hagberg et al. 2017b; Lefaso.net 15/9/2018). The traditional leaders of Western Burkina Faso rejected their establishment in this region where the traditional Dozo hunters are much more prevalent (Hagberg 2018, 2019b). The confrontations in Karangasso-Vigué were linked with the Koglweogos wanting to establish themselves in this community, despite these warnings. The ethnicization of the stance between the pro- and anti-Koglweogo is an obvious security issue.

Burkina Faso is undergoing an intense security crisis. This is happening at the same time as the people who took part in the popular insurrection 30–31 October 2014 for a change of regime are expressing high social expectations of good governance. The old regime is therefore omnipresent in the statements from our interlocutors.

Anthropological perspectives on human security

This study has as a methodological approach to document and analyse security and insecurity as seen and lived "from below", that is, how citizens or ordinary people who live in the Burkinabe municipalities perceive and experience the security challenges on a daily basis. However, such an approach is quickly confronted with a number of problems of conceptualisation. How should one define a security from below? What are the issues? Can one talk about ordinary citizens without falling into ideological populism?

Conventionally, the concept of security concerns technical systems and monitoring practices; it also refers to purely military actions (Buzan and Hansen 2010). Security of an entity is considered either individually or collectively, as an objective, as a right, as a value, as a state of what is secure, as a function or activity that aims to secure that entity. The concept is also often linked to that of safety which concerns protection against power or violence, danger or crime; safety should be every human being's guarantee against the arbitrary. But security is also linked to discourse and protection activities regarding the civil population. International human rights are founded on the principle of protection of the civil population, that is, civilians who do not take part in fighting must not, under any circumstances, be attacked, and they should be saved and protected" (CICR 17/2/2001).

Anthropologists have increasingly taken an interest in the questions of security (Breda et al. 2013; Eriksen et al. 2010; Goldstein 2010; Kibora et al. 2017, Hagberg 2018; Hagberg et al. 2017a; Maguire et al. 2014). At first glance, an anthropological approach to security stresses the discourse and the practices. Goldstein suggests a critical anthropology of security, arguing that security "calls on the power of fear to fill the ruptures that the crises and contradictions of neoliberalism have engendered and so functions as a principal tool of state formation and governmentality in the world today" (Goldstein 2010: 487). In this way, security is a concept characterised by an opacity contrary to public debate; the defence and security forces operate without the citizens knowing exactly what they are doing.

The concept of security has this peculiarity of being defined by its absence (the lack of security) or by the systems and actions mobilised for its maintenance. Security becomes an issue once insecurity is established. But the concept has known an interesting evolution the last 25 years (Buzan and Hansen 2010). The human security is a concept launched in the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994:

> The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been more to nation-states than to people. (UNDP 1994: 22)

Human security has four essential characteristics: first, it is a universal concern; secondly, its components are interdependent; thirdly, prevention is better than cure; and fourthly, human security is based on individuals (UNDP 1994: 22–23). The concept of human security has taken two directions: one concerns the responsibility to protect the individual (contra the state); the other emphasises the relations between the different types of security and the special importance of development as a security strategy.

> It is desirable to combine the two approaches – the 'absence of fear' (human rights) and the 'absence of need' (human development) – to simultaneously emphasise the security for individuals and the interdependent character of the security components (Kaldor 2006: 904)

In the edited volume *A World of Insecurity* (Eriksen et al. 2010), anthropologists stress that academic discussions and practices on human security are often incomplete or biased. Salman suggests as an example that the concept of human security "is helpful only when it is acknowledged that both security and insecurity come in many different shapes and forms, and that people's perceptions, appraisals and responses are as crucial as 'the facts' of insecurity" (Salman 2010: 25). For Eriksen, security exposes classical themes in social science, namely the conditions of social integration and the human consequences of social disintegration. The concept "insecure sociality" encompasses the conditions of integration and disintegration today. "Insecure sociality is, to a much greater extent, characterised by improvisation and negotiations over situational definitions" (Eriksen 2010: 11). In another anthropological work on security, Maguire et al. (2014) stress the importance of studying the (in)securitisation processes: "Rather than seeing security growing naturally, we see discourses and practices through which it becomes naturalised in various ethnographic contexts" (Maguire et al. 2014: 2).

In this study we propose to account for situations of uncertain sociality where improvisations and negotiations are prevalent as well as (in)securitisation processes, in order to understand the conditions and opportunities of a security from below.

> In contexts where the state seems incapable of safeguarding the security of ordinary people living in villages and neighbourhoods, we need to seriously and systematically analyse security from below in its different shapes and forms rather than merely applying standardised solutions irrespective of the context in which they are meant to have an effect. (Hagberg 2018: 22).

To do this, our methodological approach consists of seriously taking into account the points of view and reflections of citizens living in the Burkinabe municipalities. Our ambition to document the (in)securities "seen and lived" by the ordinary Burkinabe citizens forms the empirical framework of this study. However, concepts like "from below", "people", and "popular" require a conceptual clarification. The idea to shed light on experiences, perspectives and perceptions of ordinary citizens is methodological; it is not a question of classical ideological populism (cf. Hagberg et al. 2017b). Carrel and Neveu remind us of that nothing is "ordinary" in itself. The ordinary "can be a tool to include in the analysis what does not generally have access to visibility, whether for politics or for the researchers" (Carrel and Neveu 2014: 24, our translation). In other words, the distinction between the "ordinary" citizens and the "extraordinary" ones must be contextualised, since the simple reference to the ordinary could be a form of de-politicisation, hence the renewed interest for understanding what constitutes the ordinary citizens in the modern world. In combination with the concepts "people" and "popular" deeply rooted in the Burkinabe political culture (Hagberg et al. 2018: 15) the references to ordinary citizens should be taken with a lot of precaution.

Working definitions

Our approach is firmly ethnographic, considering that the analysis is reliant on the (in)securities seen and lived by the citizens in the Burkinabe communities. To begin with, we worked on the concepts of security and insecurity, rooting them in particular ethnographic contexts. It was a question of documenting "the discourses and practices" of our interlocutors. Drawing inspiration from the study on security from below in two Malian communities by Hagberg et al. (2017a), we have expanded the security concept to include the notion of "tranquillity" in the sense of living a normal life. From a multitude of forms and expressions of security and insecurity – or (in)securitisation processes (Maguire et al. 2014) – we have tried to account for security and insecurity situations in the studied communities. We have asked our interlocutors to describe the characteristics of security and insecurity to make the used concepts more concrete. This requires making a distinction between the official statements of public authorities and those of the ordinary citizens.

Our interlocutors used a wide range of expressions and words to describe the French terms *sécurité* and *insécurité*. For many Burkinabe, even among those who do not speak French, the word *sikirite* comes back very often in the statements. One interlocutor said after a terrorist attack in the municipality of Sidéradougou in March 2018: *sikirite tey* ('there is no security' in Jula). Others use the terms of their own languages. For example, in the municipality of Samorogouan the different translations of the term security are as follows: *kutura* (protect, look after) in Samogo; *koglgo* (protection) in Mooré; *lakana* (protection), *lacolochili* (looking after oneself), *yèrècolochi* (pay attention to oneself), *hakilisigi*

(peace) in Jula; and *renigo* (protection) in Fulfuldé. For the interlocutors from Samorogouan who experienced the terrorist attacks in October 2015, protection and surveillance come back in the interviews. Security "is what protects us, so that nothing happens to us, the *faaman*[7] for example."

> Tranquillity is this peace inside. I'm not safe, the attacks that have been committed have made us understand that no one is spared. We thought it was something from faraway. Someone who has experienced the attack cannot say that he is safe.

In the peri-urban municipality of Saaba, outside Ouagadougou, the terms used in Mooré to describe security are: *gnor koglgo, goudoum, koglgo* and *goussoum minga*. The terms *goudoum* and *koglgo* translate as protection; *goussoum minga* refers to self-protection. The most used term in Saaba is *gnar koglgo* ('protection of life').

In the area of Djibo, which is since a long time back the nerve centre of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, the concept of security (*ndê naagou* in Fulfuldé) translates as human or physical security; in the statements collected in this zone, security refers to calm, peace, comfort and the absence of problems.

All the people we spoke to talked about security and insecurity at the same time. "We call for Security [the defence and security forces] because we have a problem with security [insecurity]." Or else, the Dozo hunters, who put a lot of effort into security, talk about protection: *ka yoro korosi* in Jula. Throughout the conversations with the interlocutors from 13 Burkinabe municipalities we have tried to describe the references made to (in)securities in the specific contexts and the specific situations. Our reference to "(in)securities" aims to translate the ambiguities of security and insecurity. One speaks about security because there is insecurity.

It is through ethnographic fieldwork in the different municipalities that we have worked out the precise topics, in particular how citizens perceive and experience the multiple (in)securities in Burkina Faso. We have also developed case studies so that concrete examples can enlighten us on the security challenges, as seen and lived from below.

Beyond these working definitions it is important to remember that security concerns "the conditions of social integration and the human consequences of social disintegration" (Eriksen 2010: 11). Terrorist attacks and road robberies do certainly have human consequences of social disintegration. It is these conditions and their consequences that interest our research. The study of security from below translates this ambition to understand how the citizens see, perceive, experience and interpret the security challenges in Burkina Faso.

---

7 The term *faama* (*faaman*, pl.) in Jula can mean "the government" but also "the men in uniform", "the men in power", e.g. the military and the police.

Conclusion

Before going into the ethnographic description, we wanted to start this chapter with a historical overview of security issues and the socio-political transformations in Burkina Faso. Thereafter, we have undertaken a conceptualisation of security and insecurity on the basis of perspectives and expressions used by our interlocutors. We have also discussed anthropological studies on security that demonstrate the importance of keeping analytical distance when it comes to the concept of security. The idea to work on the uncertain sociality or otherwise the process of (in)securitisation will allow us to account for situations of security and insecurity in the studied municipalities.

Chapter 3: The municipality as point of entry

Our point of entry into security from below has been through the municipality as a local public authority and as a unit of analysis. As part of the decentralisation process in Burkina Faso, the municipal councils were elected in democratic elections. The first elections took place in the urban municipalities in 1995. In 2006, the first nationwide municipal elections took place. The following elections were organised in December 2012 and in May 2016. The municipal council is a new, local institution in which the mayor is elected by the residents of the municipality. Essentially, the municipality represents simultaneously a socio-political arena, a public space and a cultural representation (Hagberg 2010: 14, 2019a).

The anthropological fieldwork was conducted in 13 Burkinabe municipalities. The selection of municipalities in which to conduct field research was made on the basis of forms and manifestations of insecurity. Municipalities that had been exposed to terrorist attacks were studied alongside municipalities that had rather experienced delinquency, criminality and other forms of insecurity. Despite the fact that the study was conducted in as many as 13 municipalities, this is a qualitative study that aims to understand the contexts and situations of insecurities and how they are perceived by our interlocutors. The ambition was to cover different issues while safeguarding the comparative dimension; "to enter through the municipality" to security from below makes it possible to analyse local powers and challenges without neglecting the points of view of ordinary citizens. To use the municipality as a point of entry is an approach developed by our research team during the last decade (Hagberg 2010; Hagberg et al. 2019a) as a way to analyse how local democracy is practiced on a municipal level.

> In effect, it is in the municipalities that the plans for development are implemented and it is the place where public policies take shape in the daily life of the citizens. It is in the municipalities that the realisation of infrastructures and the implementation of development actions are made concrete. It is in the municipalities that the form and substance of democracy meet. (Hagberg 2019a: 9, our translation)

In the following section, we present, in brief, all the 13 municipalities in which the field research was conducted.[8]

[8] The field research was conducted individually or in teams as follows: Barsalogho (Amado Kaboré); Bittou (Yacouba Cissao); Bobo-Dioulasso, Arrondisement 2

Municipality of Kaya (Sanmatenga Province, Centre-Nord Region)

The Kaya municipality is situated approximately 100 km north-east of Ouagadougou. The city of Kaya is the capital of the municipality, the province and the region. Kaya is an ancient Moaaga kingdom, founded in the 15th Century. In 2006, the total population of the Kaya municipality was 117,122 inhabitants (RGPH 2008) and, in 2019, it was 207,740 inhabitants (RGPH 2022). The municipality of Kaya is mainly inhabited by the Moosé[9] and the Fulbe. Here one also finds the communities Bissa, Dagara, Bella, Marka, Samo, Nunuma, Marense, Hausa, Yoruba etc. Islam is the biggest, of which half the population are followers.

(Siaka Gnessi); Djibasso (Siaka Gnessi and Bintou Koné); Djibo (Sidi Barry); Dori (Sidi Barry); Kaya (Amado Kaboré); Ouahigouya (Maritou Zongo); Saaba (Maritou Zongo); Samorogouan (Bintou Koné); Sidéradougou (Sten Hagberg); Tenkodogo (Yacouba Cissao) and Tiébélé (Ludivic Ouhonyioué Kibora). In addition, the coordinators of the study, Sten Hagberg and Ludovic Kibora, carried out field visits in all the municipalities covered by this study.

9 In the scholarly writings, the term Moosé is increasingly used today, and less so the term Mossi. In Burkinabe French, however, the term Mossi is often used.

The MPP won the municipal elections on 22 May 2016 in the Kaya municipality with 104 seats and occupies since then the posts of mayor and the first and second deputy mayors. Other main political parties present were the CDP with 16, UPC with 10, UNIR/PS with 13, UDS with 11 and NAFA with 8 councillors. Among the 162 councillors, there were 22 women (approx. 14%): MPP (18); UNIR/PS (2); CDP (1) and UDS (1). On the municipal board one woman occupied the post as first deputy mayor.

The villages of the municipality have often been exposed to insecurity in terms of armed attacks, livestock theft and different aggressions. Currently, Kaya is often seen as being "the door to the Sahel", in particular with the repeated terrorist attacks in the Sahel Region (including the provinces of Séno, Soum, and Yagha), and in the neighbouring municipalities. These kinds of insecurities have also encouraged the creation of the Koglweogos, a self-defence movement that enjoys a certain popularity but which are also an object of distrust.

Municipality of Barsalogho (Sanmantenga Province, Centre-Nord Region)

Barsalogho is a rural municipality approximately 75 km from Kaya. The population stood at 78,919 inhabitants in 2006 (RGPH 2008). In 2019, there were 98,553 inhabitants (RGPH 2022), but Kaya is a large receiver of Internally Displaced Persons from the Sahel region.

The population is to the majority composed of Moosé, with a minority of Marka, Fulbe, Songhai and Fulse. Islam and animism are the dominant religious beliefs, although a minority of Catholics and Protestants are also present. Barsalogho is a town in the heart of Moaaga country where the traditional socio-political organisation of is hierarchical (cf. Beucher 2017; Izard 1985). The traditional chieftainship is strong in the municipality, in spite of the existence of public administration.

After the election in 2016, the municipal council of Barsalogho was composed of 151 councillors. The mayor of the municipality represented the MPP which had 78 councillors, followed by ADF/RDA (66), CDP (5) and finally UPC (2). MPP was the party in power, whereas ADF/RDA constituted the main force of political opposition. Among the 151 councillors, there were six women, around 5%; five were from MPP and one from ADF/RDA. None of them occuped any responsible position on the municipal board.

Barsalogho has one police station and one gendarmerie brigade. These two services have a staff capacity of around a dozen. Hence, the zone of intervention exceeds in size their material, technical and human capacity; the police and the gendarmerie also cover the Pensa, Dablo and Nanmissigma municipalities. With the increasing of insecurity, nowadays there is a military camp in Barsalogho, which was attacked on 10 July 2022.

The municipality has for a long time been notorious for robberies in residential homes and armed attacks on the main roads. To deal with the insecurity, 23

local security committees have been installed, but they have never really worked. So, since 2015 other security actors, namely the Koglweogos, have gradually installed themselves. Likewise, dissatisfied with the methods of the Koglweogos, Fulbe herders have created associations called Ruga that have gradually developed into a self-defence group due to the disagreement with the Koglweogos. The first terrorist attacks in the municipality of Barsalogho, caused the burning down of a school and a market in two different villages. The village of Yirgou is also situated in this municipality. This is where the massacre of the Fulbe took place following the assassination of the village chief and five others of his family in January 2019.

Municipality of Dori (Séno Province, Sahel Region)

The town of Dori is the principal town of the municipality, of the province, and of the region. It is also the capital of the emirate of Liptaako (Irvin 1981). It forms a strategic crossroads in the region, situated at the junction of four important main roads, which have given the town historical significance through the trade of salt, fish and kola nuts. Dori is linked with the capital Ouagadougou 265 km away by the National Road no 3. The town of Dori is 260 km from the Nigerien capital Niamey and 200 km from the town of Djibo. In 2006, the municipality of Dori had a total population of 106,808 inhabitants (RGPH 2008), and in 2019, it had 180,559 inhabitants (RGPH 2022). Islam is the dominant religion and is practiced by more than 90% of the population.

The municipal council was led by the PDS/Metba (104 councillors), MPP (51), CDP (5) and UPC (12). The municipal elections in May 2016 reinforced the anchoring of PDS/Metba of the late Arba Diallo (his son was elected mayor). The party took 104 councillor seats (Barry and Hagberg 2019).

Only five women had seats in the municipal council, that is 3% of the municipal councillors. The PDS/Metba counted four elected against one woman for the MPP. This weak proportion of women elected within the municipal council was an obstacle for the participation and inclusion of women in community development actions.

Since the country's first terrorist attack in 2015, which involved the kidnapping of a Romanian in Tamboao, the region has been declared a red zone, that is to say a zone that is dangerous and to where visits should be avoided.

Municipality of Djibo (Soum Province, Sahel Region)

In the Fulbe society in Soum that occupies the territory called Djelgôdji[10], social order is regulated by three actors, which are the chief of the canton, the village chief and the chief of the lineage (cf. Riesman 1974). Djibo is the main town of the province which includes the following municipalities, some of which have had their share of violent terrorist attacks: Arbinda, Baraboulé, Diguel, Kelbo, Koutougou, Nassoumbou, Pobé Mengao, Tongomael and Djibo. A major part of the province is inaccessible, especially during the rainy season and certain villages become unreachable. In 2006, the municipality of Djibo had a population of 60,052 inhabitants (RGPH 2006). In 2019, the population of the municipality was 83,211 (RGPH 2022). The population is composed of Fulbe, followed by Moosé, Songhai, Hausa, Dogon, Fulse and Bella.

Within the municipal council of Djibo, the CDP is in the lead with 39 councillors, followed by MPP (25) and PDS/Metba (1) and finally ADF/RDA (1). The deputy mayor comes from CDP; he is the younger brother of the emir of Djibo[11]. Only five women have a seat in the municipal council, i.e. 8% of the municipal councillors; the CDP has three female councillors versus two for the MPP. This weak proportion of elected women makes it difficult for women to participate in municipal governance.

The neighbouring municipalities of Djibo are constantly targets of violent terrorist attacks. The town itself has seen a kidnapping of a doctor of Australian origin and his wife in January 2016 and a violent terrorist attack against the gendarmerie of the town in 2018. The preacher Malam Dicko lived in Djibo and preached there at a local radio station before creating a jihadist group called Ansarul Islam, which continues to be very active in the zone in spite of the probable disappearance of its founding father.

Municipality of Ouahigouya (Yatenga Province, Nord Region)

The Province of Yatenga takes its name from an ancient Moaaga kingdom with Ouahigouya as capital of the kingdom as well as main town of the municipality, the province and the region. Ouahigouya is situated 180 km from Ouagadougou on the National Road no 2. In 2006, the population of Ouahigouya municipality was 125,030 inhabitants (RGPH 2008). In 2019, the population was 199,436

10 The territory covers the departments of Diguel, Baraboulé, Djibo, Tongomayel and Nassoumbou.

11 The classical work by Paul Riesman (1974, 1977) is a reference about the social and political organisation of the emirate of Djibo. However, the current challenges are quite different to those of the 1970s.

inhabitants (RGPH 2022). The population consists mainly of Moosé with a large population of Fulbe and Silmimoose.

Following the elections on 22 May 2016, the municipal council was composed of 113 councillors whereof 82 were from the MPP and 31 from ADF/RDA. Of the 82 councillors from MPP, 28 were women and of the 31 councillors from ADF/RDA, three were women. In total, there were 31 women (27%) in the municipal council of Ouahigouya. On the municipal board, only one woman held a position as a first deputy mayor.

In terms of security, Ouahigouya is declared a red zone in the wake of different terrorist attacks in the Sahel and the north in general (the attack on the town of Kain at the border with Mali, Sollé, Koumbri). Cases of theft of two or three wheeled vehicles and cases of armed robbery are recurrent, especially in the suburban districts of the town.

Our research in Ouahigouya targeted interlocutors of different origin from the province (Oula, Koumbri, Dénéan, Séguénéga, Titao, Rambo, Ouindigui and Bogoya) in order to provide testimonies from the whole of this province that has experienced repeated attacks in nearby municipalities.

Municipality of Djibasso (Kossi Province, Boucle du Mouhoun Region)

The municipality of Djibasso is bordered in the north and the south-west by Mali. It is situated 65 km from Nouna, the principal provincial town. In 2006, the municipality had a population of 52,157 inhabitants (RGPH 2008). In 2019, the population was 63,283 (RGPH 2022).

The population is composed of, primarily, the Bwa, thereafter come the Marka, Bolon, Fulbe and Moosé. The municipality harbours also some ethnic minorities like the Dogon and Samo who are found also in neighbouring Mali. Several different religious confessions cohabit in the municipality of Djibasso. These are traditional religions (commonly called "animism" in Burkinabe French), Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam (Degorce, Kibora and Langewiesche 2019).

The municipal council was composed of 99 councillors of which 68 come from the MPP, 21 from NAFA and 10 from the UPC. Women were poorly represented with six councillors from the MPP and one from NAFA, i.e. seven in all, making it 7%. Only one of them, the representative of NAFA, held a position on the municipality board as commissioner of general affairs.

Djibasso has one police station and a gendarmerie brigade occupies its present headquarters since 2003. As for the customs office in Djibasso, they were installed there some thirty years ago.

Situated ca 15 km from Mali, Djibasso is a large commercial centre that enables transactions between Burkina Faso and Mali. The closeness to Mali also has an impact on the security of the municipality. Djibasso had its first terrorist attacks the night of 31 August 2017, when a customs official lost his life.

Municipality of Saaba (Kadiogo Province, Centre Region)

The rural municipality of Saaba is composed of villages that have always played specific and important roles around the traditional Moosé king, the Mogho Naaba of Ouagadougou. Saaba lies 15 km east of Ouagadougou. The municipality has 23 villages but nowadays Saaba is a suburb of Ouagadougou, with urban management zoning bordered with unplanned, "informal" areas (Hagberg 2001). The middle class, working mostly in Ouagadougou, occupies the modern housing close to the poor housing of the unplanned areas. The municipality that once was renowned for its traditional market, much frequented by the inhabitants of the capital at weekends, now houses one of the most prestigious private universities in the country. The municipality had 50,885 inhabitants in 2006 (RGPH/INSD 2006). In 2019, the population was 285,235 people (RGPH 2022).

The municipal council of Saaba was composed of 54 seats: the MPP (30), CDP (21), UPC (2) and NTD (1). There were six women out of a total of 54 councillors (11%); five councillors were from the MPP and one was from the CDP. The municipal board was led by the MPP with the participation of one woman only, who had the position of second deputy mayor.

The municipality of Saaba finds itself today in a precarious security situation due to the rapid and uncontrolled migration of populations and the situation of a better-off middle class living practically next door to precarious habitations. In Saaba, insecurity was prevalent long before terrorist attacks. In that respect, robberies, armed attacks, burglaries and serial murders brought the populations to manifest in the streets of the municipality several times. The Saaba municipality has been "No 1" in the news these last five years because of particularly violent criminality, which was brought to its peak with the serial killings of women.

Municipality of Tenkodogo (Bouglou Province, Centre-Est Region)

The municipality of Tenkodogo lies 185 km from Ouagadougou and is close to Togo and Ghana. This municipality is part of Bissa country or Bissako and houses the seat of one of the principal Moaaga kingdoms (Dima), namely the kingdom of Tenkogodo, which historically was built on a part of the current territory of the Boulgou province in the 15th century (Faure 1996; Guebré and Zouré 2009). The population of the municipality was 124,985 inhabitants according to the latest population census (RGPH 2008). In 2019, it had 159,105 inhabitants (RGPH 2022). The municipality is populated mainly by the Bissa, the Moosé, the Fulbe, the Zaossé and the Yana.

The municipal council had 202 councillors of which 116 came from the MPP, 58 from UPC, 26 from CDP, 1 from NTD and 1 from PRDF. Of these 202 councillors, 37 were women (18%) of which 29 belonged to the MPP, 5 to UPC,

2 to CDP and 1 to NTD. On the municipal board there was only one female councillor (of the MPP), and she occupied the position as second deputy mayor. The mayor of the municipality came from the MPP, the party with a majority in the municipal council.

The geographical position of Tenkodogo, in particular its proximity to Togo and Ghana, whose borders are 105 km and 80 km away respectively, makes it a major venue for the economic exchanges of Burkina Faso with these two countries. The National Road No 16 is much used for the transportation of goods to or from the maritime ports of Lomé and Tema. Tenkodogo is also a zone of high emigration to countries like Italy, Libya, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. The local economy is highly impacted by currency remittances from the migrants or by their investments.

The town houses a military camp, two gendarmerie brigades, a camp for the Compagnie républicaine de sécurité and one police station. These facilities do not prevent the frequent cases of insecurity, especially in the surrounding rural villages and communities. The principal problems in terms of security can be summarised as thievery using different methods and recurrent tensions on rural territories. (Cissao 2018).

Municipality of Bittou (Boulgou Province, Centre-Est region)

The Bittou municipality is bounded in its southern part by Ghana and Togo. In 2006, its population stood at 72,053 inhabitants (RGPH 2006). In 2019, Bittou had 71,184 inhabitants (RGPH 2022). The population is mainly composed of Bissa, Fulbe and Moosé. There is also a minority of other ethnicities of foreign origin like the Mina (Togo), the Zangouessé (Nigeria), the Fafarsé (Ghana) and the Zarma (Niger). Like other municipalities in the province of Boulgou, Bittou is a municipality of high international migration. Livestock farming is one of the principal activities of the populations in the municipality, which has a state delimited pastoral zone.

The municipal council of Bittou is composed of 65 councillors of which 32 are from the UPC, 25 from MPP and 8 from CDP. Of the 65 councillors there are only two women (3%) of which one is from the MPP and the other from CDP. There is no woman among the members of the municipal board. The mayor of the municipality is from the UPC, thus from the political opposition on a national level.

The position of the border town Bittou – situated ca 15 km from the border with Ghana and ca 30 km from the border with Togo – puts it at the heart of the insecurity questions. In terms of formal security systems, one may note the presence of one gendarmerie brigade, one national police station and one municipal police station. Increasing insecurity and criminality in Bittou have however inspired the creation of the Koglweogos. Trans-border criminality in general and livestock theft in particular are the principle local concerns for insecurity.

Municipality of Tiébélé (Nahouri Province, Centre-Sud Region)

The rural municipality of Tiébélé is situated approximately 30 km south-east of Pô. It is accessible on the National Road No 25, which links Pô with Guelwongo, a town on the border with Ghana. Tiébélé is 10–15 km from the border with Ghana through several entries with neither police nor customs control. In 2006, the population was 54,985 inhabitants (RGPH 2008). In 2019, the population was 61,007 (RGPH 2022). It is mainly composed of Kasena but also of Moosé, Fulbe and Nankana.

Tiébélé had 135 municipal councillors divided between four political parties: the UPC (67 councillors), MPP (52), the CDP (10) and ADF/RDA (6). The UPC mayor, whose mandate was shortened by the military transition in November 2014, was re-elected during the municipal elections in 2016. After the elections in May 2016, 12 women were members of the municipal council (9%): the UPC (7), MPP (4) and CDP (1). Only one woman held a significant position on the municipal board as commissioner of general affairs.

Tiébélé is a tourist site of international reputation that has been marked by insecurity, especially robberies on the main roads and in residential homes. In 2014, the Credit Union beside the central market experienced a violent robbery in the middle of the day. The police office has been closed since urban riots flared up across Burkina Faso in 2011 (Hilgers and Loada 2013; Chouli 2012) and the gendarmerie brigade has barely a dozen men and suffers from dilapidated logistics to cover all these villages of the municipality. For the inhabitants it is easier and safer to go to neighbouring Ghana than to the principal cities of Burkina Faso, including the main town of the province just 30 km away.

Municipality of Sidéradougou (Comoé Province, Cascades Region)

The rural municipality of Sidéradougou is situated on the unpaved road between Banfora and Gaoua. In 2006, its population was 75,397 inhabitants (RGPH 2008). In 2019, the population counted 137,743 people (RGPH 2022). This population is composed of Jula, Tiefo, Dogosse, Karaboro, Fulbe and Moose. The municipality is very large with weak road infrastructure.

The municipal council was composed of 96 councillors divided into three political parties: the MPP (69), CDP (18) and NAFA (9). The mayor was from the MPP. There was only one woman elected (1%) in Sidéradougou and she was from the MPP.

A state delimited pastoral zone has been established in the area. There are also large forest reserves (Hagberg 2000). Small scale gold mining has been developed since ca 15 years back with panning operations going on pretty much everywhere (Hagberg 2000, 2006; Lanzano 2018). Criminality is often mentioned as a major issue. Sidéradougou experienced two attacks in 2018: one

where two forestry agents were shot dead by bandits, the other where the gendarmerie was attacked and temporarily occupied with no victims in October 2018.

District 2, Bobo-Dioulasso (Houet Province, Hauts-Bassins Region)

The law 0066-2009/AN of 22 December 2009 concerning the division of the urban arrondissements with a special status in Burkina Faso, separated the districts Dafra, Konsa and Do from the City of Bobo-Dioulasso and divided them into seven districts. District No 2 includes sectors 10, 11, 23 and 30 of the city, as well as the villages Dafinso, Doufiguisso, Kimidougou, Moukoma, Panamasso and Santidougou[12]. The population of the District was 191,254 inhabitants (RGPH 2022).

Following the municipal elections in May 2016, the mayor of District No 2, for a long time run by the CDP majority, passed into the hands of the MPP. There were 30 elected councillors in the municipality whose new configuration had an absolute majority of MPP councillors, in power with 16 seats, followed by CDP (9) and ADF/RDA (3). The UPC and NAFA were represented in the municipal council with one councillor each. There were six women (20%) out of 30 councillors. Of these female councillors, three had positions on the municipal board and come from two different political parties, namely the MPP and the UPC; the CDP had no woman among its members. Likewise, no woman had been elected deputy mayor. The municipal council was composed of four commissions, whereof three were presided by women. The central secretariat of the town hall was under the responsibility of a female civil servant.

The insecurities experienced in Bobo resemble those in other big towns. The use of narcotics and other drugs continues to be a problem. The free circulation of these dangerous products, the corruption and weak law enforcement are serious concerns. Numerous insecurity situations in the town such as assassinations, armed robberies and rapes involve young drug users.

Municipality of Samorogouan (Kénedougou Province, Hauts-Bassins Region)

The municipality of Samorogouan is situated in the extreme west of the country, near Mali. Samorogouan is the main town of the municipality. In 2006, the population was 35,015 (RGPH 2008). In 2019, the municipality had 45,428 inhabitants (RGPH 2022).

The first-comers of Samorogouan are the Samogo (currently in minority), the Senufo and the Bolon. Here live also Moosé, Gurunsi, Samo, Fulbe, Dafing,

12 District no 2 corresponds partly to the district of Do, according to the old division. In 2006, the District of Do had a population of 169,338 (RGPH 2008).

Bobo and Dagara. In the municipality, two branches of Islam are practiced: most practice so-called moderate Islam, others are "Sunni", Wahabis from the Salafist branch (cf. Dégorce, Kibora and Langewiesche 2019).

The municipal council of Samorogouan has 33 councillors. The majority are from the MPP (18), CDP (7), NTD (5) and UPC (3). There are four elected women (12%) in the municipal council: two female councillors from the MPP and one from the NTD.

The Samorogouan area became a state delimited pastoral zone in 1975, due to a national policy that promoted the creation of pastoral zones. A big part of the municipality's land (more than three quarters) is situated in the pastoral zone. Yet, Samorogouan is really an agricultural zone. Land is the main cause of insecurities. Nevertheless, it was the terrorist attack in October 2015 that raised awareness about the security situation.

Conclusion

This brief description of the 13 studied municipalities has demonstrated the variations and complexities of the multiple insecurities the Burkinabe are faced with. Beyond the dramatic terrorist attacks in the heart of Ouagadougou in January 2016, August 2017 and March 2018, it is important to remember that most of the security challenges experienced on a daily basis in the municipalities are more or less the same as in the whole country. It is for this reason we have tried to work in municipalities that are situated within a certain geographic, political and/or economic margin. However, at the time of finishing the English version of this study (August 2022), almost all 13 municipalities where fieldwork was carried out in 2018 have been directly affected by terrorist attacks, at least occasionally. In addition, today they are located in the "red zone," that is, a category commonly used by diplomats to geographically delimit as "dangerous" and "inaccessible" (Hagberg 2019). The number of Internally Displaced Persons in Burkina Faso amounts to almost two million people.[13]

A final remark concerns the democratic representation of the municipal councils. In February 2022, the MPRS junta dissolved all Burkinabe municipal councils. The subsequent Transition Regime led by Lieutenant-colonel Damiba has since then designed special delegations (*délégations spéciales*), that is, acting municipal councils composed of appointed members, often with more technocratic than political profiles, to run the municipalities. Most importantly, the elected mayor has been replaced by the president of special delegation.

[13] In September 2022, the two most affected Burkinabe regions (the Sahel and the Centre-North) counted as much as 1.9 million Internally Displaced Persons (Reliefweb 14/9/2022).

Chapter 4: Insecurities from the past, insecurities from elsewhere

Our research on insecurities concerns fundamentally the human condition. On an analytical level, the main difficulty lies in the interpretation of our interlocutors' perceptions, worries, discussions and stereotypes. It is for this reason that this chapter focuses on the tendency of the citizens to view the insecurities as coming from elsewhere, from the Other or from the past. The aim is above all to contextualise the statements made by our interlocutors, namely the way they describe the insecurities which they face. Throughout the field research, we have observed comments that point to the role played by the old regime and the crisis in Mali, as well as cross-border criminality. Gold panning is also viewed as a source of insecurity, since it is an activity that attracts people from different horizons. Perceptions about alcohol and drugs are also analysed. Finally, the problem with road insecurity is addressed.

The old regime

For our interlocutors, the insecurity situation that Burkina Faso is currently is experiencing, with attacks taking multiple shapes and forms in different parts of the country, is considered a new phenomenon. For many, insecurity started with the fall of Blaise Compaoré's regime. The multitude of different kinds of attacks and the installation of state approved armed groups on national territory show that "nothing will ever be as before"[14] on Burkina Faso's security map. According to public opinion, many are quick to hold the fallen regime accountable for the current situation. This is due to the fact that under the old regime, the country was spared from terrorist attacks. Ouagadougou was a "haven of peace" where numerous political opponents from African countries sought refuge. For this reason, Burkina Faso was also viewed as being complicit in numerous armed conflicts in the sub-region (Kibora et al. 2016, 2018; Hagberg et al. 2018).

Blaise Compaoré acted as a mediator during many socio-political crises in the neighbouring countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Togo…) and his regime took an active part in the liberation of numerous hostages kidnapped in the northern region of Mali.

Certain affiliates of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré do not hesitate to accuse Compaoré's affiliates of remotely operating the terrorist acts that alleged-

14 The slogan of change used after the fall of the old regime (Hagberg et al. 2015).

ly correspond with the disturbing event of phone tapping[15] during the attempted coup d'état in September 2015. "We know that they will not leave us in peace and that they plot against us all the time. These people are capable of anything" (Roger 29/1/2016, our translation) said a person closely related to President Kaboré. Some interlocutors expressed their views about the link between the current security situation and the old regime.

> Insecurity was born with Blaise Compaoré's old regime. The lorries passed here every night and they told us it was cigarette traffickers, but there were arms transiting through here. (Night guard, Dori)

According to this man, the country was suffering the consequences of actions taken by the leaders of the fallen regime. The alleged complicity of the old regime with armed groups operating in the north of Mali is spoken of with omniscient narrator descriptions by our interlocutors, to explain the cause of the multifaceted attacks.

> It's only the old regime. It is the old regime. Our old president, he has done things that weren't good, in secret even here in Burkina. He himself paid the jihadists not to come into Burkina. Back then when we were watching TV, they said in other countries that we had attacked Mali, what what what, we were in peace. We have replaced them; and then he, he is in safety over there. We cry about this every day. (Housewife, member of a women association, Tenkodogo)

> All this time when the terrorists were sheltered by us, the country saw no attacks. The terrorists slept at our place and went to attack other neighbouring countries and we were in peace. We assisted many times in the liberation of hostages in the north of Mali by certain personalities like Diendéré. Since the old regime was dissolved and the new president has refused to admit that the assassins stayed with us to be able to go and attack the neighbours, they have decided to make us experience what they did to other countries. (Vice president of the mosque, Saaba)

> As long as the old Head of State Blaise Compaoré stays in Côte d'Ivoire with his brothers and his arms we will never be safe, because he is the one who brought Ouattara into office. As long as he stays in freedom, we are in danger. When Blaise was a mediator during the Mali crisis, he sheltered terrorists in Ouaga. They have turned against us because they have lost their protection and privileges. He must be extradited and judged. (Municipal councillor, Dori)

---

15 A telephone conversation that took place at the end of September 2015 between the speaker of Ivory Coast's parliament, Guillaume Soro, and President Compaoré´s ex-minister of foreign affairs, Djibril Bassolé, was supposedly eavesdropped on by the intelligence services. In the exchange they discussed how armed men would attack Burkina Faso at various borders, in order to diverge the national army to other duties as it was preparing to march to Ouagadougou to stop the coup.

The vengeance of the old regime and its Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP), dissolved during the transition, can explain this situation of insecurity. This is affirmed by a student during a focus group session in Djibasso: "For me it is a vengeance, because we told ourselves that the enemy is within the population and the RSP, nothing can prove that they are not these guys." The longevity of Compaoré's power established certain habits and gave advantages to some people. Those people are prepared to do anything to interfere with the current power in order to create conditions for their return to power. "Those who left the power lost a lot, that is why they threaten the current power, to be able to achieve their goals." (Livestock seller, Djibasso).

Some of our interlocutors mention past friendships with the terrorists, others think that these terrorists could be old members of the RSP.

> No one can manage attacks like that without a wealthy backup. If not, how did they get all that equipment? They say the assailants who died during the attacks were wearing military uniforms. So, how did they get that? Who is to say that it was not the RSP? Because if someone chases you from the place where you eat, you will do something else. You have only learned to handle weapons and they chase you away, this way you become a rebel. (A focus group for men from Bouakuyi, Djibasso)

> It is not a question of borders. Is it not linked to the RSP? I put these attacks in that batch. For me, they are rebels, people who want to hurt the government. They tell themselves: you chased us away and you'll see, we will not leave you in peace. (Catholic leader, Djibasso)

Beyond such statements that attribute the responsibility directly or indirectly to the old regime, others, on the contrary, think that only this old regime had the means to fight against the insecurity. It is not a question of complicity, but a strategic problem. "Blaise's principle, that is collaborating for safety, that's what should be done" (Traditional chief, Tenkodogo). For this chief, the most important thing to do would be to ensure that the attacks end, even if it means doing things like before, during the old regime.

> In my humble opinion, I think for the current authorities, it would not be a disgrace if they tried to stay in line with the fallen government. In fact, the way they communicated with the jihadists to avoid bloodbaths, I think that would be good for our regime to continue in this way. All those thousands of soldiers and civilians would not be dead now. (Municipal councillor, Sabtenga, Tenkodogo)

The omnipresence of the old regime in the evocation of the current security problems exists in various ways, both for those who condemn it and for those who remain favourable of it. However, there is a point where the two attitudes meet: that there should be an exit from the current security crisis by means of national reconciliation, without however being precise about which form this should take: "For me, what causes the attacks is that there is no understanding

between the men in power, that is, the laws and the decisions taken do not please everyone" (Livestock seller, Djibasso).

The crisis in Mali

For many observers, the multiple insecurities that Burkina Faso experiences are linked to the crisis in Mali (Vincent 2019). People have often made allusions to problems in the neighbouring country as the actual origin of the Burkinabe crisis. Since 2012, socio-political and security turmoil in Mali has taken on an international dimension and it is evident that the Burkinabe watch the repercussions on their society with concern. The porosity of the borders is one factor, the relations that Compaoré's regime maintained with the rebels in Mali is another.

The attacks in Samorogouan in October 2015 are an example. Very quickly it was reported that the assailants were from Mali. These attacks took place shortly after the successful popular resistance against the coup d'état led by General Gilbert Diendéré (Hagberg 2015). At that time, the national context was characterised by a sense of complete insecurity. Several years later, it was revealed that one of the chief terrorists, who was a presumed perpetrator of the attack, was killed in the district of Rayongo in Ouagadougou (Lefaso.net 22 May 2018).

The case in the Soum Province with its main town Djibo is another example. The fact that the crisis in Mali expanded to this Burkinabe border region does not necessarily prove the Malian origins of the phenomenon. It is well established that the terrorists who operate in this zone are, at least some of them, of Burkinabe origin. The preacher Malam Dicko, founder of Ansarul Islam, was of Burkinabe origin and he lived in Djibo before being arrested in Mali and sent back to Burkina Faso.

For our interlocutors, the link between the Malian crisis is recognised without being indexed as the principal cause for Burkinabe insecurities. The border zones between Mali and Burkina Faso are especially exposed to attacks of all sorts. One of our interlocutors explained to us that after a conflict between the Koglweogos and Fulbe herders in the Soum Province, involving, among other things, torture of the herders, the latter afterwards left to join terrorist groups in Mali in order to come back to get revenge. Our interlocutor made reference to the attack in Kerboulé in April 2016 that caused the death of six on the side of the Koglweogos.

It is not uncommon for some terrorists to leave for "training" in the neighbouring countries or get inspired by what is happening in these countries. In Samorogouan, one of the assailants during the attack on 9 October 2015 was a man who had resided in the area for several years before leaving for Mali where he stayed nine years before returning with an armed group. Nevertheless, during these years he had come back regularly to see his parents. He had even married a girl from the community as his second wife.

Besides poverty, capricious rainfalls and unemployment, the nearness to Mali has caused a downgrade of security and has facilitated the recruitment of young

people by terrorist groups, who rule in the Djibo municipality and surrounding areas. One interlocutor summed up the situation in these words:

> The fact that the young ones take to arms has been fostered by injustice, by idleness and the State's neglect of the Sahel. In the north the State does not exist any longer, since a long time back, so there are no schools, no town hall, no prefecture. The State has stepped down from its sovereign role. And that makes fertile ground for terrorism and jihadism.

Another interlocutor expressed himself after the attack on the police station in Koumbri: "We learned a long time ago that the terrorists were in Mali and we didn't think that this problem could one day come to us. We suspected nothing in advance. This attack was a bad surprise for us."

In Tenkodogo, a woman expressed what many Burkinabe agree with: that the old regime should have helped where the crisis in Mali made things worse, to save Burkina Faso. These statements clarify the link between the old regime and the crisis in Mali in such a way that Burkina Faso was protected when Blaise Compaoré and his regime were still in power (Hagberg et al. 2017b). Today, the interlocutors are unanimous in recognising that the Burkinabe can also be bad. The fact that "Ouédraogo" and "Sawadogo" – common Moosé family names – were among the terrorists (Lefaso.net 22 May 2018) implies that terrorism has its cohorts also in Burkina Faso. Yet Mali remains in the minds of numerous interlocutors as the base of the terrorists' strategic retreat, even if the cohorts sometimes are Burkinabe.

Cross-border criminality

The citizens in municipalities situated in the border zones of the country are more likely to experience a security situation characterised by cross-border criminality. This has less to do with the proximity to other countries than the fact that "the borders are porous." This understanding resonates with our interlocutors who perceive insecurity as something bad coming from abroad.

> The insecurity – you see we are in a border zone – so I think that the number of uniformed agents [military, gendarmes, police], if the number is not enough, it is very worrying, because we really are situated on two borders. There is Togo, there is Ghana which is even closer. Sometimes people come from Ghana to carry out operations and they can enter easily. (Mayor, Bittou)

> As you can see, we have borders with two countries, Togo and Ghana (…). In that respect, robbery is a bit tricky; the robbers are at the border, they leave Ghana to come and do their business on a motorbike and by the time you intervene they have taken off on trails to go back to Ghana. The problem is Ghana. (Police Officer, Bittou)

In the same vein, a security agent from Bittou emphasised that the armed attacks by bandits from Ghana is one of the larger problems that they are confronted with. Even if they do not come from Ghana in the first place, the criminals can easily escape across the border after having committed their crime. The criminals often speak a Ghanaian language. During the attack on the money transfer shop at the crossroads on the road between Bittou and Cinkansé, the bandits expressed themselves in the Koussagha language. This reinforces the sentiments about the Ghanaian origin even if the interlocutors do not exclude the existence of local involvement.

> If someone leaves from abroad to come and steal from you, then he has an accomplice next to you. (Koglweogo leader, Bittou)

> What is certain is that they might be Ghanaians, or they might as well be Burkinabe Ghanaians. You can go over there, and they will train you. One day you return to do your business and then you go back there. And because you have friends there too, they also come here, they do their thing and then they go back there. (Municipal councillor in Mogandé, Bittou)

This municipal councillor asserts that, "if some of them are sons born here, they will definitely stay over there, because they know that if they stay with us here, we will not let go of them." There is a cultural proximity between the inhabitants of certain Burkinabe and Ghanaian villages. Moreover, the inhabitants of these villages use the Cedi, the Ghanaian currency, for different transactions. The existence of such cultural intermixing makes the question about the origin of the criminals complicated. For our interlocutors, Bittou's proximity to the northern part of Ghana, which is experiencing a certain instability because of ethnic conflicts, has contributed to emphasising the insecurity in this border zone.

> Bawku (Ghana) has been through a civil war that has really dragged on. That means that there are all sorts of arms over there, located abroad. That means that someone who wants to be a highway bandit, as soon as he goes to Bawku, can easily hire arms to come here to commit his crimes and then leave again. (ex-Mayor, Bittou)

The trafficking of light arms and arms of small calibre is highly developed in Bittou. According to a police commissary: "If you do a raid, you will see that there's not one backyard where there's not a weapon, and it's not just any weapons, these are war weapons."

Border surveillance is a crucial element in the fight against cross-border criminality. The Secretary General of the Union of livestock graziers in Bittou believes it is the solution for avoiding livestock theft:

> Before, we even asked the local authorities if they could set up a signalling system at the border, in cases where people suspected something, so that it would alert the authorities to come and see how to keep people or the border safe […] We have a limited number of police forces.

A patrol is conducted almost daily along the river that serves as a border between the villages in Burkina Faso and Ghana in the dry season. During the rainy season it is not feasible. In addition to this there is a lack of cooperation from the Ghanaian side in the case of intrusions, for example in the case of livestock theft. A similar situation prevails in the north of Burkina Faso in the municipality of Ouahigouya, where stolen goods are easily taken to Mali:

> In Ouahigouya the stolen motorbikes are taken to Mali. Once they have crossed the border you cannot get hold of them anymore. Especially motorbikes with big cylinders, even tricycles. Three tricycles have been stolen in Ouahigouya this year. (Municipal councillor, Ouahigouya)

The lack of dialogue between public authorities in the neighbouring countries contributes to an aggravation of cross-border criminality. Many people believe that everything being attempted by the Burkinabe defence and security forces is done in vain if it is not done in synergy with other countries. In May 2018, a joint action between the security and defence forces in Burkina Faso with Togo, Benin and Ghana led to numerous arrests and confiscation of forbidden products.

> If the three countries get together, it will end, because if they leave there to come here, they can't go back. If they want to go back to Ghana, they cannot return to Ghana. (Municipal councillor in Mogandé, Bittou)

> There have to be patrols regularly everywhere in the zone to prevent similar situations. (A father whose son was killed during an attempt to steal livestock, Bittou)

The trafficking of drugs, adulterated fuel, cyanide, explosives for small scale gold mining etc. is also a worry in terms of insecurity in the border communities, at the same time as this circulation nurtures the local economy. In the municipality of Tiébélé, cross-border criminality has intensified with the exploitation of gold panning sites. The traffic of adulterated alcohol and other drugs coming from Ghana is currently a real concern in the municipality.

Gold panning

Gold panning is an activity that boosts the local economy and brings profound changes to society. The people who search for gold come from various countries and one can find all sorts of people at the panning sites. The weak control of the panning sites and the fact that those who visit them can come and go without any official control, makes security an issue. The use of drugs (alcohol, narcotics)

is especially critical on the panning sites. Most often the collapses of gold wells are caused by individuals under the influence of drugs.

Several perceptions relate to gold panning. For some people, it represents an income-generating activity and a labour market. Others think that this practice, which continues to erode the earth and constitutes a cause of insecurity, must stop.

There is also a conflict of interest between industrial exploiters and gold panners. Gold panning is seen by the authorities and the industrial companies as "gold looting":

> The State does not receive any tax linked to the artisanal exploitation of gold. Illegal gold mining takes away from the State's mineral reserves. Also, gold panning causes numerous environmental damages. They use chemical products, like cyanide, that destroy the soil and the plant cover.

Gold panning poses problems linked to health, physical security, education, to the use of narcotics and alcohol, to child labour, to the exposure to STDs and HIV-AIDS, unwanted and risky early pregnancies etc. "Where there's gold, there's everything, you know, banditry, drugs, everything, you know."

The superintendent of the police in the town of Kaya emphasised:

> You can really see it: the gold mining is done by hand nowadays. And our parents, our brothers and others have abandoned school, they are on the sites; they are on the lookout for gold without protective material and all that. And that contributes to insecurity and other things.

However, gold panning is also a source of revenue. Around the hand mining sites, income-generating activities are being developed such as small businesses, restaurants, blacksmithing, drinking establishments, transport, video clubs etc. During a focus group session in Dégué-Dégué (Sidéradougou) this was said:

> We women, we take part in selling food and condiments at the panning sites, because our husbands don't give us money for the condiments.

Curiously, the village elders in this village are on the same page:

> If there was no gold panning here, some people would see their women leave. The gold panning is advantageous for the women.

Going to the panning sites is perceived on the same level as migration to the Global North, like a way out or a solution to the chronic human insecurity. At best, it would allow numerous young people to guarantee their social security. Some marry, some bring significant support to their family and the most dynamic and lucky ones manage to invest their money.

Alcoholism and drugs

Alcoholism and the use of drugs are perceived as sources of insecurity. A number of insecurity situations, such as assassinations, robberies, rapes and traffic accidents involve the use of alcohol and drugs, with young offenders at the forefront.

> There are many drug users among the young. Once they have used something, they are no longer afraid of anyone. If they have a problem with a person, they are always in the right, according to them. In addition, they don't hesitate to use weapons. (Municipal councillor, District 2 in Bobo-Dioulasso)

> What I see is the consumption of drugs. If the young ones go on using more, we will never be safe. If our authorities do not find a solution to this problem, even if the terrorists pull back, these young people will be worse than the terrorists. (Female leader of an association in the town of Titao, Sollé)

In Saaba, like in many Burkinabe towns, there are drinking establishments that serve adulterated drinks. These places stay open all hours. "These drinks are drugs that harden the hearts of people and can be sources of insecurity", a citizen of a rural community adjoined to the capital confided in us. A municipal councillor in Bobo-Dioulasso testifies:

> The phenomenon of addiction becomes more and more alarming. I have myself witnessed dangerous products being sold, but what are we supposed to do? Today, even in the big market, these products are sold. You talk and then someone points a knife at you in the dark. We really have to fight against these products, if not we will never be able to curb this antisocial behaviour and insecurity.

During a focus group session with young men, contradictory views were expressed. For some, the consumption of drugs and alcoholism are linked with social status.

> There are some young people who have grown older, who have diplomas or who have family burdens but no employment. These people tell themselves that alcohol or drugs can help them to forget their problems. That's why they use it. But I like to say to my friends from the tea grin [informal club of friends]: that's just being stupid. You are unemployed, you have nothing, you live on credit to go and get drunk or to get high. The effect of the alcohol will end but will your unemployment end? No. On the contrary, you are in debt. It continues like this and then they assault the small merchants and the women of the neighbourhood to strip them of their goods. (Youth leader, District 2 in Bobo-Dioulasso)

For others, the phenomenon is more a result of a lack of family education: the children grow up in an environment where their behaviour is a threat to human security.

> Once I went to sit under the mango trees to study. Someone stopped in front of me and took out a knife. When he took out the knife, he also took out some drugs and he smoked. When he had finished, he put the knife back in his pocket. He took out the knife so that I wouldn't say anything. I felt unsafe. After this day, I never go to an isolated corner alone. (Leader for a youth association, Kaya)

Road security

Road security is a real problem because of the high mortality rate due to road accidents. In the Yalgado Ouédraogo hospital in Ouagadougou, injuries caused by traffic accidents is the second cause of death after malaria (Fillol et al. 2016). The absence of security appears to be a continuous problem that materialises itself through recurrent dramatic accidents on the main roads. These accidents are mainly attributed to bad conduct by road users that do not know the traffic rules or simply to anti-social behaviour. A recent study proves that most accidents happen at traffic lights, even if they function correctly (Nikiema et al. 2017; Sidbega 2015; Bonnet et al. 2015). The problem of road security has also come up during our interviews.

> And then there are the accidents. Anyway, someone uses a commercial vehicle where there are sheep, human beings, bags of grain, all that…at a given time they have an accident and there are deaths. Anyway, in Tenkodogo, I think there have been a lot of accidents because of that and people have died. Anyway, that's one aspect of insecurity that people experience. (Responsible for a youth association, Tenkodogo)

Commercial vehicles with a mix of merchandise, animals and humans cause numerous losses of lives in rural environments, since it is quite often the only means for the traders to get to the recurring village markets. The layout of rural and urban roads also lends itself to very fast driving, which causes road accidents.

> Here, since the mining development company built a road, the trucks stir up dust and cause accidents. They have already killed a cyclist. (Young female pupil, Tiébélé)

The border municipalities to Ghana like Tenkodogo, Bittou and Tiébélé have seen numerous road accidents because of the heavy flow of traffic from neighbouring countries. A continuous flow of vehicles is an everyday part of people's lives in these communities. This exposes them to sometimes tragic situations.

> There is incivility on the roads. This is a national road that is busy 24/7. The speed with which the heavy vehicles drive through the town is a problem. (Young man, Bittou)

Situations like these sometimes lead to violent reactions from some people who try to take justice into their own hands, lynching the guilty driver or at the very least setting fire to the vehicle involved in the accident.

The dramatic consequences of road insecurity are accentuated by the incapacity of public powers to impose certain rules that are already part of the regulations. For example, using a helmet when driving a moped or motorcycle, using a seatbelt for both drivers and passengers of cars or the banning of the use of alcohol or drugs while driving.

Conclusion

This chapter has described insecurities coming from abroad, from the past, from the Other, etc. We have been able to demonstrate how citizens experience insecurity in relation to different phenomena and show how citizens perceive the different origins of insecurities. The common denominator is nevertheless factors that come more or less from outside of the community. The central State is held liable from all points of view. In the following chapter we will take a closer look at the citizens' perceptions of the State.

Chapter 5: Popular perceptions of the State

This chapter discusses the perceptions of the State by local socio-political actors as well as, more broadly, ordinary citizens. The aim is to produce examples that show how the State is perceived in all its multifaceted complexity. The perspective "from below" is fundamental here since our intention is not to describe the State per se, but to understand how the State is "seen and lived" by Burkinabe citizens in terms of multiple insecurities. In popular speech, the term *faama* in Jula is used to talk about the State, or more specifically, the government. The term refers to those in power, people of strength (*fanga*). Men in uniform (the defence and security forces) are also called *faamaw*. In applying these kinds of concepts, we are trying to document the elements of an ethnography of the State, inspired by the anthropology of the State that has been developed over the last decades (Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005; Sharma and Gupta 2005). In West Africa, the anthropology of the State places a great emphasis on the provision of public services (Körling 2011), corruption (Blundo 2000; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006), decentralisation (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1998; Fay et al. 2006; Hagberg et al. 2019), governance and public space (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1998; Olivier de Sardan and Alou 2009). Others emphasise the State's capacity to ensure the functioning of free democracy; Burkina Faso under Compaoré was for example rated as a "semi-authoritarian" regime (Hilgers and Mazzocchetti 2010; see also Hilgers and Loada 2013).

The defence and security forces

The defence and security forces (police, gendarmes, military) are at the forefront in the fight against insecurity. Their mission consists of, among other things, the defence of territorial integrity and to guarantee the security of goods and people. The deployment of defence and security forces, often simply called "the FDS", facilitates sweep searches and controls on the main roads. Their presence reassures the citizens, which is why the latter use the State security services in situations of insecurity. However, cooperation between citizens and the defence and security forces is difficult in view of the numerous incidents and grievances that involve both parties.

> We are in insecurity on a double level. On the one hand, our own sons are transformed into jihadists, who plague the villages and kill peaceful citizens. On the

> other, the soldiers and the gendarmes arrest our relatives, lock them up and deport them to Ouagadougou. We are in insecurity from two sides. (ex-Mayor of Diguel, Soum Province)

According to some interlocutors, apart from being slow at reacting, the defence and security forces sometimes abuse people based on racial profiling, and through bullying and racketeering. Identity checks are sometimes performed on the basis of prejudice, for example of the Fulbe, who are suspected of complicity with the terrorists.[16] This reality is more noticeable in the northern and eastern provinces where there are persistent attacks from armed groups who harass the troops on the ground. People who have been victims of such abuse have told us about their misfortunes:

> One day I left Baraboulé for the town of Djibo when a military patrol encircled me as I was coming out from Baraboulé. After an ID check I was arrested on the motive that I was called Oumarou Dicko, who they were looking for. I was blindfolded and my feet were tied like on a common thief. In spite of the intervention of the mayor of Baraboulé and the Police commissary who both confirmed that I was a civil servant at the town hall, they kept me imprisoned for three days, that is from Monday to Wednesday, before they set me free. (Civil servant at the town hall, Baraboulé)

> A little more than a month ago I closed my shop to go home, around 9 pm. On the way back home we crossed paths (three police on foot), they asked me for my ID. So, they took my ID and we came to the police station. They wouldn't give me back my document, so I left my motorbike with them and went home. The next morning I returned to the police station to get my ID back, but I found that they had lied to their boss, telling him that I didn't have any ID on me at the time when they stopped me. I gave 3,000 FCFA to get my ID back. They think we are illiterate. (Shopkeeper, Djibasso)

In spite of leading actions in the fight against insecurity, the complaints against the defence and security forces are numerous. Apart from excessive actions, there are examples of racketeering and corruption within the forces of order in the communities:

> Often you can see the police forces there, there is no plaque indicating that they are in control or anything like that. They start extorting money from people. They can stop the car in the bush, if they just have some kind of motive, they stop people, motorbikes. (Municipal councillor, Loanga)

> If you drive around on a motorbike and you don't have a footrest, they tell you to pay money because you are breaking the law. If you have any business with the police, you are always in the wrong. (Driver, Baraboulé)

16 Research in Mali demonstrates similar situations (Benjaminsen and Ba 2018, 2021; Sangaré 2016; Hagberg et al. 2017a)

The operating methods of the defence and security forces' fight against terrorism have also been criticised by the citizens. Some people say: "It is as if the defence and security forces want to keep the status quo."

Another reason is the clumsiness of the defence and security forces who engage in public confrontations between terrorists and informers. The arrested suspects are rounded up outside in full view of passers-by and curious onlookers. This is a source of humiliation and frustration for people whose culture sees all forms of exposure as shameful. This approach discourages citizens who would otherwise help in the fight against terrorism.

> When you give information to the FDS, they spend their time bombarding you with questions and you go back to your village without any protection. You find yourself vulnerable and at the mercy of terrorists who can kill you at your home at any moment. (Driver, Baraboulé)

> Normally they don't go on patrols. They never come in time if there is an attack and when they do come, they spend their time asking questions like: How were they dressed? In which direction did they go? (Merchant, Djibo)

Some think that the human and material resources, as well as the logistics of the defence and security forces are insufficient in the fight against terrorism: "Most of our security agents do not have enough material to face the situations." According to a human rights' activist from a political opposition party in Ouahigouya:

> The equipment that they have nowadays is sometimes rundown and sometimes they suffer from a severe lack of equipment, because we have seen it, we have gone directly to talk with certain people. They told us that they are currently doing their patrols without bulletproof vests. In a country where insecurity is such an ever-growing concern, how is it possible that the equipment is not top notch?

However, in spite of all the complaints, the citizens' trust is not completely broken. They believe that it is the security agents who are best organised, best equipped and the ones authorised to deal with people's security:

> Whatever the problem, it always ends up at the police station if they don't find a solution. It would be better to turn to them since it is their mission. If it is left to ordinary people only, it is difficult to reach a fair conclusion since each person will always prove that he is right.

Justice and impunity

The questions of justice and impunity are at the heart of security from below. On a large scale, the citizens see how serious crime and serious corruption are being tolerated in the sense that "the big fish" are always left unpunished. The expectations during the popular insurrection that should have given birth to "a new Burkina Faso" were enormous (Hagberg et al. 2018). In the revolutionary fervour at the end of 2014, some interlocutors, cited by Hagberg et al. (2017b: 62), voiced their wishes for justice:

> We hope for better conditions for the people of Burkina Faso and hope that the doors to work will be open for everyone. We hope that there will be a true fight against impunity and corruption in this country.

> We knew that there was corruption, injustice and impunity in the last regime. So, we wanted alternatives and change in Burkina. As you can see, there is gold everywhere in the country, but nothing gets better. Life is still expensive.

Impunity is not only a question of murders and economic crime. It also concerns ordinary people's expectations of a diligent and fair legal process. Certain activities carried out in the legal domain are sources of insecurity because the verdicts are not fair: the rich are privileged to the detriment of the poor; the innocent are put in prison and the guilty are set free. This feeling of injustice creates underdogs who are at the root of the rebellions. Hence these remarks by a chairman of an association in Ouahigouya:

> Punishing innocent people instead of the perpetrators of crime are actions that create insecurity. The perpetrators are not punished, they are caught and then after some time set free to walk among people again.

People often remark how thieves and bandits seem to act in complicity with the police. The self-defence groups (Koglweogos, Dozos) complain that the thieves brought in by them to the gendarmerie or the police walk around "completely freely" a few days later. In Tenkodogo, a political leader said in response to the question of who he would appeal to in a situation of insecurity : "There are always the indicated bodies, in particular the police, the gendarmerie and the law, and even if people sometimes think they are corrupted, it is always better to go to them because you can't take the law into your own hands." A youth leader from the same locality pointed out:

> I think that it is justice in itself, on all levels, because if there is injustice somewhere it can even itself provoke a number of insecurities. Do we understand each other? If you and me have a problem and we go before an authority and he handles the thing badly and I am frustrated, if the same thing happens tomorrow, I'm not sure I would go to this same authority, I will try to seek revenge in another way.

On a national level, impunity for murder and economic crimes is denounced by social movements. The assassination of Norbert Zongo became a symbol for the repression of Compaorés regime (Fofana 2016; Frère 2010; Hagberg 2002). At the time, the expression *on te fait et y'a rien* (meaning that you are killed and nothing will happen) implied that people from social and opposition movements and politicians fallen into disgrace during Compaoré's regime, were risking their lives. The expression also refers to physical violence. Not treating injustices with diligence leaves a feeling of injustice in people who are not always aware of modern legal procedures. All the social crises that have happened in Burkina Faso, up to the recent one in Yirgou (Centre-Nord), Nafona (Cascades) and Orodara (Haut-Bassins) are linked to law enforcement and court decisions. This is why people are still waiting for justice to be made for "a New Burkina Faso."

Land issues and pastoral zones

Problems around land tenure remain a source of insecurity. Whether this regards urban allotments or rural land, the insecurities concerning land are key issues for a country like Burkina Faso, as it is for other countries in West Africa. In spite of different reinterpretations of texts on the Land and Tenure Reorganisation (RAF) and the Law on Rural Land, initiatives by the Burkinabe state on land matters often lack consistent sustained implementation. Problems also exist due to a lack of agricultural land, the dominance of traditional chiefs[17], political leaders' behaviour, the management of firstcomer and latecomer relationships and inter- or intra-community conflicts. The creation of pastoral zones and the handling of the concepts "autochthons" and "migrants" have also contributed to the insecurities around land tenure. Policies regarding the delimitation of pastoral zones should have expanded livestock farming in the 1970s. Many villages ceded a part of their territory, but the State did not fulfil their objectives. The State abandoned many zones before the contracts ended, and management went back into the hands of the autochthons (or first-comers). The cases of Samorogouan and Sidéradougou are good examples (Arnaldi di Balme et al. 2010; Hagberg 2000; Hochet and Arnalidi di Balme 2013; Hochet and Guissou 2010; Nelen et al. 2004).

Such repossessions of pastoral zones, delimited by the State, are based on the will of the stronger. The village limits and the agricultural land are challenged and those with political power profit from this. Historical relations are exploited when indigeneity is highlighted as an issue (Kuba and Lentz 2006; Kuba et al. 2003). The repossessions are sometimes done with violence, intimidation and indifference, as for example in the Samorogouan municipality:

17 Cissao (2018) shows how the two-headed governing in the matters of local power in operation in several villages in the department of Tenkodogo has led to a multitude of conflicts about land between the inhabitants coming from Bissa and Moosé.

> They filled a vehicle at night, and they came to round us up. They said they were going to kill us and that there would be no consequences. They were young, but surely they had the help of their parents. (Village councillor from Tessado, Samorogouan)

> The Moaaga is a great traveller. If a Moaaga comes and moves in with you and he finds it a good place, other Moosé will follow. That's how it is, there have been lot of Moosé here. We can handle the Moosé in Samorogouan thanks to the land.

> If you are a stranger, even your truth becomes a lie. The aid that comes here, they say that it doesn't concern us. They can chase you away or even destroy your house. Insecurity can't be bigger than that, because you can't sleep at night.

Strangers are practically forced to deal with those who claim to be "landowners" (or autochthons) to be able to have a few hectares for cultivation.

> Strangers also encouraged this situation. As an example, when a stranger obtains some land another stranger will go to see the same landowner to tell him to chase away the first one in exchange for something more substantial. We as strangers have opened their eyes.

The insecurities around land tenure create more and more outsiders and marginalised people. There have been claims that the revaluation of social status often is done with violence.

The pastoral zone in Sidéradougou has experienced similar situations with repossession of land by the first-comers. It is when the Fulbe demand access to resources or to power that stranger status becomes a boundary of exclusion (Hagberg 2000). In Sidéradougou a large part of this land was sold to the Karaboro and to the Moosé, although a substantial part of the pastoral zone was repossessed, a zone that today only exists by name.

Identity cards

The control of identity documents by inhabitants themselves has become common practice in many communities. To know who is who makes identification an important issue. A general perception is that the State should deal with the issuance of identity documents. However, some citizens decide to do the work that normally should be done by the defence and security forces, which can lead to violence. The question that arises is what role citizens can play in an insecurity context when taking justice into their own hands. They seek to expose people with bad intentions, in particular those who come from elsewhere, regardless of whether those people are in transit or not. All the cases of control that we have heard about concern men only, whereas the role of women is rather to report suspect persons. The fact that women are not as considered can mean, on the

one hand, that the idea of a woman acting as an accomplice or capable of carrying out a terrorist attack is unthinkable, ignored or neglected. On the other, to have the courage to control a woman or even to denounce her can prove itself difficult, despite a security context characterised by enormous challenges. This perception began to change with the arrest of a female shopkeeper in 2019 in the Centre-North Region, suspected of supplying terrorist groups with food.

> A suspected person is a person you have never seen, someone you don't know. He could be recognised by his clothes. That's why you call the authorities. Everyone could be a suspect. You don't know who they are exactly. So, you don't take any risks.
>
> Individually, everyone is the maker of his or her own security. I am careful, because everyone who comes home to me, I ask them questions. I try to have a minimum of information about them before being at their disposal. The questions I ask are the following: Where do you come from? Do you have an ID card? Have you already been to this village? Who do you know here?

Situations like these challenge the future of the legendary Burkinabe, even African, hospitality. This value is today considered as one of the factors that can contribute to the feasibility of terrorist attacks. If you accommodate a stranger without asking questions or without asking for an ID, you risk being considered an accomplice in the case of a terrorist attack.

> You must not, above all, hide a stranger. You must show him to your family and find out why he is there […] At the moment, you cannot trust anybody, since it is clear that they have accomplices. Someone can't just leave somewhere and come and do such things, it is difficult.

The question of strangers livens up the local debates. The stranger is today in certain zones considered a potential terrorist. Therefore, a stranger without convincing arguments risks being chased away or reported to the police.

> It used to be very lax. Now we try to find out a lot. When a stranger comes to our village, if he does not have papers, we send him away. We do not want a stranger without papers.

In this way, citizens protect themselves while also taking a patriotic stance. If an attack involves someone from the village, everyone is affected. In this logic, according to the dignitaries of a village in Samorogouan:

> The imam of the Sunni mosque here was the tutor of the terrorists. The whole village was affected because of this, because people said that we shelter terrorists in our village.

In a context where the control of identity documents is just as important for the defence and security forces as it is for the citizens, not having your identity card on you is stressful: "In a few months my identity card expires and now when it is so difficult to get a new one, I am already scared." It can take months, if not years, to get an identity card: "To get an identity card can take five months instead of three weeks. And if they ever catch you, you pay 2,500 FCFA." Not only is it a difficult process to get a card, but it is also expensive and obtaining one at all is uncertain. Some women (Djibasso) said during a focus group session:

> We have asked two or three times without success and every time you pay 5,000 FCFA, now it is 2,500 FCFA. The explanation they give is the following: the identity cards have been burnt and we don't understand anything. The worst part is that you are not reimbursed.

In similar terms, according to some men (Djibasso) during a focus group session:

> The access to identity cards! After having applied you can wait six months without getting one. And even if they give you a receipt you have a problem. They say all the time that the cards have been burnt. There are some of us that have asked four times and every time you have to pay 2,500 FCFA. After all that they are cruel enough to tell you that you won't get one.

Such a situation leads to very limited or selective movement: limited, because it is difficult to move without encountering the defence and security forces; selective, because there are strategies like walking on foot to be able to avoid the checkpoints or bypassing the checkpoints by using trails. This testimony from a woman is an example:

> On market days in Djibasso, the women who don't have an identity card get off the cart during the journey, before arriving at the security forces' checkpoint. If you are not on the bus, they don't ask for an identity card.

Owning a national identity card is a right that remains disregarded. Currently, to get one quickly, you have to go all the way to Ouagadougou or to certain main towns of the province, something that is impossible for many citizens. For example, in Tiébélé, the burning down of the police station in 2011 during the national socio-political crisis has made the acquisition process of this important document difficult.

Schools and education

The school – one of the main, tangible and symbolic representations of the State – has become one of the targets of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso. Schools promote republican and universal values. In numerous localities and provinces situated in the central-east, in the east, in the north and in the Sahel, the schools are closed, school personnel has been forced to abandon their posts and the education of pupils has been disrupted.

> I have been in Kaya since November 2017 after an attack on my school in Petegoli in Soum. I do not count on returning since the security situation has not been stabilised. My pupils? Well, some are at home and others have gone to the gold panning sites.

Some actors have developed initiatives to fight against the insecurity. The madrasa school in Samorogouan has had the support of school inspectors since the terrorist attack. Faced with terrorist acts, the local actors have put strategies in place to support and attempt to resist in their own way.

> Nowadays we cannot accept just anyone into our school, like we did before. We even want to change our madrasa school into a French-Arabic school, so that we can work with the government. This is why we are working with the inspector. Our director wanted it. When someone comes to the school, we check the papers. In the case of XX, one of the terrorists who committed the attack, we could not have known it. We were tired [after the attack], four people have been taken in for questioning here. We don't want what happened to happen again. They search you as if you were a thief. (Chief of a Fulbe encampment, Samorogouan)

> When I arrived, I got the information that there had been a terrorist attack here. I have 20 madrasa schools and the first thing I did was to approach these schools. In this way I could get the dossiers about all the schools, this was not the case before me. Then there are people that you must not keep unnotified. So, I asked these people to work to get their schools in order, so that these schools could be recognised by the State. So that they would have their papers in good order so that the State could help them. And of those there are two madrasa schools that have put in requests to be officially recognised. (Primary school inspector, Samorogouan)

New strategies to overcome the difficulties are developed in the face of school closures:

> We have put the stress on different school directors and teachers of the classes in CM2. […] We told all schools to do all they can to make it possible for pupils from CM2 to do their exams wherever they are, even if this means meeting in the families and telling them that this will be the homework and corrections to make you used to exam conditions, that is not to say that we can reunite all the schools, but primarily the schools that have a CM2 class. (Educational counsellor, Barsalogho)

Facing these difficulties, the State resists through school security measures, such as the organisation of special sessions for the primary school certificate (CEP) and a first cycle diploma (BEP) in September 2018. "We stand beside the people and the victims", the mayor of a rural municipality made understood. On the ground, people are waiting for stronger and more consistent security measures. Beyond the northern and eastern regions lie Boucle du Mouhoun and the Centre-North Region, areas that are particularly concerned about school closures and where many primary and secondary pupils are deprived of education.

Conclusion

This chapter approached popular perceptions about the State. Since the citizens no longer have confidence in the police, they try increasingly to take justice into their own hands. In the end, the authority of the State is at stake. Perceptions of defence and security are linked with power and force, just like the word faama in Jula. But for the average citizen, the school (lakoli in Jula) is also an important State institution, especially since it is established everywhere on the national territory. Land is a permanent source of insecurity, both in the towns and in the countryside. The State's efforts towards land security, for example the creation of pastoral zones, can in spite of good intentions lead to new insecurities. To sum it up, the State's capacity to ensure security for people and goods is more and more questioned by the Burkinabe.

Chapter 6: Self-defence groups

In this chapter, we describe the different self-defence groups that have developed in a more or less recent period. Special stress is put on the emergence of the Koglweogos. Today, the question of Koglweogos is widely debated because, although they are credited with a certain efficiency in the fight against criminality, they apply quite violent methods, sometimes violating human rights. Long before their appearance in the sphere of vigilantes however, Dozo hunters and surveillance groups existed in Burkina Faso. Finally, the Ruggas are currently a counterweight to the Koglweogos.

There is a wealth of anthropological research literature on the Dozos in West Africa (Bassett 2004; Cashion 1984; Cissé 1964, 1994; Hagberg 2004b; Hagberg and Ouattara 2010; Hellweg 2011; Kedzierska-Manzon 2014; Ouattara 2008)[18], whereas the Koglweogos have been the object of more recent research (Bojsen and Compaoré 2019; Hagberg 2018, 2019b; Hagberg et al. 2017; Kibora et al. 2018). The Ruggas have not generated much scientific documentation. However, generally speaking, publications on vigilantism in West Africa generate a lot of interest.

The Dozos

Hunter brotherhoods (*donso* s., *donsow* pl. commonly called Dozos) are well known in West Africa. "According to different traditions, the hunter kings, great initiates, powerful magicians and diviners, dominated from around the 10th century the lands that later would constitute the heart of the empire of Mali" (Thoyer 1995: 11, our translation; see also Cissé 1964, 1994; Cashion 1984; Bassett 2004; Hagberg 2004b; Hellweg 2011; Kedzierska-Manzon 2014). To become a hunter, each candidate has to be accepted and then initiated through common rituals. The hunters are not only specialised in game hunting activities; there are also hunters who are very qualified regarding traditional medicine. Furthermore, the hunters are feared for their spiritual power and are, generally, very *wackés*, that is they have the powers of occult knowledge.

18 Beside works and theses, please note that the thematic issues of the journals *Africa Today* (2004) and *African Studies Review* (2019) were devoted to the Dozos.

The Dozo[19] hunter movement gathered steam in the 1990s with the increase in thefts and criminality and finally with the wars in West Africa (Hellweg 2011; Kedzierska-Manzon 2014; Hagberg and Ouattara 2010). These movements combine the initiation to the Dozo cult with a membership of a hunters' association, which the person in question joins. The associations are constructed around a hunter leader with the objective to fight criminality and delinquency; the hunt for game is thereby transformed into a hunt for thieves (Hagberg 2004a, 2004b). Today, there are several hunters' associations in Burkina Faso; the National Union of Dozos under the leadership of Ali Konaté is one of the most important.

In the West of Burkina Faso, the Dozos form self-defence groups. They are against the establishment of the Koglweogos in their communities, since there has been a latent conflict between the two movements since 2016. The Dozos present themselves as being defenders of "republican values" (Hagberg 2018, 2019b). One leader of the Dozos from Sidéradougou told us clearly: "The Koglweogos cannot be here, because there are Dozos here. We have never seen Koglweogos here." The Dozos say that they monitor the communities and protect the region from thieves. They catch the thieves and hand them to the gendarmerie. This pronounced respect for the State expressed by the Dozos has to be treated with caution, because in the 1990s the hunter movements were a real threat to the authority of the State (Hagberg 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2019b). As we will demonstrate, the conflictual relationships between the different self-defence groups have become a concern.

The Koglweogos

The situation with a weak territorial network of the defence and security forces, impunity, injustice, corruption etc. justified the establishment of the Koglweogos (Kibora et al. 2018). This movement has emerged in the last years especially, even if its origins date to the beginning of the 21st century. The word "Koglweogo" is Mooré and means *koglgo* ("watch over", "guard") and *weogo* ("bush"). From 2015, the Koglweogos expanded dramatically in response to multiple insecurities (Bojsen and Compaoré 2019; Hagberg 2018, 2019b; Hagberg et al. 2017b). Even if the Koglweogos are attributed a certain efficiency, the fines, the torture and the corporal abuses of presumed culprits cause problems for the recognition of this self-defence movement. "Some consider that these self-defence groups represent an emerging militia, because the Koglweogos take the law into their own hands and violate human rights" (Hagberg 2018: 28).

At the same time, some interlocutors find the Koglweogos effective. According to the police commissary in Kaya: "Since they were installed in Kaya, there are less and less cases of robbery, thefts and fraud in the town of Kaya and the villages around." Another interlocutor told us the following: "The fact that they

19 The hunter movements are called Dozo in Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, while the Malian hunters are called *donsow* (s. *donso*).

are close to the people and they know the environment makes the Koglweogos quick and efficient in their interventions and they don't ask for travel expenses, contrary to the police." A local elected official said on the same note:

> The Koglweogos help us. You must be living in a town not to like the Koglweogos. The Koglweogos represent security here where we live. If there is a problem, we turn to the Koglweogos.

Regardless of some outstanding operations, where their participation led to the arrest of two suspects of two successive attacks, one on their own headquarters in Guendbila and one on a school in Baffina in the Barsalogho municipality, people have mixed views of the Koglweogos.

> It is as if it was a national question where everyone installs their Koglweogos in their villages, well, because here too they have tried to install these Kogleweogos. The police nearby were connected with the defence forces, but they say that they are independent; they do whatever they like. It's not right, is it. Otherwise their work is good, but to kidnap people, to burn people, you can see it is inhumane, can't you.

In response to these situations, voices are raised for decisions to be taken. The defence and security forces express a technical take on this subject.

> We try to increase their awareness and we give them advice in respect to human rights […]. So, we can say that they follow these pieces of advice because there is less and less violence than before done to the men they catch. In the past they were more violent than today. If it has started to get better, we say it is because they listen, even if they have not stopped, it is because they listen that things are getting better. (General director of the Police, Kaya)

On the contrary, armed patrols, the challenge of public authority, investigation and interrogation methods like those of a lawless state, torture, racketeering and abuse of victims are also reasons for the hostile positions taken against the Koglweogos.

> You can't do one thing and also its opposite: accepting that people supersede the defence and security forces to defend the nation while other people have taken an oath to do it, were trained to do it, this can only lead to the deviances which we subsequently have experienced.

The exactions committed by some Koglweogos have drawn a lot of attention, and their methods and practices raise questions. A desperate woman testifies:

> The Koglweogos are a kind of insecurity but no one dares to say it. When we take the example, the fact that they have formed groups to extract money from individuals, that is insecurity. With them, there is no investigation. When they

> arrest someone, it is word against word. When they arrest a thief who says that such and such a person is involved, with them you can prove nothing. Immediately you are a thief, presumed a guilty person. When they arrest you, the way they straighten you out crosses the line and in addition you must pay a fine. Your enemy can also go and tell lies about you and automatically you are arrested and treated like a guilty person.

To better understand how the Koglweogos operate, here is an example from the Barsalogho municipality in 2013. A complaint was filed at the police station against a young Fulbe who had been entrusted to look after animals and who had lost them. The police investigators could not prove that the young man had lost the cattle and he was released. The case was passed to the Koglweogos by the complainant. The young man was caught, and he and some members of his family were tortured. "Neither the police, nor the Gendarmerie could rescue the young man and his parents, who were fined and ordered to pay for the lost animals." Fines were imposed on the suspect, but his family could not pay them. Because of a lack of funds for the payment and above all from fear of other exactions against his family, pushed by shame, the young Fulbe committed suicide, hanging himself from a tree near the village.

It is in this same Barsalogho municipality that the massacre of the Fulbe happened in January 2019 (Yirgou), a massacre that was attributed to the Koglweogos. Arrests, although late, were carried out in their midst by Burkinabe law enforcement. Effectively, Koglweogo leaders have offered to devote themselves increasingly to the fight against terrorism, which could nevertheless imply everything, risks of blunders, confusion and abuse. On 21 January 2020, a new law was passed to create *Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie* (VDP) as a way to mobilize all sons – and more seldom daughters – of the Nation to fight terrorism. The law defines the VDP as "a person of Burkinabe nationality, assistant of the Defence and Security Forces, voluntarily serving the security interests of his/her village or neighbourhood, by virtue of a contract signed between the volunteer and the State.[20] Since then many Koglweogos have come to fill the ranks of VDPs, hence confirming the link between the State and the Koglweogos.

The relations between the Koglweogos and the Dozos are becoming progressively tense (Hagberg 2018, 2019b). In September 2018, violence broke out between the Koglweogos and the Dozos in the Karangasso-Vigué municipality in the Houet province.

> As a matter of fact, following the dealings between these self-defence groups in the region and especially in the rural municipality of Karangasso-Vigué (at the beginning of 2018) the Dozo chief, Aly Konaté, contacted the official state authorities as well as leaders of the Koglweogos to ask them to take measures in order to avoid a 'drama'. (Lefaso.net 15/9/2018, our translation)

[20] Law N°002-2020/AN portant institution de volontaires pour la défense de la patrie.

The outcome of these clashes was three dead (the son of the canton chief and two Koglweogos) and many wounded. Numerous bloody acts implicate Koglweogos on the national map, establishing that these actors that fight against insecurity are factors of insecurity themselves.

The Ruggas

The reduction of pastoral zones, recurring conflicts between farmers and herders, livestock theft and exactions against herders all reveal the crisis of pastoralism. To remedy the acts of livestock theft, violence and attacks on herders, in some municipalities – Barsalogho, Fada N'Gourma Dori etc. – there are groups of herders commonly called the Ruggas. This term refers to "a Fulbe encampment" in the Hausa language. Others indicate that, traditionally, the Ruggas were the guides that played an intermediary role between the transhumant herders and the local administrative authorities (Leonhardt 2019).

The Ruggas emerged in this region of Burkina Faso to accompany herders and herd-owners, organise the transhumance, manage the mobility of livestock and to protect against exactions and attacks. Their task is to minimise conflicts with farmers and to ensure peaceful cohabitation between farmers and herders.

However, as a result of their actions and rapid networking in certain zones, the Ruggas are sometimes seen as a self-defence group that goes beyond its prerogatives, establishing itself as an armed group that defends the "Fulbe question." The collaboration between the Ruggas and the Koglweogos is difficult and conflicting. As a matter of fact, the Ruggas settle in localities to counter the Koglweogos' exactions against the Fulbe community, which, rightly or wrongly, is considered to shelter terrorists. Furthermore, the imposed taxes on Fulbe herders regarding transhumance and livestock sales on the markets exacerbated the tensions. A representative of the public authorities in Barsalogho gives his interpretation of the birth and expansion of the Ruggas:

> I think it started in the east just like the Koglweogos, people don't know how to study social facts […] The Koglweogos were born in the east, the Ruggas were also born in the east. They follow the Koglweogos to where they are, you don't see any Ruggas in the west but there are herders in the west, so you have to know how to interpret the facts. Where the Koglweogos have not prospered there are no Ruggas, but to where the Koglweogos have prospered, the Ruggas are on their way.

The introduction of taxes (tickets, fines, livestock control) by the Koglweogos, constitutes the divisive element between the two movements. With the attack on the village of Djébila in 2018, some inhabitants from Barsalogho accused the Ruggas of being tutors of terrorists.

The presence of Ruggas in Barsalogho is badly perceived by those who are close to the Koglweogos:

> There was a meeting in the town hall. I was there. The Fulbe had installed a group, that Ruggas, we don't know what that means. It left towards Dori, it's a group that takes care of breeding, so we told ourselves that it's a good thing. Even they want to rely on this group to do other things above the heads of all us officials, the mayor was aware of their association. Otherwise it's an association to resist against the Koglweogos. At least one person here has killed himself because of the fines. (Barsa Naaba, Village chief from Barsalogho)

These remarks, collected in 2018, foreshadow what happened in Yirgou in January 2019, and what has developed since then in terms of community conflicts and the scapegoating of Fulbe populations (Hagberg et al. 2023b forthcoming).

It is interesting to note that the settlement of the Ruggas on the territory follows the dynamics of the Koglweogos' geographic deployment. From reciprocity to opposition, this confirms the dissatisfaction of the Fulbe graziers vis-à-vis the actions of the Koglweogos. There is a National Union of the Ruggas from Burkina (UNRB) which estimates their size at: "400 Ruggas in the whole country, whereof 100 in the Sahel, which means between 16,000 and 32,000 members."[21] The ethnic dimension of the Ruggas should nevertheless be treated with caution; the current president of the UNRB is a Fulbe leader, whereas the Secretary General in a University Lecturer of Gourmantché origin.

Conclusion

Self-defence groups have developed especially these last years, even if they have existed before. The emergence of the Koglweogos has resulted in open conflicts, or at least in tense situations, with certain communities and other self-defence groups who are culturally opposed, like the Dozos in the West and the Ruggas in the Fulbe community. The self-defence groups present real challenges to the State and to its monopoly over legitimate violence. The clashes between these groups trouble the Burkinabe. The Koglweogos who make up their own laws are a special concern. At the same time, the popular perception of a fragile, or even "absent" State, opens the door to citizen groups taking security into their own hands. Nowadays, the *VDP* and the new *Brigade de veille et défense patriotique* introduced by the Transition Regime of Burkina Faso in June 2022, challenge self-defence groups, like the Koglweogos, to enter into legality.

---

21 Preparatory mission for the review midway through the thematic Program, "Human Rights and Stability" from the Country Program Burkina Faso–Denmark (2016–2020), a study on the effectivity of mechanisms and experiences of dialogue and engagement of populations with respect to security questions in Burkina Faso. Dossier 2018-16337, the Royal Danish Embassy in Burkina Faso.

Chapter 7: Citizen Initiatives

In this chapter, we shed light on different citizen initiatives, especially how citizens try to cope with violence and attacks. Questions regarding family education are also recurrent in many of our interviews.

The debate about collective action and citizen initiatives has taken a special form in Burkina Faso. The country has a long tradition of popular struggle, ever since the labour union actions in the 1950s, through the popular uprising of 1966, which overthrew the first President Maurice Yaméogo, then through the period of the Democratic and Popular Revolution under president Thomas Sankara and up to the struggle against impunity and expensive life (Hagberg et al. 2018). Since the popular insurrection of October 2014, the actions and initiatives form a part of the everyday public life of the Burkinabe. However, there are a lot of actions and initiatives that pass without being noticed, far from the attention of the media. It is this type of initiative we will describe in the following pages, starting with family education.

Family education

For children, the family constitutes a space of learning about societal norms and values. In a context of multiple insecurities, our interlocutors think that family education often is inadequate. Many parents lose control of the education of their children and it is this that explains the development of banditry, youth delinquency, the use of drugs, terrorism, etc.

The importance of family education for security was emphasised in the different studies about security from below, especially in two Malian communities, where one interlocutor said: "Security is an attribute to a well-educated person" (Hagberg et al. 2017a: 27). The education in question here does not concern school, but behaviour and rules of propriety.

> Once the protagonists are well educated, they find appropriate solutions as they are people with good morals who are not afraid of saying or accepting the truth. According to numerous interlocutors, no one attacks families with good upbringing. A family with good upbringing is a safe family. (Hagberg et al. 2017a, our translation)

Our field research in Burkina Faso confirms this perception about family education. According to a Muslim leader in Saaba:

> Parents today put a lot of children to the world and because they are so many, they are incapable of educating them correctly, hence these abuses. From 6 pm, when you go towards the market, there are children younger than 10 who roam around freely without being looked after, all this because they are so many, and the parents cannot control them. These children indulge in all sorts of practices that can cause insecurity. There are often children who do not hesitate to steal goods from people. If the number of children were reduced, we could look after them better.

An imam in Kaya suggests the following:

> For me, insecurity is also due to population growth. Before we were not that many, which meant that it was quiet, but now this is not the case. Just look at one family where there are five boys in the yard, they can no longer sit down to discuss without problems, it is just a battle, disorder, but why? It is because of the number, before we were not that many, so no one wanted anything to happen to his brother. Now, the children from the same father and mother insult each other with 'son of a bitch'. […] Today, two brothers do not even want to see each other anymore, that can't be good. How do you think there could be security? Today there is no brotherhood anymore.

Children are left on their own, which opens ways for people with bad intentions to manipulate them.

> First of all there is poverty; then you can see that it is the upbringing in the family. The families are poor, so the children go out to beg and often they even sleep in the street. So, this child who learns all this in the street, well, that means that one day he will be prepared to do anything, to go and steal, in any case to be a troublemaker. (Responsible in the local section of a youth organisation in Tenkodogo)

> There is the family upbringing, if the child starts to steal eggs at home and the family lets him get away with it, one day he will go and steal outside the home. (Teacher, Ouahigouya)

For some people, there is a link between family education and terrorism.

> When you talk about insecurity today you talk about the crisis within the family, we can see many difficulties especially when it comes to children's upbringing, this leads to troubles like anti-social conduct, terrorism, all these troubles find their source at the heart of the family. […] When we talk about terrorism and organised crime, the causes can be found within the family unit. When you look at the children in the street, they are vulnerable orphans, coming from poor families, they are children left behind and it is here a lot of acts of violence

> present themselves and also they can be recruited to become members of extremist groups. (Social worker, Kaya)

> Terrorism never comes from a religion but from a family. It means that the families have failed. (Woman leader, Ouahigouya)

This "void" of parental education is filled in several ways. Many children turn to media and ICT, within their means, which can explain certain wayward trends. The education of a child in Africa was once ensured by the community. Like a Moaaga saying: *bisongo ya boud faan biiga*, meaning that a good child is a child for the whole community. Thus, one sees a loss of African values to the gain of Western values. From now on the child no longer belongs to anyone except for its parents, who are the only ones who can decide what type of education the child should receive.

> Before, education was everybody's business, even the neighbour could discipline the children. Someone who tries this today will find himself with a summons. From now on it is each to their own, no one respects the elderly, there is no longer any understanding or affection between individuals. Today your closest neighbour could be a source of danger and should be treated with caution. (Municipal councillor, Saaba)

Facing Islamic radicalisation

Before 2014, Burkina Faso was an example of political and social stability in West Africa. Thereafter, the country has gone through a deep crisis (Hagberg et al. 2017b). When it commenced its reconstruction with the presidential and legislative elections in November 2015, the first terrorist attacks in October 2015 in Samorogouan and in January 2016 in Ouagadougou plunged the country into fear. Since then, the terrorist attacks have multiplied. The Burkinabe are increasingly affected by numerous terrorist acts. The attack on the gendarmerie in Samorogouan, the establishment of a terrorist movement in the Djibo municipality by Malam Dicko or the dismantling of a terrorist network in the Rayongo district of Ouagadougou are strong examples.

The current terrorism in Burkina Faso is, partially at least, the result of Islamic radicalisation. A chief from a Fulbe village in the Samorogouan municipality told us:

> XX, one of the terrorists left Pedon to ask me for help. He wanted to learn to speak Arabic. He wanted to study in our madrasa. I suggested to him to go and fetch one of his parents as a witness. So, he went. He came back with his father and a friend of his. He came to stay with me. One year passed and during the non-working days he went to see his family. Next year, the father came to look for a place near me where he could house his wife and child. I gave him a plot to build something. The third year, he moved to the Moaaga district and spent two years there. After that he left for Mali and stayed there for 9 years. He came to

> visit me often. After that he took a second wife in Tenasso and he brought her to Mali. In the end, he did not come to see me anymore. It is when he committed the attack on Samarogouan that his father said to the gendarmes that I was the one who had set XX on the path.

Radicalisation also manifests itself through rhetoric and acts of condemnation, through intolerance, prejudices about others, rejections of one community by another, restrictions of individual freedoms etc. The mayor of Djibasso shared his worries linked to the conflicting relations in a village with us: "There is an open conflict between the Sunnis [Wahabis or Salafists] and the Ahmadiyya. The Sunnis want to destroy a mosque belonging to the Ahmadiyya. The village councillor is on the Sunnis' side and is not playing fair."

In communities in the north of the country, the terrorists have tried to forbid women to work in the fields and the young to organise popular festivities during baptisms, marriages and feast days, threatening them with punishment.

> They come to the villages, gather people in the mosques and say that women should no longer farm and that they have to wear the Muslim veil. For them, the young should no longer organise festivities during feast days because it is *haram* [sinful]. The baptisms should be done very early in the morning with the presence of two or three people maximum and without popular festivities. On a feast day in June they came to disperse the young people in a village near Baraboulé.

Preaching in the mosques is an important occasion for radicalisation. Some religious leaders let (out of kindness or naivety) "Muslim scholars" express themselves. These scholars take advantage of their perfect command of Arabic to distil words of inter-religious intolerance in small doses. The first serious incident that triggered violence and insecurity in the Djibo municipality was linked to a baptism:

> One day in November 2016, there was an incident in Petega. During a baptism, a man who belonged to the Malam Dicko group came to preach and to stop the baptism, especially the music. He was warded off by the parents of the infant. He went back to the bush and came back armed. He killed an inhabitant and wounded a councillor. Later on, the army came [to intervene to calm the situation] and arrested around thirty people to send them to Djibo. At around 18.00, the group came and killed the councillor from Soboulé. The wounded councillor survived and fled towards Titao. They looked for him and a few weeks later he was killed together with his son.

Some teachers in this region are told not to teach French to the children anymore under threat of being attacked, which has caused numerous school closures. It is worth noting though, that many citizens, among those religious, non-governmental and communal leaders, have indicated that they are engaged in actions that have the aim to fight against this radicalisation. For example, a

primary school inspector has offered pedagogic and administrative support for madrasa schools to give them more credibility and success.

Following the attack on the gendarmerie in Djibasso in August 2017, the Muslim community worked to educate worshippers through preaching in the mosques. A devout Muslim from the big mosque confirmed:

> Those who attacked the gendarmerie were not only Malian; there were three Burkinabe among them. I don't know what the terrorists want. They want to force us to pray, but religion cannot be enforced. It should be taught. Since that day, I talk to the worshippers every Friday to make them understand that the terrorists are not true Muslims. I tell them to watch out for these people.

A pastor from Djibasso told us that he plans to introduce lessons in Arabic at his high school to find a solution to the misinterpretation of Islam: "You have to educate the children so that they can avoid the ideological influence, because if people have more support for their religion than the state, there is a problem."

The preachers sometimes carefully choose the texts they use in their sermons. An imam from Samorogouan explained to us:

> Now we no longer use Kitabu or Hadissa, since there can be many lies in those texts. They have been made to make it easier to understand, but they are misinterpreted. Currently we use only the Koran since it is the only true version. Before we held the sermons in Arabic, but now they are in Bambara. This has made the understanding of the religion much easier. We inform the officials, that is the town hall and the gendarmerie, about our sermons in public places. They give us authorisation.

But it is not only Muslims who are actively engaged in the fight against radicalisation. In Dori, the Union Fraternelle des Croyants (UFC) distinguish themselves through activities promoting a peaceful coexistence between the communities All these initiatives show how the citizens try to counteract the radicalisation of the young.

The mobilisation of women

We often get to hear that "security is men's business" and that "women and children are mostly victims." Research shows the contrary, however, since women in the studied communities often play an important role for security as mothers, sisters or wives (Hagberg et al. 2021). A group of women in Sidéradougou associate security primarily with protection: "You can put your hopes on someone. That is what is important. If you have problems you can go and sleep at the person's house. You can take refuge there. That is what security is." They also raised the question of food security, since the men cannot manage to support the family: "The woman does everything: food, medicine, education." A few years ago, these women from Sidéradougou joined forces to protest against

that the municipality stopped paying out microcredits that were earmarked for women. As they saw no results, they feared that the funds had been diverted. Last year they marched against the mayor, since financial assistance for women had supposedly been hogged by the women in the MPP. But when it comes to security, women are not so much involved.

In Kaya, there was a desire for women to be more involved in the fight against organised crime, insecurity and violent extremism. According to the head of an association: "The women know who the terrorists are, who does what, but they don't talk because they are not involved enough." During an interview with a group of women from Samorogouan, they said that the first resort in case of insecurity was still the husbands:

> When we are confronted with a problem, our first resort is our husband. It is he who looks for ways and means to try to resolve the problem. If the problem is too big for him, we resort to the village elders. And if they cannot solve it either, we pass the business on to the defence and security forces.

In Dori, the head of a women's association talked about security in these terms: "We don't know who is who. Before, the terrorists came from elsewhere. Now they are among us."

Women, as wives and mothers are unquestionably in a permanent insecurity situation, but they do not remain passive. Family education is traditionally the woman's domain. In Saaba, women have joined forces throughout a march-meeting to urge the public authorities to carry out powerful actions against insecurity.

In all our interviews, women feel challenged by the insecurities, as they are not sufficiently involved. For this reason, we are interested in finding new ways for women to get more involved in the security of the communities.

Change in behaviour

Change in behaviour is about new attitudes people adopt after attacks. Fear and mistrust cultivate cautious behaviour. Though not in a zone that has experienced a terrorist attack, this bar manager states:

> In my restaurant, I position the tables at a distance from one another to avoid someone having a bandit next to him who could turn violent. Here we are not far from the border with Ghana and we never know […] I even avoid going to places that are not well lit up or where there is a crowd. (Restaurant manager, Tiébélé)

In the zones that experienced terrorist attacks, people reviewed their social and work schedules. The farmers changed how they worked on the fields:

> Those who went […] went between 10 and 14 instead of between 8 and 18. The women went months without going out to look for firewood in the bush. The women don't dare, even now, to go into the bush by themselves. When night fell, everyone went into their rooms. The lights, radio and television were switched off. There were no longer any ceremonies that gatheredpeople. (Municipal councillor, Samorogouan)

For people who live mainly off agricultural activities, once the bush and the fields become dangerous it makes a real impact, as this woman's words attest:

> After the attack I couldn't go to my field, while it was the time for harvest. I had cultivated beans. When it was the time for harvest, I hired women to help me. The work timetable was from 7 to 16 and 500F/day before the attack. They would do it during one or two weeks. But after the attack, it was from 8 to 12 and 1000F/day. Because of the attack the price had doubled. I hired five women for two weeks. To finance that, I used money that I had managed to save. And even then, the harvest wasn't good, a big part of my beans stayed in the forest. (Farmer, Samorogouan)

Just after the Samorogouan attack, religious rituals also underwent modifications. An inhabitant told us:

> In the mosque the muezzin no longer called to prayer. Because Allahu Akbar were the words the terrorist said before attacking the gendarmerie. So not to frighten people they stopped doing the call to prayer, although people continued to pray in the mosque.

Up until today, violent extremism in the form of terrorist attacks have been carried out on the pretext of Islam. Muslim leaders work towards ensuring generalisations are not established in peoples' minds. Invited to translate the writings left by the terrorists after the attack in Samorogouan, the teacher-promotor from a madrasa school concluded that, "these people have understood nothing of Islam, because their Arabic writing is mediocre and they translate the concept of jihad badly." After the attack, the Sunni [Wahabit or Salafist] mosque was destroyed by the community, since the terrorist (originally from the village) and his host, used to attend it. Ever since, the Sunni must pray in the same mosque as the others. They stick to this initiative to prove their good will and to avoid generalisations.

In Tiébélé, the hosts of a Muslim preacher chose the school yard of a primary school for their Friday prayer. But the young people in the village protested, since according to them, if this place would be used for prayers during the Muslim holidays (*Eid al-Fitr* and *Eid al-Kabir*), it could well disturb the lessons as they are done outside, particularly the times of collective prayer. In this respect it is important to avoid new habits that can have consequences for coexistence. In Djibasso, God is also invoked:

> After the Djibasso and Madouba attacks, people are afraid and no longer have confidence in the security forces and say that security can only be granted by God. As long as the military is not here, I will never feel safe. (Teacher, Djibasso)

In Fada N'Gourma in the east, the Christmas mass that traditionally takes place the night of 24 December until midnight took place at 16.00 in the afternoon in December 2018, under heavy surveillance by the defence and security forces.

Beyond such behaviours expressing sentiments coming close to psychosis, people try to do what is possible to avoid that these kinds of acts are repeated. The public administration must also come to terms with this new situation. Agents develop individual and collective initiatives to resist the insecurities. This primary school counsellor of primary education sums it up with these words:

> People can say whatever they want, but I know that if you set up a system that works, it will always work. The police said that among the attackers there were people from here. That means that we are living with them, we are here together. Now it is up to each one to know how to behave in order not to become a target.

Civic attitudes develop. They range from verification of identity checks of strangers to the denunciation of suspects to the forces of law and order. "We have to continue to live and to work, so we have to get together to fight the terrorists", a member of the office of the Association of merchants in Djibasso insisted. This is why this leader of an association from the village of Koumbiri, situated 35 km from Djibasso, has adopted a new civic attitude:

> I work together with the police to inform them about the terrorist movements, about suspect persons. It is dangerous, but I don't fear for my life since it is in the country's interest. Following up on the information I had given them, the police have already arrested a terrorist who pretended to be a madman.

Beyond terrorism, people who have been carrying the burden of insecurity for a long time, develop reflexes and other methods of resistance, or resilience, from the moment that they do not have the option to flee. This is the case in the rural municipality of Saaba where armed robberies and killings of women have become everyday occurrences for a long time now.

> The fact that the whole population from now on is involved in security, reinforces security. For example, if there is a courtyard that houses several rooms for rent in the neighbourhood, we, the neighbours, go there as a group to see the owner of the courtyard to express our complaints. […] We ask him to verify the identities of the renters, then that he registers all those who want a house in this courtyard. We also ask him to interrogate these people to find out where they come from, what they do in life and why they have chosen this district. In one week at least, if we have the necessary information, we can allow one person access to the courtyard. We explained to him that it is for our safety we insist on

> doing all this. […] I have built a mosque in my courtyard and one day we had a visit from a stranger who prayed with us in the evening. After the prayer he stayed in the mosque to wait for the last prayer. After the last prayer he was still there when people had gone. We explained to him that the police station is just beside us and that we had received instructions not to accommodate a stranger in the mosque. He wanted to convince us of his good will, but we stood our ground and eventually he left." (Imam, Saaba)

There are also frustrations that can lead to exclusionary attitudes and behaviours or resentment towards the state. Some people live in conditions where they are forever suspected of being involved with the terrorists and others suffer from shock from daily exactions. Suspected of involvement with the terrorists, a man spent two years in prison:

> It's like this, I found myself imprisoned for two years in Ouagadougou. But what really hurts me it is the fact that my daughter has not been able to continue with her studies, because of the lack of money. She should have done her BEPC last year. My son is no longer at school since I was not there. Now what do I do with my two children who refuse to continue with their studies. I had put my hopes especially on my daughter, hoping that she would take responsibility for her younger brothers.

Behind such words, those who find they have been unjustly suspected of involvement with the terrorists expect compensation from the public authorities. These different changes in behaviour show how the citizens try to somehow adjust to the insecurities.

Conclusion

The different citizen initiatives developed to confront insecurities show that family education and the changing of behaviour play important roles. The rhetoric often becomes moralising in the sense that it is good education that will make members of the family safe from many insecurities. Also, the mobilisation of women for security questions is interesting in a context where security is perceived as "men's business." At the same time, they are important actors since they are in charge of the family home. The implications for farming in the fields have become a major constraint, especially for the women. Likewise, suspicion and distrust can easily take the lead in facing an uncertain sociability when people no longer know who is who. The Transition Regime resulting from the January 2022 coup is allegedly counting on citizen and community initiatives to initiate dialogue with local terrorist groups. That is nowadays purported as one solution against insecurity.

Chapter 8: To live in insecurity

In this chapter we describe how citizens, often in precarious conditions, experience multiple or daily insecurities. The aim is to shed light on "the human consequences of social disintegration", to use the words of Eriksen (2010). As a matter of fact, insecurities "seen and lived from below" could challenge the actual existence of the individual. This is because security and insecurity concern the very foundation of the human condition. We also examine how actors can maintain agency that is the capacity to act as opposed to what the structure imposes.

Food security

Poverty and the question of food constitute a source of insecurity for many citizens. The inaccessibility to farmlands has been growing over the years, due to terrorist attacks. The increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDS) does furthermore affect people's ability to food security. The main course of action remains the changing of life habits (Kibora 2015). For them, poverty is often associated with a lack of capacity to change their life conditions or their situation (Hagberg 2001). In Jula, the concept *fangntanya* (poverty) is constructed from absence (*ntan*) and force (*fanga*). In Burkina Faso, food security is something households must face, especially in the villages and particularly in the north. The main course of action for young men is still rural exodus, especially migration toward the gold mining sites, giving them the possibility to earn some income to deal with food necessities. In the north, food security is strongly dependent on climate conditions, especially rainfall, which determines the grain harvests (millet, maize, cowpea etc.) and the abundance of livestock. For some, food security requires a good rainy season and pasture for the livestock. Livestock constitutes a compensation in a food crisis situation. The sale of animals (goat, sheep, cattle, chicken) makes it possible to buy provisions: "If you sell your bull at the end of the harvest you can fill your granary."

Going to the gold panning sites is perceived as a way out. Young men seek to guarantee their own security by going to the gold panning sites, although with many negative consequences: "Last year, two young men from the village were caught in a landslide on a gold panning site not far from Essakane," a resident of the village Sambonaye confided in us. Thus, the sites allow these actors to fight

against insecurity in permitting them to buy provisions and the lucky ones come back to the village with a bit of money.

> Many young men go to Ivory Coast. They do 8 to 9 months there and come back during the winter season to help their parents with the farming and this constitutes an attachment to the land for the young and a way to overcome food insecurity. Some sell sunglasses or do some other small-scale business. They go on an adventure after the harvest, that is November-December, to come back when the first rains fall. (Young man from Sambonaye, Dori)

Women constitute the most vulnerable layer, since they are confronted with the caprices of nature (draught, the absence of plant cover for the small animals) and the lack of food. All these difficulties are an important source of food insecurity for women, who play an important role in the household food supply:

> We are confronted with destitution. There is not enough millet. We sell our sheep and our goats to buy provisions (millet, sorghum, sugar, oil). If we finish our meagre supplies, we can only lie down to die. The young ones can go to the sites or go to other countries, but the women and the old ones like us cannot leave the village and go to the gold sites or on an adventure. We can only stay and confront this insecurity or die. Women cannot leave and adventure on their own.

Food insecurity does not only refer to situations of extreme poverty but can also "strike" a family that in normal circumstances makes a decent living. Misfortunes such as illness, unemployment and death can lead families to insecurity. The poor is alone and without capacity to perform socially admirable actions at family ceremonies. "A poor person," as one interlocutor said in Bendogho more than 20 years ago, "is a lonely person without people around and everything is sad" (Hagberg 2001: 107).

Unemployment and job opportunities

> The major problem even for the young is employment, the fight against unemployment, you can understand that, can't you? (Leader for a youth movement, Tenkodogo)

The question of unemployment and job opportunities was raised throughout the discussions. The situation for the youth is characterised by growing unemployment. Another leader of a youth organisation from Tenkodogo painted a grim picture:

> I don't think the situation for the young in Tenkodogo is any different from the one experienced in the rest of the country, do you? The question is about employment. I think that is their main worry, isn't it? People don't have access to

> employment. This leads people to behave differently, either using drugs or in any event engaging in petty crimes. […] And it's like there are no prospects for them.

What is more, the idleness of the youth is perceived as a major threat to the country's stability. This traditional chief is in line with this logic with the following words: "There are many who have diplomas and do not have any way out. This is a social problem from where there could come a revolution" (Traditional chief and minister of the Naaba king, Tenkodogo).

In the Bittou municipality, youth idleness has become more acute these last years with the transfer of the border point of the customs office to Cinkansé: "Nothing can replace the customs office; everyone gets something out of it. The customs office is like a gold panning site, especially for a town like Bittou" (Freight forwarder, Bittou). This situation, according to this freight forwarder, may constitute fertile ground for the emergence of delinquency in the sense that people relied on a certain facility. For the former mayor of Bittou the situation is alarming:

> Right now all seems calm, but I see danger coming, because of the customs office leaving for Cinkansé; I told them, you want all the vehicles to move along normally and calmly but one day you will be surprised, because all these freight forwarders that have been abandoned, all these young people who lived off the presence of this customs office, all the women who lived off the presence of this customs office who now suddenly find themselves with nothing, it means that one day there will be problems, there will be problems because if a man sits down and he waits and waits and finally has nothing, he is ready to sacrifice his life. Exactly like terrorism, today if Boko Haram wants to infiltrate themselves here, they can do it easily; basically, the young ones if they are here or not, couldn't care less, there are no support measures, if someone comes along and suggests something to them, even if death is in front of them, they will leave.

The lack of employment encourages deviant behaviour like the use of drugs, theft or banditry: "People suffer, things are not good. There are drugs; the young go to university, they come out with diplomas and they don't get jobs. They can't resist the temptation" (Woman leader, Bittou).

The gathering of young people in the grins or the HQs is widely disliked. In Bobo-Dioulasso, the distance that exists between the communal authorities and the youth encourages these bad perceptions and that makes the authorities unaware of young people's concerns as the following remarks suggest:

> The authorities in the town hall think that the young just drink tea and don't want to do anything. No. You shouldn't have a bad opinion about the tea drinkers in the grins. Instead you should go and discuss with them. If the authorities could go to the grins often and talk with the young it would be good, because if you are a criminal and those who are fighting criminals are close to you, even if it doesn't end the bad things they might diminish.

Neglect of the youth is listed as one of the main reasons for the increased terrorism in the Sahel region.

> The major problem even for the young is employment, the fight against unemployment, you can understand that, can't you […] The biggest part is vagrancy. When you look today, insecurity or even jihadism exists in the neglected environments, do we understand each other; when I say neglected environments, they consider that they are suffering in comparison with other localities, so there is no way out anymore, they are frustrated. They say that a man who is hungry is no longer a free man. If someone comes along, he can be easily diverted because he is hungry.

In Djibo the same feelings stir up several interlocutors. One of them is this worker at an NGO:

> The fact that the young ones take to arms has been fostered by injustice, by idleness and the state's neglect of the Sahel. In the north, the state does not exist any longer since a long time back, so there are no schools, no town hall, no prefecture. The state has stepped down from its sovereign role. And that makes fertile ground for terrorism and jihadism.

Terrorism is fuelled by the precarious situation and young people who are more willing to join the terrorist groups. Insecurity has also made the socio-cultural foundations more fragile so that the values that were once advocated by the Fulbe culture have now been demoted to a secondary position:

> Insecurity is linked to the upheavals in the zone for some years now, which have an impact on the way of life, socio-cultural habits and people's economy. The Pulaaku[22] [the Fulbe dignity] which is a code of conduct, a way of life and a behaviour pattern of how to live and how to be, typical for the Fulbe, is over with the reduction of pastoral zones. If you are hungry you cannot sustain Pulaaku and you have no control.

The difficulties with livestock farming in the Sahel compel people to turn towards the mining sector. With the existence of several sites in localities like Essakane, Goulountougou, Gassel, Sokadjè, Wouro-boulo and even more sites in neighbouring Mali, many of these young people resort to gold panning. The young also favour seasonal migration in pursuit of well-being as the living con-

22 The concept of pulaaku indicates the appropriate qualities for the Fulbe, especially in public (Riesman 1974: 128): "Pulaaku being at the same time the men and their manner of being, it is clear that acting in Fulani means first and foremost to act like the others, act in such a way that the latter cannot detect the difference between you and themselves." Today, the concept of pulaaku has taken a political and associative direction, especially with the creation of the organisation Tabital pulaaku international (Hagberg 2011b).

ditions of their environment do not guarantee this. It means having to "look for money" to deal with the hazards of life.

> There have to be structural investments in the province (infrastructure, roads, drilling, schools) to find occupation for the young unemployed, that's the aim of the Urgency Program for the Sahel since the jihadists come with tempting proposals to the young. Someone who has never in his life seen the sum of 10,000FCFA and they give him 500,000FCFA, he will join.

Fear and worry

Our field research has detected the omnipresence of fear in people: "Today we are even afraid of putting the light on at night, because if someone is there in the dark, we cannot see him. In contrast, the one who is in the light can be seen." Even in zones where there have been no attacks, people are far from calm: "Whether they attack people or not is only a question of time. When they are finished with our security forces, which is the first obstacle for them, our turn will come." Since 2018, we have seen proofs of this.

Border insecurity accentuates the fear and worry since borders can be useful places of refuge. These feelings of fear and worry have come to light throughout the statements about security and insecurity:

> Tranquillity is this peace inside. I'm not safe, the attacks that have been committed have made us understand that no one is spared. We thought it was something from faraway. Someone who has experienced the attack cannot say that he is safe.

> Security is having a calm mind, you can work as you like. Fear does not exist.

> Before the attack, people were calm. We accommodated guests [or étrangers as people often say in Burkinabe French] without any problem or any second thoughts. But now, a person you don't know, you are even afraid of going up to him, everyone is holding back.

Here are testimonies that show the conditions some people live under following an attack:

> Because of the insecurity I sleep 21 km away from my workplace. In Madouba [municipality in the province of Kossi] I was in a house that was not only on the roadside but also opposite the police station.

> I am an imam in the mosque and every time someone asks for me, I get really frightened.

> What is sure is that one is not in safety, especially not during the night. I have no fixed place for sleeping. I sleep badly, because they could come and take me away quietly without the security forces knowing. During the night, when I hear

> the sound of two or three motorbikes, I get scared. But I have to muster up the courage so that my wife doesn't panic.

Fear does not limit itself to the populations only. Some say that the lack of adequate materials or training are reasons for the presence of fear and worry in the police forces. Others say it is due to lack of courage. These statements are examples:

> We are afraid, but our security forces are afraid too.

> People say that the terrorists' equipment is powerful. That's not true, it is only fear. During the attack, I was out of my house. Six people stopped near my home, I could see them well, they tried to leave discreetly and I went to the police building. I tried to call the gendarmes and the police officers, but it went straight to answer phone.

> Facing the attack, the gendarmes fled without trying to defend themselves.

> A soldier who escapes without coming back, that is serious. And we, the simple citizens, what can we do? The terrorists can come back since security is weak.

Despite the presence of defence and security forces, people do not feel reassured. "They say in the village that the terrorists will come back. This is what makes people afraid."

Within the framework of denunciation, people no longer feel protected. In addition, our interlocutors do not feel that their protection is guaranteed: "If you give them a key piece of information about the terrorists, they put you in a van and do a tour of the whole town or village and they expose you to the terrorists." However, fear does not stop people from taking part in the fight against terrorism. The president of a Village Development Committee (CVD) confided in us: "I work together with the police to inform them about the terrorists' movements, about suspect persons."

In the municipality there is no support centre for the after-effects of terrorism, especially with regard to fear and worry. Many affected people live out their anxiety and other depressions in isolation or at best with the support of family and friends. On a national level, the psycho-social care of traumas linked to insecurity remains problematic.

Violence against women

Women are often confronted with different kinds of violence; physical, moral or psychological. These types of violence manifest themselves on different levels: forced marriages, female genital mutilations, levirate marriages, rapes, assassinations, accusations of witchcraft etc. When it comes to assassinations, a municipal councillor gave us an account of the situation in Saaba: "I can say that we are

really concerned about security. We're only at the beginning of the rainy season and at least three or four women have been killed."

On the subject of witchcraft, women may be accused and banished from their village. Many are welcomed in social centres, but their reintegration into their original family poses a problem. There are also other difficulties that this inspector of social affairs in Kaya related in these words:

> Allegations of witchcraft exist. If you go to Ouaga, in the district of Sakoula ex-Delwende, you will see a lot of women from the province there. They even forbid children to go and visit their mothers. I think that the biggest problem is reintegrating these women, how to work when they return? The problem of re-integration is always there, because it is very uncommon to see a woman accused of witchcraft returning to her family, to her community. […] The return of these women accused of witchcraft leads to acts of vengeance and disputes within the families. Moreover, it is because of this they are at the centres.

Directly or indirectly, women are subject to new ordeals of violence through terrorism. Some women in Djibo recounted this:

> I know a 36-year old woman from Nassoumbou, whose husband was killed by the terrorists. The latter, after having killed her husband, left with the family's animals, leaving the widow and her children in poverty. Today she lives in the village Pabé with at least five children, without a house because she lives in a straw hut in a field.
>
> There are women who help their husbands working in the fields. With the terrorists banning women from helping their husbands in the fields, hunger will kill some families. Households in certain villages will experience famine.
>
> We are tired, strangers are scared to come here to Djibo. Business does not work any longer and this has an impact on our families. Before, I sold my milk and yoghurt all the way to Kerboulé, Inata where a director of a school was one of my biggest clients and came to buy my products to resell them. Since the situation has deteriorated, no one comes here.

Finally, the terrorists try to impose a dress code for women, the wearing of the veil and the ban against trousers. This woman's words point at this fact:

> They now forbid women to wear hair extensions in certain villages. Me, I wear hair extensions, because I don't care. I will not let fear win over me. I even wear trousers as you can see.

Women are victims of several forms of violence: psychological, moral, domestic and physical. If you add terrorism to this, women are confronted with new forms of violence, which can lead to an uncertain social situation involving both psychosis and rebellion.

Robberies

In all the studied municipalities, one manifestation of insecurity are the robberies and the hold-ups. The inhabitants' collective memory brings up numerous cases of attacks orchestrated in the homes, in shopping areas or on the main roads. In Bittou, the main security problems, according to a Commander of the gendarmerie, are the "aggressions and hold-ups originating from Ghana." The money transfer shops called *Airtel money* (nowadays *Orange money*) have endured the fury of armed bandits these last years.

This type of attack was also experienced in Ouahigouya, as this final year student's words show: "For example here, not more than one week ago, there was an armed robbery on an Orange money shop around 10 o'clock in the daytime."

These cases of robbery occur in the middle of the day at a time when the money transfer shops are active. The robbery of the money transfer shop at the crossroads in Mogandé on the main road between Bittou and Cinkansé is one example. On 18 October 2017 around 6.45 pm armed robbers with uncovered faces came on foot to strip a fruit shop manager of her daily transactions. After their deed, the bandits fired some warning shots in the street and left on foot in the direction of Ghana. In the same way the Caisse Populaire beside the central market in Tiébélé and only a few metres away from the gendarmerie brigade was robbed in broad daylight on Monday 9 December by robbers without hoods who left calmly, shooting warning shots in the air.

Some main roads are especially exposed to robberies. After the transfer of the customs office's border services to Cinkansé in 2014, many users have been victims of armed robberies:

> The moment the customs office had moved to Cinkansé, ah, the freight freight forwarders suffered. Ah, over there they stop you, they take everything from you, they take your mobiles; if you are on a motorbike, they cut the cables and empty the tank there. When they have finished their operation, you have to push it yourself.

A place situated after a bridge on the main road between Bittou and Cinkansé had the reputation of being a place for recurring attacks. A hangar in corrugated metal serving as a control point office for the police had even been set up near this place but had quickly been ransacked by the bandits.

The rural tracks are great places for the bandits. These unpaved tracks are not regularly controlled by the defence and security forces in the same way as the paved roads. This permits the bandits to commit crimes and then disappear without interference. It was on such a rural track in the Sidéradougou municipality that two forestry agents met their deaths in March 2018 when they happened to come across bandits who were robbing a transport vehicle (Lefaso.net 26/3/2018).

The rural track connecting the town of Tenkodogo with Ouargaye is subjected to hold-ups, as this shopkeeper and member of a women's association in Tenkodogo tells us:

> One day [in 2017] we were coming back from Ouargaye. The highway bandits stopped us on the way. The driver almost left the road, we were all going to tip over with the truck. With God's grace they disappeared. […] Every time we take that road we are scared.
>
> Two weeks ago, the highway bandits stopped our truck on the same route, on the road to Ouargaye. It was the Koglweogos that came to our rescue and they fled. If the Koglweogos weren't there, we wouldn't be able to continue going to do the market in Ouargaye. So, we agree with the Koglweogos more than the security people do. [laughter]

The frequency of robberies is ascribed to the intense trafficking of firearms. This student, who had his motorcycle taken following a robbery in Ouahigouya, pointed this out: "Arms trafficking is real, the increasing number of robberies is proof of this. People walk around with guns."

In addition to this factor, it is above all the lack of reaction from the defence and security forces that facilitates the occurrence of robberies. In Saaba, these testimonies show that this form of insecurity is a local problem, which makes people more prone to turn to the Koglweogos:

> The day when the thieves walked into the SONAPOST we were around the corner and after the first shot there was a young man with us who ran to inform the police station a few metres away. Finally, it was when all was over, and the thieves had gone, that the police arrived at the spot asking us in which direction these thieves had gone. (Imam, Saaba)

This leader of an association who was the victim of a robbery at his house explained to us:

> That day I called the police, but the hours passed, and I saw no one. I decided to go to the police station. When I arrived, they asked me what had happened and when I explained, the police officers asked me what I did to the thieves. I was taken aback by their question. How can I say what I did to the thieves when they came into my house with firearms? They asked me to call 1010 [the alert number to the gendarmerie]. The thieves knew very well that they would have time to finish their mission before anyone would disturb them, because the police never intervene when the thieves are still there.

In the towns as well as in the countryside, armed robberies are one of the forms in which insecurity seen and lived from below manifests itself. Often resulting in injuries or deaths by bullets, they remain traumatising for people who have experienced any such situation.

Normalisation of violence

Violence is based on a disproportionate use of force. It is based on physical or verbal aggression (Le Run 2012). Once violence is recurrent, it eventually leads to some sort of habituation. People get used to violence through seeing it around them or through the media and social media sites. The word violence becomes a euphemism in itself. In Burkina Faso, the criminality that has developed with armed attacks on the main roads has often been the base for physical aggression, rape and even killings. The multitude of acts of violence has eventually made people accustomed to them in one way or another. When there are more aggressions committed without victims in terms of assassinations, the events become talking points, told between friends and close ones in their spare time. The direct victims of the aggressions live through and handle the aftermath as well as they can. It was in the context of the escalation of various dramatic accounts that the self-defence groups Koglweogos were established. Their acts of torture are often filmed and distributed on social media to show that, as long as physical violence is exercised on the bandits, it is acceptable. They have in this way progressively assisted in normalising violence.

Since the popular insurrection in 2014, expressions of violence have become prominent in the public arena of Burkina Faso. The many dead people after manifestations linked to the insurrection and the failed coup in September 2015 have integrated violence into the everyday life of the Burkinabe. This has in a way forged a conscience of acceptance of violence, to the point that scenes of violence that historically would have been strongly upsetting are observed with a fleeting frown and are quickly forgotten. The escalation of terrorist attacks with many civilian and military victims has bolstered this situation, leading to the normalisation of violence. One could cut up a terrorist in a thousand pieces in front of a camera and the most reserved persons would comment on it approvingly. Violence is accepted when it concerns a bandit, the enemy of the moment. Normalisation prevails because of the repeated acts of violence and because of their everyday nature. Finally, "it doesn't mean anything anymore to people" to violate the fundamental rights of the individual through violence. And that is why some people, who think that they are unfair victims of the defence and security forces in their fight against terrorism, accuse them of having normalised certain forms of violence (in word and action), they, the representatives of the state: of law and order.

Many people begin to accept that any violence should be answered with violence. Everything unfolds like during a devastating epidemic. When you are forced to watch death on a daily basis within a community, you stop being afraid of death, it becomes a commonplace phenomenon. You adopt ritual shortcuts that strip funerals of their solemn character, because death itself has become banal. This form of banalisation has consequences on community life. When a person internalises acts of violence and begins to think of them in the context of ordinary facts, he can be led to unconsciously reproduce them. Therefore, the violence committed in inter- or intra-community conflicts, terrorist cells,

self-defence groups and the FDS (defence and security forces) becomes sometimes anecdotal. This contagion is dangerous for the establishment of a true human security.

Representations of the terrorist

Throughout the different interviews one can also detect numerous prejudices, stereotypes, and hearsays expressed by the interlocutors without tangible or verifiable evidence. These have to do with cultural representations or stereotypical interpretations, reinforced by a large amount of fake news circling around the town or on social media. One of those representations is that of the "terrorist" as the Other, serving as a scapegoat.

In the current security context, the representation of the terrorist has many characteristics that have developed over the last years. In the first instance, the terrorist was associated with the stranger. To be a stranger (*duna* in Jula, *saana* in Mooré, *beero* in Fulfuldé) is not at all a problem in itself. The word stranger signifies the one who comes from elsewhere and at the same time the one who comes by. The status of a stranger is established in relation to the host; one is always a stranger to someone else. Jean-Loup Amselle suggests the concept stranger to be "social and performative; it can, from case to case, be positive or negative" (Amselle 1996: 758). In his study of the Fulbe from Barani, settled in the Comoé province (Banfora), Hagberg demonstrates that the status of a stranger with these people can be a bridge to inclusion rather than a boundary of exclusion: "When Fulbe agro-pastoralists accept to depend upon the hosts – that is, local farmers – the strangerhood may develop into bonds of friendship and mutually beneficial neighbourhood relations. But the Fulbe strangerhood is likely to become a boundary of exclusion when land and power are contested" (Hagberg 2000: 176).

A few years ago, with the first terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, people got the idea that the perpetrators of these attacks were foreigners. In particular, the attackers were often identified as "Tuareg" or "Berber" according to the physical characteristics. For example, the assailants of the attack on Avenue Kwame N'Krumah in January 2016, killed by the special forces, were of Malian origin. For many citizens it was at the time unthinkable that the Burkinabe could attack other Burkinabe in the heart of the capital Ouagadougou.

Following different attacks, this representation of the "foreign terrorist" was later complemented with that of the "Fulbe terrorist." With the incessant attacks in the Soum province carried out by the Salafist jihadist group *Ansarul Islam*, established in 2016 and led by preacher Malam Dicko, the terrorist was no longer just a stranger but had become associated with Fulbe ethnicity. The crisis in the centre of Mali had thus spread to the north of Burkina Faso (Hagberg et al. 2017a; Benjaminsen 2018; Sangaré 2016). Since then, the cultural representation of the Fulbe, discussed by numerous authors (Botte 1994; De Bruijn and Van Dijk 1997; Hagberg 2000; Riesman 1974), became the ultimate cultural matrix

of the terrorist. More precisely, the Fulbe from Djibo (the Djelgôbé) are accused of being in complicity with the terrorists. The repeated attacks are, according to some sources, aimed at the "feudality" of the traditional chieftaincies and neighbouring communities since the jihadists are recruited among the Rimaïbe (former captives), frustrated and marginalised by Fulbe aristocracy. People of Fulbe origin are often perpetrators of armed attacks, which means that even the concept of a crook takes on a Fulbe dimension. This blaming of the Fulbe is not a new thing but exists within an ancient cultural representation (Hagberg 2004). The representation of the Fulbe terrorist has nevertheless been modified following a sweep search of a terrorist cell in the district of Rayongo in Ouagadougou, where the attackers were of other ethnicities. Even if this prejudice stays engrained, the conviction that the terrorists can come from all the different ethnicities in Burkina Faso is increasingly shared by public opinion.

The third element of the representation of the terrorist is linked to Sunni (or Salafist/Wahabi) Islam. The revelations after the attack in Samorogouan in October 2015 indicated that a Sunni imam had sheltered terrorists. It also emerged that the attackers of Avenue Kwame N'Krumah in January 2016 had prayed in the Sunni mosque close to the scene of the attack. The representation of the "Sunni-terrorist" is widespread and connected with the Salafist networks of Ansar Dine in Mali.

In January 2019, following the Yirgou massacre, protest marches were organised in Ouagadougou, in Bobo-Dioulasso and in Dori to say no to the ethnic stigmatisations. An association has even been created for this purpose. These examples show that questions of identity, especially ethnicity, are increasingly being exploited by armed groups and by state actors.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to demonstrate how people experience everyday insecurities. The aim is to see how different social categories are exposed to dangers and attacks. The normalisation of violence was highlighted as a possible consequence of "human disintegration." Also, we have reflected upon the amalgam of identities, according to which "the strangers", "the Fulbe" and "the Sunni" are accused of colluding with the forces of evil, from now on the common name for the terrorists in Burkina Faso.

Chapter 9: A reshaped local political arena

The multiple insecurities seen and experienced in the Burkinabe municipalities have consequences on community life. Our field research shows that for most interlocutors, security refers to peace, calm, the absence of trouble in a given social environment etc. The insecurities the Burkinabe must deal with have also contributed to the reshaping of the local political arena. This reshaping is structured around leaders, shopkeepers and their access to rural markets, around traditional and religious leaders, migrants and strangers and also around gender.

Municipal councillors, local leaders and civil society

The new political configuration in Burkina Faso on a municipal level was quite diverse even if the party in power (the MPP) had the majority throughout the country. In the 13 municipalities that were studied in our research, two were run by the UPC, one by the CDP, one by PDS/Metba and 9 others by the MPP. Elected local representatives are at the heart of the security problem. Some were killed during the attacks and others were arrested by the defence and security forces on suspicion of complicity with the terrorists. The councillors are expected to know their surrounding environment better and to control security questions on a local level. However, the political changes have taken place in a context of strong opposition between two main tendencies where the winners of yesterday are the losers of today. The "terrorism accusations" might be at the heart of settling political scores in the municipalities. It is difficult to be firmly rooted in local politics for a democratic culture that does not want political adversity to be transferred to the spheres of social life, particularly in the case of delicate questions like the security domain. This reinforces the feeling that a political opponent is a potential enemy who is ready to make a pact with any other enemy to harm the power in place. Municipal councillors do not hesitate to accuse their political opponents of not doing anything to help them in the fight against insecurity. Some go as far as hinting that their political opponents have tacit agreements with the terrorists. When some interlocutors mention the necessary agreement between "the daughters and sons of the local community" to fight against insecurity, they are not far from thinking similarly.

Many local leaders are "discredited" due to attitudes of complicity with current or past leaders, by taking positions of partiality and by losing charisma in the management of certain social problems. They lose their neutrality as a result of

being indoctrinated by party politics. Their actions in the public arena have therefore little impact on the conscience of young people, whose expectations grow progressively larger.

On a municipal level, the civil society organisations that work with public awareness training initiatives are hardly seen, that is, non-existent. They are typically concentrated to the big urban centres, and the ones in the countryside are based on development and socio-economic integration activities that do not necessarily include security. Furthermore, many civil society organisations on a local level do not escape the political manipulations ahead of upcoming elections. Thus, certain local leaders who have lost their aura of the past engage in increasing the frustrations rather than working towards ironing them out. However, municipal councillors, local leaders and civil society organisations are facing challenges in this new national security context. The aim for them is to achieve, through concrete, positive actions, to restore their images and maintain their roles for a new social pact. They are the principal actors in the creation of a local security framework coupled with an inclusive democratic process.

Traditional chiefs and religious leaders

Traditional chiefs and religious leaders are, in popular thinking, "community leaders." People therefore expect a lot from them regarding any problem that affects community life. The question of insecurity has not undermined their social power. The fact that they are the target of terrorist attacks is not insignificant. Nevertheless, there is a sort of powerlessness on behalf of the traditional chiefs to implement measures which could bring back a level of trust and calm within the community in the context of the fight against insecurity. Even more so, in certain localities, the discords linked to the traditional chieftaincies are themselves a source of insecurity for the population. Their security depends on that.

The actions of religious leaders are important on the ground. Some of them do not hesitate to independently adopt attitudes in their religious practices to reassure people and to create a climate of tranquillity. This is the case with an imam who after the terrorist attacks in his locality stopped using *Allahu akbar* (God is the greatest in Arabic) in the morning call to prayer through the loudspeakers of his mosque. Traditional chiefs and religious leaders are on the whole seen as figures capable of taking strong initiatives against the insecurities. The ideal of peace and the ideal of better community life can be an asset. On the reverse side lies the risk of manipulating religious teachings within the question of insecurity, drawing parallels to new forms of insecurity and an increase in violent and religious extremism, all of which are sadly not just simple creations of the mind. The empowerment of religious leaders and traditional chiefs could produce positive results in terms of them taking control of communities and identifying where and how to work to fight against insecurity. Their legitimacy is still significant within many Burkinabe communities. The traditional chiefs are guarantors of cultural values, which can be used to nurture attitudes and

conduct among people to ban the deviant behaviours that lead to insecurity practices among people. Beyond religious differences, the Burkinabe share cultural values that can always be mobilised thanks to the joint engagement of community and religious leaders on a local level. However, the same values can sometimes be exploited to incite hatred and the rejection of the Other.

Merchants and local markets

Insecurity is closely linked to the marketplace, the commercial sector and their actors. Many interlocutors affirmed that insecurity quite rightly harms the socio-economic development in their community. Since the middle of the 1990s, the rise in insecurity has been marked by robberies on the roads that lead to rural markets. Merchants of grain, cotton and cattle etc. have for a long time been the robbers' victims of preference. Nonetheless, being obliged to take these roads, the merchants have embraced attitudes of individual and collective resilience and the markets have continued to function in spite of everything. Holdups often take place in the middle of the day in the markets of rural communities since the bandits are confident of their power and aware of the weak response from the public forces. This situation has encouraged people to take charge of their own security, which in turn has led to the birth of self-defence groups who have given relief to some of those who suffer everyday insecurities, although with varied success.

Certain local markets have been "killed" by the terrorist attacks whose reputation has moved beyond the communal borders. In some villages the attacks are committed in the middle of the market day. Some of the main highways under permanent control by the terrorists have been abandoned by the merchants, who risk not only being robbed but also losing their life. The regions in the north where there are big livestock markets and those in the east that host the big sale centres for grain suffer direct commercial consequences from insecurity. From east to west and from north to south-west, insecurity has a significant impact on cross-border commerce with regards to the lack of basic social services. While trade maintained with the neighbouring countries also strengthened the relationships between cross-border populations, today this situation has changed in a negative way.

Perceptions of the migrant and the stranger

In Burkina Faso, cross-border insecurity has always been a reality. Trafficking and other types of smuggling are made possible by borders generally lacking sufficient monitoring forces. Nevertheless, the consequences of the recurring terrorist attacks in the cross-border zones have altered social links. Where people once found it difficult to see the border as a rupture line between two communities, they wish today that there was a door there that they could close on occasion in order to sleep in safety. Those who come from the other side of the

"artificial" border (Hagberg and Tengan 2000) are as of now viewed differently. The Other is no longer seen as a potential alter ego but rather the likely factor or carrier of insecurity. Terrorism works against the fundamental values of welcoming, hospitality and consideration for the Other coming from somewhere else. Mistrust and incidents of racial profiling arise, and the migrant and the stranger are met with suspicion. People no longer hesitate to hand in "serious suspects" for interrogation after demanding to see their identity documents. The perception of the migrant and the stranger are changing, because a stranger and a migrant today are synonymous with a potential terrorist. Even now that it is proven that not all terrorists come from elsewhere, many interlocutors still firmly believe that the other side of the border is the nest or the base of those who spread the terror. The border as a synonym for insecurity has meant that people assimilate, a priori, all those who come from the other side of the border as people who ought to be mistrusted. This mistrust concerns even children from the village who return after being away for many years. They are not received with cries of joy and ululations from the women, but with inquisitive looks and attitudes of mistrust.

Gender and security

The question of gender refers to the roles, attitudes and values society ascribe to men and women. These elements can be strongly discriminatory and marked with inequality. We approach the topic of gender in an insecurity context in Burkina Faso. It is often assumed that men, who are more likely to travel and engage in major socio-economic activities, are the greater victims of insecurity and the more significant actors of security. Many women are silent victims of sexual assaults like rape, scarring them psychologically for life. Furthermore, it is a source of moral torture for many women when their spouse or child become active participants in the sphere of insecurity, since they are permanently torn between family love and the desire for justice.

"The woman is the home" is a saying shared by many Burkinabe. According to this perception, the woman is central to social cohesion. Hence, all that concerns sociability passes by her or has an impact on her. The woman suffers the effects of insecurity in two ways, when she is a direct target or when her spouse or offspring are affected. However, the woman is not equally involved by the public authorities in the action towards security (Dicko-Zouboye and Sangare-Coulibaly 2011). Nevertheless, insecurity hampers women's socio-economic development. Women can indeed be important actors in the fight against insecurity, taking on the role of social educator for children and counsellor for adults. "A woman's mouth is her quiver" says a Moaaga proverb. From this quiver, arrows of awareness and changes of behaviour can fly, from family education at an early age to giving advice to married couples later in life. To better include them in the domain of insecurity prevention and the defence of human security is crucial. The special needs of women in security matters are often not

taken into consideration (Valasek 2008). In early 2023, there are close to two million internally displaced persons in Burkina Faso because of insecurity. Women and children are the main inhabitants of the camps that receive these refugees in their own country. If it is women who carry the weight of insecurity, it is through them insecurity in all its forms could be more efficiently fought.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we wanted to make a synthesis of the major trends observed in the Burkinabe municipalities. The problem of security, especially this new expression of insecurity linked to attacks committed by armed individuals with ambiguous intentions, have strongly affected community life. With our centre of interest being reading the local or "the municipality as a point of entry", we observe that the insecurities have reshaped the local socio-political arena. The traditional actors in community life have suffered the consequences of insecurity. However, most of them are actors in the fight against insecurity since they have socio-cultural means to invest in these fights. We need to know what to act on in order to transform this negative impact into an opportunity in the field of social change.

Chapter 10: Conclusions

In this anthropological study, essentially based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in 2018–2019, we have analysed citizens' perceptions and perspectives of security and safety challenges in Burkina Faso. We have entered through the municipality to do qualitative field research in 13 Burkinabe municipalities with the objective of understanding the realities and perspectives of local actors – traditional and religious authorities, municipal councillors and "the ordinary citizen," that is, women and men living in municipalities and trying to make do.

By choosing "the entry through the municipality", we have wanted to be as close as possible to the ordinary citizens without falling into ideological populism (cf. Olivier de Sardan 2008), celebrating the local and the ordinary as something authentic outside the dirt of politics (Carrel and Neveu 2014). In addition, while it should be pointed out that "ordinary citizens" and "local officials" might well have different perspectives, as residents they are forced to act and interact within the community and the municipality. And their perceptions and perspectives as seen and lived from below make way for profound social transformations in a context where the decentralisation process, going on for nearly two decades now, struggles to take root in national governance (Hagberg et al. 2019a). This is all the more important to remember at a time when democratically elected municipal councils have been dissolved and replaced by special delegations appointed since the taking of power by the MPSR in January 2022.

The municipality as opportunity or threat

A decentralised "good governance" à la World Bank is at the heart of the high expectations from state development actors and their partners. The regular organization of municipal elections has resulted in socio-political reconfigurations in the local political arena. The municipality is a new local institution that was created to invent and mobilize the local (Hagberg 2010). These reconfigurations are, however, not always perceived as a foundation on which to build a new form of democracy adapted to the local reality. The municipal councillors find themselves at the heart of political issues which often go beyond contradictions on the local level. Municipal politics can sometimes constitute a pole of political opposition to national power-holders, as for example in Dori (Barry and Hagberg 2019). Yet, the councillors represent a local power alongside the traditional leaders. As a result, the municipality is as much a threat as it is an opportunity:

a threat in the sense that the terrorist attacks primarily concern municipalities like those in the Soum province (Djibo) where the terrorists seek isolation or territorial possession from the municipality, sometimes in complicity with elected local officials; an opportunity because the same local officials risk their lives when they spread information and contribute to the fight against insecurities. The elected municipal councils were dissolved following the popular insurrection in 2014 and more recently following the January coup in 2022, and replaced by appointed special delegations. And, yet, the institution itself – the municipal council – prevails despite that transition regimes appoint technocratic councils to serve as interim decision-making assembly for democratically elected ones.

However, suspicion of the political opponent creates fissures that make circumstances fragile. A Jula proverb says that "the geckos come into the house through the cracks in the wall." In other words, the political opponent is often conceptualised as "he who refuses" (*baanbaga* in Jula, *naamcisba* in Mooré); the opponent is seen as someone who is against the mayor and his leadership team. Actions to combat insecurities must therefore in the first place involve the municipalities, especially the rural ones that are very remote from the central state in terms of infrastructure and protection by the security forces. Everything emerge through the municipality and it is also through the municipality everything should start. Hence, the municipality is simultaneously an opportunity and a threat to security and safety.

The defence and security forces

The defence and security forces remain the main actors in the fight against insecurity, especially in relation to terrorist attacks. While our interlocutors talk about the need to implement state authority or to secure an area, they think of strong action from the defence and security forces. While the presence of these forces may be reassuring, their lack in number and materials is in itself an element of insecurity. Also, the incriminations vis-à-vis the defence and security forces are connected with their incapacity to protect the citizens, especially when they are bearers of information. Their responsiveness is also questioned, and examples are quoted to show that they do not act out of fear and that they intervene very late, after the bandits have had time to commit their crimes. And even worse, reports indicate that the lack of responsiveness during terrorist attacks further undermine the legitimacy of these forces, such as in for instance Solhan in June 2021. In short, people's assessments of the defence and security forces are mixed.

There is disappointment, and even despair, when people's expectations are not fulfilled. At the same time, our interlocutors consider that the defence and security forces are the better trained to fight against this new form of insecurity (terrorism). The breach of trust is often due to the forces not being sufficiently "integrated" in local society, that is, they are not listening enough to the ordinary citizens. The officers ask people to cooperate despite not doing anything

to encourage such a cooperation. There seems to be no prior dialogue between the defence and security forces and the people ahead of interventions. Suspicion and distrust characterise their relationships. It is in this context that one has to understand official references to "the growing of strength" of the these forces since the coup d'état in January 2022.

Self-defence groups

Self-defence groups are at the centre of the insecurity problems in Burkina Faso. Apart from the Dozos, who are strongly anchored in ancestral cultural traditions of certain societies, many self-defence groups were born in a context of multiple insecurities. These groups are the subject of various assessments by the citizens. While their acts of war are welcomed when they manage to get hold of the bandits, people do not fail to underline the abuse of power and other exactions committed by self-defence groups against honest citizens. These mixed feelings toward the self-defence groups lead many interlocutors to consider that these groups could be used as local representatives (*auxiliaries*) to the defence and security forces as long as they are "better controlled", without being able to specify what such a control would entail. Some, more precisely, demand that these groups are transformed into community police, which the Burkinabe government has had a hard time putting in place. They would then primarily become early warning and intelligence officers. The government has decided to consider them as a Local Security Initiative, by producing texts that guide them. However, this government initiative has had quite a weak response from the self-defence groups. Fear of seeing them transform into armed groups or militiamen in the pay of politicians is a feeling widely shared. The self-defence groups have shown their limits as they in certain cases show no respect for human rights, which proves that these movements could turn into a sort of mafia (Bojsen and Compaoré 2019; Hagberg 2018, 2019b; Kibora et al. 2018). The emergence of self-defence groups raises questions, particularly with regard to the different movements and the implications of ethnical identity claims of the local vigilantes. In January 2020, the creation of *Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie* (VDP) became a legally approved way of mobilizing volunteers in villages and neighbourhoods to fight terrorism. Since then many Koglweogos have come to fill the ranks of VDPs, hence confirming the link between the State and the Koglweogos. Since then, many VDPs have been killed in the fight against terrorism, as they are the first line of defence against jihadist attacks (Hagberg et al. 2023 forthcoming).

Mobilising women

The role and place of women is taken into consideration in the debate about insecurity. Gender inequality is an insecurity factor. On the subject of food, land and social violence, women suffer insecurity on an everyday basis. Gender

equity should be at the centre of the fight against insecurity in all its forms. Nevertheless, for many interlocutors "security is men's business." This perception seems to be related to the profound effect that conflicts leave behind, where men become the visible actors and women the invisible ones. However, the woman ultimately suffers the counterweight of all insecurity, many interlocutors said, because she is usually the foundation of the household. Direct aggression against her or indirect against her spouse or offspring brand her in her socio-economic situation. Quite often, women experience situations of insecurity in silence, with all that constitutes a psychological burden. In addition, women are more visible in IDP camps than men, particularly because of the interests of international donors and humanitarians to support women and children (see Hagberg et al. 2023b forthcoming).

Women are the main educators of children from a young age and they are also close to men as advisors and often confidants. The status of mother, wife and sister gives women moral authority. For us, this is why the mobilisation of women (also in the defence and security forces and in the psychosocial care of traumas caused by insecurity) is fundamental for fighting efficiently against insecurity. However, we think that a bigger involvement of women requires that the crisis of masculinity prevalent in Burkina Faso is taken seriously: young men incapable of providing for their own needs and making ends meet to be able to settle down; sexist attitudes and discrimination against women; sexual harassments on an everyday basis etc. (Hagberg et al. 2021). The last years, there are reports on the presence of women both in self-defence groups and in some terrorist groups. This constitutes a new dimension of the mobilization of women in security/insecurity.

The omnipresence of insecurity and the loss of trust

In the municipalities, there is a general feeling of multiple insecurities. No one is safe anywhere, because the terrorists (jihadists, robbers, thugs) do whatever they like, whenever they want and wherever they want, "because they are among us, they are part of us." To this is added the fact that the citizens perceive that the defence and security forces are at the end of their tether. They have real difficulties without equipment and with a faltering morale, factors that are reflected in their slack response. Trust between the governor and the governed is very weak. This lack of trust established itself due to the way the informants of the FDS, and the way their information were treated by both local socio-political actors and the defence and security forces.

The fact that the military coup of January 2022 did not lead to massive popular protests may be explained by the strong beliefs among the Burkinabe in the capacity of the soldiers to put an end to insecurity. However, with recurrent terrorist attacks, popular distrust in the transition regime increased, leading to the taking of power by Captain Ibrahim Traoré on 30 September 2022. The new regime has enjoyed some popular support and with the appointment of

Apollinaire Kyélem de Tambèla on 21 October 2022 as Prime Minister, many Burkinabe are in a Wait-and-See position.

Even among citizens, trust is no longer immediate or unconditional, because "no one knows who's who any longer." The identity controls witnessed on the ground speak volumes. Thus, the multiple insecurities demonstrate how an "uncertain sociability" is experienced by the citizens in the Burkinabe municipalities. The legendary Burkinabe (even African) hospitality, risks taking a serious blow in the context of mistrust and suspicion. Over the years since 2018, when the main ethnographic fieldwork was carried out, the security situation has further deteriorated in Burkina Faso.

*

We would like to conclude this study with a general discussion on how security from below, as seen and lived by the Burkinabe citizens, could be mobilised against the multiple insecurities. If family education is a means of resistance, emphasis could be placed on support for informal and non-formal education as well as literacy campaigns to reinforce the power of women in decision-making. Violent community conflicts have furthermore impacted the social bonds linking people together (Hagberg et al. 2023b forthcoming).

Another initiative could be the promotion of local civic and democratic debates to strengthen social dialogue. Elected representatives need to first sit down and talk in order to face the problems in the municipality, followed by all the socio-political actors who are not involved in party politics. Grassroots initiatives that promote intercultural and interreligious dialogues within the municipalities should also be supported. This is to safeguard the values of a more peaceful coexistence, which is starting to crumble in some social environments, districts etc. Furthermore, trust between governor and the governed has weakened considerably. Transparency and accountability are the major pillars of a return to trust. To be of service to the citizens should be the course of action for any official.

The establishment of community policing would be an asset for supporting the defence and security forces with their daily tasks. It is time to enforce rules of the game where human rights must be imperatively respected by the self-defence groups. Inaction from public authorities could lead to extremely dangerous situations. Yet, the creation of *Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie* (VDP) is indeed ambiguous, because the VDPs see many losses in the ranks, making us wonder whether they have become the cannon fodder in the fight against terrorism.

Traumas following terrorist attacks are not taken care of accordingly. There are many cases in which citizens have experienced dramatic and terrifying situations while public services have not been able to do anything. Such traumas must be taken seriously for the general well-being of the population, especially in the so-called red zones (Hagberg 2019a).

The current insecurities challenge conventional masculinities and femininities in Burkina Faso. Instead of continuing to think of the woman in the traditional roles of "mother", "sister" and "daughter", who could contribute to peace, gender-based analyses that challenge these roles should be a prerequisite to support different initiatives (Hagberg et al. 2021). The mobilisation of women in security matters is also motivated by the masculinity crisis experienced by young men.

The sacrifices of local actors should be recognised. While the daughters and sons of the Nation killed during the popular insurrection in October 2014 or during the resistance against the coup in September 2015 were recognised with the Monument of National Heroes at Ouaga2000 (Gabriel 2017), there are also people in the municipalities who are sacrificed in silence. All those who have sacrificed themselves to save people in the municipalities, in the villages, in the towns and in the whole country must be honoured in the naming of streets and squares, and in the raising of statues not to forget them, so that they can serve as references for current and future generations.

The Burkinabe municipalities fight to anchor and deepen local democracy at the same time as they are directly affected by insecurity. A true security from below needs the municipality as a socio-political arena, public space and cultural representation. This is why funding programs and joint actions must strengthen – and not bypass – the Burkinabe municipalities. Security from below will otherwise be diametrically opposed to all attempts to centralise the surveillance interventions and cooperation agreements with the central government.

Epilogue: Burkina Faso seen from below in early 2023

Sten Hagberg and Ludovic O. Kibora

The field research in Burkina Faso for this study on security from below was carried out on the basis of ethnographic investigations in a highly dynamic social context, and under ever changing political circumstances. The study followed up collaborative research carried out on socio-political transformations between 2014 and 2016 (Hagberg et al. 2017b, 2018) by a team of researchers, of what was later to become the research lab LACET (*Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Comparative, Engagée et Transnationale*). A main conclusion of the study of Burkinabe socio-political transformations was that security would be an increasingly important research theme in the years to come. Security was on everyone's minds: the security apparatus of the fallen regime, terrorist attacks both in Ouagadougou and in rural municipalities far off the main roads, the Malian crisis, the proliferation of armed robberies, the growth of self-defence movements, notably the Koglweogos, etc.

Hence, security and safety issues were a growing concern in the country, particularly after the Fall of Compaoré in October 2014. Some voices were raised indicating that Burkina Faso would not be a safe haven any longer. So, while Burkina Faso was in the midst of the one-year political transition in 2014–2015, terrorist attacks occurred in April and in October 2015. Just after the swearing-in of the democratically elected President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and the appointment of his first government, the deadly and spectacular terrorist attack on Avenue Kwame Nkrumah in Ouagadougou took place on 15 January 2016 (Kibora 2019). The very same day two other attacks took place, including the hostage taking of the Australian Doctor Arthur Kenneth Elliott and his wife Jocelyn (Dr Elliott is still in hostage, but Ms. Elliott was released the following month in Niger). Since then, insecurity in the form of terrorist attacks has come to affect all regions of the country with almost daily attacks taking place somewhere in Burkina Faso. Over the last few years, the Liptako-Gourma region, that is the three-border zone of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, has become the main epicenter of killings and violences. Most attacks in Burkina Faso take place in the provinces of Soum, Louroum, and Sourou (Walther 2019: 22).

Many villages that were still accessible at the time of our joint fieldwork in 2018–2019 have nowadays become inaccessible. They are under the threat of armed terrorist groups that control a good part of the national territory and make traffic difficult on many roads. Some 40 percent of the Burkinabe territory today is estimated to be out of the control of the state. Large numbers of people have vacated the villages to become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs),

moving to the main towns and cities where there are still pockets of security. The Permanent Secretariat of the National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (*Secrétariat permanent du Conseil national de secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation*, SP/CONASUR), reported 1,882,391 IDPs as of 31/12/2022 in Burkina Faso (Lefaso.net 18/1/2023).

In early 2023, the permanent risk of terrorist attacks which impacts all areas of social life remains the main source of insecurity. In this context, people's perceptions and perspectives on security have changed over the years, and citizen initiatives are no longer the same as in 2018. In addition, having undergone two democratic elections (viz., 2015 and 2020) since the 2014 popular insurrection, Burkina Faso now sees a resurgence of coups d'état. The country saw two coups in 2022, one on 24 January and the other on 30 September. This political instability at the helm of the state also impacted security issues. To be sure, if there was no popular reaction to the army takeover in January 2022, in sharp contrast to the strong resistance that the September 2015 coup witnessed (Hagberg 2015, 2023; Hagberg et al. 2018), it is because the people were tired of suffering from insecurity and hoped that "unconstitutional changes" – hence, the coups – at the top echelons of the State would bring a solution to security issues. This is also related to the profound deception that people perceive in the so-called "electoral democracy," that is, the routine elections being organised and conducted, but with little effect on peoples' living conditions, let alone any guarantees of minimum security and safety. The evolution of the security situation has led to a redefinition of the relationship not only within and between the communities but also between the State and its traditional partners.

It thus becomes necessary to review certain themes analysed in our study with regard to the transformations that have taken place since then, such as the transformation of social bonds, those related to self-defence groups, the issue of food security in connection with the displacement of populations, and the geopolitical security situation, including the end of the French military presence. In the following, we exemplify how these challenges are perceived and experienced from below.

Social bonds

The legendary Burkinabe hospitality forms part of a set of cultural values and norms that are shared by all sociocultural groups or communities in the country. Admittedly, the notion of the "stranger" is social and performative (Amselle 1996; Hagberg 2000), but the security crisis has led to a stigmatisation of "the Other," as someone coming from elsewhere, "from far away" (Hagberg 2000). Drawing on his ethnographic research on farmer-herder conflicts in the Comoé Province, Hagberg pointed to the fact that Fulbe herders (as well as the herd-owners) were seen as guests/strangers (*dunaw*) as long as they did not claim power or landed resources, because if they did so, they would be seen as *boyorojan*, i.e., "those coming from far away" (Hagberg 2000). Other peoples' perceptions

of Fulbe, whose mobility due to production activities leads them to crisscross villages and seek temporary or long-term places to settle, are increasingly negative and stigmatising. In Burkina Faso today, Fulbe are increasingly seen as "those coming from far away." The "Fulbe question," as it were, is accentuated and bogged down in local perceptions of "Fulbe=terrorist" at a level that raises fears of violent community conflicts. Admittedly, the characterisation of the terrorist has also evolved in Burkina Faso, since the earlier associations of 2016, of the attackers as being "Arabs" (Kibora 2019); yet, and although public opinion is now convinced of the presence of terrorists amongst each socio-cultural group in the country, the Fulbe remain at the heart of the main charges.

In our study, we highlight how the Fulbe community is "between a rock and a hard place," that is, between terrorists, defence and security forces, and self-defence groups from whom they suffer violent actions. Fulbe are therefore "taken hostage" and find it difficult to clear themselves of accusations. So it is de facto that many individuals from this community are enrolled in "jihadist groups" and that one of Mali's jihadist leaders, notably Hamadoun Kouffa, has clearly displayed his ambitions to defend this community and recover a territory that historically belonged to Fulbe by right: the Macina (Diallo and Dégorce 2019). The cross-border violence suffered by Fulbe in the neighboring countries, reinforces the feeling of communitarianism beyond national borders. During a press conference in January 2023, the Fulbe association called TEWTUGOL LAAWOL JAM (ATELJA) recognised that the Fulbe are "at the heart of all the debates." They launched an appeal to "tous ces égarés qui ont pris les armes contre le Burkina Faso. Qu'ils soient de la communauté peule ou d'autres communautés" (Minute.bf 26/01/23 ; Lefaso.net 27/1/2023).

Originating from the Burkinabe regions of the North (Ouahigouya) and the Sahel (Dori), the Fulbe, whose main activity is marked by mobility and pastoralism, are nowadays looked at with heightened suspicion of terrorism in all regions and in every corner of Burkina Faso. In the beginning, some observers saw a "class struggle" which opposed Rimaïbe (Fulfulde speaking former captives of Fulbe) to Rimbe (Fulbe nobility), as a way to understand the security crisis in the Sahel (Hagberg et al. 2023b forthcoming). The complexity of the crisis and its spread across the country, no longer allows us to stick to such analyses only. The resurgence of old inter- and intra-community tensions, revenge and settling of scores, frustrations, injustices and impunity, all contribute to the worsening of the security crisis. Furthermore, we are witnessing an opportunistic exploitation of terrorism in all localities (Kibora et al. 2021). From some municipalities, reports indicate that when local politicians wanted to impose another mayor than the one who won municipal elections, some local actors tried to seek revenge for this overrule of electoral results, by making an appeal to terrorist groups and have them settle the issue. In another case, local politicians tried to impose a village chief in a village in the North, against the will of the most villagers, who in turn appointed their 'own' chief. Such cases illustrate how terrorist groups integrate into local politics. Hence, local actors might well consider arming them-

selves against the State and thus become allied to armed groups. Moreover, all those involved in illegal activities and smuggling (fuel, drugs, cigarettes, etc.), who are also doing businesses with terrorist groups are profiting from the crisis and such actors might find it in their interest, to intervene in order to prolong the crisis. In a nutshell, to ethnographically analyse local politics and trade networks is an urgent task to be carried out, albeit an increasingly difficult one.

Another important phenomenon reinforcing the breach of social bonds is the excessive circulation of fake news, most often manipulated through different social media platforms. The profuse circulation of audios and videos presents images or voices of "Fulbe terrorists." Such publications contribute to the social divide and to the stigmatisation against the Fulbe community. For instance, in the municipality of Arbinda in northern Burkina Faso, when a local religious leader was shot dead in 2019 by terrorists who allegedly had "a Fulbe accent," the closest collaborator of the victim, who was himself of Fulbe origin, was lynched by the mob. "Even myself, who was convinced that the old man had nothing to do with this assassination, I did not dare to oppose the unleashed crowd," said an internally displaced person in Ouagadougou, a few years later (Hagberg et al. 2023b forthcoming).

More than inter-religious tensions, which are sporadic but real, the instrumental pitting of communities against each other has contributed to the growing number of home-grown terrorists. Escalating violence renders even endogenous mechanisms of social mediation inefficient and out of order. Citizen security initiatives may still be necessary because the armed forces are not suitable for rebuilding social bonds and rapport within communities. However, when these initiatives are exercised by armed civilians with the tacit recognition, not to mention acceptance, by public authorities, and in contexts where self-defence groups are sometimes accused of racial profiling and extrajudicial executions, matters become even more problematic.

Attacking the "Other" to ensure one's own safety, and arming oneself to guard against possible attacks seem to be essential elements of community initiatives. This is in sharp contrast to the changes in behavior and attitudes that were observed at the time of our fieldwork in 2018–2019 and which focused mainly on strengthening social bonds, "the living together." At that time, to a large extent, the enemy was considered to be someone coming from elsewhere.

Citizen initiatives and self-defence groups

During the fieldwork in 2018–2019, individual and collective citizen initiatives were noted in all 13 municipalities, and through various forms of expression. Beyond the change of behaviors and attitudes within communities to prevent the occurrence of a security crisis, the important element was the role, place, and authority of the self-defence groups. Today, the Dozos – the traditional brotherhoods of hunters – have added the fight against terrorism to their actions. The Ruggas that were initially associations of (Fulbe) herd-owners for the protection

of livestock, have also transformed into self-defence groups, given that pastoralism and livestock-keeping are central elements of the security crisis. And the Koglweogos whose spread is consecutive to the beginning of the security crisis and caught our attention (Kibora et al. 2018), are now turning into *Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie* (VDP).

Our position is that no armed self-defence group can or should be allowed to replace the defence and security forces of the Burkinabe State. The risk of them turning into a militia is obvious. In early January 2019, the Koglweogos were accused of mass killings of members of the Fulbe community in response to the assassination of a traditional Moaaga chief and six of his relatives in Yirgou in the Centre-Nord region of Burkina Faso, by terrorists who allegedly were identified as Fulbe.

This security crisis and its poor handling by the public authorities since 2016 is one of the fundamental causes of the exacerbation of the current situation. It appears from numerous analyses that approximately 90 percent of the terrorists are Burkinabe, as recently stated by the Chief of Defence Staff of the National Gendarmerie. This "endogenisation of the terrorist" has had effects on the social bonds. Yet rather than encouraging a top-down solution, we would like to suggest that this situation makes it even more urgent that endogenous responses to insecurity within villages and municipalities are implemented. Self-defence groups through spectacular actions are responsible for multiple abuses against populations. It is to compensate for the excesses of self-defence groups that the Burkinabe State has started to "supervise" them in its own way. To do this, it has adopted the Law establishing the VDPs. Adopted for the first time in 2020, under the regime of President Kaboré, this law was amended and re-adopted on 17 December 2022 by the Transitional Legislative Assembly, under the regime of Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who came to power in the coup in September 2022. This state intention to support citizens' initiatives to security was confronted with deviations in the sense that the critique against the Koglweogos was transferred to a critique against the VDPs. As a matter of fact, the VDPs have absorbed many Koglweogos. This newly invented security structure of the Burkinabe State is nonetheless not immune to the agency of self-defence groups, such as the Dozos, the Ruggas, and the Koglweogos (Hagberg 2019). The establishment of the VDPs did not lead to the disappearance of other self-defence groups, but in order to benefit from the support of the State, they are "invited" to merge into the VDPs. In November 2022, the regime launched a call for recruitment of 50,000 VDPs throughout the territory. The popular enthusiasm was such that 90,000 new recruits were listed awaiting selection (RFI 27/11/2022). It is likely that those who will be best placed to be admitted are those who have had their experience in self-defence groups. Hence, we are witnessing how the State's monopoly of the use of legitimate violence is nowadays outsourced to self-defence groups. At worst, this might well lead to a de facto "militiasation" of the Burkinabe state.

The massive enrolment of VDPs is a delicate subject. Either the VDPs will be insufficiently trained to deal with "heavily armed" terrorists, or the recognition of the VDPs as an integrated part of the State's security structure will give power and authority to individuals who, under cover of the anointing of public authority, indulge in various abuses. On 30–31 December 2022, VDPs attacked neighbourhoods in the town of Nouna that were inhabited by Fulbe, as they were suspected of harbouring terrorists. 28 people were killed, and the government requested the population to remain calm (Lefaso.net 3/1/2023).

Another new phenomenon is the "feminisation of violence," thereby recognising that gender-based violence is a reality in the context of insecurity. Our study shows that women experience increased insecurity due to the involvement of their children and their spouses which sets their living environment ablaze. Moreover, the disappearance of these spouses leads to many women becoming heads of their families. They are then forced to manage and feed their families alone. In field research carried out in 2021, we observed that even those men who are alive lose their sense of masculinity in situations of displacement, for having fled with wife and children (Hagberg et al. 2023b forthcoming). In addition to facing these charges, many women suffer from abuse and rape in areas with high insecurity.

In addition, more and more women join self-defence groups, especially the Koglweogos. At the same time, terrorist groups are full of women whose images have circulated in social media after terrorist attacks. Hence, women are no longer identified only as 'victims of violence,' as it were, but also as perpetrators of violence as they are oftentimes actively involved as well. Such a situation, if it continues, will have a real impact on sociability. In many Burkinabe communities the saying that "the woman is the home" is common. This means that in addition to being a "keeper of the house," the basic education of children is incumbent on her. The social reproduction of violence is an important fact that needs to be questioned in such conditions.

Internally displaced persons and food security

Burkina Faso is a country whose populations depend primarily on agriculture, and where food security is a national concern. During fieldwork in 2018–2019, the reduction of fertile land, the land use within communities, and climatic variations, were presented as factors of food insecurity. Nowadays, the inability of people to exploit farmlands and pastoral areas is due to the "people of the bush" – a euphemism used to talk about terrorists – who control a large part of the national territory. Population displacements continue in Mouhoun, the West, the South-West, etc., that is, in those regions which have been the largest suppliers of cereals in Burkina Faso.

Food insecurity has therefore increased for rural people generally. But it is more crucial for the displaced people who have abandoned everything to find themselves in IDPs sites in urban areas. As the country has almost 1.9 million IDPs (Lefaso.net 18/1/2023), these people, who for the most part practiced

agriculture as their main activity, now live in a situation of vulnerability and precariousness. The often-periodic food insecurity in the Sahel due to climatic variations is nowadays aggravated by the security crisis.

> […] le 11 octobre 2022, le CONASUR indiquait que les besoins en vivres pour la prise en charge des personnes déplacées internes pour l'année 2022 ont été évalués à 504 000 tonnes alors que l'État ne disposait que de 82 000 tonnes. (Lefaso.net 18/1/2023)

Food prices volatility (Kibora 2015) make it difficult for many households to access basic necessities. That "everything is expensive" is nowadays justified by the security crisis. When we were conducting fieldwork in 2018–2019, the terrorist threat was one of the sources of insecurity among many others. In some areas, our interlocutors did not even mention the fear of a terrorist attack. Later, it imposed itself as the first, if not only, source of insecurity. As a reminder, this statement recorded in Djibasso in July 2018 poignantly anticipated what was to come: "Whether they attack people or not is only a question of time. When they are finished with our security forces, which is the first obstacle for them, our turn will come." All other insecurities described in this study throughout, are now analysed in relation to the insecurity of being attacked, both from below and from above.

The complex nature of the security situation in Burkina Faso has placed all the indicators of human security (UNDP 1994) in red. Political instability at the highest level of the state (two coups d'état in less than nine months) adds to this complexity. However, we would like to underline that this situation is far from irreversible. Historically, in addition to being destructive for people and property, crises might also turn out to be moments of empowerment that determine the ability of people to surpass themselves, and to rebuild themselves differently. The 2014 popular insurrection gave people hope for building a "new Burkina Faso," but the security crisis has put the country in a situation of doubt and uncertainty. Certainly "nothing will be as before," to use the slogan that was current during the popular insurrection (Hagberg et al. 2017b), but far from being an irreversible disaster, this crisis may also, not the least because of the strong civic engagement and citizen initiatives, turn out to be the long-awaited opportunity to rebuild the Burkinabe state.

Geopolitics and citizen perspectives

Over the last few years, geopolitical developments have been dramatic in West Africa. The coup d'état in Mali in August 2020 that led to the fall of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, followed by a second one consolidating the new power with Colonel Assimi Goïta in May 2021, had important consequences for the entire region (Hagberg et al. 2023a forthcoming). In September 2021, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya overthrew President Alpha Condé in Guinea. And in 2002, as already discussed, the two Burkinabe coups d'état took place.

An undercurrent in these different military take-overs is a strong anti-imperialistic discourse, notably against France. Since 2021, the relations between the Mali's transition regime and France are deep-frozen, despite the fact that until recently France was a close ally in the fight against terrorism. Similarly, the current Burkinabe regime of Captain Ibrahim Traoré ended French military presence in the country in February 2023, at the same time as the country experienced severe security challenges. For instance, in February 2023, more than 50 military soldiers were killed in attacks on the road between Deou and Oursi in the Oudalan Province in the Sahel region.

To understand why the current Burkinabe regime has decided to end military cooperation with France, we must explore the strongly felt experience of colonial domination, which continues to exist in collective memory even today. Despite more than 60 years of political independence, citizens of Burkina Faso and other Francophone West African countries sense the geopolitical presence of France. The so-called Françafrique is alive in many parts of Africa, that is, in terms of the special relationships formed between France and African presidents. Francafrique is the Empire that does not want to die, as poignantly put in a recent publication (Borrel et al. 2021). While many Burkinabe citizens are profoundly worried about rampant insecurities, many indeed support the idea of cutting the bonds with the former colonial power. In the shadows, the Russian military cooperation lurks in the background with promises of weapons and armaments.

Even though this study is based on fieldwork carried in 2018–19, it is safe to say that for ordinary citizens the most important thing is to see tangible differences in terms of security and safety in daily life, in their capacity to manage and pursue farming, trade, as well as to be able to move safely and freely between markets, cities and towns, and on roads. It is for this reason, that it is unfortunate that so much of the debate and diplomacy has been polarised between the so-called "international community," (read: the EU and the USA) and West African "public opinion" (powerholders, activists, and urban residents alike). Burkinabe citizens living in municipalities across Burkina Faso are facing the terrorist threat onto their very skin; insecurity has become part of everyday life.

We would like to conclude that it is not due to any deep-felt sense of belonging or long-term historical ties to Russia that the Burkinabe today seek for new partners. It is instead related to the failure of the French military intervention in the Sahel, measured in terms of deteriorating insecurities, that has finally made people ready to search for sovereignty and freedom from French domination. In this vein, geopolitical developments are also part of citizen perceptions and perspectives on security and safety challenges in Burkina Faso.

References

Amselle, J.-L. 1996. L'étranger dans le monde manding et en Grèce ancienne: quelques points de comparaison. *Cahiers d'études africaines* 36: 755–761.

Arnaldi di Balme, L., C. Guissou, P. Hochet and R. Zagre-Konseiga 2010. Réduire l'incertitude. La stabilisation des règles de gestion des ressources pastorales et foncières à Padéma et Samoroguan (Burkina Faso), Rapport de recherche Negos-GRN. Ouagadougou and Paris: Laboratoire Citoyennetés, Gret.

Barry, S. and S. Hagberg 2019. Le tsunami électoral d'Arba Diallo: ethnographie des élections couplées de 2012 à Dori, Burkina Faso. In *Démocratie par le bas et politique municipale au Sahel* (eds) S. Hagberg, L.O. Kibora and G. Körling. Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 4. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Bayala, J.-P. 2011. Le Burkina Faso. In *Gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest francophone* (eds) A. Bryden and B. N'Diaye. Centre pour le contrôle démocratique des forces armées, Genève. Berlin: LIT.

Bayart, J.-F., A. Mbembe and C. Toulabor 2008. *Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire*. Nouvelle édition augmentée. Paris: Karthala.

Benjaminsen, T.A. and B. Ba 2018. Why do pastoralists in Mali join jihadist groups? A political ecological explanation. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 46(1): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1474457

Benjaminsen, T.A. et B. Ba 2021. Fulani-Dogon Killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. *African Security*. DOI:10.1080/19392206.2021.1925035

Beucher, B. 2017. *Manger le pouvoir au Burkina Faso: La noblesse mossi à l'épreuve de l'Histoire*. Paris: Karthala.

Biedermann, K. 19/6/2022. Burkina Faso: '40% du territoire hors du contrôle de l'Etat' (médiateur). *Sahel intelligence*. Accessed 27/01/2023: https://sahel-intelligence.com/27897-burkina-faso-40-du-territoire-hors-du-controle-de-letat-mediateur.html

Bierschenk, T. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan 1997. ECRIS: Rapid Collective Inquiry for the Identification of Conflicts and Strategic Groups. *Human Organization* 56(2): 238–244.

Bierschenk, T. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (eds) 1998. *Les pouvoirs au village: le Bénin rural entre démocratisation et décentralisation*. Paris: Karthala.

Blundo, G. (ed.) 2000. *Monnayer les pouvoirs: Espaces, mécanismes et représentations de corruption*. Cahiers de l'IUED. Genève: Graduate Institute Publications

Blundo, G. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan 2006. *Everyday corruption and the State: Citizens and public officials in Africa*. London and New York: Zed Books.

Bojsen, H. and I. Compaoré 2019. Enquête anthropologique et documentation visuelle sur la sécurité chez les Koglweogo au Burkina Faso. *Mande Studies* 21: 91–113

Bonnet E., A. Fillol, A. Nikiema, S. Sidbega, M. Ouedraogo, L. Lechat and V. Ridde 2015. Comment réduire les accidents de la route et les traumatismes à Ouagadougou ? Note de politique Equité en santé, IRSPUM.
Borrel, T. A. Boukari-Yabara, B. Collombat et T. Deltombe. 2021. *L'empire qui ne veut pas mourir: une histoire de la Françafrique*. Paris: Seuil.
Botte, R. and J. Schmitz. 1994. Paradoxes identitaires. *Cahiers d'etudes africaines* 34(133–135): 7–22.
Bréda, C., M. Deridder and P.-J. Laurent (éd.) 2013. *La modernité insécurisée: Anthropologie des conséquences de la mondialisation*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-L'Harmattan.
de Bruijn, M. and H. van Dijk (eds) 1997. *Peuls et Mandingues: Dialectique des constructions identitaires*. Leiden and Paris: Afrika-Studiecentrum and Karthala.
Bryden, A. and B. N'Diaye (eds) 2011. *Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities*. Genève: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
Buzan, B. and L. Hansen 2010. *The Evolution of international Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carrel, M. and C. Neveu (eds) 2014. *Citoyennetés ordinaires: Pour une approche renouvelée des pratiques citoyennes*. Paris: Karthala.
Cashion, G.A. 1984. *Hunters of the Mande: A Behavioural Code and Worldview Derived from the Study of Their Folklore*. Bloomington: Indiana University.
Chouli, L. 2012. *Burkina Faso 2011: Chronique d'un mouvement social*. Accessed 15/11/2016: http://tahin-party.org/textes/Burkina-Faso-2011.pdf
Chouli, L. 2015. The popular uprising in Burkina Faso and the Transition. *Review of African Political Economy* 42(144): 325–333.
Cissao, Y. 2018. État, communautés locales et gestion des conflits dans le département de Tenkodogo (Province du Boulgou). Thèse de doctorat unique de sociologie. Université Ouaga 1 Pr Joseph Ki-Zerbo (Burkina Faso).
Cissé, Y. 1964. Notes sur les sociétés de chasseurs malinké. *Journal de la Société des Africanistes* 19: 175–226.
Cissé, Y.T. 1994. *La confrérie des chasseurs Malinké et Bambara: Mythes, rites et récits intiatiques*. Ivry and Paris: Editions Nouvelles du Sud et Association ARSAN.
Comité International de la Croix-Rouge 14/2/2001. Qu'est-ce que la protection de la population civile ? Accessed 6/1/20107: https://www.icrc.org/fre/resources/documents/misc/5fzhpr.htm
Coulter, C. 2009. *Bush wives and girl soldiers: Women's lives through war and peace in Sierra Leone*. New York: Cornell University Press.
Degorce, A., L.O. Kibora and K. Langewiesche (eds) 2019. *Rencontres religieuses et dynamiques sociales au Burkina Faso*. Dakar: Amalion Publishing.
Diallo, H. and A. Degorce 2019. La notion de Jihad en contexte. In *Rencontres religieuses et dynamiques sociales au Burkina Faso* (eds) A. Degorce, L.O. Kibora and K. Langewiesche. Dakar: Amalion.
Dicko-Zouboye, F. and K. Sangaré-Coulibaly 2011. Genre et sécurité au Mali: état des lieux et nouvelles perspectives. Geneve et Bamako: DCAF et PGPSP.
Engels, B. 2015a. Political Transition in Burkina Faso: the Fall of Blaise Compaoré. *Governance in Africa* 2(1): 1–6.
Eriksson Baaz, M. and J. Vermeijen 2013. La 'mère des armées' n'est pas encore morte: Des pratiques de justice (in)formelle dans les forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo. *Politique africaine* 129: 49–72.

Eriksson Baaz, M. and M. Stern 2013. Fearless fighters and submissive wives: Voices of women soldiers in the Congo (RDC). *Armed Forces & Society* 39(4): 711–739.
Eriksen, T.H. 2010. Human Security and Social Anthropology. In *A World of Insecurity: Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security* (eds) T.H. Eriksen, E. Bal and O. Salemink. London and New York: Pluto Press.
Faure, A. 1996. *Le pays bissa avant le barrage de Bagré*. Paris: SEPIA.
Fay, C., Y.F. Koné and Catherine Quiminal (eds) 2006. *Décentralisation et pouvoirs en Afrique : En contrepoint, modèles territoriaux français*. Paris: Institut de Recherche pour le Développement.
Ferguson, J. 1994 [1990]. *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Fillol A., E. Bonnet, J. Bassolé, L. Lechat, A. Djiguimde, G. Rouamba and V. Ridde 2016. Equité et déterminants sociaux des accidents de la circulation à Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. SFSP *Santé publique* 28(5): 665–675.
Fofana, H. 2016. Mort tragique d'un grand journaliste: L'affaire Norbert Zongo comme analyseur d'une révolte populaire au Burkina Faso. Thèse pour l'obtention d'un doctorat en sociologie. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. Centre d'études des mouvements sociaux, Institut Marcel Mauss, Paris.
Frère, M.-S. 2010. 'Enterrement de première classe' ou 'lecon de droit': la presse burkinabè et l'affaire Norbert Zongo. In *Révoltes et oppositions dans un régime sémiautoritaire: le cas de Burkina Faso* (eds) M. Hilgers and J. Mazzocchetti. Paris: Karthala.
Frère, M.-S. and P. Englebert 2015. Briefing: Burkina Faso: the Fall of Blaise Compaoré. *African Affairs* 114(455): 295–307.
Gabriel, M.-C. 2015. Quand les frondeurs deviennent des héros nationaux: La renaissance du Monument des héros nationaux à Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) à l'issue de l'insurrection populaire de 2014. *Cahiers d'études africaines* 227(3): 691–718.
Guébré, B.H. and H.A.V. Zouré 2009. Le Bisako: genèse, population et organisation sociopolitique précoloniale. In *Histoire des royaumes et chefferies au Burkina Faso precolonial* (eds) P.C. Hien and M. Gomgnimbou. Ouagadougou: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technologique (CNRST).
Goldstein, D.M. 2010. Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security. *Current Anthropology* 51(4): 487–517.
Hagberg, S. 2000. Stranger, Citizens, Friends: Fulbe agro-pastoralists in western Burkina Faso. In *Bonds and Boundaries in Northern Ghana and Southern Burkina Faso* (eds) S. Hagberg and A.B. Tengan. Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology 30. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
Hagberg, S. 2002. Enough is Enough: An Ethnography of the Struggle against Impunity in Burkina Faso. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40(2): 217–246.
Hagberg, S. 2004a. La chasse aux voleurs: une association de chasseurs et l'administration de l'Etat dans l'ouest du Burkina Faso. In *Les raisons de la ruse: une perspective anthropologique et psychanalytique* (eds) S. Latouche, P.-J. Laurent, O. Servais and M. Singleton. Paris: La Découverte.
Hagberg, S. 2004b. Political Decentralization and Traditional Leadership in the Benkadi Hunters' Association in Western Burkina Faso. *Africa Today* 50(4), 51-70.

Hagberg, S. 2006. 'It was Satan that Took the People': The Making of Public Authority in Burkina Faso. *Development and Change* 37(4): 779–797.
Hagberg, S. 2007. Traditional Chieftaincy, Party Politics, and Political Violence in Burkina Faso. In *A new dawn for traditional authorities? State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (eds) L. Buur and H. M. Kyed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hagberg, S. (ed.) 2010. Inventing and Mobilising the Local. *APAD Bulletin* 31–32. Münster: LIT Verlag.
Hagberg, S. 2011a. Trajectoires de l'anthropologie du développement à la suédoise. *Ethnologie Française* XLI(3): 509–519.
Hagberg, S. 2011b. Organising Fulbeness: Ethnicity, Livelihoods and Civil Society in Burkina Faso. In *Auf dem Boden der Tatsachen : Festschrift für Thomas Bierschenk* (eds) N. Schareika, E. Spies and P.-Y. Le Meur. Köln: Köppe.
Hagberg, S. 2015. 'Thousands of New Sankaras': Resistance and Struggle in Burkina Faso. *Africa Spectrum* 50(3): 109–121.
Hagberg, S. 2018. Beyond regional radars: Security from below and the rule of law in the Sahel. *South African Journal of International Affairs* 25(1): 21–37. DOI : 10.1080/10220461.2018.1417903
Hagberg, S. 2019a. Introduction: démocratie par le bas et politique municipale au Sahel. In *Démocratie par le bas et politique municipale au Sahel* (eds) S. Hagberg, L. Kibora and G. Körling. Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 4. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
Hagberg, S. 2019b. Performing tradition while doing politics: A comparative study of the dozos and the koglweogos self-defense movements in Burkina Faso. *African Studies Review* 62(1): 173–193.
Hagberg, S. 2021. Alternatives to Consultancy and NGOing: Developing Anthropological Team Research in Burkina Faso and Mali. In *NGOs and Lifeworlds: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (eds) M.C. Kalfelis and K. Knodel. Oxford Berghahn.
Hagberg, S. 2023. Memory making, memory marketing: Mobile films, social media, and popular struggle in Burkina Faso. *kritisk etnografi – Swedish Journal of Anthropology* 6(1): 59–78.
Hagberg, S. and S. Ouattara. 2010. Vigilantes in War: Boundary Crossing of Hunters in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. In *Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa* (eds) T.G. Kirsch and T. Grätz. Woodbridge and Rochester: James Currey; Boydell and Brewer.
Hagberg, S. and G. Körling 2014. Inaccessible Fields: Doing Anthropology in the Malian Turmoil. *Anthropologie & développement* 40–41:143–159.
Hagberg, S., L. Kibora, F. Ouattara and A. Konkobo 2015. Au cœur de la révolution burkinabè. *Anthropologie & développement* 42–43: 199–224.
Hagberg, S., Y.F. Koné, B. Koné, A. Diallo and I. Kansaye 2017a. *Vers une sécurité par le bas: Étude des perceptions et des expériences des défis de sécurité dans deux communes maliennes*. Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 1. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
Hagberg, S., L. Kibora, S. Barry, S. Gnessi and A. Konkobo 2017b. *Transformations sociopolitiques burkinabè de 2014 à 2016: Perspectives anthropologiques des pratiques politiques et de la culture démocratique dans 'un Burkina Faso nouveau'*. Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 2. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Hagberg, S., L. Kibora, S. Barry, S. Gnessi and A. Konkobo 2018. *'Nothing will be as before': Anthropological perspectives on political practice and democratic culture in 'the new Burkina Faso'*. Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 3. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Hagberg, S., L. Kibora and G. Körling 2019a. *Démocratie par le bas et politique municipale au Sahel*. Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 4. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Hagberg, S., L.O. Kibora, S. Barry, Y. Cissao, S. Gnessi, A. Kaboré, B. Koné et M. Zongo 2019b. *Sécurité par le bas: Perceptions et perspectives citoyennes des défis de sécurité au Burkina Faso.* Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 5. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Hagberg, S., L.O. Kibora, B. Koné, A. Konkobo, E. Zongo, S. Barry, Y. Cissao et P. Kaboré 2021. *« Femmes de devant ! »: Combat du leadership féminin au Burkina Faso.* Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 6. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Hagberg, S., B. Coulibaly and N. Traoré 2023a forthcoming. *Alternance putschiste, souveraineté violentée, résistance citoyenne: Une recherche engagée sur la crise et la transition au Mali.* Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 8. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Hagberg, S., Y.F. Koné, L.O. Kibora, O. Hamani, I. Kansaye, B. Koné, A. Konkobo, S. Barry, A. Kaboré, R. Hassane, M. Mohamed, A. Omar and O. Arou 2023b forthcoming. *'Il faut qu'ils reviennent': La transformation des liens sociaux dans la crise sécuritaire du Liptako-Gourma*. Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies 9. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Harsch, E. 2017. *Burkina Faso: A History of Power, Protest, and Revolution*. London: Zed.

Hellweg, J. 2011. *Hunting the Ethical State: The Benkadi Movement in Côte d'Ivoire*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Hilgers, M. and A. Loada 2013. Tensions et protestations dans un régime sémi-autoritaire : croissance des révoltes populaires et maintien du pouvoir au Burkina Faso. *Politique africaine* 131: 187–208.

Hilgers, M. and J. Mazzocchetti (eds) 2010. *Révoltes et oppositions dans un régime sémi-autoritaire: le cas de Burkina Faso.* Paris: Karthala.

Hochet, P. et C. Guissou 2010. Une politique d'adaptation climatique inachevée mais persistante: Le cas de la zone pastorale du CEZIET de Samarogouan (Burkina Faso). *Sustentabilidade em Debate* 1(2) : 55–70. https://doi.org/10.18472/SustDeb.v1n2.2010.1681107

Hochet, P. and L. Arnaldi di Balme 2013. La dialectique de l'étranger: La construction des relations contradictoires à l'étranger à la croisée des institutions coutumières et des politiques publiques dans l'Ouest du Burkina Faso. *Autrepart* 64(1): 55–70

Intellivoire.net 9/10/2018. Une nouvelle cellule de « Al-Qaïda » se forme au Burkina Faso. Accessed 23/11/2018: https://intellivoire.net/une-nouvelle-cellule-de-al-qaida-se-forme-au-burkina-faso/

Irwin, P. 1981. *Liptako Speaks: History from Oral Tradition in Africa*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Izard, M. 1985. *Gens du pouvoir, gens de la terre: Les institutions politiques de l'ancien royaume du Yatenga (Bassin de la Volta Blanche)*. Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.

Jeune Afrique 22/5/2018. Burkina: trois jihadistes présumés et un gendarme tués dans une opération à Ouagadougou. Accessed 26 mai 2019: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/561405/politique/burkina-trois-jihadistes-presumes-et-un-gendarme-tues-dans-une-operation-a-ouagadougou/

Kaldor, M. 2006. La sécurité humaine: un concept pertinent? *Politique étrangère* 2006(4): 901–914. https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.064.0901
Kedzierska-Manzon, A. 2014. *Chasseurs mandingues: Violence, pouvoir et religion en Afrique de l'Ouest*. Paris: Karthala.
Kibora, L.O., P. Kouraogo and A. Kaboré 2016. Les groupes d'auto-défense Koglweogo au Burkina Faso: http://africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/les-groupes-dautodefense-kogl-weogo-au-burkina-faso/
Kibora L., P. Kouraogo and A. Kaboré 2018. Les groupes d'auto-défense Koglweogo au Burkina Faso: Quel avenir ? *Recherches africaines: Annales de l'université de lettres et sciences humaines de Bamako*. Juillet 2018, 20: 303–316.
Kibora, L. 2013. Conflits fonciers, mutations sociales et migrations: Un exemple Burkinabè. *Etudes Sahéliennes* 7: 236–252.
Kibora, L. 2015. Social Change, New Food Habits and Food Price Volatility in Burkina Faso. *IDS Bulletin* 46(6): 105–109.
Kibora, L.O., M. Traoré and N. Bakayoko (eds) 2017. Vers une réforme du système de sécurité burkinabè? *Observatoire du monde arabo-musulman et du Sahel*. Paris: Fondation pour la rechercher stratégique : www.frstrategie.org
Kibora, L.O. 2019. Réactions populaires aux attaques terroristes de janvier 2016 à Ouagadougou. *Mande Studies* 21: 55–69. https://doi.org/10.2979/mande.21.1.05
Kibora, L.O., B. Coulibaly and O. Hamani. 2021. Conflits communautaires et les violences sociétales dans la région du Liptako-Gourma. Dakar: UNESCO-BreDa.
Kirsch, T. and T. Grätz (eds) 2010. *Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa*. London: James Currey.
Krohn-Hansen, C. and K. Nustad (eds) 2005. *State formation: Anthropological perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.
Kuba, R., C. Lentz and C.N. Somda (eds) 2003. *Histoire du peuplement et relations interethniques au Burkina Faso. Paris: Karthala*.
Kuba, R. and C. Lentz (eds) 2006. *Land and the Politics of Belonging in West Africa*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Körling, G. 2011. *In Search of the State: An Ethnography of public service provision in urban Niger*. Uppsala: Acta Upsaliensis Universitatis.
Lanzano, C. 2018. Gold digging and the politics of time: Changing timescapes of artisanal mining in West Africa. *The Extractive Industries and Society* 5: 253–259.
Le Run, J.-L. 2012. Les mécanismes psychologiques de la violence. *Enfances & Psy* 2012/1, 54: 23–34. DOI 10.3917/ep.054.0023108
Lefaso.net 26/3/2018. Sidéradougou: Deux forestiers tués par des individus armés non identifiés. Accessed 25/11/2018: http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article82626
Lefaso.net 22/5/2018. Lutte contre le terrorisme: 3 assaillants abattus et 1 gendarme tué à Ouagadougou. Accessed 25/11/2018: http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article83545
Lefaso.net 15/9/2018. Commune de Karangasso-Vigué: Après le drame, l'heure est aux discours d'apaisement. Accessed 25/11/2018: http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article85427
Lefaso.net 13/12/2018. Etude sur l'insécurité au Burkina: Des citoyens accusent l'ancien régime. Accessed 16/1/2019: http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article86946

Lefaso.net 3/1/2023. 28 personnes tuées à Nouna: Le gouvernement appelle la population au calme. Accessed 24/2/2023: https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article118549

Lefaso.net 18/01/2023. Burkina: 216 754 déplacés internes ont moins de 5 ans à la date du 31 décembre 2023, by F. Bassolé. Accessed 23/01/2023: https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article118893

Lefaso.net 27/1/2023. Burkina Faso: Une association peulh exhorte ceux qui ont pris les armes à les déposer. Accessed on 24/2/2023: https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article119090

Leonhardt, M. 2019. Regional Policies and Response to Manage Pastoral Movements within the ECOWAS Region Study on behalf of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), within the framework of the Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa (FMM West Africa) Project. International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS).

Maguire, M., C. Frois and N. Zurawski (eds) 2014. *The Anthropology of Security: Perspectives from the Frontline of Policing, Counter-terrorism and Border Control*. Pluto Press.

Mbembe 2001. *De la postcolonie*. Paris: Karthala.

McFarland, D.M. and L.A. Rupley 1998. *Historical Dictionary of Burkina Faso*. Second edition. Lanham, Md. and London: The Scarecrow Press.

Minute.bf 26/01/23. Burkina Faso, une association 'peule' appelle 'tous les égarés' à déposer les armes, by M. Kam. Accessed 27/01/2023: https://www.minute.bf/burkina-une-association-peule-appelle-tous-les-egares-a-deposer-les-armes/?noamp=available

Netafrique 17/9/2018. Sécurité nationale: Le Premier ministre Paul Kaba Thièba fait le bilan et dévoile les mesures prises par le gouvernement. Accessed 3/10/2018: https://netafrique.net/securite-nationale-le-premier-ministre-paul-kaba-thieba-fait-le-bilan-et-devoile-les-mesures-prises-par-le-gouvernement/

Nikiema A., E. Bonnet, S. Sidbega and V. Ridde 2017. Les accidents de la circulation à Ouagadougou, un révélateur de la gestion urbaine. *Lien social et Politiques* 78: 89–111.

Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2008. *La rigueur du qualitatif: Les contraintes empiriques de l'interprétation socio-anthropologique*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant.

Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (ed.) 2015. *Élections au village: Une ethnographie de la culture électorale au Niger*. Paris: Karthala.

Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. and M. Tidjani Alou (eds) 2009. *Les pouvoirs locaux au Niger: En attendant la décentralisation*. Paris: Karthala; Dakar: CODESRIA.

Paley J. (ed.) 2008. *Democracy: Anthropological Approaches*. Santa Fé School for Advanced Press.

Pratten, D. (ed.) 2008. Perspectives on Vigilantism in Nigeria. Special Issue. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 78(1).

OMS 2018. Rapport de situation sur la sécurité routière dans le monde 2018 : résumé. Genève: Organisation mondiale de la Santé; 2018 (WHO/NMH/NVI/18.20). Licence : CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

Radio France Internationale 27/11/2022. Burkina Faso: le recrutement de volontaires face au terrorisme dépasse les objectifs fixés. Accessed 24/2/2023: https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20221127-burkina-faso-le-recrutement-de-volontaires-face-au-terrorisme-d%C3%A9passe-les-objectifs-fix%C3%A9s

Reliefweb 14/9/2022. Burkina Faso, Mali et Ouest du Niger - Aperçu Humanitaire (à la date du 12 septembre 2022). Consulted on 17/9/2022: https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/burkina-faso-mali-et-ouest-du-niger-apercu-humanitaire-la-date-du-12-septembre-2022

RGPH 2008. Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat: Résultats définitifs de 2006. Institut National des Statistiques et de la Démographie.

RGPH 2022. Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat: Résultats définitifs de 2006. Institut National des Statistiques et de la Démographie.

Riesman, P. 1974. *Société et liberté chez les Peul Djelgôbé de Haute-Volta: Essai d'anthropologie introspective.* Paris: La Haye-Mouton.

Riesman, P. 1977. *Freedom in Fulani Social Life-an Introspective Ethnography* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Roger, B. 29/1/2016. Attentat de Ouagadougou: Pourquoi le Burkina a été frappé. *Jeune Afrique.* Accessed 07/03/17: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/296480/politique/attentat-de-ouagadougou-burkina-a-ete-frappe/

Salman, T. 2010. Taking risks for security's sake: Bolivians resisting their State and its economic policies. In *A World of Insecurity: Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security* (eds) T.H. Eriksen, E. Bal and O. Salemink. London and New York: Pluto Press.

Sangaré, B. mai 2016. Le Centre du Mali: épicentre du djihadisme ? Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité. Accessed 25/11/2018 : https://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-05-20_FR_B-SANGARE.pdf

Sawadogo E. 2011. L'impact de l'exploitation artisanale de l'or: cas du site de Fofora dans la province du Poni. Mémoire de Maîtrise en Géographie, Université de Ouagadougou.

Sharma, A. and A. Gupta (eds) 2005. *The Anthropology of the State: A reader.* Malden, MA, Oxford and Victoria, Australie: Blackwell.

Sidbega S. 2015. L'apport de la géomatique dans la gestion et le suivi des accidents de la route dans la ville de Ouagadougou: cas de l'arrondissement de Baskuy. Mémoire de master SIG-AGEDD, Université Ouaga I – Pr Joseph Ki Zerbo.

Thoyer, A. 1995. *Récits épiques des chasseurs bamanan du Mali.* Paris: L'Harmattan.

United Nations Development Programme 1994. Human Development Report 1994. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Accessed 16/1/2017: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

Valasek, K. 2008. Place du genre dans la réforme du secteur de la sécurité. In *Boîte à outils : « Place du genre dans la réforme de secteur de la sécurité »* (eds) M. Bastick and K. Valasek. Geneve: DCAF, OSCE/BIDDH, UN-INSTRAW.

VOA 4/2/2019. Burkina Faso: Au moins 210 morts lors du massacre du 1er janvier, selon un collectif. Accessed 26/5/2019 : https://www.voaafrique.com/a/au-moins-210-morts-lors-du-massacre-du-1er-janvier-selon-un-collectif/4771648.html

Vincent, E. 2019. Les confidence d'Ibrahim 10, jihadiste au Sahel. *Le Monde* 25/2/2019. Accessed 10/072019 : https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/02/25/les-confidences-d-ibrahim-10-djihadiste-au-sahel_5427750_3212.html

Walther, O. 2019. *Frontières, sécurité et développement en Afrique de l'Ouest.* Notes ouest-africaines 26. Paris: Éditions OCDE.

Yaro Y., I. Kaboré and H. Kobanka 2011. Etude sur le travail des enfants sur les sites d'orpaillage et les carrières artisanales dans cinq régions du Burkina Faso. UNICEF, MASSN, Ouagadougou.

Uppsala Papers in Africa Studies
Editor: Sten Hagberg

1. Sten Hagberg, Yaouaga Félix Koné, Bintou Koné, Aboubacar Diallo et Issiaka Kansaye. *Vers une sécurité par le bas ? Étude sur les perceptions et les expériences des défis de sécurité dans deux communes maliennes*. 2017.
2. Sten Hagberg, Ludovic Kibora, Sidi Barry, Siaka Gnessi et Adjara Konkobo. *Transformations sociopolitiques burkinabè de 2014 à 2016. Perspectives anthropologiques des pratiques politiques et de la culture démocratique dans « un Burkina Faso nouveau »*. 2017.
3. Sten Hagberg, Ludovic Kibora, Sidi Barry, Siaka Gnessi and Adjara Konkobo. *'Nothing will be as before!' Anthropological perspectives on political practice and democratic culture in 'a new Burkina Faso'*. 2018.
4. Sten Hagberg, Ludovic O. Kibora et Gabriella Körling (sous la direction). *Démocratie par le bas et politique municipale au Sahel*. 2019.
5. Sten Hagberg, Ludovic O. Kibora, Sidi Barry, Yacouba Cissao, Siaka Gnessi, Amado Kaboré, Bintou Koné et Mariatou Zongo. *Sécurité par le bas. Perceptions et perspectives citoyennes des défis de sécurité au Burkina Faso*. 2019.
6. Sten Hagberg, Ludovic O. Kibora, B. Koné, A. Konkobo, E. Zongo, S. Barry, Y. Cissao et P. Kaboré. « *Femmes de devant !* ». *Combat du leadership féminin au Burkina Faso*. 2021.
7. Sten Hagberg, Ludovic O. Kibora, Sidi Barry, Yacouba Cissao, Siaka Gnessi, Amado Kaboré, Bintou Koné and Mariatou Zongo. *Security from below in Burkina Faso. Citizen perceptions and perspectives*. 2023.