Making Questions and Answers Work

Negotiating Participation in Interview Interaction

CLARA IVERSEN
Abstract

The current thesis explores conditions for participation in interview interaction. Drawing on the ethnomethodological idea that knowledge is central to participation in social situations, it examines how interview participants navigate knowledge and competence claims and the institutional and moral implications of these claims. The data consists of, in total, 97 audio-recorded interviews conducted as part of a national Swedish evaluation of support interventions for children exposed to violence. In three studies, I use discursive psychology and conversation analysis to explicate how interview participants in interaction (1) contribute to and negotiate institutional constraints and (2) manage rights and responsibilities related to knowledge.

The findings of study I and study II show that child interviewees actively cooperate with as well as resist the constraints of interview questions. However, the children’s opportunities for participation in this institutional context are limited by two factors: (1) recordability; that is, the focus on generating recordable responses and (2) problematic assumptions underpinning questions and the interpretation of interview answers. Apart from restricting children’s rights to formulate their experiences, these factors can lead interviewers to miss opportunities to gain important information. Also related to institutional constraints, study III shows how the ideal of model consistency is prioritized over service-user participation. Thus, the three studies show how different practices relevant to institutional agendas may hinder participation.

Moreover, the findings contribute to an understanding of how issues of knowledge are managed in the interviews. Study II suggests the importance of the concept of believability to refer to people’s rights and responsibilities to draw conclusions about others’ thoughts. And the findings of study III demonstrate how, in evaluation interviews with social workers, children’s access to their own thoughts and feelings are based on a notion of predetermined participation; that is, constructed as contingent on wanting what the institutional setting offers. Thus, child service users’ low epistemic status, compared to the social workers, trumps their epistemic access to their own minds. These conclusions, about recordability, believability, and predetermined participation, are based on interaction with or about children. However, I argue that the findings relate to interviewees and service users in general. By demonstrating the structuring power of interactive practices, the thesis extends our understanding of conditions for participation in the institutional setting of social research interviews.

Keywords: Interviews, participation, epistemics, institutional-talk-in-interaction, questions and answers, social studies of childhood, sociology of scientific knowledge, discursive psychology, conversation analysis

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List of Papers

This thesis is based on the following papers, which are referred to in the text by their Roman numerals.


II   Iversen, Clara (In press) “I don’t know if I should believe him”: Knowledge and believability in interviews with children. British Journal of Social Psychology.


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During the first years of my PhD-studies, I collected data for the evaluation study Support to Children who have Witnessed Violence against their Mothers. Although I always appreciated meeting children, mothers, and professionals, this was a strenuous time in many ways. The mothers’ and children’s difficult situations, the time pressure, and the challenges provided by
Sweden’s railway system made me reconsider my choice to become a PhD-student several times. Karin Sörbom helped me through this period and I am forever grateful to her. The community formed by the research group also encouraged me to continue. I wish to thank my fellow junior interviewers Anna Forssell, Karin Grip, and Ulrika Sharifi for their wonderful support and for the good times we shared in places like Ugglarp, Uppsala, Örebro, Loka, and Gothenburg. I also wish to thank the project leader Anders Broberg. Anders’ passion for interdisciplinary work and eagerness to make the interviews available for sociological analysis strikes me as unique. In the research group, Ulf Axberg, Åsa Cater, Maria Eriksson, Kjerstin Almqvist, and Linnea Almqvist have been very good mentors. Further, my contacts at the agencies being evaluated, Eva Bladini Amborn, Karin Hagerell, Lena Kallio, and Li Forsman, have always welcomed me and facilitated the contact with the children and mothers.

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Clara Iversen, London, June 2013
## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Discursive Psychology</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Conversation Analysis</td>
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<td>TCU</td>
<td>Turn Constructional Unit</td>
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<td>TRP</td>
<td>Transition Relevance Place</td>
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<td>FPP</td>
<td>First Pair Part</td>
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1. Introduction

Most people encounter interviews regularly during the course of their lives. The private lives of others are made available to us through interviews in various contexts such as media, employment procedures, and health-care screening. Further, it is far from exceptional for people to contribute to and take advantage of interview-based social research. Asking the right questions is considered a gateway to others’ reality. This has led some scholars to suggest that we live in an interview society (e.g. Silverman, 1993, p. 96).

The psychological research interview is a model of the way that we use interviews—as keys to unlock the door to interviewees’ experiences, feelings, and cognitions. Its features can be found in different kinds of interviews: In sports television interviews as well as political opinion polls, questions are designed to tell us something essential about the interviewee’s inner motivations. However, in relation to some groups of people and some life events, psychological interviews are a core part of formulating participants’ experiences. Children who encounter social welfare work¹ are one such group. Psychological interviews are used to screen for their problems, assess their needs, and evaluate the outcome of the interventions in which they have participated.

The present thesis examines the social aspects of this kind of interviews. It takes as its focus a national Swedish evaluation study of interventions for children exposed to violence against their mothers. Because the practices in this particular evaluation study are not unique, the thesis’s scope goes beyond the Swedish case and discusses generic institutional conditions of interviews.

As with most activities both inside and outside of institutions, social interaction is fundamental to making interview research happen. It is through linguistic and other interactional resources that shared meaning, mutual understanding, and coordinated action develop. And interaction is the main channel by which cultures and identities are transmitted, renewed, and altered. Therefore, this thesis follows a sociological tradition of analyzing the interactional details of institutional business. Studying interaction provides information about how people participate in institutional activities: For ex-

¹ I use the term social welfare work when I refer to practices that occur in social work as well as in child and youth psychiatry. Article III only analyzes interviews with social workers, so that article refers only to social work.
ample, it establishes the positions available for participants, such as speaker and hearer. Exploring interaction also reveals the actions that individual participants conduct while in these positions. Finally, it shows whether and how people’s actions are ratified by other participants (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990).

Studies exploring interactional details in interviews have, with few exceptions (Baker, 1983; Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; Maynard & Schaeffer, 2002; Simonen, 2012), been concerned with the implications of mundane interactional resources for research validity and reliability. Thus, they have studied science in relation to its own ideals. The present thesis differs from this approach by focusing primarily on what the interview situation implies as a social encounter. Today, interviews are used in settings guided by ideals that sometimes differ from scientific principles. Two such ideals are service users’ participation and ethical practice. In studying the implications of interview practices for interviewees’ participation, my goal is to understand how participants manage knowledge, rather than to understand how the knowledge that the interviews generate may be “tainted” by interactional practices. This means that I abstain from analyzing and discussing the results of the evaluation study. Likewise, I focus more on how the interviewees treat interview questions than on the details of the interviewers’ actions.

When people talk, the relevance of categorical and contextual features depends on the particular setting in which their talk occurs. This is true for conversation in general, but especially for interaction related to institutional tasks. Some settings heighten the relevance of people’s categorical attributes—for instance, heterosexuality is habitually taken for granted by companies offering services for couples (Land & Kitzinger, 2005). In other institutional settings, peoples’ categorical attributes are downplayed or ignored in favor of the activities in which they take part (Goffman, 1964). Interview interaction makes relevant a number of categorical attributes and institutional inferences connected to the interview agenda. Below is an example of a question in an interview conducted as a part of the evaluation study: number 22 in a Swedish version of a psychometric questionnaire called KIDSCREEN (Herdman et al., 2002):

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2 Apart from the report to the National Board of Health and Welfare (Broberg, Almqvist, Axberg, Grip, Almqvist, Sharifi, et al., 2011), the interested reader can find results of the evaluation study in Grip (2012). Grip shows that children 9-13 reported reduced symptom levels of post-traumatic stress and general psychological problems after receiving support and that their mothers reported significant reductions in the children’s behavioral problems. Still, the majority of the children did not report changes, and individual-level analysis demonstrates that many children who had clinical levels of problems at the beginning of the study continued to have elevated symptoms after the support intervention (cf. Grip, Almqvist, Axberg, & Broberg, 2013).
If you think about this last month how often …

22. were you scared of other pupils? Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always

The question includes some presuppositions, for example that the recipient is a pupil who attended school during the last month. It also invites the recipient to choose one of the five response options. Below is an extract from an audio-recorded interview in which nine-year-old William is answering this question. The extract is transcribed according to the conventions developed by Jefferson (2004, see Appendix A), to make visible issues related to turn taking and sequence (concepts which will be explained in chapter 3). The interviewer is reading the question when William comes in early with his answer:

[134_1]
2 IR how w- often were you scared of [oth-]
3 W [no ] not so much.
4 IR was it ne[ver or seldom]
5 W [a little bit ]
6 IR right then you can [pick that one]
7 W [if they ] teased me
8 (. ) [then I] wasn’t very scare[d
9 IR [seldom] [no
10 W seldom.
11 IR that one,
12 W m.

This short extract, less than 43 seconds in total, shows how the interviewer and William negotiate the answer into one that can be captured by the response options. Whereas the psychometric question “how often,” works with amount in terms of frequency, William’s answers, “not so much” and “a little bit” concern being more or less scared. In lines 7-8, William suggests a reason for this difference: The psychometric question does not make a distinction between being subjected to actions that might cause fear and being scared, but William suggests that he has been exposed to scary events, being teased, but still “wasn’t very scared.” Two things are noteworthy in the sequel to this utterance: first, that the interviewer guides William to abandon his answer in favor of the response option “seldom,” and second, that the interviewer does not offer any display of recognition or empathy to his report that he has been teased by other children. In ordinary conversation, a child telling an adult about being teased in school would typically demand a

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3 For illustration purposes, the extract only includes the English translation. The subsequent examples in this summary chapter use both the original Swedish version and the English translation. Article III only shows the English translation and the Swedish original can therefore be found in Appendix B.
response more elaborated than “no.” Cues to the interviewer’s limited response can partly be found in William’s delivery, in which “they teased me” (line 7) is embedded in the middle of a turn which is mainly oriented to answering the interviewer’s question. Yet another reason is the overall structural organization of the interaction, which dictates that interviewers should not evaluate interviewees’ answers on an interpersonal level.

This organization of the talk is related to several institutional goals of the interview: It produces a large amount of information in a time-effective way, and the responses are produced so that they can easily be compared to other interviewees’ answers. Moreover, the questions address topics that are avoided in ordinary conversation between strangers, such as violence and vulnerability. Institutional restrictions such as these can help participants escape other institutional orders such as age, ethnicity, and gender. In emergency calls, for example, patients’ dispositions and traits are generally ignored in favor of information concerning their medical conditions (Cromdal, Osvaldsson, & Persson-Thunqvist, 2008). However, institutional terms also restrict what information the “client” can provide and how it will be recorded, and thereby treat clients as having a limited authority in knowing their experiences.

Thus, by analyzing the interactional details of interviews, the thesis contributes to unpacking the “black box” of interviewing; specifically, it explains how psychological interview questions are put to work in social welfare work settings. This contribution relates to two important sociological tasks: studying the production of social order in institutional settings and extending knowledge on conditions for participation in interviews with vulnerable groups. This latter task is increasingly important as social research methods and theories become a primary resource for developing and assessing work and people in social welfare.

Aim and Research Questions

The current thesis explores interviews as a social practice as well as the conditions for child service users’ participation as constructed by the participants in interview interaction. The thesis draws on the ethnomethodological idea that to be allowed to participate in, and contribute to, social situations, we must be considered to be competent actors. It focuses on participation in the form of epistemics; that is, how people orient to, invoke, or contest knowledge in unfolding interaction. More specifically, I study three different kinds of interviews conducted as part of the national Swedish evaluation of support interventions for children exposed to violence against their mothers: psychometric interviews with children, “mentalization” interviews with children, and evaluation interviews with social workers (see Appendix C for a description of the interviews). The main concern of the thesis is to examine
conditions for participation in terms of how participants in interview interaction navigate knowledge and competence claims and their institutional and moral implications. To address this primary aim, I ask the following questions:

1. How do interview participants contribute to and negotiate institutional constraints in interaction?
2. How do interview participants manage rights and responsibilities related to knowledge in interaction?

By studying interactional properties relevant to participation—such as resistance, epistemic stance taking, and construction of agency—in three settings, the thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of conditions for research participants and service users. Both children’s and service users’ epistemic status is often considered to be lower than that of adults and institutional agents. Therefore, the specific case of child interviewees who take part in social welfare interventions works to amplify issues of interviewees’ and service users’ participation. However, the findings of the thesis are also relevant in relation to other interview participants, and therefore extend knowledge on generic practices related to participation in interview interaction.

Disposition of the Thesis

The introductory part of the thesis is divided into six chapters. To contextualize the thesis, chapter 2 first outlines the thesis’s relationship to three research fields: institutional talk-in-interaction, social studies of childhood, and sociology of scientific knowledge. I present this research in two sections: Institutional Talk-in-Interaction and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical and analytical framework of the study—discursive psychology and conversation analysis—and explains the concepts of turn taking, sequence, preference, epistemics, and resistance. In chapter 4, I describe how I have used this framework in relation to the data and analytic procedure. I also discuss limitations of the approach and matters of reflexivity. Chapter 5 summarizes the three empirical articles from which the thesis is composed. Finally, in chapter 6, I bring the findings of these studies together and discuss their contribution in relation to issues of participation and knowledge: The thesis provides new understanding of how interview participants manage institutional restrictions and of the relationship between knowledge and morality in interaction.
2. Research Context

By focusing on discursive conditions for research participants and service users, in particular child interviewees, the thesis brings together and contributes to three research fields: studies of institutional talk-in-interaction, social studies of childhood, and sociological studies of scientific knowledge. Fruitful combinations of two of these three areas have already been conducted: Important work in the sociology of scientific knowledge includes studies in discursive psychology and conversation analysis (e.g. Drew, Raymond, & Weinberg, 2006; Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 1995; Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; Maynard & Schaeffer, 2002; Suchman & Jordan, 1990). There are also studies that focus on interactional details in institutional settings open to children, such as education, counseling, and emergency calls (Evaldsson & Svahn, forthcoming; Hutchby, 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998; Osvaldsson, Persson-Thunqvist, & Cromdal, 2013; Osvaldsson, 2004; Silverman, Baker, & Keogh, 1998; Svahn, 2012).

However, to my knowledge, studies combining these three areas are very rare. Together, they provide a background to understanding how interview participants can manage issues related to knowledge and participation in research interviews. Research interviews are becoming one of the main devices for improvement of social welfare work, and this thesis offers a unique understanding of the discursive conditions that these interviews present for service users. I will shortly review the most relevant work for the thesis in two sections: The first section describes the research field of institutional talk and its relevance for childhood studies, and similarly, the relevance of childhood studies for understanding participation in institutional talk. The second section presents the field of the sociology of scientific knowledge, with a specific focus on interviews.

Institutional Talk-in-Interaction

Sociological researchers have theorized, criticized, compared, and contributed to the development of social welfare all through its existence. Yet, situated activities in social welfare settings have largely escaped sociological interest. Whereas studies of social welfare in education or linguistics have benefited from an understanding of talk-in-interaction, sociology has mainly reached its understanding of welfare through theoretical discussions, inter-
views, ethnographic observations, participants’ commentaries, self-reports, diary studies, and register data (Donzelot, 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996; Fraser, 1989; Hessle & Vinnerljung, 1999; Maluccio, 1998; Munro, 2010; Orloff, 1993; Pinkney, 2011; Pringle, 2010; Valiente, 2007). Although these approaches may be useful for collecting large-scale data, as well as professionals’ and service-users’ accounts, a focus on institutional talk-in-interaction gives the researcher several advantages for understanding participation in actual welfare practices.

Because studies of institutional talk focus on how people relate and contribute to rather than just follow institutional norms (Adelswärd, Aronsson, & Linell, 1988), they are suitable for studying conditions for service users’ agency. Analyzing interaction allows for the exploration of actual rather than planned institutional practices (Day, 1998; Osvaldsson, 2009). Further, it shows whether and how participants themselves orient to institutional attributes, identities, or procedures (Schegloff, 1992). Finally, this approach avoids some methodological problems associated with interview research, such as the gap between what people say and what they do. And unlike ethnographic research that relies on field notes, using recordings allows researchers to study activities over and over and employ sophisticated investigative techniques (Drew & Heritage, 1992, p. 5).

Studies of institutional talk-in-interaction use findings from conversation analysis about how people interact in mundane settings to understand the particular constraints and possibilities in various institutions. This research field has contributed information about a number of welfare practices; for example, court proceedings (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Maynard, 1979, 2009), educational interaction (Benwell & Stokoe, 2002; Björk-Willén & Cromdal, 2009; Danby & Farrell, 2004; Nyroos, 2008; 2010; Svahn & Evaldsson, 2011, 2012; Tholander & Aronsson, 2003), and doctor-patient interaction (Heritage & Maynard, 2006; Peräkylä, 1993, 2005, 2008; Stivers & Majid, 2007). There is no straightforward way of defining institutional talk. Interaction is not institutional just because it occurs within an institution: Co-workers regularly interact beyond the scope of the institution they work within (Llewellyn & Hindmarsh, 2010, p. 22). Neither is institutional talk limited to interaction that occurs within institutions (Drew & Heritage, 1992, p. 5). For instance, participants in an online forum have been shown to manage the credibility of being on sick leave, thus orienting to institutional categories regardless of not being physically within an institution (Flinkfeldt, 2011). Likewise, interviews are not necessarily conducted within a research institution. Instead, the questionnaire or interview guide work as institutional anchors in various places, such as the interviewee’s home, in welfare agencies, or at cafés. Analyzing the interplay between mundane and institutional talk is an important part of getting to know the constraints of an institution.

Still, Drew and Heritage (1992, pp. 23–24; cf. Heritage & Clayman, 2010) suggest three features that institutional talk is likely to cover. First, at
least one of the participants should be oriented to some institutional goal, task, or identity. Tasks are institutions’ reason for existing and can relate to both broad institutional agendas, such as teaching practices in educational settings (Tholander & Aronsson, 2003), and to specific institutional activities, such as advice-giving in phone calls between nurses and patients (Leppänen, 1998). Second, institutional interaction often involves special and particular constraints on what one or both of the participants will treat as allowable contributions to the business at hand. In institutional settings, such as police interviews, child helpline services, and mediation services, clients’ descriptions need to be defined in terms of the institution’s services (Edwards, 2008; Edwards & Stokoe, 2007; Hepburn & Potter, 2011a). For example, in medical visits, both patients and doctors orient to the principle of doctorability. This means that patients initially work to establish their problems as worthy of medical attention and that doctors medicalize the patients’ concerns by reconstructing them within a course of questioning that embodies a medical frame of reference. Consequently, only the problems that can be managed with medical competencies are attended to (Heritage & Robinson, 2006). Institutional constraints can be informal and loosely monitored, as with doctorability, but also legally enforced, as with suspects’ right to talk in court rooms (Linell, Gustavsson, & Juvonen, 1988). Third, institutional interaction is associated with inferential frameworks and procedures that are particular to specific institutional contexts (Heritage & Clayman, 2010, p. 34). There may be specific ways of reasoning that make sense in certain settings, as well as specific available linguistic resources. Again, in courtroom interaction, legal professionals initiate almost all the talk and have the right to reformulate what the defendant says (Adelswärd, Aronsson, Jönsson, & Linell, 1987). Because studies of institutional talk-in-interaction reveal how people manage these kinds of institutional restrictions, they are useful for understanding participation.

Children in Institutional Settings
The specific case of children further highlights issues of participation; social studies of children have helped create a movement to better orient institutional interventions to service-users’ needs and wishes. For example, social welfare interventions for children have been criticized for unreflectively using the concept of childhood and for using theories, such as developmental psychology and socialization theory, which do not appreciate children’s agency (Eriksson, 2003, 2007, 2012; Forsberg & Pöösö, 2007; Kenkel & Couling, 2006; Qvortrup, 1994). James, Jenks, and Prout (1998) argue that there is a tendency to respond to children as objects of interventions rather than as active subjects. Children’s participation has been found non-existent in processes concerning welfare benefits (Fernqvist, 2011). Further, the use of medical diagnoses in education may promote a decontextualized under-
standing of children (Börjesson, 1997, p. 65; cf. Wahl, 2006, p. 171). In a study of diagnostic testing, the analytical relationship between empirical notes about children’s play and the theoretically bound conclusions regarding their personalities was shown to be very distant (Börjesson & Palmblad, 2003, p. 203). Moreover, children have, in interviews, described welfare professionals neglecting or outright challenging their calls for help (Eriksson & Näsman, 2008; Weinehall, 2005). As these studies exemplify, however, social studies of childhood suffer from the same complications as many other sociological studies of welfare: They have reached their understanding of institutional conditions for children through theoretical discussions, interviews, text analyses, and participants’ commentaries (Cromdal, 2006, 2009). Because they do not study children’s actual actions in institutions, their utility in understanding conditions for children’s participation is limited.

Exceptions show that an interactional focus enhances understanding of how institutional terms enable and constrain children’s participation (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998). In an early contribution, Speier (1976) suggests that in conversation with adults, children risk being subjected to restricted conversational rights: Adults can enforce silence on children, intervene in children’s interactions, dismiss children’s contributions, or refrain from talking to children. In short, in interactions with children, adults get away with behavior that would in other circumstances be considered impolite. Speier suggests that these practices underlie institutional responses as well as presuppositions in sociological research. Asymmetries may be enforced in institutional interaction where clients are also accorded fewer conversational rights (Haakana, Laakso, & Lindström, 2009). Still, institutions have been shown to rely on children’s interactional competencies for carrying out their agendas (Mackay, 1975). For example, in analyzing interaction in standardized reading tests, Mackay (1974) found that children used the abilities that the test was designed to measure, regardless of whether the children provided the correct responses. Thus, some of children’s abilities were ignored for the sake of methodological certainty. By contrast, a focus on children’s actions presupposes that all interaction is based upon participants’ underlying interpretive competence (Mackay, 1975).

Studies of institutional talk involving children suggest that many institutions that work with children have strategies for circumventing the conflict between the ideal of participation and the common institutional agenda of changing children’s behavior (Hutchby, 2005a). For instance, Butler et al. (2010) show how helpline counselors soften the epistemic asymmetry in advice giving by delivering the advice in interrogative form, thereby relaying epistemic authority to child callers. However, studies also show that institutional agents working with models for enhancing participation, such as “active listening” in counseling or interviews about children’s views, actually construct and direct answers (Danby, Ewing, & Thorpe, 2011; Hutchby, 2005b; Nijnatten & Jongen, 2011). Persson-Thunqvist, Osvaldsson, and
Cromdal (2012) criticize previous research about children for targeting interactional problems as children’s cognitive inability (cf. Silverman, 1987). In contrast, studies of institutional talk have demonstrated that children competently use conversational strategies similar to those of institutional agents to pre-empt and solve interactional problems and to provide relevant information (Cromdal et al., 2008; Danby, Ewing, et al., 2011; Osvaldsson et al., 2013; Persson-Thunqvist et al., 2012). In a study of interviews with adolescents about age-relevant matters, Baker (1983) suggests that just as the interviewer’s questions imply a theory of the adolescent, the adolescents’ answers contain an implicit theory of adulthood. Children have also been shown to use their knowledge of institutional practices and their own lives to resist particular proposals from institutional agents (Danby, Butler, & Emmison, 2011; Hutchby, 2002; Lloyd, 1992; Marlaire & Maynard, 1990; Nijnatten, 2013) as well as the general institutional agenda (Hutchby, 2005a, 2005b).

To sum up, the broad field of institutional talk-in-interaction offers a helpful backdrop against which to understand interview interaction. The case of children as interviewees exposes issues of participation in this setting; children are surrounded by ideals concerning participation at the same time as participation may be challenging to realize in practice. Because I depart from an understanding of social science methods as a certain institutional environment, the next section will present the sociology of scientific knowledge.

Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

Early sociology of science (e.g. Merton, 1938) assumed that social norms in science are functional and that deviations from those norms are exceptions. As opposed to the treatment of science as contributing increasingly accurate facts about the world, today’s science studies mainly use constructionist perspectives (Mulkay, 1991). Accordingly, scholarly interest has shifted from what should count as proper facts to what members of a scientific community treat as knowledge and how they produce and defend their versions of knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 2005; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Potter, 1996; Stehr & Meja, 2005). This form of sociology of scientific knowledge—represented, for example, by the strong programme (Barnes, Bloor, & Henry, 1996)—suggests that there is no epistemological difference between scientific knowledge and everyday knowledge or between good science and bad. Instead, science is viewed as a form of knowledge that operates in different scientific communities (cf. Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Mulkay, 2005).

In many areas, including social welfare work, scientific knowledge can be regarded as capacity for action because it works as a basis for decision mak-
ing (Stehr, 2005). Latour (1987) argues that the idea of science is connected to researchers' ability to bring back traces from their studies, allowing the inexperienced actor to “be familiar with things, people and events, which are distant” (Latour, 1987, p. 220). Scientific devices, such as statistics, provide means for making phenomena: (a) mobile, so that they can be brought back from the field, (b) stable, so that they can be moved without being changed, and (c) combinable, so that they can be accumulated, aggregated and mixed (Latour, 1987, p. 232). Doing this, scientific knowledge makes possible presence in absence—the actual person or event studied does not have to be around for the scientist to draw conclusions. The problem is that the knowledge requires that the element which it represents acts in a familiar way (Latour, 1987, p. 254). Thus, scientific knowledge is valuable only as long as its objects are recognizable within the scientific regime.

Pioneering studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge focused on the categorizing procedures that scientists use to arrive at their findings (Garfinkel, Lynch, & Livingston, 1981), the communication from scientists to professionals (Mulkay, Pinch, & Ashmore, 1987), and the use of science to understand social situations (Mulkay, Ashmore, & Pinch, 1987). Science studies have further been concerned with how scientific controversies are resolved to produce credible findings (Collins, 1985; Mulkay & Gilbert, 1986), what goes on in natural science laboratories (Latour, 1987), and how scientific technologies make living entities into objects (Holmberg, Schwennesen, & Webster, 2011). A core idea is that the scientist—for example, an economist—“performs, shapes, and formats” the object of study—such as the economy—rather than just observing and representing how it functions (Callon, 1998, p. 2).

An increasing number of studies attend to the mundane practices through which social scientists collect and analyze their data. Just like natural science, social research depends upon mobilizing investigators, gathering and archiving data, and coding, calculating, and displaying results (Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Callon, 1998, p. 256; Latour, 1987, p. 235; Maynard & Schaeffer, 2000; Rose, 1999, p. 197). And to an even greater extent, social research methods are linguistic phenomena. Both the implementation of social research methods and the practical realization of the phenomena themselves rely on the routine demands of ordinary language use. Accordingly, as with other institutional practices, the skills of mastering a natural language compete and collude with the skills generally presumed necessary to conduct sound scientific research (Drew et al., 2006; Speer & Stokoe, in press).

Interviews as a Topic of Study

One of the main ways of generating data in social science is interviewing. Briggs (1986, p. 1) estimated in an early study that 90% of all social science
research uses interview data, and there is no reason to expect that this number has diminished. Interviews are, accordingly, an important social scientific resource. However, just as scholars can study the production of knowledge in laboratories, the activities in interviews can be a topic of investigation (see Baker, 1983; Cicourel, 1968, 1974). According to Cicourel (1968, p. vii), “the researcher’s activities must be as much an object of study as the actor’s way of ‘knowing’ or ‘explaining’ his environment.” In a study of how statistics are created in juvenile justice, Cicourel (1968, p. 166) demonstrates the differences between the unfolding dialogue in interviews and the way the exchange is written up as a report of what happened. The juvenile may have been cajoled, lied to, or pleaded with, but the report never reveals what kind of exchange preceded the disclosure of information that was then recorded (Cicourel, 1968, p. 167). Similarly, in an examination of theories and methods in an Argentine fertility study, Cicourel (1974, p. 160) remarked that the various conditions of interaction in the interviews were absent from the display of the research results.

Subsequently, studies of interviews have focused on three types of interviews: standardized interviews, open-ended interviews, and focus-group interviews (Roulston, 2006). Standardized interviews include response options which promote efficiency in getting particular information (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; Pomerantz, 1988). These requirements may, however, conflict with the expectations associated with everyday interaction. Both interviewees and interviewers have been shown to depart from the standardized activity (Suchman & Jordan, 1990). Interviewees’ elaborated answers can be unproblematic in relation to the standardized ideal, for example when they add information that does not compete with their already delivered response. But more problematic are cases in which interviewees’ elaborations deviate from the terms of the instrument. Likewise, the standardized ideal fails when interviewees correct the interview’s trajectory by suggesting that their answer would imply something other than what the instrument’s response option presumes, or when the answer is ambiguous (Iversen, 2012; Maynard & Schaeffer, 2006).

Interviewers, on the other hand, should ideally respond to interviewees’ answers to standardized interview questions by providing minimal acknowledgement tokens such as “okay.” But interviewers have been shown to check, clarify, and provide alternative responses (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000, p. 114), as well as revise questions in personalized terms (Antaki, 2002) to arrive at recordable answers. Houtkoop-Steenstra (2000) demonstrates how interviewers do “being friendly” by reacting to interviewees’ assessable answers and by reformulating neutrally formatted scripted questions into questions that invite positive, so-called “no problem” answers, such as the question “Your back’s alright?” (cf. Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994). Moreover, Simonen (2012) shows that interviewers, in relation to questions about interviewees’ abilities, reinforce interviewees’ competence in three ways: They
(a) upgrade interviewees’ positive evaluations of their ability by suggesting that the interview itself displays the interviewee’s competence, (b) disagree with interviewees’ negative evaluation of their ability, and (c) apologize for questioning the interviewee’s competence. Thus, the standardized interview is much more infused with social consideration than the format presumes; several researchers have therefore recommended a more elastic approach in using them (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; Roulston, 2006; Suchman & Jordan, 1990).

Open-ended interviews are more flexible and responsive to the requirements of everyday interaction than standardized interviews are. However, there are several drawbacks to open-ended interviews that result from analysts overlooking the interactional basis of data production (Antaki & Rapley, 1996; Antaki, 2006; Potter & Hepburn, 2005). Potter and Hepburn (2005) suggest that there are problems in qualitative interviewing that can be managed but that there are also problems that cannot be avoided. Analysts can remedy certain problems by: (a) including the interviewer’s questions in the representation of the interview, (b) transcribing to a level that allows interactional features to be appreciated, (c) presenting the extracts with line numbers so that discrete connections can be made between elements of talk and analytic interpretations, and (d) including information about how participants were approached and how they understood the interview task. Treated in this way, interview data can show how small clauses—for example, “I don’t know”—do important interactional work. The extract below is from an interview study with members of youth subcultures:

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[Widdicombe and Wooffitt 1995: 96-97]
1 IR can you tell me something about your style and the way you
2 look,
3 (0.7)
4 IR how would you describe yourselves
5 (0.7)
6 IE1 °h!!!°
7 (0.7)
8 IE1 I dunno >I hate those sorts of quest[ions uhm
9 IE2 [yeah horrible isn’t
10 it
```

Instead of just reporting on the interviewees’ state of mind, the “no knowledge” claim in line 8 addresses a delicate issue: The interviewees had a distinctive appearance and therefore, the question could be heard as a challenge, asking them to account for their looks. The “no knowledge” claim has a defensive orientation as it displays the interviewees’ recognition that the position they are taking may be disputed (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006). As this example shows, an interview is a high-stake setting that involves benefits and risks for interviewees; some categories and actions are socially problematic. Thus, formulations such as “I don’t know” should not be over-
looked or treated as examples of an overall theme, but can profitably be examined as activities in interviews (cf. Baker, 1983).

More problematic in open-ended interviews is treating responses as a pathway to interviewees’ authentic experiences or to social settings (Baker, 1997). Questions in institutional settings are never just asking for information; rather, they embody institutions’ specificities and moral frameworks (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Freed & Ehrlich, 2010). For example, in performance appraisal interviews, the organization of turns has been shown to limit the possibilities for employees to raise issues of negative experiences (Nyroos, 2012; Sandlund, Olin-Scheller, Nyroos, Jakobsen, & Nahnfeldt, 2011). Qualitative interviews are flooded with psychological and/or sociological agendas—for example, in the categories and terms that they use (Iversen, in press; Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Roulston, 2006). Interviewers guide interviewees to answer their questions in a certain way by providing formulations, assessments, and acknowledgements (Roulston, Baker, & Liljestrom, 2001). However, analysts routinely treat interviewees’ answers as if they had not been guided by their own conduct in picking up and elaborating on some details of interviewees’ accounts (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006).

Finally, studies of focus-group interviews have shown similar problems as those of open-ended interviews: Although researchers often justify their use of focus groups by referring to the benefits of seeing how topics are produced in interaction, the analysis of this interaction is largely absent (Roulston, 2006). Interviewers negotiate interviewees’ answers into institutionally relevant knowledge, such as “freestanding opinion packages” in market research (Puchta & Potter, 2002). Accounts are treated as simply “tellings,” not as fitted responses to other participants’ turns (Myers, 1998; Potter & Puchta, 2007; Puchta & Potter, 1999, 2002). Moreover, focus-group interviews may include socially tricky situations in which speakers refrain from giving an opinion or distance themselves from their own words by using a generalized gloss. Treating such glosses as the participant’s opinions misses the interactional quality of the interviews (Wilkinson, 2006).

The present thesis analyzes an evaluation study that uses interviews to produce knowledge about children’s psychological well-being. Like interview research in general, the evaluation study disregards the interactional properties of the interviews. I draw on the sociology of scientific knowledge to view knowledge as what participants treat as such in different settings, and I am interested in how participants manage knowledge in these interviews. As chapter 3 will discuss, my concern is with how the interlocutors use knowledge to demand, provide, and resist participation. Thus, the main focus is how issues of knowledge provide resources for participation in the interview setting, rather than on the knowledge that the interview finally produces. The actualization of participatory ideals in social welfare work interviews is important to examine because interviews may have conse-
quences for the development of support interventions. It may also influence practices concerned with, for example, custody policy concerning children’s contact with a father who has used violence. But regardless of what interview interaction implies in terms of institutional guidelines, it is also relevant from a sociological and social psychological point of view to understand the social and epistemic resources that participants can use to make questions and answers work. In the next section, I describe the theoretical framework that I use to analyze interviews in this thesis; this framework is based on discursive psychology and conversation analysis.
3. Talk as Action: Discursive Psychology and Conversation Analysis

The present thesis’ engagement with psychological interviews as well as issues related to knowledge and agency makes discursive psychology a fitting theoretical and analytical framework. Similar to the conversation analytic critique of the idea that institutions are separate entities that have a determinist effect on interaction, discursive psychology challenges the idea that cognition is a separate mental space that controls action (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007a). This chapter will describe some basic principles of discursive psychology (henceforth sometimes DP) and explain central concepts in conversation analysis (henceforth sometimes CA) which the thesis relies on.

Discursive psychology differs from other discursive approaches in its purely epistemological focus. Instead of discussing the ontological basis of discourse, DP limits its interest to text and talk as social practices; that is, not as pathways to objects in the world or to an inner subjective world, but as displays of knowledge about subjective and objective states of affairs. Thus, discourses are theorized not as entities with beginnings and ends but as situated ways of speaking. This view incorporates a basic critique of psychology and other approaches that adopt a referential theory of meaning.

Potter (2010) suggests that DP research can be divided into three branches of study. From its beginnings in the early 1990s, there were two lines of study in DP. One aimed mainly at identifying different interpretative repertoires that people use to build action (e.g. Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This work has continuously opposed mainstream social cognitive accounts of action, and it addresses topics such as gender and nationalism using data from newspapers, debates, interviews, and focus group interviews (e.g. Augoustinos, LeCouteur, & Fogarty, 2007). The second line of early DP studies examined how descriptions of the world and of psychological states are involved in action formation and management of accountability (e.g. Edwards, 1991, 1994, 1998). The focus was and continues to be on respecifying cognitive psychology and concepts such as memory, perception, and scripts by using naturalistic data (conversation and text), often analyzed with the methods of conversation analysis (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997). In the middle of the 1990s, a third line of DP studies emerged. These studies had a deeper engagement with CA and a focus on institutional practices, epistemics, and how categories are used in action (Hepburn &
This thesis draws primarily on the third set of studies but also on the aim of respecifying and reworking concepts in psychology. This means that I rely heavily on the ideas and methods of conversation analysis. CA was developed by Harvey Sacks in association with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. However, it builds upon prior work in sociology, and I will start by describing the sociological origins of CA.

**Sociological Origins: Order and Action**

The foundation of CA developed in a sociological environment in which the dominant theory of social action was a synthesis of anthropology, psychology, and sociology. The main idea associated with this standpoint is Talcott Parsons’ (1937, 1951) suggestion that internalized cultural values become personality dispositions, which, in turn, are the causal forces of social action. Thus, the motivation of action was considered to be culturally conditioned dispositions, acquired during socialization. According to Parsons, mutual understanding and coordinated action pre-exist within cultural systems’ norms of conduct. This framework was not guided by empirical analysis of actions but focused on constructing a conceptual approach for macro-analysis of systems of social action. As a consequence, linguistic resources in mundane interaction were left out of the understanding of action. In a parallel vein, the social aspects of language were deemed unimportant to linguistics (see Chomsky, 1957; Saussure, 1983). Thus, both sociologists and linguists viewed social interaction as disorderly and defective—mere obstacles to understanding ideal ordering structures (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990).

The essential move towards integrating language and social action was initiated by Harold Garfinkel. Inspired by Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology, Garfinkel criticized Parsons’ treatment of action for not paying attention to the everyday experiences and practical reasoning of social actors. Phenomenology conceptualizes mutual understanding and common sense as approximate and therefore open and revisable. Consequently, the social actor is seen as an active participant in constructing social order. In order to grasp action and understanding, it is therefore essential to incorporate the subjective world of social actors—otherwise, scientific observers risk replacing social reality with fictional, non-existent ones (Schutz, 1964, p. 8). Garfinkel used the term ethnomethodology (“people’s methods”) to frame sociological inquiries that empirically investigate these issues in phenomenology. The ethnomethodological program stresses the importance of adapting a perspective
that is indifferent to the established corpus of social science. This ethnomethodological indifference refers to an effort to refrain from deciding “in advance what the phenomenon consists of on the basis of prior formal analytic studies” (Garfinkel, 2002, p. 171). Instead, the analyst’s task is to try to grasp social order as understood by the research participants. Thus, unlike scholars’ previous concern with motivational issues socialized into individuals, ethnomethodology associates social action with the knowledge that actors use to recognize, produce, and reproduce social order (Heritage, 1987).

According to Garfinkel, people always exist in situated contexts, as members of an ongoing achievement of order. Social reality is a continuous project, tied to a local goal: making the present situation intelligible. The achievement of shared sense making—intelligibility—is seen as the primary motivation for actors in interaction (Garfinkel, 2005, p. 30). This intelligibility is dependent on members being accountable; that is, “visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii). This grammatically uncomfortable collection of descriptors makes three points. The first is that accountability is something that actors should be able to see in others’ behavior. Thus, actors must behave accountably—mutual understanding happens not in people’s brains, but in their actions. A second point is that accountability must be reportable. That is to say, an actor’s visible behavior must be something that we, if asked, could use a shared language to tell others about (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 185). A third point is that accountability is rational in relation to a practical purpose: Our actions are guided by what works in a given situation. Thus, unlike, for example, symbolic interactionism, which stresses the symbolic nature of action, ethnomethodology views social action as practical. People understand, misunderstand, negotiate, and collaborate in constructing social reality—their participation is at the core of social order.

A condition for effective action is that surprise occurs as little as possible; that is to say, that our actions follow a routine (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 53). To accomplish shared sense making, people rely on methods of practical reason—ethno-methods—when they interact with one another (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 252). To demonstrate such ethno-methods, Garfinkel designed experiments that breached social order. For example, participants were told that they were testing out a new therapy model and were instructed to ask questions to which a psychologist would answer “yes” or “no.” But instead of a psychologist responding to their questions, answers were randomly generated. Still, the participants “vigorously sought to make the strange actions intelligible and to restore the situation to normal appearances” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 47). This ethno-method, termed the “documentary method of interpretation,” is a way to conceptualize people’s tendency to go to great lengths to interpret others’ actions as relevant and based on shared knowledge. In this sense, members share a set of methods for making sense in, and of, the world.
When ethnomethodology emerged, Erving Goffman was also elaborating a notion of action that criticized the prevailing Parsonian version. His most important contribution to CA is the idea that social interaction has an organization of its own that is independent from macro structures (Goffman, 1983). Even the simplest interactions require a form of commitment: the commitment to agree with others on what is going on—a working consensus (Goffman, 1956). This working consensus is partly achieved by understanding others as belonging to institutional categories, such as “children” and “adults.” However, when we greet someone with “hello,” we do not primarily expect the other to answer “hello” as a child. Rather, we first and foremost expect the other to greet us back. This answer is not ordered in relation to the status of being an adult or a child or to any other institution, but to the norms of how we tell another that we exist and agree on the first terms of interaction: We answer, and we answer with a word that is connected to the first utterance (Goffman, 1964). Thus, regardless of what status people are displaying, they make a commitment to the orderliness of that display (Goffman, 1967).

Much of Goffman’s work is concerned with the nature of participation in social encounters: how people are involved in interactions with others. Social situations demand more ways to participate than just speaker and respondent; for example, the roles of animator, author, principal, addressed or unaddressed recipient, overhearer, bystander, and eavesdropper (Goffman, 1981). The concept of footing, which refers to different participant roles that interlocutors can take, is at the core of Goffman’s understanding of participation (Levinson, 1988). Issues of footing occur when participants’ alignment, set, stance, or projected self is somehow at issue (Goffman, 1981, p. 128). For example, people change footing when they shift between different institutional roles (e.g. nurse and co-worker) or from an institutional role to a personal role. But footing also refers to finer changes, such as a shift in voice quality from an accusatory to an emphatic stance. Although Goffman’s work generally conceptualizes social action as symbolic, the concepts of footing and interaction order have been central to the understanding, in CA and DP, of how social relations are managed in interaction.

The concepts of ethno-methods, accountability, interaction order, and footing offer a framework in this thesis for understanding the interviewers and interviewees as thoroughly social beings participating in accomplishing specific actions. Among the various approaches that ethnomethodology has influenced, CA may be the one most clearly concerned with social action (Heritage, 1987). An essential part of CA is understanding interaction as a fundamental social domain. Another core idea is that the focus of analysis should be the practices and procedures by which members orient to, produce, and recognize social order. Thus, Harvey Sacks followed Garfinkel and also Goffman in many respects. However, Sacks found their work insufficiently empirical to actually study how this order comes about. Conversation analy-
sis therefore developed as a way to empirically address notions such as ethno-methods, accountability, interaction order, and footing.

Organization in Interaction: Turn taking, Sequence, and Preference

CA starts from the idea that social interaction is orderly on an individual, action-by-action, case-by-case, level (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). This order should preferably be studied in naturally occurring interaction; not in materials fabricated in interviews, experiments, or role playing. This has to do with the ethnomethodological standpoint that the organization of talk-in-interaction should be approached from the participants’ own perspectives. Therefore, if we are to understand social order, it is essential that this order is not just produced as part of the research project studying it. Relatedly, CA stresses participant orientation in analysis; that is, the analytical search for interactional phenomena of relevance to the participants. Participant orientation means that analysts need to demonstrate (1) the relevance of the observed phenomenon to the participants studied and (2) that the phenomenon is consequential for their course of action (Schegloff, 1987). For the benefit of readers who are unfamiliar with CA, I will describe three of the main types of organization which have been shown to structure interaction: turn taking, sequence, and preference.

Turn taking is a prominent kind of social organization, not just in conversation but in activities such as playing, queuing, and driving. In conversation, turns are distributed within an economy of opportunities to speak. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974, p. 699) made the observation that “overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time, though speakers change, and though the size of turns and ordering of turns vary…” With a few exceptions, such as in laughter, unison greetings, and assessments, overlaps are brief and transitions between speakers occur with minor gap. Turns can consist of one or several turn constructional units (TCUs); that is, units that can be treated as a complete turn (as a sentential, clausal, phrasal, or lexical construction) but speakers still manage to come in with minimal overlap or gap. In the extract below\(^4\), the interviewer asks the interviewee to provide an example of his father’s change:

\[\text{IR} \quad \text{kan du ge något exempel=å berätta (lite)}\]
\[\text{can you give an example=and tell me (some of)}\]

\(^4\) Interview interaction is not the best way to understand turn taking organization though, as the turns are allocated by the institutional order of interviewing in which long pauses and outstretched turns are characteristic features.
Using questions is a grammatically clear way of indicating to someone that they are supposed to speak next (Stivers & Rossano, 2010). But the interviewer’s first turn (lines 1-3) is built of three TCUs: the question, “can you give me an example,” the directive “tell me some of what has changed so much,” and the assertion “I sure can hear that it is something.” The micro pauses in line 2 are clearly not cues for speaker transition; neither is the pause in the interviewee’s turn in line 4. Still, from line 3 to 4, there is a transition between the speakers without gap or overlap. So what lies behind this smooth but complex organization of turns? Grammar apparently constrains this practice: The words before the micro pauses in line 2 are hearably incomplete TCUs. So does action: The interviewee is asked to provide examples of his dad’s positive change, and “he shouts” is an incomplete answer because it describes a problem rather than improvement. But also, interactional resources such as pace, volume, intonation, and prosody offer important resources for participants to decide when turns are complete. In line 1, the interviewer rushes into “and tell me some of,” whereas the word “something” in line 3 is spoken more softly in a way that can be heard as a trail off, and thus a cue for the next speaker to come in.

Sacks et al. (1974) suggest that the turn-taking system allocates to speakers rights to produce one TCU at a time. After each TCU, there is a transition relevant place (TRP). Speakers who produce multiunit turns, like the interviewer does in the extract above, have been shown to orient to TRPs by increasing pace or volume through them (Schegloff, 1998). Thus, turn taking is a basic form of organization for conversation, and TCUs and TRPs are monitored and anticipated by participants. They show participants as well as analysts when silence is to be treated as an absence of response and when it is part of an ongoing turn.

Still, Schegloff acknowledges that “turns do not follow one another like identical beads on a string” but have some primary organization to them (Schegloff, 2007, p. 1). In sociology, it has been common to describe patterns in interaction in terms of topics—that turns fit together because they concern the same thing. However, Schegloff (1990) demonstrates that the organization of talk-in-interaction is better understood in terms of actions—what turns are doing, rather than what they are about. Turns of talk are designed to perform specific actions, such as greeting, offering, or requesting, and because there are fitted responses to those actions (greeting, accepting/declining, granting), turns fit together sequentially. Sequentiality refers
to this orientation of turns to what came before—most often, the immediately preceding talk (Sacks, 1984; Scheglof & Sacks, 1973). Apart from being oriented to what came before, actions also project the relevance of a particular next action to be performed by a subsequent speaker (Schegloff, 1972). This relationship can be compared to Schutz (1970) suggestion that actions have “because” motives and “in-order-to” motives; that is, they respond to a move and strive to bring something about. The relationship between an action and its response is critical to defining them both (Enfield, 2011).

Utterances are, to a large extent, sequentially organized into first pair parts (FPP) and second pair parts (SPP)—adjacency pairs. The concept of adjacency pairs means that when one item (for example, a greeting or a question) has been issued, the second (a return greeting or an answer) is relevant to follow (Schegloff, 1968). Adjacency pairs are not structured in terms of statistical probability or as categorical imperatives. Instead, they are ordered in relation to a norm to which participants hold each other accountable. By producing a SPP fitted to the FPP, speakers display an understanding of the prior action. When there is no answer to a request, the participants treat it as notably absent (Sidnell, 2010, p. 64). This is referred to in CA as the principle of conditional relevance: FPPs make relevant, but not necessary, a SPP. People may or may not provide the normatively called for SPP. For instance, many invitations are declined. However, speakers often design their invitations so that declinations will be less problematic, such as in the utterance “Do you want to come over, or are you busy?” The point is that when people do not provide the SPP to a FPP, they are held accountable. By studying how SPPs fit together with FPPs, the analyst can explicate meaning making in interaction as understood by the participants themselves. In CA, this way of studying intersubjectivity in action is known as the “next turn proof procedure” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 15; Sacks et al., 1974). Speakers show understanding of prior actions on multiple levels: By accepting an invitation, for instance, the speaker demonstrates an understanding of the prior turn as complete, as addressed to them, and as an invitation (Heritage, 2001).

The third basic organization of conversation that I will describe here is preference. FPPs often have different possible, normatively relevant responses. Sacks’ (1987) first observation regarding preference was that if a question, for example, invites a “yes,” then “yes” will most often be picked as an answer. He suggests that this is because there is a preference for agreement. Sacks also remarked that when there is a question in a turn, the question often occurs at the end of the turn, while an answer occurs in the beginning of the turn. He calls this the preference for contiguity—sequences

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5 This idea had been approached before by both Garfinkel and Goffman (Garfinkel, 2005, p. 30; Goffman, 1972, p. 174). When there is no prior talk, the item used to begin talk serves as a “ticket,” warranting having begun to talk (Sacks, 1972a, p. 343).
fit together in the simplest and clearest way possible (Sacks, 1987). Preference, in this sense, does not refer to psychological states of the participants but to observable patterns in talk (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984).

According to Schegloff (2007), there are two main preference structures in conversation. One is related to the action that an utterance accomplishes. If a person tries to get someone else to do something, the preferred action is to grant that request; that is, to fulfill the action that the FPP started. Similarly, the FPP of an assessment prefers agreement as a SPP. The second preference structure has to do with the design of the utterance. For instance, the question “Do you like apples?” prefers a “yes,” whereas “Did you not sleep well last night?” prefers a “no.” A vast number of CA studies have shown that when participants provide the preferred response, it is brief and comes without delay. Dispreferred responses, by contrast, come with delays, including silence, “hm,” or “well-prefaces” (Schegloff & Lerner, 2009), along with apologies, accounts, or pro-forma agreement (Sidnell, 2010, pp. 78–79). This fits with Sacks’s (1987) suggestion that there is a relationship between agreement and contiguity and disagreement and noncontiguity. When action preferences and design preferences compete, action has precedence over design. Such cross-cutting preferences can be used by participants to make a dispreferred action less conversationally problematic (Schegloff, 2007, p. 77). Raymond (2003) also suggests a third preference structure—type-conformity preference—which refers to the grammatical constraints of a FPP. Raymond has shown that yes/no interrogatives prefer a “yes” or a “no” and that a different, non-conforming response is only produced for a reason (Raymond, 2003).

The three organizations of turn taking, sequence, and preference help analysts understand restrictions that utterances set up as well as the conditions under which utterances conform and depart from those restrictions. The present thesis uses these ideas to understand interview participants’ management of scripted questions. A renewed interest and debated issue in CA is the role of knowledge as another organizing feature of interaction. Because the activity of question-answer sequences clearly concerns the participants’ knowledge, epistemic issues are highly relevant here.

Knowledge in Interaction

From the start, DP and CA have both been occupied with issues of knowledge and how it is managed in interaction. DP has approached knowledge in relation to how people accomplish facticity (Potter & Wetherell, 1988; Potter, 1996) and how participants manage subjective stance when they deliver descriptions of the world (Edwards, 2005, 2007). And early on in CA history, Sacks (1992) noted that people have different access to knowledge based on their experiences and that their rights to tell stories
are limited by these differences in experience. Similar to (and in DP’s case, strongly influenced by) the view represented by the sociology of science, these approaches consider knowledge to be what participants in different settings treat as such. But unlike sociology of science, DP and CA do not restrict their analysis of knowledge to scientific activities. Both DP and CA integrate analyses of knowledge and action to explore how participants in interaction generally orient to epistemic matters, such as evidence, to accomplish different actions. Although my data derives from a scientific setting—psychological research interviews—my focus is on knowledge in this mundane sense: as a prerequisite and resource for participation in the interviews. Thus, instead of studying what the evaluators treat as scientific knowledge, for example in the analytical process, I am interested in how the interview participants relate to knowledge to accomplish different actions.

In recent years, Heritage and others have suggested that epistemic issues are central for structuring conversation in general—not just conversation that is related to particular knowledge-producing institutions. According to Heritage, our knowledge, or lack of knowledge, is the driving force in sequence organization—even beyond adjacency pairs. Heritage refers to this structuring feature of knowledge as the epistemic engine and suggests that “giving and receiving information are normative warrants for talking” (Heritage, 2012a, p. 49). Line 3 in the extract below shows a common feature in talk, which is that speakers offer sequence-closing thirds, an acknowledgement token or receipt, suggesting that they have been informed by the recipient’s utterance (Heritage, 1998).

[HG:II:25]
1   Nan  .hhh Dz he ‘av ‘iz own apa:rt[mint?]
2   Hyl       [.hhhh] Yea:h,=
3   Nan    =Oh:,

Here, the change-of-state token “oh” communicates that Nancy has acquired the knowledge she sought from Hyla in line 1. Heritage uses this and similar examples to claim that the difference in knowledge between Nancy and Hyla is what drives the sequence forward. An indication of imbalances of information between participants is sufficient to motivate a sequence of interaction that will be closed when the imbalance has been attended to. This claim has been considered a radical alternative to Schegloff’s suggestion that sequence is the primary factor in interactional organization. However, Heritage’s suggestion can also be understood as taking seriously Garfinkel’s (2005, p. 30; cf. Sacks, 1972a) idea that the main reason for interacting is to achieve mutual understanding. Irrespective of whether this claim is adequate for describing all sequences, Heritage’s analysis clearly illustrates the importance of knowledge in relation to various actions, such as questions, answers, and assessments.
Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig (2011) suggest that epistemics can be understood as having three dimensions:

Table 1. *Dimensions of knowledge in conversation* (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011, p. 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic access</td>
<td>Knowing vs. not knowing&lt;br&gt;Degree of certainty&lt;br&gt;Knowledge source&lt;br&gt;Directness of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic primacy</td>
<td>Relative rights to know&lt;br&gt;Relative rights to claim&lt;br&gt;Relative authority of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic responsibility</td>
<td>Type of knowable (Type 1 vs. Type 2)&lt;br&gt;Recipient design of actions&lt;br&gt;Recipient design of turns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, epistemic access refers to the grounds for our knowledge that Sacks discussed. The two norms that epistemic access is concerned with are: Do not inform already-knowing recipients, and avoid making claims for which you have an insufficient degree of access (Stivers et al., 2011, p. 10). The first norm can be seen in interaction when people start informings with pre-informings such as “Have I told you about…” or “Did you hear that…” The second norm is visible in the varying levels of certainty that people show and the differentiations they make between direct and indirect or substantial and minimal access, for example with certainty markers such as “maybe” (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). Still, epistemic access is largely related to people’s knowledge state in absolute terms—you either access knowledge or don’t (Stivers et al., 2011, p. 13).

Epistemic status, or primacy, is a purely relational concept that refers to asymmetries in participants’ relative rights to know about some state of affairs. Sacks (1992) argued that membership categories are linked to what people can and are entitled to tell, experience, and know. Mothers, for example, are expected to know about their children’s preferences better than the children’s caretakers. In line with this claim, Enfield (2011) suggests that those with more authority have greater rights to make assertions in a domain. However, many factors are involved in deciding who has epistemic primacy: how recently a person experienced the event, the certainty of the knowledge, the independence of the experience, and the person’s right to know it in the first place. Thus, whereas authority based on epistemic access concerns what you know, status-based authority concerns what you should know or are entitled to know (Enfield, 2011). For example, even though a doctor and a patient may simultaneously look at, and thus access, the patient’s medical
documents, the doctor has the primary right to assess them (Peräkylä, 1998). In other settings, those with a longer period of experience have epistemic authority: Grandparents have epistemic primacy over their friends to assess their grandchildren (Raymond & Heritage, 2006). One reason why we insist on our epistemic status is that it is intertwined with how we relate to one another (Stivers et al., 2011, p. 16).

Epistemic responsibilities, finally, are concerned with people’s rights and responsibilities to know different things. Pomerantz (1980) describes type 1 knowables as information “that subject-actors as subject-actors have rights and obligations to know” (Pomerantz, 1980, p. 187). For example, accountable individuals are expected to know their own thoughts and feelings. Type 2 knowables, by contrast, are items of information “that subject-actors are assumed only to have access to by virtue of the knowledge being occasioned” (Pomerantz, 1980, p. 187). This can be other people’s opinions or thoughts. In addition to different types of knowledge, turns must be designed for a particular recipient, both in what is presumed to be common knowledge and in what the speaker already knows about the recipient (Stivers et al., 2011, p. 18). This can be seen in standardized interviewing when interviewers, who must ask questions to which the interviewees have already provided responses or displayed cues to the answer, refrain from asking or account for asking again by referring to the interview procedure (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; cf. Wilkinson, 2011).

In conversation, several sequential and evidential resources work to index participants’ epistemic rights. One of the main resources for conveying oneself as knowing or not knowing is epistemic stance. According to Heritage and Raymond (2012), asking a question invokes a claim that the speaker lacks information (a K- position). It also suggests that the recipient has the information (a K+ position). Heritage and Raymond suggest that epistemic stance is gradient, rather than binary (see figure 1).

Q1: Who did you talk to? Q2: Did you talk to John? Q3: You talked to John, didn’t you? Q4: You talked to John?

Figure 1. The epistemic gradient (Heritage & Raymond, 2012)
However, interrogatives do not simply exhibit a K-position. Questions always involve constraints: presuppositions, a choice of topic and agenda, and preferences (Boyd & Heritage, 2006). Polar questions, such as Q2, Q3, and Q4 (Figure 1) in which the recipient gets to choose from two alternatives, strongly restrict the knowledge with which the recipient can contribute. The SPPs in question-answer sequences allow for negotiation of epistemic matters. For example, repetition in response to yes/no interrogatives instead of “yes” or “no” asserts the recipient’s epistemic entitlement. Thus, by answering the question “Would you like to dance?” with “I’d like to dance,” the recipient confirms rather than affirms the proposition raised by the question, and thereby pushes back on the underlying terms (Heritage & Raymond, 2012).

In addition, Heritage (2012b) has demonstrated that participants’ epistemic status takes precedence over morphosyntax and intonation as resources for deciding whether an utterance requests or conveys information (cf. Antaki, 2013). Labov and Fanshel (1977) suggest that participants discriminate between knowledge possessed primarily by the speaker—A event knowledge—and knowledge possessed mainly by the recipient—B event knowledge. This can be seen in rhetorical questions and in threats, such as “Do I have to feed you like a baby” (Hepburn & Potter, 2011b), which are not heard as spoken mainly to elicit an answer from the recipient. Declaratives, on the other hand, are heard as requesting information if they concern the recipient’s epistemic domain. When speakers make B event statements, such as “You must be exhausted,” they are heard as soliciting confirmation, since the statement concerns the recipient’s epistemic domain. When speakers make B event statements, such as “You must be exhausted,” they are heard as soliciting confirmation, since the statement concerns the recipient’s epistemic domain (Heritage & Roth, 1995). This means that epistemic status is a central element of the background knowledge that participants use to grasp the meaning of actions in interaction (Heritage, 2012b). Still, epistemic stance works as a useful resource for negotiating epistemic status. For example, using tag questions in FPPs of assessments is a way to downgrade a claim of epistemic primacy. By contrast, tag questions or negative interrogatives in SPPs challenge the prior speaker’s epistemic primacy by resetting the sequential order (Heritage & Raymond, 2005).

Knowledge, thus, is not just related to scientific activities. Rather, it is a moral domain with important implications for social relationships. As with other moral issues, people support and challenge each other’s epistemic projects. Next, I discuss how participants’ management of norms surrounding epistemic matters can be understood in terms of cooperation and resistance.

Cooperation and Resistance

The current thesis focuses on cooperation and resistance in the fine details in the interplay between FPPs and SPPs. CA distinguishes between two levels
of cooperation in talk-in-interaction: alignment and affiliation. Resistance happens in relation to both these levels; as second speakers’ claims to more agency than the first speaker provides them with (cf. Heritage & Raymond, 2012). Alignment occurs at the structural level of interaction by facilitating the activity proposed by the FPP. Aligning responses accept the FPP’s presuppositions, topic, and action agendas, and they also match the formal design of the FPP (Boyd & Heritage, 2006; Stivers et al., 2011, p. 20; Stivers, 2008). The extract below is an example of an interviewee aligning with the structural restrictions of the question:

The interviewee’s answer aligns with the presupposition of the question: that she has beliefs about Gustav’s thoughts. Further, her answer aligns with the question’s agenda of eliciting information and with the topic of Gustav’s thoughts. She also aligns with the design of the question: She uses the most fitting response (“I believe”) to the question (“what do you believe”), and she uses the exact words (“what he has done”) as the interviewer. By contrast, the next extract shows an interviewee misaligning with several of the question’s constraints:

Although the interviewee provides an answer, he misaligns with the question’s agenda. His answer delivers a general assessment rather than his beliefs. Further, he offers information not about his dad’s thoughts but about how his dad is likely to feel. The use of “likely” and “y’know” approaches common knowledge. The interviewee’s response is, thus, a comment on how people should normally react to their immoral actions. This could be under-
stood either as suggesting that this information is something that the interviewer could have drawn conclusions about herself (see Heinemann, Lindström, & Steensig, 2011; Stokoe, 2012b) or as a tentative delivery of an emotionally difficult message. Although the response misaligns with the structural restrictions of the question, the interviewee still provides an answer to the question and does, accordingly, resist in a way that does not question the whole activity of interviewing.

The concept of affiliation, on the other hand, refers to cooperation at the level of action and stance. Affiliation supports and endorses the other participant’s project and stance-taking—for example, by agreeing with and upgrading assessments or displaying understanding in relation to stance-taking in storytelling (Stivers, 2008). While alignment is always relevant, affiliation is only relevant in relation to stance-marking activities. Stance can be affective but it can also be epistemic. The extract below shows the interviewer affiliating with the interviewee’s “no knowledge” stance:

```
[208_1]
1 IR  .hh eh va- va det nån gång att han visade det som
 .hh eh wa was it sometime when he showed it as
2 om han (.) ångrade eller?
   If he (.) regretted ((it)) or?
3 (5.8)
4 IE  asså inte vad jaq ve[t
   well not that I know
5 IR   [inte vad du vet=nej inte som
   [not that you know=no not that
6 du kommer ihåg?
   you remember?
7 (0.4)
8 IE   ***nej***
     ***no***
9   (0.3)
10 IR  .hh nej för du var- det var rätt länge sen nu
       .hh no ’cause you were- it was quite a long time ago now
11 va?=  right?=  
```

The interviewer affiliates with the interviewee’s no knowledge stance (line 4). Not only does the interviewer repeat “not that you know” (line 5) but he also provides an account for the interviewee’s lack of knowledge (as difficulty in remembering because “it was quite a long time ago,” line 10). Note also that the interviewer repairs “you were” to “it was” which can also be
heard as an affiliative move since it minimizes the interviewee’s responsibility for remembering by substituting the subject with the object of time.

Sometimes, preferences regarding alignment and affiliation can be crosscutting; for instance, the formal properties of a self-deprecating utterance such as “My hair looks awful today, doesn’t it?” invites a “yes,” but because a “yes” would imply a socially disaffiliative stance, misaligning with the question can be in the service of affiliation (Stivers et al., 2011, p. 22). Moreover, Heritage (2011) suggests that the difference between territories of experience and territories of knowledge can be problematic in relation to affiliation. In terms of knowledge, affiliation has to do with supporting others’ ownership and priority of knowledge. In relation to experience, affiliation can also be concerned with reaching genuine singularity—a mutual understanding of the experience. Heritage suggests that these moral systems grind against each other in emphatic moments; when an interlocutor tells another about her or his experiences, an affiliative response would be to display understanding, but this may be disaffiliative to the speaker’s primary epistemic rights to know and assess the experience (Heritage, 2011). When affiliation is displayed at the expense of alignment, the participant is prioritizing the social aspects of the interaction, rather than the informational (Stivers, 2008). This can be particularly problematic in interviews, because interviews concern interviewees’ experiences and aim to elicit information, but at the same time, they may also bring up strong affective stances:

```
1        IR  vad tänker du:: om de ra att han:
            what do you:: think about that then that he:

2        nästan är glad för det han har gjort.
            is almost glad about what he has done.

(2.0)

4        IE  tch. jag tycker att han: kan dra åt helvete=
            tch. I think that he: can go to hell=

5        IR   =mm mm

(2.1)
```

The interviewee’s answer in line 4 strongly marks her stance against the perpetrator who has abused her mother. In ordinary conversation, an affiliative response to this would likely be something other than the minimal “mm mm” that the interviewer offers, which, instead of doing affiliation, aligns with the interviewee’s rights to keep talking (Stivers, 2008). A parallel assessment (Heritage, 2011), such as “Yeah, he totally deserves that,” would not be uncalled for. To some extent, the institutional norm of short responses in interviews justifies the lack of affiliative response, but it also marks the interaction as information seeking and not emphatic.
In sum, a question is a powerful interactional device because it puts respondents in second position: They must respond to the restrictions that the question sets up. However, the response offers a slot for the second speaker to challenge these restrictions. CA concepts and findings about organization in interaction and management of knowledge and morality offer ways of understanding how issues of restrictions, cooperation, and resistance actually work in interviews. In the next section, I describe the data that this thesis analyzes, how I have used DP and CA in the analysis, and some limitations of this approach. Finally, I discuss questions of reflexivity which have emerged during the course of the research project.
4. Data and Analysis

Interview data can be used as a resource or studied as a topic. This thesis uses the latter approach. This choice relies on a distinction between contrived data, specially made for the research enterprise, and natural data, which is not constructed for the research at hand. When interviews are used as a resource for collecting knowledge about interviewees’ experiences, the interviewee spends most time in second position; that is, responding to the researcher’s initiated actions. Therefore, contrived data is heavily weighed down by the researcher’s agenda (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). Natural data, by contrast, would exist even if the researcher never designed her project. Of course, there is a limit to the naturalness of the data. Research participants have to consent to participate in the research and to being recorded (Speer, 2002). Therefore, discursive psychologists prefer the term naturalistic data. Data is not in itself naturalistic; anything can be studied as naturalistic if the focus is on the practice of the participants (Potter, 2002). Thus, the interviews that I analyze are naturalistic data because they would be conducted regardless of my research. The point of naturalistic data is, accordingly, that it has not been constructed with the analyst’s agenda in mind (Potter, 2010).

Data

All the interviews that this thesis analyzes were conducted as part of a national Swedish evaluation study of support interventions for children who had been exposed to violence against their mothers. The evaluation study’s aim, as communicated to the child interviewees, was to inform researchers about (1) the problems children can suffer from if they have experienced violence against their mothers, (2) whether the support that children receive from different agencies helps, and (3) what mothers and children think about the support they receive. The data collection started in August 2008 and finished in March 2011. Together with six other interviewers, I conducted interviews with children, mothers, and professionals connected to 16 different agencies that delivered support interventions for children exposed to violence. All seven of the interviewers had experiences of working with vulnerable children, but were not trained in standardized interviewing.

Children were included in the national evaluation study based on three criteria. The first was that they had experienced violence towards their
mothers and were planning to participate in one of the evaluated interventions. The second criterion was age: Mothers were interviewed about their children who were between 3 and 13 years but children only participated as interviewees if they were between 9 and 13 years at the start of the intervention. This was because the researchers wanted the children to be able to read the questionnaires by themselves if they wanted to. Children of age 14 and above were excluded because this group was considered to face increased risk of violence from peers. The third inclusion criterion was that the interviewees be able to read text in Swedish or English, since there was no funding for interpreters or translation of questionnaires.

The inclusion of the children and mothers in the evaluation study involved several steps. Professionals working in the evaluated agencies first informed the mothers about the study. The interviewers then provided the mothers with written and oral information about the project. At the first meeting, the mothers signed a document of consent if they still wanted to participate in the evaluation study. If the mothers allowed it, the interviewers sent information to custodial fathers, giving the fathers a chance to decline the children’s participation in the study (in the cases in which mothers did not allow this, children were excluded from the study). Then, the interviewer conducted a pre-interview with the mothers before the children started the intervention. For children nine years of age and older, the interviewer also asked mothers for permission to inform the child about the evaluation study. If the mother consented to this, a new meeting was scheduled, during which the mothers filled out questionnaires about the child. Before this meeting, the interviewer telephoned and asked whether the child had been informed and whether s/he wanted to come to the meeting. If the child was interested, s/he accompanied the mother and received more information. At this meeting, the interviewer asked the child to participate and, if s/he agreed, to sign a consent document. After the pre-interview, the interviewer asked mothers and children whether the interviewer could contact them in three to six months. A similar procedure, except signing the consent document, was repeated at a post-interview, conducted after the intervention had finished, and at a follow-up interview, conducted one year after the pre-interview. If the mothers and custodial fathers had consented to the professionals at the evaluated agencies being interviewed about their children’s participation in the interventions, the interviewer also interviewed professionals at the time of the post-interview. For further information about procedures in the evaluation study, see Broberg, Almqvist, Axberg, Grip, Almqvist, Cater, et al. (2011).

Table 2 shows an overview of the interviews and the number of research participants in the different interviews. The bracketed numbers refer to the interviews that I conducted. A detailed presentation of the interviews with children can be found in Appendix C.
Table 2. Overview of interview participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Pre-interview</th>
<th>Post-interview</th>
<th>Follow-up interview</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>Child 9-13</td>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219 (44)</td>
<td>69 (21)</td>
<td>168 (32)</td>
<td>~250 (36/49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>31 (14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>134 (28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thesis is based on three data sets from the evaluation study: In article I, I used audio recordings of the psychometric portions of 31 interviews with 21 children from the pre-interviews, post-interviews, and follow-up interviews that I conducted. I only used data from my own interviews because I was the only interviewer who recorded the psychometric interviews. I did not record all my interviews because of children’s lack of consent or background noise. In article II, I used the 31 audio recordings from the mentalization/coherence interviews with children conducted by five interviewers (of whom I was one) as part of the follow-up interview. In article III, I used 35 of the 49 interviews with the professionals about the children; these were part of the post-interview, and again I only used my own interviews.

The Regional Ethics Committee in Gothenburg approved both the evaluation study and the use of the interviews for qualitative analysis (Nr 292-05). Still, my use of the data involves some ethical dilemmas. My aim of studying conditions for participating in interviews could possibly, with a quite long stretch, be incorporated into the evaluation study’s first object as communicated to the child interviewees: to inform researchers about the problems that children can suffer from if they have experienced violence against their mothers. However, this is not the purpose that the evaluators had in mind, and most likely not the way that the child interviewees understood it. When I was the interviewer, I solved this problem by informing the interviewees that audio-recording was only required for my thesis and that I recorded interviews because I was interested in how we talked in the interviews. With this procedure, I think that the children who agreed to be recorded made an informed decision to participate in my study.

However, in relation to the mentalization interviews, which were audio-recorded by all interviewers in the study, the interviewees had no way of knowing how their contribution would be analyzed. In one sense, this problem concerns the mentalization coding as well as my study: Mentalization interviews are coded to indicate how interviewees talk rather than just taking their words as plain evidence. Using them in my study is, however, more problematic, because my aim of examining how interview participants navi-

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6 The professionals were interviewed about both the children (49) and the mothers (36).
7 I refer to these interviews as “mentalization” interviews because my analysis focuses on the mentalization part of the interview. However, the interviews were also included in the evaluation study to generate information about the children’s ability to coherently describe persons, emotions, thoughts, and events.
igate knowledge and competence claims and their institutional and moral implications differs from the communicated aim of the evaluation study. The main reason that my use of the data can still be considered ethically acceptable is that the benefits for future interviewees outweigh the risks to this study’s interviewees: Understanding how children’s participation in theory-guided interviews is realized is important if we are to understand the implications of the use of interviews in social welfare work. In addition, I do not study linguistic patterns connected to particular interviewees; instead, I study the generic features of interviewees’ talk. Thus, individual interviewees are not singled out and characterized in a way that could compromise their anonymity.

The interviews with children lasted between 20 minutes and two hours; the usual length was around 45 minutes. The follow-up interviews took longer: around one hour and 15 minutes for the children. The interviews with the professionals varied between 30 minutes and one hour. After each interview, the children were asked why they had participated in the interviews and what they thought about it. Examples of children’s comments were “To be able to contribute so that other children can see that there are other children who have the same problem as they have,” and “I guess it was good since I didn’t just answer something, I answered what I really think.” A comment on the worst part of participating was “It’s a bit tough when you have to think about how it is really, those questions about dad.” The questionnaires were criticized “because it’s the same questions all the time.” The semi-structured interviews were also described as too long and messy: “That interview was really long. And then it was hard to understand sometimes too.”

As the quotes above suggest, the reasons for, and experience of, participating in the evaluation study differed a lot between children. The children were continually asked if they wanted to continue, take a break, or stop during the interviews. Because of frequent gaps, the interviewers did a lot of non-interview-related activities, such as playing, cleaning children’s rooms, fixing dinner, attending to pets, and doing homework. Despite this, the children’s descriptions show that the interviews sometimes became too demanding or problematic in other ways. In my experience as an interviewer, it was very difficult to respond to the children’s wishes to participate and contribute to the research, while at the same time attending to their right to stop before the interviewing became too hard on them. Interviews of this kind are very extensive and demand a lot from interviewees as well as interviewers. This experience was and continues to be one reason for my interest in conditions for participating in interviews.
Analytic Approach

The analysis in the current thesis uses an emic approach; that is, it focuses on categories and practices as approached by the participants. An emic approach does not mean an approach without theory. I bring theory and concepts to the analysis, but these concepts consider how participants in interaction accomplish different actions. For example, a statement such as “I think it was good” produces the subjectivity of the interviewee as relevant to an issue, while “It was good” does not. The goal is not to find features like this in a deductive manner. Instead, “the interest is in unpacking it and show what it’s doing in this particular set of materials” (Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2003, p. 25). In other words, I take for granted that participants in interaction strive to appear accountable, but I do not presuppose that, for example, childhood and gender are always central to this accountability. Moreover, my interest in issues of resistance and knowledge arose in working with the data, rather than having been entities that I set out to study from the start. I do use the categories of children, social worker, interviewer, and interviewee in my presentation of the extracts. The use of “interviewee” and “interviewer” is partly a practical matter: I think that establishing that those categories are relevant to the participants before using them would take space and time away from the project’s main purpose. Partly though, my use of categories relies on analysis: The children were addressed as children and interviewees from the beginning of the evaluation study—for example, in information letters.

Doing Analysis

I conducted the analyses of the different papers in a different order from the one in which the thesis presents them. Article III was the first analysis, then article I, and article II was last. The analyses have proceeded in slightly different ways, but all have been influenced by the following steps (for an introduction to CA’s methodology, see Sidnell, 2010):

1. Make a collection of X (the action/interactional aspects under study).
2. Study each clip closely to see how it is recognizable as an example of X.
3. Use the tools of CA to examine how X is designed. (Where in the sequence do the participants do this? How is the turn taking managed? What roles do preferences, word choice, prosody, and epistemics play?)
4. How does the recipient respond?
5. Then compare the clips, looking for differences and similarities.
6. Finally, decide on the main finding and choose the clearest examples for presentation.
I started the analysis of article I by listening to the recordings of the psychometric interviews over and over and taking notes about talk that deviated from the scripted questions and the fixed response options. After this, I selected cases with longer stretches of this “unstandardized talk.” I transcribed long episodes broadly and found that children’s objections against different things in the questionnaires were recurrent. Then, I transcribed this data more thoroughly with the software program Transana, using the conventions developed by Jefferson (2004, see Appendix A). This transcription scheme represents elements of action in talk, rather than just the spoken words (Hepburn & Bolden, 2013). At first, I analyzed this collection by looking at different epistemic resources (cultural knowledge, personal information) that the interviewees were referring to. However, after discussing transcripts at data sessions during visits to the University of Southern Denmark and the University of York, I chose to focus on cases in which children resisted the presuppositions of the questions by drawing on information in their epistemic domain. I made a collection of this kind of resistance and then proceeded to steps 2-6.

I began the analysis of article II by listening to all the recordings of the mentalization/coherence interviews. After this, I focused on question 3 (see Appendix C) because I found the ways that children accounted for their fathers’ actions interesting in regards to what the children’s descriptions implied about themselves. At first, I structured the analysis based on different kinds of evidence that children provided for their fathers’ regret (such as “he apologized,” “he has improved,” and “he seems sad”). I did not find any interactional evidence for keeping this analytic structure, though. So after data sessions during my visit to the University of York, I transcribed in detail all interaction related to the multiunit question 3, again using Transana. Then I looked at how the turns were designed and how they were responded to. I found that words that could be translated to the English “really” (faktiskt, egentligen, riktigt, verkligen, ju, direkt) were recurrent (they occurred in 24 instances in 14 of the 31 interviews), and I made a collection in which I studied them more closely. However, I still did not find any patterns (other than that “really” was a sign of dispreference and seemed to be used for stressing one’s epistemic access). After this, I started to look at the contrasts many children used in their answers to the questions. I made a collection of contrastive constructions and after a data session at the Analyzing Discourse: Hands-On Conference at Stockholm University, I found (using the analytical steps 2-6) that they were used in relation to epistemic matters both in regards to the children’s access to the perpetrators’ thoughts and to the question of evidence of regret.

During the analysis of article III, I was transcribing and analyzing data while I was still conducting the interviews. I stopped transcribing interviews
when I did not find new ways in which social workers talked about children’s wishes. I started out transcribing all interviews broadly and then decided to focus on questions about outcomes and children’s wishes and willingness, which I transcribed in detail. I examined talk concerning intervention outcomes and children’s wishes for several reasons. One was that answers to the question on outcomes included a lot of accounts and therefore seemed relevant to professional accountability. Moreover, willingness is a central matter both regarding children’s participation and in relation to a discursive psychological concern with how mental terms, such as intention, are used in various settings (e.g. Edwards, 2008). Thus, the analysis was initially more theoretically motivated than the ones in the other two articles, and also more loosely focused on interactional features. Although the analysis does account for features in turn taking, sequence, and preference, these aspects are not central to the presentation. I did an analysis of accounts, interpreting the social workers’ explanations as justifications or excuses (Scott & Lyman, 1968), and I focused on how category-relevant descriptions were used in the interviewer’s questions and comments, as well as in the social workers’ accounts (cf. Eglin & Hester, 1992; Sacks, 1995; Stokoe, 2012a).

Limitations of the Approach

As with all approaches to social reality, DP and CA have a limited scope and specific difficulties that come with them. Apart from obvious limitations—for example, that conversation analysis should preferably be used to study recorded social interaction and that both transcription and analysis are time-consuming activities—CA’s basic principles of ethnomethodological indifference and participant orientation (see chapter 3) restrict its contributions in other ways. These restrictions can be understood as generating two main problems.

First, common sociological issues related to class, ethnicity, and gender may be difficult to address within a regular-sized dissertation project. For instance, it is impossible to show how participants orient to gender if they do not talk about gender in a way that can be detected as consequential for the activity at hand. In some contexts, categories may be detectable because they are relevant for the participants when they accomplish certain actions. For example, Stokoe shows that in police interviews, suspects respond to interrogators’ questions about whether they have hit specific women with the general claims that they would never hit a woman—thus orienting to a discourse on men’s violence towards women (Stokoe, 2010). Similarly, in article III, I show that the interview participants treated category-bound activi-

Although psychologists were also interviewed in the national evaluation study, I only interviewed social workers.
ties connected to age as relevant when they accounted for intervention outcome. However, in other settings, this kind of pattern may not be visible or the most important issue to discuss. This is of course related to a project’s aim. In an article about displays of heterosexuality in classic CA data, Kitzinger (2005) suggests that her focus on sexuality should in no way be read as a critique of prior studies that analyze the same data without this focus. Instead, sexuality is relevant to study in relation to her aim, and should not be included in all CA studies. In my data, participants’ references to gender did not occur in ways related to my aim of studying participation.

However, even if my aim had been to study how participants oriented to gender in interviews evaluating domestic violence interventions, the data would not have been very fitting. Although the questions involved presuppositions about age, class, and gender, the interviewees in my study treated the questions’ agenda of interpreting their answers as a matter of psychology as a more pressing issue. The child interviewees did at points orient to categories such as child, father, and mother, but not in a systematic way. In fact, the category with which the child interviewees were most clearly concerned was “emo”—defined by the Urban Dictionary as “Genre of softcore punk music that integrates unenthusiastic melodramatic 17-year-olds who don’t smile.” This category was brought up several times in relation to an item in an instrument for measuring posttraumatic stress symptoms: “I want to hurt myself.” Thus, because CA works with participants’ orientations, issues related to specific categories of the analyst’s interests may be difficult to find in a particular data set. For researchers interested in issues regarding specific categories such as homosexuals, men, or Swedes, using conversation analysis may therefore require a great deal of empirical material, preferably from many different contexts (see Kitzinger, 2005, 2007; Land & Kitzinger, 2005; Stokoe & Edwards, 2007; Stokoe, 2012a).

Second, if the analyst is using data from an institutional setting, the findings may not be useful for understanding the institutional context in the ways that the institution may want. CA has proven to be valuable for organizations because it problematizes concepts that have been formulated within other theoretical frameworks and corrects practitioners’ assumptions (Stokoe, 2011a). Further, Stokoe (2011b) demonstrates the advantages, for organizations, of working with real situations over traditional simulated role-play. Still, this may not be what organizations are requesting. Kitzinger (2011) explains that when she was using data from birth helplines, she received questions from the organizations that were not conversation-analytic in nature, such as “What percent of the women calling have had their labors induced?” and “Can you send me some quotes in which women describe what was traumatic about their episiotomies?” Kitzinger explains that she was sympathetic to the questions, but could not use CA to answer them. As a solution, she used CA to study interactional features, such as reaction tokens, self-reference, and membership categorization. Kitzinger also used CA to
study issues that may be relevant to the institutional context, including how concepts such as active listening and empowerment were realized in interaction. Then she employed thematic analysis to address the organizations’ questions.

The thematic analysis had the benefit of being quickly produced and more accessible to the public than the CA findings were. Moreover, the thematic analysis treated the words of women calling the birth helplines as straightforward reflections of their experiences. This view is not possible within CA or DP, as talk is not treated as a reference to experience but as composing different actions. Thus, while the thematic analysis misses the action-orientation of what the women say, and furthermore risks misinterpreting what is going on in the calls, it may sometimes be much more fruitful for trying to support and develop the work of organizations, as well as for empowering clients (Kitzinger, 2011).

In sum, these two limitations of CA are related to its lack of prescriptive-ness—CA does not provide tools for deciding whether one way of interacting is better than another. This means that CA can be used for ethically problematic purposes, such as teaching telemarketing companies how to improve their sales. Thus, to be useful for organizations or for “changing the world,” the analyst must engage with the professional stock of knowledge and with ethical considerations regarding what her analysis can accomplish. This can, however, be regarded as a great resource: Not being bound by organizational values or by preset political agendas inherent in the analytical procedure may help the researcher find unexpected patterns, as well as creative solutions to institutional problems.

On Reflexivity

Discursive psychological and conversation-analytical studies have been criticized for not taking a stance on the production of their own findings (e.g. Corcoran, 2009). Although this is an unjust reading of at least DP, as many of its founding texts include considerations of its own production of facts, I will discuss some issues of reflexivity\(^9\) in relation to my analysis and presentation of findings.

\(^9\) Note that this discussion refers to reflexivity as self-reflection and not in an ethnomethodological sense. Within ethnomethodology, reflexivity is closely tied to the concept of indexicality; that is, actions’ dependence on social context for their meaning. Actions achieve intelligibility through the methods by which they are produced. Reflexivity, in this sense, means that context shapes members’ actions, while these actions at the same time reshape context (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 11–18). Accounts with referential context, such as “You know I can't organize a baseball team,” show how participants produce the context as relevant to understanding their stance (Wieder, 1969, p. 203ff). In this sense, ethnomethodologists refer to reflexivity as practices that both describe and constitute a social framework.
First, I use data that features myself as an interviewer, and I describe and analyze my own conduct in the third person, just as I refer to other research participants in the third person. This is unusual both in conversation analysis and sociology in general, but for different reasons. In sociology, speaking of yourself in third person is connected to a positivist notion of research participation in which limiting the researcher’s presence is considered a virtue. This is not what I wish to do here. Rather, I analyze my own participation in the same way as the other participants and it would, accordingly, be awkward to refer to myself as more of a subject. In CA, on the other hand, analyzing data with oneself as a participant is rather uncommon because, as discussed above, data should ideally not be constructed by the researcher (Have, 1999). It has been done in analyses of data sessions (Antaki et al., 2008), focus groups (Kitzinger, 2000; Wilkinson, 2006), and other studies of research practices (Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Speer & Stokoe, in press). Some of these authors use third person to refer to themselves, and some do not. Typically, they treat data as naturally occurring; that is, they analyze their practices in terms of what they are doing as institutional practices, not as gateways to events, emotions, or thoughts.

One objection that I have encountered from sociological readers, related to analyzing my own talk in detail, is the suggestion that I could easily throw things into the interviews that would be interesting to analyze. My response to this relies on Schutz’s (1945) notion of the natural and reflective attitude. Schutz argues that interaction occurs in an intersubjective world where all actions are guided by pragmatic motives, and as long as we live in our acts, they do not have other meanings. Actions in this natural attitude are “perceived but not apperceived” (Schutz, 1945, p. 536). The reflective attitude, by contrast, is a result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present. Of course, interviewers oscillate between the natural and reflective attitude just by remembering to ask questions in a certain way. However, to keep this activity going, it would be overwhelming to also figure out interesting moves from a conversation-analytic point of view. Besides, it is impossible to know what will be an interesting conversational move until the analysis has developed quite far. In the mentalization interviews, it is clear that there are differences between the interviewers in interviewing styles and word choice. These differences can, however, be traced back to different training and prior experience with this particular kind of question guide, rather than to different research interests. Moreover, the analysis of the interviews shows that all interviewers use common interactional resources, also found in other studies of interview interaction.

Second, coming from the sociology of scientific knowledge, I view the findings of my work as contingent on my research commitments, like any other analytic enterprise such as cognitivism, constructionism, grounded theory, and phenomenology. This position does not imply that I must move to a narrative epistemology, describing what I do as simply storytelling. An
appreciation of the practical side of scientific work does not entail lesser need for being careful and systematic in analyzing data (just as analyzing the norms of interaction does not mean that the analyst should refrain from acting according to those norms in her everyday life). Neither does it require a reflexive description of aspects that could influence analysis and data collection. Reflexivity is methodologically problematic because it presupposes a coherent, analytic, self-aware subject. Moreover, such “confessions” do not take into account the work that confessions do (Potter, 2010). In the tradition of Kuhn (1970), acknowledging that science must bend to the pressure of normative groundings does not lead to the need to abandon scientific procedure. Because there is no way for the researcher to control this normative base, scientific practice can proceed as if it produces fact, and then be open to criticism and discussion.

Descriptions of problems and “unscientific” procedures in scientific work are often understood as criticizing science itself. And researchers in the sociology of science are sometimes criticized for not wanting to be scientists (Ashmore, 1989). A reason for this may be that scientific work is often considered to be much more certain and unproblematic than it actually is (Sager & Bohlin, 2011). But like other institutional practices involving power and potential subordination, the conditions for people whose lives are affected by research must be open to examination. This is what I have aimed for by using the procedures described in this chapter.
5. Summary of Studies

Article I

[Recordability: Resistance and Collusion in Psychometric Interviews with Children]

Article I is based on a study of psychometric interviews with children. The theoretical framework for the study is discursive psychology, and with that, the notion that talk delivers action (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Research on interaction in similar interviews has shown that such interviews fail to live up to ideals of validity and reliability: The generated data is a co-production of answers between the questionnaire, the interviewer, and the interviewee. However, less attention has been given to how interviews supply participants with resources and restrictions for talking interpersonal encounters into being and for describing their lives. By investigating in detail child interviewees’ resistance to constraints in psychometric questions, article I aims to contribute to studies of how psychological methods operate in institutional settings (e.g. Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007a).

Within studies of talk-in-interaction, questions are recognized as obligating actions because they place restrictions on the recipient (Boyd & Heritage, 2006). However, answer slots allow negotiation of the amount of agency that the question provides (Heritage & Raymond, 2012). Resources for resisting questions’ constraints can be more or less cooperative. For instance, resetting the terms of a question can facilitate understanding and agreement, and is thus a mild form of resistance. To resist assumptions that must be true for the question to be valid is a far stronger form of resistance (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). In article I, resistance is understood as interviewees’ claims to more agency than what the question provides in defining their experiences. The study uses data from interviews conducted as a part of a national Swedish evaluation study of interventions for children exposed to violence against their mothers. It is based on the audio recordings of 31 psychometric interviews with 21 different children.

The findings show how the interviewees make use of the asymmetrical epistemic authority in the interviews: They resist questions’ presuppositions by referring to information in their epistemic domain, which is unavailable to the interviewer. The interviewees accept some presuppositions in the questions but resist the implications that their simply answering would have.
However, this resistance seems to be done in the service of telling the interviewer about experiences in the interviewees’ lives. Thus, although challenging a question’s presuppositions has been described as a particularly strong form of resistance (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010), the findings suggest that the interviewees’ resistance is cooperative both with regards to the overall interview agenda of obtaining information and towards the interviewer as an interested recipient. Rather than rejecting the questions, the children claim epistemic primacy to knowing their own lives. Thus, the article supports prior findings of children using knowledge of their lives and of institutional practices to cooperate with, as well as to resist, institutional restrictions (Cromdal et al., 2008; Danby, Butler, et al., 2011; Lloyd, 1992).

The different responses that the interviewer offers can be understood in light of the sequential position of the resistance. Only when the response is already recorded does the interviewer attend to the interpersonal aspects of what the interviewee says. I use the term recordability to explain the interviewer’s focus on, and the interviewees’ collusion in, getting fitting responses: The interview interaction structures talk as a matter of providing recordable responses that accord with the options given by the psychometric questionnaires. This is reminiscent of how the principle of doctorability in medical settings has been shown to operate. According to this principle, the details of patients’ descriptions are addressed to the extent that they can be solved with medical knowledge (Heritage & Robinson, 2006). Likewise, the interviewer’s focus on recordability prioritizes the questionnaire’s definitions over opportunities to talk about children’s experiences. Because the questions are still relevant to the child interviewees, the article concludes that psychometric measurement seems to be valuable as a starting point for conversation. However, this potential is neglected in the course of generating recordable answers. Both as information-gathering devices and as social encounters with a supportive potential, research interviews may benefit from treating children’s resistance as a resource rather than as a problem.

Article II

[“I Don’t Know if I Should Believe Him:” Knowledge and Believability in Interviews with Children]

Social psychologists interested in social interaction have begun to focus on the ways that people negotiate “who knows what” and “who is entitled to know what” across a variety of conversational settings. These themes mark an overlap between discursive psychology and conversation analysis concerning epistemic stance; that is, how people orient to, invoke, or contest knowledge in unfolding interaction (Edwards, 2005; 2007; Heritage, 2012b; Potter, 2010). Article II extends this work by examining epistemic stance
taking in 31 interviews with children. These interviews were conducted as a part of a national Swedish evaluation study of interventions for children exposed to violence against their mothers.

The article focuses on a particular question: “What do you believe [the perpetrator] thinks about what he has done?” which is included in the evaluation to produce information about the children’s mentalization; that is, their cognitive ability to picture others’ mental states based on their behavior (Fonagy, 1991). Critical work on the theory of mind has rebutted this kind of referential theory of meaning (Antaki, 2004; Leudar, Costall, & Francis, 2004; Reddy & Morris, 2004). Drawing on this work, article II explores how interviewees use mental terms to accomplish different actions rather than just report mental states. By examining contrastive constructions—reports that issue two versions of morally implicative behavior, such as “he doesn’t say, but I believe he regrets it”—the article demonstrates how children navigate knowledge claims regarding (a) the perpetrator’s thoughts and (b) evidence of regret.

First, the analysis demonstrates how interviewees use contrastive constructions to negotiate the question’s constraints while still cooperating with the epistemic responsibility of believing things about their fathers’ inner state. The interviewees describe having access to what their fathers think by claiming knowledge, not through their fathers’ active expressions of regret, but by displaying the fathers’ overt and covert behavior as believable indications of regret. I suggest that this believability is composed of a combination of credibility—the fathers’ trustworthiness—and what may be called knowability, which is the epistemic accessibility of the fathers’ thoughts. Second, the analysis shows how interviewees produce the fathers’ ways of thinking as both morally and cognitively inaccessible: Because of the fathers’ lack of credibility, their thoughts and feelings are produced as inaccessible to people who are themselves credible. In these cases, the interviewees’ contrastive constructions produce puzzles by putting together inconsistent facts about how their fathers can be expected to feel (regretful) and how they act (laugh at violent films and use violence after verbally expressing regret). The interviewees leave these puzzles for the interviewers to solve, thereby protecting themselves from rebuttals (see Drew, 1992, p. 513). Thus, culturally accepted indications of regret are weighed in regards to their believability—whether they are knowable and credible.

In showing this, the findings suggest that he epistemic stance of believing, taken for granted by the interview question and the theory of mentalization, is inseparable from actions such as defending and accusing. With the concept of believability, the article adds to a social psychological understanding of what competent individuals can accountably believe about others. The article also contributes to research on how child interviewees manage knowledge in institutional settings: It shows how their claims of (no) epistemic access accomplish work regarding their own accountability and that of
their fathers. Finally, the article contributes to the DP project of criticizing and respecifying psychological concepts. Because the concept of mentalization favors certain types of evidence over others and presupposes a closer epistemic relationship to the father than some interviewees are prepared to report, it neglects versions of the interviewees’ experiences that are important to them.

Article III

[Predetermined Participation: Social Workers Evaluating Children’s Agency in Domestic Violence Interventions]

Promoting children’s participation and producing research-based practice are normative goals within social work today. Although both principles share the ideal of service users’ right to interventions that work, article III argues that they may also conflict with each other: The focus on model consistency may limit children’s ability to participate in decisions about the intervention. This argument is based on an analysis of how intervention outcomes are accounted for in a specific institutional setting: 35 interviews with social workers conducted as a part of a national Swedish evaluation study of interventions for children who have experienced violence against their mothers.

In the evaluation interviews, the social workers are asked to state whether a support or counseling intervention was right for particular children and to account for their answer. The analytical frame for the study is discursive psychology, influenced by membership categorization analysis and account analysis (Eglin & Hester, 1992; Sacks, 1995; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Stokoe, 2012a). This means that I study how categorical knowledge is made relevant in the accounts for the outcome. Account analysis suggests that the reproduction of a moral order can be seen in excuses; in making excuses, individuals embrace the norms they have broken—for example, by describing themselves as victims of circumstances. Justifications work the other way around: Individuals challenge a moral order by arguing that they had good reasons for violating it.

I find that in justifying or excusing their actions, social workers, in collaboration with the interviewer, implicitly categorize children in ways that constrain children’s agency. When children are described as willingly participating in the interventions on the institutionally established terms, the ideals of participation and intervention consistency co-exist and the social workers characterize the children as competent. In these cases, the children’s willingness is also presented as central to the success of the intervention. However, the ideals conflict in cases in which children are described as unwilling or resistant. Predicates tied to subjectivity and lack of competence, such as whining and wishing to do what is “more fun,” justify breaking the norm of
doing what children want. In this sense, the interview interaction downplays the ideal of participation when it conflicts with the intervention model. Finally, in relation to children who want to come to the intervention, but who are described as trying to rule the counseling, the social workers describe themselves as going along with the children’s wishes, and in this sense, as respecting the ideal of participation. However, in their accounts in the evaluation interviews, they interpret this participation as a failed intervention and provide excuses attributing that failure to circumstances, themselves, and the child rather than to the intervention model.

Thus, the accounts invoke a predetermined participation that treats children’s willingness as important only if they are first established as competent by wanting to do what the social worker advises. This supports recent work (Antaki, 2013) on how knowledge is treated in interaction. Some categories of people—including children—have low epistemic status in society, and these people’s primary access to knowledge, even concerning their own wishes, may be disregarded by those who claim to know more. In the context of child counseling, where children’s unwillingness is often understood as a call for external motivation (see Thompson & Henderson, 2010), the focus on model consistency risks enforcing the difference in rights between adult social workers and child service-users. Therefore, children’s participation, especially in institutional settings, needs to be undergirded by recognition of them as competent enough to challenge restrictions (cf. McDonald, 2009; Pinkney, 2011).

Article III contributes to research on how research methods in social work may encourage and suppress children’s participation (cf. Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007a; Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998). The findings are likely linked to the evaluation context: a high-stakes setting in which the social workers must account for their actions in relation to norms concerning model consistency may promote categorical descriptions. Further studies are needed to explore the validity of a moral order of predetermined participation in other institutional contexts.

The aim of the present thesis is to examine how participants in interview interaction navigate knowledge and competence claims and their institutional and moral implications. This aim stems from the assumption that knowledge is related to participation in social situations. To fulfill the aim of the thesis, I have explored how interview participants manage (1) institutional constraints and (2) rights and responsibilities related to knowledge. More specifically, I have analyzed how interviewers and interviewees resist and contribute to the institutional task of generating “recordable” answers; how they negotiate institutional ideals as well as claims about competence, experiences, and knowledge; and how they manage the interpersonal relationship between the interviewee and the interviewer. In this section, I discuss the main results and implications of the thesis, and towards the end, some possible limitations.

Dimensions of Knowledge and Participation

Questions and answers exemplify social action in a typical form: An initiating first part sets up restrictions for a responding second part. Furthermore, they are both dependent on their relationship to each other for their respective realization. In institutional settings, questions are used to carry out institutional agendas and to guide the interaction to relevant topics (e.g. Drew & Heritage, 1992; Edwards, 2008; Freed & Ehrlich, 2010). Therefore, the way that questions are formulated and the responses to them tell us about the conditions for participating in those settings.

The present thesis’s development of prior knowledge has to do with this focus on participation as a social psychological phenomenon—how people take part in interactions with others—in the institutional setting of interviewing. According to Goffman (1981, p. 128), issues of participation are especially relevant to study when participants’ alignment or stance is somehow at stake. Therefore, the three articles composing this thesis examine settings in which alignment and stance are at issue: Article I shows child interviewees’ resistance towards constraints in psychometric questions, article II shows how child interviewees manage the stance of believing things about others’
thoughts, and article III shows how the interviewer and social workers account for child service users’ wishes when the children disagree with the institutional agenda.

With these studies, the thesis extends knowledge about social research methods as a form of institutional interaction by pointing to practices in the interview interaction that can enable as well as restrict interviewees’ and child service users’ participation. This understanding has practical implications: Research methods in social welfare work provide professionals with capacity for action (cf. Stehr & Meja, 2005), including the capacity to make decisions about support, develop new interventions, and influence policy. But moreover, understanding participation in relation to question-answer sequences in interviews adds to sociology in general: The social and epistemic resources that interview participants use when they put questions and answers to work tell us about institutional and mundane practices that guide our lives as social beings. Therefore, the thesis contributes to two main areas: institutional constraints in interaction and mundane epistemics. These areas are relevant to the research fields of social welfare, childhood studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, conversation analysis, and discursive psychology.

How Institutional Constraints Are Managed in Interaction

The first contribution of the study has to do with how interview participants support as well as negotiate institutional constraints. People’s management of institutional norms in interaction is a core interest of studies of institutional talk-in-interaction (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Heritage & Clayman, 2010) and is also becoming more acknowledged in social studies of childhood (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998). The present thesis adds to these areas by demonstrating (1) how institutional presuppositions are negotiated with different epistemic resources in the special setting of interviews and (2) how conflicting institutional constraints are managed in interview interaction.

Resistance, as misalignment and disaffiliation, is a useful indicator of the conditions for taking part in particular institutional interactions with others, because it shows the opportunity that speakers have to change the starting points set up for their involvement (Stivers & Heritage, 2001). The findings of article I reveal that the children participate very actively in the interviews as they resist the institutional constraints. Their resistance is based on the epistemic resource of their personal experiences, which is unavailable to the interviewer. Thus, the study supports prior findings of the importance of clients’ primary access to their experience for negotiating institutional constraints (e.g. Danby, Butler, et al., 2011; Hepburn & Potter, 2011a; Hutchby, 2002).

However, article I modifies the suggestion that personal information is necessarily an effective epistemic resource in institutional settings. The find-
ings show that in the special setting of interviews with children, there is a highly restricted character to what knowledge the interviewer treats as legitimate: The interviewees’ participation is not shown in the boxes that are finally ticked. Accordingly, the institutional constraints of the psychometric interviews, which I conceptualize as *recordability*, enforce a theory-weighted research practice. This is similar to other settings in which clients’ descriptions are negotiated in terms of their relevance for the institution’s services, such as in the case of establishing intention in police interviews (Edwards, 2008). In relation to this, it is notable that the interviewees at several points resisted the psychometric questionnaires’ treatment as psychological phenomena of what they themselves described as circumstances in their lives. One example is when an interviewee described “not being able to go to one’s father when one is sad” as a practical issue. The psychometric questionnaire, however, treated it as an issue of trust—an extension of problems of attachment. Such resistance points to the limits of implementing a one-sided psychological understanding of people in social welfare work. In sum, these findings point to the creative ways that children as clients handle institutional restrictions, as well as providing concrete evidence of ways that institutions may fail to appreciate children’s displays of competence (cf. Cicourel, 1968; Mackay, 1974).

Also connected to institutional restrictions in terms of questions’ presuppositions, article II shows how interviewees deal with a specific assumption: the prescription of a certain epistemic stance—the stance of believing—in a multiunit interview question. The interviewees negotiate this stance by using the epistemic resource of contrastive constructions. With these constructions, the interviewees position themselves as informed about what the institutional setting considers evidence for regret and thus a legitimate cause for believing others’ expressions or displays of regret. However, the interviewees contest this legitimacy—sometimes by suggesting that although they lack evidence, they do believe that their fathers are regretful, and sometimes by stating that although they may have evidence that indicates the perpetrators’ regret, they do not trust this evidence. Thus, article II shows that because contrastive constructions present the interviewees as knowledgeable about institutional constraints at the same time as they challenge them, contrastive constructions work as an effective epistemic resource for negotiating institutional constraints (cf. Drew, 1992; Hutchby, 1992). Like article I, this extends our knowledge on available resources for clients in institutions: Not only can they use epistemic resources that are unavailable to the institutional agent, such as personal information; they can also question the institution on its own terms.

Whereas article I and article II demonstrate noticeable constraints of the questions that the interaction revolves around, article III draws conclusions about institutional constraints as a way of understanding social workers’ accounts. I propose that the social workers and interviewer relate to the ide-
als of children’s participation and model consistency when evaluating whether an intervention worked for a particular child. The findings show that the social workers conceptualize their actions, in actually having followed the children’s lead, as a failure when this choice does not comply with the intervention model. Therefore, I draw the conclusion that the evaluation interviews downplay the ideal of participation in favor of the ideal of model consistency. The article’s main contribution is, thus, showing how the social workers’ accounts employ a predetermined participation: a moral order that constructs children as competent only if they want what the institution offers. This helps explain why certain institutional priorities, such as the ideal of participation, can be difficult to realize in practice. The findings in article III also caution against relying heavily on research ideals, such as model consistency, for improving practice; these methods may circumscribe other values in practice.

A presentation of these problems may be taken as a recommendation to refrain from interviewing children or using research methods in social welfare work—that the questions simply do not work. On the contrary, both article I and II show how children competently deal with the restrictions in the interviews. Article I demonstrates that even when given response options that invite them to choose one over the other, the interviewees treat the questions with regards to what conclusions the people hearing the answers will draw. Likewise, the findings of article II show how children use epistemic resources to resist assumptions in institutional interaction. Accordingly, children do not just adhere to suggestions in “leading questions.” Rather, contrary to warnings (Ceci & Bruck, 1993) about asking children directly about, for example, violence, this thesis demonstrates that children can actively negotiate those constraints. Thus, direct questions can be a good starting point for talking about difficult issues. But the children’s opportunities for participation in this institutional context are limited by two factors: (1) recordability; a one-sided focus on recordable responses and (2) problematic theoretical assumptions. Apart from restricting children’s rights to formulate their experiences, these factors can lead interviewers to miss opportunities to gain important information. Professionals using research methods and theories in social welfare work should be aware of conflicting demands: Their need to produce certain objects that are related to a specific regime designed to improve practice may lead them to neglect the practical reasoning through which members of socially organized activities seek to order their interpretations (cf. Mackay, 1974). The effort of making questions and answers work in relation to children’s participation should preferably focus on developing social research practice so that it can appreciate interviewees’ involvement.
Mundane Epistemics

The second area to which the thesis contributes is mundane epistemics—how interview participants manage rights and responsibilities related to knowledge in interaction. Mundane epistemics is a revitalized domain of interest for both conversation analysis and discursive psychology. Because knowledge is tied to people’s rights and responsibilities, this area of research is important to understanding participation. Within the sociology of science, researchers have stated that scientists’ activities must be examined on the same terms that we examine other actors’ ways of knowing and explaining their surroundings (e.g. Cicourel, 1968, p. vii). However, if science is just examined as researchers’ production of scientific knowledge, with a focus on matters such as the questions and coding procedures in relation to interviews, science studies miss the interplay between scientific ideals and other principles connected to the setting in which they are exercised. Scientific methods and theories are put to work in a variety of settings which cannot simply be distinguished as scientific or unscientific. Therefore, the present thesis stresses the importance of studying how participants in scientific activities produce and rely on knowledge—not just what researchers consider to be knowledge, but knowledge as related to rights and responsibilities in interaction. It is worthwhile to study the social aspects of how institutional ideals—for example, reliability and participation—are actualized or restricted in interaction in scientific settings. In the present thesis, all articles concern issues of knowledge. However, article II is the main contribution to understanding epistemics in interaction.

Prior studies concerning epistemic stance suggest that epistemic access is connected to having experienced the event, emotion, or thought in question. Thus, a question about others’ thoughts can be problematic because it assumes access to a domain into which we do not have obvious rights and responsibilities (Pomerantz, 1980). Article II elaborates this notion by combining interactional research on epistemic access and responsibilities (Stivers et al., 2011) and discursive psychological findings on people’s use of subject-side and object-side constructions—how the construction of the speaker’s subjectivity and of objects in the world are intertwined (Edwards, 2005, 2007). It demonstrates that epistemic access is related not only to a specific kind of participation in the actual interaction, but also to a moral relationship with the object of knowledge. Thus, I suggest that the concept of believability is needed in some circumstances: Believability widens the notion of epistemic access and responsibilities from questions of what one can observe (for example, one’s own thoughts and others’ displays of their thoughts) to what one, as a moral being, can draw conclusions about regarding other moral beings.

The concept of believability suggests that intersubjectivity is a highly moral phenomenon associated with the knowing subject as well as the object
of knowledge. This concept relates to participation in a wider sense than just involvement in current interaction. Believability concerns the interviewees’ participation in their fathers’ lives: the interviewees’ believing things about their fathers’ thoughts. Interview interaction may be a fruitful setting for studying believability—in interviews, “What do you think/believe?” questions are a viable device for eliciting information because of epistemic responsibilities. People are expected to be able to formulate beliefs about events and other people. Still, the responsibility to believe things about others is valid in many other institutional as well as mundane settings. Our beliefs about others and the world are considered an essential part of who we are. So if the concept of recordability is associated with the actualization of institutional restrictions in talk, the concept of believability extends broader social psychological issues of epistemic and moral responsibilities concerning our access to other people’s thoughts.

Article II conceptualizes the gap between the question’s presuppositions and the interviewees’ answers as a matter of not taking believability into account; with this conceptualization, article II also contributes to the discursive psychological project of respecifying concepts in psychology. The study illustrates how the epistemic stance of believing, taken for granted in the concept of mentalization, is inseparable from actions such as defending and accusing. Article II therefore adds to the critique of the Theory of Mind: The concept of mentalization may mistakenly consider actions in interview interaction to be evidence of interviewees’ ability to draw conclusions about others’ thoughts. Especially considering suggestions that children who have experienced traumatic events have problems mentalizing (see Lieberman, Van Horn, & Ippen, 2005), it is notable that in the present analysis, claiming no knowledge of the perpetrator’s thoughts is a way for the interviewees to distance themselves from him. The difficulties that can be traced in the interaction are, thus, not to be treated as belonging to the interviewees as individuals. Instead, the difficulties are associated with the question’s actualization of a theory and interpretative framework that considers knowledge to be something within the interviewees’ heads that the right question can bring out; this assumption neglects the moral and relational functions of knowledge as well as the interactional work involved in actualizing questions and answers.

Article III also relates to work concerned with epistemic issues; specifically, it addresses epistemic status. Prior studies suggest that whereas authority based on epistemic access concerns what people know, status-based authority is associated with what people should or are entitled to know (Enfield, 2011). Although the analysis in article III is restricted to participants’ talk about competence and agency rather than their display of it, it accords with Sacks’ (1992) claim that knowledge relates to membership categories. Article III shows that children’s status as “less competent” than social workers trumps their primary epistemic access to their own wishes. In a parallel
vein, Antaki (2013) has demonstrated that low epistemic status is associated with being a client in institutions as well as with categories such as “child.” In interviews with people with cognitive disabilities, answers to the institutional agents’ questions about issues in the interviewees’ lives, even concerning their beliefs and wishes, were treated as known better by the institutional agents (Antaki, 2013). In line with those findings, article III shows how children’s access to their own thoughts and feelings is constructed as contingent on wanting what the institutional setting offers.

These findings regarding mundane epistemics are relevant to the engagement with knowledge in discursive psychology and conversation analysis. However, they also modify the notion of participation in the majority of childhood studies by emphasizing the action orientation in displays of knowledge. Childhood studies advocate a view of the child as a competent actor but seldom investigate children’s utterances as actual activities. The findings of the present thesis shows that research can benefit from acknowledging children’s answers in interviews as actions associated with moral implications. Treating children’s utterances in interviews as simple evidence of their experiences, feelings, and thoughts disregards the interactional work that children, as social actors, do.

Concluding Remarks

These conclusions are based on audio-recorded interaction with or about children. By demonstrating that children use resources similar to those that other social actors employ, the present study reverses tendencies to discuss children as beings whose actions need to be interpreted in terms of incompleteness and incompetence. Instead of treating findings about adults as relevant for all, it treats findings about children as generally important. The case of children as interviewees may highlight challenges to participation and show how participants, in a particularly vulnerable situation, manage knowledge in interaction. But the institutional restrictions and treatment of knowledge demonstrated in this thesis are important to discuss in relation to other participants in interviews, as well. The principle of recordability is unlikely to be waived in relation to adult interviewees. Likewise, orienting to believability can be expected to be just as relevant for adults who are asked to account for others’ inner motivations as it is for children. And the difference between the principle and practice of participation can be compared to a similar ideal in health-care settings designed for older people: The principle of dignity is a popular ingredient in these settings’ guidelines but is difficult to fully realize in practice (Parry, 2005).

Today, if I could change my work with the thesis, my first adjustment would be to ask all the interviewers to record their interviews. There is nothing to indicate that the findings of articles I and III would have been differ-
ent with other interviewers, but with a dataset including interviews with all the interviewers, I could also have studied certain psychometric questions, like I could do in article II, which I think would have been rewarding. For example, I could have studied whether interviewers’ delivery of questions differed in ways that mattered for interviewees’ subsequent participation. In addition to this, video recordings would have made the analysis more precise with regards to visible displays of resistance or for showing when, in sequences, interviewees chose a response option. The lack of video recording is ethically justified because it could be too strong an intrusion into the lives of the children, many of whom were living under threat from the perpetrators. This means, however, that the analysis is limited to vocal contributions and misses bodily conduct and facial expressions which are not hearable. Again, nothing suggests that the findings would have been different, but video recordings in similar settings could reveal additional resources for participation.

In conclusion, the current thesis focuses on the social aspects of interviewing, rather than primarily assessing ideals of research validity and reliability. In doing so, it contributes to an understanding of interactional conditions for those who respond, rather than for those who ask. By showing how children claim epistemic authority in the institutional setting of interviewing (article I), how they manage their relationship to an abusive father through epistemic stance (article II), and how social workers’ accounts of outcomes are associated with categorization practices (article III), the thesis extends studies of institutional conditions for interviewees and service users as well as adding to work on the relationship between knowledge and morality in interaction.
Sammanfattning


Den föreliggande avhandlingen undersöker sociala aspekter av denna typ av intervjuer; hur deltagare i intervjuer förhåller sig till kunskaps- och kompetensanspråk och till deras institutionella och moraliska implikationer. Avhandlingen utgår från en nationell svensk utvärdering av stödinsatser för barn som har bevittnat våld mot sin mamma. Eftersom praktiken i denna specifika utvärderingsstudie inte är unik har resultaten relevans utöver det svenska fallet och avhandlingen diskuterar allmänna institutionella villkor i intervjuer.

Tidigare forskning om intervjuinteraktion har med ett fåtal undantag undersökt vilken betydelse vardagliga interaktionsmässiga resurser har i förhållande till forskningsideal om reliabilitet och validitet. Den här avhandlingen skiljer sig från denna ansats genom att främst fokusera på intervjsituationen som en social händelse. Intervjuer använts idag i sammanhang som vägleds av andra ideal än de vetenskapliga, till exempel inom socialt välfärdsarbete där ideal om brukares delaktighet och en betoning på etisk praktik väger tungt. Med fokus på de följder som intervjupraktiken får för intervjupersonens delaktighet, undersöker jag hur kunskap hanteras av intervjudeltagarna, snarare än hur kunskapen som erhålls genom intervjuer kan ”befläckas” av interaktionsmässiga praktiker.

Avhandlingens teoritiska och metodologiska hemvist är de etnometodologiskt inspirerade ansatserna diskursiv psykologi och konversationsanalyss. Dessa ansatser har gemensamt antagandet att handling och interaktion produceras genom och för varandra. Därför analyserar man inom både konversationsanalyss och diskursiv psykologi de praktiker genom vilka personer metodiskt skapar och bekräftar social ordning i olika sammanhang. Istället för att se interaktion som determinerad av institutionella sammanhang, förstår man inom konversationsanalysen institutioner som uppbyggda genom interaktion. Inom diskursiv psykologi ifrågasätter man på samma sätt att kognitioner och emotioner skulle ligga bakom och kontrollera våra handlingar. Istället ser man på hur samspelet tagare använder och konstruerar psykologiska termer och begrepp för olika praktiska syften. I denna avhandling innebär utgångspunkten i diskursiv psykologi och konversationsanalys att jag undersöker de psykologiska intervjuerna som socialt samspelet: jag utforskar hur samtalsdeltagare förhåller sig till varandras tal-, hur deras uttalanden är sekventiellt ordnade i förhållande till varandra och hur de hanterar preferens; det vill säga att vissa uttalanden är socialt och grammatiskt önskvärda i förhållande till andra.

Eftersom frågor om kunskapshantering är centrala i förhållande till avhandlingens fokus på delaktighet använder jag också forskning inom diskursiv psykologi och konversationsanalys om hur människor förhåller sig till kunskap i interaktion. I samspelet med andra förhåller vi oss till kunskap på olika sätt – den som har epistemisk tillgång genom att till exempel ha erfarenhet av ett fenomen har vanligtvis större auktoritet att uttala sig om detta fenomen än den som bara har hört talas om det. Samtidigt har människor asymmetrisk epistemisk status: en läkare och en patient som tittar på röntgenbilder tillsammans har samma kunskapsmässiga tillgång till vad de ser men läkaren har ändå större auktoritet att tolka bilderna. Till sist så finns det epistemiska skyldigheter och rättigheter. Vi förväntas känna till våra egna känslor och åsikter, men kanske inte andras. Ett område som är nära förbundet både med konversationsanalysens utgångspunkter generellt och med kunskapshantering mer specifikt är hur samspeletsdeltagare samarbetar med, stödjer och gör motstånd mot varandras interaktionsmässiga projekt. Första-


Artikel I handlar om hur barn, med hjälp av den kunskapsmässiga resursen personlig information, gör motstånd mot antaganden i psykometriska intervjufrågor. Personlig information brukar beskrivas som en användbar resurs i institutionella sammanhang eftersom den institutionella representanten har en begränsad tillgång till kunskap om intervjupersonens liv. Detta gäller också resultatet i artikel I där barnen hänvisar till förhållanden eller
upplevelser som visar att intervjufrågorna inte passar dem. Att ifrågasätta antaganden i frågor har i tidigare forskning beskrivits som en stark form av motstånd som bemöter frågan som ogiltig. Men i artikel I är det tydligt att barnen ifrågasätter antaganden i syfte att lämna så giltiga svar som möjligt och för att berätta om sina liv för intervjuaren. Därför verkar frågorna vara relevanta för barnen och därmed användbara som en ingång till samtal. Intervjuaren är dock främst inriktad på att generera registrerbara svar. Jag menar att intervjuinteraktionen ordnas i förhållande till en princip som jag kallar registrerbarhet (recordability): intervjuaren orienterar sig mot intervjupersonens beskrivningar som interpersonellt betydelsefulla, till exempel genom att visa empati, först när ett registrerbart svar redan är på plats. Intervjuarens orientering mot principen om registrerbarhet verkar hindrande, både i förhållande till den institutionella agenda som handlar om att få information om barnens liv, och för att bemöta barnen som personer vars egna definitioner av sina liv är giltiga och viktiga.


Artikel III berör hur ideal om barns delaktighet å ena sidan och modellkonsistens å andra sidan konkurrerar i socialarbetares förklaringar av behandlingens utfall. Eftersom dessa ideal ibland kan krocka – det finns barn som inte vill delta i en stödinsats enligt de ramar som en specifik behandlingsmodell ställt upp – ger studien information om hur barns agentskap diskursivt möjliggörs och begränsas av både intervjuaren och socialarbetarna

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För det andra bidrar avhandlingen till en förståelse av hur kunskapsfrågor hanteras i interaktion. Artikel II visar att anspråk om kunskapsmässig tillgång inte bara är relaterad till en specifik form av delaktighet i själva interaktionen – såsom att man har sett en annan persons beteende och därför har rätten att berätta om det. Anspråk om epistemisk tillgång till andras tankar handlar också om en moralisk relation till kunskapsobjektet: personens tankar måste framstå som trobara – både trovärdiga och vetbara. Slutligen visar artikel III hur barns tillgång till sina egna önskningar konstrueras som villkorade av att deras vilja stämmer överens med vad det institutionella sammanhanget erbjuder.

Dessa bidrag är baserade på analyser av interaktion med och om barn, men jag menar att resultaten är relevanta att diskutera även i förhållande till
villkor för intervjupersoner och brukare mer generellt. Förhandlingar om principen om registrerbarhet är antagligen närvarande i många institutionella sammanhang i vilka information om klienter ska registreras samtidigt som klienterna ska bemötas på ett respektfullt sätt. Och även om frågor om trobarhet ställs på sin spets när det gäller moraliskt problematiska handlingar som våld, så är det ett begrepp som torde vara viktigt i flera sammanhang när vi ombeds uttala oss om andras tankar. Den förbestämda delaktigheten som framställs i utvärderingsintervjuerna med socialarbetare är kanske speciellt närvarande när det gäller grupper av människor vars kompetens ifrågasätts, men detta gäller förutom barn även brukare inom socialt välfärdsarbete i allmänhet.

Avhandlingens begränsningar handlar framförallt om att jag bara har undersökt ljudinspelade data, främst med mig själv som intervjuare. Om fler intervjuare hade spelat in sina intervjuer hade analysen av de psykometriska intervjuerna också kunnat fokusera på andra problem, såsom specifika frågor som genererade motstånd. Med videoinspelade data skulle det vara möjligt att se andra sätt på vilka intervjupersonerna och intervjuarna deltar i interaktionen och när, i en sekvens, som barnen kryssade i ett svarsalternativ. Dessa begränsningar innebär dock inte att resultatet av de genomförda analyserna är ogiltiga. Videoinspelning och intervjuer med fler intervjuare hade dock kunnat ge en ännu rikare bild av de villkor för delaktighet som finns i interaktionssituationen.

Sammanfattningsvis fokuserar den föreliggande avhandlingen på de sociala aspekterna av intervjuandet, snarare än att primärt undersöka interaktion i förhållande till forskningsideal om reliabilitet och validitet. Därmed bidrar avhandlingen till en förståelse av interaktionsmässiga villkor för de som svarar på frågorna, snarare än för den som frågar.
References


Appendix A: Transcription Symbols

Extract from Gail Jefferson’s (2004, pp. 24–31) transcription symbols

[ ] Onset of overlap
] = The point at which two overlapping utterances end
(0.0) = Latching, no break or gap
(.) = Elapsed time by tenth of seconds
(word) = Micro pause
word = Stress via pitch and/or amplitude
↑↓ = Prolongation of the immediate prior sound
?,= = Shifts into especially high or low pitch
,?: = Punctuation marks are used to indicate the usual intonation
WORD = Louder sounds
°word° = Softer sound
wo- = Cut off
>word< = The bracketed sounds are sped up
<word> = The bracketed material is slowed down
.hhh = Inbreath
hhh. = Outbreath
wo(hh)rd = Laughter particles in word
((word)) = The transcriber’s comments
Appendix B: Swedish Transcripts Article III

Extract 1
1 IR var samtalet rätt insats
2 för Emma då?
3 (1.0)
4 SW jag tror det var bra för henne,
5 IR mm,
6 (4.0)
7 IR på vilket sätt då?
8 SW ja det kändes som (1.0) hon tyckte att (.)
9 det var bra att komma prata- hon pratade
10 gårna,
11 (.)
12 SW och det kändes som hon tyckte det var ganska
13 skönt att få en chans att prata om
14 dom sakerna som vi gjorde=
15 IR =mm
16 (2.0)
17 IR kändes det som att hon ville komma?
18 SW ja det kändes som att hon ville komma.
19 (2.0)
20 IR sa [hon]
21 SW [abs]olut hon var glad och
22 positiv när hon kom in här och ville-
23 (. ) sprang snabbt in här och började och
24 (1.7) det var aldrig någon utmaning hon visste vad
25 vi skulle göra så snart vi kom in i
26 rummet.

Extract 2
1 SW han kan säga att han behöver komma hit och han
2 vill träffar Christine,
3 IR mm,
4 SW sen han- ja det är positivt- väldigt bra=
5 IR =mm väldigt positivt.
6 (2.0)
7 SW och det är faktiskt ganska öppen att han sätter
8 ord på vad han tänker och [känner]
9 IR [mm ]

Extract 3
1 SW både Anna och jag var förvånade över hans utveckling
2 under ter[minen]
3 IR [mm ]
4 SW för under slutet av gruppen ville han nämligen inte
5 komma,
6 (.)
7 IR okej?
så gärna nej för han hade börjat träna basket, (.) mm, och han tyckte det var så mycket
raboligare än att vara här och det får man ju ha ha ha (.) full förståelse för (.) vad är viktigt här i livet?
ja [ha ha ] [hhh ha] ja när man är tio är han va ha ja ha ha ja [och] vi bara uppmuntrade det, [ja ]
[ha ha       ] (.) på alla sätt, ja men vi ville ändå att [han] skulle gå kvar här
[ja ] [ja ] den sista a- för han kunde fråga såhär >då var det fortfarande kanske två eller tre gånger kvar< "är det den sista gången idag?" "nej" "Åh vad synd" sa han.
[ha ha ]

Extract 4
1 IR var samtalena rätt insats för honom?
(1.0)
2 IR eller eh behövs det något annat eller mer av det här eller (0.5) eh
(4.5)
3 SW svår fråga [i det här] fallet
4 IR [ja men ] kan du säga=
(0.5)
5 SW =jo precis men Tim var ju inte villig egentligen att vara här.
(.)
6 SW m,
7 SW men sen lossnade det efter den här tredje gången
8 IR (1.0)
9 SW det var som en stor suck [he] när han gick ut
10 IR [mj]
11 SW ur rummet sen så kunde han ju faktiskt lyfta på mungiporna.
12 IR mm mm,
13 SW mm
14 IR (.)
15 SW så jag kan tycka absolut att det var rätt.
16 IR (.)
17 SW och det var alldeles tillräckligt i det här fallet.

Extract 5
1 IR hur har det varit med henne,
(0.5)
2 IR har hon velat komma hit eller.
(0.5)
3 IR ja hon har velat komma hit,
4 SW ja hon har velat komma hit,
och (0.5) men hon har velat styra mycket.

IR
mm,

hon har velat styra att "idag ska vi göra det här och nu ska jag" hon har accepterat lite att jag försöker bestämma "ja men nu gör vi det här först och sen kan vi avsluta med att göra det där".

IR
mm,

sen gör hon det en liten stund och sen "nu då?"

IR
ja(h)a ha ha vad är det som hon vill göra då?

SW
ja hon vill spela spel eller hon vill rita det här,

IR
jaja.

SW
så det har varit mycket att rita bilder till mamma.

IR
jaja med stora hjärtan.

---

Extract 6

jag kan ha en (.) en fundering i bakhuvudet och det är det här att (.) eh den här mannen är ju (0.5) polisanmäld för även misshandel mot Simon, okej,
så jag tror att Simon har blivit förhörd av polisen om detta.

IR
okej,

(0.5)
så att jag kan tro att det här är (.) han är (.)
ell jag kan inte tro men jag kan tänka (.)
tanken har liksom- (.) att att han är in[körd] på att det är det här det handlar om.

IR
[jaha.]

(IR

mm,

och att jag egentligen har fått hörare lite såna här polisförhörssaker,

IR
justde m,

(0.5)

och (2.5) i en annan situation och liksom (. under andra omständigheter så ja kanske kanske jag hade kunnat komma bakom den här historien] och eventuellt hitta en annan-

IR
[m ]

SW
Simon’s egen historia.
Appendix C: Interviews

Interviews with Children

Pre-Interview
The current situation: school, leisure time, friends, family; the child’s knowledge concerning why the child is in contact with the agency; the child’s knowledge about the violence and the child’s actions during violent events; support in the child’s life; the child’s views on participating in the research.

Post-Interview
The child’s views on the intervention; fear of being exposed to violence; contact with friends, family, and the perpetrator; custody and visitation; views on participating in the research.

Follow-Up Interview
Any contact with helping agencies since the post-test interview; the current situation regarding school, leisure time, peers, family, the perpetrator, custody and visitation; fear of being exposed to violence, support; views on participating in the research.

Instruments

KIDSCREEN (Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2005) is a generic quality of life instrument designed for children and adolescents between 8 and 19 years of age. The Swedish evaluation uses a shortened version with 32 items in all three interviews.

Emotional Regulation (Rydell, Berlin, & Bohlin, 2003) is a Swedish instrument designed for children 5-8 years old. It measures emotionality and emotional regulation related to anger, fear, and positive emotions or exuberance. The evaluation study uses 23 items in all three interviews.

Children Exposed to Domestic Violence (CEDV) (Edleson, Shin, & Johnson Armendariz, 2008) is used to measure the level of exposure to domestic violence that children may have experienced, the frequency of experiences, and the children’s involvement in the events. It is designed for 10- to 16-year-old
children. The evaluation uses a version with 18 items (the first part of the original instrument) in the first interview.

*Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children* (TSCC) (Briere, 1996) is an instrument for evaluating posttraumatic symptomatology in children and adolescents (ages 8-16). The Swedish evaluation study uses a version of the instrument with 43 items in the pre-interview and follow-up interview and a shortened one with only 11 items in the post-interview.

*Attachment Security Scale* (ASS) (Kerns, Klepac, & Cole, 1996) is designed to measure children’s perceptions of security in parent-child relationships in relation to their sense of whether an attachment figure is responsive and available. The evaluation study uses a version with 15 items which were asked in relation to both the mother and father, for a total of 30 items. During the pre-interview and the follow-up interview, the evaluation used the versions concerning both mothers and fathers; during the post-interview, the instrument asked about fathers.

*Violence Directed at the Child* is an instrument constructed for the evaluation study designed to measure the type and frequency of violence against children. The instrument included 16 items and was used in the post-interview.

*Consumer Satisfaction* (CONSAT-C) is a short instrument constructed for the evaluation study; it includes three items. These items ask about the child’s thoughts about the intervention, whether the child had wanted to go to the intervention, and whether the child would recommend the intervention to other children in a similar situation. It was used in the post-test interview.

*Conflict Tactics Scale for Children* (CTS-PCA) (Straus, 1999) is an instrument for measuring children’s reports of their parents’ behavior towards them. The evaluation study uses nine items from a scale based on Parent-Child Conflict Tactics Scale in the follow-up interview.

**Mentalization/Coherence Interview**

1. Has X or your mother talked to you about the <violence>? (what he/she did that is the reason for your contact with us)?
   I When did X do that? Do you remember what he said?
   II What do you think about that?
   III When did your mom do that? Do you remember what she said?
   IV What do you think about that?

2. Has any one of them said (explained) why <the violence> happened?
I Who was that?
II What did he/she say?
III What do you think of that?
(Here it is important to be observant of any tendencies of the
children to blame themselves, and to, in that case, be clear that
children are never responsible for the violence.)

3. What do you believe that he/she/they think/s about what he/she/they
ha/s/ve done?
   I Do you believe that X regrets what he has done? How does he
       show that?
   II Do you believe that your mom regrets what she has done?
       How does she show that?

4. How do you yourself think about the <violence> (what he/she/they
did)?
   I Why (what makes you think that)?
   I Have you talked to anyone about that?
   II Who?
   III What did you say?
   IV How did it feel to talk about it?
   V What did she/he who you talked to say?
   VI What do you think about that?

5. Is there anything else you want to tell me (about <the violence>?)
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