



Illicit Flows and African Security

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Foreword

In 2013, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) hosted a joint one day African security conference. The theme of the conference was *Illicit Flows and African Security*, and was held at the Museum of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities in Stockholm on 17th October 2013. The expectation was that a mixture of researchers and practitioners coming together would be able to share ideas and solutions on how illicit flows can be tackled more effectively. Presenters were carefully chosen from among a highly qualified group of experts interested in sharing their knowledge and experience. Below follows a report based on the presentations, held by various experts, from the event.

The theme of the conference grew out of an emergent realisation that African and European states, the European Union and the African Union, must gather joint forces to tackle new and emerging security threats. Since the establishment of the African Union in 2001, and the emerging peace and security architecture that has evolved ever since, new institutions and charters have been adopted for the purposes of dealing with peace and security in Africa. The question is if these new AU capabilities being set up are suitable for the challenges Africa faces in terms of security. While hard security concerns such as wars, civil wars, ethnic conflicts etc. are still raging across various parts of the continent, and receive much policy attention, other more subtle security challenges go unnoticed. Yet, both forms of challenges pose equal threats to peace, stability and governance. They also cause tremendous human suffering.

To put AU peace and security capacities in relation to the complexity of security challenges, the aim of this conference has been to look at new and emerging security concerns. Dealing with illicit flows might demand new and different means and methods. Illicit flows and African security is not a new problem. The shadow flows of arms, capital, natural resources, humans and drugs are a phenomenon that may even be increasing in Africa, and between Africa and other continents. This needs attention.

Although a conference report like this cannot mirror the authenticity of the conference as such, which also included a number of person-to-person meetings, informal talks alongside the conference, a documentary screening, and illustrative PowerPoint presentations, this summary sends a strong and clear message of taking illicit flows in Africa seriously.

To build on the presentations, the conveners, when in the process of drafting this report, asked each of the presenters to also include a number of clear-cut policy recommendations. In this unique addendum, scholars and experts alike give a full arsenal of advice on what to do about the problems of illicit flows. In this context it is worth reiterating the recommendations of the Swedish State Secretary, who was one of the presenters at the conference: that there is not one single solution to the problem of illicit flows. On the contrary, one need to engage it with a broad set of tools which are a part of a comprehensive approach. This advice also corresponds well with the very personal note made by one of the messages from the migrants who were smuggled through the Sahel desert to Europe, that a banned human flow does not stop at borders but travels across and continues in the indefinite. The point being that the consequences of the misery that illicit flows create in Africa, in whatever form, and for whatever reason, also in the long run pose a challenge for those of us who happen to be better-off. As such, we are linked to the challenges in Africa and also carry a duty and responsibility to respond to the problems arising from illicit flows. Following this conference, we sincerely hope that the policy community follows swiftly on responding to some of the challenges outlined below.

Finally, the conference to which this report testifies builds on a long-standing collaboration between the Swedish Defense Research Agency (the Program of Studies in Africa Security) and the Nordic Africa Institute. Since 2008 this collaboration has laid a solid basis for cooperation and capacity-building in Africa-related research on peace and security. In keeping with this objective research cooperation on these issues has continued, and public seminars and

conferences have become key elements in this cooperation.

The edited versions of the presentations each convey a personal take on the theme of the joint lec-

tures. The views, interpretations and any errors are those of the author, not of FOI or NAI, and authorship should be attributed to each presenter.



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Introduction

by Maria Lignell Jakobsson

Maria Lignell is Head, Division of Defence Analysis, The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

This conference is a joint project between the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). I am glad to see so many participants here from many different organisations and especially our distinguished guests and speakers.

FOI is an independent agency under the Swedish Ministry of Defence. We have roughly one thousand employees, working with a great variety of subjects; for example security policy, and protection against chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. We help the government with disarmament questions and we also work with non-proliferation. For example, we have just finished the analysis of samples from Syria where we have detected sarin gas. Other topics we cover include: explosives, information security, electronic warfare and crisis management. We also have knowledge in African security and a team working with these issues. For the last five years, we have been working very closely with NAI to build up this knowledge.

Today's conference is about a very interesting topic: illicit flows and African security. It is not a new problem, but I think the understanding of



this problem is new and maybe growing. There are fewer traditional conflicts in Africa but I think the problem with illicit flows, as well as our understanding of it, has grown in importance. If we don't do anything about it, it might be undermining the building of peace, safety and security in this region. Dealing with illicit flows might demand new and different means and methods. I really look forward to this day and the chance to gain new knowledge about these subjects and serious problems and how to actually manage them. I hope you all feel very welcome.

Introduction

by Ina Soiri

Ina Soiri is Director of the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI)

Those of you who know me also know that I always want to start everything with a light touch. This morning it actually puzzled me a lot, because I couldn't find anything funny to say about illicit flows. The phenomenon, I think, is such a tragic, dangerous and sad state of affairs. I am however very happy and delighted that we, the Nordic Africa Institute, have been able to gather this distinguished group of participants, scholars and policy makers at this seminar today together with the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI. This is what I would wish was the core of our activities: combining research and discussion on modern African challenges.

We all know, you much better than I, that the illicit flows of capital, humans and drugs are a phenomenon which is not new and which is perhaps even increasing in Africa and between Africa and other continents. This poses a threat to security. It poses a threat to African governments' authority and legitimacy. It also causes tremendous human suffering. Therefore, this question is not to be treated with a light touch. At the same time, I think this is the group – a combination of researchers from different disciplines and of practitioners and policy makers – that can try to find solutions and at least share some ideas how this phenomenon, or these phenomena, can be tackled as well as what solutions the combined group of African and Nordic academics and policy makers can offer in order to curb it.



I have worked a lot with illicit capital flows. Although that is not the topic today, it is very closely linked. Often the routes – how the money flows and the profits are made, what is gained from the illicit arms trade, drug trade and human trafficking as well as the channels that are used – are the same. I will however leave it to you since you are the specialists. I hope that the outcome of this seminar is that we will all have learnt a little bit more about what this phenomenon encompasses.

I urge you all to stay within our networks. As the Nordic Africa Institute we wish to be the Africa Institute on this part of the globe. Together with you, our partners, we can also contribute to the building of an even stronger partnership of knowledge production and research between the Nordic countries and Africa in the future. You are very welcome to this conference.

Speech

by Carl von der Esch

Carl von der Esch is State Secretary, Ministry of Defence

On behalf of the Swedish Ministry of Defence I would like to highlight the importance of this conference, which addresses an issue that is a growing threat to African as well as global security. The international community faces security challenges that are very different from those fifty years ago. We face complex emergencies of different kinds. Some involve irregular opponents who fight against an international presence, the government or the civil population. Some challenges involve protection of civilians in danger. A somewhat different set of challenges are posed by post-conflict reconstructions of societies torn apart by years of conflict. This includes the rehabilitation of soldiers, security sector reform or capacity building. It also includes applying a gender perspective and awareness of the specific situations of women and men in post-conflict societies.

Today's conference addresses an area which undermines good governance and stability. Sweden is actively engaging in the international community with the aim of mitigating these challenges.

First, I would like to develop thoughts regarding some of the problem areas and then elaborate on how we engage directly or indirectly in Africa, providing support to overall efforts to solve these problems.

Illicit flows, such as the illegal proliferation of small arms, organised crime, terrorism and the trafficking of narcotics, weaken states, undermine state structures and have negative effects on local and national economies. Organised crime in West Africa is so severe that it undermines the authority of entire states. Since illicit flows are normally connected to broader illegal activities, they tend to be defended by violent means, resulting in an increased security threat.

The illegal trade in small arms has a negative effect on conflict management. In general, illicit flows are fuelling conflicts since they provide much of the funding needed to maintain conflict. But they also act as a driver of conflict, since peace and stability are rarely in the interest of those actors who

make money out of these activities. Countries in conflict are often either country of origin, country of transshipment and/or destination for smuggled goods and people. The lucrative business of illicit trade flows also have a tendency to attract people that are young and unemployed in Africa, wasting parts of a generation that could engage in positive state building.

The World Bank predicts a sharp increase in world trade over the next decade. This increase in world trade and flows of goods and people is assumed to apply to legal as well as illegal flows, including new smuggling and trafficking routes.

The question is how to approach these increasing problems. Sweden is looking at this from a whole-of-government approach. Let me explain: to address the security threats discussed in today's seminar, we firmly believe that there is not one single solution. We need to engage with a broad set of tools which is a part of a comprehensive approach. Sweden believes that security is built together with others through cooperation and integration, both in the region and globally. Here the EU is a central platform for Sweden's foreign defence and security policy. Sweden is contributing actively - inter alia, through the EU - to the promotion of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights.

What makes the EU a unique global player in the field of crisis management are all the tools at its disposal. Diplomacy, trade, aid and civilian and military crisis management enable the EU to act in many different ways. Few international actors can match the breadth of the EU capacity in this field. Within the EU the comprehensive approach provides conditions to be stronger and more ambitious in crisis management.

A clear example of this comprehensive approach is the EU's engagement in the Horn of Africa, where three crisis management operations - both military and civilian - work in parallel under a single overall strategy. The EU's maritime operation off the coast of Somalia, the EU training mission in Somalia and the EU Cap Nestor, enhancing regional maritime coastguard capacity, are examples of how the EU acts to stabilize the region.

Currently more than 7,000 civilian and military

personnel are deployed in the EU's CSDP missions. More importantly, they are producing results.

Sweden is contributing to all these three missions with an overall aim to improve the security situation. Among the recently launched CSDP missions in Africa, we count the EU missions in the Sahel, Niger and South Sudan. A final example of the important work against illicit flows was the decision in May 2013 to establish the EU mission in Libya – a civilian CSDP mission to support the Libyan authorities in developing capacity for enhancing the

security of Libya's land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader integrated border management strategy in the longer term. These efforts are aimed at contributing to state consolidation, economic development and the fight against organised crime and terrorism in the country and the wider region.

I would like to wish you all a fruitful conference and I am looking forward to continued discussions. Thank you.

Trafficking Panel

Trafficking and Smuggling in Human Beings, Helené Lackenbauer

Helené Lackenbauer is Researcher, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Sweden.

First of all, I would like to explain what my involvement has been with human trafficking and also the smuggling of human beings or migrants. In my previous incarnation, I served as migration protection displacement specialist with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Federation, where I had reason to research irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, especially out of Africa, for policy reasons but also for reasons of humanitarian assistance to these groups. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are very engaged in the assistance of these groups of people who are victims of these phenomena.

In this presentation, I am not only going to talk about human trafficking as such, because it is closely interlinked with another issue, and that is smuggling. When we hear about what is going on in the Mediterranean in the Maghreb region, it is usually about smuggling. There are legal definitions of smuggling and trafficking: human trafficking is the acquisition of people by improper means, such as force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them. There is a UN convention and a protocol that defines this issue. Smuggling migrants involves the procurement of financial or other material benefit for illegal entry of a person into a state of which that person is not a national or resident. Human trafficking is a crime against an individual while smuggling is a crime against a state. People can be victim of both, or they can be smuggled and enter into a state illegally – then they are committing a crime. At the same time they are being trafficked – then they are victims. However, every person on this Earth has the right to seek asylum, if you have a legitimate asylum claim it is not illegal to enter a state without a visa or permission. The principle of non-refoulement forbids the rendering of a true victim of persecution to their persecutor. The difference between smuggling and exploitation and trafficking is a complicated story. You can be part of all of them

and they are also interlinked. Trafficking often follows the same routes as the smuggling routes.

Trafficking in Africa is a little bit different than in the rest of the world. Trafficking exists everywhere, here in Sweden and in all corners of the world. Africa is not a destination region, only few sources indicate links to transnational trafficking networks from Asia and in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The hub for trafficking in Africa is West Africa. There is trafficking in other parts of Africa as well, but there is a significantly larger amount or higher number of trafficking victims both within and out of West Africa. Nigeria is on the very top of the list, followed by Benin, Ghana, Morocco, Togo and other countries in West Africa.

One can speculate on the reasons for this. Maybe it is related to the conflicts that have occurred in West Africa, the social makeup or perhaps the social economic situation. There is no clear explanation for this. It is however worth acknowledging that West Africa used to be the hub for the slave trade. Unfortunately bad habits die slowly. There might be historical links that are worth exploring between the system or set-up that at one time related to slavery, and what is going on today in West Africa.

The drivers of trafficking are basically the demand for labour and the demand for sex. In Africa and in West Africa, it is mainly children and women that are trafficked. Children are trafficked in the region and also between the sub-regions. They are trafficked for labour reasons, very often for the mining industry and also the petroleum industry. There is also trafficking for domestic servant reasons and all kinds of other service reasons, as well as for forced marriage. Another reason for the trafficking of children is forced recruitment of child soldiers. These children could be soldiers, but they can also be domestic servants to the different armed factions. Children are also trafficked into plantations. You have probably heard about the cocoa plantations in West Africa that use a lot of forced labour, predominantly children.

There are very few cases of male trafficking although it exists. The definition is basically based on people held in bondage and there are many cases

of people held in bondage, especially debt bondage. For example, you are in debt with the employer so you cannot leave the worksite. There are also cases of people being exploited and held in bondage on fishing vessels. There you cannot escape, especially not if you are out at sea. Children are also used in the fishing industry where they are, for example, forced to dive in, to force the fish into the nets or the baskets.

The United Nations Organisation of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has not found a relationship between the transnational illegal crime organisations and trafficking in Africa, which is of note. There is very little trafficking going into either. There are a few documented cases of people from, for example, Thailand or the Philippines or from East European countries being trafficked into Africa. These cases are mainly found in South Africa something which I would argue relates to the economic situation of that specific country.

Where does the trafficking in the sex trade go? There is a clear relationship between the sex trade out of Africa and the legislation around prostitution. The trafficking for sexual services mainly goes to the Middle East and to West Europe – that is countries like the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Italy. Women from Nigeria today make up the majority of prostitutes in Italy. When visiting holding centres for irregular migrants, there are a lot of women from West Africa and especially from Nigeria.

I would also like to touch upon the issue of smuggling. It is a very contemporary issue that we hear a lot about, and have heard a lot about, these last weeks. There is smuggling all over Africa. There are different routes that go along the East coast, from Eritrea, Sudan and up into Egypt. There are others going down from the Southern countries to South Africa. I am not going to touch upon these today, but consider those that relate to the Mediterranean since these are the ones that we currently hear about.

The majority of the people that try to cross the Mediterranean into Europe are refugees and labour migrants, people seeking a better life. I would like to stress that it is not a crime to seek asylum. You have a right according to international law to enter into another country and have your case tried, so they can determine if you have protection needs. It is not a crime but sometimes it is talked about as if we have to stop the refugees. To seek asylum and have your case tried is a right that every human being has according to international law.

The migration patterns from North Africa depend on the EU's migration reforms and subsequent border control. The irregular migrants and the refugees follow the same route. In Africa there are certain hubs. Morocco has been one of these hubs, but the main hub today is Libya due to its location in North Africa and the closeness to Lampedusa in Italy. It also has to do with the relations that Gaddafi had with the Sub-Saharan countries. Remember, he had a pan-African politics and vision. He welcomed labour migrants from Sub-Sahara countries into the country. Libya became a destination hub for both regular labour migrants and irregular migrants, which are those smuggled into Libya. In Libya migrants and refugees worked so that they could get money to continue their journey to Europe. It is important to stress that the majority of the migrants that come from South Sahara into North Africa do not try to enter into the European Union. They remain in North Africa. You can only travel if you have money. When you run out of money, then you are stuck. Who makes the journey to North Africa and across the Mediterranean? Often it is a young man, from the lower middle class or better-off working class; a person who can't make ends meet in his home country. The poorest segment of the society does not migrate, due to lack of resources.

The smuggling networks are not necessarily linked to other forms of trafficking or to other illegal crimes according to the UNODC. I seriously doubt that though, because I have visited villages in the North of Africa that, depending on the supply and demand, sometime smuggled people over the Mediterranean and sometimes "packages". In those packages we can assume that there were drugs or weapons. What is being smuggled depends on the market.

The smuggling is dominated by a few clans and families, and they have a very well developed network that is extremely agile and flexible. When we in Europe change the migration laws or try to enforce a certain jurisdiction limiting the possibilities to enter Europe, they too change and find loopholes that they can use in order to continue smuggling people. A couple of years ago when the possibility to cross over from Morocco was closed, smugglers began to go from Mauretania. When that started to be complicated, they went further down. These networks know how to change swiftly. Maybe we could learn something from them. On the other hand, these networks are extremely complicated with a system made up of different functions such

as recruiters, middle-men, innkeepers, smugglers in the destination country and transporters that keep the migrants in bondage and exploitation.

This was a very short overview of a very complicated issue. Thank you very much.

Policy recommendations:

In order to mitigate human suffering caused by trafficking and smuggling in human beings into the EU, there is a need:

- To adopt policies that ensure refugees safe access to fair and efficient asylum procedures without having to purchase transportation services from illegal networks;
- To remove impediments to labour migrants' safe, legal and orderly access to the European labour market, by adopting a migration regime that allows migrants to apply for labour visas before embarking on the journey to Europe, and in so doing making it possible for them to enter into the EU legally without having to utilise illegal means; and,
- To acknowledge EU member states' dependency on labour migrants in sectors such as agriculture, domestic services, tourism, health, etc.; and allowing migrants to exercise their human rights including labour rights.

Soldiering Shaky Grounds: Sierra Leonean Ex-Militias as Local Threats and Global Security Providers, Maya Mynster Christensen

Maya Mynster Christensen is Assistant Professor, Anthropology, military mobilisation, Royal Danish Defence College, Denmark.

In this presentation, I will not talk about trafficking as such, but about the global circulation of military labour, which – at least in some ways – can be perceived as forced labour. More specifically, I will talk about how Sierra Leonean ex-militias, who are perceived of as local threats, come to operate as providers of global security. As a point of departure I will consider two types of security contracting that Sierra Leonean ex-militias have been recruited for in recent years: mercenary missions in Guinea and security contracting in Iraq.

These two types of contracting are apparently quite different, yet they are facilitated in similar ways and shaped by similar dynamics – not least because it is the very same ex-militias who move between them, as they seek to carve out space for

survival. In comparable ways, these two types of contracting can tell us something about the implications of soldiering shaky grounds, and about the entanglements and ambiguities that characterise contemporary processes of security outsourcing in Sierra Leone and also in the larger global economy.

At a more basic level, these types of security contracting exemplify how markets for violence emerge and co-exist with those for peace building. Even though the demobilisation and reintegration of militias was considered a key milestone in the peace process in Sierra Leone, there is an on-going demand for military labour, not just locally but also, as I will talk about today, regionally and globally. It is this emerging economy of violence, and the forms of soldiering being produced through this economy, I have been researching in Sierra Leone. In order to explain how soldiering is produced and facilitated and how securitizing institutions come to reproduce the very threat they seek to protect themselves against, the notion of 'shaky grounds' can serve as a point of departure.

Among ex-militias in Sierra Leone shaky grounds is an expression used in reference to spaces where recruitment for various types of violent deployment takes place, including mercenary missions within the region. Shaky grounds are spaces of illicit transactions where ex-militias can congregate without the threatening gaze of unwanted spectators. As such they are spaces of risk, not least in the view of securitizing institutions that seek to arrest the illicit flows of people and goods. But for ex-militias, and for those on the lookout for violent labour or cheap, military skilled labour, they are spaces of opportunity because it is possible to quickly gather large groups of military-skilled young men on these shaky grounds.

As explained by Shakur – a dismissed soldier who serves as a mid-level broker when private politicians demand support for mercenary missions in the region – shaky grounds are favoured recruitment sites exactly because they constitute bases for social excluded and economically marginalised youth on the lookout for work to gather.

Shakur: I always look for shaky grounds. You know, when the ground is shaky it is easy to mobilise instantly.

Maya: What does shaky grounds mean? Where is the ground shaky?

Shakur: Where there are idlers, where the drop-outs are, when there is nothing to do for the youth, just desperation and poverty. Those that live a real vaga-

bond life, they are on shaky grounds. The grumblers and the “disgruntlers” who do not give a damn.

Examples of shaky grounds where Shakur and others go to recruit are the drug cartels, and certain corners of the slums and ghettos in Freetown.

When politicians in neighbouring countries on the lookout for an effective fighting force that has no personal stake in the conflict, they work their way through shaky grounds in Sierra Leone from where they can recruit ex-militias and ex-soldiers for mercenary missions – what ex-militias themselves refer to as ‘underground missions’. Underground missions are one of the few employment opportunities available to people like Shakur, living at the extreme margins of society in Sierra Leone. What is implied is that it is a phenomenon of illicit and even illegal nature, and therefore also associated with high risk.

During my fieldwork in Sierra Leone, I have traced former militia soldiers who have been mobilised for underground missions to participate in fighting in the neighbouring country of Guinea during a period of political power struggle. Such missions are risky businesses. Not only do they involve the illegal crossing of borders into foreign territory under the supervision of foreign commanders – they are also characterised by high levels of violence. For mobilised militias it is a form of soldiering that pays and it is a form of soldiering that they engage in, in the absence of an alternative path towards becoming a recognised ‘somebody’.

In regional news and in policy reports the flow of local militias is linked to the destabilising effects of larger illicit flows and criminal activities that span the porous borders in the region – to regional insecurity and instability. In 2004 the UN Security Council, for instance, stated that “the increasing use of mercenaries, child soldiers and small arms accounts for much of the instability in the West African sub-region”. Sierra Leonean security specialists have echoed such concerns, and have warned about the recycling of fighters from conflict to conflict that fuels also the circulation of small arms in West Africa.

The association of mercenary recruitment with criminal flows is important because it directs awareness to some of the organisational dynamics that facilitate mobilisation for ‘underground missions’. In this regard the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has argued that West African criminal networks are at the forefront of international developments, exactly due to the network structure that characterise their organisation. This

network structure enables rapid recruitment, and simultaneously makes it difficult for outsiders to infiltrate criminal activities. To begin with, the criminal networks are often facilitated by local dialects and cultural codes that are impassable to outsiders. Secondly, they often work in parallel with legitimate business organisations, thus making it hard to track the channelling of money earned from criminal activities. Thirdly, they tend to employ an ‘ad hoc’, ‘project based’ form of recruitment, meaning that the principal recruiters know very little about the people they hire, and vice versa.

Such temporary project-based and networked recruitment is characteristic also of the underground missions I have been researching. Though participation in a mission can extend up to several months, as it might involve prior military-strategic training and a gradual advancement towards the point of destination, the recruits are dismissed once the mission is carried out. As a consequence, ex-militias usually shift between different ‘projects’, or between different forms of soldiering extending both into legal, illicit and illegal spheres.

In recent years, the most significant emerging field in this regard has been private security contracting in Iraq, which is facilitated by various private security companies that offer services to the American government. In May 2009, a British company arrived in Sierra Leone to recruit ex-soldiers for security contracting in Iraq. In collaboration with the Sierra Leone government, they announced that they were employing up to 10,000 people to secure strategic military sites. Channelled through the government and particularly through the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, as a regular form of “overseas youth employment”, the recruitment went through public institutions. As such, it may seem to be fuelled by very different dynamics than the underground missions. The apparently regular and public character of overseas recruitment gradually faded out, as the recruits found themselves operating in the private domain as part of a larger international security complex in which the Sierra Leonean recruits were reduced to members of an invisible army of so called ‘third country nationals’. As they experienced being reduced to bodies rather than recognised military labourers, the Sierra Leonean contractors began referring to their employment as ‘civilised human trafficking’ and slavery.

Only a few months after the first batch of recruits had taken up work in Iraq, I received an email from a friend, a former militia soldier who, like

other recruits, had envisioned that overseas employment would be a step to a better life:

“Maya, today we lost one of our brothers here in Iraq, he has been suffering from cold and pain in the body. Maya, the job is not easy, the majority of us have become discouraged over the job, and some are even willing to be returned home because there is no proper medication and the weather condition is not easy. I am telling you, it is just because of the job crisis in Freetown – otherwise I should also have returned home. We are the least paid workers here and there is no good food. I greet you all. May God bless you! Please do that these serious slavery days are over.”

Only a few days after I received this email, the Sierra Leonean contractors in Baghdad began striking. *“We are mocked even by the Indian workers cleaning our toilets”*, they complained as they explained the injustices they were faced with. Not only were the other African contractors paid a monthly salary of 800 USD, while they were only paid 200 USD, but their own brothers had begun to fall ill. Some had even died. *“We are slaves!” “This is civilised human trafficking”*, the angry contractors protested.

As a result of the strike, 150 Sierra Leonean contractors were deported from Baghdad. Though they were relieved to leave the military camp, their return was characterised by feelings of doubt, uncertainty, anger and fear. Because they were afraid that they would be blamed for their protest, the deportees took refuge in the ghetto areas of central Freetown – on shaky grounds where they could look for new opportunities for violent deployment.

While the deportees represent a somewhat specific group because they were sent home before the end of their contract, the other recruits had similar difficult experiences of homecoming. Having been employed ‘overseas’ – almost in ‘white-man country’ – families and friends expected them to return home with money enough to help everybody out, to buy land, build houses and make significant investments. As few had been able to save much from their earnings, their money quickly dried up. As a consequence, they too returned to shaky grounds from where they had previously been deployed for violent labour.

A significant question to reflect on in this regard is how the supply of global security affects the production of local security? What happens when thousands of former militia soldiers return home with experiences of being degraded to the status of slaves, and with almost empty pockets – considering that they have not much to come home to?

What happens when ex-militias are retained in the use of arms, deployed in yet another warzone and then sent back home to a post-conflict environment in which they are unwanted citizens? Put differently: what implications does it have for local security when emerging global markets for force generate a recycling of demobilised militias?

There is not sufficient time to go into the more complex implications of these questions, but I would like to conclude by pointing out that we are dealing with quite obvious discrepancies between local and global security provision, and with ambiguous attempts to manage violence. These discrepancies become apparent when we direct attention towards ‘shaky grounds’. Constituting spaces for violent deployments and for the facilitation of illicit flows, shaky grounds are spaces of risk for securitising institutions that seek to police and control subjects considered dangerous to national security in Sierra Leone. The demand for military labour produces and reproduces shaky grounds exactly because they are spaces of risk and because they are favourite recruitment sites.

Policy recommendations:

- My suggestion in this regard is not that we try to ban the outsourcing of security and the illicit flows this outsourcing sometimes triggers, but that we more closely explore the dynamics of shaky grounds, and in particular, what inspires ex-militias to navigate shaky grounds. When we do so, we see how people living on the margins of society engage in a constant evaluation of risk and profit as they move between shifting forms of soldiering. We also see how violent deployment becomes an emerging possibility in the absence of alternative paths to becoming a recognised ‘somebody’.

Connecting Conflict Zones to Global Markets: the Role of Trafficking Networks, Koen Vlassenroot

Koen Vlassenroot is Professor, Conflict Research Group, University of Ghent and Director, Africa Programme, Institut Royal des Relations Internationales (Egmont), Belgium.

I will say a few things about how markets, how local and global markets, are connected in conflict areas and how they have an impact on this specific violent context. Before going into a number of examples,

which I mainly draw from the Democratic Republic of Congo, I would just like to highlight some dominant debates that are on-going in academia and that have also resulted in very inspiring policy responses.

The first debate is the one of natural resource abundance and a resource curse, in which greed has often been perceived as a contributing factor to armed struggle. Since the end of the 1980s, there has been much discussion about the existence of a resource curse. The idea that natural resource abundance, or at least the abundance of particular types of natural resources such as oil, increases the likelihood that countries will experience negative economic, political and social outcomes.

One argument that emerges from this literature is that mineral wealth leads, in specific cases, to rent-seeking practices and a rent-seeking cycle, with processes of state building leading to predation and finally to state failure. Natural resources are also increasingly being presented as explanatory factors for violent behaviour and the persistence of conflict. The underlying idea is that economic opportunities are far more important as causes and triggers of conflict than political or social grievances.

This 'greed literature' relies on the assumption that rebels in many cases tend to share two main characteristics. First, they are profit-maximising individuals. Second, they search for power. The greed perspective has also become an analytical lens to look into conflicts such as Sierra Leone and Eastern DRC. It has been very influential in policy circles, leading to a wide range of policy responses that for instance try to promote transparency through certification schemes, including the Kimberley Process. The problem with this account however, is that there is very limited empirical evidence underlying the claim that greed is indeed the main cause of violence. A second problem with this focus is that it tends to ignore the wider context of armed struggle.

More convincing, in my opinion, is the literature on the larger political economy of conflict. This literature also tries to assess the networks and incentive structures of those involved in trafficking in conflict situations but from a different perspective. It tries to investigate the relationship between for instance economic globalisation, organised crime and the illicit trade in natural resources. The argument is that in resource rich countries, which in some cases are characterised by political and economic misrule, poorly functioning government structures and endemic corruption, the exploitation and trade of resources is often controlled by transnational net-

works. These transnational networks are composed of state officials, army officers, warlords, private companies, brokers, entrepreneurs and different political and economic elites. In other words, we have to look into those networks that include both formal and informal actors, both actors that operate in the formal and the informal spheres. The members operating in these networks derive various personal benefits from their business operations in unstable environments where they can easily bend the law to their advantage. There has been, particularly in border areas, a proliferation of networks including state and non-state actors that are increasingly linked to a global shadow economy. This perspective makes, I think, a clear difference between armed actors, that we tend to put into a relationship with resource exploitation, and other actors that profit from the existence of these networks - but do not necessarily opt for a strategy of violence.

I will only consider one more debate, which is the one on hybrid governing arrangements. This debate is on-going and looks into the institutional outcomes of all these different networks that are taking shape in these conflict affected and fragile areas. It also looks into different practices and norms that are the basis of this institutionalisation of trading patterns and trading mechanisms. This is of particular interest if we want to understand trafficking activities in conflict-affected areas.

Let me look into a number of concrete examples. The first one is that of Mr Kisoni Kambale. Kisoni is a gold trader who had been active in the gold trade connecting Eastern DRC to Kampala, Nairobi, Dubai and also to Switzerland. Kisoni made some preferential deals during the war in Ituri in North Eastern DRC with a specific rebel group that was controlling some of the most lucrative gold mines in Mongbwalu. This rebel group had a preferential agreement with Kisoni, trading the locally exploited gold with Kisoni. Kisoni brought it to his home town, the border city of Butembo, where he had some smelting infrastructure, and then exported the gold to Kampala where he traded with Ugandan and Kenyan traders that, further on in the commodity chain, sent it to Switzerland.

This is a very clear example of how war economies, or war situations and trading activities, are closely linked to global markets. In 2007, Kisoni was put on the sanction list of the United Nations because he was becoming a dominant smuggler of gold. It was assumed that every ten days he was smuggling 50 kilograms of gold to Kampala. He

was connected to rebel leaderships and to political elites until he was killed, also in 2007. Nobody really knows who killed Kisoni, but some indications point to the fact that he was killed by competitors - by gold traders from Kenya.

Another example is the Goma Airport incident in early 2011. Like the previous case, it illustrates how trafficking, in a way, links conflict areas to global markets. It is a story of a botched attempt to export millions of dollars and gold in Congo, using a Gulf Stream jet from Northern Texas. According to a UN report, the Houston oil tycoon Kase Lawal, a US Nigerian businessman and founder of the energy firm Camac and also a member, which is important, of one of President Barack Obama's trade commissions, partnered with a former NBA star, Dikembe Mutombo, to finance a gold deal in the DRC. According to the UN report, Lawal and Mutombo tapped a Houston diamond merchant to pick up a gold shipment in Goma. This gold shipment came from a mining area controlled by the troops of Bosco Ntaganda, who is now in the Hague. At that moment, Bosco Ntaganda was acting as an official member of the Congolese army. Ntaganda's men would have unloaded more than 6 million USD from the plane and were about to load 400 kilograms of gold. The deal, however, fell through when Congolese authorities seized the gold and arrested the foreign businessmen travelling aboard the plane, including someone coming from Nigeria.

It is an important and very illustrative story of trafficking in Eastern DRC and how Eastern DRC is connected in particular to East African markets through often informal networks. Figures such as Bosco Ntaganda have been crucial in some of these networks. Ntaganda collaborated with East African regional networks of dealers that are selling both real gold but also counterfeit gold to international buyers. Behind Camac's local representative in Kinshasa for instance, the UN Group of Experts has uncovered a wide-reaching network of gold swindlers throughout Eastern Africa, some of whom have had very close associations with Ntaganda, and some of them are also associated to political circles in Kinshasa and in Nairobi.

This story underscores the sophisticated links between army commanders, rebel leaders, regional businessmen and international businessmen – all operating through shadow networks. Today it is the Kenyan capital of Nairobi which seems to be the transit point for the majority of deals involving real

and fake gold – deals which attract those international buyers who are seduced by the prospect of easy gains from Congo's gold mines.

Nairobi is however not only the focal point of the gold trade. It is also becoming a focal point of all sorts of other trafficking activities, including ivory which is the result of poaching. The trading networks in ivory are indeed less documented examples. A few months ago, a report published by an American advocacy group stated that the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group from Northern Uganda that is now operating in North Eastern DRC and the Central African Republic, had been increasingly involved in the trafficking of ivory and has been funding its military activities through ivory poaching. This report on the LRA has triggered some more sophisticated analyses of the ivory trade. It has been concluded that historical networks including Libyan and South Sudanese poachers have been profiting from the ivory trade and Ugandan traders were crucial in this network. Even though in the report the role of the LRA has been extremely over-exaggerated, it has nevertheless pointed us to a much more complex situation. Evidence for instance shows us that Al-Shabab has also been linked to poaching activities.

What makes trafficking so easy in these areas? First, many of the trafficking groups rely on existing historical trade routes that connect different parts of Eastern Africa. Secondly, legal frameworks do not seem to have much effect on trading patterns. They are nonetheless crucial, they need to exist: you cannot smuggle if you don't refer it to something that is legal, or illegal. There is huge competition between different networks and between different elites, including both formal and informal actors. Indeed these networks skilfully exploit the divide between formality and informality. People in a formal position are involved in informal activities, and those in an informal position try to mobilise formal actors to make deals.

Trafficking, as was recently documented in a report on Western Africa, is putting a fragile region at even greater risk – I think we all agree on that – because it is undermining the rule of law, it is deepening corruption, it is polluting the environment, violating human rights, stealing natural resources and so on. It makes many parts of Africa more prone to political instability.

The question is: What should we do? How should we deal with these trafficking activities? Fighting organised trafficking, I think, should be

part of a wider transformative strategy that builds sustainable peace and contributes to security. One of the mistakes that we should try to avoid is to respond through a focus on security, even if trafficking is considered as a security threat. Instead we need a much more sophisticated approach to trafficking, as was also suggested in a report on EU policy. This approach, as was suggested, would take a long-term political commitment, starting from the larger context trying to understand the underlying dynamics that lead to these trafficking practices. The previous presentation by Maya Mynster Christensen explained this very clearly. I think, that is the main challenge we are faced with here today. Thank you very much.

Policy Recommendations:

- Trafficking should be approached from a multi-dimensional strategy, not only focusing on it as a security threat.
- Every response to trafficking should go beyond security and have a long-term political commitment and, in addition to the tackling of different trafficking activities, invest in the strengthening of state capacity to impose the rule of law and in socio-political development.

Undocumented Migrants in West Africa, Christian Vium

Screening of Christian Vium and Janus Metz’s film *Clandestine (Everntyrrerne)* and photos from Vium’s work with Undocumented migrants in West Africa.

Christian Vium is post. Doc, Aarhus University, Anthropologist, Photographer, Documentarian, Denmark.

I will show a clip of a film mixed with images that I hope will provide a good overview of my work on undocumented migration. By undocumented, I mean primarily people who travel up through the Sahara from West Africa – Mali, Senegal and Mauritania – into Europe.

This is a picture ① taken on the back of a four-wheel drive somewhere not too far from the Nigerian border in the Sahara. It captures the core of my interest in this research: What makes young men undertake this long and very perilous journey which, for many, results in death? These boys have left behind their families and are travelling, also symbolically and metaphorically, into the unknown. They do not know what is ahead. They know that there are dangers waiting, but they do not know exactly how they will materialise. That is the point of departure.

Now I would like to show you a clip from my movie that, in a way, summarises the work that I have been doing. It will give you an idea of the journey itself.

FILM CLIP

There are many more details that were not brought up in this film clip, but it gives an idea of my research. The focus in this project was to give an idea of young men, from their late teens and onwards, who travel in groups or alone – like this boy, who is





pictured here in a village in north western Mali, in the Kayes region. It is the evening before his journey and he is going through what is going to happen. He is praying, preparing himself to depart from his family and go on this journey. The family has invested a lot of money in his journey, it is not just an adventure. These young men call themselves ‘adventurers’, but it is not just about curiosity or exciting stuff. It is also about supporting the family. To most of you this is perhaps common knowledge, but I think it is sometimes forgotten that it is not individuals that are travelling; it is actually individuals on behalf of whole families. They travel to support their families. To me, maybe this sounds naïve, it is a very heroic journey. It is very thought-provoking that these men are actually willing to sacrifice themselves. I followed them, after their arrival in Paris, for several years and saw how they sacrifice,


in my view, their lives for their families. I will get back to this.

This is a picture ② from the village. Ironically, the young men are watching *Mission Impossible* before leaving. They discuss why they are going and their reasons for leaving. They say: “all we can do here is farming or we can repair houses. This is not a life for us. We want to go”. In these villages there is an imperative to travel. It is not something that just a few people do. In the months leading up to my first arrival in the village I have been working in, there were 70 men out of a population of 1,000 who had left.

This picture ③ was taken in 2006. These are the fathers, praying in the mosque for their sons.

The boys travel in these cars. They have to change along the way and pay new drivers and new traffickers on the route into the Sahara.





This photo ④ was taken in the border city of Inhalid, located on the border with Algeria. This was not that far into the journey, but this boy was not going to continue. He felt that it was going to be too dangerous and he had already used too much money. He was contemplating whether to continue, knowing that he could carry on or he could turn back and, in his opinion, save his life. He chose to turn back, but he told me that he would have to face his family and that his younger brothers would laugh at him because he would now have to ask them for money. He was already financed by the family to go to Europe and support them and it was very shameful for him to turn back. Still, he felt that he did not have the courage to move on.

I will now go from imagination of the journey to the city of Nouadhibou in north-western Mauritania. I think Helené Lackenbauer mentioned this as a port of departure for the Canary Islands. It was, at that time, but now it has shifted more towards Lampedusa and Malta. There are still people landing in the Canaries, but not that many. At this time, it was like Lampedusa is right now. It was however a much longer and more dangerous journey. The boats were much smaller and were not made for seafaring.

This photo ⑤ was taken in the morning. In the centre, the boat is being loaded and people are getting ready to sail. This next picture is from a detention centre in Nouadhibou, which was ironically





dubbed “Little Guantanamo”. It was a school that had been turned into a detention centre because, at that time, there were so many people being caught by the coastguards. The school was transformed into a holding centre for these people, who were waiting to be sent back.

It was this young man’s ⑥ third attempt at arriving in the Canary Islands. It was also his third time of being picked up by the Mauritanian coastguard. He planned to go again, he had two kids back home and a wife that he needed to support. The minute he got the chance, he would do the same thing all over again. It is not a safe journey, as illustrated in Lampedusa just recently. These boats are very small,

they are fishermen’s boats. This man was drifting for nine days, because of an engine problem, until the boat got picked up. There were 17 in the boat and not all of them came back. Yet, he was still prepared to go again.

Let us turn now to the *Promised Land*, in this case Paris ⑦. In this image, the Eiffel Tower looks like a lighthouse. A lighthouse is supposed to keep people away from the coast and make sure they do not navigate into it, yet here it is a kind of magnet. For obvious reasons Paris is the place to go for West Africans. The language is not an issue and the colonial ties make it easier to find a job. The people I have followed, since 2006 now, have been com-



ing and going in north-eastern Paris, in a so-called “Foyer de travailleurs migrants”. It is a house that was initially built for working migrants, but now is occupied by undocumented people. Half of the 500 people, who were living in that house at this time, were undocumented. They try to get by and find all kinds of manual work; in the construction business, in restoration, or as workers in the basements of restaurants for example.

It is not really the end of the journey when you have crossed the Mediterranean. Even if you survive the boat trip, you arrive in a new situation where you face constant pressures and have to dodge the authorities. The minute you start sending back money, you need to continue doing it. The young men do not earn that much money. A colleague of mine, who works in Italy, told me that the migrants working in the Italian supermarkets are not paid. They only receive the tips they get from packing the groceries for people. When they are thirsty, they have to buy the water from the shop. It is a desperate situation, to put it mildly.

It makes sense for these boys to move. When they start off, they have all these dreams. They also have a family who supports them and who really believes that they can make a living for them. Perhaps they live in a drought prone area, there are problems with the harvest and there are no employment opportunities in the capital cities either. Even though, in the end, the boys do not make a lot of money in Europe, they still manage to support their families back home. The journey was worth it. Some of them will say: “Yes, economically, I can support my family. On a personal level, if I had known this was what I was travelling towards, I would never have come”. This is something I have heard many times. Nevertheless, your family have supported your journey there and now you are in Europe and cannot go back and forth because you have no papers. You are there and you have to start to work and send back money.

It is not just a small nuclear family of two kids that these boys support. A lot of these guys pay the taxes for their fathers in their home country and form an integral part of the economy for entire villages. In a country like Mali, the remittances are part of the national economy. Some of my interviewees, called their situation a prison. Others, like the one in ‘Little Guantanamo’, contemplated trying to go again.

I have been working with these men since 2006. I have not followed them all the way, from the village to Europe, because it takes several years for most of them to make the journey. It is not something you can do in two weeks. On the way you are likely to get robbed. If you survive the desert, you are stopped and have to pay another smuggler who cheats you and you lose all your money and are forced to wait and work in Libya or Morocco. Then you get detained and sent back to the border in the desert. From there, you can try to work your way back. We always see the images of the crossings in the Mediterranean, but it is such a long journey before that.

The ambition with this project was to illustrate that for these men, this journey has existential consequences. When you undertake a journey like they do – and you experience that when you meet the world you are being literally stripped naked and your dignity is challenged – it is a very profound experience. In Paris they are faced with another system. For example there is the ‘Sans-Papiers’ which is a kind of political movement, in which migrants are organised and have the capacity to exert political pressure. The people I worked with are not in that position. They have not been to school and they are not connected to influential people. It is a brutal and in many ways violent journey for them.

Thank you.

Small Arms panel

Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Africa: Monitoring, Diagnosis and Response, James Bevan

James Bevan is Director of Conflict Armament Research, weapon specialist and conflict analyst.

To start with, I will give you some idea of who I am. From 2002 to 2008, I served with the Small Arms Survey. During the 2010–2011 civil war, I headed the UN Sanctions Monitoring Group on Côte d'Ivoire. Now I represent Conflict Armament Research, a UK-based organisation, which specialises almost entirely on tracking conventional weapons, not just small arms, in active armed conflicts. When I say tracking, I mean that we get onto the ground and physically document weapons and ammunition in situ. We interview their users, suppliers and intermediaries. We launch investigations to identify the transfer history of the weapons concerned – from production through the supply chain to their eventual users in an armed conflict. I hope this presentation today will give you a pretty good indication of the value of this type of work.

This is a general presentation, because I know there are a lot of you in this room who may be new to the field of small arms and light weapons.

In terms of objectives, I am going to begin with a broad overview of proliferation trends in Africa. What are the primary transfer dynamics? Where are these weapons coming from? Who is supplying them? I then want to cast the spotlight on diversion by African governments, which, from our perspective, is arguably the primary catalyst of most African conflicts today. Finally, I want to explore our, the international community's, current approaches to understanding this issue and how we might, I probably should say must, improve our approaches.

In terms of dynamics, the most important thing to stress is that most of the weapons that we will encounter in a contemporary armed conflict or in a post-conflict African country have passed through the stockpiles of an African government. There is very little direct illicit or illegal supply from outside the continent. The kind of lord-of-war style arms dealers, who delivered arms and ammunition by air

to the RUF or to Charles Taylor's causes; they are not really a factor today.

Today's conflicts are very different. Although there are, as we heard this morning, resources at stake, we are not seeing the major resource wars that we saw in the 1990s. Most of the rebel forces in Africa are not cash rich. In fact, even when we look back at the wars, particularly in West Africa in the 1990s, most of the major arms traffickers supplied arms to neighbouring governments like Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. It was these governments themselves that then orchestrated the transfers into the conflict. Keep this in mind as I go through the presentation, because it all comes back to this.

I will now give you some idea of the dynamics of proliferation in detail. To do that, I am going to take one country and we will focus on what is going on inside there. I have picked South Sudan. It could be anyone of a number of states. The situation is much the same in Darfur, Central African Republic, Eastern Congo or Somalia. First of all, this is a new state that has only been independent since 2011. Like many post-conflict African states, the country is awash with military weapons left over from two civil wars. These weapons are probably primarily those that were supplied either by Khartoum – North Sudan now – to various factions, including ethnic militias during the civil wars, or were supplied to the SPLA, which is now the government of South Sudan, during the conflict. These came from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and a host of other countries. These are legacy weapons and they are all over the country. The distribution is however not even, as is the case in many countries. Since the end of the civil war, effectively since 2005, fairly large parts of the country have stabilised, but other parts of the country remain critically insecure. That is where we see very high concentrations of weapons in the hands of civilians. These are older weapons, primarily left over from the civil war, still in the civilian population.

The weapon distribution around the country looks a bit like this: There are large volumes of weapons acquired by civilians and retained, particularly in unstable border regions of the country, and notably in areas in the interior of the country

where conflict persists, sometimes quite aggressively, primarily along ethnic fault lines.

That is the backdrop, or the baseline. The legacy weapons are left over from either past conflicts or from wars in neighbouring states or regional wars. That is the grey reality of a number of African states, even relatively stable states like Kenya, Uganda or Ethiopia. Significant sections of the civilian population remain armed with military weapons.

In this case a second dynamic comes into play when states exacerbate existing and often violent fault lines, ethnic fault lines in neighbouring states. These marks on the map, are the primary supply routes for weapons supplied by Khartoum to rebel forces operating against the government in South Sudan in the last few years. This is very common. In the past three years alone we have seen this happening in Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Chad, Eastern Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal and Somalia – state supplies to non-state forces with the objective of destabilising neighbouring or regional states.

A third dynamic that is also common in many African states is kind of responsive: the national government itself attempts to bolster threatened groups and communities in its own territory by supplying weapons from the national arsenal. State agents in South Sudan have supplied these weapons and ammunition to Nuer communities in Jonglei state, and also to Toposa groups in the south-east of the country who are in conflict with communities along the Kenyan and Ugandan borders. This dynamic actually goes further, because the government of South Sudan also retaliates by supplying insurgent groups operating in the north, operating in Sudan. Moreover, Kenyan and Ugandan state agents supply weapons to communities along the border with South Sudan to protect them from being attacked by Toposa and Didinga communities in South Sudan. In addition, they create paramilitary forces which are essentially civilians armed with military weapons over which there is very little government control.

If you view this at a regional level, you find this complex web of intermeshing arms transfer dynamics. As one state party supplies arms to destabilise another, or to support communities along the border, other state parties respond either by retaliating or by trying to bolster their own communities. All of this involves the supply of weapons.

Our bread-and-butter job is to go in a little deeper and explore the origins and types of weapons involved. First of all, we have a lot of old weapons,

which are constantly being redistributed around the civilian population and that responds to localised threats. We have weapons which leak from national stockpiles. Poorly paid soldiers and members of the police force frequently sell, or even rent out, weapons because of the cash value in it. Generally this is kind of self-contained and we are looking at pretty old weapons that were already in the national stockpile or already in the hands of civilians.

When we get on the ground in an active armed conflict, we find that the weapons are often new. These are brand new Chinese manufactured, 5.56 mm CQ assault rifles supplied by Khartoum to South Sudanese rebels. I am just going to give you a few snapshots here: Chinese Type 80 general purpose machine guns, also brand new. Since we are documenting these weapons on the ground, we are starting to get a much clearer picture of the types and origins of the weapons that are in circulation. We are talking about tens of thousands of weapons that we are documenting. This means we have got a pretty representative sample size.

In some regions of Africa, as much as 50 per cent of the weapons on the illicit market have been manufactured within the last five years. Increasingly they are Chinese, Iranian or they are being manufactured by states such as Sudan itself, which means that we have in-region manufacturing. In some regions, Chinese manufactured weapons comprise as much as 90 per cent of all the illicit weapons that are documented. The important thing to stress is that none of these transfers are reported to our normal reporting mechanisms like the UN Commercial Trade Statistics Database, national reports to the UN Programme of Action or the UN Register of Conventional Weapons. They are not reported. This is invisible. They are almost exclusively Soviet calibre weapons, from former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and alliance states. You do not tend to find new Western European weapons anymore. That market is gone.

All this means that, from a Western perspective, the arms trade into Africa is moving ever further from the orbit of our control. We are no longer in control of this, because it is not our weapons. Our export control agencies cannot deal with this problem, because they are not coming from our countries. Everything has gone east. In terms of supply, most of these weapons are coming through African governments in the region. We are nevertheless increasingly seeing certain African governments operating almost as regional redistribution hubs pur-

chasing foreign weapons, largely from countries like China, and supplying them not only to non-state actors in their own countries but further and further afield. In some cases this goes a long, long way. We have for example documented Sudanese manufactured weapons in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Darfur, Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and also Syria. We have documented Chinese weapons coming out of the same country. This is not Southern Sudan, this is Sudan, Khartoum. Tens of thousands of weapons and ammunition, all post-2002 manufacture, most of them produced in the past three years.

There are similar problems with Eritrea supplying groups in Somalia and Ethiopia, Rwanda supplying the M23 in Eastern Congo and Burkina Faso supporting the former *Forces nouvelles* rebel forces in Côte d'Ivoire. Effectively we have got an arch of instability all across that region. Most of the weapons are going in there, coming through regional governments and going out to non-state forces.

To conclude, the prevalence of new weapons and these transfers suggest that some states import weapons explicitly to supply rebel and insurgent forces. Whereas we might previously have expected states to supply rebel forces with old weapons that they do not need anymore, we now find weapons in the hands of rebel forces dating from as late as 2010 - 2011. That means they have all been manufactured legally, then legally transferred to an African government, and finally supplied to rebel forces in a neighbouring state within two years of being manufactured. Here is an example of this: Chinese ammunition manufactured in 2008, transferred into the region sometime after 2008, and now already in the hands of rebel forces.

What is the point of this? Basically, our current monitoring capacity, as an international community and experts working in this field, is weak. We do not have enough people on the ground doing this kind of work. Most conflicts are like black boxes: you ask where the weapons are coming from, but nobody is on the ground, so you cannot tell. They are not reported in legal trade. We need to start unpacking this. The problem is that this leads to a lot of policymaking, which effectively 'floats' above the reality on the ground, with people continually coming up with the same problems: it is porous borders and it is the recirculation of old weapons. It is very clear this is not the problem. Every border is porous. If you continue supplying weapons into a conflict, this is what happens.

Finally, some brief notes on what we do and the way forward. The only way we can get around this is to put people on the ground, because we need to diagnose the problem before we can respond to it effectively. What we are doing with EU funding, is putting in place something called iTrace. What we do is that we take all of our data on these weapons and ammunition and put it in a format suitable to policy makers, so they can see what is happening and can map it. We will basically put together a major information management system, but what you will see is a free access map where all these weapons and ammunition are, by individual item. If we find one round of ammunition, you will find it on there. It will tell you exactly who was using it. You can click on it, and "find similar" so you can map between regions. When we have the information you can plot its exact route. I am talking about tens of thousands of entries.

Because this trade has moved so far out of the orbit of our control, the only thing that is left for us to do now is to put pressure on non-reporting states by showing them where their weapons are. In fact, if we cannot achieve an international political consensus on solving these problems, then we have to do it by naming and shaming. I think that is the most powerful thing we have in our toolkit. Thank you very much.

Policy Recommendations:

- States and international organisations enhance their funding of on-the-ground investigations to identify and track conflict weapons.
- UN agencies, notably DPKO, install the required technical expertise and resources within peace-keeping operations to identify and track conflict weapons.

Maritime Trafficking and the African Coastline: Threats, Challenges and Policy Options, Hugh Griffiths

Hugh Griffiths is Head of the Countering Illicit Trafficking-Mechanism Assessment Projects (CIT-MAP), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden.

We were asked today by the convention organisers to present empirical examples, but above all to lift examples to the broader perspectives of threats and challenges to African peace and security. In order to do this, my presentation will focus on maritime

trafficking, narcotics and other illicit maritime activity along Africa's coastline, as a cross-cutting issue. The budgets that are stove piped into small arms and light weapons, military equipment, the work that has been done to counter illicit narcotics trafficking, the work that should be done on, for example, saving lives of these people who are dying unnecessarily at sea in large numbers - much to Europe's shame, the dumping of illegal, hazardous waste primarily by European companies off Africa's coast, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing – all of these destabilising flows or illicit activities are about maritime. To me, this goes to the heart of everything that we are looking at.

At SIPRI, the projects that I work on together with others focus on transportation. This is really interesting when we are talking about clandestine, not necessarily illicit as James pointed out, activities. They are not always illegal, but they are hidden. I work from Stockholm, and not in the field. A frequent question is therefore: where did you get the information from? One really good source is when illicit or destabilising or prohibited or banned commodities are transported. The production or the sale of these commodities is often confidential or hidden and the movement, by aircraft or ships, of the finished product to the market, if you have access to the traces of this – including ship satellites, AIS, the automatic indicator signal for vessels, flight records, flight planning – there is a lot you can see. Since very few people have access to this data, most of us are blind to what happens on the sea or in the air. There are documents, there is insurance, there are all these different things that provide sources of information and tell us what is going on.

The first case I am going to look at today is a ship, I will call it ship X. I am mentioning it because it is very recent. We got information in mid-September that X was one of three ships bought by Syrian nationals. We are in Sweden, but as far as I am concerned Africa's coastline, to use the tired cliché, is globalisation. What happened was that some Syrian nationals flew to Estonia to collect these three ships, of which X was one. The other name that we want to remember apart from X is ship Y. The last owner of X and Y was a Swedish company in Blekinge, in the southern part of Sweden. The last owner of the third ship, ship Z, was a Norwegian company. These ships were thus Scandinavian vessels until very recently. They were all badly kept and not very safe. The Syrians turned up in Estonia and promptly registered the vessels under a new

name and under a Sierra Leonean flag of convenience. Our research shows this is a high risk registry. If you look at all the data on all the trafficking or destabilising movements by sea, when things are not being shipped by container, or in other words, when the captain and crew or the ship's officers are complicit, then it is these kinds of old vessels – under a flag of convenience with dodgy registries operated off-shore – which my colleague Lawrence Dermody is doing some really interesting research on.

I will show you a video of X and Y, because this is illicit flows in action. As you can see, it is the end of September. We were actually looking at this vessel before the drug seizure was made. *Video of the drug seizure*. The Spanish customs officers found 16 tons of hashish, which according to the media was worth 97 million Euros at street value.

I will now show you the voyage of X. My colleague, Lawrence Dermody, uses AIS data, the automatic indicator signals from ships, and codes it into Google Earth. Providing they are not switched off, which is often an indicator of something clandestine, we can see where they are at any one time. This is the voyage of X until the point it was interdicted by the Spanish and taken to the Spanish port of Almeria. It set out from Tallin, sailed around Europe, got busted around about here and pulled into the port here. What we are interested in however, is the movement here.

Here is the anomaly. Even though the ship had told us on the Saturday that it was destined for Alexandria, for some reason on the Saturday morning it sailed out into the Middle of the Atlantic, out of Moroccan territorial waters. Between these two points, we have no AIS reading off the ship, and this is the part we are really interested in.

We have access to an informal network in Spain and we were able to access the log of X's captain. The Spanish authorities thought he was new to drug trafficking because he kept a record of the course he plotted, which you can see here. That is Casablanca, that is the turn out, this is the route he plotted to here, and that is roughly the point where you see the AIS signal from before.

There was also the other vessel called Y. The same Syrian interests who purchased X purchased Y. It was the same type of ship, same age of ship and the same concealed cargo space. There was an overhang under which you could hide up to about 30 kilos of hash that you would not be able to see if you were looking from straight above. It was the same modus operandi with the Sierra Leonean flag

of convenience. Ship Y's voyage was however in late July and early August as opposed to September 2013. It was nevertheless exactly the same route. This is the route, but there is a big difference. Y sails from Tallin through the channel, like X will do. It takes the Casablanca turn and then continues, as the ship X was supposed to do, towards Alexandria. We will focus on the Casablanca turn again, because Y does the same thing as X. For me it is very interesting, Y's anomaly was actually much larger than X's anomaly in terms of distance and time. In fact, there was a higher probability that this ship was picking up a very large quantity of, for instance, cannabis than X. X was busted for drugs.

This ship tends to sail at about nine knots and here it is sailing under normal speed, coming out of Casablanca. It is a relatively normal speed and we are just giving you the distance reading: 81 kilometres in approximately less than 5 hours. Then from here to here is only 13 kilometres but that takes 12 hours. The anomaly is bigger. Y was never stopped by Spanish customs, probably because they did not have the intelligence on these three vessels at that point of time. These examples hopefully illustrated something which I think you can easily grasp and understand.

We collaborate with different organisations and this is another platform, built by a company called Windward, which actually plots anomalies. They found another vessel, after we had given them the information we had on our ships. This cargo vessel W had a Panamanian flag and Syran owners. It made the same Casablanca turn and was not busted either.

To conclude, there is so much happening in the Mediterranean Sea right now. It is all fuelled by conflict, insecurity and above all money. Large numbers of people are dying and you have seen how the European Union and the Italian authorities do not seem to be able to pick up these economic migrants before they drown. It is actually worse with the drug trafficking, because there is very little genuine information sharing most of the time.

I have focused a lot on North Africa and I have been talking about narcotics instead of small arms and light weapons. I will now swing it back into military equipment and talk about the background. We mapped all the open source reports and we submitted freedom of information requests related to illicit, trafficked, destabilising or sanctioning prohibited military equipment transfers, illicit narcotics transfers, and banned dual-use goods. So for that

the main destinations are Iran and North Korea. We looked at all the incidents that have been documented in the last 20 years and at all the ships that have been transporting them, which had not been done before. What is relevant to Africa's coastline and security, is that the seizure rate for military equipment and dual-use goods was substantially lower than the seizure rate for narcotics. This is because narcotics are illegal all the time. As James Bevan pointed out earlier, a lot of the small arms and light weapons in circulation are not illegal. They are not illicit and might only become illegal once they are transferred from Khartoum to Darfur. At least they are illicit, but nothing much happens.

The situation is actually much worse when you remove all the reports that relate to Iranian or North Korean origin or destination of military equipment and dual-use goods. That is really because the intelligence and the political interest is all focused on Iran and North Korea. That is where you get seizures and that is when it starts looking like some kind of law enforcement operation. A lot of intelligence and a lot of resources are put into that. Take them away and most of the embargo supplied to Africa, you have got very little. The most obvious and glaringly terrible case relates to Somalia, where there is really no governance over the maritime domain at all. NATO and the EU have had very significant counter piracy missions going on for the last few years, but they have refused to get involved in interdicting boats transporting arms to Somalia. The situation has become so bad that esteemed colleagues, people who I reckon James Bevan knows well, have taken to writing articles in *Le Monde* when they are not working for the UN Sanctions Panels, to complain about the fact that despite all these fantastic intelligence resources on what is aboard these ships, no action has been taken to stop arms flows, just to protect rich companies from the threat of piracy. That was my last example.

To summarise and to try to combine narcotics and arms within this African context and within the framework of the organisers, you can safely say that judging by the reports that we have collated over the last 20 years, very few illicit or destabilising military equipment transfers by sea to Africa have been subject to interception or interdiction by member states. At best, it is the panel's reporting after the event. In my opinion, very little is going on in the way of improving governance. A huge amount is however happening and very few people see it because, for a start, you need to pay an expen-

sive subscription to Lloyds, and then you have to know what you are looking for. It is a lot of money involved.

Policy Recommendations:

- For both European security and African security, European policy-makers should engage in a mapping exercise to better understand how the lack of effective maritime monitoring and law enforcement is affecting their development and security goals, both in Africa, the Middle East and Europe itself.
- European policy-makers should get an independent assessment on levels of coordination and effectiveness of maritime monitoring and interdiction in the Mediterranean as it pertains to flows of illicit narcotics and drugs that are transported via sea. This could also take into account the monitoring of the vessels and activities of transnational organised crime groups currently exploiting undocumented migrants' aspirations to reach EU member states in what are generally unsafe and overcrowded vessels. Levels of coordination and effectiveness between EU member states could then be improved.

Diversion of Weapons and Ammunition in Africa: Peace Operations as a Contributing Factor, Eric G. Berman

Eric G. Berman is Managing Director of Small Arms Survey, Switzerland

I am here to talk about the diversion of weapons and ammunition within peace operations. It is something that is not necessarily of the same significance as that James Bevan and Hugh Griffiths talked about. It is however something that exists and it is something that needs to be looked at more.

I am the managing director of the Small Arms Survey, a research institute based in Geneva, Switzerland. We conduct evidence-based research and analysis to allow governments to be able to establish better policies and create better programmes that are more effective in countering arms proliferation and in reducing incidents of armed violence. We are made up of 25 people in Geneva and another 15 to 20 consultants. We also work a lot with partners. The research that I will present today was always a topic of interest for us, but came about when SIPRI gave us some space and asked us to contribute and present to one of their sessions in Addis Ababa.

This presentation will focus on three different issues. One, I will give you some examples of three UN and AU peacekeeping missions on a continent in which large-scale diversion has occurred. Then I am going to relate that to how it fits into the bigger picture. After that, I will talk about the cultural reporting and the acceptance of the status quo. That is what we really want you to go away with, that the status quo does not help anybody. It is in nobody's interest to allow what is happening. Many policy-makers and practitioners may think to themselves: "Peacekeepers operate in difficult neighbourhoods. Of course there are going to be problems..." I hope as a result of this intervention that you will not think in those terms.

I am now going to focus on Sierra Leone; not the ECOWAS mission that was there in the late 1990s, but I will start with the UN mission in 2000. I will also talk about Sudan: both AMIS and UNAMID. There are other interventions that have occurred there; like UNMIS and UNMISS, but I will not consider them in this presentation. I will then talk about Somalia and AMISOM.

This [pointing to a map of Sierra Leone on a screen] is Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front. This is a well-known case and we have already had an intervention about Sierra Leone today when Maya Christensen talked about former combatants and what they are doing these days. In 2000, just as it switched from the ECOWAS mission to the UN mission, there was a battalion from Guinea that crossed into Sierra Leone to report for duty and be blue-hatted for the new UN mission. Just as they crossed, they lost all of their weapons. One of the problems with this was that they had all the ammunition in the reconnaissance convoy, just at the very front of the deployment. This is not standard military practice and is very unusual. They lost some 2 tons of ammunition, 500 weapons, and dozens of mortars and machine guns. The UN found this to be so egregious that even the Secretary-General at the time asked if it was a commercial transaction. This was just within weeks of this new mission. It was not an auspicious beginning.

Let us fast-forward to May 2000. Do you remember the hostage crisis where there were Kenyans being held in Makeni and Magburaka? The force commander sends out a battalion of Zambians and they head out from Freetown, go to Lunsar, and then on the way to Makeni they are stopped and the Revolutionary United Front takes all their weapons. The contingent consisted of 500 – 600 men and

they lost everything; hundreds of automatic rifles, all their ammunition and also light weapons.

A lot is known about what happened here, but less well known is what happened in Kailahun. At the same time as the Kenyans were detained in the two DDR centres there were two companies from India that were essentially not allowed to leave where their deployment was. In July, there was an operation to rescue them and they were indeed rescued. There were no casualties amongst the peacekeepers, but they left behind armoured vehicles and some weapons. The focus in the international press was on the success of this mission. In one way it was successful and the armoured vehicles that were taken were returned, but without their machine guns and without any of the ammunition that had been inside.

We are moving forward to 2007. In 2004, the African Union deployed into Darfur because of the humanitarian crisis. In September 2007, a team site was completely overrun in Haskanita in North Darfur. It resulted in more than a dozen casualties, which became the public focus. Nobody focused on what it meant for an entire team site to be overrun – including the loss of so much ammunition and area-defence weapons.

The hybrid mission called UNAMID came in and in April 2008, four months into the operation, a convoy of Chinese weapons, which was there to resupply the Chinese Engineer Battalion in Darfur, is seized together with a 20-foot container, on the way from Port Sudan to Nyala. This was 12 tons of ammunition or some 600 thousand rounds of ammunition that went missing in that one instance. The Chinese were not implicated for being involved in anything that was problematic, but the problem was that it was an inside job, because the group that came to attack the convoy knew exactly what they wanted to get. They got the container that had the ammunition. It was a resupply line. They had to do it from Port Sudan and go across a vast area very far area, in a logistically challenged terrain, to get to where the troops were.

This incident was big enough to make it into the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council. The question, however, is: How many times does this type of thing happen when we do not hear about it?

My third example occurred in March 2010. These are not the only three instances here, I only want to give you a flavour. In this case, 60 infantry troops were stopped in Southern Darfur. What

would you think would be the amount of ammunition that they lost when they had their weapons seized? ... about 14,000 rounds. This is in part because when you are on patrol you sometimes bring four, five or six magazines with you. It adds up quickly.

Let us go to AMISOM. In October 2011, outside of Mogadishu in Daynile, over 100 men were reportedly killed in hostile action. It was the largest number of peacekeepers killed in hostile action since I have been following it – that means for 15-20 years. Essentially an entire company was killed and maybe even a number of people who went in to try to rescue them. It was an incident that we cannot get good information about, because the amount of casualties on that mission is an incredibly delicate topic. For Burundians, it was a very sensitive matter to have so many people killed on one day.

How does this fit into the bigger picture? These are not isolated events. These are not individuals or small patrols that came under attack and lost weapons. These are incidents in which formed units have lost weapons – that means from a platoon, to a company, to a battalion. These are just the documented cases, much of what occurs is undocumented.

We know about the problem of weapons that are recovered through civilian arms recovery and DDR. We know that there is recirculation that occurs. It is well-known that the UN does not – in most cases – do a good job of controlling these weapons. What I want to focus on is the fact that there are a lot of other weapons that circulate, caches of weapons, sometimes quite large. If you ask the UN, they say: "Oh, yes of course, it went to a container and the contingent commander knows, the sector commander knows, the force commander knows, everything is under control". It just does not work that way. We all know that. Here is an example in the DRC in 2004, the troops deployed are Pakistani or Indian. This example of weapons that have been captured is from Somalia. To give you an idea of the scope; because of the embargo, the Ugandans that are training the new Somali national army are able to arm 850 men with captured ammunition; i.e. 4-5 battalions with captured ammunition. This is not small. This was just one example.

What can we do and why do we have this? What is the problem that we are facing? The photo on the screen of three office workers holding fire extinguishers is not actually one of UN staff members, but I use this because of the idea of firefighting. If you spend time at DPKO's offices at the UN Head-

quarters in New York, you would know that they are always putting-out fires, there is always some crisis in the dozen-plus missions that they have. It is hard for them to focus on this because they are pulled in many different directions. There is also the human nature of cleaning up after yourself, and trying not to have bad news become public. When something happens because of a lack of professionalism, there is self-interest in not reporting it or reporting it up the chain, but hoping that you can resolve it yourself. There is also the very real concern about “too big to fail”. We have 97,000 UN peacekeepers right now from 117 countries. Anybody have an idea of the top three peacekeepers and what percentage that makes? Almost 25 % of the 97,000 come from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. If you add Ethiopia and Nigeria, you come up to more than a third. If you then add Ghana, Jordan, Nepal, Rwanda, and Senegal you come up to over 50 %. It is not possible to go to Cyprus, for example, and say: “Can you go and give us a brigade, because we have an underperforming contributor of troops here.” There is a lack of willingness to engage and to take contributing countries to task.

This document is from FOI and it shows you what the authorised strength of AU missions are and then what the deployed strength is. You can see the many cases, we are talking about an 8-10,000 difference; it is the same thing for the UN, and the same thing for ECOWAS. There is a real problem in terms of being able to deploy. When you are being asked to go and get another battalion, another brigade, to then tell somebody that these guys who were there really should be replaced is very hard. We have a real problem generating the information that we need to document this further. I hope this has given you a little feel of the nature of the problem. I look forward to discussing this further. Thanks.

Policy recommendations

Troop-contributing countries in peace operations lose more arms and ammunition than is commonly perceived.

- Reporting practices and existing checks and balances to address this problem can be improved.
- Hoping the problem will go away on its own is a poor policy option to pursue.

Obstacles to Small Arms Control in the Gambia, Niklas Hultin

Niklas Hultin is Research Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Virginia, USA; Research Associate, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, UK

The presentation described the findings of an ongoing 15 month research project on small arms control in the Gambia. The project is premised on the idea that the acceptance of the idea of state as the sole authority responsible for regulating small arms use and ownership is socially variable. Thus, the extent to which a given group accepts this premise is a social scientific question and the answer to this question, which thus might be different for different social groups, has implications for current small arms control initiatives in West Africa. It was reported, however, that the research could not be completed as envisioned due to political difficulties in the Gambia. Nonetheless, based on the research components that were completed (e.g. interviews with stakeholders) several obstacles to effective small arms control were identified. These obstacles belong to four different, though interlinked, categories. Drawing on a report by Small Arms Survey, the first three categories are 1) lack of funding and equipment; 2) lack of human/capacity training; and 3) lack of political will. To this list, the presentation added 4) lack of social legitimacy.

1. Lack of funding/equipment: The presentation highlighted disagreement between different stakeholders over the allocation of already meager resources (ECOWAS and the Government of the Gambia over the funding of a National Small Arms Bureau, for instance). In addition, whatever resources are allocated to small arms control (e.g. maintaining a registry of gun licenses) is concentrated in Banjul, the capital. This situation potentially disincentivises citizens from following Gambian registration requirements.
2. Lack of human capacity/training: The presentation noted that this applied both to state actors and civilians and is evidenced in inadequate record keeping and inconsistent understanding of applicable regulation.
3. Lack of political will: The presentation noted reports that that security actors routinely undermine or circumvent import/export regulations governing small arms. More generally, NGOs

reported a lack of follow-through on the part of the state where small arms control is concerned.

4. Lack of social legitimacy: The presentation reported this phenomenon for specific populations. Urban, socio-economically disadvantaged, young men, for example, are generally less likely than other populations to accept the premise that the Government of the Gambia should be the sole authority to regulate small arms. These men suggested that they wanted guns to protect themselves and showed little faith in the Gambian police force to protect them from crime. Other populations, by contrast, were broadly supportive of the government's efforts even if these posed an inconvenience (hunters, for example).

Policy recommendations:

- Small arms control requires an approach that empowers the appropriate institutions both legally (e.g. by making sure customs have the right to inspect imports and exports) and practically (by making sure adequate resources are available).
- Institutional reforms should be undertaken to increase the legitimacy and competency of the police force to make gun ownership seem less necessary.
- Local stakeholders, especially traditional practitioners (e.g. hunters), should be included in any discussion of small arms control as they are respected members of the community with a traditional role in local security.

Illicit Goods panel

Drug Related Organised Crime as a Driving Force to Disrupt States in Africa, Stewe Alm

Stewe Alm is Senior Strategic Analyst, Swedish National Bureau of Investigation, Sweden.

My name is Stewe Alm and I am a senior strategic analyst at the National Bureau of Investigation. This means that I am mainly responsible for international matters in relation to our national intelligence work at the National Bureau of Investigation. What I will talk about today relates to what you call the “guarding of the environment” – what takes place around us – since we are not directly affected by the drug trade in the context which I will tell you about now. In most cases, we are only the end recipient of this. It is nevertheless really important that we have the full picture. At the National Intelligence Unit, this is our task. We are also tasked to predict what will take place in the future and what takes place today around us.

Many interventions today are related to money. I perceive money as the basic theme that connects the different presentations given here today. We discuss economic conditions for people that will end up as refugees on the boats on the way to the Mediterranean. We talk about buying guns. There is some kind of economic power behind all this. I would argue that one of the most important driving forces, or the economic fundament, for what takes place in Africa relates to money and also the drug trade. It is perhaps a strong argument, but because so much money is involved in the drug trade and in drug production today, organised criminality would not survive without this source of economic resources.

These are some general observations about organised crime involvement when it comes to international drug trade and production. The first is about how drug related, organised criminals criminality use their economic strength to corrupt or control weak and vulnerable states. This is very much relevant when it comes to West Africa. What we have seen in terms of cocaine trafficking and the involvement and the influence of all the activities from the Latin American cocaine traders into Western Africa is that before these organised crime groups began to pay attention to West Africa, the situation was

quite different. Now, however, it has worsened and is definitely the driving force behind the conflicts.

This is perhaps better expressed in the next bullet point. It is about how drug related organised crime establishes parallel societies that compete with the legal state and threaten government institutions. This is a good example from Mexico. The northern part of Mexico is more or less governed by organised crime groups; the cartels essentially own the economy. When you own the economy, you have the power in your hands because you can corrupt the society. If you also exert control over the national government institutions, you have a good chance to take over the rule and create your own legislation.

Looking at strategies of organised crime, the first point is to take over or to secure illegal activities. The next is that terrorist organisations gain control over the production part of the existing drug trade in order to finance their activities. The FARQ guerrilla group in Colombia and also the Taliban in Afghanistan would not have the strength or the political implication, if they had not had the money from the cocaine and the heroin traffic respectively, to buy the guns and set up their infrastructures. When it comes to the FARQ in South America, they have been there in alliance with the cocaine business. This means that they facilitate each other's existence.

Some terrorist organisations control the whole drug trade chain from production to distribution. Al Shabab in Somalia is an interesting example and equally so Hezbollah's activities in Africa. There is a large Lebanese population in West Africa. Al Shabab in Somalia is interesting because they are good strategists. They have built up the trade of Khat for instance. Until recently, it was under control in all European countries. They own these factories, and control this trade. In addition they have the control over other economic sources, such as piracy. We also have intelligence about them being involved in immigration since most Somalis pay something upon leaving Somalia. Putting this in the context of the strategy of organised crime groups - or in the context of those kinds of terrorist organisations with intentions on more political power - is interesting.

Drug related organised crime and dictators look for non-official islands for money and for sustained

power. This is a quite general scenario. It is generally not really seen on the surface, but this goes on in many, many countries. This relates to mafia structures and common agreements about staying in power and earning money. Many or most of the West African countries are involved in drug trading in one way or another. Cocaine forms the biggest part of the trade, which relates to the fact that Latin American organised crime groups have set up hubs for distribution in many of the West African countries. This particularly concerns Kap Verde and Guinea Bissau, but also Senegal, Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry. These countries are, as was expressed previously in several presentations, vulnerable, weak countries with weak institutional capacities. They are easily corrupted.

Looking at the drug related organised crime in West Africa, North West Africa is a more isolated hub with Moroccan organised crime trafficking in cannabis and cocaine. This very much relates to the maritime trafficking over these straits and over the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to European hubs.

When it comes to the recipient part on the European continent, the Netherlands and the Spanish harbours are most affected by this trade. However, alternative smuggling routes are always used because organised crime groups always analyse the situation very carefully. If they consider the risk is too high in one place, they move to another place and set up their logistics there.

The Sub-Saharan and West African trafficking in cocaine, which is linked to Latin American organised crime groups, has been facilitated by the Touaregs. This is interesting since the Touaregs, to a certain extent, earn their money for buying weapons and other things from the drug trade of cocaine northwards, towards the European continent. There the money made out of the drug trade facilitates the acquisition of weapons which in its turn has kept the conflict in Mali going.

The Sub-Saharan, West African hub Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Togo and Cameroun are also linked to Latin American and European organised crime groups. Recently, we have also had a report on the production side of this trade where the production of synthetic drugs, or methamphetamine in the first place, but also ecstasy, are set up in all these countries. If you create an environment in which organised crime groups are active and there is a drug trade, there is likely to be further establishment of drug production in the area.

Latin American organised crime groups; Co-

lumbian, Venezuelan and South Brazilian groups, work closely with similar European groups, and have established criminal hubs in Western African countries, such as Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry and Sierra Leone. This development is quite dramatic, because with money you can more or less corrupt all societies. How does organised crime affect states in West Africa? There is wide-spread corruption. The different strategies that the criminal organisations work with are, for example, bribing local individuals to ensure that that they are not disturbed in their activities or bribing local politicians and other decision makers in local authorities to make sure that the illicit activities are not disturbed. Higher placed politicians are of course also corrupted, for example the president in Guinea Bissau was killed because of these kinds of criminal activities.

Other strategies include threats and a systematic weakening and undermining of democratic, economic and political systems in the affected countries. On the other hand, another part of the organised crime strategy can be to make investments in favour of the state. This is more or less what the Hells Angels, for instance, used to do. They set up kindergartens for example, and in that way bribed the local authorities, or stirred up conflicts and promoted their own purposes.

Thank you.

Policy recommendations:

- In the planning of support programmes for developing countries, strategic risk analysis should be performed as part of a pilot study. Such analysis could cover the areas of crime that are considered relevant to the country or region.
- The purpose of this type of analysis is to prevent the ability of organised crime to undermine vital functions and mechanisms of decision-making in society.

Central Marginality: On Critical States and Cocaine Connections, Henrik Vigh

Henrik Vigh is Professor, Department of Anthropology, peace and conflict studies, transnational organised crime and migration, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

I would like to talk about central marginality and cocaine connections. It is much the same topic as Stewe Alm presented, but I will focus on a specific

case; Guinea Bissau. I will move across scale and start with a very specific view on the militia and its mobilisation and then move on to some more general comments on the development of Guinea Bissau and perhaps the sub-region as such. If there is time, I will also end up with some lessons learned.

I have been studying the Aguentas, following them through ethnographic fieldwork for the last 15 years. This is a young militia man in Bissau. We can learn a lot from a picture. He is obviously young and he is male. If we look a bit further we see that he is not fully uniformed; he is an irregular soldier as such, an unlawfully mobilised combatant. If we look a bit further we can see that he is wearing a somewhat odd type of shoe for fighting in the war. I do not know if you can see this, but he is wearing flip-flops. In Bissau that is called *pe di zinello*, a flip-flop foot. For these young men, who are the poorest of the urban youth in Bissau, much of your status can be found in your footwear. The cooler you are, the more elaborate and high-end your sneakers are. Flip-flops are not cool footwear. Wearing flip-flops is indicative of him being a poor man. It is a poor man's footwear.

The Aguentas was a private militia and much of my perspective on the cocaine trade has come from following them. The Aguentas were hired by the then president of Guinea Bissau, "filhos de Nino", sons of "Nino" Vieira (the president). There were approximately 2,000 of them and they were mobilised in the civil war from 1998–99. They have since then been mobilised a handful of times, in and out of military service. The war in Bissau was, during that period, primarily fought over the control of regional smuggling activities. It was about the control of guns to the MDFC rebels in Casamance, Senegal. It was about the smuggling routes of weapons and cannabis. There was already a slight cocaine connection as well. The war was also fought for the control of the armed forces as such, and ironically for development aid, since they could funnel development money into their pockets.

The war was a catastrophe for Bissau. Politically, we have been waiting for it to end ever since Bissau was caught in a situation of chronic political instability in 1999. There have been eight coups or coup attempts up until now. There are endless purges and factional conflicts. There is an amount of unspecified gunfire in which no one really knows who is shooting at who. Essentially, I started out thinking I was researching a critical event, but I soon found myself actually researching critical continuity –

something that does not go away, where a "post" never actually steps into the picture.

In terms of development aid, which ironically was what the war was fought about, there was a tremendous donor-flight after the war ended in 1999. There has been a 2/3 decrease in aid in 5 years, and that is in a country where 80 % of the state budget was derived from development assistance to start with. Secondly, it is a mono-crop area where most of the people have put all their money into cashew nuts, and where there has been a 50 % drop in cashew nut prices. Bissau was destitute after the war and has been ever since. It is a feeling of being abandoned, quite frankly, of being abject, cast away, no one really caring about it anymore. It is also a feeling of being so geo-politically marginal that you are actually not a part of the system as such.

Bissau was stuck in an economic catastrophe. There was deflation. When I returned over the years, I would find people in the city that were suffering from starvation. They would tell me that they have *um tiro kada dia* which means one shot of food a day – they were telling me in a militarised idiom – that was what they had to eat. It is normally a large bowl of rice with palm oil. It was a situation of state ruination, of complete institutional collapse and a persistently volatile situation. The Aguentas went from guarding the presidential palace – they were not very good at it, they were not a very successful fighting force – to being engaged in this, which is a shipment of cocaine outside of Bissau in the Bijagos islands. The last ten years' research I have done has been following people who traffic, protect, or in some way or another are involved in the cocaine trade. It is massive in Bissau right now. From 2005 to the present, there has been a massive influx of cocaine into the country. Bissau has become a primary transshipment hub. Cocaine is moved along air and sea. It goes in around here, which you can see goes straight to the Bijagos islands. You can actually ship the cocaine over in small high-speed boats or Cessna airplanes. The cartels have their own little airport in the Bijagos islands. It goes back and forth.

There is a Colombian cartel present and there is a Peruvian cartel present. Even though it is clearly illegal activity, this happens in plain sight in Bissau. You see the cartels building haciendas – large, elaborate houses – in landscapes that are completely ruined. The president drives along the streets with cartel representatives inside his car and so on. It is as if it was not a problem and as if it was not an issue of illegality.

The interesting thing is that Bissau went very quickly from being the most geo-politically insignificant place perhaps, to having a quite interesting sort of altered importance. Around 2005, we saw the proliferation of newspaper articles, which would otherwise never report on anything in Bissau, and all of a sudden the country had front pages with headlines about “the cocaine coast”, “the cocaine country”, and creatively, out of Africa “the new cocaine mules.” All of a sudden, people actually thought that there was something going on here that we needed to know more about.

There was also a scare within the UN, which was otherwise not too terribly engaged in Bissau either. All of a sudden the UN said: “Listen, we are looking at Africa’s first narco-state.” I think we need to question the concept of state, and that is what I am going to do in five minutes. I think there is something to the idea of Bissau as Africa’s first narco-state. An estimated 40 tons pass through each year. It is supposedly invisible, but this happens in plain sight. It is not a hidden, secret trade. The cartels operate with impunity. The central figures of state have been arrested or indicted in terms of their involvement, named as drug kingpins under the US Drug Kingpin Act. The admiral most recently arrested by American authorities in the high seas was trying to swap arms for cocaine with people he thought were FARQ rebels. There are thus indications that there is actually a narco-state problematic. If this is a state issue, then we might say that Bissau is actually not Africa’s first narco-state. It might just be the world’s first narco-state. It is not just partially so, it is fully so. If this is a state issue then the state apparatus, as such, is currently set only to serve cocaine-connections. It does nothing else in Bissau. The navy is actively moving cocaine, the army is busy loading cocaine, the port authorities, the customs, are active in some sort of trade or moving of cocaine. The police punish those who do not comply.

In this respect we might actually have to be more drastic. If we want to use a state perspective, Bissau is not Africa’s first narco-state, it might be the world’s first. The revenue from the cocaine trade is currently double the size of Bissau’s GNP. Obviously, it is a very small GNP, but we are looking at twice the revenue coming in from the cocaine trade in terms of what is made otherwise. It is quite clear that the country is becoming a nexus of transnational organised crime. Recent developments have shown that there is an Asian heroin connection, moving drugs the other way right now. What we

have is a country which because of its global insignificance is able to connect four continents in terms of illegal trade. Cocaine is going one way, heroin is going the other.

Let us have a second look at the issue of the state. The UN has, in a common inversed logic, issued a warning, saying: “Listen, we need to do something about Bissau now because the cocaine cartels are destroying the state.” This is of course turning things upside down. The cocaine cartels are not in Bissau because there is a state to destroy; they are there because there is none. The cocaine cartels are not destroying the state, they are facilitated by it. They are not hiding from the state, they are hiding underneath it. It is a very different scenario. What we are looking at is what we could call a situation of expedient dysfunctionality. A report said it was like moving into an empty house, as the state has only nominal existence. It exists in IR, it exists in the UN, but otherwise – in Hobbesian terms, in Weberian terms, in terms of sovereignty and governmentality, all pillars of understanding contemporary politics – there is no state in Bissau. It is a vacant sovereignty.

The failed state, weak state or lacking state that normally frightens us as a perspective is actually the point in Bissau right now in terms of the cocaine collection. What I find interesting is that we should actually be looking at something else, not just state as in a dysfunctioning way which only leads us to see something that comes out as pathological. If we want to understand what is going on, then perhaps we should shift our focus a bit and see the emergence rather than the destruction going on there. Let us try not to look at the state and actually see what comes up.

What I have been trying to argue is that if we do so, we land at something that we might term “central marginality”. There are areas of the world that are so marginal that they become central for the illicit movement of people and goods. There is a combination here, which is very interesting – a combination of geo-political insignificance, global indifference and recognised sovereignty, which all sort of coalesce into a facilitator in terms of what moves on the shadow side of globality.

What I am specifically looking at right now is TOC, transnational organised crime. I am trying to figure out if this is an alternative global actor. What are we actually looking at? Now, the cartels function more or less as a large scale multinational corporation. They have a logistics department, eve-

rything is set and runs smoothly. We can call this an assemblage of political formations, moving from the local to the global, from very, very localised big men, patrimonial figures to large scale geo-political actors. There is an assemblage of interest ranging from revolutionary ideas, patrimonialism, to plain monetary issues and livelihoods. There is also an assemblage of flows, ranging from people to arms to drugs. The same organisations that traffic drugs are the ones that traffic people. They are the ones that traffic guns and they are the ones that traffic illegal goods or illicit goods. Thank you.

Illicit Trade in Consumer Goods and Normally Licit Products, Karl Lallerstedt

Karl Lallerstedt is Political Analyst, co-founder of Black Market Watch, OECD Task Force on Charting Illicit Trade, Switzerland.

My name is Karl Lallerstedt, I am co-founder of Black Market Watch, an NGO looking at illicit trade. I am also involved with the OECD task force on charting illicit trade. I have a background working with political and economic analysis. I have also been Anti-Illicit Trade Director for a big multinational company and in that capacity I was involved in the International Chamber of Commerce's Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP).

What I am going to do today is to talk about illicit flows in consumer goods and normally legal products. First, I will talk about the global picture before moving on to Africa, just to put things in perspective. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) did a meta-study a few years back. The figure they came up with, was that an estimate of 1.5 % of GDP is the turnover of transnational organised crime. That figure is equivalent to six times the global development aid budgets of governments. It is a lot of money. If you expand the money to today's money, accounting for inflation, it exceeds one trillion USD. If you break it down, the biggest categories, according to this study, are narcotics, counterfeiting and trafficking. Another big category that is worth mentioning is of course excise goods.

In 2011, the National Chamber of Commerce came out with a study where they identified counterfeiting as a growth problem, which is logical considering the internationalisation of the economy and the expansion of international trade. If the fig-

ures of the International Chamber of Commerce are credible, they indicate that counterfeiting is a bigger problem in terms of turnover than narcotics.

If we look at illicit trade and the number of ill-effects that some of them have, regardless if it is counterfeit products, excised goods or narcotics – they apply pretty much universally – but there are some effects from the illicit trade in “normally legal goods” that do not apply to purely “criminal products”.

For all illicit products the following applies: This was mentioned by the first speaker, and perhaps it is a very obvious point, but it is the revenue, it is what these organisations make money from, which essentially gives them “military” and political power. There is also the corruptive element, and there is the smuggling route element. Once you are developing routes and corrupting individuals to move one particular category of goods, you have created a channel to move in other products, undermining border security.

Let us consider normally legal products now: when these products are traded illegally there are a number of additional negative effects. Of course the key one is that you are reducing government tax revenue, because you are not taxing the product and the trade that is going on. Instead you are depriving states of much needed revenues, and of course this applies especially in developing countries. You are undermining job creation and economic development. There is also a significant consumer risk involved with counterfeit products. If you look at anti-malaria and tuberculosis medication, there is one study which estimated that up to 700,000 people die every year from counterfeiting of just those two categories of medication.

If we move on from the global perspective to Africa, we have had two recent significant events in the media in terms of international attention on terrorism. We had the attack in Kenya very recently, and we had the attack earlier in the year in Algeria. Both of these incidents actually had EU citizens being killed as well. What do these two events have in common? Al Shabab claimed responsibility for the attack in Kenya. Mokhtar Belmokhtar has been pointed out as the mastermind behind the failed kidnapping attack in Algeria. If we look at Al Shabab, they make money from a lot of activities. The alleged activities they make money from include narcotics and human trafficking and “purely illegal” activities, but also include illicit trade in usually legal “consumer goods” such charcoal

smuggling, consumer goods smuggling into Kenya and the poaching trade mentioned earlier as well. Considering Mokhtar Belmokhtar himself, one of his nicknames is Mr. Marlboro. This guy has made a lot of money smuggling cigarettes.

Looking at the economics of illicit trade, these statistics are from the United Nation's Office for Drugs and Crime in 2009. Let us look at the four biggest categories. These are the value of the illicit flows in West Africa: 1, oil – a legal commodity, 2, cocaine – clearly illegal, 3, cigarettes – normally a legal commodity, 4, anti-malarias – normally legal products. Three out of four top illegal markets are actually normally legal products.

Looking at oil bunkering in Nigeria, this is really an enormous problem in terms of value. If we consider the estimated value every year of the oil that has been bunkered, it is between 3 and 8 billion USD. Put into perspective, the UNODC estimates that the wholesale value of the cocaine from all of West Africa annually is 1.25 billion USD. Additionally, networks are involved in piracy, drugs and gun smuggling, oil bunkering, and there is also an oil bunkering connection to kidnapping.

Let us consider the illicit tobacco trade. Transcrime is an organised crime research institute in Italy. They say that the scale of the illicit tobacco trade is comparable to the global cocaine market. I think this is a little bit of an exaggeration, but it is still a massive market. In Africa 400 billion cigarettes are smoked every year, and it is estimated that 60 billion of those are illegal. One in seven cigarettes is actually illegal. It is probably even worse, because that UNODC figure is a little bit old. Looking at South Africa, it has been estimated that a third of the market is illegal. The government is losing 5 billion rand every year – a little bit over 500 million USD – in state revenues. The South African government says that the groups that were involved in narcotics are now moving into the cigarette trade, because it is a low risk and high profitability area. This is something that law enforcement all over the world is confirming. It is not unique to South Africa.

The Lancet published a study where they had aggregated a number of studies analysing medication. The striking figure is that 20 % of the medicines analysed in Sub-Saharan Africa were falsified. Even a higher percentage of these were substandard. These WHO figures on anti-malaria medication are from 2011. Looking at Nigeria, 77 % of the anti-malarial medications were non-compliant with

quality standards. A survey that was carried out in 2010 asked if you or a member of your household had been a victim of fake medicine. In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, over 40 % of respondents replied yes. Of course, there might have been unknowing victims as well. These are pretty shocking figures. The World Customs Organization did a one-week operation last year, I am just showing this because it illustrates the point I am trying to make. During this one week they seized over 82 million doses of medication that were either fake or brought in under false premises.

There is a whole range of other products that are counterfeit or illegally brought in. The main sources are China, which is the biggest, and India.

I talked earlier about tobacco and I just talked about medication. There are actually some interesting overlapping factors if you look at these two quite different problems of illicit trade. First of all, when considering the sources, there is significant Asian import, China being key here. There is also domestic production. If you look at the routes from Asia, there is also a significant use of the free trade zones, and the Jebel Ali free trade zone in Dubai is really a key one here in the case of tobacco. There are over 20 tobacco factories within the free trade zone itself. It is not just tobacco that is being routed by a free trade zone, but there is production as well. Of course, when it comes to medication it is more used as a routing zone. Container shipments are key ways to move the goods into Africa. Commonly they are brought into a container port, but marked with a final destination somewhere else to reduce the chance of being checked. Once you are in on the ground in a member state of a customs union then of course it is much easier to move the goods to other member states. It is the same concept as if you smuggle something into an EU state, once you are in moving goods around is easy.

If we look ahead towards the future of illicit trade in normally licit products, what can we predict? In the case of oil, the oil price is a key thing. When the oil price goes up, the criminal incentive to steal oil increases. The Gulf of Guinea is growing in strategic importance. It is projected to supply a greater share of the world's oil. What happens if more oil is going to be produced there, and prices continue to go up?

If pricing has an impact on the illicit oil trade, it also does on tobacco smuggling too. Pricing of tobacco is closely related to taxation. The growing awareness of the ill effects of tobacco has led to a

trend of increasing tobacco taxation, which in its turn means that the incentive to smuggle tobacco - in order to avoid taxes - will grow. It will become a more important illicitly traded commodity.

Let us look at the International Chamber of Commerce's very strong growth projection figures for counterfeiting. It is interesting to look at the role of China and Africa in this context as well, because what is quite clear is that it is not just about products being made in China and brought into Africa. There are also many Chinese people on the ground in Africa that are becoming involved in all stages of the supply chain. What is happening as well is that there is Chinese involvement in counterfeit production within Africa. That is more of a curiosity, but I thought I would mention it.

Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.

Policy recommendations

Illicit trade is a complex multifaceted problem. Consequently a holistic approach is needed to combat it:

- Making the fight against illicit trade a development priority.
- The scale of illicit trade is so great that it constitutes a major impediment to development in Africa. It drives corruption, deprives governments of tax revenues, provides revenues to criminal elements, and undermines legitimate economic growth. Consequently fighting illicit trade should be treated as a central development objective.
- Trade policy, deregulation and taxation as tools.
- Illicit trade is driven by economic incentives. Protectionist trade restrictions, high taxation or excessively burdensome regulation may create the preconditions for illicit trade of certain normally legal goods. Foreign trade and economic policy makers must learn to see their world through the prism of illicit trade impact. Their policies are important tools to disincentivise illicit trade, and thereby further boost economic growth.
- The need for data, and learning to see prevention as an investment rather than a cost. Data on illicit trade is sketchy. When the scale and impact of a problem are unknown, motivating expenditure of time and resources on countermeasures becomes difficult. A prerequisite to dealing with the illicit trade problem is to quantify it. Commissioning studies to assess illicit trade empower African governments and donors to enact much needed anti-illicit trade policies.

How Trafficking Flows Redraw the Sahara-Sahel Map of Territories, Laurence Aïda Ammour

Laurence Aïda Ammour is Research Fellow in International Security and Defence issues to the CI-DOB-Barcelona, Algeria/France.

This presentation will focus on the perceptions from the North on the region of Sahara, Sahel and Maghreb. My aim is to try to convince you that we should look differently at the region. When we talk about flows and networks, we should avoid thinking in terms of political borders. This is the way we look at a region normally; this is a political, normal map of Africa, and particularly North Africa and the Sahel. Very often the Sahara is seen as a quite empty area, a kind of terra incognita. In reality, it is actually a place of very intense and constant flux of people, goods and ideas. It has always been the case. During the last 30 years, the Sahara has gained 5 million people.

This is another aspect I want to show you. The demographic growth and urbanisation in the Sahara, where there are cities which previously were of small or medium size, are becoming very important, not only because there are specific reasons – let us say a drought that obliges the nomadic communities to settle in the cities – but also because of the migration flows. As a previous presenter said; many migrants have to stop on their journey, perhaps in a city where they have to find a job. They gather in the city, they find a job and they form a life there. That is why, this morning, I was saying that cities in the area are the main point where people are settling. They may remain that way for a long time, maybe forever. Therefore, we are experiencing a new human settlement pattern in the region.

Another aspect of this that I would like to stress is the diversity of human settlement. If you look at the communities, what we call the ethnic groups, you will see that they are transnational most of the time. This is very important, because researchers and policy makers need to understand that local and social dynamics play a role within the flow structure and within what we call the transborder illegal trade.

I am not sure that all violent extremist groups are linked with drug trafficking. There is no evidence that Al Qaida and the Islamic Maghreb are linked with drug trafficking. We should also think about what the relationships between violent extremist groups in the region and the local communities

are. Are they neutral, antagonistic or cooperative? Sometimes they are, sometimes they are not. It depends on the power balance on the ground. Within the transborder areas, there are always shifting alliances between tribes. The region is not a static area. There have always been all sorts of alliances: alliances of convenience, alliances for controlling a particular flow. For example today, the Tebous (a local ethnic group) in Southern Libya are fighting against Islamic militias sent by Tripoli to control the border, because they want to keep their historical control of the contraband coming from Niger and from Sub-Saharan Africa.

If we look at the region without borders, this is what we can see. Here we can draw the flows. This is why I called my presentation “How Illicit Flows Draw a New Map of Territory”. It is difficult today for policy makers not to consider each country separately. Even if security challenges are common to many states. When you have a growing threat or a conflict in a country, it will spread out to the neighbouring countries. This poses of course the question of regional cooperation that I will address later in my presentation. What is interesting is that illicit flows are the drivers of globalisation of Africa. Globalisation of the continent through illicit flows will generate a map like this. Here you do not look at the borders; instead you look at the whole region when considering for example the circulation of light weapons, the routes of cocaine, etc.. Looking first at the flows is another way to conceive the security issues.

Flows and networks have local, regional and international intensity and impact. As will be illustrated by the next example; flows can be very local, but can also be aimed to fund other activities. There are illicit flows of licit goods as Karl Lallerstedt pointed out previously. My example is about fuel smuggling. Algeria, as you know, is a producer of oil and gas. The smuggling with Morocco is becoming a very big national issue in Algeria. The responsibility for this issue has been given to the army recently, because Algeria is losing a lot of money. In a country that produces oil, we have reached the point where there is now a lack of oil or fuel in the petrol stations. However, when they close the point where the fuel is passing to Morocco, of course the smugglers find another route, south of the border.

There is also fuel smuggling between Algeria and Libya. Many Libyan families were in trouble after the war, and still are. They have gold. In the Arab world, each family has to hold gold just in case

something bad or dramatic happens. Now they are exchanging gold for fuel. I will show you the place where the smuggling happens. The same goes on between Algeria and Mali. This transborder trade is very old. Between Algeria and Mali the trade is not only about fuel, but also about food. In Algeria, the food is subsidised by the state. This has allowed the Malian poor people on the other side of the border to maintain a certain degree of food security. The trade aimed to avoid these people dying from hunger.

Fuel is partly in the hands of people from Ansar-Ed-Dine. Ansar-Ed-dine was one of the groups which conquered Northern Mali with AQIM and MUJAO. After the French intervention in Northern Mali, they came back to southern Algeria, where they are settled. They are still controlling the smuggling of fuel with the complicity of Algerian officials holding provincial functions. This example shows how illicit trafficking of a licit good can be handled by violent extremist groups. That is why Naim Moises says in his book: “The goods, product, is not important”. This morning someone said, you have trucks crossing the Sahara. In the trucks you have people, you have drugs, you have fuel, you have food, you have everything. The goods are not important. The important things are the money and the route. To find the best and easiest route to arrive at your point is the most important.

A question I would like to pose to you is that we always talk about the poor world and the rich world as the reason why we have all these problems in the region. That is the picture of what we could imagine by porous borders. If you look at Northern Mali and you go along the Niger northern border, you arrive in Libya. That is where the people from AQIM passed when they were confronted by the French and Chadian militaries. This is not the best way or the easiest way, but this is the only way in this very difficult region. It is a tough region. It is very arid and there are no wells. They did it because it is a very ancient trafficking route. This is what we can imagine by porous borders. Why are the borders porous? They are porous because the states are porous through corruption and natural and financial resources plundering. Otherwise it would not be possible. The satellite view does not give you the idea of what a porous state is. What we call the illicit dematerialised flows – financial flows – are very important because it all relates to money, which is at the core of every illicit transaction. When you see the figures of the amount of public money drained

out of African countries by high-ranking governmental agents, it is obvious that there is a problem there. When we talk about corruption, this is exactly what we are talking about.

The other pattern I would like to present, is the centre-periphery regional pattern. All the red spots represent capital cities. If you look, it is like a circle. Each capital is turned towards the exterior, not towards the internal lands, the Sahara and Sahel region. This pattern is so entrenched in the region historically and, of course, that means Northern Mali, Northern Niger, Southern Algeria, feel neglected or feel very distant from the decision making centres. The decisions are taken very far from them and they are not considered part of the countries. I mean, it has always been like this, but since trafficking routes follow the routes of traditional trades, nowadays this pattern becomes problematic.

The centre – periphery pattern implies that the citizens who are living in these very remote and neglected areas are feeling marginalised and are considering the state as something external to them. They are not concerned about the decisions, they are not concerned about the law and they are not concerned about institutions. If we think about the huge amount of money put into the development of Northern Mali, funded mainly by the EU, which has resulted in nothing after the Touareg rebellion in 2013, we should conclude that this pattern represents an obstacle. Even if you look at the flows of natural resources (oil, gas, uranium, gold, iron, etc.), they are all directed and drained outside the continent. All these countries have extroverted economies. This is exactly the colonial pattern that is still working despite 50 years of independence.

Another thing I want to stress is the overlapping of political and criminal activities. First, the pattern, as you can see here, the pattern is exactly the same as in West Africa, in terms of, for example, drugs. We are experiencing a similar process. The intersection between transnational organised crime and illicit flows and instability is well shown on this UN document where you can see the point where you have UN regional peace missions, conflicts, and where the flows arrive from the West, from Latin America, and from the East from the Golden Triangle.

I want to conclude with the overlapping of political and criminal activities. The corruption phenomenon is an economic and political phenomenon, because it involves all the agents of states at any level. It affects the elites close to power as well

as managers, mid-level civil servants, military officers, security officers, and all agents of state with the capacity to negotiate a position of power. Let us say you go to the city hall because you need an identity document. Normally, you have to present some document but the agent behind the desk asks you for anything else which is not on the list, just because he wants money. A thing that should be considered a right becomes a favour. This is what we call petty corruption and it is most about mentality. I argue that the mentality of corruption is becoming a normal social activity.

To conclude, I will present some examples of corruption. In 2006, the heads of police of 152 nations met in Brazil for the 70th General Assembly of Interpol, whose president at the time was Jackie Selebi, the National Police Commissioner of South Africa. In his opening address, Selebi exhorted his colleagues to “find systems to make sure that our borders and border controls are on a firm footing”. Four years later, Selebi turned out to be a crook himself. He was convicted of accepting 156,000 USD in a bribe from a drug smuggler, and he is now serving a 15-year prison sentence.

Another example is more recent. On 3rd September 2013, a general of the republic of Gabon had been robbed of 6 billion CFA in his home. He could not make a complaint, because he would have been obliged to explain the origin of this huge amount of cash money. This is really the more blatant example, but to me this is very illustrative.

I will finally make a short assessment about how now in the region of North Africa and the Sahel, the cooperation is not very deep. Even if security challenges are common and shared in the region, it is difficult for each country to give up parts of its sovereignty in order to mutualise efforts and means with military intelligence, political diplomacy and economy that could be a way to arrange things. The problem of North Africa and the Sahel is that you have two big countries: Algeria and Morocco, that could be leading the cooperation with other neighbours. The problem is that they are very jealous of their own sovereignty and are locked in a hostile relationship. They consider each other as an enemy. We are still in a cold war perception of sovereignty, and in an economic extroversion situation where national interests are seen in the framework of cooperation with external actors (France, US, UK, Spain, Italy, Russia, etc.), but not with the neighbours. Thank you.

Policy recommendations:

- Despite the considerable number of regional as well as international plans, programmes and mechanisms (in the economic, legislative, military and police spheres), the actions taken to fight organised crime and terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel area remain unfocused and divided into numerous sectorial objectives. Moreover, the multiplicity of regional and sub-regional organisations and the various bilateral and multilateral agreements have generated a certain amount of confusion, clouding the real security issues and leading to dispersal of efforts. This confusion has been an obstacle to the fight against terrorist and criminal networks, which are not confined to national territory. Because of their fluidity, mobility and ability to adapt rapidly, they use only deterritorialised areas. Regional integration, of course, could reduce crime-related risks. But to be more effective, the fight against terrorism and organised crime can no longer be based on criteria such as the inviolability of borders, sovereignty, or rivalry for regional leadership; it should be seen outside the purely national context and based on ‘across the board’ criteria and on integrated regional areas that share the same problems and are exposed to the same threats.
- This also means that each of the actors will have to give up some of their sovereignty. They are not inclined to regional cooperation and are suspicious about sharing or transferring expertise at supranational level. Indeed, those countries are witnessing a marked domestication of foreign policy, which has become a source of political legitimacy and an indispensable factor in state building. Moreover, if the current situation continues, there is a risk that the present colonial configuration of Maghreb and Sahelian States will be maintained, based purely on revenues from raw materials (uranium, gold, gas and oil) and extroverted, essentially rentier, economies.
- In the promising African context, and bearing in mind its economic potential, development and stability in Africa could receive a further boost, provided there really is the political will and courage to deal first and foremost with corruption – especially if the approach to security issues is based on a definition of shared economic interests that have been evaluated beforehand, in the light of common threats, by African and non-African partners.
- At the political level, greater synergy between Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan countries would be necessary. Partnerships in the form of regional platforms would have the advantage of positively involving the countries concerned in African security questions and of bringing governments together in a common effort. Finally, the territory of action should be enlarged beyond the Sahel to involve Burkina Faso, Senegal, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Cameroon, all key actors in the expansion of violent extremist groups and criminal activities.
- The EU Sahel Strategy slowly adapted to the rapidly changing dynamics of a very complex region, especially since the “Arab Spring”. In spite of its shortcomings, it is gradually evolving into a project that could help mobilise fragmented regional actors around shared security objectives. A major challenge though remains for the EU to engage important regional actors such as ECOWAS, Nigeria and Algeria that are indispensable for a viable regional approach.
- Connecting conflict systems and peripheral areas of the Sahel mean that more multifaceted EU approaches, beyond narrow bilateral engagements, are necessary. The EU therefore is called to strengthen the regional potential of key states like Nigeria and Algeria. Containing the Mali and Libyan crises’ potential regional contagion should now be seen as a top EU priority. As global jihadist involvement emboldens regional insurgent groups like Boko Haram and franchises, swathes of the region risk serious destabilisation from Senegal through Niger to Chad, to Cameroon and now Séléka militia in Central Africa Republic.
- As national and regional security response capacities appear grossly insufficient (i.e. Cemoc and UFL), the potential danger of a geopolitical power rivalry between regional players like Algeria, Morocco and ECOWAS must encourage the EU to more closely bind those three actors to the Sahel Strategy implementation efforts. The EU should therefore better target its political dialogue and financial leverage to push major regional stakeholders towards harmonising their often fragmented political, diplomatic and military initiatives.
- At the level of civil societies, youth and women should be targeted as the core intermediaries in the deradicalisation policies and processes that should be implemented all over the countries

affected by violent extremist ideologies. That is where public and religious education might play a relevant role, as the Mauritanian experience in this field shows.

- From the operational point of view, intraregional battalions should be created urgently with the capacity to undertake joint transnational operations along border areas. Counter-terrorism and transnational threats can no longer be understood within national borders. Rather, stabilisation efforts must be structured around integrated regional zones grappling with the same problems. Along these lines, the intra-regional force structure must develop a more efficient intelligence sharing capability since, given the nature of the threat, the monitoring of information is more crucial than it is in conventional military operations.
- These joint security patrols should include the Tuaregs. AQIM's and other groups' violent tactics are not seducing the vast majority of people in the border regions. The group's ability to mobilise significant popular support, however, is raising concerns among local leaders. Gaining Tuareg participation in the stabilisation effort would tap their intimate knowledge of the terrain and population and would allow Tuaregs (including those who recently came back from Libya and led the 2012 rebellion) to play an active role in the defence of their traditional nomadic territories. This would also enhance military readiness and precision against an enemy that is mobile, flexible, and proactive.

Final words

by Maria Sjöqvist

Maria Sjöqvist is foreign news reporter, formerly Africa correspondent, Swedish Radio (SR), Sweden.

As an Africa correspondent for Swedish Radio, one of my main instruments has been my voice. These fascinating and very important presentations we have heard over the day concern such complex matters that you start feeling that is there really a solution to all this?

I am going to go back to real basics now. I am going to tell you about a friend I have in Mozambique where I have been living for the past 3 years. We can call her Celia. She works as a housemaid, one of the most common jobs for women in the capital Maputo. She cleans, cooks and washes clothes all day. When her workday is over at four o'clock, she does not go home to her kids and husband. She goes to school. Mozambique has an ambitious program trying to educate its poor population after centuries of colonialism and the civil war. Celia is 30-plus and she is going through high school now. Her dream is to become an accountant and get a job at any firm that would hire her.

Now you might be starting to ask yourself what on earth Celia has to do with all these things we have been talking about today. My answer is that it is actually all about Celia in Maputo, and all the other Celias around the Sub-Saharan continent that I have met during my travelling in recent years.

Smuggling is not only a story about criminals, or the very concrete and important measures we have been hearing about today like border controls and policing. It is also about a much bigger picture; the possibility for people to seek their own destiny and their chances to improve their own lives. In Celia, I see much of the new Africa we have been hearing a lot about during recent years, an ambitious and fast growing continent with the new lion economies ready to take yet another leap.

Celia's ambition to do something else than to clean other people's houses, and her courage to try to end the poverty and history of no education in her family, will not be worth much if she has not got a functioning state around her. A state run by officials who will not harass her for money and bribes

at every step of her daily life, a state that has border controls and mechanisms for smooth trade and the ability to control that trade and control companies, to be able to tax them and get income to make the country develop in favour of Celia and all her compatriots. The ability to make illicit trade and goods, which we have been hearing so much about in the past few hours, become legal and thus tools to help the country to grow.

Mozambique is today still one of the poorest countries on earth, but also one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. They recently discovered coal and gas in Mozambique which will generate huge incomes in the future. Big international companies are coming in to invest. There is however also always the whisper on the streets about where does some of that money actually come from, that is so visible in the capital Maputo today? There is also the whisper about the baker in the little town in the north of Mozambique. How on earth did he build himself that new big house? Was it really from selling bread? Did he lend his services to the existing drug smuggling rings that has made US blacklist one of the richest businessmen in the country?

I travelled to Uganda with the beautiful capital of seven hills that has now grown to twenty plus hills. How big a part of that growth has to do with the porous borders to the neighbouring Congo and its vast mineral riches? Similarly in traveling to Rwanda, with the new wealthy blocks with big beautiful villas overlooking Kigali, blocks that people on the street in a whisper mockingly call "Merci Congo", "Thank you Congo". The building boom in Nairobi, what part of that is built on laundered money coming from the piracy across the border in Somalia? These are the rumours and questions being whispered in a lot of places I have travelled to in recent years. Whispered, because you cannot be sure who is actually involved in businesses that do not want to see the daylight.

Stopping illicit trade would make a difference on so many levels; very concrete and practical levels that we have been hearing about today and more than that, it would be a clear sign of a functioning state at work, a state with both the capability

and the purpose of serving its citizens, a state that could serve the many Celas around the continent. Celia could then see all her efforts, all her working hours bear fruit and give life to the most basic, but

actually the biggest dream of all, that is the same around the globe, seeing a better future for herself and for her loved ones, and having the possibility to accomplish it.

Appendix 1 Program



Illicit Flows and African Security

Date: Thursday 17 October 2013
Time: 8:30 am – 4:45 pm
Venue: The Museum of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities, Stockholm

8:30 – 9:00 Registration

9:00 Introduction: Iina Soiri, Director, NAI and Maria Lignell Jakobsson, Head, Division of Defence Analysis, FOI

1. Trafficking

Helené Lackenbauer, Trafficking in Human Beings

Maya Mynster Christensen, Soldiering Shaky Grounds: Sierra Leonean Ex-Militias as Local Threats and Global Security Providers

Koen Vlassenroot, Gold Trafficking: Connecting Conflict Zones to Global Markets

Commentator: **Hans Lundborg** (Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

Questions

2. Screening of parts of Christian Vium's film *Clandestine (Eventyrerne)*

Director: Janus Metz, Anthropologist: Christian Vium, as well as photos from Vium's work with undocumented migrants in West Africa.

Questions

State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, **Carl von der Esch** speaks.

12:00 – 12:45 Lunch.

3. Small Arms

James Bevan, Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Africa: Monitoring, Diagnosis and Response

Hugh Griffiths, Maritime Trafficking and the African Coastline: Threats, Challenges and Policy Options

Eric Berman, Diversion of Weapons and Ammunition in Africa: Peace Operations as a Contributing Factor

Niklas Hultin, Obstacles to Small Arms Control in the Gambia

Commentator: **Kwesi Aning** (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre)

Questions

4. Illicit Goods

Stewe Alm, Drug Related Organised Crime as a Driving Force to Disrupt States in Africa

Henrik Vigh, Central Marginality: on Cocaine Connections in the State in Bissau

Karl Lallerstedt Illicit Trade in Consumer Goods in Africa

Laurence Aïda Ammour, How Illicit Flows Draw a New Map of Sahara-Sahel Territories

Commentator: **Maria Sjöqvist** (Swedish Radio)

Questions

4:45 The conference ends

6:30 Dinner

Appendix 2 List of Speakers

Illicit Flows and African Security, 17 October 2013

List of speakers

Stewe Alm	Senior Strategic Analyst, Swedish National Bureau of Investigation, Sweden.
Laurence Aïda Ammour	Research Fellow in International Security and Defence issues to the CIDOB-Barcelona, Algeria/France.
Kwesi Aning	Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC), Ghana.
Eric Berman	Managing Director of Small Arms Survey, Switzerland.
James Bevan	Director of Conflict Armament Research, weapon specialist and conflict analyst.
Maya Mynster	Assistant Professor, Anthropology, military mobilisation, Royal Christensen Danish Defence College, Denmark.
Hugh Griffiths	Head of the Countering Illicit Trafficking-Mechanism Assessment Projects (CIT-MAP), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden.
Niklas Hultin	Research Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Virginia, USA; Research Associate, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, UK
Helené Lackenbauer	Researcher, Peace and Security, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Sweden.
Karl Lallerstedt	Political Analyst, co-founder of Black Market Watch, OECD Task Force on Charting Illicit Trade, Switzerland.
Hans Lundborg	Ambassador at the Department for Multilateral Development Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden.
Maria Sjöqvist	Foreign news reporter, formerly Africa correspondent, Swedish Radio (SR), Sweden.
Henrik Vigh	Professor, Department of Anthropology, peace and conflict studies, trans-national organised crime and migration, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
Christian Vium	Post. Doc, Aarhus University, Anthropologist, Photographer, Documentarian, Denmark.
Koen Vlassenroot	Professor, Conflict Research Group, University of Ghent and Director Africa Programme, Institut Royal des Relations Internationales (Egmont), Belgium.

