Logo: to the web site of Uppsala University

How do adversaries build sustainable peace through negotiated settlements? The last few decades of conflict resolution efforts across the globe have provided us with an extensive body of knowledge and experience on pathways out of protracted and seemingly unsolvable armed conflicts. In this study, we set out to discuss more precisely how this transformation can come about. We do so by exploring three important turning points on the path from war to peace: the opening of negotiations, the reaching of peace agreements, and the establishment of durable peace. We depart from a triangular model of conflict resolution, which suggests that there are three dimensions to all conflicts, each of which must be transformed or managed to achieve sustainable peace: the conflict issues at stake, the parties' violent conflict behavior, and their contentious conflict attitudes. Illustrative examples from twelve cases of conflict resolution are provided. The primary intended audience for this study is peace practitioners who are struggling to address and resolve protracted civil wars.

Civil war peace processes are frequently accompanied by spoiler behavior relating to intra-party divergence, such as leadership struggles or breakaway groups, which risk undermining the implementation of a peace accord. However, previous literature has not sufficiently explored how third-party actors can address spoiler behavior linked to such intra-party aspects. This study addresses this gap by providing an empirical analysis of a few illustrative cases of spoiler behavior by armed actors in two peace processes in West Africa—Sierra Leone after the 1999 Lomé peace accords and Liberia after the 2003 Accra peace agreement. We find that in contexts where there is a vertical divergence between the leader and the rest of the group, divisive strategies—aimed to divide and rule or marginalize—are effective. In contrast, in situations of horizontal divergence between different factions that are more equal in power, integrative strategies—aimed at unifying the ranks or reconciling a divided leadership—are more appropriate. This study enhances our understanding of how third-party strategies can be devised to manage intra-party divisions that otherwise may threaten a transition from war to peace.

What kind of peace has emerged in the Bangsamoro region in the Philippines after the 2014 peace agreement? And how does it matter for the prospects of sustainable peace and development? The peace deal between the government of Philippines and the armed group Moro Islamic Liberation Front builds on the establishment of a new autonomous region. The new autonomy has the potential to end a prolonged cycle of armed rebellions. But if it fails to deliver the expected peace dividends, it could also lead to escalating violence. This article uses the Peace Triangle as a conceptual tool to analyse the current status of peace in Bangsamoro. As such, it advances a theoretical understanding of peace that focuses on how autonomy solutions impact on conflict issues, violent behaviour, and conflict attitudes and aid an assessment of the longer term prospects of peace in the wake of autonomy.

The former rebel party Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) in Sierra Leone has struggled with a discredited wartime reputation and electoral defeats throughout the post-war period. In spite of this, the party has remained loyal to its wartime revolutionary ideas, symbols and political rhetoric. Why is this the case? In this article, I argue that the answer lies in the premises of party politics in war-torn states and new democracies on the African continent. In a political landscape where brokerage is power, retaining wartime identities can sometimes serve as a valuable source of (potential) patronage. With few other options for access to resources and opportunities, the core of the party membership has clung to its past as a means to both rally electoral support among the marginalized ex-combatant community and to get access to the long-awaited funds that were promised to them in the peace negotiations.

How are threat images framed and constructed by the so-called warlord democrats (WDs)? Societies that have suffered from large-scale civil wars are commonly permeated by inter-group fear and hate. In these contexts, former military or political leaders of armed groups sometimes become involved in post-war politics. These WDs can act as reconciliation spoilers by making securitising moves, i.e. they construct threat images that are potentially very costly for fragile post-conflict democratisation processes. It is therefore crucial to explore WDs’ speech acts. Yet, the literature on post-war politics has largely overlooked these individual aspects. This article argues that the central components of securitisation theory can be useful in understanding this phenomenon if adjusted to the contextual circumstances of post-war societies. By analysing speech acts by seven WDs in post-war Liberia and Sierra Leone, two forms of framing strategies stand out as particularly relevant. First, WDs’ securitising moves are often framed as veiled threats of violence, as it is often deemed too risky for these individuals outside formal power positions to overtly express threats in a generally de-securitised setting. Second, when WDs construct threats, they often chose to frame themselves or their constituencies or followers as the referent object of security.

Multiparty elections have become the bellwether by which all democracies are judged, and the spread of these systems across Africa has been widely hailed as a sign of the continent's progress towards stability and prosperity. But such elections bring their own challenges, particularly the often intense internecine violence following disputed results.

While the consequences of such violence can be profound, undermining the legitimacy of the democratic process and in some cases plunging countries into civil war or renewed dictatorship, little is known about the causes. By mapping, analysing and comparing instances of election violence in different localities across Africa – including Kenya, Ivory Coast and Uganda – this collection of detailed case studies sheds light on the underlying dynamics and sub-national causes behind electoral conflicts, revealing them to be the result of a complex interplay between democratisation and the older, patronage-based system of 'Big Man' politics.

Essential for scholars and policymakers across the social sciences and humanities interested in democratization, peace-keeping and peace studies, Violence in African Elections provides important insights into why some communities prove more prone to electoral violence than others, offering practical suggestions for preventing violence through improved electoral monitoring, voter education, and international assistance.