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This study provides new insights regarding how the EU dimension relates to the left-right dimension in national politics. It does so by examining to what extent parties’ oppositional behaviour in EU affairs in parliament is a function of their distance to the government, other parties, the voters and party supporters on the EU dimension and the left-right dimension, respectively. The results suggest that oppositional behaviour is determined by two parallel dynamics: When expressing opposition, political parties are receptive both to the positions of the government and other parties on the EU dimension, and to the positions of voters and supporters on the left-right dimension. Our results thus indicate that the politicization of EU affairs in national parliaments primarily is an elite phenomenon. In their relation to the voters and supporters, parties still primarily navigate along the traditional left-right dimension.

I den nationella SOM-undersökningen 2022 ställde vi frågor om vilka samhällsproblem som kan motivera svenskarna till att tillfälligt vilja pausa demokratin.Resultaten var oroväckande eftersom de visade att det fanns en utbredd villighet att,även om så bara för ett tag, försätta demokratin i ett slags vänteläge. Historien visaratt ”tillfälliga” pauser ofta kan bli långvariga. Resultaten motiverade en uppföljningmed fördjupade frågor i den nationella SOM-undersökningen 2023. Där har viundersökt mer ingående vilka delar av demokratin som svenskarna kan tänka sigatt tillfälligt sätta ur spel givet att landet utsätts för olika slags kriser. Vi undersökeräven vilket styrelseskick som svenskarna anser är bäst på att lösa dagens samhällsproblem: demokrati, autokrati eller expertstyre. I kapitlet analyserar vi resultaten frånden senaste SOM-undersökningen och drar slutsatser om dessa centrala frågor fördemokratins fortlevnad.

This study attempts to break new ground by systematically comparing oppositional behaviour of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the two key arenas found in parliament: the plenary and the committee. Do MPs express more opposition frontstage in the plenary than backstage in the committee when discussing European affairs? The article sheds new light on political opposition in parliament by using a dataset of hand-coded statements made by MPs during plenary debates and European Affairs committee deliberations in five national parliaments. The results lend strong support to the main hypothesis that MPs express more opposition during plenary debates than committee deliberations.

A vital political opposition is one of the cornerstones of democracy, yet we know surprisingly little about the conditions that shape it. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive assessment of the drivers of parliamentary opposition in European Union (EU) politics in five countries: Denmark; Germany; Ireland; Sweden; and the United Kingdom. Based on an extensive hand-coded data set of 7,520 statements made by members of parliament (MPs) during both plenary sessions and deliberations during European Affairs Committee (EAC) meetings, we examine how institutions and party characteristics shape two types of oppositional behaviour: the expression of critique and the presentation of alternatives. We find that both factors are important for understanding to what extent, and how, opposition is voiced in national parliaments. Oversight institutions’ strength and a party’s degree of Euroscepticism jointly function as significant determinants of the likelihood that MPs will express opposition in the form of critique. However, when it comes to the likelihood of offering alternatives, oversight institutions’ strength fails to explain variations in the share of alternatives, while degree of Euroscepticism remains a significant predictor.

Is oppositional behaviour in legislatures gendered? Despite a growing literature on gender and legislative behaviour, there is a conspicuous absence of research on differences between female and male members of parliament (MPs) when it comes to one of the key aspects of parliamentary debates: the voicing of opposition. This article connects the literature on gender and legislative behaviour with opposition scholarship. We examine the role of gender for oppositional behaviour in four legislatures with a focus on debates concerning European Union affairs. Our results show that female MPs generally are equally likely to express opposition as their male colleagues. This result, however, is conditioned by government status. Whilst there is no significant difference between the proportion of opposition expressed by female and male MPs from opposition parties, we find that male MPs representing government parties express more than twice as much opposition as their female colleagues.

Previous research has shown that comprehensive welfare states are effective at bridging ethnic divisions and promoting political tolerance of marginalized groups. Do these results hold up in the face of the great influx of migrants into European welfare states following the 2015–16 refugee crisis? In this case study of Sweden, we map the general level of political tolerance and test various individual-level explanations for it. Based on a survey of about 3500 citizens, our results show that the level of ethnic antipathy in Sweden is low. Other groups, however—such as supporters of the Sweden Democrats, a radical-right party—are widely disliked, as are abortion opponents and anti-vaccinationists. The individual-level explanations we have tested—in connection with threat perceptions, civic and political engagement, and socio-economic factors—turn up mixed results. Our conclusion is that the results we have found reflect something of a liberal-democratic backlash, whereupon a certain kind of political intolerance has become widespread.

In the wake of the new security situation in Europe, Sweden has decided to apply for membership in NATO. After over 200 years without war, the country must now be set to defend not just itself, but its allies as well. Are Swedes ready for this? Previous research has shown a high willingness among Swedes to defend their country. But what actually explains this high defence willingness among Swedes, given their unfamiliarity with the task? To examine the willingness of the country’s population to contribute to the military, we make use of survey data collected before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It turns out that the most general explanation for defence willingness, namely threat perception, has little or no explanatory value in the Swedish context. Surprisingly, this was true before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as after. Furthermore, context-specific explanations citing the prevalence of emancipatory values among Swedes find no support either. However, this study does find robust support for gender, trust and political orientation as important explanatory factors for defence willingness. Our findings thus underscore some challenges facing Sweden as a newcomer to NATO, as political divides along lines of gender and trust widen.

Det här kapitlet tar avstamp i den offentliga debatten i Sverige om yttrandefrihetens och demonstrationsfrihetens gränser där det blivit allt vanligare med krav på att begränsa demokratin för att hantera kriser och lösa samhällsproblem. Vi undersöker om det finns liknande uppfattningar bland medborgarna. Genom att ställa frågor om hur villiga svenska medborgare är att tillfälligt sätta demokratin åt sidan för att hantera olika kriser och samhällsproblem görs en bedömning av demokratins nuvarande ställning. Är det bara vid särskilt allvarliga och akuta kriser som medborgarna kan gå med på inskränkningar i demokratin eller är uppfattningen mer utbredd än så? Resultaten är både förvånande och oroande. Det tycks krävas betydligt mindre än en allvarlig och akut kris för att en majoritet av medborgarna ska gå med på att tillfälligt begränsa demokratin. Det reser en viktig fråga om demokratin alltjämt är att betrakta som en överideologi i Sverige eller om den snarare ses som en ideologi bland andra.

Previous research has looked at how Eurosceptic challenger parties can cause mainstream parties to change their policy positions and bring about adjustments to their programmes. We explore whether this contagion effect extends to the parliamentary behaviour of mainstream parties in European Union (EU) affairs. The empirical analysis is based on a large-scale study of 6215 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committee of Sweden between 1995 and 2016. A dynamic panel analysis of the data shows that the oppositional behaviour of Eurosceptic challenger parties has a significant impact on the opposition statements made in EU affairs by mainstream parties. These findings have important implications for the general understanding of factors that drive national EU opposition.

This article offers a comprehensive comparison of oppositional behaviour in European Union (EU) affairs in six countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. By drawing on a unique data set of hand-coded statements made by Members of Parliament during European Affairs Committee (EAC) meetings it provides new knowledge on political opposition. The data uncover that there is more opposition expressed in EU affairs than has been assumed by previous research. The results also reveal that there exists considerable cross-national variation in oppositional behaviour during EAC deliberations in the six countries. The study finally shows that Eurosceptic parties are key drivers of opposition in EU affairs, especially when it comes to opposition directed at the EU political system.