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The Nordic states have long made distinct choices regarding foreign and security policy principles. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we are witnessing a convergence of the Nordic countries’ general patterns of cooperation within their security policies. We argue that the challenging international context has led to heightened threat perceptions, triggering a reformulation of their foreign policy roles. Based on this assumption the article aims to analyse the convergence of the Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies by tracing changes in their foreign policy roles following Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. We trace the changes in the Nordic countries’ foreign policy roles through three dimensions: the changes to the international order, threat perceptions and perceptions of reduced manoeuvrability in international affairs. Our empirical analysis sheds light on how all Nordic countries perceive an increasing threat to the multilateral rule-based order, which has consequences for the roles of these states, how the threat perceptions of the Nordic states have been on high alert since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and finally how this has significantly impacted the Nordic foreign policy elites’ perception of their countries’ ability to manoeuvre and conduct autonomous foreign policy, motivating radical changes in the roles.

This article focuses on foreign policy role change in small liberal states caused by a weakening rules-based order illustrated by the decisions of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership of NATO, thereby abandoning longstanding policies of military non-alignment. Although both countries sought alignment with NATO in the context of intense security threats in northern Europe, the domestic processes of foreign policy role change proceeded along different trajectories. In Finland, the domestic process of role change was characterized by strong elite and public consensus on membership of NATO, whereas in Sweden there was more hesitation regarding giving up military non-alignment and losing freedom of action. In this article, we address a gap in the literature on role theory and domestic role change by conceptualizing the dilemma of small liberal states being compelled to reassess national role conceptions in their domestic settings in the face of external challenges outside their control, without jeopardizing national autonomy and deep-seated social identities. To this end, we construct a model for national action strategies based on scope conditions of domestic role change, varying according to the level of congruence in national identity and the degree of domestic elite consensus concerning national foreign policy.

The European Union (EU) has systematically promoted global climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Since the 1990s, despite varying success in international climate negotiations, it has sought to take a leadership role in global climate politics. Internal consolidation of environmental and climate policies has enhanced EU policy coherence and strengthened its ability to influence international efforts to mitigate climate change. Globally, however, the picture is marred by geopolitical competition, rendering the context of global climate politics less propitious for the EU’s climate leadership. This article examines how the EU’s climate diplomacy is adapting to an increasingly complex international context. It finds that while the EU climate action is still premised on the deep-seated beliefs of the EU’s ambitious approach to climate, the practices of EU climate diplomacy have adapted to a changing geopolitical context. This evolution is traced through a set of key diplomatic practices: narration, co-ordination, outreach and mainstreaming.

In the last two decades, the European Union (EU) has forged an international role as a ‘force for good’ and a champion for democracy, human rights, multilateralism, free trade, climate change action, and sustainable development. However, as the international context has grown more competitive and turbulent, it has become more challenging for the EU to uphold this global role. Subsequently, the EU has pursued more proactive policies to confront urgent challenges to the rules-based international system and global governance norms. This paper explores what the EU’s evolving geopolitical foreign policy role actually entails and how it is compatible with the Union’s understanding of itself as a global leader as expressed as a Normative Power, Market Power, and Security Power. Utilising the Indo-Pacific Strategy of 2021 and subsequent communications as illustrative examples, it examines how the EU is upscaling its plans and partnerships into a broader, sustainable connectivity strategy that fits into the context of a reoriented EU foreign policy and its leadership goals. In conclusion, it finds that the credibility of the three powers that the EU proclaims to play will be dependent on the coherence of the role set and the extent to which the EU can achieve these roles.