Logo: to the web site of Uppsala University

After centuries of persecution in Europe, large carnivores are now recovering. Whether this conservation success continues depends in part on public support. Here we show, using a survey of 10,000 respondents across European Union Member States, that while support for the recovery of wolves, bears and lynx remains strong, most respondents oppose both further population growth and hunting—particularly of wolves. Attitudes are remarkably consistent across rural and urban populations, and many respondents express no strong position, suggesting that large carnivores are less polarizing than often portrayed. The recent amendment to the Habitats Directive, which grants Member States greater flexibility to manage their wolf populations, appears broadly aligned with public opinion, as long as its implementation does not lead to population declines. However, the presence of views in tension—rejecting both population growth and hunting— may pose challenges for designing policies that are both science based and supported by the public.

Species protection laws, like the US Endangered Species Act (ESA), are key tools for reversing biodiversity loss. One important question concerns whether legal protection can be phased out once a species is considered recovered and how this affects population dynamics. We used Bayesian hierarchical models and time series of annual population size estimates for gray wolves (Canis lupus) across eight US states to assess how annual population growth rates were affected by the proportion of each year that each wolf population was not listed under the ESA. We found that between 1979 and 2022, delisting had an overall negative effect on the growth rate of wolf populations. This effect remained after accounting for potential confounders like density dependence. The resulting growth rates after 1 year unlisted varied between the different states' populations and included short-term declines as well as population stabilization and continued growth at slower rates over longer terms.

This chapter is a scholarly play in four acts. It is inspired by a series of discussions between three legal researchers (Van Dijk, Epstein and De Vries) and a cultural theorist (Goriunova), about proposals to grant legal personhood to two types of non-human entities: nature and artificial intelligence. We queried whether doing so would help meet challenges such as environmental catastrophes and co-existence with opaque and unpredictable AI systems. In Act I (Divergences) Law and Critical Theory present their respective positions, but fail to gain any understanding of each other. Law defends a neutral legal pragmatism, while critical theory debunks all claims to neutrality. Act II and Act III present two fictional narratives: one plays out in a courtroom where a man is suspected of the murder of a river (Act II) and the other features an AI-system addressing the European Parliament (Act III). By discussing these counterfactual narratives in Act IV (Convergences), Law and Critical Theory are, at least partially, able to see how there could be cross-fertilization between their respective positions: one has to take into consideration how legal personhood operates both inside the court room as well as how it impacts the world outside; and one can travel towards an “enlarged pragmatism” that focuses on the possibilities of masks, fiction and play in expressing different voices, perspectives and ontologies.

Over 300 cities are inscribed on the World Heritage List. While each site has its unique challenges and opportunities, in each of them a balance must be achieved in protecting heritage values and meeting demands of modern life, including the demand for energy efficiency and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This article uses Visby (Sweden) as a case study to examine how conservation laws implementing the World Heritage Convention in light of international commitments to mitigate climate change can influence the balance between cultural heritage preservation and energy measures in historic sites. International laws must be implemented by states. But these national laws must be applied locally, in each heritage site. It is therefore important to examine how regional and local decision makers, including individual property owners, navigate and understand their obligations stemming from international laws in order to understand the impact and challenges in meeting sustainability goals in heritage sites. We find that while Visby’s World Heritage status promotes a high level of cultural heritage protection, restrictive laws alone fall short in achieving sustainability. Supportive factors such as funding, planning tools, knowledge support and dissemination, and community engagement help bridge these gaps. We recommend further support for financial incentives, place-based technological solutions, and collaboration amongst experts and others to help officials and property owners make choices that are sustainable from both energy and heritage perspectives.

Are laws attributing rights to nature a just or even a possible was to protect the environment? Some scholars and others have raised objections. This chapter responds to some common objections and argues that rights of nature laws are feasible worldwide. It further argues that if these laws are formulated and implemented well, they have the potential to contribute to a more just environmental law for nature and for people.

A growing number of countries around the world now recognize some types of legal rights for nature. Some of these laws have resulted in positive outcomes for the environment, and others have sparked backlash, but the full impact of these laws has yet to become apparent. This chapter raises various questions on whether rights of nature laws have been, can be, or will be effective. Are rights of nature better suited to some types of legal systems than others? Are rights of nature compatible with ‘Western’ ontologies? Are rights of nature necessarily ecocentric, or are anthropocentric rights of nature laws possible or even desirable? Can or should nature have duties? How can the legal system deal with different time scales of humans and non-human nature? How useful is international comparison, and how viable is legal transplantation? And what is the relationship between rights of nature and traditional environmental law?

In this 2018 decision, the Colombian Supreme Court considered that deforestation in the Colombian Amazon contributed significantly to climate change and therefore violated the constitutional environmental rights of future generations, as embodied by the young people who brought the case. Further, it recognized the Colombian Amazon as a subject of rights, with the rights to protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration. In its decision, the Court ordered the state and other organizational defendants to take several innovative measures intended to stop deforestation. It ordered the Presidency of the Republic, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and other regional and municipal bodies to issue action plans to address deforestation and reduce the impact of climate change. It also ordered the Presidency of the Republic, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to formulate an "intergenerational pact for the life of the Colombian Amazon", together with the plaintiffs, impacted communities, scientists, and other interested persons including the general public, with a goal of reducing climate change, and reducing deforestation to zero. Importantly, this case made explicit the link between climate change, the rights of children, the rights of future generations, and the rights of nature.

Foreword to a special issue of the Global Journal of Animal Law on "Biodiversity and Animal Law". This foreword also contains the data results of a survey of 11,000 people in 23 EU countries, showing widespread support for legal rights for animals.

I denna studie reds ut i vilken utsträckning naturen tillskrivs egenvärde i svensk rätt, och i så fall vilka delar av naturen det gäller. Det konstateras att naturen till viss del erbjuds skydd för sin egen skull i svensk rätt genom den svenska miljöbalken, underordnade författningar och vissa andra lagar, genom exempelvis bestämmelser om områdesskydd, biologisk mångfald, invasiva främmande arter, genetiskt modifierade organismer samt jakt och djurskydd. Studien belyser att delar av lagstiftningen ger naturen skydd inte enbart av antropocentriska skäl utan för olika entiteters egen skull, och det kan röra sig om såväl individuella entiteter såsom specifika djur, som kollektiva entiteter såsom arter eller ekosystem. Det skulle kunna innebära att dessa entiteter därigenom tillskrivs implicita rättigheter i svensk rätt, mot bakgrund av synsättet att ett skydd för naturens egen skull innebär plikter för människan gentemot naturen, samt att en juridisk plikt i regel motsvaras av en juridisk rättighet. Det talar för att framöver stärka möjligheterna till rättslig representation av de entiteter i naturen som tillskrivits egenvärde, så att hänsynen till naturen i högre grad säkerställs och det rättsliga skyddet i tillräcklig omfattning upprätthålls av rättssystemet.

This article argues that EU law can be interpreted to support the current existence of legal rights for animals and nature. While these rights have not been explicitly recognised in law, the prerequisites for doing so already exist in the EU legal order. The theoretical justifications for the protection of animals and nature differ, but the protection of both may benefit from a rights approach. Further, such a rights approach helps address jurisprudential questions pertaining to direct effect and the effectiveness of EU law, and related EU law concepts. In this article, we examine EU animal and nature protection laws to analyse where these laws can be interpreted to assign rights to non-human natural entities. We argue that the rights animals and nature already implicitly have in EU law should have consequences for how non-human protections should be implemented and enforced in the EU context.