Open this publication in new window or tab >>2024 (English)In: Nordisk miljörättslig tidskrift, E-ISSN 2000-4273, no SI, p. 13-27Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Abstract [en]
Can nature have rights, or is this idea bound to be considered odd, frightening or even laughable as Christopher Stone stated when arguing for nature’s rights in his seminal article in 1972? The idea is based on the view that nature should be allowed to exist on its own terms and not on man’s. Expectations are that such an approach will become a tool for changing the view of the relationship between man and nature. In modern Western legal systems however, nature is primarily seen as property. Property usually has one or more owners with far-reaching rights to dispose of it. The idea that nature has rights is therefore new and radical; it represents a shift in the balance of power between humans and nature. The purpose of this article is to investigate how the current Swedish constitutional protection of nature may relate to the dea of the rights of nature. How is nature, environment, climate and nature negotiated in the existing legal and constitutional framework? With examples from the Cementa and the Girjas cases we discuss how the constitutional issues involved are legally interpreted and politically negotiated in ways leading to environment and nature being downplayed. Examples discussed are the Cementa and the Girjas cases, which both led to Government actions and interventions. The question is if nature would have a stronger position, were it given rights of its own, and if could fit in the constitutional system or. Or is it a strange bird?
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Nordisk miljörättslig tidskrift, 2024
Keywords
rights of nature, swedish instrument of government, cementa cases, girjas case
National Category
Other Legal Research Criminology
Research subject
Constitutional Law; Legal History and Sociology of Law
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-537466 (URN)
Funder
Swedish Research Council Formas, 2020-00437
2024-09-022024-09-022025-07-02Bibliographically approved