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This paper presents a new line of inquiry into ethnicity and armed conflict, asking the question: are conflicts in which rebels mobilize along ethnic lines more likely to see intensified violence than non-ethnically mobilized conflicts? The paper argues that the ascriptive nature of ethnicity eases the identification of potential rebels and facilitates a rebel group’s growth, leading to an increased risk for war. This proposition is empirically tested using a Cox model on all intrastate armed conflicts 1946–2004; the results show that ethnically-mobilized armed conflicts have a 92% higher risk for intensification to war. In extending the analysis, the study finds that the vast majority of conflicts intensified in the first year, but for every year a low-scale conflict remained active thereafter, the risk of intensification increased, peaking around year twelve.

This paper investigates the question of participation in rebellion using new time-series data on over 400 rebel groups during the period 1946-2007. Drawing on a number of theoretical literatures, the study investigates factors commonly argued to lead to increased levels of participation. Surprisingly, the study finds that neither material incentives (contraband, oil in conflict zone) nor social incentives (ethnic mobilization) were associated with larger rebel groups. Instead, security concerns are important in determining participation; the study finds that individuals are more likely to join rebel groups when repression is at intermediate levels. The results also find that gdp per capita is robustly correlated with larger troop sizes. This is the first cross-national study to explicitly investigate participation, and its findings present a number of challenges to common arguments within the civil war literature.

Previous research on rebel recruitment has focused on the economic and social incentives groups use as enticements, but has overlooked the question of why many armed groups recruit using coercion. The puzzle is why coercion occurs despite alienating civilian populations and being costly in terms of organizational and military effectiveness. I argue that recruitment is a dynamic process and that groups are likely to shift recruitment strategies depending on the exigencies of the conflict. The study tests this argument by examining whether rebels are more likely to employ coercion after suffering losses on the battlefield. Using unique microlevel new data on the conflict in Nepal, the results show that the argument is supported: the more rebel fatalities on the battlefield, the more likely are rebels to employ coercion.