The author explores whether Spinoza can consistently maintain two doctrines which he espouses in his Ethics. The first doctrine is the equivalence between perfection, reality, being, and essence. The second doctrine is the Metaphysical Difference between that in which essence and existence are identical (God) and those things for which essence and existence are distinct (everything but God). The article is structured as follows. First, the author shows that these two key doctrines apparently clash. Second, she shows two ways in which this clash can be avoided. The first way consists in drawing a line between mere being and existence. This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called “Platonist” in the secondary literature. The second way consists in denying that the Metaphysical Difference cuts reality at its joints. Instead, the Metaphysical Difference, on this reading, differentiates between appearances (those things in which essence and existence come apart) and reality (that thing in which they are one). This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called Eleatic in the secondary literature. The author concludes by suggesting that, if the Spinozist rejects both the Eleatic and the Platonist approach, she is obliged to find another way to salvage her system.