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ReCon: Efficient Detection, Management, and Use of Non-Speculative Information Leakage
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Information Technology, Computer Systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6602-1988
Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, Trondheim, Norway..
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Information Technology, Computer Systems.
Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, Trondheim, Norway..
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2023 (English)In: 56th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture, MICRO 2023, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2023, p. 828-842Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In a speculative side-channel attack, a secret is improperly accessed and then leaked by passing it to a transmitter instruction. Several proposed defenses effectively close this security hole by either delaying the secret from being loaded or propagated, or by delaying dependent transmitters (e.g., loads) from executing when fed with tainted input derived from an earlier speculative load. This results in a loss of memory-level parallelism and performance. A security definition proposed recently, in which data already leaked in non-speculative execution need not be considered secret during speculative execution, can provide a solution to the loss of performance. However, detecting and tracking non-speculative leakage carries its own cost, increasing complexity. The key insight of our work that enables us to exploit non-speculative leakage as an optimization to other secure speculation schemes is that the majority of non-speculative leakage is simply due to pointer dereferencing (or base-address indexing) - essentially what many secure speculation schemes prevent from taking place speculatively. We present ReCon that: i) efficiently detects non-speculative leakage by limiting detection to pairs of directly-dependent loads that dereference pointers (or index a base-address); and ii) piggybacks non-speculative leakage information on the coherence protocol. In ReCon, the coherence protocol remembers and propagates the knowledge of what has leaked and therefore what is safe to dereference under speculation. To demonstrate the effectiveness of ReCon, we show how two state-of-the-art secure speculation schemes, Non-speculative Data Access (NDA) and speculative Taint Tracking (STT), leverage this information to enable more memorylevel parallelism both in a single core scenario and in a multicore scenario: NDA with ReCon reduces the performance loss by 28.7% for SPEC2017, 31.5% for SPEC2006, and 46.7% for PARSEC; STT with ReCon reduces the loss by 45.1%, 39%, and 78.6%, respectively.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2023. p. 828-842
Keywords [en]
Speculation, side-channels, load pair, non-speculative leakage
National Category
Computer Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-525488DOI: 10.1145/3613424.3623770ISI: 001164081800058ISBN: 979-8-4007-0329-4 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-525488DiVA, id: diva2:1846648
Conference
56th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), OCT 28-NOV 01, 2023, Toronto, CANADA
Funder
Vinnova, 2021-02422Swedish Research Council, 2018-05254Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, FUS21-0067Swedish Research Council, 2022-06725Available from: 2024-03-25 Created: 2024-03-25 Last updated: 2025-09-10Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Advances in Speculative Side Channel Mitigations and New Exploitations
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Advances in Speculative Side Channel Mitigations and New Exploitations
2025 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Speculative execution optimizes processor performance by predicting the correct path of execution and executing instructions before it is legal to do so, introducing potential vulnerabilities when the prediction falls short and the program follows the wrong path of execution. While the processor recovers the architectural state, the microarchitectural state remains and can be exploited. In these vulnerabilities, that leverage the speculative side-channel (known as Spectre attacks), a secret is improperly accessed speculatively and then leaked by passing it to a transmitter instruction that leaves irreversible changes in the microarchitecture. Several proposed defenses try to close this security hole by prohibiting the propagation of speculatively loaded values, or by delaying the transmitter instructions (e.g., loads) from executing under speculation. Each of these proposed solutions leads to considerable performance degradation and, in certain instances, fails to entirely mitigate the security vulnerability.

This thesis tries to address the challenges of performance and security by proposing three works on optimizing the performance of existing speculative side-channel defenses, namely Janus, ReCon, and Doppelganger Loads, and two works on addressing security vulnerabilities by demonstrating attack scenarios, namely DOIN!, and Reorder Buffer Contention.

Regarding enhancing the performance of existing speculative mechanisms, Janus applies two of the simplest defense ideas in the same processor design and uses reinforcement learning to select the optimal performance-wise underlying defense mechanism on the fly, ReCon leverages non-speculative information leakage in an efficient manner to enable the execution of speculative load instructions that access non-secret values, and Doppelganger Loads employs an address predictor to unlock more speculative memory-level parallelism by predicting speculative load addresses in a secret-independent way. All the aforementioned techniques are able to recover a significant part of the lost performance introduced by speculative side-channel defenses.

On the other hand, to expose security vulnerabilities, DOIN! attack exploits inclusive caches and the co-existence of instructions and data in last-level caches to create observable timing differences in the data cache, surpassing speculative defenses, and Reorder Buffer Contention adds secret-dependent contention to the reorder buffer pushing in or out, on demand, a transmitter instruction able to leak the value of the speculatively loaded secret.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2025. p. 48
Series
Digital Comprehensive Summaries of Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Science and Technology, ISSN 1651-6214 ; 2599
Keywords
computer architecture, speculative execution, processor, security, out-of-order execution, side-channels, microarchitecture
National Category
Computer Engineering Computer Sciences
Research subject
Computer Science
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-566433 (URN)978-91-513-2619-1 (ISBN)
Public defence
2025-12-12, Polhemsalen, Ångströmlaboratoriet, Lägerhyddsvägen 1, Uppsala, 09:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2025-11-14 Created: 2025-09-10 Last updated: 2025-11-14

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Aimoniotis, PavlosChen, XiaoyueKaxiras, Stefanos

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