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Quickest detection of bias injection attacks on the glucose sensor in the artificial pancreas under meal disturbances
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering, Signals and Systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3044-8810
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Information Technology, Division of Systems and Control. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Information Technology, Automatic control.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5491-4068
Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Automat Control Lab, Phys Str 3, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland..
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering, Signals and Systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9066-5468
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2024 (English)In: Journal of Process Control, ISSN 0959-1524, E-ISSN 1873-2771, Vol. 135, article id 103162Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Modern glucose sensors deployed in closed -loop insulin delivery systems, so-called artificial pancreas use wireless communication channels. While this allows a flexible system design, it also introduces vulnerability to cyberattacks. Timely detection and mitigation of attacks are imperative for device safety. However, large unknown meal disturbances are a crucial challenge in determining whether the sensor has been compromised or the sensor glucose trajectories are normal. We address this issue from a control -theoretic security perspective. In particular, a time -varying Kalman filter is employed to handle the sporadic meal intakes. The filter prediction error is then statistically evaluated to detect anomalies if present. We compare two state-of-the-art online anomaly detection algorithms, namely the ᅵᅵᅵᅵᅵᅵ2 and CUSUM tests. We establish a robust optimal detection rule for unknown bias injections. Even if the optimality holds only for the restrictive case of constant bias injections, we show that the proposed model -based anomaly detection scheme is also effective for generic non -stealthy sensor deception attacks through numerical simulations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2024. Vol. 135, article id 103162
Keywords [en]
Type 1 diabetes mellitus, Artificial pancreas, Quickest change detection, Control-theoretic security, Sensor deception attack
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-525038DOI: 10.1016/j.jprocont.2024.103162ISI: 001164643000001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-525038DiVA, id: diva2:1847446
Part of project
Analysis and design of secure and resilient control systems, Swedish Research Council
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2018-04396Swedish Foundation for Strategic ResearchAvailable from: 2024-03-27 Created: 2024-03-27 Last updated: 2025-02-02Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Sensor Attack Detection in Artificial Pancreas Systems: A Control-theoretic Approach
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sensor Attack Detection in Artificial Pancreas Systems: A Control-theoretic Approach
2025 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Type 1 Diabetes (T1D) has challenged humanity for over 3,500 years, from its earliest descriptions in ancient medical texts to today’s cutting-edge biotechnological solutions. Even today, T1D remains a growing global health concern and is the second most common chronic disease among children in Sweden. Although there is no cure, significant progress has been made in treatment strategies, particularly through the development of artificial pancreas (AP) systems. An AP is a closed-loop insulin delivery system that integrates a glucose sensor, an insulin pump, and a control algorithm to mimic the glucose-regulating function of a healthy pancreas. By continuously adjusting insulin infusion based on real-time glucose measurements, AP systems reduce the burden of diabetes management and improve long-term health outcomes.

However, as AP systems rely on sensor data and wireless communication, they are susceptible to cyber threats. One such threat is sensor deception attacks, where an attacker manipulates the sensor readings to mislead the insulin delivery algorithm, potentially causing excessively low or high glucose levels. Detecting such attacks is particularly challenging due to natural glucose fluctuations caused by meal intake, which can mask adversarial manipulation.

The need for computationally efficient and reliable anomaly detection algorithms is paramount, particularly in wearable medical devices such as the AP. To this end, model-based anomaly detection schemes offer a mathematically rigorous and lightweight alternative, enabling timely and accurate detection of anomalies, including cyberattacks, while meeting the real-time constraints of safety-critical systems. This thesis aims to advance model-based detection methods by integrating residual generation and evaluation techniques, optimizing the trade-off between detection speed and false alarm minimization. By contributing to the development of secure AP systems, this research aims to enhance patient safety and improve the quality of life for individuals with T1D.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2025. p. 67
Series
Digital Comprehensive Summaries of Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Science and Technology, ISSN 1651-6214 ; 2498
Keywords
Type 1 Diabetes, Artificial Pancreas, Sensor Deception Attacks, Bias Injection Attacks, Control-theoretic Security, Model-based Anomaly Detection
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-548796 (URN)978-91-513-2371-8 (ISBN)
Public defence
2025-03-25, Polhemsalen, Ångströmlaboratoriet, Lägerhyddsvägen 1, Uppsala, 09:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Funder
Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, 2018-04396
Available from: 2025-02-27 Created: 2025-02-02 Last updated: 2025-02-27

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Tosun, Fatih EmreTeixeira, AndréAhlén, AndersDey, Subhrakanti

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