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Although nearly all states have adopted multiparty elections, democracy still struggles to firmly take root in many parts of the world. This dissertation examines the relationship between electoral violence and democratization using a multi-method approach. Each of the four essays takes a unique perspective on the link between electoral violence and democratization, focusing on citizens, political parties, and constitution-making processes. Essay I explores how electoral violence dampens the democratizing effects of repeated elections, finding that only peaceful elections contribute to liberal democracy. Essay II analyzes citizen responses to government-perpetrated electoral violence. Essay III examines how political violence influenced interparty negotiations during Turkey’s 2011–2013 constitution-making process. Essay IV finds that in hybrid regimes, negotiated constitutional reforms can reduce government-led electoral violence but have little impact on violence perpetrated by non-state actors. The dissertation makes three main contributions. First, it offers nuanced insights into how electoral violence undermines democratization across multiple dimensions and levels. The findings highlight the importance of adopting a partisan lens to grasp how violence affects different political actors and constituencies. Second, the dissertation highlights an understudied relationship between electoral violence and constitution-making. It demonstrates the conditions under which constitutional reform can help mitigate violence and when it cannot. The findings also highlight how violence poses challenges to constitution-making, underscoring the complexity of implementing democratic reforms when violence and polarization persist. Third, the research elucidates how partisanship shapes the impact of electoral violence on support for democracy. It reveals that while opposition supporters may push for democratic reforms or resist autocratization in the face of government-perpetrated electoral violence, incumbent supporters and non-partisans remain, on average, unmoved. This complicates efforts to advance and protect democracy if intraparty accountability toward violent incumbents is low.