Logo: to the web site of Uppsala University

uu.sePublications from Uppsala University
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2007 (English)In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 109, no 2, p. 321-339Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Bertrand supergames with non-binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero-cost, low-cost and high-cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 109, no 2, p. 321-339
Keywords [en]
Economics and Econometrics
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-458831DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2007.00500.xOAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-458831DiVA, id: diva2:1611701
Available from: 2021-11-15 Created: 2021-11-15 Last updated: 2021-11-15

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

Publisher's full text

Authority records

Andersson, Ola

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Andersson, Ola
By organisation
Department of Economics
In the same journal
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Economics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 84 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf