A key to the verification of nuclear weapon dismantling is the identification of presence respectively absence of fissile materials in items, specifically weapons grade plutonium and/or high enriched uranium. In the case of plutonium, spontaneous fission of minority isotopes enables its detection through emitted neutrons, making passive use of neutrondetectors an attractive path. In the case of high enriched uranium, the emission of spontaneous fission neutrons is negligible, making its detection difficult. However, using active interrogation where an external neutron source irradiates the item under investigation, induced fission neutrons are emitted from high enriched uranium as well as from weapons grade plutonium. Liquid organic scintillation detectors are a promising route to detect fission neutrons for verification of nuclear disarmament. These detectors are sensitive to fast neutrons, which are characterized by low self-attenuation in most materials. In addition, while the detector is sensitive to gamma radiation, it can be effectively discriminated by pulse shape analysis. This work details the assessment of the applicability of a liquid organic scintillator for fast neutron detection for use in verification of nuclear weapon dismantling. The assessment was performed as a part of the BeCamp2 measurement campaign organized by SCK-CEN, where a delegation from the Alva Myrdal Centre on Nuclear Disarmament of Uppsala University participated. As a part of the campaign, 19 items with unknown content were assessed, with three different aims: template matching, determining the absence of nuclear material, and a technology challenge using active interrogation In this first stage, where the content of the items is still not disclosed, it was concluded that the equipment was able to identify the presence of spontaneous fission content in items, using passive interrogation mode, within the measurement time constraints. Gamma and neutron spectrum comparison was a valuable tool for template matching, and active interrogation measurements enabled the detection of fissile content in interrogated items. Our preliminary assessment is that liquid organic scintillator detectors have the potential to be part of the toolbox that will support the technical verification of nuclear weapons dismantlement. Lessons learned from the campaign are discussed with focus on advantages and disadvantages of the technique, and possibilities for further development of the analysis.