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Aesthetic Cognitivism and Aesthetic Normativity
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Aesthetics.
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Here is one normative question: Why aesthetically appreciate artworks? Here is a second: Which artworks do we have most reason to aesthetically appreciate? An intuitive line of thought that is popular in the folk says that the artworks we have most reason to appreciate are those that provide rich perspectives on topics of human concern. We have reason to appreciate artworks of this kind, on this line of thought, because of the rich way they present and enable us to explore these topics. Here is a third normative question: What does aesthetic appreciation aim at? The most natural answer to this question for those sympathetic to the line of thought under discussion is that aesthetic appreciation aims at occupying and exploring the rich perspectives that artworks of this kind make available to us. In spite of the recent explosion of work on aesthetic normativity, aestheticians have not yet moulded these intuitive thoughts into a general framework for understanding aesthetic normativity. I undertake that task in this paper. I call the view I formulate ‘aesthetic cognitivism’.

Keywords [en]
Aesthetic Normativity, Normativity, Value Theory, Aesthetic Cognitivism, Aesthetic Obligations.
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-539877OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-539877DiVA, id: diva2:1903805
Available from: 2024-10-07 Created: 2024-10-07 Last updated: 2026-04-23
In thesis
1. Essays on Aesthetic Cognitivism
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Essays on Aesthetic Cognitivism
2024 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This thesis consists of four essays on aesthetic cognitivism. Aesthetic cognitivism says that artworks can have significant cognitive value and that the arts constitute a significant body of understanding. This thesis formulates and defends aesthetic cognitivist positions on central debates in philosophical aesthetics and works towards a comprehensive aesthetic cognitivist account of our aesthetic practices.

In essay one, ‘Aesthetic Communication’, I defend the view that the purpose of a central form of aesthetic communication is sharing an aesthetic understanding of the distinctive aesthetic character and value of artworks (and inculcating this aesthetic understanding in others). I argue for this view by setting out a novel account of the nature of aesthetic communication and of the criteria of communicative success in aesthetics.

In essay two, ‘Aesthetic Cognitivism and Aesthetic Normativity’, I set out an aesthetic cognitivist answer to three normative questions. Why appreciate artworks? What does appreciation aim at? Which artworks is there weightiest reason to appreciate? Aesthetic cognitivism says that there is weightiest reason to appreciate artworks that are aesthetically valuable in virtue of the rich perspectives they bear to their subject matters. It says that the appreciation of these artworks aims at the sensitive exploration of their distinctive aesthetic value (i.e., of the rich perspectives they bear). It says there is reason to appreciate these artworks because they are aesthetically valuable. 

In essay three, ‘The End of Pleasure in Aesthetics: Aesthetic Cognitivism Revived’, I argue for an aesthetic cognitivist account of what it is to be responsive to aesthetic value. I argue that aesthetic responsiveness consists in a motivationally self-sustaining cognitive exploration of the distinctive aesthetic value of an artwork. I contrast my account with a pleasure theoretic account.

In essay four, ‘Artistic Honesty’, I describe how honesty serves as a standard that guides and governs the creative process and provide an account of the property we attribute to artworks when we judge them to be honest. I argue that for an artwork to be honest is for it to confront a truth that it is epistemically and/or emotionally difficult for us to confront (individually and as a community).  

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, 2024. p. 39
Keywords
Aesthetic Cognitivism, Aesthetic Normativity, Normativity, Value Theory, Reasons Responsiveness, Meta-Aesthetics, Aesthetic Communication, Honesty.
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Aesthetics; Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-539873 (URN)978-91-506-3074-9 (ISBN)
Public defence
2024-11-25, Sal IX, Universitetshuset, Biskopsgatan 3, 753 10, Uppsala, 15:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2024-10-31 Created: 2024-10-07 Last updated: 2024-10-31

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